The Gill Doctrine A Model for 21st Century Counter-terrorism ?

Prem Mahadevan* Faultlines: Volume 19, April 2008 The defeat of politico-religious terrorism in the Indian state of Punjab represe nted a spectacular counterterrorist success. For the first time in history, the security forces of a democracy were able to comprehensively defeat a terrorist m ovement, instead of just containing it. No political compromises were made, no ro ot causes were addressed1. Yet, terrorism disappeared from Punjab with a swiftnes s and permanence that continues to surprise many. What was truly impressive was the fact that Punjab represented one of the earlie st examples of religious terrorism in modern times. Between 1981 and 1993, a tot al of 21,469 people died in the conflict, including 8,009 terrorists2. Although ostensibly a separatist struggle for the creation of an independent Sikh homelan d, the so-called Khalistan movement was actually nihilistic. The terrorists osten sible political aim was to win independence for Punjab from India. However, the manner by which they went about achieving it defied strategic logic. Instead of seeking to win adherents to the concept of Sikh separatism, the terrorists merel y sought to create as much chaos within India as possible3. Between themselves, the 162-odd terrorist groups fought bitterly for supremacy even while remaining generally united in their opposition to New Delhi. Lacking any coherent blueprint for political action and forced to rely almost to tally on foreign patronage, many so-called Khalistani militants focused on selfenrichment4. The handful who were serious about secession were gradually but har shly disillusioned. In essence, although their objective of a separate Sikh stat e was tangible enough, and quite explicitly articulated, the terrorists basicall y remained anarchists. Their blueprint for translating vision into reality centr ed on the fond hope that New Delhi would simply lose the will to retain Punjab, or would be pressured by foreign Governments to grant independence.5 Terrorism in Punjab (hereafter called Khalistani terrorism) was an imported phen omenon, born out of an identity crisis within the Sikh Diaspora in the West.6 Mi grants to Canada, the UK, the US and West Germany grew increasingly conscious of their ethnicity once abroad. Rediscovering religion, they began to fund religio us militants in Punjab from the late 1970s. Among the Sikhs who remained in Indi a, the concept of a separate Sikh homeland had practically no grassroots-level s upport. The biggest impetus for Khalistan only occurred in 1984. Reacting to a wave of violence by Sikh extremists in Punjab, on June 5, 1984, th e Indian Government sent the Army into the Golden Temple, the Sikh faith s holiest shrine. The Temple had long been used as a headquarters complex by the terroris ts, who had fortified it heavily. A bitter battle followed, during which the Tem ple suffered extensive damage. In retaliation, two Sikh Policemen assassinated I ndia s Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi. The murder of Mrs. Gandhi was followed by a horrific series of massacres across India, perpetrated by supporters of the ruling Congress party. In a disgraceful chapter of Indian history, over three thousand Sikhs, including women and childr en, were burnt alive in the national capital Delhi. The effect on the nascent Kh alistan movement was electrifying. What had previously been a rag-tag politico-r eligious grouping within Punjab, sustained by expatriate donations, mutated into a separatist rebellion. Hoping to conciliate the Sikh community, the Indian Government agreed to make su bstantial concessions. Before these could take effect however, terrorists began

to assassinate moderate Sikh leaders. In an atmosphere of spiraling chaos, the I ndian Army was withdrawn from counter-terrorist duties in Punjab. Henceforth, it would be the State s Police force that would bear the brunt of the fight against terrorism. Initially struggling to adapt to the unusual task of counter-terroris m, the Police were ineffective. This changed with the appearance of K.P.S Gill i n Punjab. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill was born in 1934 in the Punjabi city of Lahore, in what is currently Pakistan. After joining the Indian Police Service (IPS) in 1957, he s erved for 25 years in India s northeastern States and in Jammu and Kashmir7. Prior to being inducted into Punjab in 1984, he had directed counter-terrorist specia l operations in the State of Assam. Upon Gill fell the responsibility of helping the Punjab Police force structurally and psychologically adapt to the wholly un familiar phenomenon of political terrorism. Recognizing his expertise, in 1988 the Indian Government elevated Gill to the po st of Director-General of Police in Punjab. His knowledge of terrorist psycholog y, both in general and especially in the case of Punjab, made him a natural lead er of the counter-terrorist effort.8 As a member of the Jat caste within the Sik h community, Gill s identity grouping was a mirror image of the terrorists he was fighting.9 He argued that only a Jat Sikh could defeat another Jat Sikh a credo that underpinned much of his subsequent success.10 Through a series of doctrinal innovations, Gill moulded the Punjab Police into I ndia s most effective counter-terrorist force. In 1992, this force11 launched a fi nal and synchronized counter-offensive against the Khalistan movement that wiped out militancy in Punjab within 18 months. Since 1994, a theory has emerged that attempts to rationalize India s highly atypi cal counter-terrorist success in Punjab. It posits that the Punjab Police under Gill carried out a campaign of state terror 12. The defeat of religious terrorism o ccurred in spite of, and not due to, the Government s counterterrorist efforts.13 Instead, a quasi-mystical force usually known as popular support abandoned the mil itants cause. Their defeat was thus a historical inevitability. As explanations go, this theory is ahistorical and intellectually lazy. By argui ng that terrorism in Punjab lost popular support, its proponents rid themselves of the need to examine the events of the time more closely. Perniciously, this n arrative suggests that at some point, the terrorist movement actually did enjoy widespread popular support. Such intellectual confusion springs from a common te ndency among academics to conflate counter-terrorism with counter-insurgency. By importing Western counter-insurgency theories from the late 1950s and 1960s i nto the post-Cold War era, scholars do themselves or their readers no favours. I nstead, they would do well to study conflicts like Punjab within their local and regional contexts, and only then decide if a political rebellion ever had popula r support . The presence of such support would implicitly question the Government s legitimacy, and make for a counter-insurgency war. The absence of popular suppor t for the rebels on the other hand, would make the contest purely one of operati onal dominance, and thus a counter-terrorist war. This paper hopes to take scholarship on the Punjab problem a step forward by exa mining Gill s unique approach to counter-terrorist operations. It codifies the mea sures he took to combat the terrorist threat in Punjab into a discrete counter-t errorist doctrine. The Gill Doctrine is thus not an official Indian Government pol icy on counter-terrorism. In fact, it is a suggested alternative to the current policy of stalling for time and allowing matters on the internal security front to drift on aimlessly. Gill s 1992 offensive offers a rare and perhaps isolated instance where purely kin

etic (i.e., force-based) counter-terrorist efforts defeated a terrorist movement . Hitherto, academics have often asserted that security forces can only contain terrorism.14 They assert that the defeat of terrorism requires the implementatio n of a political solution that addresses the root causes of militancy. Gill dramatic ally proved this thesis to be false. The objective of this paper is to explain h ow he was able to do so. In particular, it shall demonstrate the fallacy of the theory that human rights violations contributed to his success. The reason the P unjab example has not been replicated elsewhere shall also be discussed. The Conceptual Framework At the core of the Gill Doctrine lies the view that terrorism has mutated from b eing merely a tactic of political rebellion, as it was in the 1970s, to an entir ely new way of waging warfare. Counter-terrorism in the closing decades of the 2 0th century and the early decades of the 21st cannot be denigrated as a mere law and order issue. Instead, it is the major challenge to the security of individual nation-states, precisely because it is still being mistaken as an appendage to popular insurgency.15 Gill argues that extensive foreign sponsorship of terrorism by rogue states has dramatically increased the striking power of terrorist groups. Consequently, the traditional Police doctrine of minimal use of force can no longer be blindly ap plied. Instead, the use of force should be proportional to the threat posed by e ach particular terrorist movement. When fighting terrorists armed with military-issue hardware, the definition of w hat constitutes minimal force requires recalibration. If terrorism is after all a new way of warfare, then the Government must be prepared to combat it on a war-f ooting. At the same time, there remains an overwhelming need to insulate the loc al population from suffering disproportionate collateral damage. For this reason , the use of area weapons and airpower is to be avoided, even if the result is h eightened casualties on one s own side. 16 To do full justice to the Gill Doctrine, it is necessary to appreciate the nuanc es of K.P.S Gill s arguments. He does not reject the proposition that misgovernanc e has a role to play in fostering political militancy. Indeed, Gill has not spar ed the Indian bureaucracy for its corruption and general incompetence. He has wa rned that chronically poor administration within Punjab since terrorism was quel led raises the possibility of resurgent violence.17 Gill does, however, make a d istinction between the root causes of terrorism, and the dynamics that sustain it once violence actually erupts. His associate, Ajai Sahni, argues that far more i mportant for counter-terrorist policymakers than addressing root causes , is neutra lizing the sustaining dynamic of terrorism.18 This point needs to be understood by critics of Gill s methods. At no point does h e suggest that the security forces, as the coercive arm of the Government, can a ct as a substitute for the administrative wing. Nevertheless, the simple fact re mains that one cannot develop areas one does not physically control, hence the G ill Doctrine s emphasis on kinetic counter-terrorist measures. As John Paul Vann n oted in the context of counter-insurgency in Vietnam, "you can argue about wheth er security is 10 per cent of the problem or 90 per cent of the problem, but it s the first 10 per cent or the first 90 per cent."19 It has been suggested that the Gill Doctrine relies on coercion alone in order t o succeed. Suggestions have been made that as chief of Police, Gill neglected to win local support in the fight against terrorism.20 In fact, he spent much of h is time trying to mobilize Punjab s Sikhs against extremist violence.21 Where he d iffered from his more politically-correct colleagues was in the depth of expecta tion he placed upon such efforts. Whilst pacifists in the Police attempted to pu t the cart before the horse and rally the population against terrorism before as

piring for operational dominance, Gill reversed these priorities. One of the Gill Doctrine s most significant contributions to the study of low inte nsity conflicts has been the concept of a societal Stockholm Syndrome. 23 This conc ept holds that even in instances where popular support for militancy appears hig h, it may not be so in reality. Rather, such support might only amount to a surv ival tactic adopted by populations living continuously under the shadow of the g un. Once this point is appreciated by counter-terrorist strategists, it becomes possible to develop a response to terrorist violence that balances political sus tainability with operational effectiveness. Gill argues that the first objective of counter-terrorism is to break the collec tive mental paralysis that terrorist violence imposes upon individuals living in its close proximity. To achieve this mass-psychological transformation, it was necessary for the Police to engage terrorists operationally and physically isola te them from the terrorized. Thereafter, mass contact programmes could impress u pon local communities the impossibility of maintaining an ambiguous moral positi on on terrorism. Once these measures are taken, popular support for counter-terr orist operations shall appear, and in massive quantities. The Doctrine refers to this outpouring of popular support as the pressure cooker effect , and holds that it is as much a symptom of counter-terrorist success as a cause of it. Gill s aggressive views on counter-terrorism were not immediately accepted when he articulated them in the context of Punjab. Tensions arose from the fact that hi s was a rationality-based view of counter-terrorism, up against a sentimentality -based one held by the administration. To elaborate on this point: the Gill Doct rine is grounded in hard-headed Clausewitzian principles. The very ruthlessness of these principles brought them into inevitable conflict with the Gandhian idea lism that to this day, pockmarks Indian strategic thinking.24 Gill operated on the Clausewitzian dictum of first trying to understand what kin d of conflict he was engaged in, and then devising an appropriate strategy.25 Ma ny Police officers in Punjab however, stuck fast to the principle that force was only to be used when all other policy options were exhausted, not when the situ ation most demanded it. They continued to see Punjab as an ethno-nationalist con flict of the kind that had long troubled India s northeastern region. In the proce ss, they missed out on the qualitative impact that the politicization of religio n brought to the conflict. Unlike the northeastern rebellions, violence in Punjab, according to its initiat ors, was legitimized by the ultimate identity differentiator: religion. In the t errorists view, massacres of innocents were part of a larger offensive conducted in the name of the Sikh community worldwide. Thus, the fact that the majority of terrorism s victims in Punjab were Sikhs was explained away by a belief that othe r Sikhs supported the killers.26 Gill recognized that the religious element of the Khalistan movement meant it wa s closer to being an identity-driven struggle than one that was ideology-driven. The difference is crucial. While ideologically motivated terrorists can be induc ed to defect through intellectual persuasion, identity-driven terrorists create a psychological barrier between themselves and members of the out-group. Surmoun ting this barrier by non-coercive means is near- impossible, particularly when t he differences between the terrorists and the out-group are clearly visible. Rac ial and religious differences are two particularly potent dividers of identity. Political views are not, because they can be moderated through dialogue and prol onged discussion. For example, in the 1950s, a communist terrorist in Malaya cou ld be induced over a period of time to change sides and become a capitalist. Tod ay, a jihadi fighting in the name of his religion cannot change the fact that he is a Muslim.

As a Sikh, Gill knew the tenets of his religion better than anyone else. He knew that the Khalistani terrorists had developed a perverted interpretation of Sikh ism to resolve their own personal identity crises. Aware that they had inured th emselves against Government propaganda, he did not waste time trying to engage t hem in theological debates. Instead he appealed directly to their natural instin ct for survival. Gill offered the terrorists a stark choice: they could either d ie for their idea of God, or live for themselves. There was no third option. Man y Khalistanis responded as per logical dictates and surrendered. Those that did not, engaged in gun battles with the Police, and frequently ended up meeting the ir Maker. The uniqueness of the Gill Doctrine lies in the fact that it offers a template f or counter-terrorism which is potentially applicable across time and space. All terrorist movements share a common weakness: the need to constantly replace cadr es lost to security forces action.27 Failure to match recruitment rates to opera tional losses means that terrorist groups start to experience a manpower deficit . If this goes on long enough, it can lead to the terrorist movement simply with ering away. In order to be effective therefore, counter-terrorism needs to be co nceived of as a war of attrition. The challenge for the Government is to develop an operational capability for attrition levels which are intolerable for the te rrorists but politically sustainable for itself.28 By politically sustainable , what is meant is that counter-terrorism should make ev ery reasonable effort to avoid violations of human rights. Democracies by their very nature are conscious of the need to preserve individual freedoms and curtai l the power of the Government s coercive apparatus. It is therefore essential for security forces to develop excellent intelligence and investigative capabilities in order to ensure that only the guilty suffer.29 The Gill Doctrine provided a mechanism by which the rate of terrorist neutraliza tion in Punjab could be raised to exceed the rate of terrorist recruitment. It i nvolved the targeted repression of terrorists and their active supporters, based upon good local intelligence. Since the vast majority of the noncombatant popul ation was left unaffected by security forces action, sympathy for the terrorists did not automatically increase. Furthermore, by carrying out synchronized operat ions, the security forces could create large manpower deficits within the terror ist movement in a short space of time. These greatly hampered the ability of ter rorist groups to carry out diversionary attacks and thus helped in keeping the c ounter-terrorist effort focused. Once the political establishment was prepared t o acquiesce in the continuation of such an attritional counter-terrorist policy, terrorism could be wiped out without any concessions having to be made. In line with what has been said above, one may deduce that the success of the Gi ll Doctrine hinged upon three crucial variables: * The Quality of Local Intelligence * A Capacity for Synchronized Operations * The Degree of Political Resolve Each one of these variables helped security forces achieve one of the three possi bles of attritional counter-terrorism, upon which the Gill Doctrine was based. Th ese were to: * Surgically neutralize as many terrorists as possible, * As quickly as possible,

* For as long as possible. The three possibles outlined above triangulate the actions encapsulated within the Gill Doctrine, enclosing it within a complete analytical model that captures it s essentials. Rapid and Sustainable Attrition (RASTA an Indian word for way ) was t he guiding objective according to which the progress of counter-terrorist effort s was measured. While the Punjab Police were able to attain the first two possibl es within 19 months of Gill s appointment as Police chief, the third was not achiev ed until 1992. Terrorists could be identified and surgically neutralized on the basis of good local intelligence, and at a very rapid pace, but lack of politica l resolve undercut the Punjab Police s efforts. Not until the political establishm ent in New Delhi allowed Gill to continue his efforts without interference from would-be peacemakers, did attrition of terrorist cadres become both rapid and su stainable. In 1992, three distinct and separate factors converged to defeat the terrorist m ovement. These were: an intelligence-led Police offensive, a massive influx of s upplementary manpower to assist the Police, and the acquisition of a political m andate to eradicate terrorism. Previously, none of these factors had existed alo ngside the other two, and in isolation, each was insufficient to bring about a s ituational transformation in Punjab. By bringing together all of the three possib les at the same time, Gill put the Khalistan movement under unbearable pressure t hrough high-paced attrition. Its implosion was thus a foregone conclusion. The n ext three sections shall enunciate the relationship between local intelligence, operational synchronicity and political consensus on the one hand, and each of t he three possibles on the other. Local Intelligence Helps Distinguish Between Terrorist and Noncombatant Intelligence helps the security forces discriminate between those involved in te rrorist activity, and ordinary members of the population.30 It thus helps minimi ze harassment and inconvenience to the public at large, leaving the common man f ree to go about his business. Intelligence helps meet the first possible , by allow ing for the surgical neutralization of terrorists and their active supporters. T he reason that such intelligence is produced locally, rather than at the federal level, comes down to simple constraints of resources, doctrine and legality. Federal intelligence organizations have to cater to a multiplicity of consumer r equirements of which counter-terrorism is only one. Such organizations strive to assist policymakers before all other categories of consumer. The informational requirements of security forces at the tactical level are only fulfilled once hi gher priorities have been met.31 In effect, operational units in counter-terrori sm have to take the initiative in developing their own intelligence-gathering ca pabilities. The only alternative is to wait until the intelligence bureaucracy c an free up resources to begin meeting their requirements. Furthermore, the limited federal intelligence capabilities that are devoted to t he collection of tactical intelligence are usually oriented towards conventional military targets. Order of battle analyses of foreign armies and target acquisi tion in wartime constitute their main roles in supporting operational-level cons umers. The asymmetric structure and tactics of terrorist groups makes them a hig hly unusual challenge for intelligence systems. Barring counter-intelligence exp erts, who are accustomed to tracking down clandestine networks, many intelligenc e professionals have little knowledge of combating non-state actors.32 Also, intelligence organizations face certain legal handicaps in counter-terrori sm. It has generally been the case that Police officers, with their executive po wers, possess a comparative advantage in handling agents. A Policeman can negoti ate deals with an informer, which trade-off a reduced prison sentence in exchang e for his collaboration. By comparison, intelligence officers in democracies are

usually constrained from independently extending such offers to potential or ac tual terrorists.33 According to one Police officer who served in Punjab, in any counter-terrorist e ffort it is always the local Police who stand the best chance of acquiring actio nable intelligence.34 Traditional human intelligence systems, consisting of paid informers and professional handlers, virtually disintegrate in the face of targ eted assassinations by terrorists. Relying on professional intelligence officers to furnish information on terrorist activity is thus a recipe for perpetual int elligence failure. The only alternative is to empower operational units of the s ecurity forces to meet their own intelligence requirements. This requires the in fusion of large sums of money into the counter-terrorist effort, and its dispers al among tactical-level commanders. The lynchpin of Gill s intelligence strategy was the thana, or local Police statio n. Thanas were first introduced into the subcontinent by the British East India Company in 1793. From 1810 onwards, they began to be systematically used for int elligence-gathering. An elaborate network of informers, usually very disreputabl e characters, functioned as the eyes and ears of the Station House Officer (SHO) . Following the Sepoy Rebellion of 1857, thanas became the central nervous syste m of the British Empire in India. They served to detect the very first murmuring s of discontent against colonial rule and were very effective in suppressing the se.35 With the transition to Indian independence however, internal security policing c eased to occupy the same priority for the political establishment. It was assume d that democracy would act as a palliative to societal unrest, thus obviating th e need for a large coercive apparatus. The Police system in India thus began to lag behind external requirements posed by changing political and demographic tre nds. Infrastructure inherited from the colonial authorities was not built upon a t a rate commensurate to population growth.36 As a first step towards reinvigorating Police intelligence networks, Gill introd uced a regime of meticulous documentation of terrorist crimes.37 The purpose of this was to detect alarming trends and patterns in terrorist activity before the y gained momentum and became irreversible. Furthermore, data would be collated t o facilitate link analyses of relations between terrorist groups and individual members within these. Thereafter, the Police prioritized their man-hunting effor ts, focusing on interdicting those terrorists who constituted the most active no des of the movement. The idea was to exert a demonstrative effect upon the terrori st movement, without undergoing the prohibitive costs of chasing down rank-and-f ile cadres. Bounties were placed upon the heads of particularly notorious terrorists. To aid in the process of prioritization, terrorists were classed into A , B or C categories o n the basis of their commitment. Hardcore or category A terrorists were generally extremely violent and were targeted for special attention. Whenever less ruthles s category B or C terrorists were captured by the Police, they were usually required to co-operate in neutralizing their more fanatical comrades if they wanted to b e let off. During 1992, many such betrayals took place and had a cascading effec t on the fortunes of the Khalistan movement. The number of terrorists classed as priority targets for neutralization usually ranged between 30 and 40.38 Though few in number, these individuals continued lib erty in defiance of the Government made them poster-boys for terrorist recruitme nt. Capturing or killing them translated into a psychological victory for the Go vernment and thus became the focus of Police counterterrorist efforts. Here, the thanas played a crucial role. As bastions of Government authority situated squa rely amongst the local community, they possessed an institutional memory which n o external agency could match.39 Police officers knew the association matrices o

f prominent terrorists, right down to their distant relatives and childhood frie nds. They thus knew whom to approach for information while hunting for a particu lar individual, without having to question those unconnected with him. Federal c ounter-terrorist forces on the other hand, could not help but harass the innocen t along with the guilty during man-hunting efforts. The Indian Army s counter-terrorist operations in Punjab during 1984 provide a rea dy example of this point. Writing retrospectively, Gill outlined the intelligenc e challenges faced by the Indian Army when it chose to operate independently of the Police: [T]he classical defects of Army intervention in civil strife an extraneous and h eavily armed force suddenly transported into unfamiliar territory; mistrustful ( in this case, exceptionally so) of the local Police and intelligence, but with n o independent sources of information; dealing with a population, large elements of which had become hostile; and operating under a political fiat that not only condoned, but emphasized the use of punitive force. Operating blindly, the Army arrested large numbers of people, many innocent, others perhaps merely sympathet ic to the militant cause, but by no means associated with any terrorist or crimi nal activity. Lacking in adequate information to distinguish effectively at the local level, the [Army s] indiscriminate sweep pushed many a young man across the border into the arms of welcoming Pakistani handlers.40 By contrast, the Police possessed an in-built surge capability to gather intellige nce on terrorist related activity, which could be rapidly activated in a crisis. State Police officers possessed an awareness of local geographic, demographic a nd cultural factors that simply lay beyond the reach of their federal counterpar ts. Such knowledge proved invaluable in operational planning. For instance, a nu mber of terrorists often pursued sexual relations with favoured women in both ru ral and urban areas. Once the Police identified these women and where they lived , it was relatively simple to put surveillance on their houses and wait till the terrorists came calling. Once provided with additional funds for intelligence-g athering, Police Stations were able to intensify their coverage of terrorist act ivity within their jurisdictions. In Tarn Taran, the area of highest terrorist a ctivity, an elaborate system of informers allowed the Police to accurately ident ify terrorist harbourers in each village. Typically, the terrorists would come c alling at night, enjoy the hospitality of their hosts, and depart before daybrea k. Within hours, Policemen would descend upon the harbourers houses and demand an explanation for the nocturnal visitors. By repeatedly carrying out such raids, the Police conveyed to the population tha t hidden sympathies for the terrorists would not remain a secret. At the same ti me, raids on harbourers established a cause-and-effect relationship between the presence of militants in a neighbourhood, and subsequent Police activity. The Po lice were thus not seen as a hostile force, intent on disrupting the lives of lo cal residents, but as a force engaged in pursuit of specific individuals. The fa ct that only those who actually sheltered the terrorists were questioned also sp lit the large majority of the population from the militants and their active sup porters. If thanas were the building block of Police intelligence in Punjab, money-power was its lifeblood. The quality of information provided by informers was directly related to the financial inducements offered. The experience of Punjab in this respect tallies with what has been observed in asymmetric wars elsewhere. Human intelligence was crucial to the effectiveness of counter-terrorist operations, a nd such intelligence was usually the result of good policing and an established security forces presence at the local level. Since the Police were part of the s tate s civil administration, they were able to set up intelligence networks under the guise of civic action programmes. For instance, a number of Police Stations established hockey clubs in their jurisdictions to reach out to local youths. So

me of these were subsequently recruited as undercover operatives. Increments of money had a positive effect on the outcome of counter-terrorist ef forts, provided such increments were directed at the tactical level of the intel ligence hierarchy, and not the strategic one. Even indirect investments in local infrastructure could yield intelligence dividends, as became evident when the G overnment expanded the state telecommunications network. A number of individuals phoned in anonymous tip-offs regarding the whereabouts of wanted terrorists, us ually motivated by personal vendettas. Although strategic intelligence on the te rrorist movement was excellent, it was of little actionable value at the grass-r oots level. Indian intelligence agencies did not share a lot of their data on th e Khalistan movement with the Punjab Police. When it came to tactical intelligen ce, the volume of information locally developed and exploited by the Police was far greater than that provided by Federal agencies. Synchronized Operations Increase the Neutralization Rate Gill s experience of counter-insurgency in northeastern India allowed him to study and map out the comparative advantages of the Police and the military. Police f orces possessed a vital asset which could not be easily acquired by the military , namely, local intelligence networks. The Army on the other hand, had two advan tages which could be replicated by the Police over time: manpower and firepower. Both of these were essential to attaining area dominance over a terrorist-infes ted region. Area dominance in turn, helped maintain intelligence dominance since an improved incident response capability led to more terrorists being captured. More captures meant more information could be obtained from interrogations. The y also emboldened the people to increasingly volunteer information on terrorist activity as public confidence that quick action would follow increased. Therefore, after developing the capability to distinguish terrorist from noncomb atant, the next priority was to neutralize terrorists at the highest possible ra te. Gill aimed to improve the neutralization rate in Punjab by empowering first responders to react with maximum speed to terrorist incidents. Towards this end, he advocated militarizing the Police force: a move that brought him into confli ct with more conservatively- minded colleagues. For a start, there was strong bureaucratic resistance to the idea of upgrading P olice weaponry to match the Kalashnikov assault rifles available to the terroris ts. A view existed that no matter how grave the security situation, an ostensibl y civilian force such as the Police could not be armed with military weapons. These fears stemmed in part from worries that equipping the Police with assault rifles could lead to widespread human rights violations. In fact, the opposite turned out to be the case. Confident of their fighting capacity once provided with a su itable counter to the AK-47, the men of the Punjab Police grew more willing to c lose in with the terrorists during shoot-outs. By extension, civilian casualties dropped as the Police were better able to distinguish terrorist from noncombata nt. Less controversial changes included efforts to strengthen the vehicle fleet and the Police radio network. Eventually, the number of vehicles available for Polic e response teams was tripled, while INR 140 million was spent on improving the e xtent and quality of Police communications. In addition, the Police radio networ k was interlinked with those of the central paramilitary forces, who had been sp ecially inducted into the state to contain terrorism. The Police force itself wa s expanded from 35,000 men to 60,000 men, 65 per cent of whom were Sikhs. As had been done with the terrorists, Police Stations were graded into A , B and C categories to prioritize resource allocation. Category A stations were those within whose ju risdictions the largest number of terrorist incidents occurred. Their vulnerabil ities and inadequacies were subject to intense scrutiny, and additional resource s were allocated to rectify these. Different stations were afflicted by differen

t types of shortages, ranging from manpower deficiencies in some, to poor commun ications and transport in others. To a large extent, manpower shortages were offset by improved operational co-ord ination between the Police and central paramilitary forces. As chief of Police, K.P.S Gill was given operational control over central paramilitary forces within Punjab. Upon his instructions, joint Police-paramilitary interrogation teams we re created to improve intelligence-sharing and exploitation at the tactical leve l. This minimized turnaround time on intelligence inputs and thus enhanced their actionability. Prolonged interaction between local and central security forces also dissipated the initial suspicions that each held of the other. One of Gill s biggest innovations in employing Police manpower was the near-comple te abolishment of static checkpoints. Having observed the limited utility of bar ricades and roadblocks in interdicting terrorists, he did away with them. Instea d, Policemen were reallocated to the task of actively pursuing terrorists. By th is simple expedient, the operational strength of the Punjab Police shot up from 50 per cent of total manpower, to 85 per cent. Gill set a high standard of opera tional readiness for the Punjab Police. He aimed to attain a reaction time of 35 minutes in urban areas, and 15-20 minutes in rural areas. By a combination of the measures described above, and massive manpower support from the Indian Army, this standard was achieved in 1992. Ever since its assault on the Golden Temple in 1984, the Army had stayed out of internal security duties in Punjab. The reason was strategic: Punjab was a vital operational area in the event of war with Pakistan. For reasons already outline d, the Army s counter-terrorist operations had alienated the local population. Thi s was viewed as alarming, particularly when some Sikh battalions mutinied follow ing the attack on the Temple. Eager not to worsen the situation, the Central Gov ernment focused on handing over responsibility for counter-terrorism to the loca l authorities. For this reason alone, the Army did not come to dominate the coun ter-terrorist effort in Punjab. Elsewhere, the pattern of low intensity combat o perations in India has been markedly different, and more in tune with that seen across the world. Militaries are usually tasked with responsibility for counter-terrorism when the level of violence escalates beyond what is considered locally manageable. In su ch situations, soldiers are strongly inclined to either elbow out local Police f orces or subordinate them to military command. The presumption is that terrorist violence could not have escalated had the Police not been partially subverted. A fairly common tactic used in India is for the military to call for the setting up of a Unified Headquarters to combat terrorism. Although nominally a meeting point for various services to come together and work out a joint strategy, in pr actice such headquarters cement the Army s dominance of the counter-terrorist effo rt. In Punjab after 1984, there were no such maneuvers. Once suitably armed and equipped, the Police amply demonstrated that they were more than willing to conf ront the terrorists. Accordingly, when the Army was redeployed to Punjab in aid of civil power in late 1991, it was content to accept a secondary role. Under what Gill termed the cooperative command concept, the Army formed the anvil of the counter-terrorist effort while the Police acted as the hammer. Senior ter rorists were pursued across the length and breadth of the State by Police teams armed with specific intelligence. Meanwhile soldiers set up static checkpoints o n every road in the state to restrict the terrorists freedom of movement. In cont rast to 1984, their behavior towards the local population in 1991-92 was impecca ble, owing to the very tight supervision exercised by senior officers. When troo ps moved out on patrol, they were accompanied by Police guides. Army personnel p rovided the manpower that constituted the outer cordons of Police cordon and sea rch operations. This freed up large numbers of Policemen to be deployed elsewher e to carry out simultaneous raids, increasing the pressure felt by the terrorist

s at any one time. Through a system of interlocking radio networks, the Army was able to saturate t he countryside with section-sized quick reaction teams. These were authorized to respond immediately when asked for help by local Police detachments. Their fire power helped Police personnel overcome the deleterious effects of sophisticated weapons used by the terrorists. Thanks to Pakistani largesse, by 1992 these incl uded anti-tank rockets, landmines, medium machine guns and armour-piercing bulle ts. Although the Punjab Police had developed countermeasures against some terror ist weapons, the Army s assistance helped tip the tactical balance. The cooperative command concept was sustained by extensive liaison arrangements between the Army and the Police. Here, the nature of individual personalities co unted for a lot. K.P.S Gill had an excellent rapport with his military counterpa rts, some of whom he had previously befriended during postings in the Northeast. Orders were sent down the chain of command within both services, stressing the need for unity of effort and close co-operation in the field. From the strategic level down to the tactical, Police representatives interacted closely with thei r Army counterparts. Tactical intelligence was immediately disseminated to the w idest possible audience, so as to ensure total situational awareness on the part of all units. The Indian Army played a significant behind-the-scenes role even prior to its ac tive deployment in counter-terrorist duties in l991-92. It trained 20,000 civili an volunteers and 9,000 Police officers in combat tactics, through programmes wh ich lasted between 4 and 10 weeks. In addition, the Army complemented the Police s meager staff resources by helping to prepare operational plans for securing lar ge urban centres. Lastly, the Army helped set up a Special Weapons and Tactics ( SWAT) capability within the Punjab Police. The SWAT teams eventually grew to a t otal strength of over 10,000 personnel, or just over one-sixth of the state Poli ce force. With their high standard of operational readiness, their contribution in helping control terrorism during 1992 and 1994 was crucial. Lastly, the Police made very effective use of the mass media as an instrument of psychological warfare. K.P.S Gill had taken a decision way back in 1988 to allo w journalists unprecedented access to Police operations. The idea at the time wa s to counter terrorist allegations of Government atrocities. Once the media was given a ringside view of events in Punjab, it gradually grew to appreciate the d ifference between fact and fiction. For a start, journalists were able to indepe ndently investigate allegations of Police brutality, and noted that many were ex aggerated. One correspondent summed up the situation: "when there is no guarante e of security of life and property, citizens tend to believe anything." During the 1992 operations, Gill switched from defensively using the media to co unter terrorist propaganda, to employing it offensively. The neutralization of t errorists well-known for their brutality automatically made for a newsworthy sto ry. From June 1992 onwards, the press in Punjab was flooded by a series of repor ts on spectacular Police successes. With almost dazzling speed, the Police began arresting or killing all the top terrorists in the State. These individuals had , just six months previously, seemed beyond the reach of the law. Their deaths i n shootouts with the Police were greeted with marked indifference and occasional glee from ordinary Sikhs, a point that the media noted. Meanwhile, their confed erates in the terrorist movement noted both the rate of Police successes, and th e lack of popular reaction. Many began to defect from their terrorist groups, op ening a floodgate of intelligence information for the Police. Political Will is Needed to Sustain Operations So far, the first two possibles that triangulate the Gill Doctrine has been discus sed. To recap, these are: to surgically neutralize as many terrorists as possibl

e, as quickly as possible. Doing so for as long as possible however, proved to b e the biggest stumbling block for counter-terrorist efforts in Punjab. The Polic e were repeatedly stymied by political machinations at both the State and Centra l Government levels. Eager to ingratiate themselves with the militants, many pol iticians actively shielded them from justice. The political dimension of the Khalistan movement represented the only overlap b etween terrorism s root causes , and its sustaining dynamic. During the 1980s, one of the factors that had permitted the emergence of militancy in Punjab was high-le vel complicity from New Delhi. Eager to consolidate its political hold over the State, the ruling party in the Central Government was prepared to ignore politic al violence when it served to intimidate opposition parties at the State level. Politicians of all hues thus rushed to align themselves with militant factions, realising that this gave them extra clout while dealing with the top policy-maki ng elite in Delhi. In neutralizing the sustaining dynamic of terrorism in Punjab , Indian security managers necessarily had to split the politician-terrorist nex us. This was the toughest part of the counter-terrorist effort, and the most mur ky. Details of how it was done are non-existent, with only the scantiest of outl ines available. Basically, the Indian Government started by devolving power in 1985 to a promine nt regionalist party in the hope that it would combat terrorism. The scheme back fired. Regionalist politicians were not compelled, for reasons of political ideo logy, to confront the militants. Attempts to create a rift between extremists an d moderates in Punjab s political climate thus died stillborn, particularly when t he terrorists assassinated moderates. The next step taken was to impose direct r ule from New Delhi. Dismissing the elected State Government did not affect the security situation on the ground in practical terms. By 1988, the Punjab terrorist conflict was rapid ly escalating into a proxy war between India and Pakistan. Events within the Sta te started to be shaped more by operational, rather than political, dynamics. K. P.S Gill s efforts to strengthen the Police and integrate counter-terrorist effort s within a common strategy thus proved highly important in containing violence. Once Gill had demonstrated a capability to suppress terrorism however, politics intervened to assume primacy once again. In December 1989, a change of Government occurred in New Delhi. Eager to embarra ss its predecessor over the issue of terrorism, the new regime set about conscio usly undoing all that had been achieved. It initiated talks without precondition s with the Khalistanis, but primarily for public relations purposes. Over the ne xt two years, successive Indian policymakers sought to smooth-talk the terrorist s into giving up their demands. All the time, they avoided making any meaningful concessions as a quid pro quo. Terrorist violence skyrocketed in Punjab as a result of these sham negotiations. In a bid to prove its goodwill, the Government issued unwritten instructions fo r the immediate release of hardcore terrorists. These men had been captured at g reat risk to the security forces and the impunity granted them by the political establishment damaged morale. In addition, the Police were ordered to go slow on those terrorists who were still at large. While the Police were forced onto the defensive, recruitment rates to terrorist groups shot up. It was because of thi s that the Army eventually had to be redeployed to Punjab in 1992. Notwithstanding the impressive results delivered by the Police, the surge in ter rorist numbers between 1990 and 1992 forced the military to return. During this period, the terrorists scored a significant psychological victory when the India n Government conceded their demand to post K.P.S Gill out from Punjab. Realizing that Gill was their biggest nemesis, the terrorists and their allies in the Sta te s political establishment actively pressed for his removal. It was only when Ne

w Delhi forged a political consensus on eradicating the terrorist movement, and after another change of Government at the Centre, that Gill was posted back to P unjab in December 1991. During Gill s absence from the State, violence in Punjab escalated and eventually settled at a quantitatively new equilibrium level. Conciliation had encouraged m ore individuals to take up arms in the belief that the Government was powerless to stop them. Between 1981 and 1989, 5,521 people were killed by terrorists. Dur ing the following two years (1990-91), when the Indian Government made repeated negotiation offers, over 6,000 people were killed. The terrorists were so embold ened by the Government s keenness to accommodate them, that they felt free to targ et the Police. While 451 Policemen were killed by terrorists between 1981 and 19 89, the years 1990-91 alone saw 973 policemen killed. The terrorists went so far as to massacre the families of Policemen, including the women and children. Between late 1989 and early 1992, the Police fought an essentially tactical war against terrorism. Attrition of Khalistani groups was high, but was carried out more on an ad hoc basis. Political mood-swings in Delhi decided if and for how l ong aggressive operations against the terrorists could be initiated. True to for m, Indian policymakers would order an offensive against the Khalistan movement, and then suspend operations to reopen negotiations. They did not comprehend that the terrorists saw willingness to talk as a sign of weakness, and that this was keeping recruitment rates high. The essence of the Gill Doctrine was prioritization of resources and co-ordinati on of efforts. In order to produce a strategic effect, counter-terrorist plannin g had to be extended into at least the medium-term. Time was needed to work down the list of operational priorities, so that, instead of just fire-fighting, the Police could begin to rollback the terrorist movement. Starting at the top with the category A terrorists, they would work their way down towards the rank and fi le. Crucial to the Doctrine was the view that counter-terrorist attrition could be made both rapid and sustainable. By the early 1990s, the enlarged terrorist m ovement threatened to swamp the overworked Punjab Police. Policymakers in New De lhi, for their part, prevented the Police from operating aggressively. As a resu lt, counter-terrorist attrition in Punjab was neither rapid nor sustainable, des pite the higher fatality rates in all categories. In effect, Police efforts were dealt a body blow whenever mandarins in New Delhi sought to try out yet another political solution . Initiating negotiations with th e terrorists inevitably raised fears within the force of a political sell-out. N o rational Policeman was prepared to risk his life and that of his family combat ing terrorists, if there was a possibility of being abandoned by the Government. A number of terrorists had promised that they would pursue vendettas against th e Police if rehabilitated. Thus, whenever talk of a political solution was aired , many Policemen were compelled to hedge their bets. In order to ensure some continuity in the counter-terrorist effort while New Del hi vacillated, the Punjab Police began a programme of civic outreach. Police off icers actively mobilized peasants (particularly in the areas of the State border ing Pakistan) against terrorism. Since most terrorist attacks occurred in the bo rder regions, the people living here had no love lost for the Khalistanis, but w ere justifiably reluctant to actively oppose them. By continuous liaison with co mmunity leaders, Police officers gradually helped dissipate this sense of fear. First, the Police provided firearms to selected rural settlements, so that their inhabitants could take responsibility for their own defence. This became partic ularly necessary when the quantum of terrorist activity in 1990-91 exceeded the capacity of the Police force to de-escalate violence. Owing to their excellent l ocal knowledge, Police Stations knew from past voting trends where the political loyalties of each settlement lay. They began to arm those with Leftist sympathi

es first, as Punjab s communist parties had long been opposed to the concept of Kh alistan. Thereafter, Police parties of around 20-30 men would camp out in the settlements for days at a stretch in order to reassure the inhabitants of their support. Th ese parties also provided arms training to volunteers in local self-defence forc es. The nucleus of these forces consisted of former Sikh soldiers of the Indian Army, who were willing to take the lead in mobilizing their neighbourhoods to fi ght terrorism. In addition, the Police held public meetings, where the victims o f terrorist violence could narrate their experiences without fear of retribution . Since, in many cases, the victims were known to members of the audience, such meetings served to create a collective sense of anger against the Khalistani ter rorists. What eventually transformed the situation was the election of a State Government in February 1992, which was implacably hostile to the terrorists. Ever since th e assassination of Mrs. Indira Gandhi, the Congress party had been bitterly oppo sed to the Khalistan movement. A fortuitous electoral victory brought the party to power at both the Central and State Government levels. There was thus a stron g unity of purpose across the political establishment, which had been missing pr eviously. The Congress party, consequently, had only one agenda, to carry on the counter-terrorist fight to its logical conclusion and without let-up. It is commonly believed that the Congress Government gave K.P.S Gill a free hand to suppress terrorism in Punjab. Before the accuracy of this statement can be e valuated, the specific implications of the phrase free hand need to be understood. If taken to mean that the Police force was allowed to run riot, then the impres sion is wholly inaccurate. At no point did Gill ask for the right to commit exce sses upon the local population or for political acquiescence in whatever excesse s did take place. What he did receive from policymakers was an assurance that hi s force would not be ordered to call off its drive against the terrorists halfwa y, just when results were starting to appear. The so-called free hand only allowed the Police to do what they were in any case s upposed to do, but had long been held back from by interfering politicians. It w as a principled no-negotiations policy rather than a "string em up" policy. Had i t been the latter, the Police would have relied on inducing fear among the popul ation and browbeating it into silence. Instead, the Police worked throughout the conflict to restore normalcy to the lives of the citizenry, and allow them to g o about their daily business without fear of being killed. The free hand theory proved immensely beneficial to the terrorists as it helped sustain allegations o f human rights violations by the authorities. These were usually leveled by terr orist front organizations or political figures with terrorist links. Upon invest igation, many such allegations were found to be either grossly exaggerated or co mplete fabrications. Conclusion Questions began to be asked even as the 1992 counter-terrorist offensive was sti ll raging. Why had it been able to effect so sudden and massive a turnaround in Punjab s security situation? Gill, despite his unique experience and immense skill , had previously been unable to completely eradicate militancy from either Punja b or the northeastern States. There was something different about the 1992 opera tions, which made them far more successful than past counter-terrorist efforts. The fact was that, unlike his earlier efforts, in 1992 Gill was left to conduct operations untrammeled by politically-imposed handicaps. The counter-terrorist offensive of 1992 was so effective because all the three po ssibles were satisfied at the same time, creating the perfect mix of conditions t o crush terrorism. The first was the strengthening of Police intelligence and re

sponse capabilities, which had hitherto been allowed to atrophy. The second fact or was the massive deployment of the Army, which provided manpower to supplement Police operations. The third was the existence of a political consensus that th e Police would be allowed to get on with its job without interference. This last factor was perhaps the most important of the three. At no point of the conflict till then, had there been a clear political consensu s on whether it was possible to negotiate a peace deal with the terrorists. For local politicians, there had always existed a possibility that today s terrorist c ould be rehabilitated under a peace settlement, to become tomorrow s political all y. Consequently, each major terrorist had a political patron to shield him from Police action. It was only when these politicians realized that their terrorist protgs would be liabilities rather than assets in the State s future political clima te, that they abandoned them to the Police. For this, the Police needed to be se en as unquestionably in the ascendant and terrorism steadily on the wane. Allegations that the Police achieved ascendancy through brutality were proven to be demonstrably false, but not before they tarnished the force s reputation. One officer complained that "[t]he kind of actions that are treated as human rights violations when committed by the Punjab Police are treated as normal policing in other states." The general consensus among Sikhs in the areas worst-affected by terrorism was that Police action made their lives easier. They rejected the the sis that instances of Police harassment alienated the population, provided such harassment was directed at the right person. Perhaps the most important lesson of all is that today s terrorist movements diffe r fundamentally from those of yore. Massive noncombatant casualties are almost a necessary feature of identity-based rebellions, where ethnic cleansing and cult ural separation is the desired objective. Like the present-day al Qaeda movement , Khalistani terrorists were not interested in winning the hearts and minds of t hose who were not already within their identity group. On the contrary, the more Hindu-Sikh relations in Punjab deteriorated as a consequence of terrorist outra ges, the closer the concept of Khalistan came to reality. Given the high standard of living enjoyed by Sikhs in India, the terrorists had no choice but to opt for a purely destructive strategy, bereft of any forward-lo oking political agenda. Their only weapon against the moral authority and legiti macy of the Indian democratic system was religious absolutism enforced under a c limate of fear. India s previous counter-terrorist experiences have demonstrated that it is far ha rder to effect intelligence penetration of identity-based terrorist movements th an those that are ideology-based. Recruitment efforts in counter-terrorism becom e much more complicated when a handling officer s ethnicity or religious faith dif fers from that of his source. Even the Sikh-dominated Punjab Police got off to a slow and painful start when it came to penetrating terrorist groups. Much of th eir intelligence data in the early years of the campaign came from interrogation reports and it was only later that inside information could be obtained on a sy stematic basis. By contrast, Indian security forces have had little or no diffic ulty penetrating ultra-Left insurgent groups, since these are always on the look out for ideological converts. Furthermore, terrorist movements are increasingly drifting towards concepts of le aderless resistance and netwar . Gone are the days when political rebels needed a ce ntralized decision-making apparatus to guide them. Modern communications technol ogy and banking systems allow groups of like-minded individuals to come together for specific operations, wreak havoc and disperse. The Khalistan movement could not be defeated by political conciliation because religion proved to be a parti cularly potent fuel for self-starters in the terrorism business. Consequently, t he movement lacked a centre of gravity which could be bought off or otherwise in

duced to renounce violence and persuade others to do so as well. The Gill Doctrine offers a blueprint for future counter-terrorist efforts, as mo re and more political violence starts to coalesce around issues of identity rath er than ideology. The Doctrine holds that, while terrorism in any region cannot be defeated by a force from without, neither can it be appeased through concilia tion. The only viable solution in the long-run is to steadfastly improve the qua lity and extent of local policing, and leave the fight against terrorism to indi viduals recruited from the communities that the terrorists themselves claim to re present . Within India, a number of factors have conspired to prevent the Punjab experimen t from being replicated. First, the lessons of the 1992 campaign have been forgo tten because of a poor institutional memory. Second, the Indian Army has been le ss willing to accept a secondary role in internal security management. It did so in Punjab on an exceptional basis, due to over-riding strategic considerations. Lastly, local Governments have a vested interest in perpetuating the Army s presen ce. The presence of central forces allows them to shift the financial burden of responsibility for counter-terrorism to New Delhi. Indian policymakers need to m ake a concerted effort to overcome this last obstacle. Only once the operational capabilities of Police forces are improved at the local level, can counter-terr orism eradicate militancy. Otherwise, the use of military force shall succeed in containing terrorism, but not in defeating it. * This paper was originally prepared for and delivered at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 30 September, 2007. The aut hor would like to express his deepest thanks to Mr. K.P.S Gill and Dr. Ajai Sahn i for their invaluable contributions to the preparation of this paper. The Gill D octrine is the outcome of collaborative research between the author and the Insti tute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, India. * Prem Mahadevan is a PhD candidate at the Department of War Studies, King s College , London. 1. Ajai Sahni, Responding to Terrorism in Punjab, and Jammu and Kashmir, in S.D . Muni, ed., Responding to Terrorism in South Asia, New Delhi: Manohar, 2006, p. 69. 2. http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/punjab/data_sheets /a nnual_casualties.htm, accessed on June 24, 2007. 3. Manraj Grewal, Dreams after Darkness: A Search for a Life Ordinary Under t he Shadow of 1984, New Delhi: Rupa, 2004, pp. 121-2 and pp. 137-9. 4. K.P.S Gill, Lucrative returns of terrorism, accessed online at http://satp.o rg/satporgtp/kpsgill/terrorism/Jan6Pio.htm on May 21, 2007 5.

Bhaskar Sarkar, Tackling Insurgency and Insurgency: Blueprint for Action N ew Delhi: Vision, 1998, p. 44. 6. Interview of former Indian intelligence analyst Bahukutumbi Raman, Chennai , December 28, 2004 7. Praveen Swami, 38. 8. Interview of former Union Home Ministry official, Bangalore, August 12, 20 04. 9. The majority of terrorists in Punjab were Jat Sikhs. 10. Julio Ribeiro, Bullet for Bullet: My Life as a Police Officer, New Delhi: Penguin, 1998, p. 322. 11. Shekhar Gupta and Kanwar Sandhu, April 15, 1993, p. 63. 12. Paul Wallace (2006), Countering Terrorist Movements In India: Kashmir and K halistan, in Robert J. Art and Louise Richardson eds., Democracy and Counterterro rism: Lessons from the Past, Washington D.C: United States Institute of Peace, 2 006, p. 426. 13. K.P.S Gill, Endgame in Punjab: 1988-93, in K.P.S Gill and Ajai Sahni, eds., Terror and Containment: Perspectives on India s Internal Security, New Delhi: Gyan , 2001, p. 24. 14. Robert J. Art and Louise Richardson, Conclusion , in Art and Richardson, eds. , Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past, Washington D.C: United States Institute of Peace, 2006, p. 564. 15. Gill (2002a), pp. 1-3. 16. A point made by Dr. Ajai Sahni after reading an earlier draft of this pape r. Email correspondence, June 24, 2007 K.P.S Gill: True Grit , India Today, Delhi, Punjab s Tussle, Frontline, Chennai, November 18, 1994, pp. 36-

17. K.P.S Gill, Foreword x. 18. Sahni, Responding to Terrorism in Punjab, and Jammu and Kashmir, 19. Ajai Sahni and J. George (2001), Security and Development in India s Northeas t: An Alternative Perspective, in Gill and Sahni, eds., Terror and Containment, p . 313. 20. Ribeiro, Bullet for Bullet, pp. 349-50. 21. K.P.S Gill, Special Address by Mr. K.P.S Gill , in Lakshmi Krishnamurti, R. S waminathan and Gert W. Kueck, eds., Responding to Terrorism: Dilemmas of Democra tic and Developing Societies, Madras: Bookventure, 2003, p. 23. 22. K.P.S Gill, Dubious Things Called Popular Support , accessed online at http://s atp.org/satporgtp/kpsgill/terrorism/Dec01Pio.htm, on May 24, 2007. 23. Interview of K.P.S Gill, New Delhi, January 3, 2005. 24. At least two of Gill s most prominent detractors in Punjab were self-confess ed Gandhians. 25. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, London: Everyman s Library, 1993, p. 100. 26. According to one estimate, sixty percent of those killed by terrorists wer e Sikhs. Sarkar (1998), p. 45. 27. Phillip Heymann, Terrorism and America: A Commonsense Strategy for a Democ ratic Society, Cambridge, MA: BCSIA, 1998, p. 106. 28. It must be noted that there is a difference between attrition rates and kill rates. Attrition rate refers to the number of terrorists killed or otherwise neut ralized within a certain time-frame, relative to the number freshly recruited wi thin that same period. Kill rate refers the number of terrorists killed vis--vis pp. 32-33. in The Punjab Story, New Delhi: Lotus, Roli, 2004,, p.

own losses in combat. By 1993, the kill rate was fifteen terrorists killed for e very Police or noncombatant fatality. Manoj Joshi, Punjab s Progress, Frontline, Apr il 23, 1993, p. 63. 29. Michael Freeman, Freedom or Security: The Consequences for Democracies Usi ng Emergency Powers to Fight Terror, London: Praeger, 2003, pp. 11-12. 30. Sarkar (1998), p. 128 31. Stephen Sloan, Meeting the Terrorist Threat: The Localization of Counter Te rrorism Intelligence, in Police Practice and Research, Vol. 3, No. 4, 2002, Londo n, pp. 340-1. 32. Interview, former Police official, New Delhi, January 2, 2005. 33. Heymann, Terrorism and America, p. 27. 34. http://www.india-seminar.com/1999/483/483%20lal.htm, accessed May 30, 2007 35. SBasudeb Chattopadhyay, State Intelligence Network and Surveillance in Colo nial India, in Amiya Kumar Bagchi, Dipankar Sinha and Barnita Bagchi eds., Webs o f History: Information: Communication and Technology from Early to Post-Colonial India, New Delhi: Manohar, 2005, pp. 197-8. 36. D.C Nath, 2004, Intelligence Imperatives for India, New Delhi: India First Foundation, 2004, p. 139. 37. Gill (2001a), pp. 43-44. 38. Interview of K.P.S Gill, New Delhi, January 3, 2005. 39. Email correspondence with Dr. Ajai Sahni, April 10, 2007. 40. Gill (2001a), p. 30. 41.

Kesava Menon, 114. 42.

Terrorism: New Ethics, Frontline, 29 April - 12 May, 1989, p.

Subrata Talukdar, 43.

In Sheer Terror, Frontline, March 4-17, 1989, p. 11.

Praveen Swami, To bottle the genie, Frontline, November 18, 1994, p. 42. 44. For instance, during anti-Thugee operations in 19th century India and in c olonial Malaya during the 1950s. The key to British success in both campaigns wa s the introduction of large financial rewards for actionable intelligence, which were distributed by tactical-level commanders rather than sanctioned centrally. Mike Dash, Thug: The True Story of India s Murderous Cult, London: Granta, 2005, p. 200. Also see Noel Barber, The War of the Running Dogs, London: Fontana, 1973 , pp. 65-66. 45. Interview of K.P.S Gill, New Delhi, June 20, 2007. 46. Interview of former Union Home Ministry official, Bangalore, August 12, 20 04. 47. Interview of former Indian counter-intelligence officer, New Delhi, June 1 9, 2007. 48. Gupta and Sandhu, 49. Manoj Joshi, Combating terrorism in Punjab: Indian democracy in crisis, Conf lict Studies 261, Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, Lo ndon, 1993, p. 13. 50. A point made by Dr. Ajai Sahni after reading an earlier draft of this pape r. Email correspondence, June 24, 2007. 51. Gill (2001b), p. 187 52. K.P.S Gill, Punjab: The Knights of Falsehood, New Delhi: Har-Anand, 1997, p. 106. K.P.S Gill: True Grit, p. 64.

53. Ved Marwah, Uncivil Wars: A Pathology of Terrorism in India, New Delhi: Ha rper Collins, 1995, p. 219. 54. Gill (2001a), pp. 39-40 55. Manoj Joshi, Combating Terrorism in Punjab: Indian Democracy in Crisis, Conf lict Studies 261, Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, Lo ndon, 1993, p. 12. 56. In Northern Ireland for instance, the British Army classified certain data For UK eyes only , in order to prevent the local Police from seeing it. Brian A. J ackson (2007), Counterinsurgency Intelligence in a Long War : The British Experience in Northern Ireland , in Military Review, January-February Issue, p. 76. 57. http://www.india-seminar.com/1999/483/483%20lal.htm, accessed on May 30, 2 007. 58. Subhash Chander Arora, Strategies to Combat Terrorism: A Study of Punjab, New Delhi: Har-Anand, 1999, p. 163. 59. Manoj Joshi, Fear in the fray, 60. , 61. Interview of K.P.S Gill, New Delhi, June 20, 2007. 62. Gill (2001a), p. 73. 63. Ibid. 64. Pankaj Vohra, 65. Praveen Swami, Signs of Peace, Frontline, April 23, 1993, p. 71. Lawless in Punjab, Frontline, September 15-28, 1990, p. 16. Combating Terrorism in Punjab: Indian Democracy in Crisis. Frontline, February 28, 1992, pp. 4-10.

66. Gill (1997), p. 21. 67. .V Lakshmana, 68. Ajai Sahni, Responding to Terrorism in Punjab, and Jammu and Kashmir, 69. Joshi, Combating Terrorism in Punjab: Indian Democracy in Crisis, 70. Ibid., pp. 4-5. 71. K.V Lakshmana, A New Offensive, Frontline, April 14-27, 1990, p. 17. 72. Interview of K.P.S Gill, New Delhi, June 20, 2007. 73. Joshi, 74. For instance, a known terrorist ideologue was Professor Brajinder Singh, w ho was a close confidante to Sukhdev Singh Dasuwal, leader of the notorious Babb ar Khalsa group. In addition to advising Dasuwal on terrorist strategy, Prof. Si ngh also worked as an over-ground human rights campaigner against the Police. Pr aveen Swami, Life after terrorism, Frontline, September 23, 1994, p. 115. 75. V.N Narayanan, Tryst with Terror: Punjab s Turbulent Decade, New Delhi: Ajan ta, 1996, p. 17. 76. Gill (1997), pp. 105-106 77. Venkitesh Ramakrishnan, Punjab: A Festival of Politics, 94, p. 21. 78. Subrata Talukdar, 79. In sheer terror, Frontline, March 4-11, 1989, p. 11. . Frontline, May 6, 19 Combating Terrorism in Punjab: Indian Democracy in Crisis, p. 8. p. 4. p. 43. A new offensive, Frontline, April 14-27, p. 13.

B. Raman, Intelligence: Past, Present and Future, New Delhi: Lancer, 2002, pp. 257-8. 80. Interview of K.P.S Gill, New Delhi, June 20, 2007. 81. Interview of K.P.S Gill, New Delhi, January 3, 2005. 82. Leaderless resistance is in particular, an attractive strategic option for right-wing terrorist groups as their objectives usually involve preserving the existing order rather than ushering in revolutionary change. Audrey Kurth Cronin , How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups, International Sec urity, Volume 31, Number 1, 2006, pp. 23-24. 83. Gill (1997), p. 108. 84. The success of cooperative command between the Police and Army in 1992 was l argely due to the military s eagerness to avoid a repeat of Operation Woodrose. Se e Gupta and Sandhu, K.P.S Gill: True Grit, p. 64. 85. K.P.S Gill, The Danger Within: Internal Security Threats, Bharat Karnad ed., Future Imperilled, New Delhi: Viking, 1994, p. 129. ====================== Linkages between the Ethnic Diaspora and the Sikh Ethno-National Movement in Ind ia Suneel Kumar * Faultlines: Volume 19, April 2008 Exile is the nursery of [ethno-] nationalisma 1 - Lord Acton The Sikh Diaspora is integrally tied to the question of homeland. It is difficult to foresee if overseas Sikhs can remain aloof from the situation of Sikhs in In dia. 2 - Darshan S. Tatla States are neither the only, nor necessarily the most important, sponsors of eth no-national insurgent movements. Diasporas immigrant communities established in other countries frequently support kindred ethnic uprisings in their homeland, w hich has been controlled or colonized by the state dominated by a particularly m ajority group or/community. Despite being separated by thousands of miles, homel and struggles are often keenly felt among immigrant communities. Indeed, ethnic fighters receive various and important forms of support from their respective mi grant communities. Significant Diaspora support has occurred in the every region of the globe. Migrant communities have sent money, arms and recruits back to th eir countries, which have proven pivotal in sustaining ethno-national campaigns. This support has, at times significantly, increased insurgents capabilities and enabled them to withstand Government counter-insurgency efforts.3 In fact, relia nce on Diasporas to wage an insurgency has become an increasingly common phenome non in recent years. The Sikhs provide a particularly illuminating case study of attracting sympathy and support from their co-ethnics living abroad in Diaspora, for the ethno-natio nal struggle against the Indian state. The Sikhs are a dispersed people. Althoug h their origins are in the Punjab, there are probably no major countries or citi

es in the world where a Sikh community will not be found.4 The presence of Sikhs outside India is probably as old as the Sikh faith itself, shaped by the ten Gu rus between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries. Indeed, early Sikh traders developed small colonies in Afghanistan, Persia and Sri Lanka. Yet, the rise of Sikh mass migration outside South Asia did not occur before the enlistment of th e Sikhs in the British colonial army, after the annexation of the Sikh homeland Punjab in 1849, and the Mutiny of the Sepoys in 1857.5 The Sikhs were then decla red a martial race by the Britishers and many Sikh soldiers were subsequently post ed to places in British-held South-East Asian countries, including Thailand, Mal aysia, Singapore and Hong Kong. From there, early pioneers ventured to Australia and America. The first decade of the 20th century saw the rise of Sikh communit ies on the western coast of North America, but Canada started controlling the mi gratory flows in 1908. In the US, South Asian immigrants were denied entry by th e immigration Act of 1924. After the Second World War, Sikhs also started moving in large groups to North America where a change of immigration policy was imple mented in 1962 in Canada and in 1965 in the United States.6 After the attack by the Indian Army on the Golden Temple complex in 1984, the massive repression of separatist guerrillas and the massacre of Sikh civilians following the murder of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, a flow of Sikh refugees also started arriving in Western Europe and North America; around 10,000 in Germany, 800 in the US, 6,000 in Canada and the UK, 5,000 in Belgium and 4,000 in France.7 Today, the global Sikh Diaspora numbers one million individuals, three-quarters of whom have settl ed in the United Kingdom, Canada and United States. In 1998, in the United Kingd om, the Sikh Diaspora numbered between 400,000 and 500,000 individuals; in Canad a 147,440; and in the United States 125,000.8 These figures have, subsequently, increased substantially. People of the same blood attract! is a fact of an unconscious, non-rational and em otional side of mankind.9 Blood and soil, as Bismarck had said, can t be bartered.10 Thus the Sikhs living abroad, like other immigrant communities, also adapted to the circumstances within which they found themselves, but even then, never did de-link themselves from their ethnic kin and the soil of their ethnic homeland, Punjab. From time to time, they involved themselves in socio-economic and politi cal activities in Punjab. The early Sikh Diaspora remitted a great part of their income to their kin in Punjab. Through these remittances, they intended to prom ote the izzat or prestige of their extended families.11 Since, they planned to r eturn to their homeland, they expected these contributions to ensure them a comfo rtable family life. 12 Most of the Sikh Diaspora s remittances, then, went to buying land and expanding farms, in accordance with the ethos of Sikh farmers, who fav our land as a source of social prestige and social security.13 Further, inspired by the organizations or political parties like the Chief Khalsa Diwan of Amrits ar and Singh Sabhas, overseas Sikhs also founded certain Diaspora organizations such as the Khalsa Diwan Society in 1907 at Vancouver, and later in California. Similarly, the Sikh Diaspora set up Singh Sabhas and provided funding and advert ising to Punjabi causes.14 Due to the political mobilization of Sikh Diaspora by the political activists of Punjab in the early part of the 20th Century, Sikhs overseas started taking interest in homeland politics. Two intellectuals Lala Ha rdayal and Taraknath Das mobilized the Sikhs in United States and Canada respect ively. They advocated the liberation of India through armed struggle. In 1914, w hen Hardayal tried to convince his militants to return to India and embrace the fight for independence, 3200 Indians, a majority of who were Sikhs, answered his call and attempted to start an uprising in the homeland against the British Emp ire.15 Though, due to the Sikh peasants loyalty towards colonial empire and in t he absence of local political and public support, they did not succeed, this eve nt had an important outcome, with the Sikh Diaspora starting to develop its own politics. Again, albeit symbolically, overseas Sikh got involved in homeland aff airs during the Gurdwara Reforms Movement. One Canadian Sikh delegation, which w as joined by several Sikhs from Shanghai, Hong Kong, Singapore and Penang, took part in the Jaito Da Morcha of 1923-25. The Jatha started from Vancouver on July 13, 1924, and reached at Jaito in Punjab, in February 1925.

These events reflects that, from 1915 onwards, political actors and issues of Pu njab mobilized the Sikh Diaspora, benefiting from its funding and advertising an d, retroactively, the overseas Sikhs started developing their own politics, infl uencing the Punjab polity and supporting the homeland cause in return.16 In the post-independence period, the green revolution strategy in Punjab was fin anced partly by immigrants remittances. The financial clout provided by relatives abroad helped many Sikh farmers to take the risks with the newly introduced hyb rid varieties of wheat. In Jalandhar and Hoshiarpur, where water logging constit uted a major hindrance to farm productivity, overseas funds provided for many pr eventive measures.17 Similarly, investments in new agricultural machinery, seeds , harvesters and tube wells were made possible by overseas contributions. Betwee n 1953 and 1966, during the Punjabi Suba movement, the Vancouver-based Khalsa Di wan Society provided volunteers and funds for the movement. Further, between 198 1 and 1984, during the Dharam Yudh Morcha, the Babbar Khalsa and Khalsa Diwan So ciety provided volunteers and funds to their community.18 Tracing the origin and development of the demand for Khalistan among the oversea s Sikhs, in the present paper, efforts have been made to analyze how the Sikh Di aspora got involved in the Sikh ethnic uprising in India. What was the nature an d modus operandi of its involvement? Further, what was the response of the India n as well as host states, especially United Kingdom, Canada and the United State s, on the issue, and what measures were adopted by the Indian state to prevent t he Sikh Diaspora s involvement in the ethnic homeland imbroglio? The demand for a separate Sikh State called Khalistan came from the Sikhs within P unjab. However, the history of a demand for Khalistan among the Sikh Diaspora ca n be traced from the arrival of Davinder Singh Parmar in London in late 1954. He began promulgating the view that Sikhs required an independent Khalistan in ord er to ensure their survival as a community. Only one person supported Parmar dur ing the early stages of the movement, but he, nevertheless, contributed to newsp apers, distributed pamphlets and debated with his fellow Sikhs regarding the que stion of Sikh separatism. Parmar s idea of Khalistan was validated, however, durin g his 1970 meeting in London with Jagjit Singh Chauhan, who shared the formers u nrelenting commitment to Khalistan. In 1970, the Khalistan movement was formally launched in London at a Press Conference in Aldwych, located just opposite Indi a House, where the Indian High Commission offices are situated. During this early stage, membership of the movement consisted of three individua ls: Parmar, Chauhan and Mangat Singh. All these years, support for the movement within the Sikh Diaspora community was negligible and many Sikhs, including the d evout , viewed them as madmen .19 Chauhan continued to single-handedly disseminate hi s message to a largely unsupportive audience. He unfurled a Khalistani flag at a n event in Birmingham where hundreds of Sikhs were in attendance. In 1971, he or ganized a demonstration in Hyde Park in which demonstrators displayed several sl ogans proclaiming Sikh sovereignty. Chauhan s blatant anti-India display was a con tinuous source of embarrassment to most of the Sikhs who regarded India with dee p affection at the time. Issuing formal edicts against what they termed unpatriot ic behaviour, numerous Gurdwaras (Sikh place of worship) imposed sanctions agains t Chauhan and barred him from attending their services.20 In September 1971, Cha uhan held a Press Conference in London and made allegations of the oppression of Sikhs in India. On October 13, 1971, he sponsored a half-page advertisement in The New York Times explaining why he wanted Khalistan.21 In October 1971, prior to the start of the India-Pakistan war over Bangladesh, Chauhan attended the bir th anniversary celebrations of Guru Nanak s birthplace in Nankana Sahib in Pakista n and announced his intention to establish a Rebel Sikh Government at Nankana Sahi b.22 The Pakistan media immediately seized upon his statements about an independ ent Khalistan, and the ensuing publicity resulted in most Indians hearing about Khalistan for the first time.23 However, Chauhan had negligible support from the

community and most of the Sikhs in Britain, Canada and United States viewed his separatist position as extreme. The Akali Dal in Britain and Akali leaders in I ndia, including Sant Fateh Singh, publicly condemned his statements and expelled him from the party. In 1977, Chauhan came to India and stayed for three years and later returned to Britain in 1980. On June 1, 1980, Chauhan distributed a press release of the Int ernational Council of the Sikhs to the British media, which stated that it would institute consulates in the United Kingdom, Germany and other Western European countries. In the vision of Chauhan and his supporters, Khalistan was to be 850 miles long, stretching from Porbander on the Arabian Sea to Chamba in Himachal P radesh. The map stated that the creation of Khalistan was approved by the All Pa rties Sikhs Conference of London. Another goal was to obtain counsellor status i n the United Nations, but their bid was subsequently denied in 1987. Their plans also included setting up a government-in-exile in the U.S.A. and organizing an army of 10,000 there, and printing Khalistan passports, currency, and other state documents that would serve to legitimize the movement.24 The Government of India did pressure the American, British and Canadian Governments to curb the politic al activities of Chauhan and other Khalistan activists. Host Governments, howeve r, maintained that they could not press charges against Khalistani sympathizers as no laws were being violated in their respective countries. Chauhan was not the only early promoter of the Khalistan movement among the over seas Sikhs. Ganga Singh Dhillon, a naturalized American Sikh and the President o f Nankana Sahib Foundation, also committed himself to the promotion of Khalistan since the beginning of the 1980s. In March 1981, he visited India and was elect ed the President of the Sikh Educational Conference organized in Chandigarh by t he Chief Khalsa Diwan. The main outcome of the Conference was the adoption of a resolution which authorized the pursuit of associate membership in the United Na tions for the Sikhs. Chauhan and Ganga Singh Dhillon were also in contact with P akistani officials through General Daniel Graham, Co-Chairman of the American Se curity Council. He had arranged a meeting between Chauhan and Agha Shahi, Pakist an s Foreign Minister. Dhillon claimed Senator Mark Hatfield and Representative Ja mes C. Corman as patrons of his Foundation and Chauhan maintained contact with H atfield, Senator Jesse Helms, Senator Sam Nunn, Charles Percy and Alexander Haig . Due to his anti-Indian activities, the Indian Government cancelled Chauhan s passp ort in April 1982. However, when he was denied a visa to enter the United States , Senator Helms helped circumvent the barrier by inviting Chauhan to testify bef ore the U.S. Senate Agriculture Committee. He travelled to the United States und er a British Certificate of Identity. While in the U.S., he led 200 Sikhs repres enting about 10 organizations in Canada and the United States in a demonstration outside the United Nations (UN) asking for UN intervention for persecuted Sikhs in India.25 Anti-India feelings were noticeable in Canada by May 1982 when the Indian High Commissioner, Dr. Gurdial Singh Dhillon, himself a Sikh, was pelted with eggs and rotten tomatoes during a visit to Vancouver.26 Although, the idea of Khalistan was advocated early on by some individuals like Chauhan and Ganga S ingh Dhillon in the Diaspora, and was discussed and designed in the UK, the US a nd Canada since 1970s, it did not receive much popular support either within the Diaspora or in Punjab before the attack on the Golden Temple by Indian security forces. The events of 1984 were to drastically change the Khalistan movement, which had been, until then, considered by most overseas Sikhs as unworthy of serious atten tion. The events that occurred in the Punjab in 1984, created a deep sense of in security among the Sikhs in India as well as abroad. The actions taken by the In dian Government helped to expand and popularize the separatist movement among th e common masses. When the overseas Sikh heard the news of the Indian Army s assaul t on the Golden Temple, they reacted with extreme anger and grief and ensured th

at the feelings of their community were publicly known. The assault was perceive d by many Sikhs as a premeditated act of brutal sacrilege, a gesture of contempt , the manifestation of a conspiratorial plan to annihilate the Sikh traditions a nd humiliate the Sikh nation.27 The desecration of the Golden Temple resulted in moderate Sikhs reassessing their earlier loyalties towards India and reassertin g their collective ethnic identity. Many Sikhs, who had, prior to 1984, regarded themselves as moderate, became increasingly sympathetic to the separatist posit ion of the hardliners.28 In the United Kingdom, frenzied activities followed Operation Blue Star, with Br itish Sikhs turning out en masse on June 10, 1984, at a London demonstration pro testing the desecration of the holiest shrine. Over 25,000 Sikhs from diverse ba ckgrounds took part in the march that began in Hyde Park and ended outside the I ndian High Commission office. They proclaimed Khalistan Zindabad! (Long live Khali stan!) and unequivocally denounced the actions of the Indian state. Similar demo nstrations were organized by Gurdwaras in Birmingham, Bristol, Coventry and othe r cities with large Sikh populations.29 The Sikh outrage over the Army action in the Golden Temple was expressed in numerous forms. Several young British Sikh v olunteers offered their services in response to a call in the Punjabi media to li berate the Golden Temple. However, plans to return to Punjab were swiftly aborted by the introduction of stringent visa regulations by the Indian Government desi gned to curb Sikh extremism from abroad.30 Punjabi newspapers continued to be fi lled with vitriolic editorials, articles and readers correspondence denouncing th e action of the Indian Government. Photographs of Bhindranwale, Shahbeg Singh, A mrik Singh and other Sikh militants killed during the attack were displayed prom inently next to the ubiquitous portraits of Guru Nanak and Guru Gobind Singh in the Sikh homes and Gurdwaras.31 Moderate and respected Sikh leaders, especially Sardar Sampuran Singh Chima, Giani Amolak Singh and Gurcharan Singh, were upset over the way the armed action was conducted. They perceived the invasion of Gold en Temple as an attack on Guru Ram Das, Guru Arjun Dev and Guru Gobind Singh and on the Sikhdom as a whole.32 Earlier, moderate Sikhs were of the view that any solution to the Punjab problem will have to be resolved by the Sikh leaders with in India and a Punjab out of India, in the long run, would be injurious to the v ery interests of the Sikh community. Besides, in Britain, there was a common opi nion among the moderate Sikh leaders that unless the whole Sikh community of Ind ia and especially of Punjab would not stand for separate Sikh state, i.e., Khali stan, their demand for such a state would be a mockery of the whole concept of K halistan. However, the armed action brought a radical change in their opinion. F ollowing Operation Blue Star, they decided to support the Sikh uprising in India and also to make efforts for Khalistan, on their own part, using diverse method s.33 On June 21, 1984, a group of top Sikh community leaders in London asked the then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher for an interview to clarify the misunders tanding that had been created in her mind as a result of Indira Gandhi s communica tion with her on the Punjab situation. The Sikh leaders said that they were also approaching Amnesty International, the International Red Cross and the UN to as k them to investigate what they called was a crime against humanity , which Mrs. Ga ndhi had committed on the Sikhs.34 They added: We want a list of the dead, wounded and the missing persons, men, women and chil dren, from the Red Cross and we hope that Mrs. Gandhi will co-operate with them. 35 Giani Amolak Singh, President of the Shiromani Akali Dal in London, said that th ree organizations, i.e., Amnesty International, the International Red Cross and the UN, could find out the truth about the arms, weapons and drugs that were all egedly found in the Golden Temple complex. He said that the Sikhs would abide by their verdict. At the spot, a group of Sikh leaders decided to go on a world to ur to explain the cause of the Sikhs to various Governments. They also decided t hat after the completion of their tour they would hold a World Conference of the Sikh community in Vancouver, which would be attended by Sikh representatives fr

om Singapore, Hong Kong, Thailand, Malaysia, and all over Western Europe. It was also decided that they would bring unity among the diverse Sikh factions and a united front would be formed to fight against the Indian Government.36 During th e preparations to mobilize a worldwide public opinion against the armed operatio n in the Golden Temple, the interview of Mrs. Indira Gandhi on BBC TV became a s ubject of debate among the community leaders. They concluded that, from all acco unts, Mrs. Gandhi appeared to be very tired and faltered several times while ans wering questions, for instance, she called Mrs. Thatcher head of state instead of ead of the government. Her answer about the Akal Takhat was also not convincing. They were also not convinced with her statement that the sanctity of the Golden Temple had been maintained during the Army action and the troops had gone there to weed out the terrorists and terrorism, not to kill the innocent Sikh people. The community leaders also criticized Mrs. Gandhi over the argument that Pakista n was involved in the Sikh affairs. The argument was not convincing and just gav e an impression that she was trying to implicate the General Zia-ul-Haq Governme nt in Pakistan unnecessarily. All moderate Sikh leaders appealed to the Sikhs an d Hindus in India and Britain to live as brothers. Giani Amolak Singh and Sampur an Singh Chima said that the Sikhs and Hindus would always remain brothers. And, moreover, a true Sikh will never hurt his Hindu brother.37 The Sikh Diaspora in Britain had made a clear Oust Indira plan and determined, sim ultaneously, to work for an independent and sovereign Sikh state, for which Dias pora members called various meetings and passed resolution on diverse issues. On June 23-24, 1984, Sikh leaders, along with hundreds of their supporters, met in Southall and Kent. In Southall, the moderate Sikh congregation passed a resolut ion saying that the Sikhs ultimate goal would be to create a separate state.38 To this end, they formed a five-member committee. At the Kent Gurdwara, they passe d a resolution asking all the Sikhs in Britain and other parts of the world: * To boycott Air India; * To withdraw all the savings from Indian banks and; * To stop remitting funds for their relatives in India through any of the In dian banks. Despite regular appeals by Sikh leaders to community members to follow the Kent resolution, many Sikhs continued to travel to India by Air India. However, some started withdrawing their savings from the Indian banks and an insignificant num ber of them stopped their standing orders to banks regarding the monthly remitta nces to their relations in Punjab. However, finally, young Sikhs who took over t he leadership of the Sikh community from the elder leaders, became more active i n persuading the others to act seriously on these resolutions.39

Nevertheless, Sikh Diaspora organizations lacked unity on the various issues des pite their common agenda for the establishment of a separate homeland state call ed Khalistan . The calls for Khalistan , in fact, created further confusion among the disorganized members of the Sikh Diaspora community. Immediately, after the mili tary operation in June 1984, Sikhs in Britain were confused over the announcemen t of two separate Khalistan governments in exile. A committee of five members belo nging to the Dal Khalsa declared that it had established a Sikh government in ex ile and released the names of its Cabinet Ministers , which included Harjinder Sing h Dilgir as Foreign Minister and Jaswant Singh Thekedar as Minister for Home Affair s . However, on June 14, 1984, Jagjit Singh Chauhan, the self-styled President of K halistan , also announced the existence of his own government-in-exile and inaugur ated his embassy building with a purpose to issue passports to Khalistan citizens. 40 T wo governments-in-exile in one city (London) not only angered the sober-minded eld erly Sikhs, but also some young elements, who made it known that this kind of gim mick would not serve the cause of the Sikh community. According to them, some ambi tious Sikhs were making a mockery of their own cause and religion. Sampuran Singh Cheema, President of the Presidium of the UK Akali Dal, Gurnam Singh, Chief Adv isor to the International Council of Sikhs, and Harnam Singh, another Sikh leade

r, were upset over the Sikh ethnic uprising being exploited by the s they obliquely described these elements.

opportunists , a

On the other hand, the extremists were also unhappy. They were upset with Genera l Arora s television interview on June 13, 1984, in which he had not condemned the role of the Indian armed forces strongly. He merely said that it was true that the military action had hurt his co-religionists and created more problems than solutions. Sikh leaders, especially the militants, had expected him to call for r evenge. 41 Like the British Sikhs, the Sikhs in Canada and America showed their disapproval over the stand on their Vatican . By the evening of June 3, 1984, when the news of the Army action in the Golden Temple spread, many Sikhs converged on their neig hbourhood Gurdwaras and extraordinary gatherings took place. They interpreted th e assault as an act of sacrilege, a premeditated brutality, a gesture of contemp t and the beginning of a process to destroy the Sikh traditions. Tejinder Singh Kahlon, President of the Sikh Cultural Society in New York, called it outrageous immoral . According to him, by doing so Mrs. Gandhi was laying the foundation of a separate Sikh state. 42 Various Gurdwaras arranged prayers for those who fought fo r the sanctity of the Golden Temple Complex. On June 8, 1984, 250 Sikhs held a d emonstration at Massachusetts Avenue in Washington, D.C., a few blocks from the Indian Embassy. The very next day, 400 Sikhs protested outside the Indian Consul ate in Chicago.43 On June 10, 1984, processions were held in New York, San Franc isco, Edmonton, Calgary, Toronto and Los Angeles. Over 25,000 Sikhs, a majority of whom were moderates, marched on the streets of Vancouver wearing black arms b ands in protest against the military operation, chanting Death to Indira . At a maj or Gurdwara in Vancouver, an emotional appeal for funds saw many Sikh women taki ng off their gold bangles for donations while barely concealing their tears.44 S ome of the anguished Canadian Sikhs burnt the Indian National flag and raided th e Indian consulates. They also dishonoured Mahatma Gandhi s portrait in the Toront o Consulate.45 On July 28, 1984, Didar Singh Bains led 3,000 Sikhs in a rally in Madison Square Garden, New York City, which resolved to establish Khalistan, an independent sovereign country of the Sikh nation encompassing the present Punja b and the Sikh majority areas of India.46 On June 24, 1984, representatives of t he Federation of Canadian Sikh Societies asked the Canadian Government to stop d eporting Sikhs who had applied for refugee status until the internal political st rife in Punjab was over. Federation representatives and their lawyer met immigrat ion department officials in Ottawa in an effort to seek special consideration of their demand. They said that the Sikhs constituted the largest ethnic group app lying for refugee status in Canada. Between 1980 and January 1984, Ottawa had re jected the refugee claims of 2,470 Sikhs who came to Canada and staked their cla im for permanent residence, and had ordered them deported. Further, another 300 to 400 non-immigrant Sikhs still living in Canada, who applied for refugee statu s, had been ordered to return to India. Under a new order issued by the Canadian Federal Cabinet in February 1984, the immigration officials had been granted wi de powers to refuse visas to those people who were married to Canadian citizens or landed immigrants in an effort to stop marriages of convenience. 47 Prior to Ope ration Blue Star, for most of the Sikhs in Canada, Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwa le was a potent source of terrorism on Canadian soil . However, after his death whi le fighting against the Indian Army, he emerged as a great martyr of the communi ty. In Vancouver, bumper stickers announced, I love Bhindranwale .48 After the events of June 3, 1984, in a communally surcharged atmosphere, Akali l eaders in India and abroad were questioned within the Gurdwaras and through the Press. They were asked to resign for they had betrayed the Panth . The Akali Dal wa s paralysed, as its members were denounced as collaborators , agents or stooges of the Indian state.49 Henceforth, in the given circumstances and political vacuum, the new leadership came forward and formed numerous new organizations to struggle f or the communal cause. United Kingdom saw the emergence of new Sikh organization s like the Khalistan Council (in 1984 in London), International Sikh Youth Feder

ation (in 1984 in London and Midlands) Dal Khalsa (in 1984 in Midlands) and Punj ab Unity Forum (in 1986 in London). In the United States, Sikh leaders formed ce rtain important organizations including California Sikh Youth (1984), Sikh Youth of America (1986), Council of Khalistan (1986), World Sikh Organization (1984), International Sikh Organization (1986), Anti-47 Front (1985) and Babbar Khalsa International (BKI).50 Similarly, International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF, 198 4), World Sikh Organizations (1984), National Council of Khalistan (1986) and BK I, came into being in Canada with centres in important cities like Vancouver, To ronto and Edmonton.51 These new organizations played a crucial role to mobilize the Sikh community and further, to internationalize and propagate the issue of S ikh homeland, while raising funds and lobbying in the host states to put pressur e on Indian state to stop alleged human rights violations and suppression of the Sikhs. Propaganda was disseminated in a number of ways by these organizations, including electronic mail, the Internet, telephones, hot lines, community librar ies, mailings, television programmes and radio broadcasts, as well as political, cultural and social gatherings. They arranged various rallies, seminars, discus sions and publications and highlighted the plight of the Sikh community under th e Brahmin Hindu rule of the Indian state. Major organizations, e.g., the World Sikh Organization, Council of Khalistan, IS YF, Khalistan Council and Babbar Khalsa, started a number of daily, weekly, fort nightly and monthly newspapers, journals and magazines in English as well as Pun jabi languages. The name of certain prominent dailies, weeklies and monthlies su ch as World Sikh News, The Sword, Awaz-e-Quam, Chardi Kala, The Sikh Herald, Sha msheer-e-Dast, Sikh Messenger, Wangar, Sangharsh, Jago, Watan, Hamdard and Itiha s are mentioned in this context.52 Apart from the print media, Sikh organizations established a prominent presence on the Internet, with many of their websites fully documented and indexed on pop ular search engines such as Yahoo, Google, Altavista and Alltheweb. Leading proKhalistani Websites included: www.khalistan.com, www.khalistan-affairs.org, www. dalkhalsa.org, www.worldsikh.org, www.burningpunjab.com, www.panthkhalsa.org, an d www.khalistan.net53 On these Websites, Khalistani organizations advertised Kha listan, their workers achievements and biographies of their leaders. Through prin t and electronic sources, the Sikh Diaspora propagated the discrimination, atroc ities and oppression real and imagined of the Government of India against the Si khs in India. Sikh Diaspora organizations argued that Sikhs were slaves in India and that nobody was defending their interests; their homeland had always been t reated as a colony and that they had been discriminated against and exploited on the socio-economic, political and cultural fronts; everything produced by Sikh farmers was bought at a discounted price by the Indian establishment; Sikhs had contributed disproportionately (26 per cent) to the Indian Government s budget, bu t only 2 per cent of the budget was spent on their homeland, Punjab. In the lite rature, it was also propagated that the Sikhs were least favoured in Governmenta l jobs and that they had only one per cent of jobs within the Central sector. The Diaspora also highlighted certain factual information of military oppression o f the Sikhs by the Indian Government.54 For example, the Council of Khalistan cl aimed that the Indian state had murdered 250,000 Sikhs since 1984 and had held 52 ,268 Sikhs as political prisoners without charge or trial. It was also asserted t hat the kind of treatment that had been meted out to the minorities, especially the Sikhs, by the Indian state confirmed that India is a fundamentalist Hindu the ocracy and not a secular or democratic state at all. In 1997, Narinder Singh, a s pokesman for the Golden Temple, told America s National Public Radio: The Indian Government always boasting that they are democratic, and secular. The y have nothing to do with secularism, nothing to with a democracy. They just kil l Sikhs just to please the Hindu majority.55 The Sikh Diaspora argued forcefully that the Guru had granted the sovereignty to

the Sikh nation saying, In grieb Sikhin ko deon Patshahi (Give these poor Sikhs d ominance (kingship). The Sikh community, according to the Diaspora organizations , always remembers this dictum, reciting, Raj kare ga Khalsa the Khalsa (meaning t he Sikhs, but also the pure ) shall rule every morning and evening. It was then put forth that the Sikh nation must achieve its independence to fulfil the mandate of the Guru. The Sikhs should unite and start a Shantmai Morcha to liberate their homeland from Indian occupation . The main objective of this propaganda was to mobi lize the Sikh community and galvanize international support for the Sikh cause, while discrediting New Delhi by disseminating a consistent message of oppression and suppression of the Sikh minority. The experience reflects that Sikh organiz ations were far ahead of the Indian Government in the propaganda war. This short coming, occasionally, has allowed the groups to embarrass New Delhi and gain pol itical capital at its expense.56 To propagate the ideology and generate common support, Sikh Diaspora organizatio ns used the Sikh religious institutions. Operation Blue Star changed the opinion of a majority of Sikhs residing in the West, especially in the UK, USA and Cana da. Now, a majority of the Sikhs started looking for an independent Sikh state t o protect their faith and identity from further persecution by the Hindu Indian s tate . Sensing a change in the public sentiment, Sikh Diaspora organizations and s ympathizers implemented a strategy to consolidate their support in the Sikh Dias pora. The strategy invoked taking control of the central institutions in the Sik h faith, the Gurdwaras. Sikh organizations and sympathizers understood that if t hey were able to control the functioning of Gurdwaras, they would have access to a large congregation to whom they could preach the virtues of establishing Khal istan and who could provide them with access to the financial resources of these institutions to support the Khalistan movement. During this period, there was a dramatic shift in the composition of democratically elected committees of Gurdw aras, with moderate committees being removed and militant organizations being el ected into power. Many of these Sikh Gurdwaras were controlled by or had links t o Sikh militant organizations like the Dal Khalsa, World Sikh Organization (WSO) , BKI, ISYF, Khalistan Commando Force (KCF) and Khalistan Liberation Force (KLF) , as well as other small organizations which were operating in Punjab from the f oreign soil. Between 1984 and 1993, these Sikh organizations controlled the reli gious institutions and entrenched their ideology in the Western Sikh consciousne ss. As the Khalistani lobby consolidated its power in Gurdwaras, it began to expose the Sikh congregations to the extremist ideology. Executive committee members, g ranthis (Sikh preachers) and dhadis (religious hymn singers) gave fiery sermons condemning the actions of the Indian state. The Sikh masses were exposed to stor ies of Sikhs being persecuted in Punjab and were shown images of Sikh martyrs who had sacrificed their lives for the communal cause. They spoke to their public ab out the need for an independent Sikh state based on religious doctrine, in order to protect the Sikh population from further persecution. They justified the use of violence in this pursuit as it was a last resort thrust upon the Sikh populati on. Thus, the Gurdwaras emerged as a new platform from where the Khalistani lobb y justified and legitimately propagated the ideological underpinnings of the Sik h ethno-national movement in India.57 Alongside propaganda, a significant amount of money used to support and fight fo r Khalistan was raised from the Sikh Diaspora. In fact, after the Indian Army s at tack on the Golden Temple complex, support and money for the revolutionary cause had increased dramatically among Sikh emigrants. Britain emerged as the biggest centre for financing the Sikh militants in India. Funds were being illegally fu nnelled out of Britain to Pakistan and other countries where the Sikh militant l eadership was located.58 Gurdwaras in the United States, England and Canada gave thousands of dollars a week to support the revolutionary movement in Punjab. Manb ir Singh Chaheru, Chief of the Khalistan Commando Force in Punjab, had confessed that he had received more than 60,000 dollars from Sikh organizations in Britai

n and Canada.59 In Canada, the ISYF, which controlled Gurdwaras in Abborts Fort, New Westminster, Surrey, near Vancouver and on Ross Street, Vancouver, had rais ed huge amounts of funds from the Sikh Diaspora. In 1984, it had launched a memb ership drive in Canada and charged five dollars as fees. Those who did not enrol were branded as agents of Government agencies. To avoid suspicion, most Sikhs b ecame members. The ISYF also established a human rights organization known as the Khalsa Human Rights Group, which subsequently emerged as a powerful fundraising unit of pro-Khalistani Sikh militants located in foreign countries. In 1991, the ISYF launched the Bhai Amrik Singh Shaheed Fund in UK, reportedly to assist the f amilies of Sikh militants killed in security forces operations in Punjab. It also promised to send more money in the future.60 The World Sikh Organization, anoth er Sikh Diaspora organization, had financed and arranged the visit of Canadian p arliamentarians Barbara Greene, Derek Lee and Svend Robinson to Punjab from Janu ary 15 to January 22, 1992.61 The overseas Sikh organizations had also received funds from the Government in C anada. According to Indian diplomatic circles in Canada, the Federation of Sikh Societies, many of whose members were advocating a separate Sikh state, was rece iving funds estimated to be 9,000 dollars yearly from the Canadian Government si nce 1982 when the Sikh Federation had been started. However, the Government fund s were not being given to the Sikh organization to preach and promote secession in India, but were being wrongly used for that purpose. The money so given was p art of a budgetary fund that was earmarked every year for the promotion of Canad a as a multi-cultural society. Representative groups emanating from different co untries of the world that had settled in Canada received the funds from Governme nt to enable them to maintain their ethnic identity. Thus, the Indian community as a whole received part of this funding every year. But the Sikhs who were part of the Indian community received special treatment and received large sum of mo ney, much of which was used to promote militant activities against the Indian st ate.62 India and Canada are both members of the Commonwealth and, as such, are t ied by such bonds of friendship and are expected to discharge certain political and diplomatic obligations towards each other. Thus, when funds provided by one Commonwealth country were going to finance militant ethnic secessionism in the o ther Commonwealth country, this surprised many.63 Sikh Diaspora organizations sent money to militant organizations in Punjab to bu y arms and ammunition and to fulfil other requirements in the field. In 1981, th e Babbar Khalsa reportedly raised 60,000 Canadian dollars in the UK and Canada a nd this was sent to Babbar Khalsa militants active in Punjab. In 1982, Talwinder Singh Parmar received 35,000 US dollars from Canada, which was later used to sp onsor Babbar Khalsa attacks against the Nirankaris and Indian authorities. Besid es the militant organizations, in the post-1984 period, funds were sent for huma nitarian causes as well as legal expenditure to defend the militants and other p eople put on trial before the Indian judiciary. The Diaspora organizations transferred money to militant groups in Punjab primar ily through three methods: First, money was deposited or transferred directly in to Indian bank accounts controlled by the Sikh militant group or individual memb ers sympathetic to the communal cause, with funds later withdrawn for organizati onal use. Second, money was sent through third parties, mainly unregistered fore ign money exchanges. These foreign exchanges transferred money through agents to specific locations within India and all over the world. This method of money tr ansfer was effective because the money could not be traced and senders remained anonymous. Third, human mules who were the members or supporters of the Sikh milit ant organizations based abroad were used to transfer the money to the Sikh milit ants in Punjab. Many times, these individuals travelled to India or Pakistan wit h huge amounts of money in their possession. Once individuals arrived in India o r Pakistan, they made contact with the specific organizations and distributed th e money through their organizational structures. It is well established that mem bers of the BKI, ISYF, KCF and WSO travelled to India and Pakistan to provide fu

nds, raised abroad, to their militant organizations.64 The Diaspora leadership lobbied with various Government officials, parliamentari ans and international human rights agencies. The strategies of the Sikh Diaspora were determined by their perceptions, resources and also by the lobbying system of each host state. In the United States, ethnic diplomacy is well established and is a part of Congressional proceedings. Consequently, the Sikh Diaspora gain ed considerable support from US Congressmen for the cause of Khalistan and on th e issue of human rights violations by the Indian state. In fact, the Sikh lobby led by Gurmit Singh Aulakh of the Council of Khalistan in the United States made extensive contacts with US Congressmen. To get their support, the Sikh lobby ex ploited the poor history of India-US relations. With Pakistan as a stable ally s ince 1959, India had been relatively peripheral to the US strategic and politica l interests in South Asia. The United States was not satisfied with several aspe cts of India s domestic and foreign policy, such as its Afghan policy, rejection o f the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its refusal to discuss the nuclear re straints with Pakistan; its missile and space programmes, trade frictions with t he United States and the sharp deterioration of its relations with Nepal and Sri Lanka.65 The Sikh lobby exploited the situation to get the support of US Congre ssmen. Sikh Diaspora leaders, especially Aulakh, highlighted anti-US activities by the Indian state, focusing on the anti-US stand at the United Nations and In dia s help to Iran to build up its military arsenal. The Sikh lobbyists honoured t he Congressmen and contributed to their campaign funds. The Sikhs had establishe d early links with the US Congressmen from California, Norman Shumway, Wally Her ger and Vic Fazio. In October 1986, Herger was given $ 10,000 for a fundraising dinner.66 Later on, in August 1988, Dan Burton was presented with a Sikh Heritag e Award.67 Again, in February 1993, he was presented with a plaque in recognitio n of his solidarity and support to the Sikh nation.68 Fizio was honoured at the National Press Club in February 1993, while Pete Geren was honoured in a Gurdwar a.69 When meeting with these Congressmen, Sikh leaders discussed the issue of th e alleged large-scale violation of human rights against the Sikhs in India. These Congressmen heard the Sikhs pleas with sympathy and they emerged gradually as consistent supporters of the Sikh cause. From time to time, these US Congress men introduced resolutions in the House of Representatives in support of the Sik h cause and ultimately to pressurize the Indian Government. Thus, in August 1988 , Shumway introduced a Congressional resolution concerning human rights of the S ikhs in India. The debate was usually initiated as an amendment to the House For eign Aid Bill. In 1989, Wally Herger moved a resolution proposing that United St ates not only freeze its bilateral aid to India but also prevent international f inancial institutions like the World Bank from extending economic assistance to the Indian state until it stopped the human rights violation in Punjab and aband oned its missile development programme. The US bilateral aid to India, at that t ime, was a mere 25 million dollars, but India s dependence on World Bank and IMF a id was considerable. Therefore, the Herger move was not easy to ignore for India . It was hotly debated in the House and was defeated by 212 to 204 votes, a marg in of a mere eight votes. Of course, the Herger amendment, to be sure, had littl e chance of being passed into law, even if the House of Representatives had adop ted it.70 Nevertheless, the considerable support that it received was a sufficie nt booster for the Khalistani lobby. Consequently, they moved many other resolut ions against India. In 1991, Dan Burton sponsored a more stringent resolution to stop the US development assistance programmes for India unless international ag encies were allowed to monitor human rights. In 1992, a similar resolution was p assed, which led to a small reduction in development assistance to India. Burton reintroduced a bill to the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House of Represe ntatives in June 1993. In the bill, Burton had sought to cut off aid if India fa iled within 60 days to repeal five preventive detention laws, which included the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA) of 1987, National S ecurity Act (NSA) of 1980, Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act of 1978, and Arme d Forces (Punjab and Chandigarh) Special Power Act of 1990. It took 10-hours to

debate the bill before it was defeated by 233 to 201 votes. Despite the defeat o f the Burton Amendment, 1993, the Sikh lobby succeeded in convincing a large num ber of US Congressmen about human rights violation in India. Even the members wh o had voted against the Bill shared Burton s concern for human rights. Further, pr o-Sikh Congressmen succeeded in the House when, on the same day, the House adopt ed another amendment, by voice vote and without discussion, seeking to deny Indi a USD 345,000, allocated in the bill under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) Programme.71 The American Overseas Interests Act stipulates the cut of 70.4 million in US dev elopment aid to any country that did not vote with US at the UN at least 25 perc ent of the time. India s record of voting against the United States at the United Nations, consequently, became an issue due to which, on May 24, 1995, the US Con gress passed the Burton Amendment effectively cutting USD 364,000 from the IMET Programme.72 On May 25, 1995, Dan Burton stated in the House of Representatives: the House approved my amendment to deny development aid to any nation that votes against the United States more than 75 percent of the time at the United Nations . One of the countries that votes against us at the U.N. 80 to 90 percent of the time every year is India India is also one of the world s worst human rights abuse rs. For years, I have criticized the atrocities committed by Indian security for ces against Sikhs in Punjab, Muslims in Kashmir and Christians in Nagaland this i ssue is one of the main reasons I offered my Amendment. Any country that consist ently votes against us at the U.N. and systematically violates the human rights of innocent civilians should not receive foreign aid from us. Indian security fo rces in Punjab and Kashmir routinely torture political prisoners, gang rape wome n, and abduct innocent people to demand, ransoms from their families In Punjab, t orture and murder victims are thrown into canals, usually with their hands and f eet still tied. Dozens of bodies are found every time a canal is drained for rep airs... we must demand that India respect the human rights of all people, and gr ant them freedom, democracy and basic human rights. Until India stops the abuses and begins to vote with us even occasionally, at the United Nations, we should not give that country our foreign aid.73 Obviously, Congressmen and House of Representatives emerged as a big platform fo r the Sikh Diaspora. Through it, the Diaspora succeeded to pressurize the Indian state on the issue of human rights, by introduction of Foreign Aid Bills in the House. On numerous occasions, they succeeded in passing the bill to cut off US aid to India. Furthermore, pro-Sikh Congressmen challenged India s democratic stat us and argued in favour of designating India as a terrorist state . For instance, C ongressman Edolphus Towns, contended, on October 6, 1998: the Government of India has murdered more than 250,000 Sikhs since 1947, almost 6 0,000 Kashmiri Muslims since 1988, and tens of thousands of Assamese, Tamils, Ma nipuris, Dalits and others between 1992 and 1994 the Indian Government paid over 41,000 cash bounties to Police officers for murdering Sikhs. Two Canadian journa lists published a book called Soft Target in which they proved that the Indian G overnment blew up its own airliner in 1985 just to blame the Sikhs. In this ligh t, the United States must declare India a terrorist state we must then impose al l the sanctions that we impose on any other terrorist state.74 In the changing atmosphere of Indo-US relations, the resolution failed to attra ct the attention of significant numbers of US Congressmen and of public opinion. But, again on the part of Sikh Diaspora, this was another major achievement on the propaganda front as it put the democratic image and reputation of world s larg est democracy at stake before the international community. Sikh lobbyists also sought support for the Sikhs right to self-determination. On February 22, 1995, Pete Geren along with another 28 Members submitted a resoluti

on in the House of Representatives stating that the Sikh nation should be allowe d to exercise the right to self-determination in their homeland, Punjab-Khalistan . The resolution was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.75 In a separat e move, in March 1997, Gary Condit and Dana Rohrabacher introduced a bipartisan resolution, H. Con. Res. 37, which argued: the Sikh nation should be allowed to exercise the right of national self-determin ation in their homeland, Punjab, .a plebiscite should be held in Punjab, Khalista n, on the question of independence, under the international supervision, so that the Sikhs can determine their political future in a free and fair vote in accor dance with international law.76 On occasion, under the strong influence of Sikh lobbyists, US Congressmen wrote to the Indian Government to improve their human rights record , particularly agains t the Sikh community. For instance, on January 30, 1995, David E. Bonier wrote t o the then Indian Prime Minister, P.V. Narasimha Rao, to review the case of Simr anjit Singh Mann, who was arrested under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act. He also urged the Government to amend the draconian laws to conform with int ernational human rights standards.77 The Congressmen also expressed concern at the proposed extradition treaty with I ndia. On February 10, 1995, 43 members of the House of Representatives wrote in a letter that anti-perspective provision should be included in the proposed extrad ition treaty between the Government of India and Government of United States, so that individuals could be protected from persecution on the basis of race, reli gion, nationality, or political belief in India.78 Gurmit Singh Aulakh himself o pposed the India-US Extradition Treaty. He decried the treaty s effect on politica l asylum seekers by claiming that: if Sikh activists are returned to the clutches of the Indian tyrants I fear for t heir lives. They will almost certainly be tortured and murdered by the world s lar gest democracy.79 Aulakh wrote many letters to international personalities for which he got some p ositive response. For instance, on February 5, 1997, the then US Vice President Al Gore wrote a letter to Aulakh in which he described the Sikh uprising in Punj ab as the ongoing civil conflict in Khalistan and viewed it as a serious situation . Gore wrote: Civil conflict in any nation, and the inevitable hardships and bloodshed that in flicts on that nations civilian population, offends our sense of human dignity an d our humanitarian ideals A high priority of this nation s foreign policy agenda is to strengthen efforts to promote democracy and uphold human rights in regions a cross the globe.80 Again, this was a major achievement for the Sikh lobbyists, especially for Gurmi t Singh Aulakh. In a Press Release on February 25, 1997, the Council of Khalista n said that, by acknowledging the civil conflict in Khalistan, Al Gore s letter im plied recognition of Khalistan s independence. The letter energized the struggle for Khalistan.81 It appeared that U.S. foreign policy supported human rights includ ing the basic right to self-determination, which underlined the Sikh struggle fo r an independent Khalistan. The Khalistani activists were aided by a long history of ethnic diplomacy in the United States and were able to pressurize the Indian Government through US Cong ressmen. However, the United Kingdom and Canada, with their respective parliamen tary systems, did not prove as accommodative of their efforts to influence IndoBritish and Indo-Canadian diplomatic relations. Hence, the British and Canadian Khalistan activities, in comparison to their counter-parts in the US, were much more limited in scope. Because of the Sikh concentration in certain areas, howev

er, a few British Members of Parliament, such as Terry Dicks and Lord Avebury, d id voice concern in the British Parliament regarding the Sikh issue. They tended to focus almost exclusively on the Indian Government s human rights record in Pun jab. Both the ISYF and the Khalistan Council highlighted the cases of the relati ves of British Sikhs who were allegedly tortured, killed or who disappeared whil e in the custody of the Indian security forces. In November 1992, Dicks, a Conse rvative MP from Hayes and Harlington, opened the debate in the House of Commons by saying: I want to mention yet again in the House, the persecution of Sikhs in the Punjab . Members of the Sikh community living in my constituency and Sikhs throughout t he world have been concerned for the safety of family and friends living in the Punjab. The rape of young women, the beating of old men and the murder of young boys, to say nothing of the imprisonment without trial of many thousands of inno cent people, has been going on since 1984 and continues unabated. Indian securit y forces are killing hundreds of innocent Sikhs in fake encounters and there is evidence that those forces have swept through villages in the Punjab intent on n othing less than widespread slaughter.82 Dicks then referred to the continuous central rule over the Sikh homeland , Punjab, the unfettered powers given to the Security Forces under special legislation relat ing to national security , the resultant lack of legal safeguards for the protectio n of human rights and a similar campaign of oppression in Kashmir. Referring to the role of the British Parliament in this regard, he stated that Parliament had re fused to condemn atrocities carried out by the Indian Government, No matter how well documented they are by Amnesty International. It has happened because of friendship of British Government with India as a Commonwealth country and due to its close relationship with the Indian Congress Party and the Gandhi family in particular. Actions of this kind, that were condemned elsewhere by the British Government, have been ignored in India (sic).83 While questioning the successive Indian Governments claims that they rule the wor ld s largest democracy, he castigated the British Government: How can governments, who went to war to defend the rights of the Kuwaitis, in th eir own country refuse to bring pressure on the Indian Government to recognize t he rights of the Sikhs in Punjab? Are the Kuwaitis more important than the Sikhs ? Or, can it be that much of the world s oil comes from the Middle East but only f ood to feeding millions of hungry mouths is produced in the Punjab?84 Further, he added that the abuse of human rights cannot be condoned no matter wh ether it takes place in a Middle Eastern country or a country that belongs to th e Commonwealth. Therefore, the British Government should have a consistent posit ion on human rights.85 According to him, the British Government had a unique mor al responsibility in this regard, because, In 1947, when India obtained its independence, it was the British who accepted a guarantee by the Hindus, who make up 84 percent of the population, that the sel f-determination of the Sikhs in the Punjab would be recognized. On that basis th e British Government granted India its independence. Unfortunately for the Sikhs the British Government has done nothing to enforce the guarantee and successive Congress Party dominated Indian Governments have been able to ignore the pledge .86 Dicks held that both the Indian and British Governments were responsible for the Sikh ethno-secessionist uprising in Punjab. He demanded that the British Govern ment should pursue a policy linking overseas aid to a country s human rights recor d. He was of the view that the new approach would be brought firmly to the atten tion of the Indian Government who, at that time, received more than GBP 100 mill

ion annually under the British Overseas Aid Programme.87 He also pleaded that if the British Government were to take a tough stand on the abuse of human rights in India and persuade the Indian Government to recognize the rights of the Sikhs in the Punjab, the majority of the Sikhs throughout the world would be prepared to renounce violence as a method of achieving their objective of self-determina tion and would welcome the opportunity to meet with anyone at an international f orum in an attempt to come to a peaceful settlement of the problem.88 Jacques Arnold, another Conservative MP from Gravesham, supported Dicks on the h uman rights aspect of the Sikh uprising. Though he refrained from making any com ment on the self-determination aspect raised by Dicks, Arnold highlighted the conc erns and anxieties of his Sikh constituents who expressed great misery and anxie ty about the fate of their families in the Punjab where, according to him, there was a total denial of democratic rights by the state.89 In more recent years, Sikh activists have received the support of other Parliame ntarians, such as John McDonnell, Gabrielle Farrell, Khalid Mehmood, Rob Morris and Caroline Spelman. The Federation of Sikh Organizations, on various occasions , honoured these MPs and received their support for their cause in the United Ki ngdom. Among these, Khalid Mahmood, the Labour Party MP from Perry Bar, at a con ference organized by the Federation of Sikh Organizations on the occasion of Khal istan Day , on April 29, 2003, at Birmingham stated: every nation has an inalienable right to self-determination and, as with the case of both Punjab and Kashmir, it was self evident that when people are grossly mi streated by the state, they will take the necessary steps to control their own d estiny.90 The British Parliamentary Human Rights Group, a cross-party group of the Members of Parliament that shapes the perceptions about human rights in the corridors o f power, especially in the UN Commission on Human Rights, viewed Punjab as one o f the regions of the contemporary world where a persistent violation of human ri ghts had occurred. The group also organized occasional hearings on the Punjab. S ubsequently, in March 2005, another organization known as the Human Rights Advis ory Group of the Punjabis in Britain All Party Parliamentary Group recognized th e right to self-determination of the Sikhs in Punjab in the following words: Self-determination is the bedrock of all human rights in international law; witho ut self-determination all individual human rights can be breached with impunity s elf-determination is a key to the resolution (and prevention) of scores of viole nt conflicts, which invariably have a massive cost in terms of human life and de velopment The Sikhs, as a nation, have a lawful right to self-determinations. It is hoped that the international community will recognize this in order to take f orward the cause of peace and justice and the rule of law in South Asia.91 The Sikh Diaspora, in Britain, United States and Canada, through organizations l ike the Council of Khalistan, Nankana Sahib Foundation and World Sikh Organizati ons, had tried to get legitimacy for their struggle by attempting to secure memb ership or get a special status in certain international institutions, such as th e UN and the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organizations (UNPO). On May 17, 1984, Jagjit Singh Chauhan, President of the National Council of Khalistan, appe aled to the then UN Secretary-General, Perez de Cueller, to call upon the Govern ment of India to desist from activities directed at the violation of human right s in respect of the Sikhs in India.92 The overseas Sikh leadership had also approached the UN and lobbied with various subcommittees of the world body. In the mid-1980s, they made a request for nongovernmental organizations (NGO) status to the Sikh nation. The UN Committee, co mposed by Cyprus, Sri Lanka, France, Bulgaria, Cuba, the Soviet Union, the Unite d States and Malawi, considered the application on February 25, 1987, for the ca

tegory of consultative status, but it was rejected. In rejecting its application , the Committee felt that an NGO status to Khalistan would undermine the sovereign ty of a member state, i.e., India.93 After Operation Black Thunder in 1988, Mano har Singh Grewal, President of the World Sikh Organization, wrote a letter on th e genocide of the Sikhs in India to the UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuell ar. He pleaded: Your Excellency, the situation in the Punjab is becoming more alarming... again Indian paramilitary forces are holding innocent people in the Golden Temple as h ostages they can t drink water or even go the toilet without being shot at the India n Government has been engineering incidents to justify a new wave of oppression. Since Punjab is closed to the foreign press except for the guided official tour s, the world does not know the truth about Punjab. As per the records of Human R ights reports, (there is a situation of) an undeclared, unilateral ruthless war against hundreds of innocent defenceless men and women in far away tiny villages of Punjab from where their voices do not reach the rest of India. In the letter, Grewal wrote, further: The bleeding Sikh nation is in agony. Your Excellency, as Secretary General of t he World Organization, you represent the conscience of humanity and the UN inspi res hope for freedom and justice Thousands of innocent Sikh orphans, widows and o lder parents whose loved ones have been lynched, for them freedoms of religion a nd expression have been reduced to the right to cry in the wilderness Their voices, though inaudible amidst the media blitz of misinformation and deception, are ap pealing to the world community and the UN to urge the ruling regime of India to stop the genocide of the Sikhs In the meantime, the 1948 Convention on the Preven tion and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide should be invoked. India should be asked to lift the occupation of the Sikh homeland when the normal conditions are restored the people of Punjab should be given the opportunity to determine their own destiny through an independent and impartial referendum 94 In 1990, the Sikh delegation made a presentation to the UN on the violation of h uman rights against the Sikhs in India at the Centre of Human Rights in Geneva. The Sikhs also took part in the UN Human Rights Day ceremony on December 10, 199 1, in San Francisco.95 Significantly, during June 14-25, 1993, when the UN World Conference on Human Rights was being held in Vienna, the Sikh delegation presen ted their case carrying placards and documents on India s alleged human rights abu ses in Punjab. In this conference, the official delegation of the Indian State, which was led by the then Finance Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh, along with Atal B ehari Vajpayee and a Punjabi newspaper editor, Jagjit Singh Anand, and Gurcharan Singh Galib, Member of Parliament, faced strong opposition from the Sikh delega tion.96 Through their letters or sometimes by sending joint delegations to these organiz ations, the Sikh Diaspora did not merely attempt to convince these institutions on the issue of Khalistan but also sought to secure some kind of status in these organizations for Khalistan , which they demanded should be completely separate an d independent from India. In 1993, the extremist element within the Sikh Diaspor a achieved a major milestone in this regard. It succeeded to securing the recogn ition of Khalistan as the newest full member of the Unrepresented Nations and Peop les Organization (UNPO).97 The Nishan Sahib (Insignia of Sikh religion) was hoiste d at Hague in the Netherlands during the Annual General Assembly of the Organiza tion. The General Assembly of UNPO was attended by renowned dignitaries like Lor d Ennals, Member of the British House of Lords; H.S.H. Prince Hans-Adams-II of L iechtenstein; and Ireland s Noble Peace Prize Laureate M. Corrigan Magquire, Presi dent of the Peace People, Belfast. The extremist Sikh Diaspora was of the view t hat UNPO membership for Khalistan would increase the international pressure on t he Indian state and would eventually lead to the formation of Khalistan, with it s own membership in the United Nations.98 Gurmit Singh Aulakh, who headed the Si

kh delegation to the UNPO, described it as a big boost to the movement for Sikh freedom, adding that it would increase international pressure on the Indian state to honour the independence of Khalistan and cease its violation of human rights against the Sikh nation. According to him, India is not one nation but a conglomerate of nations held together against the will of the people. Like the Soviet Union, India too will disintegrate into its natural parts. We now have behind us an organization recognized by the internati onal community for its integrity. India can no longer malign the Sikhs in the ey es of the world with its disinformation its tactics of government by oppression w ill no longer be accepted by the International community The Sikh nation will hav e its freedom. India has no other choice.99 For the other members of Sikh delegation, including Paramjit Singh Ajrawat and B hupinder Singh of Holland, it was an occasion of pleasure, as the Sikhs were acc epted by the UNPO as a nation without state . According to them, India had sought to keep the Sikhs isolated from the international community for years, but now, with help of this new platform, they will spread the news of In dia s oppression of the Sikhs throughout the world community. Bhupinder Singh opined that, . 100 Now India cannot hide. Its brutality will be exposed

Overseas Sikhs also used militant methods to achieve their desired goals. In Can ada, the militants had organised a small segment of the Diaspora Sikh community. They were mostly concentrated in areas like Vancouver, British Columbia, Toront o and Winnipeg. They exploited the weaknesses of the basically liberal political system of Canada. Such militant action was centered in, but not limited to, Canada. The Babbar Kha lsa had reportedly launched an all-out effort to recruit Sikhs abroad for the cr eation of Khalistan through a Khalistan Liberation Army. In February 1982, the o rganization hired Johan Vanderhorst, a veteran mercenary who had fought in Rhode sia, to train Sikh recruits in British Columbia. Vanderhorst hired fellow mercen aries by putting advertisements in Canadian papers offerings salaries of 1,250 U S dollars monthly to train people in the use of weapons and combat techniques. T he Indian Government had obtained clandestine pictures of the training camps in British Columbia which had been handed over to the Canadian Government.101 The ISYF and Dal Khalsa also indulged in militant activities. One of the promine nt militant leaders was Talwinder Singh Parmar, a Canadian citizen and leader of 50 members of the Babbar Khalsa, a militant Sikh group demanding the creation o f Khalistan. They had claimed responsibility for 40 murders in Punjab between 19 79 and 1981. Another leader was Lakhbir Singh Rode, a nephew of the late Bhindra nwale, who headed the ISYF with 150 members in Canada. His coordinator in the Un ited States was Arjinderpal Singh Khalsa. Violent reactions are seen to have sta rted in Vancouver when the acting Indian High Commissioner in Canada, K.P. Fabia n, visited Manitoba on July 18, 1984. He was pelted with eggs and attacked, alth ough, he was not seriously injured.102 The Indian Independence Day celebrations of 1984 in New York, Toronto, and Vancouver, were disrupted by Sikh secessionist demonstrators, while in Washington, Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco and Ott awa, protests were more peaceful.103 In May 1985, when Haryana s Chief Minister Bh ajan Lal was in the United States for medical treatment, five Sikhs reportedly p lotted to kill him. He was particularly hated because he had worked against the Sikhs as the Chief Minister of the State neighbouring Punjab. One of the Sikhs a ccused in this case was Gurpartap Singh Virk, who was convicted of violating Ame rica s neutrality laws in March 1986. Virk, along with other conspirators from New York and Jatinder Singh Ahluwalia of New Orleans, were also accused, but not co nvicted, of planning to assassinate Rajiv Gandhi during his visit to the United

States. These Sikhs had also selected a site for a guerrilla training camp in Ne w Jersey. Virk and his accomplices had attended the Ricondo School which offered a course in guerrilla warfare for mercenary soldiers. Frank Camper, who was runni ng the school, and his assistant, testified that Sikhs were openly trying to lea rn about terrorism because they wanted to kill thousands with a single blow .104 In October 1985, when Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited England, a plot by 15 Sikhs and Kashmiris to assassinate him was foiled. It led to the convicti on of two Sikhs in December 1986. In June 1985, Sikh militants bombed an Air India flight, Kanishka, killing all 3 29 people aboard, including 154 Canadians. Canadian authorities believed that th e bombing was masterminded and perpetrated by the Sikh militants operating from Canada, including some Canadian citizens. Two Canada-based Sikhs, Ripudaman Sing h Malik and Ajaib Singh Bagri, who were eventually released by the Canadian Cour t, were put on trial in Vancouver for involvement in the aircraft bombing and fo r another suitcase bombing at the Narita Airport in Tokyo, that killed two bagga ge handlers.105 On November 26, 1985, two senior diplomats of the Indian Embassy in the Pakistani capital Islamabad, Councillor B. Jain and First Secretary K. K . Khanna, were attacked by some Canadian Sikhs within the Dehra Sahib Gurdwara C omplex at Lahore. Both the officers sustained head injuries and were admitted to a Lahore hospital.106 In 1991, a British Columbia-based Sikh militant, Inderjit Singh Reyat, was convicted of building the Tokyo bomb and pleaded guilty in Feb ruary 2003 to aiding in the construction of the Air India bomb. It is believed t hat the bombings were the part of a conspiracy by British Columbia-based Sikh mi litants to take revenge against the Indian Government for its 1984-storming of t he Golden Temple complex.107 On May 25, 1986, the Punjab Planning Minister, Malkiat Singh Sidhu, who was visi ting Canada to attend his nephew s wedding, was shot four times in the chest at Ca mpbell river, a town on Vancouver Island. Canadian authorities had arrested four suspects at a Police roadblock and they were charged with attempted murder. The y were later convicted and sentenced to 20 years in prison. In the United States, in May 1986, Police arrested five Montreal area Sikhs, who were involved in conspiracy to blow up an Air India jumbo jet out of New York C ity. Out of the five, two men were tried, convicted and given life sentences for the conspiracy, while the others were jailed for a month and subsequently relea sed.108 Dilawar Singh, the human bomb who killed Beant Singh, the then Chief Minister of Punjab, on August 31, 1995, was linked to the Babbar Khalsa International. Simi larly, in June 1995, Delhi Police arrested a suspected suicide bomber, Rachhpal Singh of the Babbar Khalsa, who was on a mission to kill the former Punjab Polic e Chief K.P.S. Gill.109 The Indian Government s reaction and response to the activities of extremist overs eas Sikhs started as early as the late 1970 s, when Mrs. Indira Gandhi made public statements about problems created by the Sikhs in Vancouver. In 1981, soon afte r some Sikhs hijacked an Indian Airlines Boeing to Lahore in Pakistan, the Gover nment of India pressured the United States, Canada and Britain to oust Khalistan leaders, or at least counter their activities.110 In April 1981, the Indian pas sport of Jagjit Singh Chauhan was revoked, and subsequently a case of sedition a nd promoting hatred among different communities was registered against him in Au gust 1981.111 In July 1984, after Operation Blue Star, the Indian state assessed the extremist Sikh Diaspora s role in its official report, the White Paper on the Punjab Agitation . Out of 58 pages of this report, nine pages were devoted to the subversive overseas Sikh organizations and how they fostered separatism in the p eriod up to 1984. While referring to the role of external factors in the White P aper, the Government of India argued,

The recent occurrences in Punjab cannot be divorced from the wider international context Powerful forces are at work to undermine India s political and economic st rength. A sensitive border state with a dynamic record of agricultural and indus trial development would be an obvious target for subversion. In this context the activities of groups based abroad acquire special significance. A section of th e foreign media is deliberately presenting totally distorted versions of the Pun jab situation, which have the effect of encouraging and sustaining separatist ac tivities.112 In the White Paper, the Government of India remarked that it was certain oversea s Sikhs who had provided the ideological underpinning for the demand for a separ ate Sikh state. It was also pointed out that numerous Sikh organizations indulgi ng in secessionist activities were operating from foreign countries. According t o the report, the National Council of Khalistan, Dal Khalsa, Babbar Khalsa and A khand Kirtani Jatha were the main organizations which had raised the slogan of a separate Sikh state called Khalistan . The National Council of Khalistan headed by Jagjit Singh Chauhan was active in the UK, West Germany, Canada and USA. Dal Kh alsa activities were primarily in UK and West Germany, while the Babbar Khalsa w as operating largely from Vancouver in Canada. The Akhand Kirtani Jatha had unit s in UK and Canada.113 The Government of India was of the view that the Sikhs were among the large numb er of Indians settled or working abroad. Their love and patriotism for the India n state was not in doubt. Nevertheless, some were misinformed or misled by inter ested parties. Some others were vulnerable to pressures in their host states. Mo reover, it is not always easy for the affluent settled aboard to identify with t he basic socio-economic interests of the working masses in India. As a result, f or some of them, the troubles in Punjab were a good opportunity to project thems elves as leaders of the Sikh community.114 The Government of India took numerous legal, political and diplomatic steps to c urb anti-Indian activities among the overseas Sikhs and their radical organizati ons. In London, the Indian High Commission drew the attention of the British Gov ernment to the continuous anti-India activities in Britain that began immediatel y after Operation Blue Star. Jagjit Singh Chauhan had announced awards for behea ding Indira Gandhi and her family members and is also said to have despatched a h it squad to India to take revenge against the Indian Prime Minister. Through these announcements and statements, Chauhan secured unexpected publicity in the Britis h media.115 In a way, it was helping him to gain popularity among radical elemen ts within the overseas Sikh community and was also instigating the Sikhs to viol ence against a particular community and against the Indian state, both in India an d abroad. Due to such developments, the then High Commissioner, Pushkar Johari, took up the issue with the British Foreign and Home Affairs Ministers, as well a s with the BBC, in the strongest possible terms.116 In New Delhi, on June 22, 19 84, the youth and student wings of the Congress (I) organized separate demonstra tions before the British High Commission to protest the anti-India propaganda on the BBC. In private correspondence, India s Prime Minister Indira Gandhi wrote to her British counterpart, Margaret Thatcher, about events in Punjab and clarifie d the position of the Indian state in this regard. She also requested her to pre vent the activities of individuals and organizations in UK who were supporting t he secessionist movement in India.117 Through diplomatic channels, the Government of India tried to justify its milita ry action in Punjab, and also to persuade the overseas Sikh community, as well a s world public opinion, in its favour. For example, in Washington on June 22, 19 84, in a talk show Evening Exchange on a local TV station, the Deputy Chief of the Indian mission in the United States, Pete Sinai, stated that the Government of India had no option but to enter the Golden Temple Complex and neutralize the Si kh militants. In this talk show, two local Sikhs, including the President of the

Guru Gobind Singh Foundation, Ujjagar Singh Bawa, were also present which made it more significant and relevant from the Indian point of view.118 Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi herself told a foreign journalist that Army action was not against the Sikhs. It was only to remove some hidden groups of individuals in th e Temple Complex, who were indulging in terrorism and anti-national activities. S he also said that there was false propaganda about killings of children and women d uring the military action. Not even a single child or a woman was killed, she asse rted.119 She admitted that there was widespread anger among the Sikhs over the s ituation but said that they would gradually understand the situation. The Indian Embassy in Washington reportedly distributed video-cassettes to American Televi sion Centres. In these cassettes, the interview of Giani Kirpal Singh, Jathedar of the Akal Takht (Chief Priest of the highest seat of temporal authority for th e Sikhs), was recorded, in which he admitted that, during Operation Blue Star, S ri Harmandir Sahib (Golden Temple) and Kotha Sahib (where the Holy Book, the Gur u Granth Sahib, is safeguarded each night) had not suffered any damage. The main objective of the distribution of these cassettes was to pacify the anguished Si kh Diaspora by giving them true information regarding the military operation and t he aftermath.120 As a large number of Sikhs from India had acquired citizenship of Commonwealth c ountries and a section of them was encouraging the ethno-secessionist movement i n Punjab, the Government of India reportedly discovered unmistakable foreign links with the militants in the Golden Temple Complex, which apparently impelled the state to take certain steps for regulating the visits of foreigners, especially Sikhs of Indian origin that could have been used for undesirable purposes in Ind ia.121 The Government of India also imposed strict visa regulations for overseas visitors. On June 3, 1984, the Government of India prohibited the entry of fore igners into Punjab.122 And on June 15, 1984, the Indian Ministry for Home Affair s issued a notification in which citizens of Britain and Canada were brought und er the new visa regulations. On the very next day, it was notified that it would be compulsory for citizens of all Commonwealth countries, including Britain and Canada, to obtain visas from Indian missions before visiting India. For those w ho were already in India, the Government imposed a requirement that they obtain a residential permit within 15 days of the notification, for their continued sta y in India.123 Extremist elements of the Sikh Diaspora had gained the sympathy and support of U S Congressmen, British Parliamentarians and human rights organizations such as A mnesty International, by claiming widespread repression of and human rights viol ations against the Sikhs. Consequently, at various national and international pl atforms, Indian authorities clarified their position before the international co mmunity and criticized the biased reports against India in this regard. For exam ple, during a speech at the University of London on September 21, 1992, the Indi an Home Minister, S. B. Chavan, stated that reports prepared by human rights gro ups accusing India of human rights violations against the Sikhs in Punjab were n ot authenticated. He said We are proud of our concern for human rights and we fee l hurt by unfair, biased, exaggerated and unverified accusations of human rights violations. 124 To clear the misunderstanding about the Indian Government s stand o n human rights, Chavan invited Amnesty International to send a delegation to New Delhi to engage in a meaningful discussion.125 Further, on various occasions, the question of the involvement of elements withi n the Sikh Diaspora in the Punjab problem was also discussed and debated in the Indian Parliament. This debate also focused on the soft attitude of host states towards the Sikh militants living and operating from their territories. As the U S Congressmen were criticizing India for its poor human rights record against th e Sikhs, Indian Parliamentarians, including K.K. Tewary, Saifuddin Chaudhury, Bh agwat Jha Azad, E. Ayyapu Reddy, et al, jointly criticized them for interfering in India s internal affairs. On April 18, 1985, while speaking in the Lok Sabha (L ower House of Indian Parliament), Saifuddin Chaudhury stated that the US Congres

s Annexe had actually become a platform to spread anti-India feelings, with the vociferous participation of extremist Khalistani leaders like Ganga Singh Dhillo n and Jagjit Singh Chauhan.126 K.K. Tewary pointed out that America itself had a poor human rights record which had evolved out of the genocide and butchery of Re d Indians, Negroes and other indigenous populations. All these races were decima ted and destroyed by them. They were guilty of exposing humanity to atomic exter mination in the Second World War and were also responsible for the monstrous brut ality in Nicaragua, Chile and a host of other countries. They had, consequently, no moral right to speak about the human rights situation in India, he opined.127 Defending the use of force by the Indian state, Ayyapu Reddy argued that every n ation has the right to protect its integrity and to prevent its disunity and dis integration. Therefore, Reddy asserted, if according to the US Congressmen, tryin g to prevent secessionist tendencies amounts to suppression of human rights, the n Abraham Lincoln should also be considered guilty of suppressing human rights, because he had led the war against the disunity and disintegration of United Sta tes. 128 Another Parliamentarian, G.G. Swell, argued that, as the Americans and th e rest of the world considered Abraham Lincoln as the greatest President , a man of God and a man of prayer , they should also put Indira Gandhi in the same pantheon , sin ce she had fought and died for the unity and integrity of India.129 Further, par liamentarians like Kamal Nath, Bala Saheb Vikhe Patil, S.M. Bhattam, N.G. Ranga and Datta Samant expressed serious concern over certain institutions in the USA and Canada, which were imparting training to Sikh militants. The Indian Governme nt had reportedly traced 25 schools which were providing facilities for such tra ining, including the Ricondo School of Frank Camper at Hueyville in Alabama and the Eagle Combat and Body Guard Training School of Roy Maia in Estminster, Briti sh Columbia, which had become the focus of discussion and debate in the Indian P arliament.130 The Government of India had drawn the attention of USA and Canada to these developments, while requesting urgent investigation and appropriate cor rective action.131 As pointed out earlier, according to Indian diplomatic sources, the Canadian Gov ernment was granting funds to minority groups to strengthen their culture and to expand their cultural activities. These funds were, however, misused by differe nt Sikh organizations. Indian parliamentarians also protested against such finan cial help being provided by Canada.132 They also emphasised the issue of fund ra ising and misuse by the Sikh extremists in Britain. For example, on December 2, 1985, during a discussion on the issue in Lok Sabha, S.M. Bhattam disclosed that , Large sums of money are being collected regularly in Britain in about 30 to 40 G urdwaras to buy weapons and pass them on to Sikh extremists in Punjab about one l akh133 to two lakh Pounds (GBP) are raised every week and this amount is being u tilized for the purpose of buying light weapons, sub-machine guns and explosives from illegal European markets to be sent to the subversive elements of the Sikh community in Punjab.134 On its part, India maintained its links with the host governments while requesti ng them to take appropriate measures against the militant activities of the extr emist elements within the Sikh Diaspora. On October 15, 1985, for instance, Prim e Minister Rajiv Gandhi, during his visit to the United Kingdom, had pressed Mar garet Thatcher to do more about the Sikhs who were involved in terrorist activit ies directed against India. He also requested that a bilateral extradition treat y be established to deal with the issue of Sikh militancy in Britain.135 Respond ing to the politico-diplomatic pressure of the Indian state, the British Governm ent expressed regret for statement Jagjit Singh Chauhan on BBC Radio. The Britis h Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Baroness Young, met Pushkar Johari, Hig h Commissioner of India in London, on June 14, 1984, and conveyed regret over th e issue and hoped that such statements would not be allowed to affect the tradit ionally good relations between Britain and India.136 Meanwhile, the British Gove rnment asked the Sikhs living in Britain to observe restraint and not to resort

to any form of violence in reaction to the events in Punjab. Immediately after Ope ration Blue Star, the British Minister for Home Affairs, David Waddington, had u rged the Sikhs, in a meeting held in Birmingham, to act like responsible human b eings. Besides, David Mellor, a junior Minister in the British Home Office, also called the Sikh representatives and told them to act within the confines of the law.137 Clarifying the stand of the British Government, the British authorities explained, on June 25, 1984, that the British Government was fully aware of the sensitivities of the Indian Government over these matters, including the public statements of some of the Sikh leaders and the security of Indian diplomatic mi ssions and personnel.138 He disclosed that British authorities had told the Sikh leaders that a serious view would be taken of any unlawful act. According to hi m, the Government sought and obtained assurances that reactions to the events in Punjab would be peaceful in Britain. At the same time, responding to a question on the formation of the so-called Government of Khalistan-in-exile by some Sikh s, he said that, in Britain, organizations and individuals are allowed to espous e any case so long as they do not break British laws. Therefore, as these organi sations had not broken any law, these could exist within the British legal frame work. However, the British Government had not accorded any diplomatic status to the Government of Khalistan-in-exile, since Britain recognizes only states and n ot governments .139 At the other end, the Governments of the United States and Canada also assured I ndia that they would not allow Khalistani Diaspora organizations to act against the Indian Government from their territories. Due to the huge efforts made by the Indian state, Western analysts, once pessimi stic, consciously began to accept that Punjab would gradually stabilize itself.1 40 James W. Michael, editor of Forbes, strongly defended Indira Gandhi s response to the Sikh ethnic uprising by arguing, when traditional societies modernize, they frequently spew up reactionary groups which violently challenge the new society. Thus, we have the bloody and obscuran tist Khomeini regime in Iran, the bizarre rule of Gaddafi in Libya and the terro r by Sikh fanatics of northern India. These fanatical groups, Michael argued, can t be negotiated with due to their irrat ional and fascist nature. Thus, Michael viewed Indira Gandhi s effective military act ion as a triumphant reassertion of Government with the consent of the governed. Ac cording to him, to blame Mrs. Gandhi for the violence was a little like blaming Ab raham Lincoln for bringing the civil war in United States to an end.141 The Government of India signed extradition treaties and confiscation agreements with Canada, Britain and the United States. On February 6, 1987, Indian External Affairs Minister N. D. Tiwari and the Canadian Minister of State for External A ffairs, Charles Joseph Clark, signed a treaty agreeing to extradite any person w ho was accused or convicted. The treaty, which came into effect on February 10, 1987, proved a landmark in the history of Indo-Canadian relations. India was abl e to successfully extradite from Canada certain Sikh militants wanted in India.1 42 For instance, in May 1995, Tejinder Singh Pal, a Dal Khalsa member, convicted of hijacking an Air India flight, entered Canada using a fake name and claimed refugee status. Subsequently, he became the subject of a Canadian Security and I ntelligence Service (CSIS) investigation. Eventually, on December 22, 1997, the Federal Court of Canada issued an order of deportation against him.143 In 1998, a Sikh militant of the Babbar Khalsa was deported from Canada.144 Further, in Ja nuary 2000, Davinder Pal Singh, a member of the Babbar Khalsa who was involved i n non-combat related activities, including fund raising, was ordered to be extra dited to India.145 In December 2000, another active member of the Babbar Khalsa, Harjinder Singh Patwal, who entered Canada without documentation, admitted to h is links with the militant organization and consequently, became a subject of im migration proceedings.146

Encouraged by the Indo-Canadian treaty of 1987, India signed an extradition trea ty and an agreement on confiscation of militants assets on September 22, 1992, in London. The treaty, which was signed by Home Minister S. B. Chavan and British Home Secretary Kenneth Clark, excluded the political factor in crimes of violenc e as a defence against extradition and provided that any crime carrying the sent ence of 12 months or more in either country would be a subject of extradition. T he Agreement on Confiscation provided forfeiture of funds and assets of any indi vidual or organizations involved in terrorism or drug trafficking in either coun try. The assets of the guilty would be confiscated not only in that country, but also in the other country. The Agreement also provided for the orders of the co urts in one country to be executable in the other country. Under the authority o f this Agreement and Anti-terrorism Act, searches and seizures were also made at the premises of suspect individuals and organizations. The Agreement on confisc ation of terrorists and drug- runner s assets was the first of its kind in the worl d, where two countries agreed to act together on the subject, and India was the first country with which Britain signed such an agreement. Thus, along with the extradition treaty, the Agreement ensured that Britain would not be the shelter to anti-Indian extremists operating from British territory. It also ensured that Britain-based patrons of Indian militant groups lost their capacities to operat e with impunity.147 The extradition treaty between India and Britain was significant for India on th e diplomatic front as well. In September 1992, before the extradition treaty, Si kh and Kashmiri extremist groups had launched a campaign against the treaty. A g roup demonstrated outside the 10-Downing Street residence of the British Prime M inister and urged him not to sign the treaty. They also launched a signature cam paign against the treaty and secured the signatures of 130 Members of British Pa rliament. In a joint appeal, Sikh and Kashmiri militants told British Parliament arians that It would appear that Britain is anxious to secure trade contracts wit h India and was even prepared to swap Sikh and Kashmiri militants. 148 After prolonged negotiations, an extradition treaty was als signed between India and the United States on June 25, 1997. Saleem Shervani, Minister of State for External Affairs, and Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State of the United St ates, signed the treaty. Both parties agreed that, extradition shall be granted fo r an extraditable offence regardless of where the act or acts constituting the o ffence were committed. Though the two states unanimously accepted that, extradition shall not be granted for a political offence, they also said that murder or other wilful crime against a Head of State or Head of Government or a member of their family, aircraft hijacking offences, aviation sabotage, crimes against internati onally protected persons including diplomats, hostage taking, offences related t o illegal drugs, or any other offences for which both contracting states have th e obligation to extradite the person pursuant to a multilateral international ag reement, shall not be considered to be political offences. 149 Extradition treatie s with the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States were a symbol of diploma tic victory of the Indian state against the Sikh Diaspora lobby, since they had actively lobbied against these treaties. As a result of these extradition treaties, many Sikh militants were extradited to India. For instance, Kulbir Singh alias Bira, a self-styled lieutenant of the Khalistan Commando Force (Panjwar faction), was extradited from the US. Kulbir S ingh, who was wanted in over 30 cases of mass murder, including the killing of e x-ministers, political activists and Security Forces personnel, and also of robbe ry and extortion, had fled to the United States in 1993 on a fake passport, wher e he was arrested and imprisoned immediately on landing. The Government of India had sought his extradition in 1993 too, but it did not take place in the absenc e of an extradition treaty between the two states. However, due to the treaty an d a decision of the Federal Appeals Court of the United States to deport Kulbir Singh, Indian authorities were able to secure an expedited extradition process.1

50 Again, in May 2006, Indian authorities succeeded in extraditing Harpal Singh Cheema from the United States. Cheema, a militant associated with the Sikh Stude nts Federation, had been living in the USA for the preceding decade. On March 12, 1992, the Jalandhar Police had arrested him along with explosives and narcotics and had registered a case against him under the TADA.151 He jumped bail in July 1992 and managed to flee to the United States in the same year, using illegal c hannels. After 1997, he spent nine years in US jails for not possessing valid im migration documents.152 In July 2006, Canada deported Gurcharan Singh of the BKI. He was alleged to have plotted to assassinate the former Chief Minister of Punjab, Parkash Singh Badal , and former Police Chief of Punjab, K.P.S Gill. Earlier, his application for as ylum was rejected by the Canadian authorities and he was consequently imprisoned . He remained in a Canadian jail for about three years before being deported to India.153 These examples make it clear that, to some extent, extradition treaties did prov e effective in bringing back Sikh militants living in the West, especially in th e UK, USA and Canada. This was a significant achievement of the Indian diplomati c front against the extremist element within the Sikh Diaspora, since it was the ir leadership that had financed the terrorist elements, and was defending them l egally in the host states. On the diplomatic front, the Indian state achieved another milestone in 2000, wh en the United Kingdom outlawed two Sikh militant groups under the Terrorism Act, 2000. Among the 25 proscribed international groups were the Babbar Khalsa Inter national and International Sikh Youth Federation.154 Furthermore, one of the groups that international security officials believed su pported the violent Sikh ethnic uprising in India, was the Babbar Khalsa Society . In Canada, it was registered as a religious group and charitable organization in 1993. However, according to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the group rais ed money in Canada to buy weapons for the Sikh militants in India. Consequently, the Canadian Government revoked its charitable status in 1996.155 Canada added the Babbar Khalsa International to its list of banned organizations indulging in militant activities. In a nutshell, the discourse on the Sikh Diaspora s involvement and support to the Khalistan movement in India establishes that using a combination of peaceful, d emocratic and, violent methods, the radical element in the Diaspora community, i n the post-Operation Blue Star period, sponsored and supported the militants str uggling for a separate sovereign state of Khalistan. Through various demonstrati ons, they criticized the repressive policies of the Indian state against the Sikhs . They internationalized the issue of Khalistan, publishing literature in the fo rm of newspapers, magazines and books, and also launched various Websites. While discussing the issue of human rights violations with the political parties, and legislative and executive bodies of host states such as USA, Canada and UK, radi cal Sikh Diaspora organizations and protagonists of Khalistan raised various dem ands to put the pressure on the Indian state to end alleged atrocities and human rights violations against the Sikh community. They also approached the UN and ot her international fora on various occasions. In Canada, a few Sikh militant orga nizations like the BKI, Dal Khalsa and ISYF used violent methods to lodge their protests against the Indian state. Members of these groups also indulged in kill ings in Punjab and attempted to assassinate prominent personalities of the India n state. The assassination of Beant Singh, Chief Minister of Punjab, and the Kan ishka bombing, were results of such attempts made by Sikh militant organizations in the Diaspora. In other words, through both peaceful and violent methods, the Sikh Diaspora not only supported the ethnic separatist cause but also posed a serious challenge t

o the Indian state. To deal with this challenge, the Indian state activated its politico-diplomatic channels at the international level and also clarified its p osition before the world community. The Indian leadership imposed visa restricti ons on certain foreigners and put pressure on the host Governments, especially o f USA, Canada and UK, to take action against the Sikh militants. Due to such dip lomatic efforts, the Indian state succeeded in signing extradition treaties with the US, Canadian and British Governments and also managed to secure the deporta tion of a few Sikh militants from the host states. Besides, the host Governments also banned certain Sikh militant groups. However, even today, certain sections of the Sikh Diaspora keeps the Khalistan movement alive in host states, though the very ideology has died in the perceived homeland and home-state of the Sikhs . * Suneel Kumar is Senior Research Fellow at the Department of Political Science in Guru Nanak Dev University, Amritsar, Punjab. 1. As quoted in Athena S. Leoussi, ed., Encyclopaedia of Nationalism, New Bru nswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2001, p. 213. 2. Darshan S. Tatla "Sikhs in Multicultural Societies," International Journal of Multicultural Societies, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2003, p. 195. 3 For the theoretical understanding of Diaspora-homeland Relationship, See Robin Cohen, Diasporas and the Nation-State: From Victims to Challenges, Inte rnational Affairs, Vol. 72, No.3, 1996, pp.507-20; Robin Cohen, Global Diasporas : An Introduction, London: UCL Press, 1997; Gabriel Sheffer, Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003; William Safran, Dias poras in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return, Diaspora, Vol. 1, No.1, 1991, pp.83-99; James Clifford, Diasporas , in Montserrat Guibernau and John Rex, E ds., The Ethnicity Reader: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Migration, Cambridg e: Polity Press, 1997, pp. 283-290 and; Kachig Tololian, The Nation State and Oth ers , Diaspora, Vol. 1, No.1, 1991 pp.3-7 and ; Machael Dahan and Gabriel Sheffer , Ethnic Groups and Distance Shrinking Communication Technologies , Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol. 7, No.1, 2001, p. 94. 4 Arthur W. Helweg, The Gurdwara and The Sikh Diaspora, Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1, 2003, p. 117. Journal of Sikh

5 Sangat Singh, The Sikhs in History, Amritsar: Singh Brothers, 2002, pp. 539-73. 6 Laurent Gayer, The Globalization of Identity Politics: The Sikh Exper ience , International Journal of Punjab Studies, Vol.7, No. 2, 2000. 7 Ibid, p. 226.

8 Darshan S. Tatla, The Sikh Diaspora: The Search for Statehood, Londo n: UCL Press, 1999, p. 41. 9 71. 10 Walker Connor, The Impact of Homelands Upon Diasporas, in Gabriel Shef fer, ed. Modern Diasporas in International Politics, London: Croom Helm, 1986, p . 17. Martin Bulmer, Ethnicity , in Leoussi, Encyclopaedia of Nationalism, p.

11 See Deepak Nayyar, Migration, Remittances and Capital Flows: The Ind ian Experience, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1994. 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Tatla, The Sikh Diaspora, p. 64. Gayer, The Globalization of Identity Politics, p.230. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid, p. 231. Tatla, The Sikh Diaspora, p. 65. Ibid, p. 94.

19 Therese Sue Gunawardena, The Daisporisation of Ethno Nationalism: Bri tish Sikhs and the Punjab, Ethnic Studies Report, Vol. 18, No. 1, 2000, p. 58. 20 Tatla, The Sikh Diaspora, p. 104.

21 Arthur W. Helweg, Sikh Politics is India: The Emigrant Factor, in N. G erald Barrier and Verne A. Dusenbery, eds., The Sikh Diaspora: Migration and Exp erience beyond Punjab, New Delhi: Chanakya Publications, 1989, p. 314. 22 Ibid.

23 M. J. Akbar, India: The Siege Within, Auckland: Penguin Books, 1985, pp. 173-4. 24 25 Helweg, Sikh Politics is India, p.315. Ibid, p. 316. India Ab

26 For details see, Suresh Jain, Pro-Khalistan Sikhs Plet Envoy, road, Vol.12, No. 33, 1982. 27 Tatla, The Sikh Diaspora.

28 Bidisha Biswas, Nationalism By Proxy: A Comparison of Social Movement s Among Diaspora Sikhs And Hindus, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol. 10, No.2 , 2004, p. 281. 29 30 31 Gunawardena, Ibid, p. 60. Ibid. The Indian Express, The Daisporisation of Ethno Nationalism, p. 59.

32 B. K. Tiwari, Sikhs in UK Having Second Thoughts, Delhi, June 28, 1984. 33 34 Ibid. Ibid.

35 B. K. Tiwari, Sikh Leaders Seek to Meet Thatcher, 22, 1984.

Indian Express, June

36 37 38 39 984. 40 41 42

Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Tiwari, Ibid. Indian Express, June 28, 1984. New York Times, June 7, 1984. India Abroad, Vol. 14, No. Sikhs in UK Having Second Thoughts, Indian Express, June 28, 1

43 Aseem Chhabra, Thousands of Sikhs Protest, 37, pp. 1 and 14. 44 Tatla, The Sikh Diaspora, p. 113.

45 J. N. Parimoo, Canadian Government Funds for Sikh Extremists, The Time s of India, Delhi, September 16, 1984. 46 47 48 pp.19-23. 49 50 51 52 53 Helweg, Sikh Politics is India, p.322.

Indian Express, June 25, 1984. John Barber, A Troubled Community, Tatla, The Sikh Diaspora. Ibid, pp. 116-7. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Macleans, Vol. ICIX, No. 25, 1986,

54 Sue Gunawardena, Constructing Cyber Nationalism: Sikh Solidarity via The Internet, International Journal of Punjab Studies, Vol.7, No.2, 2000, pp. 263 -322. 55 Council of Khalistan, An Open Letter to Sikh Organizations and Instit utions, February 11, 2004. 56 V. Siddhardh, New Indo-British Treaty: What is the Purpose? Economic a nd Political Weekly, Mumbai, Vol. 27, No. 47, November 21, 1992, p. 2531. 57 C. Christine Fair, Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies: Insights fro m the Khalistan and Tamil Eelam Movements, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol. 11, No. 2 2005, pp. 125-156 and Charanjit Singh Kang, Counterterrorism: Punjab A Case Study, Canada: Simon Fraser University, 2001, pp.168-170. 58 59 Helweg, Sikh Politics is India: The Emigrant Factor, p. 322.

South Asia Terrorism Portal, www.satp.org.

60 61

Parimoo, Times of India, September 16, 1984. Ibid.

62 Bhabani Sen Gupta, Internationalization of Ethnic Conflict: The Punja b Crisis of the 1980s, in K. M. De Silva and R .J. May, eds., Internationalizatio n of Ethnic Conflict, London: Pinter Publisher, 1991, p. 56. 63 64 65 66 67 World Sikh News, October 31, 1986. Kang, Counterterrorism: Punjab a Case Study, pp.172-3. World Sikh News, August 5, 1988. World Sikh News, February 26, 1993. Dallas Morning News, January 10, 1994. Internationalization of Ethnic Conflict: The Punjab Crisis of

68 Gupta, the 1980s, p. 57. 69 70 71

The Tribune, Chandigarh, June 18, 1993. Ibid. World Sikh News, June 11, 1995.

72 Dan Burton, No Respect for Human Rights In India, Congressional Record , May 25, 1995, p. E1140. 73 Edolphus Towns, India should be declared A Terrorist State, nal Record, October 6, 1998, p. E 1913. 74 75 76 77 78 The Sikhs: Past and Present, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1995, p. 50. Congressional Record, March 7, 1997. The Sikhs: Past and Present, Vol.5, No.1, 1995, p. 50. Ibid, pp. 49-50. Ibid. Congressio

79 Council of Khalistan, Vice President Al Gore Letter Acknowledges Civi l Conflict in Khalistan, News Release, Washington. D.C., February 25, 1997. 80 Ibid.

81 House of Commons Parliamentary Debates, Weekly Hansard, Vol. 199, No . 22, November 1991, p. 1241. 82 83 84 85 86 Ibid, p. 1242. Ibid. Ibid, p. 1243. Ibid, pp. 1242-3. Ibid, p. 1243.

87 88 89

Ibid. Ibid, p. 1244. Khalistan Calling Newsletter, May 21, 2003.

90 The Human Rights Advisory Group of the Punjabis in Britain All Party Parliamentary Group, Self-Determination as a Human Rights and its Applicability to the Sikhs: A Report, Westminster, UK: HRAG Publication, 2005, p. 15. 91 S.M. Mirza, S.F. Hasnat and S. Mahmood, The Sikh Question? From Cons titutional Demands to Armed Conflict, Lahore: University of Punjab, 1985, p. 78. 92 Giorgio Shani, The Politics of Recognition: Sikh Diasporic Nationalit y and the International Order, International Journal of Punjab Studies, Vol.7, No . 2, 2000, p. 213. 93 A letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations by Dr. Manoh ar Singh Grewal, President of World Sikh Organizations, USA, Published in World Sikh News, June 17, 1988. 94 95 World Sikh News, December 13, 1991. Shani, The Politics of Recognition, p. 214.

96 Khalistans Admitted into UNPU: Major Milestone for Independence, World Sikh News, Vol. 4, No. 4, January 29, 1993. 97 98 99 100 Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. India Today, Delhi, September 15, 1985.

101 Helweg, Sikh Politics is India The Emigrant Factor, in N. Gerald Barri er and Verne A. Dusenbery, eds., The Sikh Diaspora: Migration and Experience Bey ond Punjab, New Delhi: Chanakya Publications, 1989. 102 Ramesh Guru, Peaceful and Unruly Protests Mar India Day Celebration, ndia Abroad, Vol. 14, No. 47, 1984, p. 19. I

103 L. Zhegalove, Imperialist Plot against India s Unity, New Times, No. 42, 1985, p. 13. 104 105 106 Canada and Terrorism, www.adl.org, January 2004.

Tribune, November 27, 1985. Canada and Terrorism , www.adl.org, January 2004. In depth: Air India; Sikh Military, CBC News, Augus

107 Peter Hadzipetros, t 27, 2003. 108 109 www.satp.org. Helweg,

Sikh Politics is India: The Emigrant Factor.

110 Government of India, White Paper on Punjab Agitation, New Delhi: Gov ernment of India, 1984, p.36. 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 8, 1984. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Indian Express, June 15, 1984. Indian Express, June 16, 1984. Indian Express, June 23, 1984 Ibid. Indian Express, June 16, 1984. Punjabi Tribune, Chandigarh, June 24, 1984. The Times of India, Delhi, June 17, 1984 and Punjabi Tribune, June 1 Internationalization of Ethnic Conflict: The Punjab Crisis of

121 Gupta, the 1980s, p. 55. 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137

Times of India, June 17, 1984. Tribune, September 22, 1992. Ibid. Lok Sabha Debates, Vol. 14, No. 26, April 18, 1985, Col. 343. Ibid, Col. 348. Ibid, Col. 342. Ibid, Cols. 371-372. Lok Sabha Debates, Vol. 7, No. 2, 24, July 1985, Col. 311-312. Ibid. Lok Sabha Debates, n. 126, Col. 353. Lok Sabha Debates, Vol. 10, No. 10, December 2, 1985, Col. 337. Lakh = 100,000 Helweg, Sikh Politics is India: The Emigrant Factor, p. 325.

Indian Express, June 16, 1984. Ibid. Indian Express, June 26, 1984.

138 139 140 141 142

Ibid. Ibid. The Washington Post, June 17, 1984. Times of India, June 19, 1984. Tribune, February 7, 1967.

143 Federal Court of Canada, Tejinder Singh Pal V/s Minister of Citizens hip and Immigration, December 22, 1997. 144 Reflex, No. 108, February 3, 1999.

145 Federal Court of Canada, Davinder Pal Bhalrus V/S Ministry of Citize nship and Immigration, January 12, 2000. 146 Federal Court of Canada, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration V/S Harjinder Singh Patwal, June 3, 2001. 147 148 149 150 151 152 Tribune, September 23, 1992. Ibid. Tribune, June 26, 1997. The Hindustan Times, Delhi, March 30, 2005. Tribune, May 3, 2006. Hindustan Times, May 3, 2006. Police Remand for deported Babbar Khalsa Man, Tribune, Ju

153 Lalit Mohan, ly 6, 2006. 154 155

Hadzipetros, CBC News, August 27, 2003. Ibid.