China CC Link

Cuba engagement reverses Chinese dominance Luko 11 (James Served in Washington DC with the National Council For Soviet East European
Research, the Smithsonian Institute and two years as an analyst with the Canadian Department of National Defence, China's Moves on Cuba Need to Be Stopped, 6/29, http://www.nolanchart.com/article8774-chinas-moves-on-cuba-need-to-be-stopped.html)
The Red Dragon takes another wide step of not only flexing its muscles in Asia, but now wishes to supplant Russias and (former USSRs) forward base presence 90

Cuba is China's biggest trade partner in the Caribbean region, while China is Cuba's second-largest trade partner after Venezuela. Over the past decade, bilateral trade increased from $440 million in 2001 to $1.83 billion in 2010. [1] In
miles from the United States- CUBA. 2006 China and Cuba discussed offshore oil deals and now China's National Petroleum Corporation is a major player in Cuban infrastructure improvements. [ibid] In 2008, none other than China's President himself, Hu

JinTao visited Cuba with a sweet package of loans, grants and trade deals. If Cuba becomes a 'client' state of China, it will be a source of leverage against America whenever the U.S. Pressures China
on Tibet and Taiwan. Soon we will witness the newly constructed blue-water navy of China cruising Cuba's coast in protection of their trade routes and supply of natural resources. In 2003 it was reported that Chinese personnel were operating at least TWO (2) intelligence signal sations in Cuba since at least 1999 ! [2] This month, June 2011, the Vice President of China made an important visit, extending more financial aid, interest-free, as well as related health projects to be paid for by China. A client state in the making ! [3] The

best way to counter the Chinese in Cuba is to reverse Americas 50 year old, ineffective and obsolete policy of isolationism and boycott of Cuba. The Chinese threat in Cuba should be the catalyst for the US to establish open and normalized relations, with economic incentives to re-Americanize Cuba, return of
American investments and security agreements. Checking the Chinese move in Cuba early on is vital to preventing a strategic Chinese foothold 90 miles from Florida. Allowing China to replace Russia in Cuba would be a strategic disaster. China

is dangling financial assistance and investments in order to establish a beachhead close to the shores of America. This is a counter-response to Americas
continued military presence in Asia, continued support of Taiwan and recent increased American aid to the Philippines in its spat with China over sovereignty of the Spratly Islands. The Cuban people wish to return to the American fold and re-establish the traditional relationship with the Cuban anchor in Florida- namely the almost 900,000 Cubans living in Florida alone! [4]

***AT Latin American Relations

Generic Stuff
Bad relations inevitable--- its not a priority Hakim 2011 (Peter Hakim, President Emeritus of the Inter-American Dialogue, The United States and
Latin America: The Neighbourhood has Changed, The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs, Volume 46, Issue 4, 2011)
During the following ten years, US foreign policy attention turned sharply to the Middle East. Washington's integrationist strategy for the Americas unravelled as its weaknesses and inconsistencies became increasingly visible. For their part, Latin American governments became increasingly independent and assertive in their foreign policies, diversified in their international relations, and more inclined to challenge US leadership and initiative. The United States has not yet come fully to grips with this changing context of hemispheric relations. The G.W. Bush and Obama administrations remained, at least rhetorically, wedded to the idea of partnerships and shared responsibilities with Latin America, but these concepts seem less and less relevant to the region's evolving context.

What the past two decades of USLatin American relations may have most clearly revealed is how difficult it is for Washington to define and execute a coherent policy in the regionwith officials constrained by domestic politics, far more urgent demands on its foreign policy resources, and an increasingly independent and self-assured Latin America. The fact is that US policies toward Latin American and the Caribbean are almost invariably derivative policies. They tend not to be the result of a careful calculation of US interests and values and a clear view of what it will take to advance them. Instead, they tend to be mostly shaped by US domestic political considerations or by the demands of global issues.

Several alt causes Hakim 2011 (Peter Hakim, President Emeritus of the Inter-American Dialogue, The United States and
Latin America: The Neighbourhood has Changed, The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs, Volume 46, Issue 4, 2011)
The electoral triumph of Barack Obama was enthusiastically welcomed in Latin America and the Caribbean.15 The spirited reaction to Obama's election made it clear that Latin Americans wanted a good relationship with the United States, but that they also wanted the United States to pursue a different approach to the region and to foreign policy generally. Expectations for the new administration were high throughout the region. In contrast to many of his predecessors, Obama did not present a grand vision or a broad strategy for US policy in the hemisphere. Instead, he saw his presidency as an opportunity to solve some long-standing problems, reduce discord and friction, and encourage greater cooperation. Most of all, he promised a change in style and emphasisfundamentally a turn to multilateralism and partnership, and a closer alignment of the United States and Latin American policy agendas. This would be a time to reinvigorate US relations in the hemisphere and perhaps set the stage for a new approach to regional affairs, not to embark on major new initiatives.

Obama himself remains widely admired and extremely well liked in Latin America, but his administration has not
managed to improve the quality of USLatin American relations or develop more productive regional ties.

The new president's overcrowded agenda has left little room for Latin America. Foreign policy has generally taken a back seat to the US' economic problems, health reform and myriad other domestic challenges. Latin America has had no chance of competing successfully for Washington's limited foreign policy attention with
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Iran's nuclear ambitions and China's expanding global muscle. The intense

and bitter partisanship of Washington has compounded the problem. Neither Democrats nor Republicans which remains the highest priority issue for Mexico and most nations of Central America and the Caribbean.16 Though the US Congress finally
have been eager to take on the politically volatile challenge of immigration reform, ratified the long-stalled free trade agreements with Colombia and Panama, only one in six Democrats in the House voted for both pacts. A Republican majority in the lower house of Congress now blocks any further relaxation of Cuba policy.

Finally, an increasingly assertive and politically divided Latin America has also complicated US policymaking. Only a few countries are openly hostile to Washington, but across the region, governments have demonstrated a growing independence from the US. They have built diverse relations internationally, and increasingly resisted US approaches. These are natural trends for a region of middle income
countries that is expanding economically, more confident of its ability to resolve its own problems, and developing a significant global presence. They do not necessarily represent a setback for the United States. Over time, they might well allow for more productive hemispheric

partnerships. But, today

they are a major source of friction in USLatin American relations, which have been strained by disagreements over Honduras, regional efforts to restore Cuba to OAS membership, South American opposition to the USColombia defence pact, and Iran's ties to Brazil and other nations.

Immigration & drugs impede relations.

Shifter, 12
Michael Shifter. (Pres. of the Inter-American Dialogue. Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America, An IAD Policy Report). http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf, ACC. 6-6-2013, JT//JEDI
Similarly, Washingtons policy, is

more than half-century embargo on Cuba, as well as other elements of United States Cuba strongly opposed by all other countries in the hemisphere. Indeed, the US position on these troublesome issuesimmigration, drug policy, and Cubahas set Washington against the consensus view of the hemispheres other 34 governments. These issues stand as obstacles to further cooperation in the Americas. The United States and the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean need to resolve them in order to build more productive
partnerships.

Cuba Relations Defense

Bad relations with Cuba are inevitable Hanson 2013 (Stephanie Hanson, associate director and coordinating editor at CFR.org, and Brianna
Lee, Senior Production Editor at CFR, January 31, 2013, U.S.-Cuba Relations, http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113) What are the issues preventing normalization of U.S.-Cuba relations? Experts say these issues include: Human rights violations . In March 2003, the Cuban government arrested seventy-five dissidents and journalists, sentencing them to prison terms of up to twenty-eight years on charges of conspiring with the United States to overthrow the state. The Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National
Reconciliation, a Havana-based nongovernmental group, reports that the government has in recent years resorted to other tactics besides prison --such as firings from state jobs and intimidation on the street-- to silence opposition figures. A 2005 UN Human Rights Commission vote

Guantanamo Bay . Cuba indicated after 9/11 that it would not object if the United States brought prisoners to Guantanamo Bay. However, experts such as Sweig say Cuban officials have since seized on the U.S. prison camp--where hundreds of terror suspects have been detained--as a "symbol of solidarity" with the rest of the world against the United States. Although Obama ordered Guantanamo to be closed by January 22, 2010, the facility remains open as of January 2013, and many analysts say it is likely to stay in operation for an extended period. Cuban exile community . The Cuban-American community in southern Florida traditionally has heavily influenced U.S. policy with Cuba. Both political parties fear alienating a strong voting bloc in an important swing state in presidential elections.
condemned Cuba's human rights record, but the country was elected to the new UN Human Rights Council in 2006.

The aff is insufficient Hanson 2013 (Stephanie Hanson, associate director and coordinating editor at CFR.org, and Brianna
Lee, Senior Production Editor at CFR, January 31, 2013, U.S.-Cuba Relations, http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113) What is the status of U.S.-Cuba relations? They are virtually nonexistent . There is a U.S. mission in Havana, Cuba's capital, but it has minimal communication with the Cuban government. Since 1961, the official U.S. policy toward Cuba has been two-pronged : economic embargo and diplomatic isolation. The George W. Bush administration
strongly enforced the embargo and increased travel restrictions. Americans with immediate family in Cuba could visit once every three years for a maximum of two weeks, while family remittances to Cuba were reduced from $3,000 to just $300 in 2004. However, in April 2009, President Obama eased some of these policies. He went further in 2011 to undo many of the restrictions imposed by the Bush administration, thus allowing U.S. citizens to send remittances to non-family members in Cuba and to travel to Cuba for educational or religious purposes. Congress amended the trade embargo in 2000 to allow agricultural exports from the United States to Cuba. In 2008, U.S. companies exported roughly $710 million worth of food and agricultural products to the island nation, according to the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council. However, that number fell by about 50 percent in 2012. Total agricultural exports since 2001 reached $3.5 billion as of February 2012. Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Texas have all brokered agricultural deals with Cuba in recent years. Tension

between Cuba and the United States flared in December 2009 with Cuba's arrest of Alan Gross, a USAID subcontractor who traveled to the country to deliver communications equipment and arrange Internet access for its Jewish community. Cuban authorities alleged Gross was attempting to destabilize the Cuban regime through a USAID-sponsored "democracy promotion" program, and he was subsequently sentenced to fifteen years in prison. Despite initial optimism over Obama's election, Cuban politicians and citizens are less hopeful of a positive relationship developing between the two countries. Ral and Fidel Castro have both criticized the Obama administration. In a 2009 speech, Ral Castro accused the United States of "giving new breath to open and undercover subversion against Cuba."

Latin America Likes the Embargo

Embargo doesnt help Latin American relationsthey actually secretly like the embargo Suchlicki 2k (JAIME SUCHLICKI is Emilio Bacardi Moreau Professor of History and International Studies and the Director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at
the University of Miami. He was the founding Executive Director of the North-South Center. For the past decade he was also the editor of the prestigious Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs. He is currently the Latin American Editor for Transaction Publishers and the author of Cuba: From Columbus to Castro (1997), now in its fourth edition, and editor with Irving L. Horowitz of Cuban Communism (1999). He is also the author of Mexico: From Montezuma to NAFTA (1998). He is a highly regarded consultant to both the private and public sector on Cuba and Latin American affairs. The U.S. Embargo of Cuba Jaime Suchlicki University of Miami June 2000 http://www6.miami.edu/iccas/USEmbargo.pdf, nkj) Note: The first line of the card is saying an aff argument and then refuting it. If we lift the Embargo, U.S.-Latin American relations will improve.

Cuba is not an important issue in U.S.-Latin American relations. The U.S.-Latin American agenda includes as priority items trade, investment, transfer of technology, migration, drugs, environment, and intellectual property rights. Cuba is not a priority item on this agenda. While publicly many Latin American countries oppose the embargo, privately they are extremely concerned that Cuba will divert investments from their countries to the island, and particularly that tourism will flock to Cuba, to the detriment of the
Caribbean economies.

Cuba Doesnt Want Relations

Cuba doesnt want cooperation Padgett 7/3 [Tim, reporter for WRN-- http://wlrn.org/post/why-summeroffers-hope-better-us-cuba-relations -- 2013-SR]
Like a lot of idealistic U.S. presidents, Barack Obama took office in 2009 hoping to establish better dialogue with communist Cuba. Remember his plan to pursue direct diplomacy with Havana? Then he quickly

Cuba really doesnt want improved dialogue with Washington, since conflict with the U.S. offers more political payoff on the island. Hence Cuban leader Ral Castros 2009 Christmas gift to Obama: the arrest of U.S. aid subcontractor Alan Gross on dubious espionage charges. Second, the hardline U.S. Cuban exile lobby doesnt want improved dialogue with Havana, since conflict with Cuba offers (or has traditionally offered) more political payoff here. Hence the Cuban-American congressional caucus efforts in 2011 to keep Obama from letting convicted Cuban spy Ren Gonzlez return home to finish his probation, a fairly benign gesture that might have enhanced the chances of Gross
discovered what most U.S. presidents find out: First, communist release.

Alternative Causes
A. North Korea is a stronger alt cause to relations OReilly 7/18 [Andrew, reporter for Fox News Latino-http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2013/07/18/north-korean-ship-puts-uscuban-relations-on-ice-experts-say/ -2013 SR] North Korea and Cuba have had steady diplomatic ties for decades, but these
relations picked up steam in 2001 when a Cuban delegation visited the North Korean capital, Pyongyang.

Cuba is also one of the few countries globally to maintain close ties to the government of Kim Jong-un and is one of the four countries along with China, Iran and Syria to reject the weapons embargo that the UN Security Council ordered against the Asian nation in 2006. Cuba might have much to lose over soured relations with the U.S., but North Korea doesnt appear concerned if it angers the U .S. or not. From a number of controversial
missile tests to closing the border for time with U.S. ally South Korea, Pyongyang has traditionally drawn

the latest incident involving Cubas dated weaponry is a sign of the North Korean cozying up to the U.S.s traditional backyard neighbors . The very fact of the
both the ire of the United States and much of the international community. Some experts worry that relationship between Cuba and North Korea argues for a better look at whats going on in Havana, sa id Susan Kaufman Purcell, the director if the University of Miamis Center for Hemispheric Policy. It

means that North Korea has projected itself into the Western Hemisphere and is only 90 miles from the U.S. The reaction from Washington has been mixed ,
with the State Department holding back any formal condemnation until more information is released by Panamanian authorities while anti-Castro lawmakers have denounced the incident as another reason that Cuba is a dangerous nation.

B. Political incompatibility Hanson and Lee 2k13 [Stephanie and Brianna, analysts for the Council for Foreign Relations-http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113 -January 2013-- SR] A fundamental incompatibility of political views stands in the way of improving U.S.-Cuban relations, experts say . While experts say the United States wants regime change, "the most important objective of the Cuban government is to remain in power at all costs," says Felix Martin, an assistant professor at Florida International University's Cuban Research Institute. Fidel Castro has been an inspiration for Latin American leftists such as Venezuelan President Hugo Chvez and Bolivian President Evo Morales, who have challenged U.S. policy in the region .

C. Guantanamo Bay Hanson and Lee 2k13 [Stephanie and Brianna, analysts for the Council for Foreign Relations-http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113 -January 2013-- SR] Cuba indicated after 9/11 that it would not object if the United States brought prisoners to Guantanamo Bay. However, experts such as Sweig say Cuban officials have since seized on the U.S. prison camp--where hundreds of terror suspects have been detained--as a "symbol of solidarity" with the rest of the world against the United States. Although Obama ordered Guantanamo to be closed by January 22, 2010, the facility
remains open as of January 2013, and many analysts say it is likely to stay in operation for an extended period.

RelationsAlt Cause
War on drugs outweighs Winter 11-9
Brian, Analysis: Obama faces Latin America revolt over drugs, trade, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/09/us-obama-latinamerica-idUSBRE8A80ZS20121109 President Barack Obama will face an unprecedented revolt by Latin American countries against the U.S.-led drug war during his second term and he also may struggle to pass new trade deals as the region once known as "America's backyard" flexes its muscles like never before. Washington's ability to influence events in Latin America has arguably never been lower. The new reality is as much a product of the United States' economic struggles as a wave of
democracy and greater prosperity that has swept much of the region of 580 million people in the past decade or so. It's not that the United States is reviled now - far from it. Although a few vocally anti-U.S. leaders like Venezuela's Hugo Chavez tend to grab the media spotlight, Obama has warm or cordial relations with Brazil, Mexico and other big countries in the region. Most Latin American leaders were rooting, either privately or publicly, for his re-election on Tuesday. That said, even

close allies are increasingly

emboldened to act without worrying about what "Tio Sam" will say or do. Nowhere is that more evident than on
anti-narcotics policy. In 2012 as never before, many governments challenged the four-decade-old policies under which Washington has encouraged, and often bankrolled, efforts to disrupt the cultivation and smuggling of cocaine, marijuana and other drugs in the

The reason s for the unrest: Frustration with what many perceive as the pointless bloodshed caused by the "war on drugs," plus a feeling the United States has not done enough to reduce its own demand for narcotics - if, that is, it's even
region. possible to curb demand.

DemocracyAT LA Democracy
Democracy now Jones 12 Professor of Political Science @ Rice
Mark, The Diversity of Latin American Democracy, World Politics Review, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11751/the-diversity-of-latin-american-democracy
The recent collapse of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and North Africa during the Arab Spring provides a backdrop to reflect on Latin America's democratic transitions from authoritarian rule during the "Third Wave of Democratization" as well as to review the current health of the region's democracies. Compared to the paucity of democracies in Latin America at the start of the Third Wave in today highlights the

the mid-1970s, the near-universal presence of democratic regimes

tremendous democratic progress made in the region over the past three-dozen years.

Nevertheless, within this broader regional success exists considerable country-by-country variation in democratic experience and quality. This article will first review the stark differences in the foundations upon which the region's Third Wave democracies were constructed, with particular focus on the nature of the democratic transition and prior experience with democratic elections and governance. It will then discuss the evolution of democracy in the region over the past three and a half decades. Next it will examine the considerable variance in the degree of democratic consolidation and democratic quality in the region as of 2012. A final section will draw some general conclusions about some of the most significant factors that drove the democratization of Latin America. The article will concentrate on the 19 former Spanish and Portuguese colonies of the region -- Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela -- while excluding a discussion of democratic transitions and democracy in the region's former British, Dutch and French colonies. This latter group is dominated by the dozen ex-British colonies, which with the exception of Guyana have avoided any serious democratic breakdowns since achieving independence between 1962 and 1983, and at present all possess robust democratic systems. Democracy and Dictatorship in Latin America at the Dawn of the Third Wave In

January 1977, only two of the 19 former Spanish and Portuguese colonies could truly be classified as democracies.
Costa Rica and Venezuela were islands of consolidated democracy within a sea of dictatorship, with the former continuously democratic since 1953 and the latter since 1958. A third country, Colombia, was in the midst of a democratic transition following the end in 1974 of its experience with a quasi-democratic power-sharing pact between the Liberal and Conservative parties, which had been established in 1958 as a means to help end a decade-long civil conflict. The remaining 16 countries were governed by military or civilian dictatorships of diverse stripes. In many cases the dictatorship was relatively institutionalized, with the presidency and other key posts regularly changing hands, while in others the lion's share of power lay in the hands of a single personalist dictator who had governed -- or would continue to govern -- for decades. Examples of the former set of countries include Brazil and Mexico. In Brazil, different generals occupied the presidency for a fixed term during most of the dictatorship. In Mexico, a new president from the country's omnipotent Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) assumed office every six years. Nicaragua and Paraguay are examples of the latter type of country. Nicaragua was governed in 1977 by Anastasio Somoza Debayle, who had assumed control in 1967 following the death of his brother, who had in turn taken the place in 1956 of their assassinated father, Anastasio Somoza Garca, whose tenure had begun in 1936. In Paraguay, Alfredo Stroessner had held the reins of power continuously since 1954 and would continue to do so until his removal by a military coup in 1989. The Third Wave Democratic Transitions Between

1977 and 1994, 15 of these 16 nondemocratic Latin American countries would embrace democracy, with the exception being
totalitarian Cuba. The nature of the initial transitions from authoritarian to democratic governance, however, varied tremendously among the 15 countries that became democracies during the post-1977 period. Several

countries experienced gradual, managed transitions, with Brazil and Mexico two examples of this model. In Brazil, where restricted elections had
been held to select national legislators and local officials throughout most of the 1964-1985 military dictatorship, these elections became increasingly free and fair over time. This gradual democratic transition in Brazil, often referred to as the process of "political decompression," culminated with a fully democratic election in 1986 of national legislators who would go on to draft the country's 1988 constitution.

Latin American democracy is resilient Fingar 1

Thomas Fingar, Statement by Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Hearing on Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, February 7, 2001. http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/terrorism/t_0031.htm That said, Latin American democracies have proved resilient in the face of economic crises, and all ideological alternatives to democratic government remain discredited. Fragile democratic institutions in countries such as Ecuador and Paraguay remain under great pressure to respond to

legitimate mass needs, but few consider military rule a feasible alternative. Latin American militaries know that overt intervention risks international opprobrium and sanctions. They will, therefore, favor solutions that maintain at least a semblance of constitutional legitimacy. To date, popular support has sustained
President Chavez's political revolution in Venezuela, but the swift, dramatic fall of former Peruvian President Fujimori indicates that

there are limits to the appeal of populist authoritarians. The OAS-managed hemispheric reaction to suspect elections in Peru in mid-2000 underscored the strength of the prevailing prodemocracy consensus. In none of the other major countries of Latin America-- Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico-- is democracy threatened in the short or medium term. Indeed, the election of Vicente Fox to the Mexican presidency, ending peacefully the long reign of the Institutional Revolutionary Party, is a major step forward for democracy in Mexico and throughout the hemisphere.

DemocracyAT Solves War

The democratic peace theory is obsolete Henderson 2
Errol Henderson, Assistant Professor, Dept. of Political Science at the University of Florida, 2002, Democracy and War The End of an Illusion?, p. 145
I n this chapter, I summarize the main findings of the study and briefly discuss their research and policy implications. The main finding resulting from the statistical analyses is that democracy

is not significantly associated with a decreased likelihood of international wars, militarized disputes, or civil wars in postcolonial states. There does not appear to be a dyadic democratic peace or a monadic one. To the extent that a democratic peace obtains, it does for extrastate wars, which are more than likely relics of a bygone era; nevertheless, even for these wars,
while democracies in general are less likely to become involved in them, Western statesespecially Western democracies are more likely to fight them. These findings result from analyses using straightforward research designs, similar data, and identical statistical techniques as those found in research supporting the DPP. They suggest that politico-economic

factors in the postwar era greatly contributed to the phenomenon that is erroneously labeled the democratic peace. Further, they imply that foreign policy strategies aimed at increasing the likelihood of peace in the future by spreading democracy are likely to be ineffective, at best, or conflict exacerbating, at worst.

No democratic peaceother domestic political factors are more important than regime type for determining war and peace decisions Elman 97
Miriam Elman, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Arizona State University, 1997, Paths to Peace Is Democracy the Answer?, p. 483

MISSING DOMESTIC-LEVEL VARIABLES. The

democratic peace theory presents a truncated view of domestic politics in general, and democratic politics in particular. Specifically, the theory ignores the role of leaders; underemphasizes norms that are not associated with domestic political ideology; obscures the role of political parties; and discounts how civil-military relations can concentrate or disperse war powers. First, the theory requires us to believe that it matters little who controls the state; that is, the democratic peace
theory suggests that regime type predominates, hence the identity and beliefs of the governing coalition do not matter. We suggest that this is a very misleading and apolitical argument. For example, in Chapter 1, Layne argues that individual

leaders made a difference in determining whether Anglo-French relations were conflictual or cooperative. The
presence of Lord Palmerston in the British Foreign Office increased cross-Channel friction. Palmerstons replacement, Lord Aberdeen, had a more collegial diplomatic style. Thus, it is not surprising that in the 1840s Anglo-French relations shifted toward increasing conciliation and cooperation. Instead of changes of regime type, changes in foreign policy leadership made the difference. Similarly, Kacowicz (Chapter 8) finds that domestic changes within regimes can bring to power new and moderate leaders, thus facilitating the resolution of militarized disputes. For example, leadership changes in Peru can explain why its conflict with Colombia was resolved short of war. In addition, in Chapter 7, I suggest that democracies will be more likely to initiate conflicts and use force if ruling coalitions favor the use of force to solve international conflicts. In and the Likud had

Israel, since the two main political partiesLabor different views regarding the legitimacy of using force, changes in leadership dramatically affected Israels war-proneness. These intra-regime changes led to changes in Israels foreign policy toward Lebanon even though Israels regime typedemocracyremained constant. In short, the important consideration may not be whether a country is democratic or not, but whether its ruling coalition is committed to peaceful methods of conflict resolution. By focusing solely on domestic regime type, the democratic peace theory obscures the extent to which hard-line leaders are often a prerequisite for war.14 Second, the democratic peace theory obscures the fact that war and peace decision making often reflects normative and cultural factors that have little to do with different political ideologies. For example, in Chapter 2, Rock suggests that beliefs in a common racial identity led Britain to retreat from the brink of war with the United States during the Venezuelan crisis. Anglo-Saxonism also explains the great rapprochement between the United States and Britain at
the turn of the century; the British perceived the United States as less menacing than Germany because of the racial and cultural affinity they felt for Americans. Furthermore, public expressions of Anglo-Saxonist sentiment were loudest when diplomatic relations

between the United States and Britain were at their worst, suggesting that AngloSaxonism was not merely a consequence of AngloU.S. reconciliation, as neorealists would argue. Ganguly (Chapter 6) also argues that the norms that drive foreign policy may only partly be related to political organization and regime type. In

the war between Pakistan and India in 1971, political ideologysupport for democracy and democratizationwas less important than ensuring Indias secular way of life. Similarly, Freedman (Chapter 5) argues that while democratic peace theorists are right to emphasize the importance of
norms in explaining a states foreign policy choices, political ideology is not necessarily the most powerful normative justification for war or peace decisions. Consistent with the dyadic democratic peace argument, Freedman finds that support for democratic norms goes far in explaining Britains decision to reoccupy the Faildand Islands by force. Argentinas regime type was a permissive condition for war: a military response was a more acceptable and feasible option than it might have been had Argentina been a liberal democracy. Nevertheless, Freedman points out that Britain justified its war decision on the grounds that it was upholding the international principle of self-determination, and not rewarding aggression. Instead of liberal ideology and the nature of the Argentine regime, these international rights were crucial in the British decision making calculus. Third, the democratic peace theory discounts the fact that it is not regime typedemocracy versus nondemocracythat explains war and peace decisions, but particular attributes of democracy, such as the nature of political parties. According to John C. Matthews Ill (Chapter 11), the democratic peace is not a result of democracy, but of strong parties. Strong parties that favor the use of force only as a last resort can screen out more radical actors from the foreign policy making process. Finally, the democratic peace theory ignores civil-military relations. The institutional argument for the democratic peace phenomenon asserts that democracies are less war-prone because the power to wage war is not concentrated in the hands of one person. But even

democracies delegate war powers, increasing the chances that war and peace decisions will reflect the views of a small group of civilian and military figures. For example, in Chapter 7, I argue that due to the nature of civil-military relations in Israel, Defense Minister Sharon was able to direct and control the war in Lebanon. The cabinet was presented with faits accomplis
that escalated actions in Lebanon and incrementally led to the implementation of a far larger military initiative than the cabinet had originally approved. Similarly, Layne (Chapter 1) suggests that Britains

Lord Palmerston had a great deal of power to decide war and peace issues due to the way m which foreign policy was delegated. In sum, like
democratic peace proponents, we argue that internal characteristics of the state are relevant for predicting whether states will or will not fight each other. However, we reject the claim that crude attributes of states domestic political systemsdemocracy versus nondemocracyprovide sufficient information about the domestic sources of foreign policy. While

domestic politics matters, it is not regime type that crucially accounts for variations in foreign policies, but other variables that may be present or absent in democracies (and nondemocracies).

DemocracyAT Environment
Biodiversity is not critical survival of ecosystems. Grime 97
J.P. Grime, biologist at the University of Sheffield. Science Vol. 277. August 29, 1997. Biodiversity and ecosystem function: the debate deepens Academix OneFile This view that "biodiversity begets superior ecosystem function" is not shared by all ecologists[5, 6]. There are obvious conflicts with published evidence from work on natural rather than synthesized ecosystems. As early as 1982, Leps et al.[7] had suggested that ecosystem processes were determined primarily by the functional characteristics of component organisms rather than their number. The same conclusion was
drawn by MacGillivray et al.[8] who showed that differences between five adjacent ecosystems in northern England in their responses to frost, drought, and burning were predictable from the functional traits of the dominant plants but were independent of plant diversity. This edition of Science (pages 1296, 1300, and 1302) includes three contributions[9-11] to this important debate. One is a report of results from the Cedar Creek synthesized plant assemblages, whereas the two others describe biodiversity-ecosystem studies conducted on natural systems (mediterranean grassland in California and northern forest in Sweden). In all three, variation in ecosystem properties is found to be related to differences in the functional characteristics, especially resource capture and utilization,

there is no convincing evidence that ecosystem processes are crucially dependent on higher levels of biodiversity. The evidence presented by Wardle et al.[10] is particularly compelling because it involves an extensive study of ecosystem properties on 50 relatively pristine forested islands of varied size and plant biodiversity. It is clearly shown that a suite of
of the dominant plants, and ecosystem properties -- including higher microbial biomass, high litter quality, and more rapid rates of litter decomposition and nitrogen mineralization -- coincide with the lower botanical diversity and the earlier successional state of the vegetation on larger islands (both consequences of the higher incidence of lightning strikes and more frequent fire history of larger islands). On

small islands, succession proceeds uninterrupted to more species-rich vegetation, but here the dominant plants, Picea abies and Empetrum hermaphroditum, are extremely stress tolerant and produce litter of poor quality, thereby slowing the rates of ecosystem processes. This strongly supports the contention of MacGillivray et al.[8] that it is the biological characteristics of the dominant plants rather than their number that control ecosystem productivity and biogeochemistry. This same conclusion is prompted
by the new data presented by Tilman et al.[9] and Hooper et al.[11]. Both of these groups have adopted a more experimental approach and created ecosystems in field plots where they can control both the functional composition and species richness of the vegetation. Here again, there is strong evidence that productivity and nutrient cycling are controlled to an overwhelming extent by the functional characteristics of the dominant plants, and evidence

of immediate benefits of species-richness within

functional groups remains weak.

StabilityAT War
Latin American conflicts wont escalate no vacuum of power. Fettweis 11 Professor of Political Science @ Tulane
Christopher, Professor of Political Science @ Tulane, Dangerous Times?: The International Politics of Great Power Peace, pg. 85 The trend is apparent on every continent. The only conflict raging in the entire Western Hemisphere in 2010 was the ongoing civil war in Colombia, and even that was far less bloody than a decade prior. Cruise ships have returned to Caratagena. Despite the fact that there are no nuclear weapons south of the United States, the states of Central and South America act as if they do not fear an attack from their neighbors. The rules of realpolitik no longer seem to apply. Europe, which of course has been the most warprone of continents for most of human history, is entirely calm, without even the threat of interstate conflict. More than one scholar has noted the rather remarkable fact that no serious war planning now goes on among the European powers.'; All over Europe and the Americas," John Keegan has observed, "armies are withering away."" The situations in Bosnia and Kosovo, while not settled, are at least calm for the moment. And in contrast to 1914, the great powers have shown no eagerness to fill Balkan power vacuums; to the contrary, throughout the 1990s. they had to he shamed into intervention, and were on the same side when they eventually did so. International reactions to turmoil in the Balkans in 1914 and in 1992 demonstrate the extent to which the international system had changed. Today's power vacuums seem to repel far more than they attract.

No underlying triggers of interstate conflict in Latin America Hofmeister '08

Wilhem, PhD, "International Security: A European-South American Dialogue" Conference Report, 11/20/08, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, www.kas.de/bruessel/en/publications/15122/, AD 5/22/12
Security is one main concern of Latin-Americas citizens. For them, it is not only a question of carefreeness with regard to general risks, but a question of protection against violence and crime. Compared to international standards, most Latin-American countries show a relativly elevated degree of intra-state violence. In Brazil, for example, more than 40.000 people fall victim of criminal violence each year. This extent

Latin-America is considered the region with less inter-state conflicts and the one, who in proportion to its gross national product (GNP), spends less in military expenses. The subcontinent lacks any major territorial dispute, as well as religious or ethnical conflicts. Besides, Latin-America is the only region in the world where all countries pronounce openly against the aquisition and posession of nuclear weapons. Therefore, central topics on the agenda of international security, as the fight against terrorism or
of intra-state violence seems to contrast with another phenomenom: In an international comparison, the issue of non-proliferation, dont have an immediate impact on Latin-American countries and thus, within the continent, the interest and comprehension of these topics remain rather limited. Accordingly, the disposition of politicians, media and a broader part of civil society to support the fight against terrorism and the constriction of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, is situated on a low level. This tendency is strengthened by the widely spread critique against the Bush-Administration and the presence of the armed forces of the USA in Colombia. On the other hand, the countries of Latin-America by no means have a cohesive position with regard to matters of international security. They neither have a common view of security problems nor does there exist a coordinated collective strategy in international forums. These countries are more or less free riders with regard to questions on security. Many times, the proximity to the United States is not seen as protection against threat; on the contrary many countries feel threatened by the hegemon.

No risk of war in Latin America. Barshefsky et al. 8

Charlene Barshefsky and James T. Hill, Chairs and Shannon K. ONeil, Project Director. U.S.-Latin America Relations: A New Direction for a New Reality. Council On Foreign Relations. Independent Task Force Report No. 60. 2008. Online.

Cross-border threats among countries of the region are much diminished today, thanks to the end of military governments in the region, relatively low levels of defense spending, few significant external threats, the settling or tabling of most major border disputes, the influence of the United States and other members of the international community, and improving mechanisms for regional cooperation through the OAS and other regional and sub-regional bodies. Of concern, however, are Venezuelas
international arms purchases, which increased from an estimated $71 million between 2002 and 2004 to $4 billion between 2005 and 2007, expenditures not included in the countrys official military budget.26 While aggregate defense expenditures in Latin Americaremainamongthelowest regionallyin theworld as a percentage of GDP, such substantial Venezuelan increases should be watched.

AT: Human Rights Advantage

The plans policy of economic engagement ignores brutal political oppression Walser, Senior Policy Analyst specializing in Latin America at The Heritage Foundation, and Zuckerman, Policy Analyst specializing in Latin America at the Heritage Foundation, 12 (Ray, veteran Foreign Service officer, Jessica, Ladies in White and Obamas Failed
Policy of Cuban Appeasement, Heritage Foundation, http://blog.heritage.org/2012/01/13/ladies-inwhite-and-obama%E2%80%99s-failed-policy-of-cuban-appeasement/, MWH)
The repression

and violence experienced by the Ladies in White is, unfortunately, not unusual. Just this week, the Cuban Commission on Human Rights and National Reconciliation announced that a record 786 political arrests occurred in Cuba last month. While many are of a short-term nature, they are designed to promote fear and intimidation. These arrests brought the 2011 total to 4,123, compared with 2,074 in 2010. Yet all too often the media and Obama Administration overlook this continuing wave of repression in Cuba. This inaction, at least on the part of the Administration, is a manifestation of Obamas flawed foreign policy of engaging with U.S. adversaries such as Iran, Venezuela and Cuba.

Cuba has still not changed its humanitarian ways- Prisons Prove AP, USA Today, January 7, 2013
{USA Today, Cuban rights abuses, jailings up in new repressive wave, 1/7/2013, Date Accessed: 7/3/2013} http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/01/04/cuba-human-rights/1809345/
HAVANA Political

arrests in Cuba jumped to more than 6,600 in 2012, the highest in decades as authorities shifted their strategy for dealing with growing civic resistance, dissident groups say. Meanwhile, Cuba's communist government said Monday it is moving ahead with plans to ease a travel ban on its citizens. An official government newspaper Escambray said immigration authorities will allow Cubans to apply for passports to travel abroad Jan. 14. The easing was announced in October. Dissidents say Cuba's regime may be hoping that government critics will take up the offer to leave the country. Cuba is using more short-term arbitrary arrests to disrupt and intimidate critics rather than slap them with long prison sentences like those used against dozens of Cubans in a crackdown on dissent in 2003. "The government has changed its tactics," said Elizardo Snchez, director of the Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation, a Havana group that tracks political arrests. Repression is "low-profile, low-intensity" but "reaches more people." Political arrests in 2012 climbed to 6,602, from 4,123 in 2011 and 2,074 in 2010, Snchez said. Most people are freed within a few hours or days. Former math professor Antonio Rodiles is among those subjected to the latest repressive tactics. Rodiles, founder of Estado de SATS, a group that encourages civic participation and debate, said he was beaten and punched in the eye Nov. 7 when he and others went to Cuban state security headquarters in Havana to ask about a lawyer friend who had been arrested.
Rodiles, 40, was jailed for 19 day.

Cubas government is not Ready- Guantanamo Bay proves Hanson, Council on Foreign Relations, January 31, 2013,
{Stephanie, What are the issues preventing normalization of U.S.-Cuba relations?, Council on Foreign Relations, Senior Production Editor, 1/31/2013, Date accessed: 7/3/2013} www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113

Human rights violations. In

March 2003, the Cuban government arrested seventy-five dissidents and journalists, sentencing them to prison terms of up to twenty-eight years on charges of conspiring with the United States to overthrow the state. The Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation, a Havanabased nongovernmental group, reports that the government has in recent years resorted to other tactics besides prison --such as firings from state jobs and intimidation on the street-- to silence opposition figures. A 2005 UN Human Rights Commission vote condemned Cuba's human rights record, but the country was elected to the new UN Human Rights Council in 2006. Guantanamo Bay. Cuba indicated after 9/11 that
it would not object if the United States brought prisoners to Guantanamo Bay. However, experts such as Sweig say Cuban officials have since seized on the U.S. prison camp--where hundreds of terror suspects have been detained--as a "symbol of solidarity" with the rest of the world against the United States. Although

Obama ordered Guantanamo to be closed by January 22, 2010, the facility remains open as of January 2013, and many analysts say it is likely to stay in operation for an extended period. Cuban exile community. The Cuban-American community in southern Florida traditionally has heavily influenced U.S.
policy with Cuba. Both political parties fear alienating a strong voting bloc in an important swing state in presidential elections. However, CFR's Sweig says that Ral Castro's tenure as president and the reforms he has brought to the country have indicated a willingness to normalize relations with the United States again. "It's

not realistic to expect the United States to undertake a series of unilateral moves toward normalization; it needs a willing partner," she told CFR.org in a 2012 interview. "I believe we have one in Havana but have failed to read the signals."

Cuba has a serious human rights issue Martinez, 12, Journalist. 11/22/12
Guillermo, Lack of basic human rights one reason to keep embargo, SunSentinel, AP http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2012-11-22/news/fl-gmcol-oped1122-20121122_1_dissidentsfreedom-of-political-prisoners-human-rights
Last weekend, during a presentation of the book "Cubans: An Epic Journey," which Sam Verdeja and I co-edited, a man in the audience asked the most expected question: "Why doesn't the United States lift the embargo on Cuba?" My response had little to do with the book. Like a good nephew of a Jesuit priest, I responded to the question with a question of my own: "Do you know who Antonio Rodiles is?" His answer was honest and simple: "No, I don't know." That is part of the problem. For decades Cuba's repressive forces have been perfecting ways of suppressing dissent within the island and at the same time trying to attract the least international notice for their abuses. Sad to say, their methods appear to be working. Back

in April of 2003, when dissidents began making their peaceful protest against the island's Communist regime, the state's repressive security apparatus quickly arrested 75 of the leading dissidents. The world rose up in protest. The European Union restricted ties and assistance to the island's regime and human rights advocates throughout the world protested. The Castro regime paid
a price for the arrests of what became known as Cuba's Black Spring. Slowly over the years, and as had been Cuba's habit, those jailed were released this time at the request of Cuba's Catholic Church. Most were forced to leave the island with their families. Since

then,

repression of dissidents in Cuba has not died down. It has only been perfected to attract less attention worldwide. Now they have government trained goon squads go out to harass and beat the dissidents when they peacefully protest. If that doesn't work, they are beaten up in public, thrown into state security vehicles and arrested for a few days. Some have been known to die in mysterious circumstances, like Laura Polln. a the leader
of the Ladies in White, a fast growing group of women who ask for the freedom of political prisoners in the island by peacefully marching outside churches throughout the island on Sundays. A decade ago they marched only in Havana outside Santa Rita, a church in the Playas District, adjacent to Havana. Now they have chapters in countless cities throughout the island. But, getting back to Rodiles:

The scientist, trained in Cuba, Mexico and the United States after living outside the island with permission from the government, decided to return to raise his voice peacefully in opposition to the regime. He
organized a television program that is distributed within the island and aired in Radio and TVMart to discuss with a panel the lack of freedoms in Cuba. Rodiles'

most dangerous endeavor, however, was to sign, distribute and present to the Cuban government a petition called "Citizens Demand for a Different Cuba." The petition turned over thousands of signatures to Cuba's National Assembly, asking only that the government abide by its own laws respecting the rights of people to peacefully assemble and protest. All this makes Rodiles a

dangerous man in the eyes of the Cuban government. When he went to the offices of the Interior Ministry on November 8 to seek information on why another dissident Yaremis Flores, an attorney, had been arrested, Rodiles was picked up and jailed. Now the government wants to try him and jail him for a year. He has been behind bars since he was arrested. Rodiles is not alone. The internationally renowned blogger Yoanis Snchez was arrested and released for inquiring about the arrest of another dissident. The number of dissidents arrested in recent weeks in Cuba is in the hundreds. They are harassed, beaten by goon squads, taken in unmarked cars, and released in a few days. The harassment of these brave
people who clamor only for the respect for the most basic human rights extends to their families. They are urged, and sometimes forced to leave Cuba. Some are allowed to die while on hunger strikes in jail. Some

international human rights organizations protest. The U.S. State Department issues a statement condemning what is going on. Yet few know of their plight. The world is a much too dangerous a place to include the rights of a few brave souls in the daily headlines. Cuba has perfected the way to make those opposed to the regime invisible to all but those who live in South Florida. This alone is not reason to lift what is left of the embargo. But then, that is another column.

The Cuban embargo shall not be lifted until the Cuban government recognizes basic human rights Delgado, 13, Al Delgado is a columnist on Mediaite. 4/13/13
Al, Bill Maher Ignorantly Rants Against The Cuban Embargo, Adding Himself To The List Of Useful Idiots, Mediaite, AP http://www.mediaite.com/tv/bill-maher-ignorantly-rants-against-the-cuban-embargo-adding-himselfto-the-list-of-useful-idiots/
On Friday nights Real Time With Bill Maher, Bill Maher and guests noted the controversy over Jay-Z and Beyonces recent trip to Cuba, prompting a discussion about the U.S. embargo towards the island. Maher, as he has done previously, criticized the policy, calling it, aside from the drug war, the stupidest policy we have. Curiously, but not surprisingly, out of the Mahers four guests, not a single Cuban exile or CubanAmerican was among them to discuss the issue. That would actually present a credible point of view on the subject, something Maher apparently will not suffer. Instead, we were subjected to a not-exactly-expert panels opinion, including Bob Costas, a sports broadcaster, noting: The more Cubans are exposed to Americans and their lifestyle and their point of view eventually this is gonna collapse of its own weight. Ah, the tired, nave exposure argument that,

if only Americans could freely travel to Cuba in droves, Cubans would see how marvelous and wonderful we are, overthrow their overlords, and democracy would flourish. Costas fails to ponder, however, why it is the constant tourism from Canada and other Western, democratic nations has failed to have this effect. Moreover, Cubans already have a massive amount of
exposure to Americans (Cuban-Americans travel frequently to visit immediate family members). Theyre well aware of how great America is its precisely why some brave Cubans (risking execution if caught) escape, even swimming in shark-infested waters to reach our shores. (Sidenote: Why does the fact that Cuba is essentially one large island-prison, one of the few nations which physically restricts its citizens from traveling abroad, much less from permanently emigrating, always omitted from any conversation?) At its very essence, the anti-embargo argument boils down to a common error: Because of A failing to have its intended effect (A = embargo) and B existing (B = a totalitarian, human-rights-abusing regime), that must mean B is caused or propped up by A (FALSE) and if we eliminate A, then B would disappear (also FALSE). Sigh. Logic is not the Lefts strong suit. Good-time lovin Maher then added: It would be Saint Barths today if we had traded with them and allowed air into the system! Well, Bill, it used to be Saint Barths (far better actually) and you can thank the Castros the very same who remain in power and whose coffers youd fill by visiting for depriving you of that. Maher also employed the second-most popular sneer used by embargo-opponents: But we trade with other evil regimes!, citing our trade with Saudi Arabia. Yes, Bill, we do business with Saudi Arabia and with China, too! Thats because we need them, whether for goods or oil without which the American economy and the American consumer would face a crisis. We

do not, in contrast, need Cuba nor any of its exports or assistance, so why not continue this embargo which, even if failing, at the very least takes a moral stand for freedom and human rights? Second, I dont recall the Saudis or the Chinese stealing billions of U.S.-owned property, as Cuba did.
Mention China, and youll soon here another embargo-opponent or simpleton (I know, I repeat myself) argument: Look how capitalism is crushing Communism in China! It would have the same effect in Cuba! I would advise proponents of this particular argument to back away slowly so as to preserve any future pretense of being somewhat well-read. Heres why: even the most cursory overview of Chinese policy denotes a strong contrast with Cuba: unlike the Cuban regime, the Chinese government tolerates and even encourages a booming, entrepreneurial domestic market. That is why China has been able to thrive, while Cuba has not. An

American embargo has nothing to do with Cubas economic failures the regimes own Soviet-style policies have destroyed its

economy and even decades of trading with a myriad of nations has not solved its problems. Maher then
really scraped the bottom of the barrel, with the obligatory caveat that is quickly albeit only very quickly thrown in by embargoopponents: Is Castro a great guy? No, of course not. Notice, however, its always the most bare-minimum of caveats: not a great guy. What a resounding condemnation! On the contrary, its the understatement of the decade. When discussing South A frican apartheid, do we ever say: Now was that regime great? No, of course not. Much harsher words are used, rightly so. So why is it embargo-opponents seem almost reluctant to strongly, clearly blast the regime? They instead simply say Castro isnt a great guy and, often, even couple it with a but hes done great things!, at which point they rattle off some nonsense about Cuban healthcare or literacy rates. The discussion continued, with Saru Jayaraman, co-founder and co-director of Restaurant Opportunities Center United (this was a Cuban-policy expert panel, clearly), chiming in: Why is [Jay-Z and Beyonce's trip] even news? I mean one-in-three Americas work in poverty right now but thank God we can focus on Jay-Z and Beyonce going to Cuba theyre the ones really in need in America. Huh? Although Mahers zombie audience cheered at Jayaramans remarks (Dude, that sounded like its against the embargo, right? So we should clap here, right?), even Maher laughed and chided: No no, thats not the issue. Moving on, Maher then noted that the whole reason for the embargo is because of Florida, because it has 29 electoral votes and its a swing state, blaming the old Cubans in Florida. Ah, Bill there you go again in fult meltdown about the power of the evil lobbies, just as you did with your recent disgusting gripe that the Israelis are controlling our government. Bill, may I present to you uber-hip Hollywood director, Phil Lord. The 35-year-old, Los Angeles-based director of the box-office smash 21 Jump Street remake, and Tinseltowns hottest new commodity, penned an open letter blasting Jay-Zs trip. While not detailing a specific position on the embargo, Lord noted the Cuban tourism industry is run by the Cuban military, so when he *Jay-Z] spends money at an officially sanctioned hotel, or restaurant, he is directly funding the oppressors of the Cuban people. Few stop to realize that its

the Cuban-Americans who are most anxious to see the embargo someday lifted and to visit their native land but only once the Cuban regime changes and institutes respect for its peoples human rights. In other words, it is precisely concern for the Cuban people that drives the embargo. Abandoning them for the sake of a sexy vacation spot seems particularly callous and selfish though one wonders if Bill wouldnt mind: after all,
one can just ignore the dissident being cracked on his skull with a police baton, simply for demanding the right to read Dr. Martin Luther Kings works, and focus on the nightlife, girls, and cigars instead. But lets not get bogged down in silly logic and facts to refuse Mahers points. While Maher and his crew seem to arrogantly speak on behalf of the Cuban people, lets

instead defer to Dr. Oscar Elias Biscet, Cubas leading democracy and human rights activist. Does he think the embargo should be lifted? Nope.
National Reviews Jay Nordlinger interviewed Dr. Biscet on the matter: It is natural to ask Biscet what he thinks of a contentious issue in the United States: the longstanding sanctions on the Cuban regime, known collectively as the embargo. He

says, The embargo has helped the Cuban people both politically and morally. He wishes that all free and civilized countries would boycott Cuba, the way they did racist South Africa. The world made South Africa a pariah state. The American embargo should be lifted, says Biscet, when the embargo against the Cuban peoples human rights, imposed by the dictatorship, is lifted. He believes that [countries in Europe, Latin America, and North
America, such as Canada+ have given the dictatorship life and oxygen for the past 20 years in other words, since the collapse of the Soviet Union. What hogwash, though! Who needs the words of Dr. Biscet, who has lived in Cuba his whole life and served 25 years in prison for his activism, when we have Bill Maher & Company, the expert panel of the uninformed, weighing in? After all, idiots may be idiots but, as Lenin reportedly remarked, they are (especially when pontificating on Cuba) certainly useful. The Cuban propaganda machine is counting on you. Carry on, good soldiers.

Solvency
Cuban pharmaceutical industry very high now, no need for plan.
Espicom, 9/30/13 (Espicom Business Intelligence is a UK-based company with a 30-year pedigree providing business intelligence on
Medical Devices, Pharmaceuticals & Healthcare and Therapeutics across global markets) The Pharmaceutical Market: Cuba accessed online 10/25/13 http://www.espicom.com/cuba-pharmaceutical-market

Cuba has developed a well-established pharmaceutical industry based on the formulation or manufacturing of generic medicines. An important Cuban biotechnology industry has also been developed. The government is responsible for domestic production, which represents between 80% and 90% of the market. In order to strengthen domestic pharmaceutical production, the Ministry of Basic Industry (MINBAS) formed the Chemical Pharmaceutical Business Group (QUIMEFA) in 2001. There were 28 pharmaceutical producers registered in 2010. Production increased by four times between 1997 and 2008. Competitive Landscape The competitive landscape section provides comparative company analyses and rankings by
US$ sales and % share of total sales - for the total pharmaceutical sector, as well as the OTC, generics, and distribution subsectors.

Other countries are helping Cuba advance with health issues, and are also learning from Cuba.
Havana live, 10/25/13 (News from cuba about pharmaceutical, travel, trade, ect) Cuba Hosts for the First Time Latin American Pharmacology Congress accessed online 10/25/13 http://www.havana-live.com/english/index.html
Havana Oct 21.- Cuba will

host for the first time the Latin American Congress of Pharmacology and Therapeutics Latinfarma 2013, which opens this Monday in the capital with experts from the region and visitors from other countries. Doctor Ren Delgado, president of the organizing committee said that in this twentieth edition
of the event, underway at the Havanas Conventions Center until Friday, aims to contribute to the development of this specialty in Latin America. Delgado, president of the Cuban Society of Pharmacology (SCF) and the American Association of the industry, announced that the

meeting will discuss issues related to pharmacology, therapeutics and related sciences, with emphasis on the development of new drugs, optimizing the existing ones and their rational use. Professionals of the biomedical and pharmaceutical industry of various nations will know Cuba advances in science and medicine in Latinfarma 2013, to be held parallel to the V Ibero-American Congress of Pharmacology. The event will include simultaneously symposia on the Teaching of Pharmacology, Update on Cancer Therapeutics, Psychiatry, Brain Damage and Neuroprotection , Immunopharmacology and Biotechnology, according to the organizing committee. More than 300 conferences are included in the scientific program as well as debates, presentations
and a similar number of workshops, as well as a trade show, all aimed at professionals who do research and teach these subjects.(ACN)

Cubas health care and biotech industry very successful despite US embargo
Nature, 9 (Cubas biotech boom, 1/7, Volume 457 http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v457/n7226/full/457130a.html)//SY
For a week after Cuba marked the 50th anniversary of its revolution on 1 January, a celebratory 'Caravan of Liberty' carried 50 people, including many university students and scientists, along the triumphal route that Fidel Castro had taken half a century earlier. These people represented

the health-care and educational systems of which Cubans are proud, however much they bemoan their other privations behind closed doors. And in no small measure the scientists in the caravan symbolize the foundation of that health-care system in the developing world's most established biotechnology industry, which has grown
rapidly even though it eschewed the venture-capital funding model that rich countries consider a prerequisite.

This growth in biotech has been a top-down affair, like most of the changes in Castro's Cuba. At the
president's personal instigation, the island nation's half-dozen university centres from before the revolution expanded to at least 35 in the decades that followed. But the

growth also owes a great deal to individual researchers' desire to make a contribution. Ask a Cuban scientist why he or she works long hours to earn little more than the US$20-per-month average wage, and the answer is often that they want to make sick people better, with the kudos of having done so. The venture-capital model's
promise of riches is nice, it seems, but not essential. But despite

many constraints on interaction between Cuban and US scientists, biotech has prospered in the nation. In 1980, with a scientifically literate workforce at hand and the biotech boom ready to take off, Castro's interest in the fledgling
industry was sparked by a meeting with Randolph Lee Clark, the former president of the M. D. Anderson Cancer Center in Houston, Texas.

Castro accordingly sent six scientists to a lab in Finland to learn how to make interferon from white blood cells. The knowledge gleaned from this project has been ploughed into an industry that developed the first vaccine against meningitis B in 1985, and subsequently a vaccine against Haemophilus influenzae type B the world's first human vaccine to contain a synthetic antigen.

The embargo catalyzed a mini-health revolution

Cassimally, 13 Honors Degree in Bachelor of Science degree in Monash University (Khalil, The Only Positive Effect Of The Cuban Embargo? Weight Loss, Scitable, 4/19/13, http://www.nature.com/scitable/blog/labcoat-life/the_only_positive_effect_of)//EX
Despite all the atrocity and machiavellianism that trail economic embargoes, science

has somehow found a way to profit from the Cuban "special period." Thanks to the impressive Cuban healthcare system which diligently collected health data even during the "special period," Manuel Franco, at the University of Alcal in Spain and colleagues from US and Cuban institutions, were able to analyse some of the health indicators of the time. What they found underlines the atrocity of the embargo on the Cuban people but does come with a surprising
silver lining which they report in a paper published last week by the British Medical Journal (BMJ).

The shortage of food caused by the embargo led to a population-wide weight loss of about 5.5 kg. The food shortage was a direct result of Cuba's inability to import anything. Physical activity was another important
contributing factor to the weight loss. The Cuban government somehow got its hands on more than one million bicycles for the population. During the "special period," Cubans were forced to walk or cycle, sometimes for kilometres, as public transport was saddled due to the virtual nonexistence of petrol. Interestingly, the weight loss matched with declines in cases of diabetes and heart diseases. Essentially, the embargo spurred a mini health

"so far, no country or regional population has successfully reduced the distribution of body mass index or reduced the prevalence of obesity through public health campaigns or targeted treatment programmes." Where campaigns and targeted programmes failed, the embargo succeeded. But it gets more interesting. After 1995, the Cuban economy started to pick up again and has risen steadily since especially post-2000. Coupled to this steady economic rise was a resurgence of obesity, and with it diabetes and heart diseases. The resurgence was predominantly due to an increased energy intake from food and drinks consumed since physical activity only marginally decreased. Energy intake reached pre-crisis levels by
revolution. As the authors state in the paper: 2002 and obesity rates had tripled that of 1995 by 2011.

What the embargo tells us is that even meagre loss of weight throughout a population, if sustained, can lead to a decline in non-transmissible diseases such as diabetes and heart diseases. How to achieve such sustained decline without having an embargo imposed however is another question. The usual strategies put forward include sensitisation through education and policy changes to promote physical activity, taxes on unhealthy food, etcetera.

The Cuban model has substantially improved health outcomes working now
Franco, 13 Social and Cardiovascular Epidemiology Research Group, School of Medicine, University of Alcal, Alcal de Henares, Madrid, Spain, department of Epidemiology, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School

of Public Health, Baltimore, MD, USA, Department of Epidemiology, Atherothrombosis and Cardiovascular Imaging, Centro Nacional de Investigaciones Cardiovasculares Madrid, Spain (Manuel, Population-wide weight loss and regain in relation to diabetes burden and cardiovascular mortality in Cuba 1980-2010: repeated cross sectional surveys and ecological comparison of secular trends, British Medical Journal, 4/9/13, http://www.bmj.com/content/346/bmj.f1515#aff-2)//EX Marked and rapid reductions in mortality from diabetes and coronary heart disease were observed in Cuba after the profound economic crisis of the early 1990s.8 These trends were associated with the declining capacity of the Cuban economy to assure food and mass transportation in the aftermath of the dissolution of the former Soviet Union and the tightening of the US embargo. Severe shortages of food and gas resulted in a widespread decline in dietary energy intake and increase in energy expenditure (mainly through walking and cycling as alternatives to mechanised transportation). The largest effect of this economic crisis occurred over a period of about five years (1991-95, the so called special period), resulting in an average weight loss of 4-5 kg across the adult population.8 This economic crisis was not a full disruption of previous routines of daily life, but was actually characterised by its slow process of economic decline. During these years, the whole population continued to meet responsibilities in relation to work, school, and other social aspects, and the Ministry of Public Health maintained its regular surveillance system activities.9 10 Since then, the Cuban economy has shown a modest but constant recovery, especially after the
year 2000.11 12 In fact, surveys have shown that the prevalence of obesity has now exceeded pre-crisis levels.13 The table shows basic sociodemographic and economic information on Cuba before, during, and after the economic crisis.

To advance the prevention of non-communicable diseases, population-wide data remain crucial. Comparing

disease rates over time, in relation to changes in risk factor levels in the population, indicates the extent to which disease can be prevented and what the most important risk factors are at the population level. 14 The
population preventive approach articulated by Geoffrey Rose in his seminal paper,15 is of importance when preventing and controlling noncommunicable diseases, particularly cardiovascular diseases. The

current study exemplifies a unique situation where population-wide body weight changed considerably, as a result of the combined and sustained effect of reduced energy intake and elevated physical activity. This scenario allowed us to assess its effect on diabetes and cardiovascular disease.16
From its lowest point in the mid-1990s, average daily intake of energy per capita increased monotonically, reaching pre-crisis levels in 2002 and levelling off in 2005 (fig 1). On the other hand, physical activity had a slight downward trend after the mid-1990s, remaining stable from 2001, with more than half of the population being physically active.

Although 80% of the population was classified as active in surveys conducted during the special period in 1991-95, this proportion fell steadily in the last decade, and is currently at 55% (fig 1). These population-wide changes in energy intake and physical activity were accompanied by large
changes in body weight over this entire interval (figs 2 and 3). Smoking prevalence (fig 1) slowly decreased during the 1980s and 1990s (42% in 1984, 37% in 1995), before declining more rapidly in the 2000s (32% in 2001, 24% in 2010). The

number of cigarettes consumed per capita decreased during and shortly after the crisis. In 1990, 1934 cigarettes per capita were consumed (fig 1). This number changed to 1572, 1196, and 1449
cigarettes per capita in 1993, 1997, and 1999, respectively. Cigarette consumption has since remained stable.

. During the special period of 1991-95, there was a weight loss of 5.5 kg across the entire range of body mass index (that is, not only among obese people), with a mean reduction in body mass index of 1.5 units. After a period of economic recovery and stability, an increase in body mass index of 2.6 units was observed from 1995 to 2010; weight regain also occurred across the entire population, irrespective of body mass index. These distribution shifts in body mass index were consistent across surveys. The proportion of the population in the normal weight category decreased from 56.4% at the end of the special period in 1995 to 42.1% in 2010. At the same time, proportions in the overweight and obesity categories increased by 19.4%, from 33.5% in 1995 to 52.9% in 2010 (web appendix 3). Diabetes trends Diabetes prevalence and incidence Joinpoint regression analyses showed two different phases of diabetes prevalence (fig 3). The
Figure 2 depicts the distribution of body mass index from the Cienfuegos surveys of 1991, 1995, 2001, and 2010 with kernel de nsity plots of each years measurements first phase had a slow and stable increase from 1980 (1.5 per 100 people) to 1997 (1.9 per 100 people), a total increase of 26.6% (2.9% per year). In the second phase, diabetes prevalence increased from 1.9 per 100 people in 1997 to 4.1 per 100 people in 2009 and 2010, a total increase of 115.8% (6.3% per year). Incidence of diabetes fluctuated widely (fig 3). For the decade before the crisis, incidence was stable, between 1980 (1.5 per 1000 people) and 1989 (1.8 per 1000 people). The only data point in the middle of the economic crisis showed a decrease in diabetes incidence, falling to 1.2 per 1000 people in 1992. For the years immediately after the crisis, incidence was lower than pre-crisis levels (1 per 1000 people in 1996 and 1997 v 1.4 per

1000 people in 1999). Sharp increases were observed from 2000 onwards, peaking in 2002 (2.2 per 1000 people) and 2009 (2.4 per 1000 people). Thus, overall diabetes incidence decreased by

Diabetes mortality first phase, from 1980 to 1989 (pre-crisis years), was characterised by an increase of 60% (5.9% per year). The second phase from 1990 to 1996 overlapped with the special period in 1991-95, during which diabetes mortality stabilised (0.7% decrease per year). However, from 1996 to 2002, we recorded a decrease in diabetes mortality of 50% (13.95% per year). Finally, from 2002 onwards, mortality rose by 49% (3.31% per year; from 9.3 deaths per 10 000 people in 2002 to 13.9 deaths per 10 000 people in 2010), returning to pre-crisis rates.Mortality trendsCoronary disease mortalityMortality from coronary heart disease evolved in three phases (fig 4). From 1980 to 1996, mortality fell consistently (reduction of 8.8%, 0.5% per year). After the crisis in 1996-2002, mortality decreased sharply by 34.4% (6.5% per year). After 2002, the rate of decline slowed to 7.4% (1.4% per year), similar to pre-crisis rates. Stroke mortality Mortality from stroke mirrored the pattern of mortality from coronary heart disease, with a modest decrease of 6.9% lasting from 1980 to 2000 (0.4% per year) and a sharp fall between 2000 and 2004 of 13.6% (5.3% per year). From 2004 to 2010, mortality fell by 1.3% (0.01% per year, similar to pre-crisis rates). Cancer mortality Cancer mortality followed a distinctly different pattern to that observed in coronary heart disease, stroke, and diabetes, with two distinct phases (fig 4). From 1980 to 1996, a slight decrease of 2.4% in cancer mortality was observed (0.1% per year), which reverted to a slight increase of 5.4% in 1996-2010 (0.5% per year). All cause mortality Mortality from all causes, as expected, was highly influenced by trends in coronary heart disease and stroke, showing three different phases (data not shown). A prolonged decrease in mortality of 1.7% from 1980 to 1996 (0.1% per year) was followed a sharp decline of 10.5% from 1996 to 2002 (2.9% per year). From 2002 to 2010, there has been a modest decrease of 2% (0.7% per year). Discussion During the deepest period of the economic crisis in Cuba, lasting from 1991 to 1995, food was scarce and access to gas was greatly reduced, virtually eliminating motorised transport and causing the industrial and agricultural sectors to shift to manual intensive labour. This combination of food shortages and unavoidable increases in physical activity put the entire population in a negative energy balance, resulting in a population-wide weight loss of 4-5 kg.8 The decline in food availability was associated with a neuropathy outbreak in the adult population in 1993.24 25 The Cuban economy started recovering in 1996 with a sustained growth phase from 2000 onwards. Since 1996, physical activity has slightly declined. By 2002, energy intake had increased above pre-crisis levels. As a result of the above trends, by 2011, the Cuban population has regained enough weight to almost triple the obesity rates of 1995. This U shaped, population-wide pattern in body weight is historically unique because of several factors: the initial weight loss occurred in a population that had been well nourished previously, lasted for five years, and affected people at all initial levels of body mass index. Diabetes trends could have been substantially influenced by these population-wide changes in body weight. Diabetes prevalence surged from 1997 onwards, as weight started to rebound. Diabetes incidence decreased during the crisis, reaching its lowest point in 1996. The largest economic recovery saw diabetes incidence peaking in 2004 and 2009. Five years after the start of the economic crisis in 1996, an abrupt downward trend was observed in mortality from diabetes, coronary heart disease, stroke, and all causes. This period lasted an additional six years, during which energy intake status gradually recovered and physical activity levels were progressively reduced; in 2002, mortality rates returned to the pre-crisis pattern. A particularly dramatic shift in diabetes mortality was observed: from 2002 to 2010, the annual increase in diabetes
53% from its peak in the pre-crisis years (1986) to its lowest point after the crisis (1996 and 1997). Subsequently, incidence rose by 140% from 1996 to 2009.

Joinpoint regression analysis of diabetes mortality showed four different phases (fig 3). T he

mortality was similar to that before the crisis. Moreover, declining rates of coronary heart disease and stroke slowed to annual decreasing rates similar to those before the crisis.

Cuba has substantial trade with the EU this solves all of their impacts Vassiliki Tzivelis , student at the College of Europe, Brussels campus. He is working toward a Masters. Degree in European Studies, March 2006, *EU Commission, The European Unions Foreign Policy
towards Cuba: It Is Time to Tie the Knot , http://www6.miami.edu/eucenter/Tzivelisfinal.pdf] [MN] First of all, this was a time of very positive bilateral relations between certain Member States and Cuba, thanks to activities that varied from trade to tourism, to humanitarian aid. As one EU official said, if a country is good enough to visit, trade with, have cultural exchanges with and provide aid to, then why is it not good enough to have political relations with?78 Secondly, the Cuban government had implemented reforms to facilitate foreign investment and economic exchange with Cuba.79 Thirdly, supporters of Cubas membership to Cotonou emphasized the Islands achievements in the sectors of social affairs, education and health and the fact that Cuba was placed 56th in the UNDP humandevelopment index of 2000.80 Finally, the adhesion of Cuba to this Convention would have greatly diminished the risks of
encountering US opposition the way that a bilateral agreement would.81

4. No solvency the aff doesnt improve Cuban water infrastructure Josenrique Cueto and Omar De Leon, July 2010, Cuerto: Director at Cuban-American Association of
Civil Engineers, Omar De Leon is an Environmental & Regulatory Advisor at ExxonMobil Development Company, *EVALUATION OF CUBAS WATER AND WASTEWATER INFRASTRUCTURE INCLUDING HIGHPRIORITY IMPROVEMENTS AND ORDER-OF-MAGNITUDE COSTS, http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/Appendices/Appendix_C_Water_Wastewater/Cueto_and_De_Leon_2010.pd f] [MN] In total the country has 59 surface water treatment plants (see approximate location in Figure 2) of which 44 are reported to be in full working order (Cubagua, 2007). As expected, plant density and plant size are significantly greater in highly
populated areas and near major watersheds. Existing water treatment plants in Cuba are mostly of Cuban and American design, with some being of Cuban and Soviet or European design (Cardona, personal communication, 2009). The predominant

form of filtration utilized is rapid sand filtration. Rapid sand filtration is a process in which sand and coarse granular media are used to remove particles that have previously undergone flocculation. The water flows through the filter media by gravity and its solid constituents are captured by the sand. In Cuba several issues have plagued water treatment at surface water plants. At the upstream of the process, during flocculation and clarification, the scarcity of chemicals and chemical dosing equipment severely hamper subsequent treatment and limit the quality of the plant effluent. There is also the issue of the quantity and appropriateness of the filter media. Rapid sand filters typically utilize silica sand or a composite mix of both sand and anthracite. Often, many plants do not have sufficient quantity of sand for their filters. The usual particle diameter necessary for the effective operation of the sand filters is from 0.95 mm to 0.55 mm. Unfortunately the sand that arrives at the plants is often not of the proper diameter for satisfactory operation. At the downstream end of the plant, where disinfection normally occurs, the problems are
similar in that chlorine is not readily available and dosing equipment is practically nonexistent (Cardona, personal communication, 2009).