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Title of the Paper: Consciousness, Intentionality, and Perception: A Review of The Phenomenological Mind Name: Cheng, Huei-Ying University Affiliation: National Chengchi niversity, !aiwan E-mail Address: cognitivis"#yahoo$co"$tw Conventional Address: %&, No$'%, Alley '(, )ane '*+, ,ec$ %, -hongsiao .$ Rd$, /aan /istrict, !aipei, !aiwan 0R$1$C2 '+3(( Telephone Number: ((3-4'4-5(5-('4 Submitted to: P,YCH.

R.6I.7 1&: 8allagher, ,$ 9 :ahavi, /$ ;++*$ The Phenomenological Mind: An

Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science$ New Yor<: Routledge$ vi = ;%% pp$ I,>N: +%'?54';;4, 0p@<$2, A;4$4? &ro" the su@heading of this @oo<, one gains an i"pression that readers will see how resources and perspectives fro" pheno"enology shed light on various Buestions in analytic philosophy of "ind and cognitive science$ !his i"pression is reinforced upon finding that "any analytic philosophersC na"es appear throughout the @oo<$ !hat appearance notwithstanding, I shall argue that the authors fail to engage with analytic philosophy at "any points$ >ut @efore that, let "e first say so"ething a@out its distinctiveness as an introductory @oo< and how this shapes its overall structure$ 7ithout Bualifications, Dthe pheno"enological "indC can "ean at least two different things: it "ight @e a declaration of a philosophical thesis that the "ind is in one sense or another Dpheno"enological,C or instead it "ight refer to the Dpheno"enologicalC "ethodology adopted @y the authors$ 8allagher and :ahavi intend the second connotation$ In their introductory chapter, a @rief history of the philosophical inBuiries into the "ind is outlined, and the content includes the analytic as well as the pheno"enological tradition 0e$g$ we have Husserl in p$;, /reyfus in p$%2$ Eoreover, in chapter ; they introduce the Dpheno"enological "ethod,C including a co"parison @etween pheno"enology and introspection 0p$'4-;'2 and the @asic idea of the Dpheno"enological reductionC 0p$;'-p$;32$ As .van !ho"pson write in the @ac< "atter, this @oo< is DFoGffering a fresh new approach,C which is Buite different fro" those adopted @y -ohn Heil, -aegwon Hi" 0ontology, especially scientific reduction and "ental causation2 and /avid >raddon-Eitchell 9 &ran< -ac<son 0philosophy of language, especially the Hrip<ean conception of reference2, a"ong others$ !he structure of this @oo< reflects this distinctive approach$ In addition to relatively fa"iliar chapters on perception 0Ch$?2, intentionality 0Ch$32, and our <nowledge of other "inds 0Ch$42, there are so"e chapters rarely seen in other introductory @oo<s a@out the "ind, such as the e"@odied "ind 0Ch$*2 and ti"econsciousness 0Ch$%2$ !i"e-consciousness is argua@ly a topic eIclusive in the pheno"enological tradition, and although e"@odi"ent has now @eco"e "uch "ore i"portant in analytic philosophy, still it is often overloo<ed to so"e eItent$ 7hatCs "ore, even in those relatively fa"iliar chapters, e$g$ on perception and intentionality, the authors put "uch effort on @ringing pheno"enology into the picture$ In this respect, 8allagher and :ahavi are successful in living up to the first half of their pre"ise: the @oo< is an introduction with the phenomenological approach$ Nevertheless, as I alluded to at the outset, I thin< they fail to live up to the second half of their pre"ise, that the @oo< is an engage"ent with philosophy of mind and cognitive science 0at this occasion I shall focus on the for"er and <eep silent a@out

the latter2$ I shall argue this @y considering their chapters on consciousness 0Ch$52, intentionality 0Ch$32, and perception 0Ch$?2$ Consciousness has always @een a central notion in the pheno"enological tradition, and it has @eco"e the "ost heated topic in analytic philosophy in recent decades$ ,ince the authors intend to confront philosophy of "ind with the tools of pheno"enology, clarity a@out how theories in the analytic tradition use the ter" is vital$ !his is particular the case given that what the authors want to offer is an introduction to philosophy of "ind and cognitive science$ nfortunately, the authors are eBuivocal with respect to Jconsciousness,K and this thwarts co""unications @etween different traditions$ )et "e eIplain$ !he authors declare that in JCh$5: Consciousness and ,elf-ConsciousnessK they will tal< a@out Jpheno"enalityK 0p$4L see also p$''4L the authors use it and Dpheno"enal featureC interchangea@ly, so presu"a@ly it is also interchangea@le with Jpheno"enal character,K JBualitative character,K and the li<e2, which suggest that they intend a close conceptual lin< @etween it and consciousness - i$e$, the Jwhat it is li<eK aspect of the "ind 0p$42$ >esides, the chapter opens with Ar"strongCs Jlong-distance truc< driverK pro@le" 0p$%?2, which is often understood as a case of dissociation @etween intentionality and phenomenal consciousness$ However, they do not always stic< to this usage of these ter"s$ At one point, they tell us that JFpGheno"enologists refer to the idea that our consciousness is of or about something as the intentionality of consciousnessK 0p$%32$ !he philosophical correctness of this proposition aside, the trou@le is that the authors eIpress this thought with the phrase Jthe intentionality of consciousness$K Intentionality and consciousness are aspects of the "entalL a "ental state, event, or process can @e intentional, conscious, or @oth$ Now the pheno"enologistsC thesis is that all conscious states 0or events, processes2 are at the sa"e ti"e intentional$ !his is interesting and "ight @e true, @ut to eIpress this with phrase li<e Jthe intentionality of consciousnessK is at @est "isguided, for if one wants JconsciousnessK to "ean Jpheno"enal feature,K as the authors do, the locution in Buestion in effect "eans Jthe intentionality of phenomenal feature$K !his is aw<ward, for what at issue is whether state li<e JpainK has pheno"enal features as well as intentionality$ If the answer is affir"ative, the @etter eIpression should @e Jthe intentionality of conscious M pheno"enal state$K ,i"ilar considerations apply to their re"ar< that JFtGhere are @asically two sides to consciousness: intentionality and eIperienceK 0p$'+(2$ Here clearly they "ean Jpheno"enal featureK with the ter" JeIperience,K @ut this is also "isguided @ecause nor"ally we use JeIperienceK to "ean "ental episodes$ 7orse still, it is not clear a@out what they "ean @y JconsciousnessK here: if it "eans J"ental state,K the usage is highly idiosyncratic and pro@a@ly false, for argua@ly there are "any unconscious "ental statesL if it "eans

Jconscious state,K it @egs the Buestion, for whether intentionality is a @asic side of conscious states is at issue$ !he trou@le is that though we can pro@a@ly guess what they "ean @y those ter"s and have charita@le readings, their usages are prone to generate confusions after all, and this is significant given that this @oo< is Jan introduction to philosophy of "ind and cognitive science$K I do not @elieve newco"ers of this field are a@le to carefully @ear various provisos in "inds when they read on and there@y not to @e "isled$ &or a "ore delicate discussion of so"e relevant "atters, I reco""end Charles ,iewert 0;++32$ !rou@les occur not only with JconsciousnessK @ut with Jintentionality$K As "entioned a@ove, generally spea<ing pheno"enologists regard intentionality as the "ar< of the "entalL this thesis has often @een called Jrepresentationalis"K or Jintentionalis"$K Here I go with the" in adopting the latter la@el 0elsewhere I argue that Jrepresentationalis"K is a prefera@le la@el in this conteIt, @ut I shall not go into that2$ As they note, one of the "ain "otivations for it is 8$ .$ EooreCs J diaphanous Buality of eIperience: when you try to focus your attention on the intrinsic features of eIperience, you always see" to end up attending to what the eIperience is ofK 0p$''*2$ !hey go on to "ention !ye and /rets<e and do not really assess the thesis$ >ut one should notice that recently this thesis has @eco"e highly controversial through reflections on, say, the eIperiences of @lurriness: when nearsighted persons see without helps fro" glasses, their visual fields are @lurry all the way out$ Is @lurriness a feature @elongs to Jwhat the eIperience is ofKN Argua@ly not$ !he de@ate is a live, heated one, and it is central to considerations concerning intentionalis"$ Nonetheless, here the authors si"ply leave the relevant issues utterly untouched$ Readers "ay refer to !i" Crane 0;++32 for a nice discussion of the transparency and the eIa"ple fro" @lurriness$ !he considerations a@out transparency lead us to perception$ !he authors open their chapter on perception @y declaring that JThe Primacy of Perception, the title of one of Eerleau-PontyCs "ost fa"ous tal<s, gives us a hint as to how "ost pheno"enologists view perception$ It is considered funda"entalK 0p$(42$ ,i"ilar declarations can @e found throughout the chapter$ !his is a true description, to @e sure, @ut to let it @e the guiding principle of that chapter is not a good idea$ &or one thing, this @egs the Buestion against what "any analytic philosophers say a@out perceptionL for another, it is not suita@le for an introductory @oo< anyway$ I "yself side with pheno"enologists that perception is in a significant sense pri"ary, @ut this needs argu"ents, @oth positive and negative$ A$ /$ ,"ith 0;++;, ;++(2 provides a@undant discussions concerning various issues a@out perception in @oth the analytic tradition and the pheno"enological traditionL although unli<e ,"ith, 8allagher and :ahavi are offering an introductory @oo<, it does not follow that one-sided discussions are

accepta@le$ I shall conclude this review @y a general o@servation derived @y a@ove discussions$ 8allagher and :ahavi intend to approach "any issues in philosophy of "ind and cognitive science fro" a pheno"enological point of view, and the thoughts @ehind this are well ta<en$ Ey worry is that "ost of what they are doing is only to envisage what phenomenologists would say a@out those issues in philosophy of "ind and cognitive science, @ut this does not fit its su@heading, and is not very significant philosophically spea<ing$ >esides, in the case of consciousness they are Oust not careful enough a@out their usages of ter"inologies$ Philosophers in the analytic tradition can certainly @enefit fro" their researches, @ut it see"s to "e that this particular @oo< is not Bualified as an introductory wor<, not @ecause it is too dense, @ut @ecause of the situations I tried to point out$ A@ove I referred to so"e other authorsC wor<s for the readers to co"pare with, @ut "y intention is not that 8allagherCs and :ahaviCs efforts should @e si"ply set asideL eIactly not$ !he review proceeds with a critical voice only @ecause I treasure eIchanges @etween philosophical traditions, and I thin< @oth clarity and depth are necessary conditions of real co""unications and i"prove"ents$ In the case of consciousness I suggest the authors to @e clearer a@out i"portant ter"inologiesL in the cases of intentionality and perception I suggest the authors to deepen their discussions$ !hey "ay do these @y engaging "ore with analytic philosophy, for the latter has provided "any intricate distinctions concerning ter"inologies a@out consciousness, a@undant discussions concerning the relations @etween intentionality and Bualia 0if any2, and the status of perception and its relation to thoughts$

>raddon-Eitchell, /$ 9 -ac<son, &$ 0;++*2 Philosophy of Mind and Cognition: An Introduction$ >lac<well Pu@lishingL ;nd .dition$ Crane, !$ 0;++32$ Is there a perceptual relationN In !$ ,$ 8endler, 9 -$ Hawthorne 0eds$2, Perceptual E perience 0pp$ ';3-'%32$ New Yor<: 1Iford niversity Press$ Heil, -$ 0;++%2 Philosophy of Mind: A Contemporary Introduction $ New Yor<: RoutledgeL ;nd .dition$ Hi", -$ 0;++32 Philosophy of Mind$ 7estview PressL ;nd .dition$ ,iewert, C$ 0;++32$ Consciousness and intentionality$ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy$ R) P Q http:MMplato$stanford$eduMentriesMconsciousness-intentionalityM R ,"ith, A$ /$ 0;++;2$ The Problem of Perception$ Ca"@ridge, EA: Harvard niversity Press$ ,"ith, A$ /$ 0;++(2$ Husserl and eIternalis", Synthese, '3+, 5'5-555$

Huei-Ying Cheng /epart"ent of Philosophy National Cheng-Chi niversity, !aiwan No$3%, ,ec$ ;, -hihnan Rd$, 7unshan /istrict, !aipei City ''3+?, !aiwan 0R$1$C$2 email: cognitivis"#yahoo$co"$tw