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INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LIMITED

NAPHTHA CRACKER PROJECT

800,000 TPA ETHYLENE PLANT

PANIPAT, INDIA

FLARE SYSTEM DESIGN BASIS

LUMMUS PROJECT NO.

12605

REVISION

1

ISSUE DATE BY

MARCH 2, 2005 AA/RPT

IOCL_FLARE_DESIGN_BASIS_REV1.doc

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 INTRODUCTION

1

2 DESCRIPTION

3

3 FLARE MANAGEMENT PHILOSOPHY

6

4 FLARE DESIGN BASIS

12

5 LIQUID DRAIN SYSTEM

21

6 ANALYSIS

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7 MECHANICAL DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS

38

8 MITIGATION SUMMARY

44

9 APPENDIX

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1

INTRODUCTION

This document summarizes the design basis for the Flare System for the 800,000 TPA Ethylene Plant including the C4 Hydrogenation and the Pyrolysis Gasoline Unit, for the Indian Oil Corporation Limited Naphtha Cracker Unit (NCU) to be built in Panipat, India. Even though the detailed flare design analysis and description are provided only for the NCU, the overall instrumented (mitigated) flare header sizing loads developed for the NCU are applicable for the entire Naphtha Cracker project including the NCU, the Benzene Extraction Unit (BEU) and the Butadiene Extraction Unit (BDEU). This is because the largest sources of flare relief loads are in the NCU. In addition, the largest mitigated load (for the various failure cases), for which the safety instrumentation system is assumed to be unavailable (fail to respond), is also in the NCU. For the detailed flare design basis for the BEU and the BDEU, the reader is referred to the appropriate section in the corresponding Basic Engineering Packages.

The flare load analysis is developed based on the controlling material balance for Case 2. The flare loads for the various emergency cases are tabulated with and without instrumented shutdown, and the approach used to derive the flare loads for various failure cases are briefly discussed. Only the mitigated flare loads will be used for the flare system design. The only exception will be in instances where the individual safety valve load controls the maximum flare load where the non- instrumented (unmitigated) flare load will be used.

The flare design basis follows standard Lummus approach to instrumented flare design. The total flare load is based on the sum of the individual peak relief loads.

The final mitigated combined flare load for the two controlling global failure (Cooling Water and Power Failure) cases are approximately 1012 T/h and 1002 T/h respectively. For these mitigated loads, heater mitigation was considered as part of

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the flare reduction strategy. If IOCL decides not to adopt heater mitigation, the loads for the Cooling Water and the Power Failure cases increase to approximately 1261 T/h and 1202 T/h respectively.

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The additional mitigated loads from the BDEU and the BEU for the Cooling Water and Power Failure cases are less than 1 T/h and therefore are not included in the flare load summary.

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2

DESCRIPTION

The flare system consists of the following:

2.1 The Wet Flare (WF) and the associated K.O. Drum

2.2 The Dry Flare (DF) and the associated K.O. Drum

2.3 The Liquid Drain System

2.4 The hydrocarbon flare stack with a seal

Refer to Section 7.0 for mechanical design considerations.

2.1 The Wet Flare System

The wet flare system handles wet, warm vapor relief loads from safety valves and “B” valves. It consists of a branched header discharging into the wet flare (WF) drum. Any liquid accumulated in the wet flare drum is pumped to the quench tower. The system is generally made of carbon steel. The main equipment connected to this header are:

- Quench Tower

11-C-1501

- Charge Gas Compressor 5th Stage Discharge

11-K-2000

- Condensate Stripper

11-C-2601

- Acetylene Converter

11-R-4101A,B

- Propylene Fractionators

11-C-4801,4802

- Debutanizer

11-C-5001

- C 4 Hydrogenation Reactor

11-R-5301

- C 4 Stabilizer

11-C-5301

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- DPG Stabilizer

11-C-5501

- DPG Tailing Tower

11-C-5502

- DPG Second Stage HP Flash Drum 11-V-5507

- Depentanizer

11-C-5503

- Rerun Tower

11-C-5504

- Propylene Refrigerant Compressor Discharge

11-K-6001

- Ethylene Refrigerant Compressor

Discharge

11-K-6501

2.2 The Dry Flare System

The Dry Flare System collects all the dry, cold relief loads from safety valves and “B” valves. It consists of a branched header discharging into the Dry Flare (DF) drum. Any liquid accumulated in the dry flare drum is vaporized in the vaporizer and sent to flare. Refer to Section 7.0 for materials of construction. The main equipment connected to this header are:

- Demethanizer

11-C-3101

- Deethanizer

11-C-4001

- C2 Green Oil Drum

11-V-4101

- Ethylene Fractionator

11-C-4201

- Depropanizer

11-C-4501

- Ethylene Refrigerant Suction Drums

11-V-6501,6502,6503

- Propylene Refrigerant Suction Drums

V-6001,6002,6003,6004

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2.3 The Liquid Drain System

Drains from the low temperature and refrigerant sections of the plant discharge into the Dry Flare (DF) drum. Any liquid accumulated in the dry flare KO drum is vaporized in the vaporizer and returned to the dry flare drum. Refer to Section 7.0 for materials of construction.

2.4 The Hydrocarbon Flare Stack with Seal

The vapors originating from the dry flare drum and the wet flare drum are combined in the main flare header leading to the hydrocarbon flare stack. The flare stack is equipped with both gas and water seals to prevent air from entering the flare system and to minimize fuel gas purging requirements, a flare tip for combustion of the flare discharge vapors and steam injection to ensure smokeless burning during the combustion process.

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3

FLARE MANAGEMENT PHILOSOPHY

The design flare load is determined by common cause failures. Those that typically predominate are either global (site-wide) loss of cooling water or global loss of electrical power. Such failures cause overpressure in many plant subsystems concurrently with the resulting activation of many pressure relief devices.

To reduce the resulting flare load, highly reliable Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) are specified that take action during a global overpressure event to reduce the number of pressure relief devices discharging concurrently. Such SISs typically function by isolating the cause of overpressure.

SISs are generally composed of three major components: process parameter sensors, logic solvers and final control elements. The process sensors often measure pressure directly, but can use other parameters that infer potential overpressure such as high temperature, low cooling water flow or low amps/voltage. Such systems are provided at individual relief sources to achieve substantial reduction in the total flare load. In summary, the following guidelines are applied:

The probability of exceeding the reduced flare capacity is managed with a SIS design that meets ISA SIL 3 requirements

Each individual relief source to be managed is provided with a SIL 3 SIS

Each SIL 3 SIS has a hardware fault tolerance in each subsystem of at least one

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Flare system design capacity is based on the sum of all unmitigated loads plus the largest SIS-mitigated relief load

Each relief source is provided with a full-capacity pressure relief device

Voting strategies are used in sensors and logic solvers to avoid nuisance trips

SISs are maintained separate from process controls as required to manage common cause failures

Sharing of sensors and field devices is often permitted since full capacity pressure relief devices provide another independent protective layer

The central design principle embodied in the above guideline is that the risk resulting from the possibility of exceeding the design flare system capacity shall be managed by SISs that acting together provide an overall safeguarding equivalent to ISA SIL3 as defined by ISA Standard S84.01.

Such SISs require redundancy in all elements. The component configuration typically consists of three transmitters with 2-out-of-3 voting, logic solving in a Triple Modular Redundant (TMR) programmable electronic system (or equivalent) also with 2-out-of-3 voting, and redundant field devices (e.g., two isolation valves).

The implementation of a SIS is contingent upon the following conditions:

It must be agreed to by the client in writing. The client acceptance of a proposal containing an instrument shutdown strategy to reduce cumulative flare load shall constitute his written acceptance.

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It must not be in conflict with any governing legal requirements.

Client bears the mandatory responsibility to institute certain maintenance and instrumentation testing procedures as an ongoing part of normal operation during lifetime of the plant to ensure that SIL 3 performance is always maintained.

SISs are applied to fractionation towers, compressor systems and heaters. Such systems can develop large cumulative relief rates during common cause failures such as loss of electrical power (e.g., concurrent loss of reflux to all columns) or loss of cooling water. A SIS is provided for each column based on sensing column pressure. The corrective action is the isolation of the feed, if necessary, to the column and/or reactor and of the heating medium to the reboiler(s). A SIS is provided for the ethylene and the propylene refrigeration compressors based on sensing discharge pressures. The corrective action is shutdown of the compressor(s).

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Global failure (loss of cooling water or electrical power) trip signals are also input to all individual trip systems. This adds some degree of diverse redundancy in sensors as well as provides a “preemptive” trip of all individual relief loads. That is, the trip is initiated before significant overpressure occurs at individual relief sources.

The pressure control “B” valves on fractionation equipment can generate a significant combined relief load. Since these valves will open before the SIS high- pressure trip setting is reached, SISs do not mitigate “B” valve discharges. Therefore, for the global failure cases (e.g. due to failure of cooling water or electric power) which controls the maximum flare loads, “B” valves are maintained closed via the use of the Global Failure Interlock. Exceptions to this are:

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® The “B” valves on the Quench Tower overhead .

® The “B” valves on the propylene and ethylene refrigeration compressor suction drums.

Redundant solenoids are required to mitigate the “B” valves on the tower overheads since they are required to close by the SIS signal.

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In some cases, special requirements must be implemented to totally exclude a flare load from consideration or to further mitigate critical systems. For IOCL, this requirement is implemented for the propylene refrigeration compressor and the cracking heaters as summarized below:

Propylene Refrigeration Compressor Mitigation:

The relief load from the propylene refrigeration compressor is substantial during loss of cooling water. To mitigate this load, a SIL 3 SIS is provided to shut down the compressor. In this system, the steam turbine drive is tripped by closing the governor valve and the trip-throttle valve in the VHP steam line to the turbine upon detection of high pressure and/or high temperature at the compressor discharge. However, significant reduction in flare load cannot be achieved if this SIS is the one SIS considered to be in a failed state when determining the total flare load.

Per Lummus practice, the relief load from the propylene refrigeration compressor need not be included in the total flare load if the failure probability of the SIS is further reduced through the implementation of additional component redundancy. In this approach, a third isolation valve is provided in the steam line to the compressor turbine, and additional sensor redundancy is provided from the global flare load reduction SIS. The global failure trip action is generated 1) by

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the total loss of cooling water via sensing of low cooling water flow and high cooling water temperature, or 2) by the loss of electrical power via sensing of under-voltage at both BUS A and BUS B.

Further redundancy in logic solving is achieved by processing the local compressor signal inputs and the global signal inputs in separate logic solvers. Trip outputs from the logic solvers act on all three isolation devices (valves) in the steam line to the compressor turbine.

Note that for this flare analysis it is assumed that the electric power is supplied to the naphtha cracker complex via a typical arrangement of two parallel buses, identified as BUS A and BUS B.

Heater Mitigation:

From a flare load mitigation point of view, the heaters can be mitigated to get a significant reduction in flare loads. The 6 liquid heaters and the single recycle gas heater can all be instrumented to trip in a plant wide global failure case. The heaters are tripped based on global failure trip signal provided for loss of cooling water via the sensing of high cooling water temperature and low cooling water flow and/or loss of electric power via sensing of under-voltage in relays for both BUS A and BUS B. Additionally high temperature signal from the quench tower overhead is provided to improve the reliability of the safety system. The trip configuration of each of these systems is designed to meet SIL-3 integrity. The component configuration consists of three transmitters with 2-out-of-3 voting, logic solving in a Triple Modular Redundant (TMR) programmable electronic system (or equivalent) also with 2-out-of-3 voting, and redundant field devices (e.g., two isolation valves).

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If the total mitigated load from all the heaters is the single largest mitigated load during any global failure, then the SIS of this largest load is considered to be unavailable and the relief load is added to the total flare load. However, even if all the heaters are considered to trip successfully, the relief load from one heater must still be added to the total flare load. The reasons are as follows:

For the whole block of 6 liquid and 1 gas cracking heaters, the trip requires the closing of 7 or more parallel heater feed lines, each containing two trip valves. It can be shown based on typical valve failure rates and a six months test interval that the probability of failure of any one isolation valve pair does not comply with SIL 3 requirements. This is a consequence of the many parallel flow paths that must be isolated successfully to achieve successful SIS operation. However, the probability of failure of two or more of these isolation valve pairs is sufficiently low and does not violate SIL 3 performance. Therefore, even if all the heaters are considered to trip successfully, the relief load from one heater must still be added to the total flare load.

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4

FLARE DESIGN BASIS

The flare systems are designed considering the following events:

- Total Cooling Water Failure

- Total Power Failure

- Quench Water Failure

- Propylene Refrigerant Compressor Trip

- Ethylene Refrigerant Compressor Trip

- Charge Gas Compressor Trip

- Startup/Normal Off-Spec Product Flaring

The relief loads are calculated based on:

- The material balance for Case 2 at the 800,000 TPA Naphtha Cracker capacity which corresponds to six cracking heaters in operation since it controls the flare loads for the flare systems covered in this document.

- For the process service pumps, the quench water and quench oil pumps have respectively one and two (out of three) pumps on turbine drive in normal operation. All the other pumps are electric driven.

- For the utility service pumps, the cooling water pumps have all the pumps on electric motor, while the BFW pumps have one of the two pumps on turbine drive in normal operation.

- No credit is taken in the relief quantities for the controller action, which is not normally in operation, on the heat input to the reboiler or the operation of compressors.

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- Credit in the relief rates is taken for LMTD suppression in reboilers due to the process side pressure increase at the relieving conditions.

- Flare loads do not include equipment overdesigns.

- Basis for ethylene/propylene refrigeration systems is 0% or 30% liquid ethylene and propylene product rundown, whichever is controlling.

- The flare stack, flare headers (wet, dry, main) and knockout drums should be designed for the maximum flow for the controlling case.

- Flare load contribution due to instrumentation such as "B" valves in parallel with safety valves are not considered for the global failure cases (e.g., failure due to loss of cooling water or electric power).

- No credit for stage releases due to the transient response of the various systems. While transient analysis may reduce the actual unmitigated peak loads or the duration of a relief, it will have no significant effect on the sizing basis of the major flare systems covered in this document.

- Flare system shall be designed for any of the stated independent failure events but not for the simultaneous occurrence of any two independent failure events.

- Other failure events such as fire, blocked-in condition and local utility failure do not control the design of the flare system and are not considered here.

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- The individual relief rates summarized in the design basis do not necessarily correspond to the maximum relief for that safety valve but correspond to the relief associated with the failure mode for the determination of the controlling flare load for the wet, dry and main flare headers. These individual safety valve loads are indicated on the safety valve data sheets in the Basic Engineering Package. These individual safety valve loads must be considered during detailed engineering for the design of the individual safety valves.

- The Detailed Engineering contractor must also consider the rated capacity of the safety valves which are greater than the process loads for the design of the individual safety valve discharge lines and subheaders.

- Detailed Engineering Contractor shall review and finalize flare loads and shall revise any design documents as required. This evaluation shall include a detailed check of the design margins between the normal operating pressure, the normal operating "B" valve pressure setting and the safety valve set pressure to determine if there is sufficient pressure margin for the instrumentation to respond before the pressure relief valve opens.

The flare load management is based on the use of instrumented shutdown systems utilizing both local (e.g., pressure) and global (e.g., loss of cooling water) parameters that indicate potential overpressure. These shutdown systems are described below.

Local Shutdown Systems:

Local flare load management systems utilize dedicated SISs of SIL-3 integrity for individual relief loads to reduce the total number of relief sources that discharge

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concurrently. These SISs utilize highly reliable instrumentation to detect equipment that are approaching overpressure and partially or completely terminate energy and/or mass input before the safety valve activation can occur. Through the use of these instrumentation systems with high safety reliability, it is possible to reduce the combined flare load during a global utility failure. The major subsystems that are equipped with SIL-3 shutdown systems are listed below:

- Cracking Heaters (7-out-of-7) (Quench Tower Overhead)

- Deethanizer

- Depropanizer 11-C-4501

- Propylene Fractionators

11-C-4001

11-H-0100-0700

11-C-4801,4802

- Debutanizer

11-C-5001

- C4 Hydrogenation Reactor

11-R-5301

- C 4 Stabilizer

11-C-5301

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- DPG 1 st Stage Reactor

11-R-5501

- DPG 2 nd Stage Reactor

11-R-5502

- DPG Stabilizer

11-C-5501

- DPG Tailing Tower

11-C-5502

- Depentanizer 11-C-5503

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- Propylene Refrigerant Compressor Discharge

11-K-6001

- Ethylene Refrigerant Compressor

Discharge

11-K-6501

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Global shutdown system

The global shutdown system utilizes a single SIS of SIL 3 integrity to do the following:

Manage the relief load from the heaters

Manage “B” valve loads

Provide an additional layer of protection for the propylene refrigeration

compressor Provide “pre-emptive” trip activation of all local flare load management

shutdown systems The global shutdown interlock is activated upon detection of loss of cooling water or electric power.

Plant wide cooling water failure is detected by two sensing systems:

- Low cooling water flow in the main supply header (the low flow sensor should be set at 30 percent of normal design flow as a minimum)

- High cooling water temperature in the main supply header (the high temperature sensor should be set at 5 o C above normal design CW supply temperature as a minimum.)

Plant wide power failure is detected by redundant under-voltage sensors. Three under-voltage relays with 2-out-of-3 voting are provided on both “A” and “B” buses. Loss of either bus activates the trip.

For each of the detection systems listed above, three transmitters with 2-out-of-3 voting are provided. The outputs from the these transmitters are processed through the TMR to initiate the trip actions for the following systems:

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- Cracking Heaters (7-out-of-7)

(Quench Tower)

11-H-0100-0700

11-C-4001

- Depropanizer 11-C-4501

- Propylene Fractionators

- Deethanizer

11-C-4801,4802

- Debutanizer

11-C-5001

- C4 Hydrogenation Reactor

11-R-5301

- C 4 Stabilizer

11-C-5301

- DPG 2 nd Stage Reactor

11-R-5502

- DPG Stabilizer

11-C-5501

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- Depentanizer 11-C-5503

- Ethylene Refrigerant Compressor

Discharge

11-K-6501

- Propylene Refrigerant Compressor

Discharge

11-K-6001

Two flare headers shall be provided in the IOCL Naphtha Cracker Unit as follows:

a) Wet flare header

b) Dry flare header

Headers a and b combine into a single main flare header downstream of the appropriate knock-out drums, and a single line connects to the flare stack.

Table 7.4.1 presents the flare loading for the various emergencies and start-up

conditions Case 2 at the 800,000 MTA plant capacity. The loads include the

NCU in the IOCL Naphtha Cracker Complex. The additional contribution to this

overall mitigated load due to the BEU and the BDEU is less than 1 T/h and is not

included. The individual flare load breakdowns with and without instrumented

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shutdown are attached in Section 9.0. The instrumented shutdown loads form the basis for the flare loads presented in this document except for the maximum single source safety valve flare load on each flare header which is based on the non-instrumented flare loads.

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TABLE 7.4.1 FLARE LOADS FOR THE EMERGENCY CASES

   

WITHOUT INSTRUMENTED SHUTDOWN

WITH INSTRUMENTED SHUTDOWN

WET

Dry

TOTAL

WET

Dry

TOTAL

Types of Failure

Flare

Flare

Flare

Flare

Flare

Flare

Cooling Water Failure

     
 

kg/h

2,618,680

135,244

2,753,924

965,861

46,603

1,012,464

MW

39.8

28.4

39.1

38.0

15.4

35.6

°C

43.4

-67.0

38.0

32.1

-140.7

24.1

Power Failure

             
 

kg/h

2,252,134

469,007

2,721,141

955,900

46,603

1,002,503

MW

36.4

33.9

36.0

30.2

15.4

28.9

°C

59.0

-31.6

43.4

50.5

-140.7

41.7

Quench Water Failure

             
 

kg/h

858,208

0

858,208

858,208

0

858,208

MW

33.1

0.0

33.1

33.1

0.0

33.1

°C

103.5

0.0

103.5

103.5

0.0

103.5

C3-R Compressor Failure

             
 

kg/h

378,292

546,976

925,268

378,292

197,281

575,573

MW

26.8

33.3

30.3

26.8

29.1

27.5

°C

61.6

-36.0

3.9

61.6

-66.3

17.8

C2-R Compressor Failure

             
 

kg/h

300,157

23,059

323,216

300,157

23,059

323,216

MW

28.6

19.9

27.7

28.6

19.9

27.7

°C

40.0

-125.8

28.2

40.0

-125.8

28.2

CG Compressor Failure

             
 

kg/h

442,904

0

442,904

442,904

0

442,904

MW

29.5

0.0

29.5

29.5

0.0

29.5

°C

38.1

0.0

38.1

38.1

0.0

38.1

Startup / Offspec Product Flaring

             
 

kg/h

0

180,246

180,246

0

180,246

180,246

MW

0.0

28.4

28.4

0.0

28.4

28.4

°C

0.0

-66.5

-66.5

0.0

-66.5

-66.5

SV Valve Relief Loads

             
 

kg/h

858,208

280,166

 

858,208

280,166

 

MW

33.1

28.4

 

33.1

28.4

 

°C

103.5

-67.0

 

103.5

-67.0

 

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4.1 Main Flare Header Design Basis

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The main flare header is controlled by the total cooling water failure case for both without and with instrumented shutdown. The controlling loads are 2,753,920 and 1,012,460 kg/h respectively. Refer to Section 9.1 for more details.

4.2 Wet Flare Header Design Basis

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The wet flare header is controlled by the total cooling water failure case for both without and with instrumented shutdown. The controlling loads are 2,618,680 and 965,860 kg/h respectively. Refer to Section 9.1 for more details.

4.3 Dry Flare Header Design Basis

The dry flare header is controlled by the propylene refrigeration failure case for both without and with instrumented shutdown. The controlling loads are 546,980 and 197,280 kg/h respectively. Refer to Section 9.4 and 9.8 for more details.

Note that the dry flare header must still be sized for the maximum safety valve relief load (Deethanizer overhead) of 280,170 kg/h due loss of tower reflux.

It should be noted that the individual sub-header loads as shown in Table 7.4.1 takes into account the unmitigated load plus the maximum mitigated load on that sub-header that could fail.

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5 LIQUID DRAIN SYSTEM

The liquid drains from the chilling train, cold fractionation and refrigeration systems are routed to a dry flare drum. The dry flare KO drum is equipped with a cold liquid vaporizer where the liquid is vaporized and returned to the dry flare drum. The system is sized based on draining the inventory of cold liquid in the equipment. The design loads and system design are not included in this Flare Design Basis and, therefore, are the responsibility of the detailed engineering contractor.

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6

ANALYSIS

The analysis presented in this section briefly describes the basis for development of the flare loads with and without instrumented shutdown (mitigation). The analysis for the instrumented shutdown case forms the basis for the flare system design for the IOCL Naphtha Cracker Complex. The exceptions are cases when the maximum safety valve loads controls the size of the flare headers, where the non- instrumented basis are applied.

6.1 TOTAL COOLING WATER FAILURE

This scenario considers plant wide cooling water failure.

6.1.1 Cracking Section

For the unmitigated case it is assumed that none of the heaters are tripped on loss of cooling water. For the mitigated case, the global failure interlock attempts to shutdown all 7-out-of-7 heaters. For this analysis, it is assumed conservatively that 2 liquid cracking heaters (2-out-of-7 heaters) fail to trip.

6.1.2 Quench Tower

Within a short time after the charge gas compressor trips, the pressure control valve on the quench tower overhead will relieve to the flare. The temperature of the bulk quench water at the tower bottom will increase from 83°C to 90°C within a short time. The quench water after cooling in the various reboilers and exchangers will be circulated continuously. The temperature of the bulk quench water entering the quench tower will increase to 75 C within a very short time. The quench tower relief load is the normal hydrocarbon flow plus saturated steam based on a quench tower overhead temperature of 78 C.

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For the case with instrumented shutdown, a similar rise in temperature and relief from the overhead of the quench tower is expected.

6.1.3 Charge Gas Compressor

Within a short time after the propylene compressor relieves (for instrumented shutdown, the propylene compressor is tripped), the charge gas compressor will trip on high discharge temperatures due to loss of cooling water to the aftercoolers. The charge gas will continue for some short time period before the charge gas compressor trips. No relief to flare is expected at this time.

After the charge gas compressor is tripped, there is no net forward flow into or leaving the charge gas compression system. Consequently, any vapor recycle streams to this system would be relieved to the flare.

6.1.4 Condensate Stripper

When the charge gas compressor trips, there will be relief from the overhead of the condensate stripper. This tower is not mitigated, the relief load being relatively small.

6.1.5 Demethanizer and Methane Refrigerant Compressor

The methane refrigerant compressor will trip on high bearing or discharge temperature. Due to loss of methane refrigeration, the temperatures in the demethanizer and in demethanizer feed drum No. 3 will become warmer and eventually approach -98 C. Assuming the methane refrigerant compressor trips at about the same time as the charge gas compressor trip, the reflux as well as heat input by the demethanizer bottom and side reboilers will cease. For the unmitigated case, the quantity of hydrogen and methane offgas to the fuel gas

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system will be below the fuel gas requirements of the cracking heaters resulting in no expected release to the flare.

For the mitigated case, 1-out-of-7 heaters are assumed to be in operation due to a failure of the heater to trip. Therefore, the total quantity of hydrogen and methane offgas to the fuel gas system will be higher than the fuel gas requirements of the cracking heaters resulting in a relief to the flare.

6.1.6

Reactors

High reactor temperature will cause the acetylene converter to trip. This will result in the isolation of the feed and hydrogen flows to the reactor and effluent from the reactor. Without mitigation, when the acetylene converter trips, the deethanizer net overhead must be relieved. With mitigation, the deethanizer overhead relief is eliminated and no release to flare is expected.

The MAPD converter will continue to operate until tripped on low flow due to loss of depropanizer condensing. No release to flare is expected.

For the unmitigated case, loss of cooling water will result in loss of heat removal from the C 4 hydrogenation reactor and DPG 1 st and 2 nd stage reactors. The additional generated vapor due to the loss of cooling will be released to flare. For the mitigated case, the fresh feed and hydrogen flow is stopped to both the C4 hydrogenation and the DPG 2 nd stage reactors. For the C4 hydrogenation reactor this prevents the potential overpressure. However, for the DPG 2 nd stage reactors, complete mitigation of relief is not possible. This is because high hydrogen concentration in the system during cooling water and power failure could potentially lead to continued reaction resulting in relief via the emergency dump (activated by high temperature or manually). For our analysis, therefore, no credit has been

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1
1

taken i.e. the full unmitigated load is added to the overall mitigated flare load. The DPG 1 st stage reactor relief is not mitigated, the load being relatively small.

6.1.7

Fractionation

The propylene fractionators, debutanizer, DPG stabilizer and C 4 stabilizer will lose the condensing medium resulting in a release of the tower overhead flow to the flare immediately. The reboilers associated with these towers will continue to provide boil-up at the elevated pressure corresponding to relieving pressure. The depentanizer overhead is condensed in an air-cooler, with the cooling water exchanger serving as a trim cooler. Therefore this tower is not expected to pressure up to relieve.

The rerun tower will also lose the condensing medium, but will not have a relief since at the elevated relieving pressure the reboilers will pinch out i.e. stop heat transfer due to LMTD suppression. The tailing tower overhead is condensed by an air-cooler and therefore will not relieve.

Deethanizer net overhead will relieve (acetylene converter tripped), while the ethylene fractionator and depropanizer will function normally until the propylene refrigerant compressor is tripped. When the propylene compressor is tripped, these columns will release to the flare but not immediately. This relief will be a function of the inventory that exists in the propylene refrigerant system after the propylene refrigerant compressor trips. All or a portion of the reboilers on these columns will still provide boil-up at elevated conditions.

For the case with instrumented shutdown, both local pressure-based SISs and the global utility failure interlock systems will cut off heat to the tower reboilers and prevent the column “B” valves from relieving. Therefore no relief is expected. Note that the ethylene fractionator has no SIS and therefore is not mitigated. For the

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propylene fractionator, which has the highest mitigated load, the mitigation based on global failure signal is assumed to fail. As a result reboiler heating continues and the “B” valve is not maintained closed. The local pressure based SIS is eventually expected to trip the reboilers, but not immediately. In the meantime, as pres in the tower rises, the “B” valve opens and results in relief from the tower overhead. For our analysis, the relief is assumed to be equivalent to the vapor load contribution from the main reboilers.

6.1.8 Refrigerant Compressors

1
1

The propylene refrigerant compressor discharge is released to the flare almost immediately on high compressor discharge pressure due to the cooling water failure. Refrigerant is provided to various plant sections until the compressor is tripped.

No relief to flare from the refrigerant suction drums is expected at this time.

For the case with instrumented shutdown, the compressor is tripped by the local SIS upon high compressor discharge pressure and/or by the global utility failure interlock. No relief is expected.

The ethylene refrigerant compressor will be running at minimum flow condition. The ethylene refrigerant desuperheaters and condensers will be in service as long as there is sufficient holdup in the ethylene fractionator to supply ethylene/ethane liquid to condense the ethylene refrigerant. The load on the system will decrease since forward flow stops with charge gas compressor trip.

No relief to flare from the refrigerant suction drums is expected. If the minimum flow conditions cannot be sustained at lower power, it is also recommended to trip the ethylene compressor (to be checked with vendor).

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For the case with instrumented shutdown, the compressor is tripped by the local SIS upon high compressor discharge pressure and/or by the global utilities failure interlock. No relief is expected.

6.2 TOTAL POWER FAILURE

For the IOCL Naphtha Cracker Complex, based on the feedback from IOCL, it is understood that all the cooling water pumps are to be on motor drive. Therefore power failure will result in a total loss of cooling water and hence similar relief loads. However the additional failure of the various motor driven reflux pumps and fans results in different interactions between the various sources of relief and hence different loads. This is reflected in the analysis below.

6.2.1 Cracking Section

For the unmitigated case it is assumed that none of the heaters are tripped on loss of cooling water. For the mitigated case, the global failure interlock attempts to shutdown all 7-out-of 7 heaters. For this analysis, it is assumed conservatively that 2 liquid cracking heaters (2-out-of-7 heaters) fail to trip.

6.2.2 Quench Tower

Assuming 1 motor/2 turbine driven QO pumps are in operation, only 2/3 of the quench oil circulation remains in operation. In addition, the reflux to the gasoline fractionator will stop, the reflux pump being on motor drive. This operation results in a major loss of heater effluent quenching and fractionator heat removal.

For this analysis, a 2 motor/1 turbine driven QW pump operation is assumed. Therefore, only 1/3 of quench water circulation remains in operation resulting in a major loss of quench tower heat removal. The gasoline fractionator overhead plus

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the gasoline stripper overhead less the gasoline fractionator reflux based on the heaters still in service will be relieved. For the mitigated case, for the tripped heaters (6-out-of-7), the dilution steam valve is assumed to be in the normal position and is expected to continue to contribute steam to the relief.

6.2.3 Charge Gas Compressor

Within a short time after the propylene compressor relieves (for instrumented shutdown, the propylene compressor is tripped), the charge gas compressor will trip on high discharge temperatures due to loss of cooling water to the aftercoolers. The charge gas will continue for some short time period before the charge gas compressor trips. No relief to flare is expected at this time.

After the charge gas compressor is tripped, there is no net forward flow into or leaving the charge gas compression system. Consequently, any vapor recycle streams to this system would be relieved to the flare.

6.2.4 Demethanizer and Methane Refrigerant Compressor

The methane refrigerant compressor will trip due to lube oil failure and lost cooling water flow. Demethanizer condensing will cease and charge gas chilling will be reduced due to loss of methane refrigerant liquid. Due to loss of methane refrigeration, the temperatures in the demethanizer and in demethanizer feed drum No. 3 will become warmer and eventually approach -98 C. Assuming the methane refrigerant compressor trips at about the same time as the charge gas compressor trip, the reflux as well as heat input by the demethanizer bottom and side reboilers will cease. For the unmitigated case, the quantity of hydrogen and methane offgas to the fuel gas system will be below the fuel gas requirements of the cracking heaters resulting in no expected release to the flare.

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For the mitigated case, 1-out-of-7 heaters are assumed to be in operation due to a failure of the heater to trip. Therefore, the total quantity of hydrogen and methane offgas to the fuel gas system will be higher than the fuel gas requirements of the cracking heaters resulting in a relief to the flare.

6.2.5 Reactors

High reactor temperature will cause the acetylene converter to trip. This will result in the isolation of the feed and hydrogen flows to the reactor and effluent from the reactor. Without mitigation, when the acetylene converter trips, the deethanizer overhead must be relieved. With mitigation, the deethanizer overhead relief is eliminated and no release to flare is expected.

Since the depropanizer is assumed to be relieving (reflux pump down) and the recycle flow is lost due to the loss of recycle pumps, feed is lost to the MAPD Converter and the reactor is assumed to trip on low flow. This will result in the isolation of the feed and hydrogen flows to the reactor and effluents from the reactor. No relief is expected.

For the unmitigated case, loss of cooling water will result in loss of heat removal from the C 4 hydrogenation reactor and DPG 1 st and 2 nd stage reactors. The additional generated vapor due to the loss of cooling will be released to flare. For the mitigated case, the analysis for C4 hydrogenation and the DPG 1 st and 2 nd stage reactors are the same as in the case of cooling water failure (refer to section

6.1.6).

6.2.6

Fractionation Section

1
1

The following major towers will lose reflux since the reflux pumps will stop. The reflux pumps are on motor drive, and all the condensers are assumed to flood back and fill with liquid. Condensing capacity is lost and safety valves will discharge

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tower overheads at elevated pressure. For the unmitigated case, it is assumed that

the reboilers on the following towers will continue to provide boil-up at elevated

pressure corresponding to the relieving pressure:

- Deethanizer

- Ethylene Fractionator

- Depropanizer

- Propylene Fractionator No. 1 and No. 2

- Debutanizer

- C4 Stabilizer

- DPG Stabilizer

- Depentanizer

The Rerun Tower and the Tailing Tower will also lose the reflux pump, but will not

have relief since at the elevated relieving pressure the reboilers will pinch out i.e.

stop heat transfer due to LMTD suppression.

For the case with instrumented shutdown, both local pressure-based SISs and

the global utility failure interlock systems will cut off heat to the tower reboilers

and prevent the column “B” valves from relieving. Therefore, there is no relief.

Since both the propylene and ethylene refrigerant compressors are tripped due

to mitigation and the charge gas compressor is tripped, the reboilers will lose

heat. Additionally, since the Deethanizer feed and reboiler is cut off, the feed to

the ethylene fractionator will stop soon and the tower will not pressure up to

relieve. For the propylene fractionator, the analysis is the same as in the case of

cooling water failure (refer to section 6.1.7).

6.2.7 Refrigerant Compressors

1
1

The propylene refrigerant compressor discharge is released to the flare almost

immediately on high compressor discharge pressure due to the cooling water

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failure (due to power failure). Refrigerant is provided to various plant sections until the compressor is tripped.

No relief to flare from the refrigerant suction drums is expected at this time.

For the case with instrumented shutdown, the compressor is tripped by the local SIS upon high compressor discharge pressure and/or by the global utility failure interlock. No relief is expected.

The ethylene refrigerant compressor will be running at minimum flow condition. The ethylene refrigerant desuperheaters and condensers will be in service as long as there is sufficient holdup in the ethylene fractionator to supply ethylene/ethane liquid to condense the ethylene refrigerant. The load on the system will decrease since forward flow stops with charge gas compressor trip.

No relief to flare from the refrigerant suction drums is expected. If the minimum flow conditions cannot be sustained at lower power, it is also recommended to trip the ethylene compressor (to be checked with vendor).

For the case with instrumented shutdown, the compressor is tripped by the local SIS upon high compressor discharge pressure and/or by the global utilities failure interlock. No relief is expected.

6.3 QUENCH WATER FAILURE

With the increase in the charge gas compressor suction temperature, and charge gas flow due to loss of quench water circulation, the charge gas compressor discharge temperatures will increase and the compressor will be tripped.

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The pressure control “B” valve on the quench tower overhead will relieve to flare. Cooling by quench water is completely disrupted and the total gasoline fractionator overhead and the gasoline stripper overhead will be relieved to the flare.

6.4 PROPYLENE REFRIGERANT COMPRESSOR TRIP

The propylene refrigeration compressor trips usually due to some compressor/turbine system related problem. The trip will cause major loss in cooling in the chilling train and a pressure increase downstream of the charge gas compressor system. As a result, charge gas compressor 5 th stage discharge will relieve to the flare via the “B” valve and will be put in total kickback operation.

On failure of the propylene compressor, pressure will rise in the refrigerant drums to the set pressure of their respective relief valves. As the relief pressure is approached, many of the chillers will cease to function. Release of vapor from the drums based on the heat input is expected.

6.4.1 Cracking Section and Quench System,

The heaters will be up and running. Since the charge gas compressor 5 th stage discharge is relieving there will be no relief from the overhead of the quench tower. Feed will continue to the charge gas compressor section.

6.4.2 Charge Gas Compressor and Chilling Train

This result of the relief from the charge gas compressor 5 th stage discharge will be a significant reduction in the refrigeration loads from the systems downstream of the charge gas compressor including the ethylene fractionator and demethanizer. With the charge gas being flared, the propylene and ethylene refrigerant vaporization will be minimized, by cutting off heat input to the chilling train. In

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addition, chilling will still be available from the methane refrigeration compressor, which minimizes refrigerant relief.

With the loss of propylene subcooling in the Cold Box, the low temperature trip on the various streams leaving the warm end of the cold box (hydrogen & methane offgas, ethane recycle) will be activated resulting in a release to flare via the “B” valve. The quantity relieved in this event, however, is not controlling since the flow entering the chilling train will be greatly reduced or stopped completely.

6.4.3 Demethanizer and Methane Refrigerant Compressor

With the charge gas compressor 5 th discharge relieving, there is no net forward flow and the hydrogen offgas production will stop. Methane offgas will be reduced since the demethanizer reboiler heating medium (charge gas) has stopped. For both the unmitigated and mitigated case, the quantity of hydrogen and methane offgas to the fuel gas system will be below the fuel gas requirements of the cracking heaters resulting in no expected release to the flare.

6.4.4 Fractionation

The deethanizer, ethylene fractionator and depropanizer will lose their condensing medium. It is assumed that the reboilers on these towers, except the C 3 refrigeration based reboiler on the ethylene fractionator, will continue to provide boil-up at elevated pressure. The column overheads will be released to the flare.

For the case with instrumented shutdown, the local pressure-based SISs will cut off heat to the column reboilers. The Propylene refrigeration compressor trip interlock will close the “B” valves in the overhead of the columns that uses propylene refrigeration and prevent these columns from relieving. Therefore no relief is expected. Exception to this is the ethylene fractionator, which has no SIS and

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1
1

therefore will generate a relief load based on forward feed and only the ethylene refrigerant condenser (tower side reboiler) in operation.

6.4.5 Refrigerant Compressors

On failure of the propylene refrigerant compressor, pressure will rise in the refrigerant drums to the set pressure of their respective relief valves. At the relief pressure, many of the chillers will cease to function. Since the charge gas compressor 5 th stage discharge is relieving, vaporization of propylene refrigerant is minimized. The quantity relieved from the associated refrigerant suction drums, however, is not controlling.

Also, no load is expected from the propylene compressor discharge to the flare since normal condensing using cooling water is still in operation.

The ethylene compressor continues to operate on total kickback because of reduced forward flow to the chilling train. The load from those chillers using ethylene refrigerant in the chilling train will increase due to the loss of propylene refrigerant. There is no load from the compressor discharge to flare since normal condensing is still taking place in the ethylene fractionator side reboiler.

Eventually, based on the inventory of the ethylene fractionator, the ethylene refrigeration compressor discharge will stop condensing resulting in a relief at the compressor discharge to flare equivalent to the reduced duty in the refrigeration system at this time. The quantity in this event is not controlling since the ethylene fractionator relief would correspondingly decrease due to loss of the side reboiler duty.

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6.5

ETHYLENE REFRIGERANT COMPRESSOR TRIP

6.5.1 Charge Gas Compressor

The operators will likely put the charge gas compressor on total kickback condition. Furnace effluent will be flared through the “B” valve on the quench tower or at the CG compressor 1 st stage suction drum. These actions will significantly reduce the load from the systems downstream of the charge gas compressor. This relief will be minimized by the operators reducing the number of cracking heaters in operation by 30-40% to the minimum plant turndown conditions.

6.5.2 Chilling Train, Deemethanizer and Methane Refrigerant Compressor

With the loss of ethylene condensing medium in the chilling train and the loss of methane refrigerant from the demethanizer overhead system, the hydrogen offgas flow will increase.

The demethanizer reboiler will lose its heating medium upon the loss of forward flow of charge gas. The demethanizer condensing will cease due to the loss of condensing medium resulting in a loss of reflux. The increased methane plus hydrogen offgas in excess of the cracking heater fuel gas requirements will be released to the flare.

With the charge gas compressor on total kickback and the charge gas being flared at the quench tower overhead, ethylene refrigerant relief to flare will be minimized by cutting off heat input to the chilling train.

6.5.3 Propylene Refrigerant Compressor

The propylene refrigerant compressor continues to operate on total kickback because of reduced forward flow to the chilling train. There is no load from the

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propylene refrigerant compressor discharge since normal condensing is taking place with the cooling water system still in operation.

6.5.4 Ethylene Refrigerant Compressor

When the ethylene refrigerant compressor trips, the pressure will rise in the refrigerant drums to the set pressures of their respective relief valves. At the relief pressure, many of the chillers will cease to function. With the charge gas compressor assumed to be on total kickback and relieving at the 1 st stage suction, vaporization of ethylene refrigerant is minimized. A relief to the flare from the associated refrigerant suction drums is expected only at high plant load when operating with liquid ethylene product rundown.

No load is expected from the ethylene refrigerant compressor discharge to flare since the normal condensing using ethylene fractionator sidedraw is still in operation.

6.6 CHARGE GAS COMPRESSOR TRIP

When the charge gas compressor is tripped, the normal quench tower overhead is relieved to flare through the safety valves. Quench water cooling is in operation at this time. There will be relief from the overhead of the condensate stripper. Any vapor recycle streams to the charge gas compressor system will also be relieved to the flare.

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6.7

STARTUP/NORMAL OFF-SPEC PRODUCT FLARING

Startup

The maximum flare load at startup is the quench tower overhead or the deethanizer net overhead. The assumption is that the unit is operating at approximately 60 percent of normal rate based on the cracking heater alignment (up to four liquid heaters cracking naphtha plus one heater on HSS) which is generally required to supply the proper quantity of SHP steam for the charge gas compressor turbine to operate on total kickback.

Initially, flaring will take place from the quench tower overhead “B” valve until the CG compressor is in operation. The final major flaring will occur at the outlet of the acetylene converter until the acetylene converter effluent is on-spec.

The duration of these reliefs can very widely but typically last 1-2 weeks.

Normal Operation

For off-spec product flaring during normal operation, it is assumed that the operators will immediately turndown the heaters to reduce the flare load. For a short period before the heater turndown, the flare load could be as high as 100% of the normal rate. However for this analysis 80% load is considered to be relieved to the flare. The calculated relief rate could last for up to eight hours before the ethylene fractionator is brought on specification.

During startup or normal operation, the quantity relieved in these events will not occur simultaneously and will not be controlling. However, the smokeless burning capacity of the flare could be affected and should be checked by detailed engineering contractor.

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7 MECHANICAL DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS

7.1 Design Practice

The flare system shall be sized in accordance with Lummus practice or local codes (if local codes are more stringent). The relief loads for the various cases given on the safety valve data sheets and the summary loads given in the Appendix must be reviewed to determine the controlling load for each header section.

For those sections of the flare system handling liquids and vapors at temperatures below -29°C, the basis for the selection of materials is as follows:

All materials must have proven Charpy V-Notch impact strength, at the minimum design temperature, sufficient to utilize the full ambient temperature allowable stress of the material. This requirement is applicable to: seamless pipe and plate materials; seam welds and butt welds including the heat affected zones; attachments welded directly to the pipe, drums and stack, including the attachment weld. To satisfy this requirement, the material supplier should submit mill certificates showing impact test results for the plate or pipe, and the fabricator should submit qualified welding procedures including impact test results for the welds and heat affected zones. The same requirement applies to field welds. This includes the dry flare piping, the dry flare drum, the combined wet/dry/hot flare header and the flare stack.

In order to properly specify materials, it is essential that the minimum design

temperature along the length of the flare line be established as outlined in Section

7.2. Guidelines for materials selection are given in Section 7.3.

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7.2

Design Temperature

For each relief condition, the minimum pipe wall temperature along the length of

pipe between the point of discharge and the flare stack should be calculated. From

these calculations the design temperature for each section of pipe is then selected

at the lowest temperature occurring in that section for any of the relief conditions.

The calculation procedure employed should take into account whether the condition

is "short term" (i.e. duration of relief less than about 30 minutes) or "long term". For

the "short term" relief the heat capacity of the pipe wall may be sufficiently high that

the pipe wall temperature will not reach its minimum (i.e. steady-state) value during

the relief. This should be evaluated after the flare system sizing and the layout

have been finalized.

7.3

Materials Selection

7.3.1

Piping

As stated in Section 7.1, all flare piping material must have proven impact strength

to the minimum design temperature. Acceptable materials based on the minimum

design temperature for a section of the flare line is given in the following table:

Minimum

 

Design

Temperature

Material Type

T

< -101°C

304 SS

-101°C < T < -46°C

3 1/2 Ni

-46°C < T < -29°C

CS (Charpy)

-29°C < T < Ambient

CS (Si Killed)

T

> Ambient

CS

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The design must follow ANSI Code B31.3 or local codes if more stringent. However, grades of steel comparable to ASTM grades may be used if economic and if all impact toughness and other ANSI requirements are met. For convenience, the ANSI B31.3 requirements are shown below in simplified form:

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Table 7.3.1.1

Impact Test Requirements for Flare Materials

Temp.

Base

Deposited Weld

( o C )

Material

Metal

Metal and HAZ

T < -101°C)

Stainless

None

0.015" Lateral Steel Expansion (Weld Metal Only)

-101°C < T < -46°C

3 1/2 Ni

None

-46°C < T < -29°

CS (Charpy)

Charpy

Same as Base Metal

 

Test as

shown in

Table 7.3.1.2

-29°C < T < Ambient

CS (Si Killed)

None

None

T > Ambient

CS

None

None

The specific toughness requirements are shown in Table 7.3.1.2.

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Table 7.3.1.2

Minimum Required Charpy V-Notch Impact Values

Specified Minimum

No. of

 

Tensile Strength

Specimens

Cal

(a)

Carbon and Low Alloy Steels

65

ksi (448 MPa) and Less

Average for

4.2

 

3

Specimens

Minimum for

3.2

1

Specimen

Over 65 to 75 ksi

Average for

4.9

(to 517 MPa)

3 Specimens

Minimum for

3.9

1

Specimen

Over 75 but not including

Average for

6.5

95

ksi (656 MPa)

3 Specimens

 

Minimum for

4.9

1 Specimen

Expansion Lateral

Stainless Steel

Minimum for

0.015 in

3

Specimens

(0.38 mm). (1)

(1) Weld Metal Only

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7.3.2

Branch Connections

At junction points where a material change occurs, the material of construction for both the branch and the header should be the same as that for the colder section. For a cold branch (e.g. stainless steel) jointed to a warmer header the header should be the same as the branch (i.e. stainless steel) for a distance of at least 3 meters both upstream and downstream of the junction. For a warm branch entering a colder header, the branch should be constructed of the same material as the header for a distance of at least 3 meters upstream of the junction.

7.3.3 Material Selection for Ambient and Elevated Temperature

As the process temperature increases to ambient temperature and above, carbon steel is the recommended construction material. The design of these systems must be based on ANSI B31.3. However, grades of carbon steel comparable to the ASTM grades may be substituted if consistent with ANSI design rules.

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8 MITIGATION SUMMARY

Table 7.8.1

Source

Type of mitigation

 

ETHYLENE

 

Quench Tower

All 6 operating heaters are tripped on local or global failure (on global failure signals and on local QT overhead temp.)

Condensate Stripper

Instrumented shutdown not provided

Demethanizer/C1 Refrig. System

Instrumented shutdown not provided

Deethanizer

Heat input to the reboiler stopped; pressure “B” valve tripped

Ethylene Fractionator

Instrumented shutdown not provided

Depropanizer

Heat input to the reboiler stopped; pressure “B” valve tripped

1
1

Propylene Fractionator

Heat input to the main and side reboiler stopped; pressure “B” valve tripped

(Note 2)

Debutanizer

Heat input to the reboiler stopped

Propylene Refrig. Compressor

Compressor tripped – Tripped on global failure signals and compressor discharge pres./temp.)

 

Ethylene Refrig. Compressor

Compressor tripped – Tripped on global failure signals and compressor discharge pres./temp.)

DPG

 

DPG First Stage Reactor

Mitigation not necessary – Relatively smaller load

DPG Second Stage Reactor

Feed and Hydrogen flow stopped

DPG Stabilizer

Heat input to the reboiler stopped

Depentanizer

Heat input to the reboiler stopped

Rerun Tower

Mitigation not necessary – reboiler pinches out due to LMTD suppession at relieving pressure

Tailing Tower

Mitigation not necessary – reboiler pinches out due to LMTD suppession at relieving pressure

C4 HYDRO

 

C4 Hydro Reactor

Feed and Hydrogen flow stopped

C4 Stabilizer

Heat input to the reboiler stopped

Notes:

1.

For the BDEU and BEU, similar mitigation philosophy and safety instrumentation will be used so as to achieve the necessary safety integrity level (SIL3).

1
1

2.

Propylene Fractionator has separate SIS for the local vs. global based signals. Therefore when global mitigation fails, local pressure based SIS is assumed to be still available. Relief load equivalent to the main reboiler contribution is considered and is added to the flare load.

IOCL_FLARE_DESIGN_BASIS_REV0.doc

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9

APPENDIX

Flare load breakdown is shown for the various failure cases in the following tables:

Legend

kg/h

Vapor relief (without overdesign factor)

MW

Molecular Weight

T in , O C

Inlet temperature at the safety valve. The effect on temperature due to the pressure increase is included for tower overhead relief.

T out , O C

Discharge temperature at the safety valve. Estimated temperature based on a back pressure of 1.6 kscg.

Flare System

Type of flare system.

IOCL_FLARE_DESIGN_BASIS_REV0.doc

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W - Wet

D

- Dry

9.1 Total Cooling Water Failure

1
1
 

Non-instrumented

 

Instrumented

 
   

IOCL

IOCL

IOCL

IOCL

IOCL

IOCL

IOCL

IOCL

Flare

Tin

Tout

Tin

Tout

Type

kg/h

MW

°C

°C

kg/h

MW

°C

°C

Case

 

2B

2B

2B

2B

2B

2B

2B

2B

ETHYLENE

                 

Quench Tower

W

461,482

29.30

78.0

77.1

173,584

27.80

79.0

78.2

CG Compressor

W

0

     

0

     

Condensate Stripper

W

35,918

34.66

33.2

18.0

35,918

34.66

33.2

18.0

Gasoline Stripper

W

0

     

0

     

Demethanizer/C1 Refrig System

D

0

     

46,603

15.41

-126.7

-140.7

Acetylene Converter

D

0

     

0

     

Deethanizer

D

135,244

28.44

-14.4

-67.0

0

     

Ethylene Fractionator

D

0

     

0

     

Depropanizer

D

0

     

0

     

MAPD Converter

W

0

     

0

     

Propylene Fractionator

W

911,226

41.97

54.9

13.6

695,359

41.97

54.9

13.6

Debutanizer

W

57,862

56.00

66.6

52.6

0

     

Propylene Refrigerant System

W

816,874

42.08

70.7

48.8

0

     

Ethylene Refrigerant System

W

0

     

0

     

Wet Flare Load, kg/h

 

2,283,362

38.74

65.2

40.1

904,861

37.94

58.7

26.2

Dry Flare Load, kg/h

 

135,244

28.44

-14.4

-67.0

46,603

15.41

-126.7

-140.7

Total Load, kg/h

 

2,418,606

37.97

60.7

34.1

951,464

35.41

49.6

18.0

DPG / Pygas Hydro Unit

DPG-1 Reactor (HP Flash Drum)

W

10,000

43.84

190.0

172.0

10,000

43.84

190.0

172.0

DPG Stabilizer

W

42,357

50.60

119.8

112.9

0

     

Tailing Tower

W

0

     

0

     

Depentanizer

W

0

     

0

     

DPG-2 Reactor (HP Flash Drum)

W

51,000

38.80

157.0

109.2

51,000

38.80

157.0

109.2

Rerun Tower

W

0

     

0

     

Wet Flare Load, kg/h

 

103,357

43.43

144.9

116.8

61,000

39.55

162.4

119.5

C4 Hydro Unit

C4 Hydro Reactor

W

200,000

54.26

125.9

40.4

0

     

C4 Stabilizer

W

31,961

45.16

80.4

62.7

0

     

Wet Flare Load, kg/h

 

231,961

52.79

206.3

103.1

0

0.00

0.0

0.0

TOTAL FLARE LOAD

Wet Flare Load, kg/h

 

2,618,680

39.85

73.1

43.4

965,861

38.04

65.2

32.1

Dry Flare Load, kg/h

 

135,244

28.44

-14.4

-67.0

46,603

15.41

-126.7

-140.7

Total Load, kg/h

 

2,753,924

39.08

68.8

38.0

1,012,464

35.63

56.4

24.1

7-46

IOCL_FLARE_DESIGN_BASIS_REV0.doc

9.2 Total Power Failure

1
1
 

Non-instrumented

 

Instrumented

 
   

IOCL

IOCL

IOCL

IOCL

IOCL

IOCL

IOCL

IOCL

Flare

Tin

Tout

Tin

Tout

Type

kg/h

MW

°C

°C

kg/h

MW

°C

°C

Case

 

2B

2B

2B

2B

2B

2B

2B

2B

ETHYLENE

                 

Quench Tower

W

581,248

24.62

103.8

102.5

335,299

20.22

101.1

99.2

CG Compressor

W

0

     

0

     

Condensate Stripper

W

35,918

34.66

33.2

18.0

35,918

34.66

33.2

18.0

Gasoline Stripper

W

0

     

0

     

Demethanizer/C1 Refrig System

D

0

     

46,603

15.41

-126.7

-140.7

Acetylene Converter

D

0

     

0

     

Deethanizer

D

280,166

28.44

-14.4

-67.0

0

     

Ethylene Fractionator

D

40,378

28.41

-29.9

-72.5

0

     

Depropanizer

D

148,463

58.11

58.7

46.3

0

     

MAPD Converter

W

0

     

0

     

Propylene Fractionator

W

406,544

41.97

54.9

13.6

523,683

41.97

54.9

13.6

Debutanizer

W

57,862

56.00

66.6

52.6

0

     

Propylene Refrigerant System

W

816,874

42.08

70.7

48.8

0

     

Ethylene Refrigerant System

W

0

     

0

     

Wet Flare Load, kg/h

 

1,898,446

34.66

76.6

57.2

894,900

29.73

71.3

45.8

Dry Flare Load, kg/h

 

469,007

33.92

7.4

-31.6

46,603

15.41

-126.7

-140.7

Total Load, kg/h

 

2,367,453

34.51

62.9

39.6

941,503

28.43

61.5

36.6

DPG / Pygas Hydro Unit

DPG-1 Reactor (HP Flash Drum)

W

10,000

43.84

190.0

172.0

10,000

43.84

190.0

172.0

DPG Stabilizer

W

42,357

50.60

119.8

112.9

0

     

Tailing Tower

W

0

     

0

     

Depentanizer

W

18,370

70.31

103.5

96.7

0

     

DPG-2 Reactor (HP Flash Drum)

W

51,000

38.80

157.0

109.2

51,000

38.80

157.0

109.2

Rerun Tower

W

0

     

0

     

Wet Flare Load, kg/h

 

121,727

46.09

138.7

113.8

61,000

39.55

162.4

119.5

C4 Hydro Unit

C4 Hydro Reactor

W

200,000

54.26

125.9

40.4

0

     

C4 Stabilizer

W

31,961

46.18

86.6

70.0

0

     

Wet Flare Load, kg/h

 

231,961

52.98

212.5

110.4

0

0.00

0.0

0.0

TOTAL FLARE LOAD

Wet Flare Load, kg/h

 

2,252,134

36.44

84.5

59.0

955,900

30.21

77.2

50.5

Dry Flare Load, kg/h

 

469,007

33.92

7.4

-31.6

46,603

15.41

-126.7

-140.7

Total Load, kg/h

 

2,721,141

35.98

71.2

43.4

1,002,503

28.92

67.7

41.7

7-47

IOCL_FLARE_DESIGN_BASIS_REV0.doc

9.3

Quench Water Failure

 

Non-instrumented

 

Instrumented

 
   

IOCL

IOCL

IOCL

IOCL

IOCL

IOCL

IOCL

IOCL

Flare

Tin

Tout

Tin

Tout

Type

kg/h

MW

°C

°C

kg/h

MW

°C

°C

Case

 

2B

2B

2B

2B

2B

2B

2B

2B

ETHYLENE

                 

Quench Tower

W

858,208

33.07

104.8

103.5

858,208

33.05

104.8

103.5

CG Compressor

W

0

     

0

     

Condensate Stripper

W

0

     

0

     

Gasoline Stripper

W

0

     

0

     

Demethanizer/C1 Refrig System

D

0

     

0

     

Acetylene Converter

D

0

     

0

     

Deethanizer

D

0

     

0

     

Ethylene Fractionator

D

0

     

0

     

Depropanizer

D

0

     

0

     

MAPD Converter

W

0

     

0

     

Propylene Fractionator

W

0

     

0

     

Debutanizer

W

0

     

0

     

Propylene Refrigerant System

W

0

     

0

     

Ethylene Refrigerant System

W

0

     

0

     

Wet Flare Load, kg/h

 

858,208

33.07

104.8

103.5

858,208

33.05

104.8

103.5

Dry Flare Load, kg/h

 

0

0.00

0.0

0.0

0

0.00

0.0

0.0

Total Load, kg/h

 

858,208

33.07

104.8

103.5

858,208

33.05

104.8

103.5

DPG / Pygas Hydro Unit

DPG-1 Reactor (HP Flash Drum)

W

0

     

0

     

DPG Stabilizer

W

0

     

0

     

Tailing Tower

W

0

     

0

     

Depentanizer

W

0

     

0

     

DPG-2 Reactor (HP Flash Drum)

W

0

     

0

     

Rerun Tower

W

0

     

0

     

Wet Flare Load, kg/h

 

0

0.00

0.0

0.0

0

0.00

0.0

0.0

C4 Hydro Unit

C4 Hydro Reactor

W

0

     

0

     

C4 Stabilizer

W

0

     

0

     

Wet Flare Load, kg/h

 

0

0.00

0.0

0.0

0

0.00

0.0

0.0

TOTAL FLARE LOAD

Wet Flare Load, kg/h

 

858,208

33.07

104.8

103.5

858,208

33.05

104.8

103.5

Dry Flare Load, kg/h

 

0

0.00

0.0

0.0

0

0.00

0.0

0.0

Total Load, kg/h

 

858,208

33.07

104.8

103.5

858,208

33.05

104.8

103.5

7-48

IOCL_FLARE_DESIGN_BASIS_REV0.doc

9.4

Propylene Refrigerant Compressor Trip

 

Non-instrumented

 

Instrumented

 
   

IOCL

IOCL

IOCL

IOCL

IOCL

IOCL

IOCL

IOCL

Flare

Tin

Tout

Tin

Tout

Type

kg/h

MW

°C

°C

kg/h

MW

°C

°C

Case

 

2B

2B

2B

2B

2B

2B

2B

2B

ETHYLENE

                 

Quench Tower

W

0

     

0

     

CG Compressor

W

378,292

26.78

80.4

61.6

378,292

26.78

80.4

61.6

Condensate Stripper

W

0

     

0

     

Gasoline Stripper

W

0

     

0

     

Demethanizer/C1 Refrig System

D

0

     

0

     

Acetylene Converter

D

0

     

0

     

Deethanizer

D

201,232

28.44

-14.4

-67.0

0