Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC DECISION November 29, 1989 A.M. No.

3249 SALVACION DELIZO CORDOVA, complainant, vs. ATTY. LAURENCE D. CORDOVA, respondent. RESOLUTION , J.: In an unsworn letter-complaint dated 14 April 1988 addressed to then Mr. Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee, complainant Salvacion Delizo charged her husband, Atty. Laurence D. Cordova, with immorality and acts unbecoming a member of the Bar. The letter-complaint was forwarded by the Court to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline (Commission), for investigation, report and recommendation. The Commission, before acting on the complaint, required complainant to submit a verified complaint within ten (10) days from notice. Complainant complied and submitted to the Commission on 27 September 1988 a revised and verified version of her long and detailed complaint against her husband charging him with immorality and acts unbecoming a member of the Bar. In an Order of the Commission dated 1 December 1988, respondent was declared in default for failure to file an answer to the complaint within fifteen (15) days from notice. The same Order required complainant to submit before the Commission her evidence ex parte, on 16 December 1988. Upon the telegraphic request of complainant for the resetting of the 16 December 1988 hearing, the Commission scheduled another hearing on 25 January 1989. The hearing scheduled for 25 January 1989 was rescheduled two (2) more times-first, for 25 February 1989 and second, for 10 and 11 April 1989. The hearings never took place as complainant failed to appear. Respondent Cordova never moved to set aside the order of default, even though notices of the hearings scheduled were sent to him. In a telegraphic message dated 6 April 1989, complainant informed the Commission that she and her husband had already reconciled. In an order dated 17 April 1989, the Commission required the parties (respondent and complainant) to appear before it for confirmation and explanation of the telegraphic message and required them to file a formal motion to dismiss the complaint within fifteen (15) days from notice. Neither party responded and nothing was heard from either party since then.

Complainant having failed to submit her evidence ex parte before the Commission, the IBP Board of Governors submitted to this Court its report reprimanding respondent for his acts, admonishing him that any further acts of immorality in the future will be dealt with more severely, and ordering him to support his legitimate family as a responsible parent should. The findings of the IBP Board of Governors may be summed up as follows: Complainant and respondent Cordova were married on 6 June 1976 and out of this marriage, two (2) children were born. In 1985, the couple lived somewhere in Quirino Province. In that year, respondent Cordova left his family as well as his job as Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Cabarroguis, Quirino Province, and went to Mangagoy, Bislig, Surigao del Sur with one Fely G. Holgado. Fely G. Holgado was herself married and left her own husband and children to stay with respondent. Respondent Cordova and Fely G. Holgado lived together in Bislig as husband and wife, with respondent Cordova introducing Fely to the public as his wife, and Fely Holgado using the name Fely Cordova. Respondent Cordova gave Fely Holgado funds with which to establish a sari-sari store in the public market at Bislig, while at the same time failing to support his legitimate family. On 6 April 1986, respondent Cordova and his complainant wife had an apparent reconciliation. Respondent promised that he would separate from Fely Holgado and brought his legitimate family to Bislig, Surigao del Sur. Respondent would, however, frequently come home from beerhouses or cabarets, drunk, and continued to neglect the support of his legitimate family. In February 1987, complainant found, upon returning from a trip to Manila necessitated by hospitalization of her daughter Loraine, that respondent Cordova was no longer living with her (complainants) children in their conjugal home; that respondent Cordova was living with another mistress, one Luisita Magallanes, and had taken his younger daughter Melanie along with him. Respondent and his new mistress hid Melanie from the complinant, compelling complainant to go to court and to take back her daughter by habeas corpus. The Regional Trial Court, Bislig, gave her custody of their children. Notwithstanding respondents promises to reform, he continued to live wi th Luisita Magallanes as her husband and continued to fail to give support to his legitimate family. Finally the Commission received a telegram message apparently from complainant, stating that complainant and respondent had been reconciled with each other. After a review of the record, we agree with the findings of fact of the IBP Board. We also agree that the most recent reconciliation between complainant and respondent, assuming the same to be real, does not excuse and wipe away the misconduct and immoral behavior of the respondent carried out in public, and necessarily adversely reflecting upon him as a member of the Bar and upon the Philippine Bar itself. An applicant for admission to membership in the bar is required to show that he is possessed of good moral character. That requirement is not exhausted and dispensed with upon admission to membership of the bar. On the contrary, that requirement persists as a continuing condition for membership in the Bar in good standing.

In Mortel v. Aspiras, 1 this Court, following the rule in the United States, held that the continued possession of a good moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of the law and its loss requires suspension or disbarment, even though the statutes do not specify that as a ground for disbarment. 2 It is important to note that the lack of moral character that we here refer to as essential is not limited to good moral character relating to the discharge of the duties and responsibilities of an attorney at law. The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes a mockery of the invi olable social institution or marriage. 3 In Mortel, the respondent being already married, wooed and won the heart of a single, 21-year old teacher who subsequently cohabited with him and bore him a son. Because respondents conduct in Mortel was particula rly morally repulsive, involving the marrying of his mistress to his own son and thereafter cohabiting with the wife of his own son after the marriage he had himself arranged, respondent was disbarred. In Royong v. Oblena, 4 the respondent was declared unfit to continue as a member of the bar by reason of his immoral conduct and accordingly disbarred. He was found to have engaged in sexual relations with the complainant who consequently bore him a son; and to have maintained for a number of years an adulterous relationship with another woman. In the instant case, respondent Cordova maintained for about two (2) years an adulterous relationship with a married woman not his wife, in full view of the general public, to the humiliation and detriment of his legitimate family which he, rubbing salt on the wound, failed or refused to support. After a brief period of reform respondent took up again with another woman not his wife, cohabiting with her and bringing along his young daughter to live with them. Clearly, respondent flaunted his disregard of the fundamental institution of marriage and its elementary obligations before his own daughter and the community at large. WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law indefinitely and until farther orders from this Court. The Court will consider lifting his suspension when respondent Cordova submits proof satisfactory to the Commission and this Court that he has and continues to provide for the support of his legitimate family and that he has given up the immoral course of conduct that he has clung to. Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur. Melencio-Herrera, J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

EN BANC Adm. Case No. 559-SBC January 31, 1984 CARMEN E. BACARRO, complainant, vs. RUBEN M. PINATACAN, respondent.

GUERRERO, J.: This is an administrative case filed on September 2, 1975 by Carmen E. Bacarro charging Ruben M. Pinatacan a 1975 successful Bar candidate, with moral turpitude and depravity, and lack of proper character required of a member of the Bar. In her Affidavit, complainant Bacarro averred that she and respondent fell in love and became engaged while they were studying at the Liceo de Cagayan in Cagayan de Oro City; that when she became pregnant as a result of their relationship, respondent abandoned her and never fulfilled his promise to marry her; that on December 4, 1971, she gave birth to a baby girl; that because of respondent's betrayal, complainant, her daughter and her family suffered shame, disrepute, moral distress and anxiety; and, that these acts of respondent render him unfit to become a member of the Bar. 1 Respondent Pinatacan in his Answer by way of a sworn Affidavit admitted that complainant had been his sweetheart for several years prior to 1971 but denied that he was the father of complainant's child. He claimed that his relationship with complainant started to cool down in January of 1971 when, over her vigorous objection and opposition, he applied for a direct commission with the Philippine Constabulary. He returned to Manila and stayed there for the greater part of March, 1971, for his physical examination. He returned to Cagayan de Oro City, but in June of 1971, he left for his hometown, Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, and never again returned to Cagayan de Oro City. On the other hand, as far as he knew, complainant was working from 1970-1971 in Cagayan de Oro City. Respondent likewise denied that he ever promised marriage to complainant and that he ever cohabited with her. 2 On June 10, 1976, this Court referred this case to the Judicial Investigator for investigation, report and recommendation. 3 Subsequently, however, upon complainant's request prompted by financial difficulties on her part, she was allowed on July 27, 1976 to present her evidence before the City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City. 4Respondent failed to attend the hearings conducted by the City Fiscal on August 30 and September 27, 1976 during which complainant presented her evidence, both oral and documentary. 5 In a nutshell, the evidence for the complainant tends to establish the following facts: After about a year of courtship, she and respondent became sweethearts on March 17, 1967 while they were students at the Liceo de Cagayan in Cagayan de Oro City. They had their first sexual intercourse on March 21, 1971, after respondent made promises of marriage, and they eloped to Cebu City where they stayed for about a week. They returned to

Cagayan de Oro and respondent left complainant allegedly to see his parents in his hometown and make the necessary arrangements for their intended marriage. Respondent came back in May, 1971, but only to inform complainant that they could not get married because of his parents' objections. When complainant told respondent that she was pregnant, he told her to have an abortion. Complainant refused and they had a quarrel Thereafter, she did not see or hear from respondent until after the birth of their baby girl named Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan on December 4, 1971. Complainant had no other boyfriend or sweetheart during the time that she had a relationship with respondent. In July, 1973, she brought the child with her to see respondent in Cavite City and the latter promised to support the child. However, respondent did not make good his promise of support so complainant went to see him again, and once more respondent made several promises, all of which were never fulfilled, until he finished his law course and married a singer by the name of Annie Sarabillo. 6 Forming part of the records, aside from complainant's testimony, are the birth certificate of her child, numerous letters written by respondent covering the period from March 6, 1967 to March 25, 1971 professing his everlasting love for complaint with assurances of his sincerity and loyalty, a letter dated January 13, 1975 from a certain Margie whom complaint Identified as the sister of respondent, and pictures of the child Maria Rochie with said Margie Pinatacan. 7 In a Motion to Dismiss dated February 16, 1977, 8 respondent argued that based on the evidence adduced by complainant and even assuming her averments to be true, no case had been made out to bar him from taking the lawyer's oath. The Court's Investigator, Atty. Victor Sevilla, agreed with respondent in a Report dated February 24, 1977, stating that "the intimacy between the parties in this case is neither so corrupt or so immoral as to warrant the respondent's permanent exclusion from the Philippine Bar." Atty. Sevilla recommended that respondent be allowed to take the lawyer's oath. 9 On December 12, 1977, respondent submitted a Manifestation stating among others that he is to recognize and give support or financial assistance to complaint 's child Maria Rochie although he cannot make assurance that he could give such support or financial assistance immediately since he is without a source of income. 10 Upon being required to comment on the foregoing Manifestation, complainant submitted a sworn statement expressing her adamant stand that respondent "is unreliable, untrustworthy, and without a word of honor, not only for what he has done to me, but on several occasion in the past he had made the same promise to support our child ..., he did not even give something to the child to buy a candy during our several meetings ... when I tried to see him every now and then for the fulfillment of his promise." Moreover, according to complainant, respondent's insistence that the child be aborted proves his "utter disregard of moral values and (C)hristian doctrines," making him unfit or unsuitable for the legal profession. Complainant stressed that she was notmotivated by revenge, for she was aware that whatever fortunes respondent may have in life would also benefit their child as an heir, but that after a serious and profound consideration of the matter, she was of the opinion that "respondent would be more of a liability than an asset to the legal profession." 11

By Resolution of October 11, 1979, this Court required respondent, "as proof of his sincerity and good faith, to acknowledge and recognize in a public document duly notarized and registered in the local civil registrar's office his paternity over the child Maria Rochie and send the original thereof to the complainant and a duplicate copy to this Court within ten (10) days after notice hereof. 12 On October 19, 1979, respondent submitted proof of his compliance with the above Resolution. 13 From the foregoing narration of the background of this case, there clearly appears no question that the complainant and respondent had been sweethearts for several years, that during the said period they have been sexually intimate with each other, and that the child Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan is the result of such pre-marital relations. Respondent, however, maintains that even admitting the truth of complainant's allegations, the circumstances of their relationship with each other do not justify his disqualification from the practice of law. One of the indispensable requisites for admission to the Philippine Bar is that the applicant must be of good moral character. 14 This requirement aims to maintain and uphold the high moral standards and the dignity of the legal profession, and one of the ways of achieving this end is to admit to the practice of this noble profession only those persons who are known to be honest and to possess good moral character. 15 "As a man of law, (a lawyer) is necessary a leader of the community, looked up to as a model citizen" 16 He sets an example to his fellow citizens not only for his respect for the law, but also for his clean living. 17 Thus, becoming a lawyer is more than just going through a law course and passing the Bar examinations. One who has the lofty aspiration of becoming a member of the Philippine Bar must satisfy this Court, which has the power, jurisdiction and duty to pass upon the qualifications, ability and moral character of candidates for admission to the Bar, that he has measured up to that rigid and Ideal standard of moral fitness required by his chosen vocation. In the two consolidated cases of Bitangcor vs.Tan and Peredo vs.Tan 18 against successful 1971 Bar examinee Rodolfo M. Tan, it was held that therein respondent "had fallen short of the requisite morality for admission to the Bar"for violating the honor of two women. Tan had sexual relations with both complainants without marriage and had sired a daughter by complainant Bitangcor. As in the Tan cases, We hold that herein respondent Pinatacan had failed to live up to the high moral standard demanded for membership in the Bar. He had seduced complainant into physically submitting herself to him by promises of marriage. He even eloped with her and brought her to another place. He got her pregnant and then told her to have an abortion When complainant refused, he deserted her. Complainant had to track him down to ask him to help support their child born out of wedlock, and during the few times that she was able to see him, respondent merely made promises which he apparently did not intend to keep. On top of all these, respondent had the audacity and impudence to deny before this Court in a sworn Affidavit the paternity of his child by complaint. These acts taken together certainly do not speak well of respondent's character and are indicative of his moral delinquency. All the years that he has been denied the privilege of being a lawyer were truly well-deserved. Nevertheless, eight (8) years could be punishment

and retribution enough. Moreover, considering that respondent has legally recognized and acknowledged complainant's child Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan as his own, and has undertaken to give financial support to the said child, 19 We hold that he has realized the wrongfulness of his past conduct and is now prepared to turn over a new leaf. Likewise, We reiterate what had been stated in Barba vs. Pedro 20 that "in offenses of this character, the blame hardly belongs to the man alone." In allowing respondent to take the lawyer's oath, he must be admonished that his admission to and continued membership in the Bar are dependent, among others, on his compliance with his moral and legal obligations as the father of Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan. WHEREFORE, respondent Ruben M. Pinatacan is hereby allowed to take the lawyer's oath. SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.M. Nos. R-278-RTJ & R-309-RTJ May 30, 1986 ATTY. ENRICO M. CABRERA, complainant, vs. JUDGE JAMES B. PAJARES, Regional Trial Court, Naga City, respondent. Emerito M. Salva for respondent in A.M. R-278-RTJ.

PER CURIAM: Respondent Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIX in Naga City, stands charged in these two cases which were jointly investigated by Intermediate Appellate Court Justice Vicente Mendoza, as per the Court's resolution of April 25, 1985. In the first numbered case, he is charged with indirect bribery, arising from the allegation that he received, on January 22, 1985, the sum of Pl,000.00 from a party-litigant in a case then pending before his court. In the second numbered case, he is charged with acts unbecoming of a judge, in that he allegedly tried to solicit testimonials from practicing attorneys in his court, attesting to his integrity and competence. Justice Mendoza, after conducting the investigation and hearing the parties and their witnesses, submitted the following report and findings dated May 2, 1986: The Facts

On January 16, 1985, the complainant Enrico Cabrera, gave a sworn statement to the National Bureau of Investigation in Naga City, denouncing the respondent Judge James B. Pajares for having allegedly asked money from him in connection with his case. Cabrera said that in September, 1984 Judge Pajares intimated to him that he needed money. Cabrera said he gave P1,000.00 to the respondent judge because the latter had been unduly strict, preventing him from making statements during the trial of his case.

It appears that the complainant is the defendant in Civil Case No. R-751 which the respondent judge was trying. The case was filed by the complainant's father, Juan Cabrera, and by his half brothers and sisters, for the annulment of the sale made to the complainant of about 28 hectares of land in San Juan, Canaman, Camarines Sur. (See Exhs. 6 and 7-B) Cabrera said he had been advised by his counsel, Atty. Roberto Verdadero, to accommodate any request for money from the respondent so that he would not be unduly hard on the complainant. In September, 1984, according to the complainant, Judge Pajares intimated to him that he needed money. Following his counsel's advice, Cabrera said he expressed willingness to help the judge financially and, the following day after their meeting, gave him P1,000.00. However, according to Cabrera, after two months (i.e., before Christmas of 1984), Judge Pajares again told him that he needed money. Cabrera said the judge saw him in front of the Han of Justice in Naga City and called him. It was then, according to him, that he decided to denounce the judge to the authorities. Cabrera asked the assistance of the NBI in entrapping Judge Pajares. The sworn statement of the complainant, which contains the foregoing, is marked as Exhibit N. On January 17, 1985, Cabrera gave another statement (Exh. O) to the NBI in which he said he was submitting ten P100.00 bills (or P1,000.00) for marking, for use in the entrapment. The bills were marked with orange fluorescent crayon and dusted with orange fluorescent powder by the NBI. At the same time, NBI Regional Director Epimaco Velasco asked the NBI in Manila to send to Naga City a female agent, between 35 and 40 years old, to take part in the entrapment. (Rollo II p. 23; transcript pp. 4749, Aug. 12,1985) On January 22, at 8:15 in the morning, the complainant saw Judge Pajares in the latter's chamber in the Hall of Justice. He was accompanied by NBI agent Angelica V. Somera whom he introduced as his wife. After exchanging amenities with the judge, the complainant informed the judge that he had decided not to settle the case and instead proceed with the trial. For this reason, he told judge that he had filed early that morning a motion for the reconsideration of the judge's order in Civil Case No. R-751, appointing a surveyor to delineate a portion of the land in dispute which Cabrera would give to his half brothers and sisters in settlement. NBI Agent Somera testified that Judge Pajares later asked 'O ano na ngayon ang atin,' whereupon, according to her, Cabrera got the envelope containing the marked money from her and handed it to Judge Pajares. Cabrera then

rushed out of the chamber on the pretext that he forgot the keys in the car and gave the signal to five waiting NBI agents, Somera said that, as soon as they got in, NBI Agent Manuel Tobias asked her where the money was. She pointed to a diary on the table of Judge Pajares, between whose pages the envelope handed to the judge was found inserted. The diary was seized by NBI Agent Artemio Sacaguing. (Exh. A; Transcript pp. 74-75, 93- 94, 98, Aug. 12, 1985, Exhs. B and C). The envelope contained the marked bills. Upon examination by an NBI Forensic Chemist, Leonor C. Vallado, it was established that the envelope and the ten P 100.00 bills were the same envelope and P100 bills previously marked by the NBI. (The ten P100.00 bills are marked Exhibits D-1 to D-10, the envelope in which they were contained as Exhibit D, and the diary, in which the envelope was found inserted, is marked Exhibit J, while the pages between which the envelope was found are marked as Exhibits J-1 and J-2.) Judge Pajares was likewise examined and found positive for orange fluorescent powder on the thumb and index fingers of the left hand. The diary was similarly found positive. (Exhs. K, L, and M Transcript pp. 48-49, 118, Aug. 12, 1985) The Issue The issue in this case is whether Judge Pajares accepted the envelope containing Pl,000.00. There is no question that the envelope was handed to him by Cabrera and that he took it. However, Judge Pajares claims that he took the envelope because he thought the money was intended for the surveyor I who had been appointed to prepare a survey plan of the land in dispute. Judge Pajares says that when he realized it was for the surveyor he threw the envelope back to Cabrera telling him, 'Bakit mo sa akin 'yan ibibigay? Ikaw ang magbigay niyan kay Surveyor Palaypayon.' (Why will you give it to me? You be the one to give it to Surveyor Palaypayon.') According to the judge, the envelope fen on the open pages of his diary and that is where the NBI agents recovered it. Parenthetically, the surveyor's fee was P2,000.00, and would have been defrayed equally by Cabrera and the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. R-751, with each party giving a down payment of P500.00. On the other hand, the complainant claims that Judge Pajares took the envelope containing the money and placed it between the pages of the diary as shown in the photographs. Exhs. C-2 and B-2, taken by NBI photographer Diosdado Belen shortly after the NBI agents got inside the chamber. Findings There is reason to believe that the respondent judge accepted the money and that he knew it was being given to him by reason of his office.

First. The evidence shows that after receiving the envelope with the money, the respondent judge did not really try to return it to Cabrera, as he claims he did, but that instead he placed it between the pages of his diary. This is the testimony of NBI Agent Angelica V. Somera. In her affidavit, Somera stated: 5. That after receiving the envelope containing the marked money, Judge PAJARES immediately placed or inserted the same between the pages of a brown covered book known as 'BUSINESS DAILY 85' which was on top of his table. Somera's affidavit (Exh. A), executed on January 22, 1985, shortly after the entrapment of the respondent, was presented as her testimony in chief. In addition, during the investigation of this case, she testified and identified the photographs, marked Exhibits C, C-1, B, and B-1, as those taken during the entrapment of the respondent judge. The photos show the diary with the envelope containing the money placed between its pages. Somera Identified the hand shown in the photograph, marked Exhibit B-1, as that of NBI Agent Artemio Sacaguing in the attention of seizing the diary. (Transcript, pp. 92-98, Aug. 12, 1985) For his part, Sacaguing confirmed that the hand in the photograph (Exh. B-1) was his and that he was in the act of picking the diary from the table of Judge Pajares in the photo in question. (Id., pp. 50-51). He testified that, as soon as he and his companions got inside the judge's chamber, Manuel Tobias, the chief agent of the NBI sub-office in Legaspi, asked Somera where the envelope was and, upon being told where it was, ordered him to seize the diary. (Transcript, pp. 51-54, Aug. 12, 1985) The respondent judge denies this. He said he took the envelope being handed to him 'instinctively' ' but realizing it contained money which was intended for the surveyor, he immediately threw it back to Cabrera. According to Judge Pajares, the envelope fell on the open pages of his diary * where it was found by the 'balding agent' (Manuel Tobias), who took the diary with the envelope inside, and then put it under his arm. Later, Judge Pajares says, the NBI agent placed the diary on his table and made it appear as though it had always been there, with the envelope containing the money placed between its pages. (Transcript, pp. 175-177, Oct. 22, 1985) Melquiades Volante, the branch clerk of court of the respondent judge, signed an affidavit on January 29, 1985, corroborating the respondent's claim that the respondent tried to return the envelope containing money to the complainant Enrico Cabrera. However, the following day, January 30, Volante executed another affidavit (Exh. V) repudiating the earlier one. He said he was pressured into signing the first affidavit by the respondent and that the fact is that he left the chamber of the respondent judge as soon as he had shown Cabrera and Somera in and did not see the incident under investigation. Volante denied that he swore to the first affidavit in the presence of Fiscal Salvador Cajot.

No weight may, therefore, be given to the first affidavit of Volante. To be sure, the respondent's claim is also confirmed by the janitor Constancio A. Elquiero. This witness was inside the chamber when the NBI staged its operation. (See Elquiero's affidavit, dated January 29, 1985, marked Exh. 10A) However, the testimonies of the NBI agents (Somera, Tobias and Sacaguing), as above summarized, deserve greater credence than Elquiero's testimony. These witnesses are law enforcement agents who must be presumed to have acted in the regular performance of their functions. In addition, there are circumstances which militate against the claim of the respondent judge. First, the photographs (Exhs. B, B-1, C and C-1), which show how the diary, with the envelope in it, was found by the NBI agents, were taken within seconds of the arrival of the agents inside the judge's chamber. (Transcript, pp. 102-103, Aug. 12, 1985). In fact the respondent complained that as the NBI agents barged into his office, pictures were taken. (Transcript, pp. 72-73, Oct. 22, 1985). This circumstance rules out the possibility that any of the NBI agents might have seized the diary and later placed the envelope between its pages. Indeed, the photographs (Exhs. C, G and B) appear to be snapshots of the events as they happened, rather than formal pictures. Second, the plan to entrap the respondent appears to have been cleared with the Executive Judge, Hon. Juan B. Llaguno, before whom the complainant swore to his statement (Exh. N) of January 16, 1985. It is not likely that Judge Llaguno would approve the 'frame-up' of a colleague. Nor is it likely that NBI Regional Director Epimaco A. Velasco would authorize a 'frame-up' considering that, according to Judge Pajares himself, Velasco is his 'close friend.' (Transcript, p. 196, Oct. 22, 1985) During the investigation, an attempt was made to show that it was not possible for Sacaguing to have found the envelope between the pages of the diary, because the envelope (Exh. D) was folded in four parts so that if inserted thus, it would leave an opening of about two inches between the pages of the diary. (Transcript, p. 36, Aug. 12, 1985) The argument seems to be that if the envelope was no longer folded when found inside the diary, it must be because, when Judge Pajares flung it at Cabrera, it spread out. The further argument is then made that it was in this condition when an NBI agent took it and placed it between the pages of the diary. Sacaguing, who seized the envelope, testified that he found it laid flat, not folded, between the pages of the diary. (Id., pp. 54-55) While the evidence indicates that the envelope was folded into four parts when Somera handed it to Cabrera (Id., p. 57; transcript, p. 125, Aug. 26, 1985), it is probable that when it was handed to the respondent judge it was no longer so. The crease marks are not pronounced, indicating that the envelope was folded only rightly, so that when Judge Pajares received it, it probably spread out.
Second ** The respondent said he was outraged by the attempt to frame him up, and he protested. (Transcript, pp. 174-175, Oct. 22, 1985) Yet the photographs taken on the occasion of his arrest show him smiling. (See Exhs. B, G and H). Of course, he explained that he was smiling in 'derision,' (Id., p. 175) and that by nature he is jolly (Id., p. 183). A smile, however, is not a normal reaction to express outrage.

Third ... The respondent's claim that he thought the money was the complainant's share of the surveyor's fees is inconsistent with his (the respondent's) admission that the complainant had told him of his decision not to settle the case. The respondent judge himself said that he had appointed Engineer Palaypayon to prepare a survey plan for the purpose of segregating the four hectares which Cabrera would cede to his brothers and sisters in the event of a settlement, As Cabrera had changed his mind and in fact had filed a motion for the reconsideration of the respondent judge's order, there was no reason for the respondent judge to believe that the money was Cabrera's share of the surveyor's fees. The respondent's claim that a survey plan was anyway needed for the 'final disposition of the case' has no basis, because what the plaintiffs are seeking is the annulment of the sale of lands to Cabrera on the theory that the sale was simulated. Conclusion The distinction is commonly drawn between instigation and entrapment. In the former, where officers of the law or their agents incite, induce, instigate or lure an accused into committing an offense which he otherwise would not commit and has no intention of committing, the accused cannot be held liable But, in entrapment, where the criminal intent or design to commit the offense charged originates in the mind of the accused and law enforcement officials merely facilitate the commission of the crime, the accused cannot justify his conduct. (See People v. Vinzol (CA) 47 O.G. 294; Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 [1958]). As has been said, instigation is a 'trap for unwary innocent,' while entrapment is a 'trap for the unwary criminal. (Sherman v. United States, supra, at 372) In the case at bar, there is no claim that the complainant and the NBI agents instigated the commission of the crime by the respondent. Rather, the respondent's claim is that he was the victim of a 'frame-up', 9 claim that, as already shown, is without basis. Hence, it is unnecessary to determine whether the indirect bribery was instigated by the law enforcement agents. What took place on January 22, 1985 was an entrapment. While there is evidence of indirect bribery, however, there is none to support the other charge of acts unbecoming of a judge. Investigating Justice Mendoza's above statement and analysis of the evidence and a review of the records fully support the finding that "respondent Judge accepted the money and that he knew it was being given to him by reason of his office." The Court has time and again stressed that members of the judiciary should display not only the highest integrity but must at all times conduct themselves in such manner as to be beyond reproach and suspicion. (Quiz vs. Castano 107 SCRA 196; Montemayor vs. Collado, 107 SCRA 258) The Court had likewise stressed in De la Paz vs. Inutan (64 SCRA 540) that "the judge is the visible representation of the law and, more importantly, of justice. From him, the people draw their will and awareness to obey the law. They see in him an intermediary of justice between two conflicting interests, ... . Thus, for the judge to return that regard, he must be the first to

abide by the law and weave an example for the others to follow. He should be studiously careful to avoid even the slightest infraction of the law." (See also Fonacier-Abano vs. Ancheta, 107 SCRA 538). The Court approves the investigator's recommendation in his report that respondent Judge be acquitted for lack of evidence of the second charge of having committed acts unbecoming of a member of the judiciary. But the Court is constrained to disapprove his recommendation as to the first charge of indirect bribery which is fully supported by the evidence that respondent Judge "be suspended from office for 2 years and 4 months, taking into consideration the penalty prescribed in art. 211 of the Revised Penal Code." The penalty of 2 years and 4 months imprisonment provided for the criminal offense of indirect bribery may not be equated with the penalty of separation from the judicial service which is the proper applicable administrative penalty by virtue of respondent Judge's serious misconduct prejudicial to the judiciary and the public interest. ACCORDINGLY, respondent Judge is hereby dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and pay and with prejudice to reinstatement in any branch of the government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities. The Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to return the ten P100.00 bills (Exhibits D-1 to D-10) to the complainant Atty. Enrico M. Cabrera. This decision is immediately executory. Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Cruz and Paras, JJ., concur. Abad Santos and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., took no part.

THIRD DIVISION

[A.C. No. CBD-174. March 7, 1996]

GIOVANI M. IGUAL, complainant, JAVIER, respondent.

vs. ATTY.

ROLANDO

S.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

In the instant case, this Court has found occasion to again remind members of the Bar to observe honesty in their dealings with clients and the public alike, and fidelity to the cause entrusted to them.

This case stemmed from a Complaint-Affidavit filed by complainant with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on September 23, 1991 to initiate disbarment proceedings against the respondent, for malpractice, deceit, dishonesty, (and) gross misconduct in his office as attorney and/or for violation of his lawyers oath x x x.[1] Respondent was accused of having unlawfully withheld and misappropriated complaints money in the amount of P7,000.00, allegedly paid by way of acceptance fee for a matter which respondent never performed any work on. The IBPs Committee on Bar Discipline, through its investigating Commissioner Vicente Q. Roxas, required respondent to answer the charges and thereafter held several hearings, during which the parties were able to present their respective witnesses and documentary evidence. After the parties had filed their respective formal offer of evidence as well as memoranda, the case was considered submitted for resolution. Subsequently, the commissioner rendered his Commissioners Report dated January 30, 1995, which became the basis for the Resolution passed by the IBP Board of Governors on February 18, 1995, which reads as follows:

RESOLUTION NO. XI-95-288 CBD Case No. 174 Giovani M. Igual vs. Atty. Rolando S. Javier RESOLVED to RECOMMEND to the Supreme Court that the respondent be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) month and restitution of the SEVEN THOUSAND PESOS (P7,000.00) acceptance fee.
The Antecedent Facts Inasmuch as the findings of fact made by Commissioner Roxas in his report are substantiated by the evidence on record, the same are herein adopted, to wit:

The complaint dated September 23, 1991 alleges that complainant met respondent attorney thru complainants tennis partner, one Sergio Dorado, sometime April 1, 1991. Complainant asked Sergio Dorado to make it possible for complainant to meet respondent at the latters house regarding the possibility of hiring respondent to handle Civil Case No. 2 188-LRC No. 215, pending with the Regional Trial Court of Aklan. A decision favorable to complainants mother had just been rendered but this decision was appealed by the adverse party to the Court of Appeals, consolidated and docketed as CA-G.R. No. 32592 [1(a) Complaint-Affidavit]. Complainant said respondent is being hired because complainants mother wanted the appeal expedited.
That very night, when Atty. Javier offered to collaborate in the appealed case [1( c) Complaint-Affidavit] because Atty. Javier through sweet talk and pretense of influence

to several justices of the Court of Appeals x x x that he could be of great help in expediting the speedy disposition of the case [1(b) Complaint -Affidavit] complainant gave respondent P10,000.00 which money he intended to buy a refrigerator with. Complainant alleged that he gave the money with the understanding that the money is for safekeeping and as proof, according to him, x x x promising to return my money should my mother and her lawyer Atty. Ibadlit disagree in his collaborating in the case [1(c) Complaint-Affidavit] - covered by receipt which provides: Received the amount of Ten Thousand (P 10,000.00) Pesos from Mr. Giovani M. Igual as Legal Fees and Filing Fees (Civil Case No. 2188). April 1, 1991 signed by respondent Atty. Rolando S. Javier. [Exhibit A and Annex A to Complaint-Affidavit]. Respondent thus entered his formal appearance as collaborating counsel dated April 3, 1991 [Annex B to Complaint-Affidavit]. Then complainant wrote respondent on June 27, 1991 stating that he is demanding P7,000.00 balance since P3,000.00 had already been refunded by respondent. [Exhibit B and Annex C, Complaint-Affidavit]. Instead of filing an Answer, respondent filed an Affidavit dated April 20, 1992, alleging that: he gave back the P3,000.00 not as a settlement because complainant said his child was hospitalized and gravely ill [par. 22, Affidavit -Javier] and that the reason why complainant wanted a refund of the remaining P7,000.00 is because it is not the fault of the affiant if Giovani M. Igual had quarreled with his mother or his brother or his sister as to the reimbursement or sharing of the Legal Fees - because the truth was that Igual wanted to secure double or bigger reimbursement. [par. 30, AffidavitJavier]. Complainant denied the allegation of respondent in a Reply-Affidavit dated May 21, 1992. Respondent presented Exhibit 4 which is certified xerox copy of the Decision dated March 19, 1991 in Civil Case No. 2188 and LRC 215, Regional Trial Court of Aklan, Province. Respondents declared purpose in the Formal Offer of Evidence was to show that Atty. Rolando S. Javier had accepted the appealed cases and had obtained pertinent records or pleadings to work on it [page 2 number (4) exhibit, Formal Offer dated February 6, 1993]. From the evidence, however, the decision is dated February 25, 1991 and the March 19, 1991 is the date of the RTCs Order stating that the appeal had been perfected. Complainant testified that he went back on April 3, 1991, to claim back the P 10,000.00 given last April 1, 1991. [TSN, page 15, July 8, 1992, Giovani Igual]. Respondent also reimbursed the P3,000.00 two (2) months after. [TSN, page 19, July 8, 1992]. Respondent testified that he entered as collaborating counsel only and was promised P20,000.00 if he wins the case and:

A: x x x as collaborating counsel I am going to to (sic) prepare the appeal brief and that I required Mr. Giovani Igual to get the consent of his brothers, sisters and mother. [TSN, pages 12-13, September 16, 1992, Atty. Javier]. .
Respondent further testified that:

A: Now as to the agreement as to the fees, about few days after our agreement he returned and gave me the money. The agreement is that that is my legal fee. That is an acceptance fee. I do not know where he got that but that is what he paid me. [TSN, page 15, Sept. 16, 1992, Atty. Javier].
The Commission confronted respondent with the question:

Q: How about the copy of the appeal? (sic) [TSN, page 27, September 16, 1992, Atty. Javier] A: It was not finished, Your Honor, because we quarreled. When I am preparing the brief we quarreled already. [TSN, page 27, September 16, 1992, Atty. Javier].
Then again:

A: This is what I promised him. I told him that upon the arrival of all pertinent records in the Court of Appeals, I am going to prepare the brief but on the basis of the paper that I have in my possession(.) I can merely be guided by the decision. [TSN, page 34, September 16, 1992, Atty. Javier] Question: Did you not ascertain from them when did they receive the appellants brief because for purposes of prescription there is the reglementary period within which to file appellees brief? Answer: I did not ascertain anymore because at that time my thinking was that I have to study first the case. Question: Considering that this is the filing of appellees brief, is there a need to pay filing fee for appellees brief? Answer: If what you inquired from (sic) is the filing of an appellees brief, there is no such thing. But if you see, in filing briefs in the appealed cases there are usually motions for reconsideration, supplement of the appellees brief and if you look on the Rules of Court, even the motion for reconsideration is payable. Even a motion for reconsideration on the appealed cases has to be paid. There is a fee so I put there the legal fees or the filing fees but that does not necessarily mean that I am referring to a filing fee of an appealed brief. Take note, sir, that in the rule of filing fees even

motions for reconsideration or supplement to the motion for reconsideration there must be a payment of fees. [TSN, pages 39-40, September 16, 1992, Cross Examination of Atty. Javier] Q: And only you did not specify that this is in payment for your professional services, is that correct? A: Yes that is true. It is a matter of style. There are lawyers who specified transportation, fees, etc. Q: Did you not also issue a receipt that this is only a partial payment? A: I did not. What I did, Your Honor, is to issue a receipt for P 10,000.00 as my legal fees and filing fees in a package deal basis with an unwritten agreement that if I will win the case on the appeal on the basis of my appellees brief in a gentlemans agreement he will give me additional P 10,000.00. It is not written. [TSN pages 44 to 45, September 16, 1992, Atty. Javiers cross examination] (italics supplied)
Commissioners Evaluation Commissioner Roxas then rendered the following analysis and evaluation of the evidene presented: This would have been a difficult situation had there been no written receipt of payment of fees. In a lawyer-client relationship, what is governing is the written receipt dated April 1, 1991. Respondent admits he was hired to prepare an appellees brief Respondent admits he did not prepare said appellees brief because he and his clients immediately quarreled after hiring. If that was the situation from the very beginning - that respondent quarreled with his clients immediately within two days after April 1, 1991 respondent knew all along he would not get his papers of the case and he knew all along he will not make the appellees brief. In such situations, if indeed the lawyer cannot agree with the client, or, as in this case, the lawyer is quarreling with his client, there are several options for the lawyer to exit from the relationship instead of merely maintaining a cold war of doing nothing in the case, such as securing a written and signed notice of withdrawal from the case, or, manifesting to the court the circumstances why he can no longer proceed in representing his client. Otherwise, a lawyers act will be interpreted as abandonment. More than the mere presumption that respondent abandoned his client if he does not render any service to the case he is handling, there are other positive indications of why such presumptions may altogether be confirmed as intentional:

FIRST, respondent alleged that he was angry at complainant because he resented what he testified to as the attitude of the clients in calling him names in the neighborhood for failing to return the money. SECOND, despite the fact the April 1, 1991 receipt specified that the money would be for legal fees and filing fees, yet none of the two materialized. Respondent claims the money given him is an acceptance fee. But, as known by respondent, ambiguities in contracts prepared by him, are construed against him, and thus, if the receipt does not specify that it is such an acceptance fee, it cannot be treated as such. When it comes to fees, the amount and purpose must be clearly stated. Otherwise said contracts are interpreted against the lawyer who is presumed to know better on such legal matters as against his client, as in this case, who is not a lawyer. The crucial evidence against respondent is his own admissions that he never really performed any work in preparing or submitting any appellees brief. Respondent claims that he was forced to such a situation because of the attitude of the client which compelled attorney to maintain his ground in refusing to reimburse money to someone who continues to malign his character - which is the reason why respondent had acted as he did. This complainant did not refute. Respondent should have set aside his personal feelings and should have pursued diligently the cause of his client within the bounds of reason, justice, and fair play. Public interest requires that an attorney exert his best efforts and ability in the prosecution or defense of his clients cause [Cantiller vs. Potenciano, 180 SCRA 246]. It has been held that such neglect of respondent, his failure to exercise due diligence or his abandonment of clients cause, renders him unworthy of the trust of his client [Ibid]. The Supreme Court has pointed out that lawyers have a higher responsibility because they are an indispensable part of the whole system of administering justice in this jurisdiction [Ibid]. Respondents attitude of blaming his client for the latters allegedly maligning him is not being candid with the Commission. Respondent must be reminded that candor towards the court is a cardinal requirement of a practicing lawyer [Paluwagan ng Bayan Savings Bank vs. King, 172 SCRA 60]. For it has been held that a lawyer is not merely a professional but also an officer of the court and as such, he is called upon to share in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving disputes in society [Zaldivar vs. Gonzales, 166 SCRA 316], and not contribute to propagating more disputes. (italics supplied) Commissioner Roxas then made the following recommendation, to wit:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended to the Board of Governors, that the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS be meted on respondent in view of the circumstances.

which recommended penalty, as indicated above, was reduced by the IBP Board of Governors to a suspension of one (1) month, but with the addition that respondent be required to restitute the P7,000.00 (balance) he received from complainant. The Courts Ruling We are in agreement with Commissioner Roxas findings and conclusions, as approved by the IBP Board of Governors. In addition, we note that respondent not only unjustifiably refused to return the complainants money upon demand, but he stubbornly persisted in clinging to what was not his and to which he absolutely had no right. Such lack of delicadeza and absence of integrity was further highlighted by respondents half baked excuses, hoary pretenses and blatant lies in his testimony before the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline represented by Commissioner Roxas. The sad thing is, he was not fooling anyone at all. He only ended up making a fool of himself in the process. Respondent, like all other members of the Bar, was and is expected to always live up to the standards embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly the following Canons, viz:

CANON 15 - A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client. CANON 16- A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession. CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. CANON 20 - A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees. for the relationship between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature and demands utmost fidelity and good faith.
It goes without saying that respondent, by his deceitful actuations constituting violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility, must be subjected to disciplinary measures for his own good, as well as for the good of the entire membership of the Bar as a whole. WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, and consistent with the recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, respondent ROLANDO S. JAVIER is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) MONTH, effective upon notice hereof, and ORDERED to restitute to the complainant the amount of SEVEN THOUSAND PESOS (P7,000.00) within thirty (30) days from notice. Let copies of this Decision be spread upon his record in the Bar Confidants Office and furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J. (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.