Alf Hornborg Beyond universalism and relativism Human Ecology Division, Lund University alf.hornborg@humecol.lu.se Ninth nternational !

onference on Hunting and "athering #ocieties Edinburgh, #e$t. %&'(, )**) IS BIOLOGY TO ANTHROPOLOGY AS FORMALISM TO SUBSTANTIVISM? THE LURE OF UNIVERSALISM IN A SCIENCE OF CONTINGENCY1 +or many years have been intrigued and ins$ired by ,im ngold-s innovative contributions to /ill in fact ta0e the

anthro$ological theory. .uch of /hat ho$e to say here could in fact be seen as a res$onse to his attem$ts to deconstruct the distinction bet/een culture and biology, and o$$ortunity to $ose a fe/ 1uestions to him on this to$ic. 2hat /ish to do is sim$ly to try to

reconcile /hat he calls a -relational&ecological&develo$mental- a$$roach 3 ngold )***a456 to human behaviour /ith the notion of -culture- as a distinct analytical category that, argue, is /orth 0ee$ing. 7ather than /riting its obituary, /ould rather /e did not thro/ the baby out /ith the bath/ater. A science of contingenc /ould li0e to begin by suggesting that various versions of universalism in anthro$ology can be inter$reted in terms of a fundamental desire to -e8$lain- reality as non&arbitrary, a desire that, $arado8ically, in itself might 1ualify as a human universal, arguably underlying religion and science and much everyday cognition as /ell. ,his desire to eliminate contingency is $articularly $roblematic in a science devoted to understanding human behaviour, as human behaviour is every/here mediated by meanings, and meanings are in turn inherently arbitrary. A central statement of this $osition, of course, is .arshall #ahlins- classic !ulture and 9ractical 7eason 3'%:;a6, a boo0 that thin0 is /orth returning to /henever /e find ourselves arguing /ith universalists or determinists of one 0ind or another. f /e acce$t !harles #anders 9eirce-s definition of a symbol as an arbitrary relation bet/een sign and ob<ect, then all culture = all human meaning&creation = im$lies contingency and a significant measure of arbitrariness. ,he message of social constructionism is basically that of elementary culture theory4 in the organi>ation of human reality, things could have been other/ise. Determinism is difficult to reconcile /ith semiotics. Every sign $resu$$oses an inter$retant = a sub<ect, and freedom is a cornerstone of inter$retation. ?et since its ince$tion anthro$ology has been engaged in a struggle to resist the tem$tations of universalism. 2hether evolutionism, functionalism, or even structuralism, models attem$ting to account for human behaviour as $redictable, rule&governed, and ultimately rational have attracted generations of anthro$ologists ho$ing to develo$ a true -science- of culture. During the last half& century this 0ind of orientation has been re$resented 1uite e8$licitly, for instance, by cultural ecology, cultural materialism, formalism 3i.e. microeconomic theory6, o$timal foraging theory, and '

sociobiology. 2hether invo0ing ada$tation, utility, ma8imi>ation, or fitness, the ambition of these schools has been to -$eel off- the arbitrariness of human e8$erience and inter$retation in order to uncover the underlying rationality = and rationale = of even the most idiosyncratic of behaviours. ,he $roblem /ith such a$$roaches is that they tend to be e8cessively abstract, tautological, and ultimately inca$able of accounting for those very s$ecifics of human life that they claim to account for. ,hey tend to assume the a$$earance of retros$ective rationali>ations rather than demonstrating the $redictive ca$acity that /e should e8$ect from models that claim to dis$el arbitrariness and contingency. 2e are not hel$ed by the observation that -Economic .an- finds commodities useful because of their -utility,- or that a given $o$ulation has survived until today because of the -fitness- of /hatever it has been doing over the $ast fe/ millennia. 2hether individuals in the mar0et or $o$ulations in evolution, their strategies could surely have been other/ise, /ithout necessarily <eo$ardi>ing survival. must hurry to say that o/n /or0 am not advocating the 0ind of cultural soli$sism that refuses to ac0no/ledge the e8istence of ob<ective and absolute constraints on human creativity. n fact, in my have been referring to the #econd La/ of ,hermodynamics as a significant factor in accounting for the uneven, global distribution of industrial technology 3Hornborg )**'a6. .y argument is rather that such universal constraints should not be sought in the $ractice of culture itself = as if the human imagination /as inherently $ragmatic and geared to ma8imal success = but in the materiality of the /orld in /hich it is $racticed. Ho/ever much it bothers me to say this, this leads me to conclude that /e cannot, after all, dis$ense /ith the dualism of !ulture versus Nature. Not as an ontological distinction, because /e all 0no/ ho/ intert/ined they are in the real /orld, but as an analytical one. ,he symbolic and the material must be 0e$t analytically distinct if /e are to understand ho/ they interact in $ractice. in fact found myself arguing this $oint /ith ,im ngold a fe/ years ago. had argued for a -triadica$$roach to human ecology that recogni>es the recursive relations bet/een the ecological, sociological, and e8istential dimensions of human life 3Hornborg )***6. .y $oint /as that Nature, #ociety, and 9erson are ontologically intert/ined but should still be 0e$t analytically distinct. ngold-s comment /as that he did not thin0 this /ould /or0, as the effect of ac0no/ledging the 9erson /ould be to do a/ay /ith the distinction bet/een Nature and #ociety 3 ngold )***b4))@6. ,his is indeed /hat ngold has been suggesting that /e do /ith res$ect to biology versus culture, and as long as /e are tal0ing about ontology and $ractice, com$letely agree. .y re<oinder, ho/ever, /ould be that an ontological -monism- should not im$ly that /e allo/ all our analytical categories to dissolve. ,he argument for monism in fact relies on those categories. t cannot be <udged unreasonable to distinguish bet/een, say, the #econd La/ of ,hermodynamics, the organi>ation of global ca$italism, and the human e8$erience of an8iety. As features of Nature, #ociety, and 9erson, they are all a $art of the same universe and can $robably be sho/n to be interconnected in many /ays, but analytically se$arate. ,o ma0e the e$istemological observation, as ngold 3)***a6 does, that !ulture and Nature are rarely recogni>ed as distinct analytical categories in non&2estern societies does not automatically ) cannot see /hat is to be gained from not 0ee$ing them

lead to the conclusion that 2esterners are mista0en in ma0ing this distinction. But in mi8ing e$istemological and ontological arguments 3and /hat /ere once referred to as -emic- and -etic$ers$ectives6 in su$$ort of his o/n theoretical $osition, ngold tends to $rivilege non&Euro$ean, native $ers$ectives as more ade1uate not only in their res$ective, cultural conte8ts but a$$arently also at the abstract level of his o/n discourse. .y first 1uestion to him, then, /ould be4 Are ecological relations 3every/hereA6 to be seen as social relations because this is ho/ the /orld is $erceived by the B<ib/aA Are animals -$ersons- even /here no humans recogni>e them as suchA ,he t/o $oints have made so far should add u$ to the sim$le conclusion that, in trying to account for human behaviour, /e must ac0no/ledge both the arbitrariness of !ulture and the non& arbitrariness of Nature. t should be 1uite feasible to be a cultural relativist /hile ac0no/ledging the #econd La/ of ,hermodynamics. ,he $roblem that continues to trouble our $rofession, ho/ever, seems to be ho/ to agree on /here to dra/ the line bet/een the symbolic and the natural, and on their relative im$ortance. /ould no/ li0e to discuss t/o 1uite different e8am$les of ho/ universali>ing a$$roaches have attem$ted to e8$and their e8$lanatory $otential at the e8$ense of those /ho see0 to ac0no/ledge the semiotic, the arbitrary, and the contingent in human life. ,he first e8am$le is a discussion that engaged several anthro$ologists about t/enty years ago, regarding ho/ to account for food taboos in Ama>onia 37oss '%:C, Densinger E Drac0e '%C'6. ,he second e8am$le is a discussion that is much more /ides$read and still very much alive, and in /hich have been recently engaged bac0 home in #/eden, namely the old FnatureGnurtureF ho$e to dra/ together controversy, $articularly /ith regards to the role of FbiologyF and FgeneticsF in relation to issues such as gender, social hierarchy, mental illness, and criminality. +inally, these various strands of argument in order to suggest a /ay of salvaging = against the onslaught of cultural materialists, sociobiologists, and even ,im ngold = the anthro$ological notion of FcultureF. E!"#$%e 1& C'%t'(e "n) eco%og .ore than t/enty years ago, the to$ic of dietary $rohibitions or Hfood taboos- in Ama>onia became the focus of a more general debate that o$$osed universalist and relativist = or Hmaterialist- and Hmentalist- = inter$retations of human&environmental relations in Ama>onia and else/here. Bn one hand, the a$$roach of cultural ecology characteristically vie/ed dietary $rohibitions as functional ada$tations to the constraints of the natural environment, i.e. as $ragmatic res$onses to the im$eratives of resource management 37oss '%:C6. Bn the other hand, several anthro$ologists instead argued that the rationale for such $rohibitions should be sought not in nature but in culture itself, /hether a$$roached from a symbolic, structural, or $sychological $ers$ective 3Densinger E Drac0e '%C'6. ,he main $oint of these studies seems to have been to sho/ that the semiotics of food taboos are more than automatic reflections of the e8igencies of the environment, and that the logic of cultural meanings has an autonomy and a s$ecificity that accords /ith a vie/ of human $o$ulations as active and idiosyncratic sub<ects. #een in this light, it is obvious that these anthro$ologists /ere $rovo0ed by the ecologists to do for human $o$ulations $recisely /hat Ia0ob von Ue80Jll 3'%C) K'%@*L6 = the founder of ethology and of ecosemiotics = and his follo/ers have sought to do for non&human s$ecies4 to grant them the status of sub<ects. ,he $aradigm of cultural (

ecology, not to mention the Hcultural materialism- of Harris 3'%:%6, indeed tends to e8tend the denial of sub<ective agency from mainstream biology-s mechanistic vie/ of ecosystems into human society and culture. An ecosemiotic $ers$ective, on the contrary, /ould grant human meaning systems the same measure of idiosyncracy as the so&called Um/elt of any other s$ecies, and $erceive ecosystems as the stochastic outcome of the coe8istence of a multitude of such sub<ectivities. H!o&evolution- is clearly a better /ord for these $rocesses than the cultural ecologistsnotion of Hada$tation,- /hich con<ures the image of a one&/ay learning $rocess, geared to a static Henvironment- and leaving no room for creative, idiosyncratic innovation. 7ather than amount to a distinction bet/een the autonomous sub<ectivity of culture and the mechanical $ragmatics of nature, humanist arguments can thus be accommodated /ithin a more sensitive, communicative theory of life. Li0e other animals, humans are e1ui$$ed to transmit and receive sensory = i.e. visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory, taste = signals. #uch $re& or e8tra&linguistic sign systems are intrinsically difficult to theori>e about, $rimarily because theory itself is founded in language. ,heory can here rarely do more than evo0e /hat remains an infinitely subtle, elusive, and largely unconscious level of human e8$erience. ?et the a$$roach of $henomenology, /ith its notions of -d/elling- and -being&in&the& /orld,- has been 1uite successful in hel$ing us ac0no/ledge its im$ortance. ,his in itself has amounted to a $o/erful counter$oint to materialist science and -!artesian- ob<ectification. #ignificantly, $henomenological a$$roaches in environmental $hiloso$hy 3Evernden '%C56 and anthro$ology 3 ngold )***a6 tend to em$hasi>e the fundamental, human inclination to e8$erience the natural environment as com$osed of sub<ects 3cf. also Bird&David '%%(, '%%%6. ,hroughout the millennia of foraging and subsistence horticulture in Ama>onia, a ma<or $art of the interaction bet/een human and non&human organisms has been mediated by a myriad sensations of the eye, ear, nose, tongue, and s0in, only a fraction of /hich have been reflected u$on and assigned linguistic categories. #uch sensory sign flo/s are /hat constitute the human embeddedness in the /orld evo0ed by $henomenologists and -$ractice theorists.- ,o the e8tent that $eo$le mimetically re$roduce and share conventional $atterns of emitting and res$onding to such sensory signals, these $atterns are thoroughly cultural. ,his sensory level of human& environmental relations includes modes of inter$reting non&human life forms as /ell as modes of communicating /ith them. +or instance, Amahuaca hunters in 9eru 0no/ not only ho/ to glean information from sounds, movements, scents, e8crements, tooth mar0s, trac0s, bits of fruit, dis$laced leaves, bro0en t/igs, etc., but also ho/ to disguise their o/n colour and scent and to imitate animal cries and try to get the animals to res$ond 3!arneiro '%:@4');&'): K'%:*L6. Hunters among the Achuar of Ecuador similarly use all their senses in inter$reting the characteristic signs of different s$ecies and are able to -do a $erfect imitation of the distress calls of young or of a female in heat of any s$ecies to dra/ the $arents or males /ithin range of the blo/gun- 3Descola '%%@4)(:6. ,hough seemingly e$hemeral and largely uncodified in language, sensory sign systems are nonetheless $otent ingredients in human&environmental relations, ca$able of inscribing themselves in the landsca$e. ,he relation bet/een such local, cultural e8$erience and natural surroundings is @

clearly co&evolutionary, or recursive, much as any other relation in an ecosystem. 2hether deliberately or not, the dietary and other cultural $references of $ast generations of Ama>onian ndians such as the Da-a$or have left a tangible record in the form e.g. of old fallo/s, /ith a much higher incidence of food s$ecies 3BalMe '%%(4)@5, '%%54'*;6. 7eferring to !arole !rumley-s 3'%%@6 definition of -landsca$e- as -the material manifestation of the relation bet/een humans and the environment,- BalMe 3'%%54'*;6 concludes that -old fallo/s constitute landsca$es $er e8cellence.,he Huaorani of the U$$er .araNon similarly tend to encourage the occurrence of the ungurahua $alm 3Iessenia bataua6 and other useful s$ecies, /hile more consciously cultivating the $each $alm 3Bactris gasi$aes6 and s/eet manioc 37ival '%%;4)(C&)@'6. 7ival sho/s that these s$ecies are assigned different symbolic values and associated /ith different 0inds of social relations. ,he $each $alms and their fruit are $erceived as gifts from deceased relatives and a$$ro$riate food for celebrating /ithin the endogamous grou$, /hile manioc is used to entertain visitors and $otential allies. t is not difficult to imagine the role of such sentiments in generating s$ecific $atterns of distribution for different $lant s$ecies. Although much of this cro$ symbolism is evidently codified in e8$licit $references, it is a$$arent that the sentiments thus e8$ressed re$resent a more elusive, sensory level of e8$erience that is transmitted largely through mimetic $ractice rather than /ords. No less than language, such mimetic $ractice re$resents a cultural $rocess that conditions human beings to res$ond in s$ecific /ays to $articular signs. ,he evidence for cultural idiosyncracy is 1uite obvious as far as the semiotic logic of food avoidances is concerned 3cf. Leach '%;@, ,ambiah '%;%, #ahlins '%:;a6. Among the #ho0leng of Bra>il, for instance, food taboos -far transcend their $urely ecological functions- by signalling social status and thus mediating social relations, a $henomenon /hich can be recogni>ed as belonging to the /ides$read $henomenon of -totemism- 3Urban '%C'6. +rom a $sychoanalytic $ers$ective, Drac0e 3'%C'6 argues that food avoidances among the Dag/ahiv can be understood as a symbolic language for articulating and resolving re$ressed, $ersonal conflicts. ,he Dag/ahiv -use nature as a rich source of meta$hor for de$icting emotional states and intimate relationshi$s.- Drac0e sho/s ho/ the domestication of non&human nature /ith human 1ualities rebounds into society by offering a code /ith /hich to e8$ress social relations4 -the $laintive call of the <acamin, the /ail of the <ogo& <ogo, and the more raucous cry of the toucan are identified /ith a baby-s crying, /hile the ta$ir is a se8ual com$etitor, the $aca self&indulgent, and the agouti and tinamou la>yO- Human 1ualities are thus $ro<ected onto animals $rior to their serving as ordering $rinci$les for society. Descola-s 3'%%)6 distinction bet/een -animism- and -totemism- should $erha$s rather be vie/ed as a continuous dialectic. #uch recursive $rocesses of meaning transfer are, of course, eminently suitable for semiotic analysis. Urban 3'%C'4C;6 observes that the $ur$orted conse1uences of transgressing a dietary restriction reveal -ethnotheoretic notions that can be conveyed only through language,- and that -turn out to involve an FiconicF 3or /hat used to be called Fsym$atheticF6 connection bet/een the s$ecies and su$$osed conse1uence.- +or instance, the #ho0leng claim that eating $aca or agouti meat /ould cause the teeth of a child to gro/ too ra$idly, causing toothache. #imilarly, the #anumP on the border bet/een Bra>il and Qene>uela say that $arents eating sna0e meat may cause their 5

children to have diarrhoea, since sna0es have li1uid e8crement, and that eating sloth meat may cause them to develo$ a t/isted /rist 3,aylor '%C'4@(&@@6. Dag/ahiv maintain that the infant child of a man /ho 0ills a curasso/ 3a red&bea0ed bird6 may develo$ inflammations of the mouth and li$s 3Drac0e '%C'4''@6. 7eferring to Leach 3'%;@6 and ,ambiah 3'%;%6, Drac0e 3'%C'4''*6 suggests that food $rohibitions among the Dag/ahiv can be accounted for in terms of the different s$ecies- metonymical or meta$horical $ro8imity to humans 3e.g., $ets are metonymically close, /hile mon0eys are meta$horically so.6 +ollo/ing LMvi&#trauss 3'%;;6, Descola 3'%%@4)'', '%%)4''@6 observes that some animal or $lant s$ecies are $articularly /ell suited to the role of symbolic signifier because of distinctive, visible features that suggest invisible $ro$erties. ,hus, dietary $rohibitions recogni>ed by the Achuar at the time of $lanting their gardens function -as a sign $ointing to one of the three categories of attributes detrimental to $lants- harmonious gro/th4 things that rot, signified by the 0an0a fish, the muntish grub, and by digestion in generalR things that burn, signified by $e$$ers and meat e8$osed to direct contact /ith fireR things that are slender, signified by mon0eys s/inging on fle8ible branches.- #uch semiotic transformations are evident not only in food $rohibitions, but throughout all the various as$ects of indigenous cosmology. +or the !am$a, /hatever is -e8cessively thin,- has the -drab colour of decay,- or -$resents a false a$$earance- is a demonR thus, shiMnti 3adult ant lions6, tsiisanti 3drab&coloured hummingbirds6, and shiinti and tsinPro 3leaf&li0e 0atydids6 are all demons 32eiss '%:@4);) K'%:)L6. #uffice to say, at this $oint, that the semiotic logic underlying indigenous Ama>onian sentiments regarding $lant and animal s$ecies cannot be reduced to ob<ective, $ragmatic $rinci$les that someho/ transcend the vagaries of sensory e8$erience and idiosyncracies of symbolic classification. n fact, the claim of some 2estern observers to have access to these transcendental $rinci$les = /hether -ada$tation,- -o$timi>ation,- or even -sustainability- = can in itself be ta0en as an e8$ression of a $articular = and im$erialistic = symbolic scheme 3cf. #ahlins '%:;a, "udeman '%C;6. hasten to add, ho/ever, that to say that indigenous cosmologies are not immediately -ada$tive- in a mechanical sense is not to deny that their fundamental, relational mode of human& environmental calibration, in all its attentiveness to the ecological Bther, seems singularly attuned to the vital tas0 of communication 3cf. ngold )***a6. ,o ac0no/ledge an ecological sensibility in $remodern e8istence thus does not have to mean reducing hunters and gatherers to mechanical reflections of their habitats. ,his leads to the second 1uestion /ould $ut to ,im ngold4 Ho/ can /e ac0no/ledge the significance of shared, semiotic idiosyncracies such as these if /e abandon the notion of cultureA ngold-s $oint, ins$ired by Iames "ibson, that Hmeaning is immanent in the relational conte8ts of $eo$le-s $ractical engagement /ith their lived&in environments- 3 ngold )***a4';C6 is a $ertinent dismissal of cultural soli$sism but hardly of cultural relativism, unless, of course, environmental Haffordances- are ta0en to someho/ determine the s$ecific tra<ectories of such $ractical engagement. Ho/ can /e em$hasi>e the s$ecifics of local, $ractical engagement and not be relativists, unless, in fact, /e are deterministsA ,he fact that the communicative relation bet/een $ersonGorganism and environment is mutually constitutive, as ngold has so elo1uently sho/n, does not detract from the idiosyncratic, arbitrary, and contingent nature of this relation. 9erha$s /e ;

use the /ord Hrelativism- differently. ,o the e8tent that it is ta0en to denote a readiness to ac0no/ledge the fundamental significance, in all human affairs, of idiosyncratic systems of meaning, then am $re$ared to defend relativism. 9erha$s, also, /e use the /ord Hculturedifferently. H!ulture- to me does not have to mean an essentiali>ed system of 0no/ledge given at the outset or transmitted inde$endently of its a$$lication, but a dis$osition that is negotiated and ac1uired through mimetic $ractice, linguistic as /ell as e8tra&linguistic. E!"#$%e *& C'%t'(e "n) +io%og ,he second e8am$le of e8$ansionist universalism that /ish to discuss is the recurrent attem$t to e8$lain a /ide range of /hat ta0e to be cultural $henomena in terms either of -biological,- human universals or of genetic differences. Let me begin by 1uoting an article called -,he 9rism of Heritability and the #ociology of Dno/ledge,- by the sociologist ,roy Duster. Duster notes that, over the $ast decades, there has been -a FdriftF to/ard a greater rece$tivity to genetic e8$lanations for an increasing variety of human behaviors- 3Duster '%%;4''%6. n an earlier study he had found that, in the si8&year $eriod from '%:; to '%C), one survey sho/ed -a )(' $ercent increase in articles that attem$ted to e8$lain the genetic basis for crime, mental illness, intelligence, and alcoholism3ibid.6. Ho/ever, these claims about the e8$lanatory $otential of genetics had a rather tenuous relation to scientific advances in molecular genetics. n fact, the ma<ority of the authors of these articles had no credentials in genetics /hatsoever. Duster suggests that the increasing em$hasis on heritability is related to actual advances in molecular genetics only in that the latter have -nurtured a climate in /hich even the /ea0est FgeneticF e8$lanations can ta0e root- 3ibid.6, and that the real foundation of the increasing fre1uency of genetic e8$lanations should be a$$roached from the $ers$ective of the sociology of 0no/ledge. A large $art of the ans/er, he suggests, is the driving force $rovided by contem$orary social concerns /ith -FdefectsF or $roblems, such as alcoholism, $oor $erformance in schools, mental illness, and so on- 3ibid., ')(6. ,he great ma<ority of the authors res$onsible for the articles referred to above indeed hold medical degrees 3ibid., ')'6. Although lac0ing formal credentials in genetics, their $rofession a$$ears to have $redis$osed them to ma0e claims about heritability that, as Duster /rites, -e8ceed those of geneticists themselves- 3ibid., ')(6. He $oints out that, beyond single gene determinants, the geneticists themselves tend to be cautious of such assertions of -Fgenetic e8$lanationsF of various diseases, illnesses, defects, and social $roblems- because of the -broad and often vague definition of the $henomenon, and the not /ell&understood multifactorial character- of its genesis 3ibid., ')@6. Discussing intelligence and cognitive functioning, Duster even concludes that -to assign to FgeneticsF a ball$ar0 figure of any 0ind,- /ithout regard to interaction bet/een the brain and its environment, -is to dis$lay a $rofound ignorance of the last three decades of develo$ments in molecular biology and the neurosciences- 3ibid., ')C6. have reiterated Duster-s argument at such length because it ma0es refreshing reading in an age /hen genetic determinism has seen a note/orthy revival, not only in academic discourse but seemingly in the $o$ular imagination as /ell. n the follo/ing /ill s0etch the outlines of my reservations about genetic e8$lanations of human behaviour and then move on to indicate some :

ne/ /ays of organi>ing our thin0ing about natureGnurture and other dualisms that might hel$ us transcend the sim$le $olari>ation of biology and culture. should mention that have become involved /ith these concerns in the conte8t of recent debates /ith $rominent #/edish $ro$onents of biological $ers$ectives on to$ics such as gender, social hierarchy, mental illness, and criminality 3Hornborg )**'b, )**)aR Uddenberg '%%C, )**'R Daun '%%%, )**)6. t should be noted that none of my o$$onents in this debate is a geneticistR in fact, none of them is even a biologist. Bur discussion to me raises some im$ortant 1uestions about the delineation of -biological- e8$lanations, /hich are often /rongly assumed to im$ly references to genes and heredity. ,hese 1uestions belong to a /ider concern /ith the ideological and moral dimensions of the discourse on human genetics, /hich, of course, includes debates relating to recent develo$ments in biomedicine 3cf. Hornborg )**)b6. 7eferences to genetics can be made to attem$t either to delineate human universals = the notion of -human nature- = or to e8$lain variation bet/een individuals, grou$s, or social categories. ,he former $ro<ect is ideologically less controversial but fre1uently a$$ears in con<unction /ith more or less e8$licit versions of the latter. ,hus, for e8am$le, both the medical doctor Nils Uddenberg 3'%%C6 and the ethnologist S0e Daun 3'%%%6 $rofess $rimarily to be interested in $ursuing universals, yet the thrust of their arguments is such that the reader is urged to attribute greater /eight to the role of genetics in e8$laining variation in $ersonality, intelligence, aggressiveness, etc. Uddenberg 3'%%C6 thus devotes one cha$ter to arguing that the notion of socially constructed gender is scientifically untenable, and to $ro$osing instead that various statistical, social differences bet/een the se8es, such as in $o/er and income, have their foundation in genetic differences. Although the intention here /ould seem to be to em$hasi>e gender differences as a universal, i.e. across cultures, the effect is to let individual men and /omen 0no/ that their different social conditions can be attributed to their genes. Alongside issues such as -intelligence- and -race,gender is obviously one of those domains /here /e have reason to be /ary of $aradigms that $resent relations of $o/er and ine1uality as -natural.2hether trying to e8$lain universals or variation in human behaviour, references to genetics are of very limited hel$. ,he search for universals inevitably results in abstractions far removed from the cultural s$ecificities and $ersonal idiosyncracies that sha$e the /ay that human beings actually conduct their everyday lives. f, as #ahlins 3'%:;a, '%:;b6 has sho/n, all human behaviour is to some e8tent mediated by idiosyncracies of meaning, there can be no such thing as a $urely biologically motivated act that can be e8haustively accounted for by reference to the biological or neuro$hysiological constitution of human organisms. Nor, as ngold 3)***a6 has sho/n, can the biological and neuro$hysiological constitution of organisms be e8haustively accounted for by reference to their genes, as -genoty$es- e8ist only as abstractions from ontogenetic $rocesses that from the very outset are interactive, relational, and situated in s$ecific environments. 7eferences to genetics and even to biology in e8$lanations of human behaviour thus necessarily stri$ a/ay the conte8tual details that /ould be crucial for a full account. Attem$ts to /eigh the genetic or biological versus the cultural or biogra$hical, as in the assertion that bet/een (* and 5* $ercent of human $ersonality is -inherited- 3Daun )**), ref. to 9lomin et al. '%%*6, seem logically misguided, C

since the relation bet/een the t/o 0inds of factors is not one of contradiction or com$etition but a relation of form to substance, that is, bet/een different levels of abstraction. ,o ta0e a very sim$le e8am$le, ho/ /ould one 1uantify = in terms of $ercentages = our biological drive to eat in relation to a cultural $reference for herring, $or0 cho$s or s$aghettiA Human behaviour should be a$$roached at the em$irical level of the actual eating, and at this level it is al/ays dee$ly embedded in the s$ecificities of culture. At the abstract level of -eating,- the ingestion of nutrients is '** $ercent biological, but at the concrete level of $artici$ating in a #/edish crayfish $arty, it is '** $ercent cultural. A genetic or conventional, biological e8$lanation can only be e8$ressed in terms of abstractions and universals, but there sim$ly does not e8ist any human behaviour that occurs in such an abstract, universal form. n em$irical reality all human behaviour is molded by culture. Unless modified in the direction suggested by ngold 3see belo/6, references to -biology- cannot e8$lain its s$ecific substance. n conventional usage, -biology- is to the social sciences as abstract to concrete, general to s$ecific, genoty$e to $henoty$e, form to substance. ,he relation bet/een -biological- se8 and -social- gender, discussed above, is a good e8am$le. ,he relation here bet/een biology and the social sciences reminds me of the $olari>ation, /ithin the field of economic anthro$ology in the '%;*-s, bet/een -formalists- and -substantivists.- ,he distinction bet/een -formal- and -substantive- as$ects of economic behaviour /as made by the economic historian Darl 9olanyi 3'%5:6, follo/ing .a8 2eber-s distinction bet/een formal and substantive rationality. A formal definition of economic behaviour focuses on abstract, universal as$ects such as choices bet/een scarce resources, calculation of means and ends, and the $roclivity to ma8imi>e. +ormalists argued that such abstract models can be a$$lied to economic behaviour irres$ective of cultural conte8t. A substantive definition of economy, on the other hand, focuses on the s$ecific /ays in /hich $eo$le relate to the material /orld4 the cultural content of economic $rocesses at the level of s$ecific value systems, institutions, and technologies. +ormalists and substantivists thus $ursue t/o very different 0inds of e8$lanations, the former see0ing to distill universal forms of rationality disembedded from cultural conte8t, /hile the latter as$ire to /or0 out in detail the $articular conditions under /hich choices are actually made. +ormalists abstractions are not incorrect, but the 1uestion is ho/ useful they are in accounting for actual behaviour. n retreating from the em$irical actualities into abstract models, they tend to $rovide less information of the 0ind needed to understand as fully as $ossible the $rocesses /hich sha$e human action. ,here is even a ris0 that formalists reduce their abstract forms of understanding into tautology, as in the underlying assum$tion of neoclassical economic theory that consumers find commodities useful because of their -utility.- Nothing is thereby said about the substantive choices that $eo$le actually ma0e, or about the s$ecific symbolic systems that define /hat to actual $eo$le is useful or valuable 3#ahlins '%:;a6. ,his e8$lanatory vacuity of formalism in economic theory is very similar to the vacuity of references to human universals. Bne of my #/edish discussion $artners in this debate 3Daun '%%%6 has rather uncritically subscribed to the list of -universal human needs,- $ur$ortedly established as given by our evolutionary history, that /as assembled by Henry .urray 3'%;) K'%(CL6 in the '%(*-s. ,o an anthro$ologist, this list says more about the American middle class in the '%(*-s than about %

universal human nature. Even if these abstractions /ere to re$resent something universal they are of little hel$ to social scientists, /ho are $rimarily interested in understanding human variation, since variation cannot be e8$lained by reference to a constant. f, for instance, our universal -need for self&esteem- can incite us to murder or <oin the army <ust as /ell as to study medicine or refuse the draft, cannot see /hat .urray-s universals could $ossibly contribute to social science. !oncisely e8$ressed, that /hich is universally human could $robably be summari>ed on a single $age. ,he struggles of anthro$ologist Donald E. Bro/n 3'%%'6 to list human universals resulted in ten unnecessarily verbose $ages. .y 1uestion is /hat social scientists are e8$ected to do /ith these listsA #hould /e from no/ on begin every te8t /e /rite /ith a standardi>ed footnote reminding ourselves and our readers that all that /e are about to describe $resu$$oses biological organisms /ith the $ro$erties listed by Donald Bro/n 3'%%'4'(*&'@*6A t is no coincidence that it /as .arshall #ahlins = a leading substantivist = /ho delivered one of the most trenchant criticisms of Ed/ard 2ilson-s influential boo0 #ociobiology4 ,he Ne/ #ynthesis 3'%:56, only a year after its $ublication in '%:5. #ahlins- res$onse, titled ,he Use and Abuse of Biology 3'%:;b6, more than t/enty&five years ago em$hasi>ed the ma<or oversight that continues to $ervade biological or genetic e8$lanations of human behaviour today, namely that there is no necessary connection bet/een cultural content and individual motivation. A s$ecific 0ind of behaviour can e8$ress very different 0inds of individual motives. A gift can actually be a /ay of e8$ressing aggression, /hereas /ar does not necessarily have to be. ,his is undoubtedly an im$ortant ob<ection to any attem$t to reduce s$ecific $atterns of behaviour to biological or genetic constitution. ,his ob<ection is as valid /hether the attem$t is to identify genetic universals or to e8$lain variation in behaviour as the result of genetic variation. n the latter case, cannot imagine ho/ it /ould be $ossible to isolate and e8tricate = not to mention 1uantify = genetic factors vis&T&vis the obvious and incredibly com$le8 influence of culture, class, and $ersonal biogra$hy. cannot see ho/ it could be claimed that -$ersonality- or -tem$erament- is measurably determined by our genes, not even if /e are literally born /ith it. Already at birth /e have lived in, e8$erienced and been molded by our environment for nine /hole months, a $eriod in life /hen /e have been ma8imally malleable and susce$tible to fundamental im$ressions being inscribed in our emergent $ersonalities. Already in the /omb, culture, class and $ersonal circumstances have invaded our souls and begun to influence our tem$eraments. +or this reason have never been $ersuaded by studies of t/ins that $ur$ortedly establish genetic foundations for s$ecific $ersonality traits. After all, t/ins /ill al/ays have had this crucial, $re&natal environmental com$onent in common4 their mother-s body, sus$ended in a s$ecific /eb of social relations and inclined to res$ond to these relations according to a s$ecific cultural and $ersonal re$ertoire. ,his all&encom$assing metabolism surrounding human beings during the nine most formative months of their life obviously has a biochemical dimension, but this biochemistry is largely a reflection and translation of larger fields of social interaction, rather than the sim$le unfolding of a genetic scri$t. Ho/ could any genetic investigation even theoretically -$eel off- these circumstances so as to isolate an imagined, -$ure- genoty$eA f /e recogni>e that environmental influences begin at the very moment of conce$tion, our categories '*

distinguishing /hat is -innate- 3/hat /e are born /ithA6 versus the result of a -shared environmentbecome blurred. 3An additional consideration, of course, is that the notion of a -shared environmentin the form of a common family or home obscures the fact that it /ill $rovide 1uite different niches for differently $ositioned siblings.6 A slightly different $ers$ective on the debate on -genetic e8$lanation- could be couched in a humanist frame/or0 of refle8ive e$istemology. At issue is our choice of language4 /hether /e a$$roach human beings as ob<ects or sub<ects. 2e can either tal0 about their biology, hormones, genes and instincts, or about their meanings, emotions and e8$eriences. Both narratives hold a measure of -truth- in the sense that they may /or0 as ma$s for effective thera$y. An8iety and aggression, for instance, are simultaneously biochemical and sub<ective conditions, /hich can be alleviated either /ith drugs or $sychothera$y. But beyond the $ragmatics of -solving $roblems- as efficiently and ine8$ensively as $ossible, /e should as0 /hich e8$lanation is the most e8haustive4 references to the $atient-s biochemistry or to the system of social relations of /hich it is an e8$ressionA ,he $sychiatrist and anthro$ologist 7obert Levy 3'%%)4))*6 notes that for the medically oriented, a blood sam$le indicating de$ression /ould be $erceived not as an e8$ression of a fundamentally social condition, but as something a$$roaching its very essence. ,he difference here bet/een a biomedical and, for instance, a $sychoanalytic a$$roach illustrates the difference bet/een /hat 9aul 2eiss 3'%:) K'%;%L6 referred to as microdeterminacy versus macrodeterminacy. ,he former is the inclination to e8$lain $henomena by referring to their com$onent subsystems, /hile the latter = generally associated /ith the social sciences = means referring to the /ider relations and conte8ts of /hich they are a $art. ,he ideal, of course, /ould be to rec0on /ith a continuous recursivity, or feedbac0, bet/een the micro&level and the macro&level 3cf. 7ose, Damin E Le/ontin '%C@R #teiner '%%(45)6, /hich in the case of human behaviour /ould mean bet/een the organic and the social. ,he choice bet/een a$$roaching humans as ob<ects or sub<ects can also be illuminated by com$arative ethnogra$hy. Eduardo Qiveiros de !astro 3'%%%6 has observed that Euro$eans and Ama>onian ndians have diametrically o$$osite images of living beings4 Euro$eans imagine that even humans dee$ inside are animals, /hereas the ndians assert that even animals dee$ inside are humans. f /e re$lace the /ord -animal- /ith -ob<ect- and the /ord -human- /ith -sub<ect,- /e have yet another reminder of that s$ecial, 2estern legacy that /e refer to as !artesian dualism. An anthro$ologist /ho has been $articularly $reoccu$ied /ith challenging and transcending such !artesian dualism, of course, is ,im ngold. His recent boo0 ,he 9erce$tion of the Environment 3)***a6 stimulates us to rethin0 the very categories through /hich /e filter our habitual understanding of the natureGnurture controversy. ,he em$hasis throughout the boo0 is on transcending modern dichotomies such as mind vs. body and culture vs. nature and demonstrating ho/ such dualist thin0ing organi>es even our conventional distinction bet/een -cultural- and -biological- as$ects. +or many anthro$ologists, ngold-s deconstruction of this latter dichotomy /ould $robably be most difficult to digest, if the outcome did not suggest a humani>ation of nature <ust as much as a naturali>ation of culture. ,he uni1ueness of his highly original synthesis is $erha$s highlighted by its ca$acity to /eld together $ers$ectives from the $henomenology of ''

.erleau&9onty and Heidegger /ith biologists- considerations of the develo$ment and constitution of organisms. Bn closer scrutiny, his hesitation about the notion of -culture- seems to resonate 1uite /ell /ith much contem$orary anthro$ology, being $rimarily directed at the idea of a body of 0no/ledge transmitted inde$endently of its a$$lication. !hallenging essentiali>ing and deconte8tuali>ing notions of abstract, cultural and biological inheritance, ngold argues that humans are constituted = as indissolubly $ersons and organisms = through $ractical ens0ilment and engagement in s$ecific environments. He consistently dismisses notions of factors given at the outset of such develo$mental $rocesses, /hether cultural or biological. An interesting as$ect of ngold-s argument is thus that it suggests a /ider and more dynamic notion of -biology- than that evo0ed by the old natureGnurture controversy. -Biology- for ngold has very little to do /ith heredity, standing instead, it seems, for the -organic- that has so long been ontologically distinguished from the -sub<ective.- His target of criticism is the 0ind of ontological dualism that in our /orld vie/ maintains such a rift bet/een the sub<ective and the organic and that simultaneously ma0es it into a difference bet/een humans and animals. ngold-s aim in bringing biology and culture together is not to cham$ion the im$ortance of either -genoty$e- or -culture- = both of /hich he dismisses as abstractions = but to transcend the !artesian distinction bet/een body and mind. ,hus, -biology- to ngold does not re$resent the abstract and the universal, as in the conventional debate, but the very s$ecific develo$mental $rocesses that organisms undergo in $articular environments. ,he only 1uarrel that have /ith this, as have already indicated, is that ngold really /ould not need to thro/ the baby 3-culture-6 out /ith the bath/ater. 2e still need to be able to distinguish analytically bet/een those as$ects of our bodies&and&minds that can only be e8$lained /ith reference to symbolic, social $rocesses, on the one hand, and those as$ects that do not re1uire such semiotic considerations, on the other. .y third and final 1uestion to ngold /ould thus be4 Do /e not, after all, need to distinguish bet/een those as$ects of -relational&ecological&develo$mental$rocesses that de$end on the mediation of symbols, and those as$ects that do notA /ould in fact conclude that there are three dualisms at sta0e rather than t/o. ,he biology&versus& culture distinction should neither be defined in terms of nature&versus&nurture 3as is the convention6, nor in terms of body&versus&mind 3as does ngold6, but more $recisely in terms of the $re&symbolic versus the symbolic. ,hese three analytical $olarities = bodyGmind, natureGnurture and biologyGculture 3thus defined6 = overla$ only $artially and need to be distinguished from each other. nstead of a sim$le dichotomy of geneticGorganic versus environmentalGsu$ra&organic, /e need to recogni>e human beings as analytically transected by three dimensions, $roducing no less than si8 distinguishable domains or categories of constitutive factors, $otentially re1uiring s$ecific mi8es of methodological tools. ,hese dimensions are4 3a6 the genetic versus the environmental, 3b6 the ob<ective 3organic6 versus the sub<ective, and 3c6 the $re&symbolic versus the symbolic. ,here are as$ects of our being that can be ob<ectively monitored and that can be derived, res$ectively, from genetic inheritance 3such as the fundamental structure of our nervous system6, somatic ada$tation 3for instance, to high altitude environments6 or cultural systems 3such as diet, or notions of the ideal body6. Bn the other hand, there are as$ects of our sub<ective being /hich are, res$ectively, genetically inherited 3such as the e8$erience of hunger6, mimetically ac1uired 3such as ngold-s ')

notion of -s0ill-6 or culturally transmitted 3such as /orld vie/6. n other /ords, both the organic and sub<ective dimensions of our e8istence can be subdivided into as$ects that are 3a6 hereditary and $re&symbolic, 3b6 environmental and $re&symbolic, or 3c6 environmental and symbolic. ,he sub<ective dimension of human e8istence cannot be derived from the organic /ithout being triviali>ed, and thus re1uires a language of its o/n that is sensitive to the symbolic and the e8$eriential. Neuro$hysiologists cannot account for the cultural content of human behaviour. Even if /e recogni>e the mutual inter$enetration of biology and culture, the analytical distinction bet/een them must be maintained, since significant as$ects of human activity cannot be understood e8ce$t through culture&theoretical, semiotic $ers$ectives that biology is not e1ui$$ed to handle. ,he gist of these $ers$ectives is to em$hasi>e the fundamental arbitrariness of culture, i.e. the e8tent to /hich things could have been other/ise. ,o return to ,roy Duster-s observations, believe that many of the $eo$le /ho tend to resort to -genetic e8$lanations- do so because they find this arbitrariness difficult to deal /ith. t is im$ortant to recogni>e that this symbolic domain is not confined to the sub<ective, as the semiotics of social relations can be sho/n to intervene in very tangible /ays in our organisms. ,his is $articularly evident in the case of those -FdefectsF or $roblems- 3Duster '%%;4')(6 that many $eo$le e.g. in the medical $rofession /ould rather relegate to the morally less troubling causality of -genetic e8$lanations.Conc%'sions 2hat do these t/o very different discussions have in commonA n both cases, attem$ts have been made to e8clude the symbolic or cultural dimension from e8$lanations of human behaviour, in the former case by arguing that it is macro&determined by ecosystems, in the latter case that it is micro& determined by genes. have found ngold-s -relational&ecological&develo$mental- a$$roach e8tremely useful in countering both 0inds of reductionism, in the first case by em$hasi>ing the mutuality of the relation bet/een $ersonGorganism and environment, in the second case by dismissing the notion of a given genetic constitution. But /hat miss is an e8$licit discussion of the role of the -symbolic- = and thus of the sco$e of imagination, arbitrariness, and contingency = in human life and behaviour. ,he 1uestion that lingers on is if this a$$roach can really afford to abandon analytical tools such as -culture- and the -symbolic,- or if they in fact should be seen as necessary to it. 2hether our goal is to understand the s$ecifics of subsistence $ractices in native Ama>onia or the construction of gender in contem$orary Euro$e, my $osition is that /e 1uite sim$ly cannot do /ithout them. +igure ' Refe(ences BalMe, 2illiam 3'%%(6. ndigenous transformation of Ama>onian forests4 An e8am$le from .aranhUo, Bra>il. L-Homme ');&')C4 )('&)5@. & 3'%%56. Historical ecology of Ama>onia. n Leslie E. #$onsel, ed., ndigenous 9eo$les and the +uture of Ama>onia4 An Ecological Anthro$ology of an Endangered 2orld, $$.%:&''*. University of Ari>ona 9ress. Bird&David, Nurit 3'%%(6. ,ribal meta$hori>ation of human&nature relatedness. n Day .ilton, ed., Environmentalism4 ,he Qie/ from Anthro$ology, $$.'')&')5.. 7outledge.

'(

& 3'%%%6. -Animism- revisited4 9ersonhood, environment, and relational e$istemology. !urrent Anthro$ology @*3'64#;:&%'. Bro/n, Donald E. 3'%%'6. Human Universals. .c"ra/&Hill. !arneiro, 7obert L. 3'%:@ K'%:*L6. Hunting and hunting magic among the Amahuaca of the 9eruvian montaNa. n Lyon '%:@4'))&'(). !rumley, !arole L., ed. 3'%%@6. Historical Ecology4 !ultural Dno/ledge and !hanging Landsca$es. #chool of American 7esearch 9ress. Daun, S0e 3'%%%6. Det allmVnmVns0liga och det 0ulturbundna. !arlssons. Daun, S0e 3)**)6. Bm natur och 0ultur. 7 " Dulturhistoris0 tids0rift )**)4'4 @%&5*. Descola, 9hili$$e 3'%%)6. #ocieties of nature and the nature of society. n Adam Du$er, ed., !once$tuali>ing #ociety, $$.'*:&');. 7outledge. & 3'%%@6. n the #ociety of Nature4 A Native Ecology in Ama>onia. !ambridge University 9ress. Duster, ,roy 3'%%;6. ,he 9rism of Heritability and the #ociology of Dno/ledge. n Laura Nader, ed., Na0ed #cience4 Anthro$ological n1uiry into Boundaries, 9o/er, and Dno/ledge, $$.''%&'(*. 7outledge. Evernden, Neil 3'%C56. ,he Natural Alien4 Human0ind and Environment. University of ,oronto 9ress. "udeman, #te$hen 3'%C;6. Economics as !ulture4 .odels and .eta$hors of Livelihood. 7outledge E Degan 9aul. Harris, .arvin 3'%:%6. !ultural .aterialism4 ,he #truggle for a #cience of !ulture. Qintage. Hornborg, Alf 3)***6. +rom Animal .asters to Ecosystem #ervices4 E8change, 9ersonhood, and Ecological 9ractice. n Hornborg E 9Plsson )***4'((&'5). & 3)**'a6. ,he 9o/er of the .achine4 "lobal ne1ualities of Economy, ,echnology, and Environment. AltamiraG7o/man E Littlefield. & 3)**'b6. H<Vl$er oss biologin fWr0lara mVns0lig beteendevariationA 7 " Dulturhistoris0 tids0rift )**'4(4';5&';%. & 3)**)a6. 7e$li0 till Nils Uddenberg och S0e Daun. 7 " Dulturhistoris0 tids0rift )**)4)4'*C& ''*. & 3)**)b6. !omment on ". 9Plsson E D. HPrdardottir, -+or 2hom the !ell ,olls4 Debates in Biomedicine.- !urrent Anthro$ology, A$ril )**). Hornborg, Alf E "Xsli 9Plsson, eds. 3)***6. Negotiating Nature4 !ulture, 9o/er, and Environmental Argument. Lund University 9ress. ngold, ,im 3)***a6. ,he 9erce$tion of the Environment4 Essays in Livelihood, D/elling and #0ill. 7outledge. & 3)***b6. !oncluding !ommentary. n Hornborg E 9Plsson )***4)'(&))@. Densinger, Denneth .. E 2aud H. Drac0e, eds. 3'%C'6. +ood ,aboos in Lo/land #outh America. 2or0ing 9a$ers on #outh American ndians (. Bennington !ollege. Drac0e, 2aud H. 3'%C'6. Don-t let the $iranha bite your liver4 A $sychoanalytic a$$roach to Dag/ahiv 3,u$X6 food taboos. n Densinger E Drac0e '%C'4%'&'@). Leach, Edmund 3'%;@6. Anthro$ological as$ects of language4 Qerbal categories and animal abuse. n Eric Lenneberg, ed., Ne/ Directions in the #tudy of Language, $$.)5&;(. . , 9ress. LMvi&#trauss, !laude 3'%;;6. ,he #avage .ind. University of !hicago 9ress. Levy, 7obert . 3'%%)6. A $rologue to a $sychiatric anthro$ology. n ,. #ch/art>, "... 2hite E !.A. Lut>, eds., Ne/ Directions in 9sychological Anthro$ology, $$.)*;&))*. !ambridge University 9ress. Lyon, 9atricia, ed. 3'%:@6. Native #outh Americans4 Ethnology of the Least Dno/n !ontinent. Little, Bro/n E !o. .urray, Henry A. 3'%;) K'%(CL6. E8$lorations in 9ersonality. #cience Editions. 9olanyi, Darl 3'%5:6. ,he Economy as nstituted 9rocess. D. 9olanyi, !. Arensberg E H.2. 9earson, eds., ,rade and .ar0ets in the Early Em$ires, $$.)@(&):*. ,he +ree 9ress. 9lomin, 7., I.!. De+ries E ".E. .c!learn 3'%%*6. Behavioral "enetics4 A 9rimer 3)nd ed.6 +reeman. 7ival, Laura 3'%%;6. Domestication as a historical and symbolic $rocess4 2ild gardens and cultivated forests in the Ecuadorian Ama>on. n 2illiam BalMe, ed., Advances in Historical Ecology, $$.)()&)5*. !olumbia University 9ress. 7ose, #., L.I. Damin E 7.!. Le/ontin 3'%C@6. Not in Bur "enes4 Biology, deology and Human Nature. 9antheon Boo0s.

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7oss, Eric B. 3'%:C6. +ood taboos, diet and hunting strategy4 ,he ada$tation to animals in Ama>on cultural ecology. !urrent Anthro$ology '%3'64'&(;. #ahlins, .arshall 3'%:;a6. !ulture and 9ractical 7eason. University of !hicago 9ress. & 3'%:;b6. ,he Use and Abuse of Biology4 An Anthro$ological !riti1ue of #ociobiology. ,avistoc0. #teiner, Dieter 3'%%(6. Human Ecology as ,ransdisci$linary #cience, and #cience as 9art of Human Ecology. n D. #teiner E .. Nauser, eds., Human Ecology4 +ragments of Anti&fragmentary Qie/s of the 2orld, $$.@:&:;. 7outledge. ,ambiah, #tanley 3'%;%6. Animals are good to thin0 and good to $rohibit. Ethnology C4@)(&@5%. ,aylor, Denneth . 3'%C'6. Dno/ledge and $ra8is in #anumP food $rohibitions. n Densinger E Drac0e '%C'4)@&5@. Uddenberg, Nils 3'%%C6. Arvsdygden4 Biologis0 utvec0ling och mVns0lig gemens0a$. Natur och 0ultur. & 3)**'6. Y$$et svar till Alf Hornborg. 7 " Dulturhistoris0 tids0rift )**'4@4)()&)(@. Ue80Jll, Ia0ob von 3'%C) K'%@*L6. ,he theory of meaning. #emiotica @)4)5&C). Urban, "reg 3'%C'6. ,he semiotics of tabooed food4 #ho0leng 3"M6. n Densinger E Drac0e '%C'4:;&%*. Qiveiros de !astro, Eduardo 3'%%%6. ,he transformation of ob<ects into sub<ects in Amerindian ontologies. 9a$er $resented at the %Cth annual meeting of the American Anthro$ological Association, !hicago. 2eiss, "erald 3'%:@ K'%:)L6. !am$a cosmology. n Lyon '%:@4)5'&);;. 2eiss, 9aul A. 3'%:) K'%;%L6. ,he Living #ystem4 Determinism #tratified. n A. Doestler E I.7. #mythies, eds., Beyond 7eductionism4 ,he Al$bach #ym$osium, $$.(&@). Hutchinson. 2ilson, Ed/ard B. 3'%:56. #ociobiology4 ,he Ne/ #ynthesis. Bel0na$ 9ress of Harvard University 9ress ' /ould li0e to than0 the Ban0 of #/eden ,ercentenary +oundation for su$$orting the $ro<ect -Native American Ecocosmologies and Environmental Ethics4 Animism, .odernity, and the !ultural 9henomenology of Human&Environmental 7elations,- conducted in collaboration /ith .i0ael Dur0iala.

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