The Journal of Special Education

http://sed.sagepub.com/ Ideologies, Practices, and their Implications for Special Education

Robert Dixon and Douglas Carnine J Spec Educ 1994 28: 356 DOI: 10.1177/002246699402800309 The online version of this article can be found at: http://sed.sagepub.com/content/28/3/356

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IDEOLOGIES, PRACTICES, AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR SPECIAL EDUCATION

Robert D i x o n Douglas Carnine
University of Oregon

We propose that the articles in this special issue support an emphasis upon specific instructional and assessment practices, as opposed to broad, vague, and often emotive educational ideologies. Often, well-researched, effective practices can be associated with any ideology, as can poor, rote-

like practices. The value of a particular instructional or assessment practice is probably dependent upon, at the very least, context and learner characteristics, and empiricism remains the most reliable means for evaluating practices.

T h e articles in this special issue suggest that a focus u p o n specific educational practices has far m o r e potential for advancing the field o f special ( a n d g e n e r a l ) education than an emphasis u p o n philosophies, m e t a t h e o r i e s , theories, o r psychological schools that we will refer to as ideologies. It is possible, in fact, that any ideologyconstructivist o r otherwisecan obfuscate and i m p e d e the progress o f education as a profession. O u r first e x a m p l e o f this thesis c o m e s from a fascinating analysis o f cognitive and behavioral psychology c o n d u c t e d by Butterfield, Slocum, a n d Nelson ( 1 9 9 2 ) . Butterfield a n d his associates p o i n t e d o u t that s o m e ideological differences between behavioral and cognitive schools a r e g e n u i n e and potentially incompatible. Specifically, behaviorists tend to play down mentalism a n d cognitivists play it up. In addition, the v e r n a c u l a r o f e a c h differs considerably. However, the phen o m e n a e a c h describe a r e often remarkably similar, particularly in relationship to notions o f transference. T h u s , many crucial instructional practices derived from e a c h school's bodies o f empirical evidence a r e virtually indistinguishable from o n e a n o t h e r when stripped o f the j a r g o n e a c h employs as language convention. F o r e x a m p l e , the differences between transference in cognitive p a r l a n c e a n d the m o r e traditionally behavioral t e r m generalization a r e practically n o n e x i s t e n t in terms o f the actual p h e n o m e n o n that e a c h describes. A n d o f far g r e a t e r importance to practitioners, substantial cognitive a n d behavioral r e s e a r c h supports essentially the same instructional conditions for achieving t r a n s f e r e n c e o r generalization. O u r thesisthat examining practices is m o r e fruitful than e x a m i n i n g ideologiesis certainly not profound, when viewed as a variation o n a classical set o f relationships: those between the abstract a n d the c o n c r e t e . W i t h o u t even speculating u p o n the epistemology o f abstractions, the suggestion that abstractions b e c o m e c l e a r e r and potentially m o r e functional when e m b o d i e d by c o n c r e t e
Address: Robert Dixon, 2716 Hillside Dr. SE, Olympia, WA 98501.

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examples seems not terribly controversial. We better appreciate love in acts o f love, kindness in acts o f kindness, understanding in acts o f empathy. Butterfield et al. have m a d e a strong case for viewing the labels that p e r m e a t e o u r field as abstraction, both at the broadest level (cognitivist/behaviorist) and in r e f e r e n c e t o "smaller" constructs (e.g., discriminative s t i m u l u s / c o n t e x t statem e n t s ) . Although b r o a d issues o f ideology and psychology a r e by n o m e a n s unimportant, in the final analysis, the e x t e n t to which we as special e d u c a t o r s are able to fulfill o u r special m o r a l obligations is d e t e r m i n e d by the practices we employ. F o r c o n v e n i e n c e , then, we will e x p l o r e some possible relations between the abstractions represented by labels a n d c o n c r e t e instructional practices. 1. Any given set of empirically supported practices can conform to multiple labels. This is the relationship illustrated most dramatically by Butterfield and his associates. Most notably, the kinds o f instructional conditions that result in the b r o a d application o f knowledge ( t r a n s f e r e n c e ) c a n objectively b e associated with any ideology. T h a t is, any label can be associated with those conditions: radical behaviorism, social dialectology, empirical constructivism, cognitive information processing, and so on. T h e r e is n o i n h e r e n t problem in this relationship. O n the contrary, we should find h o p e and e n c o u r a g e m e n t from e a c h instance in which effective instructional practices are identified in the empirical work o f diverse ideologies. T h e credibility o f those practices b e c o m e s just that m u c h stronger. However, such e n c o u r a g i n g events a r e rarely interpreted that way in o u r field, possibly because o f the fragile barriers that separate ideology from d o g m a . T h e following fallacious a r g u m e n t recurs with startling regularity in educational literature: Premise: T h e research o f my ideology supports instructional p r a c t i c e X . Premise: Your ideology differs from mine. Conclusions: a. Your ideology does not support that practice. b. Your ideology opposes that p r a c t i c e . c. Your ideology is mean-spirited. Logically, o f c o u r s e , n o single conclusion h e r e is any better than any other. T h e fact that well-educated adults with noble intentions e n g a g e in such unproductive polemics is a testimony to the ease with which o n e c a n slip silently into d o g m a tism. D o g m a , in turn, taints o u r perceptions in ways that serve n o useful p u r p o s e for learners. We might e m b r a c e a popular instructional p r o g r a m like Reading Recovery because we perceive it as "constructivist," o r scoff at it for its "phonics." We might like "behavioral phonics," but find "constructivist phonics" less savory. Stanovich ( 1 9 9 3 ) described dogmatically tainted interpretations o f well-designed research in the clearest o f terms: People like the results o f s o m e r e s e a r c h a n d d o not like the results o f o t h e r r e s e a r c h . T h e articles in this special issue offer n u m e r o u s e x a m p l e s o f the e x t e n t to which a given p r a c t i c e c a n b e attributed to different ideologies. F o r instance, G r a h a m and H a r r i s (this issue) point out that constructivists advocate for significantly m o r e time to be set aside for writing than is typically set aside in "conventional" o r "traditional" classrooms. T h a t , however, is different from saying that only constructivists advocate m o r e writing time. No ideology "owns" the idea o f

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allocating m o r e time to writing as a crucial but partial m e a n s to improved writing performance. T h e stages in the processes employed by a d e p t writers were fully explicated before the widespread advent o f constructivism in language arts, a n d were n o t inspired by constructivism in any case (e.g., H e r u m & C u m m i n g s , 1 9 7 0 ) . Neither do behaviorists o r neobehaviorists own the various notions o f "academic e n g a g e d time" o r "opportunities to learn." E n g l e r t ( 1 9 9 2 ) attributed many o f the successes of h e r excellent r e s e a r c h to principles that might best be described as social constructivist, but o n e o f h e r best known interventions ( E n g l e r t et al., 1 9 9 1 ) employed several practices that just as easily could be attributed to o t h e r ideologies: t e a c h e r models o f the writing process, "positive" a n d "negative" e x a m p l e s o f given text structures, p r o c e d u r a l facilitators that a r e not m u c h unlike behavioral cues a n d p r o m p t s , and so on. E n g l e r t et al. a r e the first to point o u t that their work has n o t isolated the relative contributions o f the several e l e m e n t s employed in their interventions. In the a r e a o f reading c o m p r e h e n s i o n , we believe it is n o t t o o far-fetched to suggest that the work o f cognitive psychologist Richard C. A n d e r s o n ( 1 9 7 7 ) o n the influence o f prior knowledge upon c o m p r e h e n s i o n was a natural extension of the work o f behavioral psychologist R i c h a r d C. Anderson (Anderson 8c Faust, 1 9 7 3 ) o n the influence o f p r e r e q u i s i t e e n t e r i n g b e h a v i o r o n a c h i e v e m e n t . Although the f o r m e r a n d the latter are n o t the s a m e thing, o n e can be viewed as a natural, m o r e specific extension o f the other. Stanovich (this issue) offers the e x a m p l e o f a study by C u n n i n g h a m in which an "anticonstructivist" s u b j e c t p h o n e m i c awarenessis taught via practices generally considered constructivist. T h e research Stanovich cites o n p h o n e m i c awareness, moreover, seems to r e p r e s e n t a fairly eclectic r a n g e o f both ideology a n d practice. W h a t informs us most clearly from that r e s e a r c h is a focus o n p h o n e m i c awareness itself, a n d those practices that seem to help students achieve it the most. Ideology does n o t inform us m u c h . O f all the articles in this special issue, Mallory a n d New's might support o u r thesis most convincingly. O u r own views o n special education have not, frankly, been influenced to any appreciable d e g r e e by the social constructivist ideology to which Mallory a n d New subscribe. Yet the e x t e n t to which s o m e o f o u r most steadfastly held views seem compatible with theirs strikes us as r e m a r k a b l e e v e n startling. To n a m e a few: T h e o u t r i g h t rejection o f any notion that s o m e children a r e u n e d u c a b l e o r "incapable o f benefiting from instruction." T h e value o f p e e r tutoring a n d p e e r collaboration. T h e u r g e n t n e e d to c o n t e x t u a l i z e learning. T h e c o n c e p t o f g u i d e d participation, including especially "a g r a d u a l but inevitable shift f r o m o t h e r - r e g u l a t e d to self-regulated activity." T h e c o n t e n t i o n that "boring, repetitious, a n d ultimately meaningless" readiness tasks a r e overemphasized in special e d u c a t i o n . T h e desire to withdraw extrinsic rewards in favor o f intrinsic as soon as possible.

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 T h e p r a c t i c e o f drawing attention to children's e r r o r s in an intellectually thoughtful fashion. A d e e m p h a s i s u p o n individual deficits, in favor o f building u p o n the child's capacities. Although Mallory a n d New (this issue) believe the tenets o f social constructivist theory can provide a m u c h - n e e d e d c o m m o n g r o u n d on which to base o u r collaborative e n d e a v o r s , we would suggest instead t h a t practices a n d c o n c r e t e approaches, such as those listed, might be the real key to collaborative instructional efforts a m o n g special e d u c a t o r s . Neither does ideology inform assessment o f instruction m u c h . T h e new directions in assessment that Meltzer a n d Reid offer for meaningfully interrelating instruction a n d assessment seem to be almost uncannily similar to alternatives suggested by others who are resolute empiricists (e.g., K a m e e n u i & Simmons, 1 9 9 0 ) . As with instructional practices, the links between assessment a n d ideology are frequently muddy, at best. T e a c h e r s were telling students they had d o n e well long before a behaviorist c a m e along a n d decided to call that "reinforcement." T e a c h e r s were seeking out and using wonderful children's stories long before constructivists c a m e along to formalize the practice. T e a c h e r s have long been c o n d u c t i n g continuous, processoriented, diagnostic assessment (as, for e x a m p l e , when they request that students "show their work" o r ask how they derived the solution to a particular p r o b l e m ) . Ideologies do not own effective practices. 2. Any given set of inefficient and ineffective instructional practices can be associated with multiple ideologies. Anyone who actively e n c o u r a g e s practitioners to t e a c h special education children in particular ways should always b e a bit frightened by the unavoidable fact that any bad practice c a n be associated with any ideology. T o describe ourselves as constructivist o r behaviorist o r anything else makes us vulnerable to association with o t h e r self-proclaimed ideologues whose practices r a n g e from generally p o o r to utterly indefensible. We, personally, a r e not always unwilling to identify ourselves as "direct instruction" people. But the fact is, s o m e selfproclaimed "direct instruction people" might e n g a g e in instructional practices that we find incredibly naive, simplistic, a n d m o s t criticallydetrimental to the cognitive growth o f children. F o r instance, imagine a p r o g r a m o f instruction that focuses upon children learning their math facts, such as 2 + 2 = 4. T h e p r o g r a m aspires to get the same answer ( 4 ) to the same relationship ( 2 + 2 ) , as accurately as possible, a n d as quickly as possible, a n d that is a b o u t all the p r o g r a m aspires to achieve. ( F o r many children, that is quite a bit, but, o f c o u r s e , not nearly enough.) In addition, the p r o g r a m is organized a r o u n d a principle o f "easy-to-hard," a n d subscribes to a hierarchical view in which all facts must be m a s t e r e d to a given criterion before they can be used. T h e r e f o r e , students spend interminable days and weeks a n d m o n t h s learning to r e m e m b e r arbitrary associations, a n d m e a n ingful problem solving is postponed. F o r t o o many special needs children, this has m e a n t never getting access to h i g h e r - o r d e r m a t h e m a t i c s . Research supports an alternative a p p r o a c h to learning m a t h facts, an a p p r o a c h that takes into a c c o u n t that e a c h "fact" sits in a predictable relationship to all

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o t h e r facts. W h e n facts a r e viewed that way, students can initially learn t h e m generativelyas instances o f generalizations instead o f as r o t e associations. Eventually, it is quite likelyand desirablethat facts l e a r n e d generatively will simply be r e m e m b e r e d (Ashcraft, 1 9 8 5 ) . Even s o m e constructivists seem to c o n c e d e a need at s o m e point for decidedly "nonconstructivist" practices, such as "drill" (e.g., Davis, Maher, & Noddings, 1 9 9 0 ) . In any case, there is n o well-established reason why students c a n n o t begin applying fact knowledge immediately to problem-solving situations. In fact, we can speculate that the m o r e p r o b l e m s students have the opportunity to solve, the less n e e d t h e r e will be for any form o f isolated fact practice. Mercer, J o r d a n , a n d Miller (this issue) outline t h r e e intervendons for effectively teaching problemsolving strategies to students with learning problems. Similarly, we a r e a bit u n n e r v e d by associations with direct instruction practices described by W a r r e n a n d Yoder (this issue) that c a n n o t maintain a high d e g r e e o f child attention and interest, that d o not place primary emphasis u p o n systematically contextualizing knowledge that is originally taught as decontextualized, and that d o not ensure b r o a d p r a g m a t i c generalization a n d transference. We suffer a n d benefit variously from the abstract n a t u r e o f ideological labels, as d o all practitioners a n d researchers. We suspect, for instance, that many constructivists share o u r trepidation over the practices with which they may be associated by virtue o f a vague ideological label. Specifically, most constructivists must be a l a r m e d by "constructivist practices" that a r e easily as rote-like as the "drill a n d kill" m a t h facts activity we described above. However insidious rote learning is, though, it may be the most insidious when it is disguised by labels suggesting something else altogether. Constructivists, for e x a m p l e , must cringe at s o m e o f the reading instruction practices that a r e attributed t o a n d frequently p r o m o t e d w i t h i n h o l i s t i c / constructivist ideology. O n e o f the authors spent two days observing in a constructivist C h a p t e r 1 classroom where students virtually m e m o r i z e d stories from selected books, then used both the pictures a n d some known words in those books as cues while regurgitating the m e m o r i z e d stories. T h e teacher, whose intent was clearly to teach reading, misinterpreted the story recall as reading, in spite o f strong evidence to the contrary. First, students could n o t r e a d grade-level stories they had n o t yet m e m o r i z e d . Second, a n d perhaps m o r e compelling, the p e r f o r m a n c e o f students in those classes on a district-developed, curriculumbased criterion reading test showed clearly that students could "read" stories at grade level, but not easier stories from earlier g r a d e levels. Obviously, students who m e m o r i z e stories are unable to r e c a l l a p p e a r to readstories they have not yet m e m o r i z e d , regardless o f whether such stories a r e far "easier" than m e m o rized stories. Inexplicably, the practices leading to such mindless, r o t e story regurgitation a r e actively p r o m o t e d by some e d u c a t o r s (e.g., J o h n s o n 8c Louis, 1 9 8 7 ) . Similarly, constructivists must be frustrated to see an early c h i l d h o o d c o m p u t e r based p r o g r a m in which students presumably discover the n a m e s o f colors, but in reality learn only a rote association between a c o l o r n a m e a n d a single, unvaried e x a m p l e o f a c o l o r a n d learn it inefficiently at that. O r it must be infuriating to see students acquiring the spellings o f words by the force o f sheer r o t e because the words o f interest to children that e m e r g e from their a u t h e n t i c writing e x p e -

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riences do n o t lend themselves adequately to meaningful m o r p h e m i c a n d morp h o p h o n e m i c generalization. Ideologiesany ideologiesdo n o t ensure against the rote, mindless acquisition o f knowledge a n d thus d o not usefully inform o u r o n g o i n g quest for practices that result in well-understood knowledge. 3. In the absence of specific practices, one ideology is as good as the next. Noddings ( 1 9 9 0 ) m a d e the case that all knowledge, o f any sort, is c o n s t r u c t e d , a n d thus a crucial distinction is between "low" rote knowledge a n d all o t h e r knowledge (as opposed to c o n s t r u c t e d a n d n o n c o n s t r u c t e d knowledge). We may all be constructivists, then, in that, as far as we know, n o o n e in the field o f e d u c a t i o n actively advocates r o t e learning o r low knowledge as a viable alternative to n o n r o t e learning and high knowledge. Given the p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f rote instruction that appears to actually o c c u r within the veils o f all ideologies, o n e might think t h e r e is a c o n c e r t e d effort to p r o m o t e it on someone's part: republicans, o r d e m o c r a t s , o r socialists, o r reactionaries. But t h e r e isn't. T h e spokespersons for the different ideologies do not seem inept at exhibiting their beliefs in bright lights ( o r at shining something less luminous u p o n beliefs to which they do not subscribe). We will a t t e m p t to illustrate this c o n t e n t i o n with two opposite views o n a single interest o f educators: problem solving. View 1: P e o p l e in this c o u n t r y a r e inept at solving authentic p r o b l e m s that o c c u r in their lives in general, a n d their work in particular. This is the result o f a faulty educational system that focuses u p o n the r o t e acquisition o f knowledge, r a t h e r than u p o n ways to productively use knowledge in problem-solving c o n t e x t s . T h e solution, quite obviously, is to allocate a large p e r c e n t a g e o f instructional time to problem-solving activity. It is time to stop treating school children as though they were dogs, rats, monkeys, o r pigeons. View 2: P e o p l e in this c o u n t r y a r e inept at solving a u t h e n t i c p r o b l e m s that o c c u r in their lives in general, a n d their work in particular. This is the result o f a faulty educational system that fails to recognize that human beings a r e innately endowed with incredibly sophisticated problem-solving abilities that d e p e n d u p o n little m o r e than a wide b r e a d t h o f knowledge. T h e solution, quite obviously, is to allocate a large p e r c e n t a g e o f instructional time to effective practices for e x p a n d ing the breadth and depth o f learner's knowledge. It is time to stop treating school children as t h o u g h they were dogs, rats, monkeys, o r pigeons. This might seem to be a droll a p p r o a c h to educational ideology, were it n o t for the fact that just this sort o f whimsical rhetoric seems to sway many a n d inspire o t h e r s . T h e tastes o f o t h e r s yet a r e m o r e inclined t o w a r d o b s c u r e , quasiphilosophical misinterpretations o r reinterpretations o f respectable schools o f ontological a n d epistemological thought, a p p r o a c h e s that d o not, at least, u n n e c essarily subject us to excessive wit. 4. The efficacy of instructional practices depends upon nonideological contexts. In the abstract, how does o n e assess the relative value o f different practices, such as discovery-oriented practices versus explicit instruction, for e x a m p l e ? Ideologies tend to ascribe blanket, universal value to certain practices a n d to uniformly reject others, often leading to e r r o n e o u s a n d misleading generalizations regarding b r o a d instructional considerations such as discovery versus explicit learning.

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T h e r e is n o intrinsic merit to either explicit o r discovery instructionin t h e abstract. A n u m b e r o f additional factors influence the judicious use o f either a p p r o a c h , including especially ( a ) the interactions a m o n g instructional practices and (b) l e a r n e r characteristics. W a r r e n a n d Y o d e r (this issue) discuss effective practices as both a relative a n d an absolute question in r e f e r e n c e to language intervention strategies. O t h e r articles in this special issue would suggest that we can generalize those questions across c o n t e n t areas. We would think, for instance, that o n e would be reluctant to c a r r y a b a n n e r for explicit instruction without an a c c o m p a n y i n g e n t o u r a g e o f qualifications. First, the object o f the explicit instruction might r a n g e from ludicrous to simply unimportant. T h e f o r m e r possibility is amply illustrated by Davis ( 1 9 9 0 ) :
Koretz (1988) reports the case of a school mathematics supervisor who noticed that the state's minimum competency test presented shaded figures to accompany questions asking that one find the area, and presented unshaded figures for questions asking about perimeter. Koretz reports that, based on this observation, the supervisor instructed the teachers to tell children to multiply the numbers in problems where the figure was shaded, and to add the numbers in problems where the figure was not shaded. This is typical of a kind of strategy that raises test scores without actually teaching the relevant concepts, skills, or understandings, (p. 102)

T h e farcical aside, explicit instruction might address topics o f marginal value, such as R o m a n numerals in m a t h e m a t i c s , o r the use o f ellipses in writing. B u t even when the focus o f instruction is u p o n the i m p o r t a n t "big ideas" within a n d across c o n t e n t domains, t h e r e r e m a i n many constraints u p o n explicit strategies. Prawat ( 1 9 8 9 ) suggested that a g o o d strategy is "intermediate in generality" (p. 2 2 ) . Strategies that a r e too n a r r o w in scope tend to result in the r o t e acquisition o f knowledge (e.g., "invert a n d multiply" as a "strategy" for solving fraction division p r o b l e m s ) . In contrast, strategies that a r e t o o b r o a d tend to result in little functional acquisition o f knowledge at all (e.g., "summarize as you read" in reading, o r "draw a picture o f the problem" in m a t h e m a t i c s ) . In short, t h e r e must be unlimited ways to m a k e explicit strategy instruction ineffective. It is easy e n o u g h to criticize explicit strategy instruction simply as a polemical exercise, but as an exercise, it is m o r e like walking very slowly than running. This cuts either way: It would require little imagination, for instance, to successfully design either a terribly ineffective explicit instruction o r discovery instruction control g r o u p for a straw m a n "experimental" study. T h e r e is little challenge in identifying either explicit o r discovery activities that result in the r o t e acquisition o f knowledge, o r in little acquisition o f knowledge o f any sort. A m o r e productive a p p r o a c h , we believe, is to identify those relatively n a r r o w conditions u n d e r which a variety o f a p p r o a c h e s c o n t r i b u t e to the accomplishm e n t o f various goals most effectively. Such an a p p r o a c h would, to begin with, force us to reject the r a t h e r simplistic d i c h o t o m y o f discovery versus explicit learning, given the rich body o f educational psychology from which we may draw. As Romiszowski asserted,
We have noted that whereas Bruner and Ausubel represent extreme viewpoints for or against discovery methods, most other writers adopt intermediate positions, accepting that both strategies may be used to good advantage and suggesting criteria for selection between them. We have also noted that discovery learning as defined by Bruner is quite different from the guided discovery approach of Gagne and that Landa's approach is different again. (Romiszowski, 1981, p. 178)

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T h e mechanisms by which apparently c o n t r a d i c t o r y instructional practices may actually contribute mutually to desired learning o u t c o m e s may be explained in large part by the way knowledge is acquired: the instances o f us knowing nothing about something and then, suddenly, instantly knowing and understanding everything is a r a r e s c e n a r i o i f it exists at all. T h e meaningful learning o f an individual c o n c e p t , strategy, heuristic, a n d so forth, o c c u r s over time (Shuell, 1 9 9 0 ) . All instructional ideologies seem to a c c e p t this observation, ranging from behaviorists talking about shaping behavior over time o r constructivists talking a b o u t the assimilation and a c c o m m o d a t i o n o f knowledge over time. As a c o n s e q u e n c e , were we to walk into a classroom a n d observe a single interaction between a t e a c h e r and student, we would have n o basis for generalization. F o r instance, imagine that we observed a t e a c h e r telling a student something related to writing instruction, such as, "Remember to use words such as then, next, first, and finally to show the r e a d e r the o r d e r o f the steps in your explanation." Next, we see the t e a c h e r ask the student, what are s o m e o f the words you can use to show your r e a d e r s the o r d e r o f steps?" Finally, the student repeats back a few o f the words m e n t i o n e d previously by the teacher. We c a n confidently c o n c l u d e n e x t to nothing from this scenario, either with respect to ideologies o r practices. T h e e x c h a n g e , to begin with, could o c c u r within a highly s t r u c t u r e d o r scripted lesson o r as a completely spontaneous event during a very u n s t r u c t u r e d a n d child-directed lesson. Moreover, we know n e i t h e r what p r e c e d e d the e x c h a n g e , n o r what follows it. We might be t e m p t e d to write off the e x c h a n g e as r o t e regurgitation, when in fact, p r e c e d i n g a n d subsequent instructional events reveal, overall, an instructional a p p r o a c h decidedly designed to bring a b o u t highly transferable, generalized writing knowledge a n d ability. High also a m o n g the criteria for selecting a m o n g available instructional options are l e a r n e r characteristics. Imagine, first, a 3-year-old middle class white child with two p a r e n t s o n e at homeplaying with a discovery-oriented c o m p u t e r p r o g r a m on pre-math c o n c e p t s at h o m e . She plays only when she feels like it. W h e n she gets into the p r o g r a m , she selects the things she would like to d o . She plays for as long o r short a time as she wishes. In d u e time, she clearly constructs or r e c o n s t r u c t s knowledge. S o m e o f those constructions a r e "weak" (Noddings, 1 9 9 0 ) , in that she learns associations, such as "two is the verbal representation for 2." S o m e a r e strong, in that she induces a generalized c o n c e p t o f things such as triangles, without l e a r n i n g a definition. S h e d o e s n o t achieve s o m e o f t h e p r o g r a m ' s goals at all, such as associating the o r d e r o f animal graphics with place value. A n d she might even inadvertently learn a few misconceptions relative to shapes such as squares, rectangles, parallelograms, a n d trapezoids. Incidentally, she b e c o m e s m o r e familiar with the technology o f h e r future, a n d on h e r own initiative, she solves problems relating to the use o f the m o u s e and o t h e r m e c h a n ics o f using c o m p u t e r s a n d software. Overall, this scenario has g r e a t appeal. A child is learning a variety o f things, some that were not specifically targeted as o u t c o m e s and s o m e not i n t e n d e d at all. Misconceptions a r e not o f particular c o n c e r n . T h e r e is time for t h e m t o sort themselves out, a n d plentiful r e s o u r c e s in addition to the software. In fact, t h e r e is n o rush to accomplish anything. This, in short, is appropriately situated discovery.

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But imagine a n o t h e r situation, a 9-year-old boy with approximately the same knowledge as the 3-year-old. H e lives in poverty with o n e semi-literate parent. His misconceptions a r e stubbornly resistant to c h a n g e . Weak c o n s t r u c t i o n s r o t e l e a r n i n g n o t only do n o t get him very far, but they are also m o r e difficult for him to achieve because m e m o r y is not o n e o f his strong suits. H e is way behind his peers, a n d statistics suggest that he will only get further behind. If we have o n e and only shot at accelerating the knowledge growth o f this boy, a r e we going to fritter it away with the sort o f dabbling that s e e m e d so e n r i c h i n g for o u r 3-yearold? To d o so would be unethical, if not criminal. Will we, rather, select a p p r o priate instructional practices, based u p o n d e m o n s t r a t e d effectiveness, r a t h e r than ideological fervor? It is an insult to h u m a n intelligence to offer simple, global, unconditional solutions to c o m p l e x cognitive problems. It is d o g m a t i c .

CONCLUSION
Well-known constructivists (e.g., Davis et al., 1 9 9 0 ) have suggested a m e t a p h o r in which United States education is at war on two fronts. First, the p e r f o r m a n c e o f U.S. students is p o o r t h e i r m a t h e m a t i c s p e r f o r m a n c e , in this case. "But the second front is perhaps even m o r e threatening: T h e r e is m a j o r d i s a g r e e m e n t o n how to p r o c e e d in o r d e r to m a k e things better" (Davis et al., 1 9 9 0 , p. 1 ) . Fighting on this second front a r e the constructivists against an e n e m y who is n o t clearly identified, but who seems to constitute the dark forces o f "direct instruction." T h e m e t a p h o r is a bit muddied. More to the point, however, it is misplaced. If we were to frame o u r chosen field within a war m e t a p h o r , we would c h a r a c t e r i z e i g n o r a n c e as the enemy against which professional e d u c a t o r s stand united to fight, even if varied in o u r c h o i c e o f weapons, tactics, and strategies. T o view the situation otherwise, as a war n o t only against i g n o r a n c e , but a m o n g us e d u c a t o r s as well, is to conjure up images o f Protestants against Catholics, Jews against Muslims, Christians against Jews, a n d o t h e r d o g m a t i c holy wars in which fringe groups, principally, battle o n e a n o t h e r ostensibly for the g o o d o f h u m a n k i n d but in fact to the advantage o f n o o n e , save, possibly, their own private a n d inscrutable interests. Every ideologynot just constructivism o r behaviorismhas its fringe elements, variously described as radical constructivists o r fanatical behaviorists. W h e n the educational fringe groups d e c l a r e war, the rest o f us e x p e n d precious resources responding to charges that a r e , when stripped o f rhetorical trimmings, often groundless. We suspect that when ideological r h e t o r i c is set aside, m a i n s t r e a m educational researchers' ( a n d o t h e r e d u c a t o r s ' ) best h o p e for advancing the field might be realized t h r o u g h o u r c o m m i t m e n t to develop a n d verify the best possible curricular a n d instructional practicesbest in the sense o f effectively resulting in wellu n d e r s t o o d knowledge for all learners, a n d doing so efficiently, particularly for those children for whom efficiency is n o luxury. T h e traditional m e c h a n i s m for d e t e r m i n i n g best practices in e d u c a t i o n ( a n d o t h e r fields) has been empiricism. As i m p l e m e n t e d in e d u c a t i o n , empiricism suffers obvious difficulties that m a k e it susceptible to easy attack by fringe elements from any ideology: insensitive o r invalid m e a s u r e m e n t devices; artificially

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contrived controls, o r n o controls at all; p o o r m e t h o d o l o g i c a l conceptualization; the statistically rigorous analysis o f useless data; unrealistic e x p e r i m e n t a l settings; and decidedly non-inquiry r e s e a r c h a p p r o a c h e s . S o m e constructivists (e.g., Heshusius, 1 9 8 9 ; Poplin, 1 9 8 5 ) advocate the aband o n m e n t o f empiricism, based ( a ) u p o n these widely acknowledged weaknesses in the application o f empiricism to e d u c a t i o n and (b) u p o n s o m e incredibly spurious misinterpretations o f "paradigms" discussed by philosophers o f science (see Stanovich, 1 9 9 3 ) . T h e alternative suggested by such constructivists seems to revolve a r o u n d a n e c d o t a l case studies, but the e x t e n t to which o u r field engages in wild flurries o f a n e c d o t a l jousting is the e x t e n t to which the problems o f an already disarrayed educational r e s e a r c h c o m m u n i t y a r e e x a c e r b a t e d (see Pressley and Harris, in press-a, in press-b; a n d Slavin, 1 9 8 1 , for t h o r o u g h discussions o f educational r e s e a r c h ) . Educational r e s e a r c h needs to b e c o m e "more empirical," not less. T h e schism between empiricists a n d anti-empiricists seems to be deep. But again, in t e r m s o f practices, it may not be as d e e p as it appears to be. Meltzer and Reid's (this issue) c o n c e r n s a b o u t new assessment methodspracticality, costeffectiveness, accountability, reliability, and validityparallel o u r own, and, m o r e over, seem n o t entirely incompatible with well-established goals for empirical measurement. T h e editors o f this special issue advised contributors to focus u p o n the implications o f constructivism for special e d u c a t i o n , and to d o so without resorting to the polemics frequently associated with such discussions. O u r thoughts h e r e may seem polemical, but unavoidably so, we believe, and in any case, are n o t d i r e c t e d against any particular ideology. As we p o n d e r e d the implications o f constructivism, it b e c a m e a p p a r e n t to us that whatever those implications might be, they a r e n o g r e a t e r o r lesser than those o f any o t h e r ideology. T h a t is, all ideologies have broad a n d potentially positive, if very indirect, implications for practice. A n d n o ideology, per se, has m u c h direct, practical implication. If, therefore, we address directly the question o f how constructivism impacts special education, then we c a n say that at a very b r o a d level, the i m p a c t is positive and desirable. S o m e o f the e m p h a s e s o f constructivism, if n o t new o r profound, are urgently critical to the e n h a n c e m e n t o f educational practices. F o r instance, the focus o f constructivists u p o n higher-order o u t c o m e s for all students is a r e m i n d e r to everyone in special education that o u r students n e e d a n d deserve to achieve authentic, useful o u t c o m e s as m u c h as anyone. In addition, t h e criticisms constructivists make o f many typical assessment tools have led most r e s e a r c h e r s to consider better, m o r e sensitive assessment methodology, without sacrificing validity. T h i r d , we believe that the constructivists have influenced a m o v e m e n t away from the proliferation o f minuscule, u n r e l a t e d objectives, a n d toward a greater emphasis u p o n i m p o r t a n t aspects o f c o n t e n t knowledge. O t h e r ideologies, n o doubt, also make b r o a d o r g e n e r a l contributions. Case a n d B e r e i t e r ( 1 9 8 4 ) , for e x a m p l e , suggested that in t h e m o v e m e n t f r o m behaviorism to neobehaviorism to cognitive psychology, e a c h successive m o m e n t is c h a r a c t e r i z e d by only small i n c r e m e n t a l changes. This is likely to be o u r response to the b r o a d implications o f any well-intended, thoughtful, morally motivated ideology: It probably impacts positively, if indi-

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rectly a n d generally. In many cases, if not most, ideologies re-emphasize "pre-" o r "meta-" ideological ideas a n d practices, which helps nourish o u r desire to be m o d e r n . If, however, we address the question o f how constructivism ( o r any o t h e r ideology) impacts special e d u c a t i o n in terms o f specific practices, then we c a n n o t respond at all. We can only r e s p o n d to the practices themselves, their interrelationship to o t h e r practices, their applications in t e r m s o f l e a r n e r characteristics, and some valid indication o f their impact. T h e intentions o f ideologues by n o means necessarily realize themselves in practice, as we have tried to illustrate with examples o f mindless, r o t e learning p e r p e t r a t e d in the n a m e s o f behaviorism a n d constructivism alike. We would hazard the guess that many "constructivist practices" o r "behavioral practices" might impact quite positively u p o n special education. Many m o r e would not. B u t m o r e crucially, as we identify practices that genuinely and verifiably benefit children, the ideologies that spawned t h e m , revived t h e m , o r otherwise claimed to own t h e m would be completely beside the point. We e d u c a t o r s may have many enemies in o u r war against i g n o r a n c e a n d inability, but those enemies should not be o n e another. Historical inertia may be o n e such enemy. F o r e x a m p l e , many a r g u m e n t s in favor o f given educational practices a r e a c c o m p a n i e d by pejorative descriptions o f traditional o r conventional practices. Frequently, those practices are widespread, on the o n e h a n d , but a r e not advocated by anyone in o u r field, on the other. N o o n e , for instance, appears to openly advocate the weekly, rote memorization o f spelling words a n d a g r a d e d Friday test. However, the o n e h u n d r e d million copies o f Webster's "little bluebacked speller" may have provided m o r e than adequate incentive to publishers for n o t fooling t o o m u c h with this practice. We a r e reluctant to criticize publishers too m u c h for publishing what people seem most d e t e r m i n e d to buy, o r to criticize t e a c h e r s for practices that were ubiquitous a m o n g their own t e a c h e r s and their teachers' teachers. A general lack o f focus o r priorities may be a n o t h e r g e n u i n e enemy. We a r e quick, for instance, to consider all m a n n e r s o f restructuring the physical a n d organizational characteristics o f schools, as if those considerations might have m o r e direct impact u p o n a c h i e v e m e n t than the instructional practices we employ every day. We may, collectively, be o u r own worst enemy, in that we at times seem m o r e intent u p o n belittling o n e a n o t h e r than u p o n c o n c e r t e d c o o p e r a t i o n aimed at upgrading the professionalism o f o u r field, e n a c t e d in part t h r o u g h powerful lobbying efforts designed to allocate the resources necessary to developing, implementing, evaluating, a n d disseminating instructional and assessment practices o f merit, regardless o f ideological claims to ownership. Genuine, notable advances in o u r field, in any case, seem d e p e n d e n t u p o n most o f us getting t o g e t h e r at least long e n o u g h to decide u p o n just what war we a r e fighting.

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