Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
2 | NEWS | financialmirror.com
APR
JAN-APR
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8.1
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-1.8
1.0
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0.6
0.7
0.6
1.1
-0.3
0.2
9.8
-3.2
1.9
-0.3
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3.6
1.3
0.9
0.8
0.7
1.1
1.1
Source: Cystat.
committee this month looking into how multinationals structure themselves to minimise tax bills.
If this is true then it seems to me that the tax administration can already intervene ... It would no longer be a case of fiscal optimisation, but of an operation in a country thats being
falsely delocalised, he told Reuters.
Philippe Marini, senator with the UMP centre-right opposition, said the evidence from France would boost the case the
French tax authority already has against Google.
Marini, who heads the Senates finance commission, has
pushed for a tax on online advertising and ecommerce since
2010.
In Germany, Sven
Giegold, MEP for the Green
Party, said he would call on
the tax authority in
Hamburg, where Google
Germany is based, to investigate the companys
affairs.
Google should publicly
explain the apparent discrepancy between the different statements it has
made about the nature of
its German units business,
he said.
financialmirror.com | CYPRUS | 3
RELIABLE NEIGHBOUR
We will move on with our relations to see how we can support each other, how we Europeans can contribute in anything
that concerns you. We need you. I am not saying that you need
us. And you dont simply have a neighbour close to you but a
brother and we will go on this way. We must work together in
order to bring peace, stability and welfare.
Shimon Peres said that the two countries are linked to each
other in many ways, adding that without Cyprus, Israel lies far
from Europe.
In statements to journalists, President Anastasiades said
that with the decision to build a liquefaction terminal across
from the Suez Canal, Cyprus will be offering to those who
want to take advantage of it, the infrastructure for exporting
to the Far East but also to Europe.
He added that there was interest from Israeli companies
that are involved in the exploitation of natural gas to be also
participants in the investment for the construction of the terminal at Vassiliko. Both Delek and Avner are a 30% stakeholder in Block 12, the gasfield explored by U.S.-based Noble
Energy that will be deploying an appraisal drill next month to
confirm the 7tcf of natural gas deposits.
Cyprus deepens
Israel ties at the
expense of Lebanon?
Things seem to have changed since the February 2012
visit by PM Netanyahu to Cyprus, when Israel sought to
replace its deteriorating ties with Ankara by
strengthening its relations with Nicosia, according to a
Beirut-based think tank.
In a comment following President Nicos Anstiades
visit to Cyprus, the Middle East Strategic Perspectives
said that the current rapprochement between Israel and
Turkey, which remains to be confirmed, offers an
additional gas export option to Israel, which seems to
have provoked some sort of nervousness among Cypriot
officials who have multiplied visits to Israel in recent
weeks. Bilateral meetings preceded the Presidents
official visit, focusing on energy and security issues.
Energy, Trade and Tourism Minister Giorgos Lakkotrypis
visited Israel on 08/04, followed by a visit by Defense
Minister Fotis Fotiou on 02/05. After meeting his Israeli
counterpart Moshe Yaalon, Fotiou announced that the
deepening of Cyprus defense relations with Israel poses
no threat to anyone and that similar cooperation with
other neighboring countries such as Greece, Lebanon or
Egypt is possible. Cyprus is now considering to allow the
Israeli Air Force to use its base in Paphos to patrol the
Eastern Mediterranean.
Although securing offshore oil and gas installations
and preventing terrorist attacks are the main reason
behind the increased military cooperation between
Nicosia and Tel Aviv, opening a Cypriot base to Israeli
fighter jets is likely to provoke unease among some of
Cyprus neighbours, including Lebanon. Added to the
recent statement by Irans IRGC commander Major
General Hossein Salami that Iran intends to stretch its
security border to the Eastern Mediterranean, the
region seems to be attracting more, not less, tension.
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4 | CYPRUS | financialmirror.com
By Dr Andrestinos
Papadopoulos
Ambassador a.h.
are entrusted to him by General Assembly, the Security
Council.. that the executive organ of the UN entrusted to
Ban Ki-moon and his predecessors the mission of good offices
to Cyprus.
Performing this duty, the Secretary General should act in
accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter, the
norms of international law and the UN Resolutions. This view
was supported by former Secretary Generals Dag
Hammarskjold and U Thant, who regarded that strict compliance with the aims and principles of the Charter was sine qua
non of every exercise of good offices by the Secretary General.
financialmirror.com | CYPRUS | 5
By Shavasb Bohdjalian
30 mln to boost
8,000 jobs
The government plans to get 8,000 unemployed
people back in work, thanks to a 30.8 mln euro
programme that is primarily aimed at the tourist
sector.
Labour and Social Insurance Minister Zeta
Emilianidou announced a package of measures
aimed at combating unemployment that reached
14.2% in March, more than double what it was five
years ago.
Emilianidou said the projects are co-funded by the
EU and said will help all permanent European
residents, but said she hoped that more Cypriots
would be employed.
According to official statistics, the number of
registered unemployed in Cyprus reached 45,000 in
April, of whom 33,500 were Greek Cypriots.
Emilianidou noted that unemployment affects all
ages, but in particular young people.
We have too many young people out of work,
graduates and non-graduates, she said, adding that
more measures will be announced at a later stage.
The three measures include a 6.8 mln euro grant
to hire or keep 1,000 people on a flexible timetable
and work from home, 20 mln euros to employ 6,000
people in the hotel, food and tourism industry, and a
4 mln euro traineeship stagiaire programme for
1,000 unemployed graduates (under 35 years) to
gain work experience by subsidising them with 500
euros a month.
Cyprus recorded the second highest rise in EU
unemployment in March. According to Eurostat,
unemployment increased in 19 member states and
fell in eight, compared to March 2012.
The highest increases were recorded in Greece
(21.5% to 27.2% between January 2012 and January
2013), Cyprus (10.7% to 14.2%), Spain (24.1% to
26.7%) and Portugal (15.1% to 17.5%).
6 | OPINION | financialmirror.com
FinancialMirror
Published every Wednesday by
Financial Mirror Ltd.
www.financialmirror.com
Tel. 22 678 666 Fax. 22 678 664
P.O. Box 16077, CY2085 Nicosia
By Bill Gates
account for the production of a farmer who grows and eats his
own food? If subsistence farming is systematically underestimated, some of what looks like growth as an economy moves
out of subsistence may merely reflect a shift to something
that is easier to capture statistically.
There are other problems with poor countries GDP data.
For example, many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa do not
update their reporting often enough, so their GDP numbers
may miss large and fast-growing economic sectors, like cell
phones. When Ghana updated its reporting a few years ago,
its GDP jumped by 60%. But many people didnt understand
that this was just a statistical anomaly, not an actual change
in Ghanaians standard of living.
In addition, there are several ways to calculate GDP, and
they can produce wildly different results. Jerven mentions
three: the World Development Indicators, published by the
World Bank (by far the most commonly used dataset); the
Penn World Table, released by the University of Pennsylvania;
and the Maddison Project at the University of Groningen,
which is based on work by the late economist Angus
Maddison.
These sources rely on the same basic data, but they modify it in different ways to account for inflation and other factors. As a result, their rankings of different countries
economies can vary widely. Liberia is Sub-Saharan Africas
second-poorest, seventh-poorest, or 22nd-poorest country in
terms of GDP, depending on which authority you consult.
It is not only the relative rankings that differ. Sometimes,
COPYRIGHT
financialmirror.com | COMMENT | 7
much more support, and sentiment might shift. The euro itself
would be finished; after all, its primary task was to break the
Bundesbanks dominance in monetary policy.
But Soros is wrong. For starters, there is no legal basis for his
demand. Article 125 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union expressly forbids the mutualisation of debt.
By Hans-Werner Sinn
Worst of all, Soros does not recognize the real nature of the
eurozones problems. The ongoing financial crisis is merely a
symptom of the monetary unions underlying malady: its southern members loss of competitiveness.
The euro gave these countries access to cheap credit, which
was used to finance wage increases that were not underpinned
by productivity gains. This led to a price explosion and massive
external deficits.
Maintaining these countries excessive prices and nominal
incomes with artificially cheap credit guaranteed by other countries would only make the loss of competitiveness permanent.
The entrenchment of debtor-creditor relationships between the
states of the eurozone would fuel political tension as occurred
in the United States in its first decades.
In order to regain competitiveness, the southern countries
will have to reduce their goods prices, while the northern countries will have to accept higher inflation. Eurobonds, however,
would impede precisely this outcome, because relative prices in
the north can be raised only when northern savers invest their
capital at home instead of seeing it publicly escorted to the south
by taxpayer-financed credit guarantees.
8 | COMMENT | financialmirror.com
A fateful mistake
Controversy is essential to the advancement of science. So
the debunking of methodological flaws and a coding error in
a paper by the economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth
Rogoff is just part of everyday life in academia. Yet coverage
of the controversy by the news media and the blogosphere
has been astonishingly intense and simplistic.
Growth in a Time of Debt, the short 2010 paper in
which Reinhart and Rogoff claimed that public debt starts to
have a significantly detrimental effect on economic growth
once it reaches 90% of GDP, was never a celebrated piece of
economic research. As a rough empirical characterization of
stylized facts, it was received somewhat skeptically by the
academic community, and both authors were known for
much more noted contributions. Google Scholar, the academic search engine, records more than 3,000 academic citations of Rogoffs most cited paper, compared to less than 500
for Growth in a Time of Debt.
What would have normally remained a subject for postseminar small talk has, however, become a topic for discussion by journalists, commentators, and policymakers. For all
of them, what matters is that the sorry fate of the
Reinhart/Rogoff paper undermines the case for fiscal austerity.
A few months ago, Olivier Blanchard, the International
Monetary Funds chief economist, had already criticized his
colleagues and policymakers in advanced countries for systematically underestimating the recessionary impact of fiscal
consolidation programs. The debacle of the Reinhart/Rogoff
paper is widely regarded as another, fatal illustration of austeritys shaky intellectual foundations.
But this is only partly true. Until the Reinhart/Rogoff
paper, the main argument for fiscal retrenchment rested on
concerns about the sustainability of public debt. The question was whether a sovereign would ultimately be able to
repay its debt, given specific economic and financial conditions, long-term trends such as the aging of the population,
and uncertainty about the future course of policy.
By Jean Pisani-Ferry
Confusion was especially acute in early 2010, when
Growth in a Time of Debt was published. The global economy was just emerging from the deepest recession in the
post-World War II period. A global Keynesian stimulus had
prevented the worst, and the most urgent policy question
was whether to continue supporting the economy or start
consolidating.
Some argued in favor of delaying consolidation, because
the economy was still in a deep recession; too harsh an
adjustment, according to this view, would have a major
impact on a still-weak private economy. Some claimed the
opposite, arguing that, given the scale of the task, there was
no time to lose.
The Reinhart/Rogoff paper appeared to provide the perfect
argument in support of rapid consolidation, which is why it
was cited intensively in policy discussions. Austerity, it was
argued, was needed to stem the rise in the debt ratio and
safeguard long-term growth.
To be sure, retrenchment could entail some short-term
costs; but the longer-term benefits would be much bigger.
By Ricardo Hausmann
levels when their economies are depressed, as Krugman recommends. There really is a big bad debt wolf, and the world is
full of examples in which it has emerged from its lair to create havoc.
Consider Spain. When the 2008 crisis erupted, the G-20
convened that November to coordinate a Keynesian response.
All member countries were supposed to fight the coming
recession by stimulating their economies through simultaneous fiscal expansion. Pedro Solbes, Spains finance minister at
the time, quickly ordered an acceleration of public investment
and spending.
By the spring of 2009, however, Solbes was forced to
reverse course. With tax revenue collapsing and expenditure
ballooning, the government found itself running such large
deficits that the markets were spooked government-bond
prices collapsed, interest rates soared, and the country found
itself unable to finance its deficit. Where were the rock-bottom
interest rates that are supposed to characterize periods of
weak growth and high unemployment?
Financial history is full of similar examples: Mexico in
1994, Russia in 1998, Ecuador in 1999, Argentina in 2001,
Uruguay in 2002, the Dominican Republic in 2003, and even
the UK in 1976. All were battling recession and high unemployment, only to find themselves unable to finance their
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Country
Detail
MAY 8
EUR German Industrial Production M/M due 1.00pm
MAY 8
CAD Housing Starts due 3.15pm
MAY 8
US
10-year Bond Auction due 8.00pm
MAY 9
NZD Unemployment Rate & Employment Change due 1.45am
MAY 9
EUR German, French and Swiss bank holiday
MAY 9
GBP Manufacturing Production M/M due 11.30am
MAY 9
GBP Industrial Production M/M due 11.30am
MAY 9
GBP Bank of England MPC meeting on interest rates due 2.00pm
MAY 9
EUR Spanish 10-year bond auction
MAY 8
US
Weekly Unemployment Claims due 3.30pm
MAY 9
US
Wholesale Inventories M/M due 5.00pm
MAY 10
EUR German Trade Balance due 9.00am
MAY 10
GBP Trade Balance in GBP due 11.30am
MAY 10
ALL G7 Meetings - Day 1
MAY 10
CAD Employment Change due 3.30pm
MAY 10
US
Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke speaks starting 4.30pm
MAY 10
US
Federal Budget Balance due 9.00pm
Indicated times are Cyprus time
Forecast
Previous
-0.10%
175k
1.10%
0.50%
181k
1.8/2.8
-1.00%
0.40%
0.30%
0.50%
0.80%
1.00%
0.50%
333k
0.30%
18.1B
-8.9B
324k
-0.30%
17.1B
-9.4B
13.5k
-54.5k
93.9B
-106.5B
Source: Eurivex
The evidence for this so far is meager, since the apparent impact
of QE is to widen inequality by boosting asset prices while doing
little for structural unemployment (the counterargument of
course is that without QE the employment situation would be
far worse).
At the other end of the spectrum, the argument for an end
to QE, a rise in interest rates and a consequent likely economic
restructuring through massive bankruptcies are logically consistent but politically impractical. Moreover, it ignores the fact that
the declining labor share of income is a decades-long phenomenon with many deep sourcescapital efficiency, technology,
globalization, the increased economic weight of the
educated/highly skilled. In addition, demographic factors will
depress structural economic growth rates in coming decades.
Any way you slice it, its difficult to see a solution to the current
economic mess that will make both labor and capital happy.
www.marcuardheritage.com
Disclaimer: This information may not be construed as advice and in particular not as investment, legal or tax advice. Depending on your particular
circumstances you must obtain advice from your respective professional
advisors. Investment involves risk. The value of investments may go down
as well as up. Past performance is no guarantee for future performance.
Investments in foreign currencies are subject to exchange rate fluctuations.
Marcuard Cyprus Ltd is regulated by the Cyprus Securities and Exchange
Commission (CySec) under License no. 131/11.
By Oren Laurent
President, Banc De Binary
www.bbinary.com
Aussie slides to 2-month low after RBA cut, euro tripped by ECB
The Australian dollar slumped to a twomonth trough on Tuesday after the Reserve
Bank of Australia cut rates to a record low,
while the euro remained capped as the common currency was unable to shake off dovish
comments from the European Central Bank
chief.
The yen bounced back from a 10-day low
versus the dollar on Japanese exporters buying
after a long weekend in Japan, though many
traders expect the currency to stay under pressure after a solid U.S. job report last week.
The big mover was the Australian dollar,
which fell 0.7% to $1.0181 after RBA cut rates
by a quarter of a percentage point to 2.75% citing a historically high Aussie dollar. The market had been evenly divided on the chance of
policy easing on Tuesday. The Aussie broke
through a support around $1.0220 and fell as
to $1.0178, its lowest since March 4. The low
Disclaimer: The commentary appearing on this page is for indication purposes only and Eurivex does not take any responsibility for investment action taken. Nothing in this report should be considered to constitute investment advice. It is not
intended, and should not be considered, as an offer, invitation, solicitation or recommendation to buy or sell any of the financial instruments described herein. Trading on leverage is very risky and may lead to losses.
WORLD MARKETS | 19
financialmirror.com |
HIGH-PROFILE INVESTMENTS
Sale of shares could start in mid-2014; Taxpayer to make profit in long run
SELL AT A LOSS
Metro Bank made a 2012 net loss of 34.6 mln pounds, which
it said reflected significant investment in building stores, infrastructure and systems.
The bank raised 126 mln pounds in June from external
investors to fund future expansion and is targeting a listing on the
London Stock Exchange in 2014.
20 | COMMENT | financialmirror.com
By Mohamed A. El-Erian
high level of public indebtedness, the risks of collateral damage and unintended consequences are potentially higher.
With gross overall government debt already at 238% of
GDP, some worry that Japan would face the threat of economic and financial dislocation were a failed policy experiment to lead its private sector which traditionally has displayed an enormous home bias to disinvest from Japan.
This does not mean that Japans policy revolution will necessarily disappoint. But, critically, it does mean that even if you
believe that the BOJs actions are necessary for Japan to
emerge from its economic malaise, they certainly are not sufficient.
Japans experiment requires meeting two additional conditions if it is to avoid going the way of previous failed policy
initiatives: meaningful structural reforms that essentially
change how segments of the economy respond and operate;
and other countries continued acquiescence in the currency
depreciation needed to boost the impact of slower-moving
domestic dynamics through meaningful gains in global market share.
Meeting the first condition is in the hands of Japanese citizens and their elected representatives. The required reforms,
though achievable, will test the governments resolve and
implementation capabilities, as well as the populations willingness to face immediate disruptions in exchange for the
promise of longer-term gains.
The second requirement is very different. It can be
achieved only if other countries are willing to sacrifice output, either because they have no choice, or because they
By Zhang Monan
PBOC, the relationship between the central bank and the financial sector entails both a division of labor and a system of checks
and balances. In theory, the financial sector serves as a kind of
accountant for the treasury and the government, while the
PBOC acts as the governments cashier.
In practice, however, the relationship between currency and
finance is vague, with both assuming quasi-fiscal functions.
Chinas low official government debt largely reflects the role of
currency in assuming quasi-fiscal liabilities not only the writeoff costs incurred from reforming state-owned banks, but also
the takeover of banks bad debts via note financing and the purchase of asset-management companies bonds. These activities
both damage the PBOCs balance sheet and constrain monetary
policy.
At the same time, finance takes on quasi-fiscal functions by
excluding government fiscal deposits government deposits in
the national treasury, commercial banks fiscal savings, and central treasury cash managed through commercial-bank deposits
from the money supply. Given the large volume of fiscal
deposits which totaled 2.4 trln yuan (3.3% of M2) at the end of
2010 their impact on the money supply cannot be ignored.
Clarifying the relationship between currency and finance is
essential to ensuring that all newly issued currency is backed by
assets. Only by exerting a harder budget constraint on the state
sector, limiting fiscal expansion, and reducing dependence on
government-led investment can Chinas excessive currency
issuance be addressed in the long term.
Zhang Monan is a fellow of the China Information Center,
a fellow of the China Foundation for International Studies, and
a researcher at the China Macroeconomic Research Platform.
Project Syndicate, 2013.
www.project-syndicate.org
COMMENT | 21
financialmirror.com |
By Clem Chambers
Contributor, Forbes
financialmirror.com | GREECE | 23
The key now is, you want to see the bulls continue to
push higher, you dont want to see the slip back, said Ryan
Detrick, a senior technical strategist at Schaeffers
Investment Research in Cincinnati, Ohio.
The ultimate contrarian would say a lot of that very well
could be priced in, the thing most people arent expecting is
a continued rally in the normally weak summer months, he
said.
By the same token, the lofty levels for equities could make
them ripe for a pullback, with investors resuming the battle
between booking profits and buying dips. That battle caused
the index to alternate between weekly gains and losses
throughout the latter portion of March and most of April.
It is a bipolar market. It is either all on or all off,
Mendelsohn said. Either things are great and we are going
to the moon, or everything is falling apart and its all over.
K.
Number Nominal
Market
Shares
('000)
A
Cap.
('000)
K.
EUR
. . .
Value
euro
A
EUR
Profit/(Loss)
2011
BOCY
CPB
HB
LOG
TSH
LUI
1 795 141
4 065 482
619 689
74 080
246 214
460 547
1.00
0.10
0.43
0.35
0.35
0.17
71 264
18 224
10 341
5 066
104 895
1.24
0.25
0.78
0.75
0.49
0.27
0.63
0.15
0.33
0.09
0.04
0.10
FWW
VCW
APE
ERME
LI
ACD
GAP
MIT
PHIL
LHH
LIB
LPL
114 252
71 936
182 725
175 000
282 213
13 416
38 750
8 200
45 000
35 000
122 804
48 006
0.34
0.43
0.17
0.34
0.27
0.35
0.17
1.03
0.17
0.35
0.10
0.35
114 320
30 932
29 236
16 100
16 368
7 915
5 038
4 100
4 275
3 850
3 930
2 688
238 753
1.78
3.20
0.25
0.45
0.15
4.69
0.31
3.00
0.09
1.96
0.05
0.48
1.37
0.13
0.13
0.65
0.20
0.38
0.13
0.42
0.17
1.06
0.06
0.68
0.12
0.34
14 631
1 587
5 408
25 421
2 239
5 101
242
4 867
576
7 289
6 887
1 249
21 054
4 130
27 716
2 096
4 617
743
6 160
3 135
4 692
2 306
10 800
335
948
10 842
1 709
11 934
4 559
5 694
7 735
941
164
31 408
62 038
1 658
15 298
5 421
298
1 650
2 557
2 727
6 825
3 175
207
196
75 000
416 263
0.49
0.02
0.45
0.76
0.79
0.33
0.40
0.27
0.03
0.65
0.09
0.27
2.08
5.70
1.86
0.43
0.29
0.30
0.67
0.04
0.15
2.73
0.92
-0.10
0.09
3.40
0.38
0.59
0.36
0.75
0.63
0.09
-0.0075
0.18
1.31
0.38
0.004
3.40
0.04
0.12
0.43
1.33
2.44
0.34
0.04
0.11
0.19
0.77
0.30
0.56
0.11
0.85
0.18
0.11
0.06
0.16
0.08
0.46
0.38
0.90
0.07
0.24
0.16
0.33
0.20
0.19
0.57
0.23
0.89
0.18
0.12
-0.15
1.27
0.10
0.25
0.99
0.20
0.07
0.28
0.14
-1.47
0.40
0.54
0.20
10.26
0.44
0.03
0.43
0.16
0.03
0.09
0.76
0.25
0.18
5.38
0.60
FBI
PROP
ANC
ATL
BLUE
CCCT
CJ
CLA
CLL
CPIH
CTO
CYP
CCC
CFI
CTC
EXE
DES
DISP
ELF
ELMA
EXIN
PES
KG
KARA
KARK
KEO
COS
KRO
ARI
LCH
MPT
MINE
MSV
PND
PHL
PGE
PTL
AGRO
FRH
ROY
SAL
SFS
SHL
TOP
COV
UFI
VIP
98 861
158 660
110 358
39 109
15 438
141 692
10 070
108 163
288 141
24 379
208 700
5 140
137 611
3 059
92 079
14 973
80 999
13 506
16 000
348 333
34 000
4 805
100 000
22 343
7 967
30 978
17 985
20 400
62 446
101 683
43 211
78 415
14 900
424 435
87 500
22 100
382 440
3 590
297 915
33 000
36 529
66 520
32 500
12 212
20 700
9 788
75 000
0.26
0.09
0.35
0.35
0.17
0.43
0.35
0.35
0.08
0.17
0.87
0.43
0.43
1.73
0.85
0.43
0.09
0.35
0.62
0.09
0.29
0.87
0.17
0.34
0.35
0.43
0.31
0.43
0.20
0.35
0.35
0.17
0.14
0.17
0.35
0.34
0.17
1.73
0.03
0.17
0.43
1.00
0.69
0.34
0.03
0.05
$ 0.10
9M
2011
EUR ('000)
K
2011
9M
2012
EUR ('000)
K
2012
Profit/(Loss)
2012
EUR ('000)
.
9M '11
-792 593
-291 493
-73 081
3 024
-1 527
-4 830
-1 160 500
9M '12
-210 956
-1 671 495
219
3 026
109
-8 489
-1 887 586
2011
9M '11
9M '12
2012
6 700
-2 312
4 059
197
-1 734
3 250
-1 647
-1 046
-1 608
702
-3 657
-1 273
1 631
3 780
-2 992
2 372
-258
287
67
-505
-3 539
1 142
-1 930
6 005
-1 354
-1 880
-492
-34 500
3 181
-49
-1 767
-1 071
1 006
-5 616
-3 284
-39 821
2011
9M '11
9M '12
1 756
1 756
482
482
Earnings
Per
Dividend
Per
Dividend
Yield
Share
2011/12
Cents
Results
Share
2012
Cents
2012
-1 371 000
-3 650 380
-100 658
3 585
-6 894
-82 674
-5 208 021
1 932
-2 776
-2 123
2 311
571
-3 532
-375
-3 913
-7 733
-104
-2 998
-652
-4 639
-4 127
6 152
658
1 600
-529
-257
-6 807
-15 527
1 608
5 226
-2 268
-112
-3 948
-802
108
-1 263
-10 021
1 324
-3 328
-337
-20 039
10 783
-868
-6 356
75
151
480
973
-19 200
1 577
-891
13
-56
2 739
-87 300
P/E ratio
2012
0
0
-23 440
2 040
-13 281
-30 442
-65 123
2012
-3 731
-637
-1 284
1 532
403
-7 040
-376
-16 998
-14 283
-95
-1 275
-366
-9 917
-2 868
4 381
-226
664
-666
-1 404
-8 999
-6 859
673
-3 246
-2 602
-203
-8 013
-670
-2 852
-2 408
-9 471
-1 006
-1 399
-318
-14 396
5 428
-719
-5 473
-148
-1 463
-1 593
-3 323
-21 450
2 218
-852
-192
-74
1 153
-142 443
n/a
n/a
n/a
8.93
n/a
n/a
1.55
4.57
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
2.49
n/a
n/a
n/a
3.83
n/a
n/a
5.12
Cents
-76.37
-89.79
-3.78
2.75
-5.39
-6.61
Cents
1.50
6.10
Cents
5.26
-1.88
-1.03
-0.28
-12.22
23.71
-0.13
-21.55
-2.38
2.87
-4.57
-6.84
Cents
2.31
1.50
%
9.63
3.49
2.10
22.83
Cents
-3.77
-0.40
-1.16
3.92
2.61
-4.97
-3.73
-15.72
-4.96
-0.39
-0.61
-7.12
-7.21
-93.76
4.76
-1.51
0.82
-4.93
-8.78
-2.58
-20.17
14.01
-3.25
-11.65
-2.55
-25.87
-3.73
-13.98
-3.86
-9.31
-2.33
-1.78
-2.13
-3.39
6.20
-3.25
-1.43
-4.12
-0.49
-4.83
-9.10
-32.25
6.82
-6.98
-0.93
-0.76
1.54
Cents
0.93
%
6.28
7.00
1.20
10.77
8.28
3.20
10.63
0.45
4.17
1.70
2.40
2.00
9.52
2012
High
Low
EUR
EUR
A K
Last
Close
EUR
K
2/5/13
Price
31/12/2012
EUR
T
31/12/12
31/12/2012
. .
31/12/2012
124.29
47.75
188.86
92.66
37.08
81.63
97.61
39.10
117.61
114.86
44.40
168.87
-15.02
-11.94
-30.35
113.87
0.278
0.047
0.177
0.300
0.048
0.019
83.34
0.185
0.040
0.107
0.226
0.042
0.011
88.60
104.69
0.251
0.044
0.175
0.263
0.045
0.018
-15.37
-34.29
-6.46
-6.67
-38.89
637.17
0.260
0.460
0.195
0.124
0.061
1.050
0.130
0.500
0.095
0.110
0.032
0.059
562.64
0.220
0.410
0.160
0.092
0.054
0.590
0.130
0.500
0.095
0.100
0.032
0.056
562.64
0.240
0.430
0.160
0.092
0.058
0.590
0.130
0.500
0.095
0.110
0.032
0.056
627.38
0.250
0.439
0.183
0.115
0.058
1.050
0.130
0.500
0.095
0.100
0.032
0.058
-10.32
-4.00
-2.05
-12.57
-20.00
0.00
-43.81
0.00
0.00
0.00
10.00
0.00
-3.45
657.64
624.36
625.18
0.148
0.010
0.049
0.650
0.145
0.036
0.024
0.045
0.002
0.299
0.033
0.243
0.153
1.350
0.301
0.140
0.057
0.055
0.385
0.009
0.138
0.480
0.108
0.015
0.119
0.350
0.095
0.585
0.073
0.056
0.179
0.012
0.011
0.074
0.709
0.075
0.040
1.510
0.001
0.050
0.070
0.041
0.210
0.260
0.010
0.020
1.000
636.57
0.153
0.012
0.045
0.650
0.180
0.041
0.024
0.042
0.004
0.290
0.037
0.270
0.153
1.490
0.346
0.140
0.073
0.055
0.385
0.009
0.140
0.480
0.108
0.015
0.119
0.385
0.089
0.585
0.069
0.053
0.184
0.013
0.011
0.075
0.733
0.075
0.052
1.510
0.001
0.050
0.066
0.046
0.230
0.260
0.010
0.020
1.000
-1.79
-3.27
-16.67
8.89
0.00
-19.44
-12.20
0.00
7.14
-50.00
3.10
-10.81
-10.00
0.00
-9.40
-13.01
0.00
-21.92
0.00
0.00
0.00
-1.43
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
-9.09
6.74
0.00
5.80
5.66
-2.72
-7.69
0.00
-1.33
-3.27
0.00
-23.08
0.00
0.00
0.00
6.06
-10.87
-8.70
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.115
0.246
0.042
0.011
% Change
since
K.
DODONI PORTFOLIO
DOD
HARVEST CAPITAL
HCM
INTERFUND INVESTMENTS
INF
ISCHIS INVESTMENT
ISXI
KARYES INVESTMENTS
KAR
TRIENA INTERNATIONAL
TINT
UNIGROWTH INVESTMENTS
UNI
AIAS
AD
APC
AST
CFL
CHAP
CBH
CAIR
DHH
TLM
DOME
EFR
EMP
ERP
CONF
ACS
KAN
KNO
KYTH
LAS
LHG
TRB
NEM
OPT
ORF
PIPF
ROL
SAFS
SEAS
STAR
SUP
USB
Number
Nominal
Market
Book Value
Shares
('000)
A
Value
euro
A
EUR
Cap.
('000)
K.
EUR
Per Share
euro
Price to
Profit/(Loss)
Book Value
2011
Times
EUR ('000)
T
. .
.
NAV
Disc/Prem
0.0369
0.1914
0.2682
0.7174
0.0012
0.0660
0.1709
0.0589
0.2229
0.0265
1.0430
2.1427
0.6125
0.2000
-53.93
-51.41
-63.83
-66.13
66.67
36.36
-71.33
-26.99
0.94
-24.53
-23.30
-6.66
-15.10
37.50
2011
58 430
56 147
44 494
200 000
282 483
14 000
56 545
11 000
2 000
20 247
2 729
2 729
1 364
13 468
81 202
128 936
36 572
99 925
5 055
50 000
160 714
391 155
157 138
7 700
25 000
11 385
47 853
31 344
49 385
72 562
60 250
21 827
42 450
61 739
189 377
8 571
67 770
46 355
80 966
9 660
54 166
70 220
629 785
38 581
124 009
99 271
0.17
0.27
0.30
0.87
0.02
0.17
0.51
0.51
0.43
0.09
0.85
0.85
0.85
0.17
993
5 222
4 316
48 600
565
1 260
2 771
473
418
405
2 183
5 458
709
3 704
77 077
0.21
0.17
0.35
0.35
0.03
0.35
0.35
0.086
0.17
0.12
0.43
0.43
0.87
0.09
0.10
0.34
0.35
0.17
0.17
0.06
0.01
0.35
0.17
0.17
0.35
0.35
0.17
0.17
0.04
0.17
0.09
0.57
162
13 023
3 657
5 296
207
1 600
12 375
9 388
157
23
15 000
285
35 890
752
148
7 256
7 833
218
1 910
8 582
189
1 971
10 843
510
1 619
773
2 925
140
1 889
77
1 240
64 526
210 466
0.1728
0.06
0.88
0.02
-1.21
0.12
0.57
-0.12
-0.20
-0.08
1.30
0.086
0.05
0.13
0.0100
0.29
0.67
0.11
0.38
0.06
-0.38
0.30
0.43
0.004
1.49
0.18
0.28
0.000
-0.08
0.05
-0.12
0.52
1 047 454
-98.84
1.68
0.11
2.41
-0.03
0.27
0.13
-0.19
-0.01
-0.04
0.46
0.29
15.00
0.19
-70.00
0.34
0.19
0.09
0.12
2.46
0.00
0.78
0.37
2.75
0.01
0.44
0.20
6.67
-0.04
-0.08
1.25
-737
-4 301
-10 771
-14 853
-6 892
-255
-9 493
-86
-180
-150
331
-136
-36
-403
-47 962
9M
2011
EUR ('000)
K
2011
9M
2012
EUR ('000)
K
2012
2012
EUR ('000)
.
9M '11
9M '12
2012
-8 799
-3 229
-8 799
-3 229
9M '11
9M '12
Profit/(Loss)
4
139
-2 774
-3 423
-2 559
-22
-443
-251
-57
-182
155
-1 921
12
-782
-12 104
2011
2012
-69
-12 265
399
-6 400
-2 974
-5 512
-3 755
-23 885
-9 100
-243
-701
35
-4 283
-219
-1 465
-24 581
-77
87
621
-10 339
-11 700
-545
2 145
-1 484
-8 648
-1 879
-328
-1 953
-15 879
-3 735
-60
-8 961
-157 753
-5 499 405
18
-17 728
18
-17 728
-1 011
-12 265
-350
-6 400
-217
-11 266
-10 859
-55 832
-9 100
-391
-70
35
6 553
-2 111
-1 465
-220
-77
87
-3 654
-713
-11 700
-605
31
494
-8 648
-959
-410
-450
-24 032
921
-60
-825
-155 569
-1 166 383
-1 909 991
-415 060
P/E ratio
2012
Earnings
Per
Dividend
Per
Dividend
Yield
Share
2011/12
Cents
Results
Share
2012
Cents
Cents
0.01
0.25
-6.23
-1.71
-0.91
-0.16
-0.78
-2.28
-2.85
-0.90
5.68
-70.39
0.88
-5.81
Cents
2012
High
Low
EUR
EUR
A K
Price
31/12/2012
EUR
T
31/12/12
Last
Close
EUR
K
2/5/13
11.00
572.39
450.90
13.75
520.49
0.017
0.093
0.097
0.243
0.002
0.090
0.049
0.043
0.209
0.020
0.800
2.000
0.520
0.275
546.03
0.017
0.115
0.119
0.250
0.004
0.078
0.048
0.043
0.002
0.101
0.100
0.053
0.041
0.032
0.077
0.024
0.001
0.003
0.600
0.025
0.750
0.024
0.003
0.100
0.130
0.010
0.045
0.139
0.001
0.230
0.160
0.011
0.020
0.080
0.054
0.002
0.003
0.002
0.010
0.650
0.002
0.101
0.210
0.020
0.800
2.000
0.520
0.250
% Change
since
31/12/2012
. .
31/12/2012
-4.68
0.00
-19.13
-18.49
-2.80
-50.00
15.38
2.30
0.00
-0.48
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
10.00
0.00
n/a
n/a
-1.25
-9.51
-0.96
-6.40
-4.29
-22.53
-6.76
-14.27
-5.79
-5.08
-0.28
0.31
13.69
-6.73
-2.97
-0.30
-0.13
0.40
-8.61
-1.15
-6.18
-7.06
0.05
1.07
-10.68
-9.93
-0.76
-0.64
-3.82
2.39
-0.05
-0.83
1.12
0.06
0.03
0.14
0.10
0.120
0.045
1.87
4.00
25.00
0.128
0.055
0.041
0.060
0.070
0.020
0.002
0.003
0.650
0.020
0.600
0.024
0.009
0.100
0.130
0.005
0.045
0.139
0.001
0.230
0.210
0.009
0.017
0.080
0.054
0.001
0.014
0.002
0.010
0.660
-21.88
-
CSE Code
/CBAM
/LIMNI
/ITTL
INLE
/ORCA
/PCSW
/WG
EXMI/
/EPIEN
/KERV
/GAS
/BRO
/INLI
STC/
No. of Shares
(000)
1 950
300 000
100 000
8 057
1 200
35 052
3 400
321
10 906
1 810
8 390
13 000
18 568
25 000
Market Cap
EUR (000)
36 855
297 000
75 000
21 834
14 280
42 062
3 400
1 541
43 624
2 552
13 844
20 020
7 799
250
580 061
Listing
Date
29/3/10
29/3/10
06/8/10
21/7/11
10/9/10
10/10/11
2/11/11
10/04/12
28/06/12
29/06/12
17/07/12
11/09/12
17/10/12
30/04/13
WARRANTS
ALKIS HADJ. FROU-FROU (WAR. 2015)
AMATHUS NAVIGATION (WAR.07-2013)
TOTAL
EMERGING MARKET
Exercise Period
Exercise Price
euro cents
Expiry Date
173
20c or EUR 35c
30-06-2005
15-11-2013
(N.E.A.)
Latest
Close
0.001
0.010
Market Cap
Latest price
Listing
Latest
EUR
EUR
Date
NAV
GreenTea SA
GRTEA
1 040
100 000
8 Nov 2011
N/A
PGFL
650
65 000 000
100 000
1 Dec 2012
N/A
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intended, and should not be considered, as an offer, invitation, solicitation or recommendation to buy or sell any of the financial instruments described herein. Trading on leverage is very risky and may lead to losses.