02/07/2003 FRI IB:27 FAI 1001/006

Ness Motley, P.A

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Date: February 7, 2003

To: Governor Thomas Kean
Fax: 973-408-3080
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NESS, MOTLEY
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February 7, 2003

Via Fax
Governor Thomas Kean
President, Drew University
Madison, NJ 07940
Fax #973-408-3080

Dear Governor Kean:

Allow me again to applaud you for graciously providing us with so much of your time,
and for the energy and commitment that you so amply demonstrated at our recent
meeting with the 9/11 family members. As we discussed, because it would be useful for
all the members of the 9/11 Commission to have the benefit of the important lessons to be
drawn from the 1990 Presidential Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism, I am
pleased to provide you with this synopsis of the lessons of the 1990 Commission.

The 1990 Commission members faced a task sadly similar to that faced by the present
Commission: to come to grips with the facts of the single greatest terrorism act against
American citizens (as of that time), and to make recommendations aimed at deterring
future terrorist attacks. Had that Commission's recommendations presented in its 182 pg.
report of May 15, 1990 been fully heeded, 9/11 might indeed have been averted.

Further to our discussion, I and my colleagues would be pleased to present to all the
members of the Commission a much fuller briefing on this subject, together with video
02/07/2003 m 16:28 FAI 1003/006

and other materials we have prepared which deals with our progress in the 9/11 families'
suit, but which also goes far beyond it with items of relevance to the Committee.

Very truly yours,

R L.Motl«
RLM/ds/001
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NESS, MOTLEY
MEMORANDUM

To: Governor Kean, Chairman 9/11 Commission

From: Ron Motley
Allan Gerson
Date: February 7, 2003
Subject: Six Indispensable Lessons from the 1990 Presidential
Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism (Pan Am 103)

Following up on your suggestion that we provide you and the other members of the 9/11
Commission with a fuller synopsis of the points we discussed at our January 30 briefing, we are
pleased to provide you with the following summation of some key lessons. We do so aware of
the magnitude of the historic responsibility thrust upon the Commission's shoulders. In this
context, we also recognize that whatever the shortcomings of the 1990 Commission, that it
nevertheless stands the test of time in two critical aspects: 1) the unimpeachable credibility of all
its bipartisan members based on the integrity it demonstrated in ferreting out key facts and in
making appropriate recommendations, while leaving politics at the wayside; and 2) its
demonstration of prescience in forseeing ongoing alarming trends, bearing in mind that that
Report, issued on May 15,1990, was released a year before the US and UK. governments filed
criminal indictments against agents of the Libyan government for the bombing of Pan Am 103
and three years before families of the victims of that bombing brought a civil action in the US
District Court in Washington, DC against the government of Libya.

1) Integrity is the keyword for all the Commission's actions.

Everything this Commission does and each of its recommendations will be scoured by the press,
the family members, and the administration upon its immediate publication. Equally important,
it will be a historical document of inestimable value in judging America's response to its greatest
single civilian tragedy.

2) Maintain and further perspective by focusing on context.

While making specific recommendations is an indispensable part of the Commission's work, so
too is the forging of an understanding that most serious terrorist actions occur in the context of
state-sponsorship, facilitation, or support. Anticipating the political difficulties in undertaking
responses against foreign governments so implicated, the 1990 Commission devoted an enure
chapter (Chapter 8) and its opening paragraphs and Conclusion to focusing on the importance of
"national will and moral courage" as indispensable to achieving the twin goals of accountability
and deterrence.

3) Detail ways to make state sponsors or facilitators of terrorism pay a price through support of
civil actions.
02/07/2003 FRI 16:28 FAI

The 1990 Commission recognized that military or diplomatic responses to evidence of state
sponsorship or facilitation of terrorism cannot be counted on alone as either workable or
sufficient measures to deter future acts of terrorism. Nor, it recognized, does the criminal justice
system provide an adequate remedy. Rather, more often than not, it enables state sponsors or
facilitators to get away with murder given the'high standard of proof required for a criminal
conviction. Moreover, until the 1996 Anti-Terrorism. Act, governments themselves could easily
claim the protection of sovereign immunity. Today, civil actions for damages by families of
victims of terrorism is viewed by the 2001 USA Patriot Act as an avenue to be rally supported as
an important additional tool in the war on terrorism. Even in 1990, however, the Commission
recognized that compensation to family members is a logical means of making state sponsors pay
a price.

4) Forge the national will and moral courage to make tough decisions.
Towards this end, the Commission's Report can itself become an instrument for the forging of
national will and moral courage. The 1990 Report expressly warned that rhetoric kills, and that
rhetoric without action serves to distract us from undertaking necessary defensive measures and,
in so doing, encourages terrorists who take our lack of resolve as indications of weakness.
Sadly, the record between 1990 and September 11,2001 demonstrates that rhetoric rather than
action prevailed.

5) Avoid the 1990 Commission's greatest failure: the inability to assure implementation of its
proposals.
Working with administrative agencies, Congress, and the executive branch should take place
early on in the course of the Commission's work to assure implementation of its proposals. It
should not await the filing of its Report, when the Commission's energy will largely be spent.

6) Hire the best staff and most able family liaison officcr(s).
The 1990 Commission had multiple staff members to deal with the tragedy involving fewer than
200 Americans and, ostensibly, posing a significantly lesser threat to all Americans than the
attack of 9/11. The 9/11 Commission must do whatever it can to assure that it is staffed
commensurate to meeting the greater challenge. As in 1990, an able family liaison officer, fully
committed to the task ahead and to involving families of Hie victims to the greatest extent
possible, can prove indispensable to the success of the mission. Today, 9/11 family members
and their attorneys who are already involved in a massive civil action involving the securing of
massive evidence, can prove even more helpful to the success of such an investigatory
commission.

As we pledged at our meeting, 9/11 Families United to Bankrupt Terrorism and its 3,000 plus
family members stands ready, willing and able to share the fruits of our investigations with the
Commission.

RLM/ds/002

cc: 9/11 Steering Committee

Allan Gerson
Harry Huge
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Jack Cordray
Senator Max del and
Paul Hanly
Jaync Conroy
Ness Motley 9/11 Team