Beyond Reasonable Doubt a paradox of ideological immunity1

Christopher Allsobrook
St Augustine College P. O. Box 44782 Linden, 2104 callsobrook@gmail.com

Abstract Ideology criticism, like scepticism, calls into question the objective or justified status of beliefs. However, where scepticism only refutes, and never puts forward, a substantive claim about anything, the ideology critic must maintain some criterion for distinguishing ideas which support relations of domination from those that do not, in virtue of her criticism of a particular set of ideas as ideological. The trouble for the ideology critic is that the sceptical methods she deploys undermine any critical thesis, including her own. Thus, the theory of ideology tends to undercut ideology criticism with a fundamental problem of self-implication. This paper draws on the epistemological problem of the criterion to explain and define a basic problem of justification for the theory of ideology. A problem of self-implication is introduced in part one. I argue that the basis for ideology criticism inevitably succumbs to the very doubt it puts forward. I draw on various criticisms of ideology criticism to formulate a specific account of the basic, fundamental problem for the theory of ideology. I show how norms for ideology criticism are vulnerable to an Ancient sceptical problem for epistemic criteria, which brings the ideology critic to a dilemma: either (i) find independent grounds for criticism, immune to ideology, or (ii) show how ideology is self-undermining. Each horn of the dilemma is ideological. Introduction Philosophers of logic, ethics, politics, science or mind, may find a way to integrate themselves into the instrumental administrative categories of the future, but what of noble first philosophy? Scepticism, the most well-recognised and entertaining offering of epistemology, stimulates some interesting, challenging thought experiments but is rarely taken seriously by philosophers in real life or by anyone else at all. A significant drawback is that scepticism is often misconstrued as a set of dispositions or beliefs. As
1 Supported by an AHRC grant at the University of Sussex Philosophy Department, 2006-2010, and a post-doctoral fellowship at the University of Johannesburg Politics Department, 2011.

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such, scepticism appears unrealistic and practically deficient. It is more profitably interpreted as a powerful set of heuristic devices, invaluable for situations where clarification, justification or warrant is required for normative commitments made, or beliefs put forward, by ones interlocutor. In this non-positional, functional mode, scepticism may be effectively deployed, without personal prejudices, moralising assumptions, etc., toward foundational normative principles in ethics, or to questions of legitimacy in political philosophy, for example. Like scepticism, ideology criticism calls into question the justified or objective status of our beliefs. The ideology critic shows the reasons the believer has for her belief are motivated by extrinsic concerns of power, or that a set of beliefs the believer holds to be grounded in politically independent, objectively neutral fact, are, in fact, motivated by politically relevant concerns. However, unlike the disinterested sceptic, the ideology critic, motivated by an -ism, hopes to gain ground from a move whose condition of victory is intrinsically Pyrrhic. The theory of ideology undercuts ideology criticism with a fundamental problem of self-implication: The ideology critic (a) distinguishes between (i) the idealism of ideas, values, customs, social relations, abstractions, etc. and (ii) the materialism of objective, empirical socio-economic conditions, (b) placing causal and explanatory priority on the latter, in order (c) to de-mystify prevailing illusions about the self-sufficiency of the former. A problem arises, however, where the original distinction in (a) is ideal. For example, Martin Heidegger voices a typical criticism of Karl Marx, the founding critic of ideology, arguing that his attack on philosophy depends on philosophy (Heidegger, M. 1969). Theodor Adorno another major influential critic of ideology is likewise criticised by Jrgen Habermas, his heir at the Frankfurt School, for engaging in a performative contradiction - arguing against the very forms of rationality on which his argument depends (Habermas, J. 1987: xv; also Fraser, N. 1985: 165-184). This paper draws on the epistemological problem of the criterion to explain and define a basic problem of justification for the theory of ideology. Though it may have broader implications for social criticism, focus is restricted to ideology criticism, which instantiates the problem discussed in a particularly vicious way. Though it cannot be solved in theory, the problem raised may not always seem problematic in practice (despite the ideological marketing, you probably have good reason to believe a diet of fast food is not in your interests). Yet because it always works, one way or the other, it is useful for tracking unreflective ideological preconceptions. A problem of self-implication is introduced through two arguments, from Alasdair MacIntyre and Joseph Heath respectively. Each argues that the theory of ideology undermines criteria on which rational social criticism (and ideology criticism, by extension) depends. By presuming an uncharitable attitude toward the rationality of its subjects, ideology criticism appears to raise doubt to such an extent that it succumbs, paradoxically, to a conspiracy of its own imagining. I challenge each outright rejection of the theory of ideology, but draw on each criticism to formulate a more specific account of the problem of self-implication for theory of ideology. In part two, I show how norms for ideology criticism are subject to an analogous sceptical problem for epistemic criteria, which brings the ideology critic to an unavoidable, seemingly intractable dilemma: either (i) find transcendent grounds for criticism, immune to distorting conditions for ideology, or (ii) find immanent grounds for criticism, which show how ideology is self-undermining. Each, I argue, is ideological.

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Part I: Normative Criteria for Ideology Criticism

The theory of ideology Ideology is understood here in a critical sense, as a shared set of interrelated ideas, values, norms, beliefs, desires and so forth, which supports relations of domination through misleading projections of social reality, which mask, obscure or disguise causally related aspects thereof. The theorist of ideology assumes dominant socio-economic conditions generally determine the prevailing ideas, norms, and values of any given society. For example, the prominence of scientific reasoning in Western society may be linked more to its instrumental value in production than to any intrinsic value2. Similarly, just as urbanisation re-shapes cultural values, often unconsciously, so capitalism may be credited with fostering narrowly self-interested, commercially-oriented interactions between consumers and producers, at the expense of traditional civic relations of mutual responsibility. Aided by the impersonal complexity of contemporary social relations, it is thought that social norms, like audit criteria, are increasingly causally integrated with oppressive social structures geared to a persistently destructive, uniform mode of exploitative development. An alternative name for ideology, false consciousness, encourages a common misconception that ideology refers just to false beliefs. Following this misconception, some theorists, such as Joseph McCarney and Michael Rosen, have rejected the epistemic or cognitive reading altogether, said, in any case, to be attributed to Marx in error3, to focus attention on the functional sense of the term, which includes any ideas that support non-coercive relations of domination (McCarney, J. 1980: 80). Rosen complains that the theory of ideology cannot account for why deluded agents would hold onto false beliefs in the face of empirical evidence to the contrary (Rosen, M. 1996: 207). But then, without the aspect of cognitive deficiency, the self-defeating behaviour ideology is supposed to engender, is even more difficult to explain (Rosen, M. 1996: 219-221) 4. Although it may involve false beliefs, ideology more often consists of true beliefs (which are usually easier to maintain) such as, African Americans are more likely criminals than Whites. The idea that African-American men are more likely to commit a criminal act may be true and ideological, if, for instance, it leads State officials disproportionately to monitor and imprison African-American men, instead of address-

2 3

In fact dominant administrative thinking on academic research is increasingly geared toward this function (it is at least honest, to make the demonstration of projected ideological complicity a condition for research). I do not have the space here to contend McCarneys exegetical point about Marx here. The scope of the article is restricted to the definition of ideology I have given above. Note, however, that a major reason McCarney gives for resisting the epistemological reading of ideology, as false consciousness, is because such fetishisation raises unwieldy theoretical burdens which distract from Marxs practical concern with problems of domination through the use of a term coined precisely to attack such abstractions from the real world in his critique of German idealism (1980: 129-133). McCarney, however, reinforces such idealist assumptions with such a characterization of epistemology, a discipline which, to the contrary, as this article tries to demonstrate, can have very real practical social implications and application. Rosen first dismisses the cognitive account and then goes on to dismiss ideology in the functional sense. He fails to consider whether each aspect might make up for the deficiency of the other.

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ing adverse social conditions that generate the effect in the first place5. True beliefs may be ideological if they obscure oppressive socio-economic conditions and accustom people to them. McCarney and Rosen are right to argue that ideology is not exclusively tied to false beliefs (though it may include these), but wrong to conclude that the epistemic aspect of ideology delusion - should therefore be dismissed. Like a good white lie, ideology endures more successfully if it accommodates truth. It is usually not so much false, as partial, superficial, or one-sided. To begin to understand the driving motivation behind the seemingly irrational behaviour attributed to ideologically deluded agents, note that our grasp of the causes of everyday phenomena tends to be underdetermined by the immediate impressions they make on us. Enquiry into underlying causal factors behind phenomena may, at least in principle, go on forever. The point at which enquiry stops, depends on practices and purposes to which we grow accustomed. Ideology mediates appearance and reality, reflecting empirical social conditions at a level of understanding which satisfies certain given purposes but, in so doing, also distracts from broader, ongoing, structures of domination in which our everyday activities are enmeshed. Ideology perpetuates domination by way of ideas (and normative principles that generalise these ideas) that inhibit reflection on the underlying socio-economic conditions that shape them. Let us assume, then, that the pejorative sense of the notion of ideology entails at least two basic aspects, the first delusory and the second functional. Ideology is said to be cognitively deficient, in some further specifiable sense, and it is said to perpetuate relations of domination (Marx, K. 1970: 37, 46-8, 51, 64-7, 80, 248; Geuss, R. 1981: 12; Thompson, J. 1990: 41-3). Ideology is supposed to consist in deficient forms of consciousness which lead people to overlook, and unconsciously perpetuate, the conditions of domination that generate it. That is to say, the theory of ideology postulates a feedback mechanism, where (P) oppressive social conditions give rise to (R) superficial impressions/representations (e.g. naturalised historically contingent hierarchies), which obscure functionally significant aspects of oppressive social orders, with the consequence that (A) agents, acting on the basis of such ideas, participate without coercion in practices that reinforce (P) the oppressive conditions that, in turn, generate (R) ideology, and so on. Criteria for ideology criticism A recurring problem with ideology, as Terry Eagleton puts it, is that, like bad breath, it is always something someone else has (1991: 2). At least in the pejorative sense of the term and in contemporary everyday understanding, people tend not to identify their own thinking as ideological. The observation also implies not just that ideology is difficult to detect in ones own ideas, but that the irony about those who criticise ideology in others is that they probably suffer from it themselves. This second assumption does not follow directly from Eagletons comment, but latent in the observation is an invitation to deride, with self-righteous recognition, the smug hypocrisy of those who make it their business to go around admonishing others for their ideological beliefs.
5 Beneath the more immediate racist ideology, the example also underscores a weakness in liberal ideology, which tends to attribute disproportionate responsibility to individuals, in blame for failure, and reward for success, under the conveniently abstract presupposition of an equal playing field, or market, that fails to account for broader environmental conditions of agency, and consequently obscures domination.

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In fact, Eagletons observation points to an intrinsic general problem of self-implication for ideology critics. Not only do ideology critics tend to overlook the possibility that their standpoint may be ideological but, more importantly, their standpoint raises such suspicion against itself. The typical pattern of hypocritical assertion and a you too response is an essentially destabilizing, and self-undermining characteristic of ideology criticism that stems from a general feature of criticism which is often conveniently neglected by critics: criticism entails background assumptions about why conditions are bad. The background assumptions the basis - for ideology criticism, in particular, appear to be implicated by the very generative conditions it attributes to ideology. Since the illusory aspect of ideology need not involve empirically false beliefs, the minimal sense of illusion that ideology may be said to involve is that it systematically misleads agents with respect to their part, and stake, in oppressive relations of power. But if the truth content of a claim is not sufficient to determine its ideological status if ideology can accommodate the truth then by what criterion may the critic unmask ideology? The ideology critic cannot simply contrast ideology against a set of social facts. How, then, might she establish the hold of pervasive causal relations between ideas and oppressive social practices, on grounds that are not effectively implicated in the process? As we shall see, it becomes hard to say why ideology criticism is immune to, or exempt from, conditions for the illusions it unmasks. MacIntyre and Heath: the theory of ideology undermines itself If we are to suspect that moral or epistemic norms, or modes of rationality, are swayed by dominant socio-economic relations of domination (as the ideology critic insists), why should, and how can, we trust the ideology critic? If conditions of domination which give rise to ideology also give rise to the normative criteria by which the critic identifies ideology, then the ideology critic undermines her standpoint with suspicion she brings to bear on ideology. Michel Foucault therefore dismisses the notion altogether, for implicitly, and incoherently, arrogating to the critic an unbiased grasp of the truth she denies to others (1980: 117-118, 131-133). Following a similar line of reason, Alasdair MacIntyre writes, The theorist of ideology as we know him from Marx to the Frankfurt School, in that slow decline from the sublime to the ridiculous, has always been someone who identified ideological contamination in someone other than himself. This trait in fact renders him basically indistinguishable from his ostensible opponent, the positivist (1973: 342). MacIntyre claims the ideology critic and the positivist face the same problem as the revolutionary: she dismisses dominant forms of consciousness on the basis of the prevailing material conditions by which they are determined. The revolutionary rejects dominant social institutions and relations of production, but depends on what she dismisses (dominant norms and conventions, shaped by dominant interests) to make her point. Revolutionary politics, and ideology criticism, argues MacIntyre, are trapped by the very conceptual schemes needed to justify their respective enterprises. For this reason, both are ultimately self-defeating (MacIntyre, A. 1973: 340-1): either the ideology critic must defend dominant social norms on which her appeal for change depends (which undermines her criticism), or she must take the very anti-democratic,

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epistemologically self-righteous approach she rejects in positivist social science and exempt her standpoint from material conditions for ideology (contradicting her position on the material conditions of ideas with a typically ideological manoeuvre) (MacIntyre, A. 1973: 342). The Marxist complaint about positivism is that it fails to account for historical social, political and economic contours of knowledge, in general, and, social scientific discourse, in particular. The positivist assumes a disinterested, universal and objective empirical description of social phenomena is possible. In fact, the Marxist ideology critic objects, the supposedly objective findings of social scientists, and the normative presuppositions which colour their assumptions, are shaped by dominant socio-economic concerns. They are not so much neutral, objective statements, as much as implicit affirmations of what exists. The challenge facing the Marxist critic is that such problematisation of normative foundations de-stabilises social criticism too. The ideology critics position stands in need of justification. She makes a normative judgment, open to challenge by those whose views she calls into question, and her critical activities depend on normative criteria. When the ideology critic complains that prevailing norms further dominant class interests, she faces the very challenge with which she dismisses the positivist: to distinguish her norms for criticism from factors for ideology. By what criterion particularly, by what normative criterion may the ideology critic distinguish ideological from non-ideological outlooks, given her claim that norms are shaped by relations of domination? MacIntyre poses a witch-trial dilemma to the ideology critic: your grounds for criticism are refuted, if not by self-implication, then by self-exemption. Ideology criticism depends on ideological norms, or else, on the kind of bona fide normative grounds it rules out. But must the ideology critic claim that all social norms are determined ideologically by pervasive relations of domination? Does ideology criticism undermine all norms of criticism simply by tying dominant social norms to underlying material conditions of domination? Or, might the ideological domain be set apart from justified norms for criticism without positivist entailment? For MacIntyre, the critic who claims material conditions are such that all norms are ideological faces the alternative of self-implication or self-exemption, each of which entails ideology. He fails, however, to consider a more nuanced interpretation of the theory of ideology, interpreting revolution, the gap between now and then, too literally, and ruling out all continuity. Revolution need not be senselessly restricted to such an abstract, incoherent extent6. For Marx, for instance, communism is not an abstract negation of capitalism - something utterly unrelated to it but a determinate negation, the rational fruition of potentially evolving circumstances. Establishing widespread conditions for ideological norms need not mean all norms are ideological. However, the critics normative grounds for ideology criticism must be distinguishable from ideology. Joseph Heath develops a more careful account of the problem of self-implication for the theory of ideology, arguing that Marx and Freud, the grandfathers of critical theory, developed theories that diagnosed such widespread error in popular belief that they undermine their own bases of interpretation. The problem, he notes, is that attributing massive error to people significantly expands the range of motives and beliefs
6 A bourgeois industrialist, for example, can imagine a possible future without private ownership and roughly gauge the extent and likelihood of such a threat to her perceived immediate short-term individual interests.

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that can be ascribed to them, and this makes it hard to show that any one interpretation is better than another (Heath, J. 2001: 167). Heath cites Donald Davidson to support the use of a principle of charity in social criticism that, he argues, rules out the theory of ideology. Since any interpretation is massively underdetermined by the available evidence, there is no fact of the matter about what people mean by what they say. Therefore, the meaning of any utterance must be determined by the best interpretation that hearers confer upon it. This interpretation, in turn, depends on beliefs ascribed to the person making the utterance. To make sense of what someone is saying, which is a formal requirement of interpretation, one must assume that a speaker has predominantly rational, true beliefs. Therefore, to suspend the assumption that people are, by and large, reasonable, and that their beliefs are predominantly true (as Marx and Freud allegedly do) prevents any meaningful interpretation of their utterances (Heath, J. 2001: 165-7). 7 Heath concludes that ideology criticism undercuts itself by spreading the charge of irrationality too widely in its diagnosis to make sense of the ideas it is supposed to interpret. Unlike MacIntyre, Heath does not maintain that the theory of ideology problematises all social norms. But the dilemma of self-implication/self-exemption remains equally serious if any social norm may be implicated, including any criterion which suggests otherwise. It may be that some norms are not determined ideologically, but if we are influenced by oppressive economic structures (or, repressed subconscious motivations) in a way that intrinsically escapes conscious attention, then, even if there are non-ideological norms, we cannot know that the criterion - by which we identify such norms - is not itself influenced in such a manner. For Heath, the widespread error and irrationality that ideology critics attribute to deluded agents counts against their own interpretations because their ill-defined variables flood the market with cheap alternatives. Since too many plausible explanations can be constructed, it becomes hard to rule out any particular explanation. Like sceptics, ideology critics raise pervasive doubt, but, unlike sceptics, who posit nothing, their reasons for doubt succumb to the uncertainty they put out. 8 Self-defeating criticism of self-defeating social norms For Heath, as for MacIntyre, the theory of ideology thereby undercuts the ground on which it depends by diagnosing irrationality too widely. If the ideology critic lives under material conditions that give rise to necessary illusions, by what right might she assure us that she has a reliable belief-forming mechanism? Each criterion, used to distinguish norms for ideology criticism from ideological norms, may, in turn, be functionally integrated in relations of domination, such that ideology criticism depends on social norms it indicts. The task of normative justification for ideology criticism appears to succumb to an inevitable trail of regressive meta-criteria. Just as psychologists cannot rule out conscious access to the unconscious, to avoid self-defeating incoherence, revolutionary social critics must establish a reliable criterion for non-ideological norms, determined by material conditions, like ideology, but not by oppression. If the role of a social norm in relations of domination determines its
7 8 The epistemically high-handed ideology critic is like a tourist astonished by the pervasive irrationality of an alien culture she has insistently failed to understand. Sceptics, however, like Socrates, do not claim to know anything, so they get away with the doubt they raise.

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ideological status, then normative criteria for ideology criticism must be distinguished from conditions for this function. The causal relations established by the theory of ideology - between underlying socio-economic conditions and dominant social norms must be clearly defined bearing in mind the threat of circularity between norms that are functionally integrated in relations of domination, and norms by which this relationship may be criticised. The problem Heath raises is more damaging than MacIntyres since he does not saddle the ideology critic with the theory that all social norms are ideological. Only some normative criteria may be influenced by, and in turn influence, oppressive socio-economic conditions, but by what criterion do we tell them apart? But, to recall a point made previously with respect to ideology and false beliefs, Heath conflates the self-defeating characteristic of ideological delusion with irrationality. Just as it is more successful if it is true, so the shape of ideology is, to some extent, constrained by the practical interests of its host, even if the host is not flourishing. A successful ideology may, for example, value individualistically rational interactions whose overall outcome disproportionately benefits an elite minority, at the expense of more comprehensively rational, cooperative modes of behaviour directed towards the overall benefit of society as whole. Ideologically deluded agents need not act against their interests irrationally. Ideology criticism cannot be successful if it fails to account for the experiences of ordinary social agents, in terms that make sense to them, to explain why they came to form the mistaken beliefs, practices or values that they did. This is necessary to restore a basis for coherent rational judgments which does not constantly and totally undermine it. The ideology critic must take care not to present some astonishing, disconnected, haughty revelation which no one else could have foreseen, but instead help agents to reflect on problematic relations between oppressive social conditions and social norms in accessible terms that make sense of everyday experience. The ideology critics normative criteria must be open to rational critical scrutiny so agents can judge for themselves which interests it is rational to pursue. So, (i) contra MacIntyre, the theory of ideology need not entail the rejection of all social norms, if grounds for criticism can be distinguished reliably from oppressive conditions for ideology; (ii) contra Heath, ideological delusion need not be irrational, just as it need not be false. Heaths criticism of ideology, however, leaves another problem: the criterion, by which conditions for ideological norms and non-ideological norms are distinguished, must be distinguishable from conditions for ideology. Conditions for ideology must be stipulated in such a way that we can identify appropriate criteria for knowledge that suits our interests, needs, desires, etc. The problems facing the critic, so far, may be summed up as follows: 1) Ideological beliefs may be true, so ideological illusion cannot be dispelled by straightforward contradiction with the truth; 2) since ideologically deluded agents do not recognise their role in oppression, the ideology critic cannot appeal to agents conscious interests to discern irrational behaviour. 3) To distinguish between actual interests (which agents consciously pursue) and true interests (which agents ought to, or would, pursue, were they not ideologically deluded) requires discrete normative criteria; but to set aside criteria in such a discrete manner is typically ideological (given her thesis that any norms may be influenced by dominant relations of power). Where everyone is arraigned, the ideological detective focuses on suspects that refuse interrogation. The remainder of the article draws on the epistemological problem of the criterion to demonstrate - by analogy - that there are only two fundamentally different ways to de-

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rive adequate normative criteria for ideology criticism. Criticism of the functional integration of dominant social norms and oppression need not rule out the rationality of all social norms, but the ideology critic must be able to show why her own particular normative criteria are not vulnerable to the socio-economic conditions for the ideological norms she wants to criticise. The task is particularly tricky because techniques of insulation and exemption from ideology have, historically, proved vulnerable to ideological abuse. The more one succeeds in exempting normative territory from critical scrutiny, the more ground may be secured for ideology. Criteria for ideology criticism must not be inconsistently exempted from relationships they predicate between social conditions and norms, but, on the basis of the problem of the criterion, I argue that the ideology critic faces a dilemma of self-implication/self-exemption, each horn of which is equally ideological.

Part II: Epistemic Criteria and Social Norms: A Sceptical Dilemma

As we have seen, the theory of ideology maintains that forms of consciousness are generated first and foremost by material socio-economic circumstances; where society is structured oppressively, dominant beliefs and attitudes in society reflect and reinforce oppression. This section shows that, to justify ideology criticism, the critic has two options: She may (i) distinguish between two sets of material conditions that give rise, (a) to the unreliable beliefs of the ideologically deluded agents, and (b) to the reliable beliefs (and criteria) of the ideology critic. This transcendent path of self-exemption is typically ideological (see above). Option (ii) is to claim that, although the same conditions give rise to the beliefs of the critic and the criticised, the critical reflection of the critic allows her to see through illusions generated by these conditions. This latter, immanent, method of criticism, I take it, is the approach taken by critical theorists such as Marx and Adorno. The problem of the epistemological criterion The problem of self-implication for ideology criticism mirrors the structure of what Robert Amico, in his influential account of the problem of the criterion, calls a meta-epistemological problem concerning the justification of second-order knowledge claims among disagreeing disputants (Amico, R. 1993: 143). Knowledge of the mechanism of the wheel shows how to expose presupposed, obscured normative criteria behind ideological beliefs and practices, without any concomitant requirement to put forward normative criteria of ones own. The sceptical problem teaches a valuable lesson to the ideology critic who wishes to maintain a substantive normative standpoint. Let us first briefly examine the problem of the criterion: Sextus Empiricus begins with the question, how do you settle disagreements over what is true or false if different circumstances for different individuals give rise to different impressions, which are the basis for these divergent beliefs or disagreement in the first place? By what criterion is one impression credibly endorsed over another? (Mattey, G. 1997: 226-7) This question leads to the following seemingly unassailable sceptical challenge: To establish the truth of the criterion one needs a proof/evidence, but the proof/evidence can be judged only by means of a criterion, therefore:

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a validated criterion is wanting and you cannot settle the dispute about impressions, since: (i) If this criterion is the one in question, this leads to a circle; (ii) If this criterion is another independent criterion, infinite regress threatens. 9 To avoid potential misunderstanding, it is worth clarifying the above account through and against Roderick M. Chisholms influential reading of the problem. Chisholm wrongly presents the sceptics challenge, not as the question, How may we know? but as an assertion that we cannot know. Such careless dogmatism makes the pseudosceptic vulnerable to a return challenge, which forces her on to the defensive, with the riposte, How do you know I cannot know? Real sceptics survive by avoiding such disputes. Sextus Empiricus does not assert that the dispute over the justification of knowledge claims cannot be settled (Chisholm, R. 1982: 61-76). Rather, he asks what rational criteria agents already use to categorise experience, to see what criteria are appropriate for the task. The point is that we do sort our experiences into knowledge claims by criteria, and so we ought to know what these criteria are. The sceptic does not assert that knowledge is impossible; she asserts nothing whatsoever. The aim of the sceptic is to get us to reflect on how we understand existing circumstances, to generate appropriate and coherent, rational criteria that suit reality and our reflectively considered ends. The aim of the sceptic is to encourage social agents to reflect on existing criteria for knowledge, to be more thoughtful about this process: not to take given criteria for granted. The sceptic seeks aporia - not the replacement of one dogmatic assertion with another, but the suspension of immediate judgment. The sceptical technique of the wheel, we shall see, is also valuable for drawing out underlying, obscured ideological criteria, to demonstrate complicity in oppression. The problem of the ideological criterion Let us consider the implications of the above sceptical dilemma, for epistemic criteria, for the normative criteria of ideology criticism: (i) The wheel shows that a criterion lurks behind every empirical claim. Any response that begins with an appeal to immediate or intuitive experience to derive criteria for the criticism of ideology obscures an original, operative mediating judgment that selects information from the outside world, that is to say, the criteria on the basis of which experience is derived. The technique of disguising normative criteria behind the guise of empirical experience is typically ideological. Unpalatable budgetary criteria and racially prejudiced social norms, for example, flourish beneath a veneer of objectivity, disguised or corroborated by empirical conditions presented in a realistic, unmediated fashion as if this is just the way the world is. The sceptic reminds us that behind every observation, no matter how objective it may seem, wherever you think you have hit empirical rock-bottom, there must be underlying normative criteria. Conversely, though such criteria may seem self-evident, they are always mediated by empirical social conditions.
9 Mattey, G. 1997: 226-7; Cling, AD, 1994: 269.

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(ii) The ideology critic sets the sceptical wheel in motion, but does not tolerate tranquil aporia in the face of domination. Unlike the sceptic, the ideology critic wishes to put forward substantive normative claims about the oppressive character of prevailing socio-economic conditions and their functional integration with dominant social norms. The device of the wheel shows formally why this rebounds on the critic, leaving two alternative approaches that define the boundaries of the problem of justification for ideology criticism. Following the problem of the criterion, we see that ideology criticism sets up a sceptical dilemma, with a choice between immanent norms, caught in a justification circle, or transcendent norms, which call for a repetition of the process, with the threat of regress: Ideology must be judged by a criterion, but (a) if this criterion is not independent of the conditions that give rise to ideology, this leads to a justification circle, and (b) if this criterion is independent, the question of justification is repeated, threatening infinite regress. Immanent and transcendent criteria (Socratic criticism vs. Philosophical ethics) One way to understand the dilemma for normative criteria for ideology criticism is to interpret the alternatives in terms of a contrast between applied ethics and Socratic elenchus (see, for example, Geuss, R. 1981: 72; 2008: 8-9, 51-2). Roughly speaking, the former is a form of transcendent criticism which depends on discrete normative criteria as a foundation for criticism. The transcendent ideology critic focuses on the second horn of the dilemma and attempts to establish valid independent criteria for ideology criticism in the mode of applied ethics. The latter, Socratic, mode of immanent criticism abandons ideological independence for a non-foundational approach which focuses on the first horn of the dilemma, to criticise ideology from within by demonstrating that an existing set of social norms is self-invalidating, on its own terms. Where the transcendent ideology critic presents a last word to the sceptic, the immanent ideology critic draws on the sceptical trope, appealing to floating premises to expose contradictions and inconsistencies on ideologically compromised grounds. Applied philosophical ethics appeals to social norms presented as antecedently justified, independently of the critical process. The foundationalist, transcendent ideology critic appeals to independent normative ideals, presumed to be above suspicion and immune to the social, economic and political concerns that otherwise ideologically distort our interpretations of universal interests or the common good. The mechanism of the wheel can be used to show how this type of approach obscures the political motivations and economic conditions that shape social norms, as well as their inadequate realization in social reality. By contrast, a non-foundationalist approach to the criticism of ideological social norms (such as naturalism, pragmatism or cultural relativism) would avoid starting with antecedently justified criteria, and instead base its appeal on a posteriori experience of existing social conditions - on norms seen to be appropriate to the real world. The immanent mode of ideology criticism takes its point of departure from existing, dominant, ideologically compromised social norms, to prevent idealistic, subjectively motivated norms being accepted ideologically as universal collective goods. The im-

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manent ideology critic tries to work with realistic social relations and norms, to avoid an independent counterpoint to existing horizons, insulated from critical scrutiny. But, though such criticism, always drawing on shared social norms, is often more productive than philosophical ethics, the mechanism of the wheel shows that it too draws the ideology critic into paradoxical self-refutation. Why this particular inconsistency, Socrates? At what end are you driving? Conclusion The theory of ideology raises the problem of the criterion with respect to norms for ideology criticism by effectively poisoning the relationship between criterion and intuition. From the sceptic, we learn that, if the ideology critic is willing to abandon an end to such criticism, the method of the wheel can be effective for drawing out criteria that have been taken for granted uncritically. Socrates, for example, on a strict reading of elenchus, may be said to take this approach in the early Platonic dialogues, positing nothing and only identifying inconsistency, as an end in itself, rather than as a means to some substantive good. If, however, the ideology critic wishes to maintain a substantive normative position of her own, in the face of the theory of ideology, the problem of the criterion poses two equally ideological alternatives: immanent circularity/transcendent regress. Scepticism, though practically deficient unto itself, is unrivalled as a philosophical method for recovering unacknowledged, potentially disavowed, preconceptions from beneath seemingly firmly established or apparently self-evident beliefs, doctrines, intuitions, etc. Of course, it is useless to imagine you are a brain in a vat for no reason at all, but there are many actual, practical reasons why it may be pertinent to ask how you know you are not. Sceptical dissatisfaction with smug, conceited dogma is a primary driver behind science and philosophy. Ideology criticism, likewise, is not always useful. It is rarely practically warranted to doubt, for example, whether the criterion - by which we distinguish advertising, marketing and PR communication from frank, honest, sympathetic human interaction is itself functionally integrated in systematically exploitative socio-economic structures of domination. On the other hand, the contemporary body image crisis, for example, reveals the intimacy of our everyday encounters with disempowering marketing and the extent to which social norms have been increasingly integrated with consumer values. Our criteria of evaluation are often influenced by oppressive social pressures. So long as she avoids the temptation to justify her suspicion, if an ideology critic thinks she has spotted an unacknowledged gap - between espoused values and disavowed practices, or an inspiring potential situation held back by oppressive norms the wheel is a handy heuristic tool for rooting out dodgy criteria, or awkward intuitions, behind reasonably (ideologically) suspicious beliefs. References Amico, Robert. 1993. The Problem of the Criterion. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Chisholm, R. 1982. The Foundations of Knowing. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Cling, Andrew D. 1994. Posing the Problem of the Criterion. Philosophical Studies 75.3: 261-92.

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Eagleton, Terry. 1991. Ideology: an Introduction . London, Verso. Foucault, Michel. 1980. Power/Knowledge. Brighton: Harvester. Fraser, N. 1985. Michel Foucault: A Young Conservative? in Ethics 96 (1): 165-184. Geuss, Raymond. 1981. The Idea of a Critical Theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School. Cambridge: Cambridge UP. Habermas, Juergen. 1987. The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (F G Lawrence Trans.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Heath, Joseph. 2001. Problems in the Theory of Ideology. Pluralism and the Pragmatic Turn: the Transformation of Critical Theory: Essays in Honor of Thomas McCarthy (T McCarthy, W Rehg, J Bohman Eds.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Heidegger, M. 1969. ber Karl Marx Und Die Weltvernderung. NESKE. Web. 18 Nov. 2010. Marx, K, Engels, F. 1970. The German Ideology with Selections from Parts Two and Three, Together with Marxs Introduction to a Critique of Political Economy (C. J. Arthur trans.) New York: International. Mattey, G. J. 1997. Review: The Problem of the Criterion by Robert Amico. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57.1: 226-29. McCarney, Joseph. 1980. The Real World of Ideology. Brighton: Harvester. Rosen, Michael. 1996. On Voluntary Servitude: False Consciousness and the Theory of Ideology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP. Thompson, John B. 1990. Ideology and Modern Culture: Critical Social Theory in the Era of Mass Communication. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. MacIntyre, A. 1973. Ideology, Social Science and Revolution. Comparative Politics 5.3: 321-42.

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