2008 IEEE Electrical Power & Energy Conference

A Ground Fault Protection Method for Ungrounded Systems

Louis V. Dusang, Jr.

AbstractThis paper presents a novel approach to simultaneous ground fault isolation for ungrounded power systems. The concept capitalizes on current differential and directional overcurrent designs by considering the second ground fault on the system to prevent a phase-to-phase-to-ground fault. Supplying uninterrupted power to consumers is important. Ungrounded power systems have an advantage of ride-through capability during single phase-to-ground faults. It is desirable and important, to trip only the appropriate breakers during faults. While an ungrounded power system can remain operational with a single phase-to-ground fault there are circumstances when a major portion of the distribution system shuts down upon a second ground fault on another phase resulting in a phase-to-phase-to-ground fault. A patent pending concept exploits prior art designs universally regardless of the various relay manufacturers implementation methods. Combining prior art differential protection and ground fault detection the invention minimizes breaker tripping by addressing multiple ground faults. Index TermsDifferential protection, ground fault protection, ungrounded power system

I. INTRODUCTION For many commercial, industrial, and even residential environments, power system reliability is of utmost importance. In some manufacturing or textile environments, a power outage can result in the loss of product in the production process when outage occurred. Further, power outages can result in down time for a facility, not only during the outage, but also due to production restarting undertaken subsequent to an outage. Losses of product and down time may also lead to substantial monetary losses for a facility as a result of the power outage. As such, facilities often take measures to improve or maximize power system reliability to avoid such losses. Utilization of an ungrounded power system is a means of improving power system reliability; hence, some textile and industrial facilities, as well as US Navy ships operate on an ungrounded distribution system. This paper presents a technique of determining two unique single phase-to-ground faults on different line section phases associated with ungrounded power systems, causing a double line-to-ground fault, and isolating one of the faults.

There are two types of distribution systems, grounded or ungrounded. These systems are typically derived from a wyeconnection or delta-connection. A wye-connected may or may not utilize the neutral for grounding. A delta-connected has no neutral. Since the delta-connected system does not have a neutral it is an ungrounded system. To ground an ungrounded system one generally employs a resistance to ground apparatus. High resistance to ground systems like ungrounded systems permit continued power system operation under single-line-toground (SLG) fault conditions. It requires another SLG fault on a phase other than the one faulted to trip the circuit protecting device. This provides an opportunity to clear the SLG fault without shutting down the system such that the end user may never no there was a problem The purpose of the high impedance grounding system is to lower the fault current and limit overvoltage transients. There are no intentional ground paths for ungrounded systems. Ungrounded systems do have a stray capacitance to ground path for current to flow. The impedance for such a system should be equal to or slightly less than capacitive reactance to ground. The reason for this is to increase the amperage slightly to a value that can be read. II. UNGROUNDED OR ISOLATED NEUTRAL POWER SYSTEM BACKGROUND System grounding minimizes voltage and thermal stresses, provides personnel safety, and assists in rapid detection and removal of ground faults [1]. Operating a power system ungrounded limits ground fault current, but does not minimize voltage stress. Additionally, locating ground faults on an ungrounded power system is difficult. The advantage of a solidly or low grounded systems, like most in the U.S., over ungrounded power systems is that they reduce overvoltage, but not to the extent of permitting uninterrupted service. Phase-to-ground faults on solidly or low impedance grounded systems must be cleared immediately to avoid thermal stress and human safety hazards. Ungrounded systems (see Fig. 1) have no intentional ground connections. The system is connected to ground through parasitic capacitance, the line-to-ground capacitance (CAG, CBG, and CCG). Additionally, there is distributed capacitance to ground for the transformers and feeder conductors, and phase-to-phase capacitances which are not represented. In both delta- and wye-configurations, loads are connected ungrounded phase-to-phase; therefore, the distributed capacitance to ground forms the unintentional

_____________________________
Louis Dusang is with Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding, Pascagoula, MS 39567 USA (phone: 228-935-2451; email: louis.dusang@ngc.com)
978-1-4244-2895-3/08/$25.00 2008 IEEE

ground. The advantage of an ungrounded power system is that for a single-phase-to-ground (closing Switch S of Fig. 1) fault, the voltage triangle (see Fig 2) remains intact and therefore loads can remain in service. When a SLG fault occurs, the faulted phase potential decreases to near zero and the healthy phases increase by a factor of 1.73. At the same time, the zero-sequence voltage increases to three times the normal phase-to-ground voltage. Fig 2 demonstrates these two conditions. Fig 2a shows an unfaulted, ungrounded system. Fig 2b shows how the voltage triangle shifts relative to ground for an A-phase-to-ground fault.
R
A

method, detects a fault it does not locate the fault [5], [6]. The traditional method for locating single-phase-to-ground faults was to disconnect a bus-tie feeder and determine if the zerosequence voltage decreased to its prefault value. Since fault current can flow in either direction, forward or reverse, modern relays incorporate a directional element to isolate the detected ground fault. III. TWO-TERMINAL UNIT PROTECTION OF UNGROUNDED POWER LINES Pilot channel relaying for two-terminal lines requires a relay at each line end and a communication circuit connected between the relays (see Fig. 3) [1], [7]. The five common types of communication channels for pilot relaying are audio tones over leased circuits, microwave or power-line carrier (SSB), power-line carrier by itself, metallic wire pairs, RS-232 or n x 64 kb digital and fiber optics. Securely transferring a trip, block or trip permission signal to the opposite end of the protected line is the premise of pilot channel relaying [8]. Pilot wire usage provides high-speed differential and directional signal capabilities.

R
B

R
CA CB CC S C

a) Delta-configuration

R
A N

R
B

R
CA CB CC S C

Fig. 3. Schematic Diagram of Modern Differential and Directional Comparison System

b) Wye-configuration Fig. 1. Three-Phase Ungrounded Systems

Fig 2. Voltage Triangle (a) Unfaulted System. (b) Faulted System (Solid A-Phase Fault, RF = 0)

The major factors in determining the magnitude of ground fault current in ungrounded power systems are the ground return impedance (zero-sequence line-to-ground impedance) and fault resistance [2], [3]. Since loads are connected phaseto-phase and there is no return to ground they do not generate any zero-sequence current. Ground faults in ungrounded systems utilize zero-sequence current or three-phase voltage measurements [4]. While this

Differential relays operate on a current summing principle that is the current flowing into a protected circuit zone equals the current flowing out yielding no differential current on a per-phase basis. When a fault occurs within the protected circuit zone, part of the current flows into the fault such that the current flowing in no longer equals the current flowing out the circuit zone. While a differential current flows in the relay, it does not assert unless the current is above a preset value. Directional overcurrent relay consist of a non-directional overcurrent element in conjunction with a directional function. Directional overcurrent relays provide sensitive tripping for fault currents in forward direction, but not in the reverse direction. Directional elements compare the current flow at the terminals. Current flows into the line at the terminals for internal faults in which the relay sends a trip signal to the circuit breaker. Current flows outward at the terminals for an external fault and utilizing a blocking signal inhibits the sending of an assert signal to the breakers. A relay may contain backup fault detection to the differential fault detection. If the differential element or fiber optic is damaged, the associated relay will not receive remote current information; therefore, a blocking scheme, incorporated into each relay takes appropriate action. While differential relay action is without intentional delay, the blocking scheme does include a short coordination time delay. The backup fault detection is typically based on the phase directional elements (67). The 67P only detects multi-phase

faults while the 67N element detects phase-ground faults. Both elements are necessary to detect all fault types because of the difference in pickup and sensitivity levels. The 67P elements operate from phase currents and the 67N elements operate from the current delivered by the core-flux summing

current transformers. A core flux summing transformer or zero sequence CT encircles all phase conductors and senses phase current imbalances. Core flux summing transformers consist of a secondary winding isolated from the core without a primary winding.

SHORE POWER 4HB 1HB

7HB

5HB

3SG DG5 DG6 6SG 5SG DG3 APS2 1SG DG1 4SG APS1 DG4 DG2 2SG

4
6HA

3
5HA

1
F1

2
4HA SHORE POWER 2HA

DIESEL GENERATOR ON-LINE GROUNDING BANK 4.16kV/460 BANK DIESEL GENERATOR OFF-LINE

CIRCUIT BREAKER (CLOSED) CIRCUIT BREAKER (OPEN)

Fig. 4. Example Power System Single-Line Diagram

For the 3-phase fault shown in Fig. 4 (F1 in the Figure), the desired result is that only Breakers 1 and 2 open. The arrows shown near Breakers 1, 3 6 indicate the direction of fault current flow. If we were to consider time-overcurrent protection, we would need to review instantaneous (ANSI 50) and inverse-time elements (ANSI 51). The arrows in Fig. 4 for Breakers 1, 3 6 indicate the direction of fault current flow for Fault F1. For those breakers where the arrow direct is away from the bus, a phase directional element would declare a forward direction fault. Conversely, if the arrow direction were into the local bus, the phase directional element would declare a reverse direction fault. What would happen if we required forward direction declaration by a directional element before allowing the 51 element at that same breaker to begin operating? Breakers 1 6 would then include directional protection, and, only Breakers 1, 2, 4 and 6 would declare a forward direction fault. (Again note that Breakers 1 and 2 are protecting the faulted line and both declare a forward fault. For all other line sections, only one line terminal directional element declares the fault direction as forward.) To achieve selectivity between the protective relays at Breakers 1, 4 and 6, these relays must sense different magnitudes of fault current. The system configuration shown in Fig. 4 is such that Breakers 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6 all sense the same magnitude of fault current. The phase current waveforms flow through Breakers 1, 3 6 for Fault F1. It should be noted that the load and fault current waveforms are 180 out-of-phase for Breakers 3 and 4, and Breakers 5 and 6. This is a strong indicator that a line

current differential element scheme applied to these lines would properly restrain. IV. SIMULTANEOUS GROUND FAULT LOGIC DESCRIPTION The zero-sequence component is the primary means to detect and clear phase-to-ground faults. Ungrounded systems produce very little phase-to-ground fault current. Continued service is possible in ungrounded power systems under SLG fault conditions. An A-phase-to ground fault alone on 1HA-2HA line as seen in Fig. 5a and Fig. 5b will not result in tripping of circuit breakers for the ungrounded power system. The same is true of a single B-phase-to ground fault. However, if the B-phase-to-ground occurs before clearing the A-phase ground fault the zero-sequence component cannot detect the resulting phase-to-phase fault. For the radial configuration shown in Fig. 5a, the relays associated with busses 1HA-2HA, 2HA-3HA, and 3HA-4HA will send an assert signal to their respective breakers resulting in differential element trip for the phase-to-phase fault. In this case the power transformers 2HA and 3HA will have no power source. Fig. 5b is similar, but a relay racing condition exists as to which breakers will trip since connected in a ring bus configuration. In the ring bus configuration case, it is possible that more of the system is shutdown. Protection against second ground faults is possible when utilizing a zero-sequence current sensor at both cable ends of each bus-tie. In general, time delays are inefficient in that it delays the differential current trip thereby defeating the high-

speed pilot function and may cause excessive damage during phase-to-phase fault and short circuit conditions. The proposed concept essentially blocks the differential elements from asserting under ground fault conditions. Utilizing a Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) system one bus-tie can be isolated in either case minimizing transformer loss. In the case of Fig. 5, bus-tie 2HA-3HA can open without removing a fault while maintaining power to all power transformers.

a) Differential Scheme

b) Ground Directional Overcurrent Scheme Fig. 6. Simplified Fault Protection Logic

V. SIMULTANEOUS GROUND FAULT PROTECTION Present day differential protection typically operates on a per phase basis. This design is suitable for both grounded and ungrounded power systems. However, for ungrounded systems a single phase fault will not result in a trip unless the relay setting is set such that it results in a signal to trip the breaker. Employing a phase-to-phase design (see Fig. 7) such as in the patent pending approach provides for single phase fault isolation.
2HB 3HB 4HB

a) Radial System

1HB

1G

2G

A-Phase Fault

B-Phase Fault

X
1HA 2HA 3HA

X
4HA

Fig. 7. Simplified Patent Pending Protection b) Ring Bus System Fig. 5. Power Distribution System

Relay manufacturers have various ways of implementing differential and directional protection. Although the methods differ between relay manufacturers the principles are similar. Fig. 6a depicts an oversimplified rendition of present day differential protection (analyzing each phase for a difference in current via OR logic) and Fig. 6b depicts an oversimplified version of directional overcurrent protection. For current differential protection if B-phase and C-phase have no differential current flow, but current flows through the differential relay in A-phase the differential relay will assert if the value exceeds the pickup setting. Operation of the ground relay is based on detection of a ground fault without isolating the fault condition.

The patent does not modify the primary differential, directional or ground fault detection schemes developed by the various manufacturers in which CT saturation and other factors are considered by the relay manufacturers design. The patent enhances each of these schemes by including additional logic to address the second ground fault. Utilizing existing ground fault detection technology we block the differential elements when a ground fault is present on the power system to prevent tripping when the second ground fault occurs. To examine the relationship of zero-sequence voltage and current and differential protection the system was modeled as a simple two line ungrounded system connected to two buses with a source connected to each bus as shown in Fig. 8.

As stated earlier, each manufacturers relay can apply the patent pending simultaneous ground fault protection. Evaluating the new concept consisted of running scenarios on power system configuration of Fig. 8 and comparing the results with present day differential and ground fault protection with simultaneous ground fault protection, see Table I.
Fig. 8. Power System Configuration TABLE I FAULT PROTECTION TEST CASES

Test Case 1 2 3 4 5

Scenario SLG fault on Line 1 Phase-to-phase-to-ground fault, Line 1 Phase-to-phase fault on Line 1 Three-phase-to-ground fault on Line 1 SLG fault (A), Line 1 SLG fault (C) w/ delay, Line 1 SLG fault (A), Line 1 SLG fault (C) w/ delay, Line 2

Non-Simultaneous Ground Fault Protection Relay 1 and Relay 2 fault detection via zero-sequence Relay 1 and Relay 2 isolate fault via differential protection Relay 1 and Relay 2 isolate fault via differential protection Relay 1 and Relay 2 isolate fault via differential protection Relay 1 and Relay 2 isolate fault via differential protection All relays assert isolating both faults via differential protection

Simultaneous Ground Fault Protection Same Same Same Same Relay 1 and Relay 2 isolate fault via new concept Selectively isolate either Line 1 or Line 2

Cases 1-5 deal with one line in which fault isolation is similar regardless of protection scheme applied. The difference lies in Case 5. If the SLG fault occurs on a bus and evolves into a double line-to-ground fault, the same relays assert similar to a differential trip except with a delay. This time delay acts as a differential element block while permitting fault isolation via SCADA system corresponding to the simultaneous ground fault protection scheme. Case 6 affects both lines. Here is where the real benefit of the concept becomes apparent. The per phase differential protection approach results in each relay sending a trip signal to open all breakers. However, when implementing a twophase scheme, blocking differential elements provides time to isolate one of the SLG faults. In other words, with the differential phase components blocked, the second ground fault utilizing a SCADA signal isolates one SLG fault. Obviously, only two breakers trip versus four. In the event no SLG fault is cleared a timer will time out tripping the applicable busses, which operates as a backup. The advantage in both Case 5 and Case 6 is it provides time to address the ground fault with continued differential protection. For larger power systems as in Figure 4 when the second ground fault occurs on a different bus (Case 6), the differential current while remaining internal between the two outermost relays covers more lines. In Figure 4a, we have three, two terminal, busses: 1HA-2HA, 2HA-3HA and 3HA-4HA. Implementing a timer in the scheme addresses multiple bus situations.

Personnel may be addressing the first ground fault occurrence when the second ground fault occurs. Under these conditions it may be unsafe to trip the breakers. Depending on whether the power system configuration is ring bus or radial depends on how the two faults will be isolated. In either case the option may be to isolate the second fault occurrence. This option can be safe for personnel and maximize power system reliability. VI. CONCLUSIONS Power system reliability is important for many commercial, industrial, and even residential environments. As such, this paper introduces a technique of determining two unique single-phase-to-ground faults, creating a double-line-toground fault, and isolating one of the faults. The concept is applicable to ungrounded and high impedance grounded systems. Additionally, the new scheme capitalizes on current differential, directional overcurrent and ground fault protection. High-speed fault clearing is maintained for phase-to-phase, phase-to-phase-to-ground and three-phase faults. Although a delay is added when a second SLG fault occurs on the system, it is insignificant in that it is similar to protection without communications. Additionally, it enhances power system performance and reliability. VII. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT The author acknowledges the co-inventor, Jeff Roberts, for his contributions.

VIII. REFERENCES
[1] [2] IEEE Recommended Practice for Protection and Coordination of Industrial and Commercial Power Systems, IEEE Std 242-2001 Cooper Bussmann Inc, Overcurrent protection and the 2002 National Electrical Code questions & answers to help you comply, On-line Training, March 2002, [Online]. Available: http://www.bussmann.com/library/docs/NE02.pdf J. Roberts, H.J. Altuve and D. Hou, "Review of ground fault protection methods for grounded, ungrounded and compensated distribution systems," presented at the 28th Annual Western Protective Relay Conf., Spokane, Washington, October 23-25, 2001. [Online]. Available: http://www.selinc.com/techpprs/6123.pdf A. A. Regotti and H. W. Wargo, Ground-fault protection and detection for industrial and commercial distribution systems, Westinghouse Engineer, pp. 80-83, July 1974. D. J. Love and N. Hashemi, Considerations for ground fault protection in medium voltage industrial and cogeneration systems, IEEE Trans. Ind. Applications., Vol. 24, pp 548-553, July/Aug. 1988. T. Baldwin, F. Renovich, and L. F. Saunders Directional ground-fault indicator for high-resistance grounded systems, IEEE Trans. Ind. Application, Vol. 39, No. 2, pp. 325-332, March/April 2003 J. Roberts, D. Tziouvaras, G. Benmouyal, and H. J. Altuve, The Effect of multiprinciple line protection on dependability and security, presented at the 28th Annual Western Protective Relay Conf., Spokane, Washington, October 23-25, 2001. [Online]. Available: http://www.selinc.com/techpprs/6109-Paper-WPRC.pdf J. Benckenstein, System reliability improvements through fiber optic systems, Pulsar Technical Publication FD45VER01, March 2001, [Online]. Available: http://www.pulsartech.com/pulsartech/docs/FD45VER01.pdf

[3]

[4]

[5]

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[7]

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IX. BIBLIOGRAPHY
Louis Dusang received a Bachelor of Science in Electrical Engineering degree from Mississippi State University in 1988 and is pursuing his MSEE at the University of Idaho. He is a Registered Engineer in South Carolina. He has been an electrical engineer with Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding since November 2001. He is the lead project engineer for LDA Power Systems. Prior to joining NGSB, Mr. Dusang worked as both an electrical engineer and controls engineer for Jacobs.