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Frank Uy & Unifish Packing Corp.

vs Bureau of Internal Revenue et al Search and Seizure Requisites of a Valid Search Warrant In Sept 1993, Rodrigo Abos, a former employee of UPC reported to the BIR that Uy Chin Ho aka Frank Uy, manager of UPC, was selling thousands of cartons of canned cartons without issuing a report. This is a violation of Sec 253 & 263 of the Internal Revenue Code. In Oct 1993, the BIR requested before RTC Cebu to issue a search warrant. Judge Gozo-Dadole issued a warrant on the same day. A second warrant was issued which contains the same substance but has only one page, the same was dated Oct 1st 2003. These warrants were issued for the alleged violation by Uy of Sec 253. A third warrant was issued on the same day for the alleged violation of Uy of Sec 238 in relation to sec 263. On the strength of these warrants, agents of the BIR, accompanied by members of the PNP, on 2 Oct 1993, searched the premises of the UPC. They seized, among other things, the records and documents of UPC. A return of said search was duly made by Labaria with the RTC of Cebu. UPC filed a motion to quash the warrants which was denied by the RTC. They appealed before the CA via certiorari. The CA dismissed the appeal for a certiorari is not the proper remedy. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid search warrant issued. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of UPC and Uy in a way for it ordered the return of the seized items but sustained the validity of the warrant. The SC ruled that the search warrant issued has not met some basic requisites of validity. A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions. These requirements, in outline form, are: (1) the warrant must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized. The SC noted that there has been inconsistencies in the description of the place to be searched as indicated in the said warrants. Also the thing to be seized was not clearly defined by the judge. He used generic itineraries. The warrants were also inconsistent as to who should be searched. One warrant was directed only against Uy and the other was against Uy and

UPC. The SC however noted that the inconsistencies wered cured by the issuance of the latter warrant as it has revoked the two others. Section 2, Article III of the Constitution guarantees the right of the people against unreasonable searches and seizures: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
PeopleofthePhilippines vs Court of Appeals & Bulacan RTC Judge Caesar Casanova et al Search Warrant Place to be Searched is Controlling In December 1995, Quezon City PNP applied for a search warrant before the QC RTC against Azfar Hussain who had allegedly in his possession firearms and explosives at Abigail Variety Store, Apt. 1207 Area F, Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. A warrant was issued the next day by J Bacalla not at AVS but at AVS, Apt. 1 Area F, Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan Apt 1 is immediately adjacent to AVS. The PNP then proceeded to search the said apartment where they seized money, some clothings, 4 Pakistani nationals including Hussain and some explosives. The Pakistanis petitioned before J Casanova that the search warrant is invalid for there is a discrepancy in the place described and place indicated in the warrant. AVS is not in any way the same as Apt 1 for Apt 1 is totally separate. J Casanova quashed the search warrant and ordered the return of the things seized and at the same time ordered the seized things to be inadmissible as evidence. Prosecutor Chiong moved that the decision be reversed. The CA affirmed the decision of J Casanova. Chiong averred that the policemen who did the search has acted on their knowledge. The PNP actually knew that the Pakistanis are indeed residing in Apt 1 and not in the AVS. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid search warrant issued. HELD: The SC affirmed the decision of the CA. The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the officers own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of their application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter alia the search warrant

to particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized. It would concede to police officers the power of choosing the place to be searched, even if it not be that delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the door to abuse of the search process, and grant to officers executing a search warrant that discretion which the Constitution has precisely removed from them. The particularization of the description of the place to be searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search. People of the Philippines vs Rosa Aruta y Menguin Search and Seizure Informers Tip In the morning of 13 Dec 1988, the law enforcement officers received information from an informant named Benjie that a certain Aling Rosa would be leaving for Baguio City on 14 Dec 1988 and would be back in the afternoon of the same day carrying with her a large volume of marijuana; At 6:30 in the evening of 14 Dec 1988, Aruta alighted from a Victory Liner Bus carrying a travelling bag even as the informant pointed her out to the law enforcement officers; NARCOM officers approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents; When asked by Lt. Abello about the contents of her travelling bag, she gave the same to him; When they opened the same, they found dried marijuana leaves; Aruta was then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation. ISSUE: Whether or not the conducted search and seizure is constitutional. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Aruta and has noted that some drug traffickers are being freed due to technicalities. Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she about to commit one nor had she just committed a crime. Aruta was merely crossing the street and was not acting in any manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude that she was committing a crime. It was only when the informant pointed to Aruta and identified her to the agents as the carrier of the marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect. The NARCOM agents would not have apprehended Aruta were it not for the furtive finger of the informant because, as clearly illustrated by the evidence on record, there was no reason whatsoever for them to suspect that accused-appellant was committing a crime, except for the pointing finger of the informant. The SC could neither sanction nor tolerate as it is a clear violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. Neither was there any semblance of any

compliance with the rigid requirements of probable cause and warrantless arrests. Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a warrantless search of Arutas bag, there being no probable cause and the accused-appellant not having been lawfully arrested. Stated otherwise, the arrest being incipiently illegal, it logically follows that the subsequent search was similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful arrest. The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure must perforce operate in favor of accused-appellant. As such, the articles seized could not be used as evidence against accused-appellant for these are fruits of a poisoned tree and, therefore, must be rejected, pursuant to Article III, Sec. 3(2) of the Constitution.
The People of the Philippines vs Ruben Montilla y Gatdula Political Law Search and Seizure Informers Tip Warrantless Arrest On 19 June 1994 at about 2pm, police officers Talingting and Clarin were informed by an asset that a drug courier would be arriving from Baguio to Dasmarias carrying an undetermined amount of marijuana. The next day, the informant pointed at Montilla as the courier who was waiting in a waiting shed Brgy Salitran, Dasmarias. Montilla was then apprehended and he was caught in possession of a bag and a carton worth 28 kilos of marijuana. Montilla denied the allegation and he said he came to Cavite from Baguio for work and he does not have any effects with him at that time except for some pocket money. He was sentenced to death thereafter. He averred that the search and seizure conducted was illegal for there was no warrant and that he should have been given the opportunity to cross examine the informant. He said that if the informant has given the cops the information about his arrival as early as the day before his apprehension, the cops should have ample time to secure a search warrant. ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest conducted is legal. HELD: The SC ruled that the warrantless arrest is legal and so was the warrantless search. Sec 2 Art 3 of the Constitution has its exception when it comes to warrantless searches, they are: (1) customs searches; (2) searches of moving vehicles, (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consented searches; (5) searches incidental to a lawful arrest; (6) stop and frisk measures have been invariably recognized as the traditional exceptions.

In the case at bar, it should be noted that the information relayed by informant to the cops was that there would be delivery of marijuana at Barangay Salitran by a courier coming from Baguio in the early morning of June 20, 1994. Even assuming that the policemen were not pressed for time, this would be beside the point for, under these circumstances, the information relayed was too sketchy and not detailed enough for the obtention of the corresponding arrest or search warrant. While there is an indication that the informant knew the courier, the records do not reveal that he knew him by name. On such bare information, the police authorities could not have properly applied for a warrant, assuming that they could readily have access to a judge or a court that was still open by the time they could make preparations for applying therefor, and on which there is no evidence presented by the defense. In determining the opportunity for obtaining warrants, not only the intervening time is controlling but all the coincident and ambient circumstances should be considered, especially in rural areas. A legitimate warrantless arrest, as above contemplated, necessarily cloaks the arresting police officer with authority to validly search and seize from the offender (1) dangerous weapons, and (2) those that may be used as proof of the commission of an offense.
People vs. Racho 626 SCRA 633, August 3, 2010 Facts: On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone withappellant for the purchase of shabu. The agent reported the transaction to the police authorities whoimmediately formed a team to apprehend the appellant. The team members posted themselves along thenational highway in Baler, Aurora, and at around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, a Genesis bus arrived inBaler. When appellant alighted from the bus, the confidential agent pointed to him as the person hetransacted with, and when the latter was about to board a tricycle, the team approached him and invitedhim to the police station as he was suspected of carrying shabu. When he pulled out his hands from his pants pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened, yielded a small sachet containingthe suspected drug. The team then brought appellant to the police station for investigation and theconfiscated specimen was marked in the presence of appellant. The field test and laboratory examinationson the contents of the confiscated sachet yielded positive results for

methamphetamine hydrochloride.Appellant was charged in two separate informations, one for violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165, for transporting or delivering; and the second, of Section 11 of the same law for possessing, dangerous drugs.During the arraignment, appellant pleaded "Not Guilty" to both charges. On July 8, 2004, the RTCrendered a Joint Judgment convicting appellant of Violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165 butacquitted him of the charge of Violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. 9165. On appeal, the CA affirmedthe RTC decision. The appellant brought the case to SC assailing for the first time he legality of his arrestand the validity of the subsequent warrantless search. Issue: Whether or not the appellant has a ground to assail the validity of his arrest. Held: The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that "reliable information" alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act thatwould indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. Wefind no cogent reason to depart from this well-established doctrine.Appellant herein was not committing a crime in the presence of the police officers. Neither did thearresting officers have personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested hadcommitted, was committing, or about to commit an offense. At the time of the arrest, appellant had justalighted from the Gemini bus and was waiting for a tricycle. Appellant was not acting in any suspiciousmanner that would engender a reasonable ground for the police officers to suspect and conclude that hewas committing or intending to commit a crime. Were it not for the information given by the informant,appellant would not have been apprehended and no search would have been made, and consequently, thesachet of shabu would not have been confiscated. Neither was the arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would allow them to do away with therequisite warrant. As testified to by Police Officer 1 Aurelio Iniwan, a member of the arresting team, their office received the "tipped information" on May 19, 2003. They likewise learned from the informant not only the appellants physical description but also his name. Although it was not certain that appellant would arrive on the same day (May 19), there was an assurance that he would be there the following day(May 20). Clearly, the police had ample opportunity to apply for a warrant

Harry Stonehill et al vs DOJ Secretary Jose Diokno et al Search and Seizure General Warrants Abandonment of the Moncado Doctrine Stonehill et al and the corporation they form were alleged to have committed acts in violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code. By the strength of this allegation a search warrant was issued against their persons and their corporation. The warrant provides authority to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit: Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers). The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split into (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and (b) those found seized in the residences of petitioners herein. Stonehill averred that the warrant is illegal for: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law. The prosecution counters, invoking the Moncado doctrine, that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against them. In short, the criminal cannot be set free just because the government blunders. ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant issued is valid. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Stonehill et al. The SC emphasized however that Stonehill et al cannot assail the validity of the search warrant issued against their corporation for Stonehill are not the proper

party hence has no cause of action. It should be raised by the officers or board members of the corporation. The constitution protects the peoples right against unreasonable search and seizure. It provides; (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. In the case at bar, none of these are met. The warrant was issued from mere allegation that Stonehill et al committed a violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code. In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be a legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code, as alleged in the aforementioned applications without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or codes. The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit: Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements. Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of Stonehill et al, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of Stonehill et al and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of the Bill of Rights that the things to be seized be particularly described as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants. The Moncado doctrine is likewise abandoned and the right of the accused against a defective search warrant is emphasized.

Bache & Co. Inc. et al vs BIR Commissioner Vivencio Ruiz et al Search and Seizure Personal Examination of the Judge On 24 Feb 1970, Commissioner Vera of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to J Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant against petitioners for violation of Sec 46(a) of the NIRC, in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sects 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and authorizing Revenue Examiner de Leon make and file the application for search warrant which was attached to the letter. The next day, de Leon and his witnesses went to CFI Rizal to obtain the search warrant. At that time J Ruiz was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to take the depositions of De Leon and Logronio. After the session had adjourned, J Ruiz was informed that the depositions had already been taken. The stenographer read to him her stenographic notes; and thereafter, J Ruiz asked respondent Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his deposition was found to be false and without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury. J Ruiz signed de Leons application for search warrant and Logronios deposition. The search was subsequently conducted. ISSUE: Whether or not there had been a valid search warrant. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Bache on three grounds. 1. J Ruiz failed to personally examine the complainant and his witness. Personal examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses is necessary to enable him to determine the existence or non-existence of a probable cause. 2. The search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense. The search warrant in question was issued for at least four distinct offenses under the Tax Code. As ruled in Stonehill Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court that a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense. Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense. 3. The search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized. The documents, papers and effects sought to be seized are described in the Search Warrant

Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars, receipts and disbursements books, customers ledgers); receipts for payments received; certificates of stocks and securities; contracts, promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex and coded messages; business communications, accounting and business records; checks and check stubs; records of bank deposits and withdrawals; and records of foreign remittances, covering the years 1966 to 1970. The description does not meet the requirement in Art III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized. A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure or when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued. DOJ Sec Vicente Abad Santos vs CFI Benguet Judge Pio Marcos Search and Seizure On March 31, 1971, Amansec went to Baguio and passed by a house at 47 Ledesma Street, Baguio; he was attracted by the sight of several persons inside the house; he peeped from outside the house and when the curtain was moved he saw a Buddha that was inside the house; he observed what was going on inside the house and he heard someone say that the golden Buddha was actually for sale and when he observed them closer he overheard that it was being offered for sale for 100,000 pesos by Rogelio Roxas; he saw the Buddha and firearms and some bullets inside the house. By these facts, Colonel Calano requested for a warrant from J Marcos at about 12 midnight on Apr 4, 1971. Due to the urgency he issued the warrant. And eventually the golden Buddha and some firearms were seized from Roxass house. Santos assailed the warrant averring that the search warrant was not limited to one offense covering both illegal possession of firearms and violation of Central Bank rules and regulations; that it did not particularly describe the property to be seized; that he did not carefully examine under oath the applicant and his witnesses; that articles not mentioned were taken; and that thereafter the return and the inventory although appearing to have been prepared on said date were not actually submitted to respondent Judge until April 13, 1971 and the objects seized delivered only about a week later on April 19.

ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant issued by Judge Marcos is valid. HELD: The SC ruled in favor Judge Marcos and had basically affirmed the decision of appellate Judge Gatamaitan. Taking into consideration to nature of the articles so described, it is clear that no other more adequate and detailed description could be given, particularly because it is difficult to give a particular description of the contents thereof, The description so made substantially complies with the legal provisions because the officer of the law who executed the warrant was thereby placed in a position enabling him to Identify the articles in question, which he did, so that here, since certainly, no one would be mistaken in Identifying the Buddha, whose image is well known, and even the firearms and ammunition because these were those without permit to possess, and all located at 47 Ledesma St., Baguio City, so far as description was concerned, the search warrant perhaps could not be said to have suffered fatal defects. Castro vs. Pabalan (70 SCRA 477) Facts: Judge Pabalan ordered the issuance of a search warrant despite failure of the application of Lumang or the warrant itself to specify the offense, to examine the applicant as well as his witnesses on the part of the Judge, and to describe with particularity the place to be searched and the things to be seized. Judge never refuted the assertions when required to answer. Application alleged that applicants wee informed and claimed that they verified the report that Maria Castro and Co Ling are in possession of narcotics and other contraband in Barrio Padasil, Bangar, La Union without specifying the particular place in the Barrio. No complete description of the goods and inquiry was brief. Upon actual search, it turned out that it was in Barrio Ma. Cristina and not in Padasil. Issue: Whether or not the search warrant is validly issued. Held: Search warrant issued illegal for violation of the 1935 Constitution and the Rules of Court because the two basic requirements are not complied with: (a) no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, (b) the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized, thus, a general warrant. However, things seized cannot be returned and shall be destroyed, except the liquors, playing cards, distilled water and five bottles of Streptomycin.

G.R. No. L-25232 December 20, 1973 ASIAN SURETY and INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE HERRERA, as Judge, City Court of Manila, NBI Agent CELSO J. ZOLETA, JR. and MANUEL CUARESMA, respondents. Petition to quash and annul a search warrant issued by respondent Judge Jose Herrera of the City Court of Manila, and to command respondents to return immediately the documents, papers, receipts and records alleged to have been illegally seized thereunder by agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) led by respondent Celso Zoleta, Jr. On October 27, 1965, respondent Judge Herrera, upon the sworn application of NBI agent Celso Zoleta, Jr. supported by the deposition of his witness, Manuel Cuaresma, issued a search warrant in connection with an undocketed criminal case for estafa, falsification, insurance fraud, and tax evasion, against the Asian Surety and Insurance Co., a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, with principal office at Room 200 Republic Supermarket Bldg., Rizal Avenue, Manila. The search warrant is couched in the following language: It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examining under oath NBI Agent Celso J. Zoleta, Jr. and his witness Manuel Cuaresma that there are good and sufficient reasons to believe that Mr. William Li Yao or his employees has/have in his/their control in premises No. 2nd Floor Republic Supermarket Building, in Rizal Avenue district of Sta. Cruz, Manila, property (Subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense) should be seized and brought to the undersigned. You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time in the ----- of the premises above-described and forthwith seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit: Fire Registers, Loss Bordereau, Adjusters Report including subrogation receipt and proof of loss, Loss Registers, Books of Accounts, including cash receipts and disbursements and general ledger, check vouchers, income tax returns, and other papers connected therewith ... for the years 1961 to 1964 to be dealt with as the law directs. Armed with the search warrant Zoleta and other agents assigned to the Anti-graft Division of the NBI entered the premises of the Republic Supermarket Building and served the search warrant upon Atty. Alidio of the insurance company, in the presence of Mr. William Li Yao, president and chairman of the board of directors of the insurance firm. After the search they seized and carried away two (2) carloads of documents, papers and receipts.

Petitioner assails the validity of the search warrant, claiming that it was issued in contravention of the explicit provisions of the Constitution and the Rules of Court, particularly Section 1, of Art. III of the 1935 Constitution, now Section 3, of Art. IV of the new Constitution, and Sections 3, 5, 8 and 10 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, hereunder quoted for convenience of reference, viz: Sec. 3 The rights of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnessed he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons, or things to be seized." (Art. IV, Section 3, New Constitution) Sec. 3 Requisites for issuing search warrant A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined by the judge or justice of the peace after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense. (Sec. 3, Rule 126, Rules of Court) Sec. 5 Issuance and form of search warrant If the judge or justice of the peace is thereupon satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the application is based, or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he must issue the warrant in the form prescribed by these rules. (Sec. 5, Rule 126) Sec. 8 Time of making search The warrant must direct that it be served in the day time, unless the affidavit asserts that the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the night or day. (Sec. 8, Rule 126) Sec. 10 Receipt for property seized. The officer seizing property under the warrant must give a detailed receipt for the same to the person on whom or in whose possession it was found, or in the absence of any person, must, in the presence of at least one witness, leave a receipt in the place in which he found the seized property. (Sec. 10, Rule 126) . "Of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and that involves the exemption of his private affairs, books, and papers from the inspection and scrutiny of others. 1 While the power to search

and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government (People v. Elias, 147 N.E. 472)." I. In the case at bar, the search warrant was issued for four separate and distinct offenses of : (1) estafa, (2) falsification, (3) tax evasion and (4) insurance fraud, in contravention of the explicit command of Section 3, Rule 126, of the Rules providing that: "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense." The aforequoted provision, which is found in the last paragraph of the same section, is something new. "There is no precedent on this amendment prohibition against the issuance of a search warrant for more than one specific offense either in the American books on Criminal procedure or in American decisions." 2 It was applied in the celebrated case of Harry S. Stonehill v. Secretary of Justice 3 where this Court said: To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision abovequoted to outlaw the socalled general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen in times of keen political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means. Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court, that a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense. Not satisfied with this qualification, the court added thereto a paragraph, directing that no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense. II. Petitioner likewise contests the validity of the search warrant on the ground that it authorized the search and seizures of personal properties so vaguely described and not particularized, thereby infringing the constitutional mandate requiring particular description of the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. It also assails the

noncompliance with the above-requirement as likewise openly violative of Section 2 of Rule 126 which provides: SEC. 2. A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of the following personal property: (a) Property subject of the offense; (b) Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and (c) Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense. The search warrant herein involved reads in part: "... property (Subject of the offense, stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense) should be seized and brought to the undersigned." The claim of respondents that by not cancelling the description of one or two of the classes of property contained in the form when not applicable to the properties sought to be seized, the respondent judge intended the search to apply to all the three classes of property. This is a patent impossibility because the description of the property to be searched and seized, viz: Fire Registers, Loss Bordereau, Adjusters Report, including subrogation receipts and proof of loss, Loss Registers, Books of Accounts including cash receipts and disbursements and general ledger, etc. and the offenses alleged to have been committed by the corporation to wit: estafa, falsification, tax evasion and insurance fraud, render it impossible for Us to see how the abovedescribed property can simultaneously be contraband goods, stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of one and the same offense. What is plain and clear is the fact that the respondent Judge made no attempt to determine whether the property he authorized to be searched and seized pertains specifically to any one of the three classes of personal property that may be searched and seized under a search warrant under Rule 126, Sec. 2 of the Rules. The respondent Judge simply authorized search and seizure under an omnibus description of the personal properties to be seized. Because of this all embracing description which includes all conceivable records of petitioner corporation, which if seized (as it was really seized in the case at bar), could possibly paralyze its business, 4 petitioner in several motions, filed for early resolution of this case, manifested that the seizure of TWO carloads of their papers has paralyzed their business to the grave prejudice of not only the company, its workers, agents, employees but also of its numerous insured and beneficiaries of bonds issued by it, including the government itself, and of the general public. 5 And correlating the same to the charges for which the

warrant was issued, We have before Us the infamous general warrants of old. In the case of Uy Kheytin, et al., v. Villareal, 42 Phil. 896, cited with approval in the Bache case, supra, We had occasion to explain the purpose of the requirement that the warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized, to wit: "... Both the Jones Law (sec. 3) and General Orders No. 58 (sec. 97) specifically require that a search warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. The evident purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the search warrant to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they shall seize, to the end that "unreasonable searches and seizures" may not be made. That this is the correct interpretation of this constitutional provision is borne out by American authorities." The purpose as thus explained could, surely and effectively, be defeated under the search warrant issued in this case. III. Moreover, as contended by petitioner, respondents in like manner transgressed Section 10 of Rule 126 of the Rules for failure to give a detailed receipt of the things seized. Going over the receipts (Annexes "B", "B-1", B-2", "B-3" and "B-4" of the Petition) issued, We found the following: one bordereau of reinsurance, 8 fire registers, 1 marine register, four annual statements, folders described only as Bundle gm-1 red folders; bundle 17-22 big carton folders; folders of various sizes, etc., without stating therein the nature and kind of documents contained in the folders of which there were about a thousand of them that were seized. In the seizure of two carloads of documents and other papers, the possibility that the respondents took away private papers of the petitioner, in violation of his constitutional rights, is not remote, for the NBI agents virtually had a field day with the broad and unlimited search warrant issued by respondent Judge as their passport. IV. The search warrant violated the specific injunctions of Section 8 of Rule 126. 6 Annex "A" of the Petition which is the search warrant in question left blank the "time" for making search, while actual search was conducted in the evening of October 27, 1965, at 7:30 p.m., until the wee hours of the morning of October 28, 1965, thus causing untold inconveniences to petitioners herein. Authorities 7 are of the view that where a search is to be made during the night time, the authority for

executing the same at that time should appear in the directive on the face of the warrant. In their Memorandum 8 respondents, relying on the case of Moncado v. Peoples Court (80 Phil. 1), argued: Even assuming that the search warrant in question is null and void, the illegality thereof would not render the incriminating documents inadmissible in evidence. This Court has reverted to the old rule and abandoned the Moncado ruling (Stonehill case, supra). Most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. Thus the Supreme Court of the United States declared: 9 If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his right to be secured against such searches and seizures is of no value, and so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praise-worthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land. Moreover, the criminal charges filed by the NBI have all been dismissed and/or dropped by the Court or by the office of the City Fiscal of Manila in 1968, as manifested in the petition filed by petitioner dated October 24, 1972, for early resolution of this case. V. It has likewise been observed that the offenses alleged took place from 1961 to 1964, and the application for search warrant was made on October 27, 1965. The time of the application is so far remote in time as to make the probable cause of doubtful veracity and the warrant vitally defective. Thus Mr. Joseph Varon, an eminent authority on Searches, Seizures and Immunities, has this to say on this point: From the examination of the several cases touching upon this subject, the following general rules are said to apply to affidavits for search warrants: (1) xxx xxx xxx (2) Such statement as to the time of the alleged offense must be clear and definite and must not be too remote from the time of the making of the affidavit and issuance of the search warrant. (3) There is no rigid rule for determining whether the stated time of observation of the offense is too remote from the time when the affidavit is

made or the search warrant issued, but, generally speaking, a lapse of time of more than three weeks will be held not to invalidate the search warrant while a lapse of four weeks will be held to be so. A good and practical rule of thumb to measure the nearness of time given in the affidavit as to the date of the alleged offense, and the time of making the affidavit is thus expressed: The nearer the time at which the observation of the offense is alleged to have been made, the more reasonable the conclusion of establishment of probable cause. [Emphasis Ours] PREMISES CONSIDERED, petition is hereby granted; the search warrant of October 27, 1965, is nullified and set aside, and the respondents are hereby ordered to return immediately all documents, papers and other objects seized or taken thereunder.

Collector vs villaluz june 18, 1976 Viduya vs. Berdiago, 73 SCRA 553 Facts: The search warrant issued by petitioner Viduya who was the former Collector of Customs is quashed by the lower court upon motion by private respondent Berdiago. The warrant of seizure and detention was issued on the basis of reliable intelligence that fraudulent documents were used by Berdiago in securing the release from the Bureau of Customs of a Rolls Royce, it being made to appear that such car was a 1961 model instead of a 1966, thus enabling respondent to pay lower custom duties. There was a demand for the correct amount due and Respondent expressed his willingness to pay. Unfortunately, he was not able to live up to his promise so a search warrant was issued, pursuant to Section 2099 of the Tariff and Customs Code which requires a search warrant if such goods are located in a dwelling house because the car was located in the Yabut Compound. Moreover, it was not shown that Berdiago did not own the dwelling house which was searched. Nonetheless, respondent judge quashed the warrant. Issue: Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the judge in quashing the search warrant? Yes Held: Petition is granted. As the car was kept in a dwelling house in Wakas, Barrio San Dionisio, Paraaque, Rizal, petitioner through two of his officers in the Customs Police Service applied for and was able to obtain the search warrant. Had there been no such move on the part of petitioner, the duties expressly enjoined on him by law namely to assess and collect all lawful revenues, to prevent and suppress smuggling and other frauds, and to enforce tariff and customs law would not have been performed.

Dizon vs castro no fulltxt/digest PEOPLE VS VELOSO48 PHIL. 169 (1925)MALCOLM, J.Facts:In May, 1923, the building located at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, was used by anorganization known as the Parliamentary Club. Jose Ma. Veloso was at that time a member of theHouse of Representative of the Philippine Legislature. He was also the manager of the club.-The police of Manila had reliable information that the so-called Parliamentary Club was nothingmore than a gambling house. Indeed, on May 19, 1923, J. F. Townsend, the chief of the gamblingsquad, had been to the club and verified this fact. As a result, on May 25, 1923, Detective AndresGeronimo of the secret service of the City of Manila, applied for, and obtained a search warrantfrom Judge Garduo of the municipal court. Thus provided, the police attempted to raid theParliamentary Club a little after three in the afternoon of the date above- mentioned. They foundthe doors to the premises closed and barred. Accordingly, one band of police including policemanRosacker, ascended a telephone pole, so as to enter a window of the house. Other policemen,headed by Townsend, broke in the outer door.-Once inside the Parliamentary Club, nearly fifty persons were apprehended by the police. One of them was the defendant Veloso. Veloso asked Townsend what he wanted, and the latter showedhim the search warrant. Veloso read it and told Townsend that he was Representative Veloso andnot John Doe, and that the police had no right to search the house. Townsend answered thatVeloso was considered as John Doe. As Veloso's pocket was bulging, as if it contained gamblingutensils, Townsend required Veloso to show him the evidence of the game. About five minuteswas consumed in conversation between the policemen and the accused the policemen insistingon searching Veloso, and Veloso insisting in his refusal to submit to the search.-At last the patience of the officers was exhausted. So policeman Rosacker took hold of Velosoonly to meet with his resistance. Veloso bit Rosacker in the right forearm, and gave him a blow inanother part of the body, which injured the policeman quite severely. Through the combinedefforts of Townsend and Rosacker, Veloso was finally laid down on the floor, and long sheets of paper, of reglas de monte, cards, cardboards, and chips were taken from his pockets.-All of the persons arrested were searched and then conducted to the patrol wagons. Velosoagain refused to obey and shouted offensive epithets against the police department. It wasnecessary for the policemen to conduct him downstairs. At the

door, Veloso resisted sotenaciously that three policemen were needed to place him in the patrol wagon.-The warrant read as follows: SEARCH WARRANT (G) The People of the Philippine Islands, to any member of thePolice Force of the City of Manila.GREETINGProof by affidavit having this day been made before me by Andres Geronimo that hehas good reason to believe and does believe that John Doe has illegally in hispossession in the building occupied by him and which is under his control, namely inthe building numbered 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippines Islands, certaindevices and effects used in violation of the Gambling Law, to wit: money, cards,chips, reglas, pintas, tables and chairs and other utensils used in connection with thegame commonly known as monte and that the said John Doe keeps and conceals saiddevices and effects with the illegal and criminal intention of using them in violation of the Gambling Law.Now therefore, you are hereby commanded that at any time in the day or nightwithin ten (10) days on or after this date to make a search on the person of said JohnDoe and in the house situated at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, PhilippineIslands, in quest of the above described devices and effects and if you find the sameor any part thereof, you are commanded to bring it forthwith before me as providedfor by law.Given under my hand, this 25th day of May, 1923.(Sgd.) L. GARDUO Judge, Municipal Court Issue: WON the search warrant and the arrest of Veloso was valid. Ruling: Yes. RD: It is provided, among other things, in the Philippine Code on Criminal Procedure that a searchwarrant shall not issue except for probable cause and upon application supported by oathparticularly describing the place to be searched and the person of thing to be seized. The name and description of the accused should be inserted in the body of the warrant andwhere the name is unknown there must be such a description of the person accused as willenable the officer to identify him when found.A warrant for the apprehension of a person whose true name is unknown, by the name of "JohnDoe" or "Richard Roe," "whose other or true name in unknown," is void, without other and furtherdescriptions of the person to be apprehended, and such warrant will not justify the officer inacting under it. Such a warrant must, in addition, contain the best descriptio personae possibleto be obtained of the person or persons to be apprehended, and this description must be sufficient to indicate clearly the proper person or persons upon whom the warrant is to beserved; and should state his personal appearance and peculiarities, give his occupation andplace of residence, and any other

circumstances by means of which he can be identified.In the first place, the affidavit for the search warrant and the search warrant itself described thebuilding to be searched as "the building No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, PhilippineIslands." This, without doubt, was a sufficient designation of the premises to be searched.As the search warrant stated that John Doe had gambling apparatus in his possession in thebuilding occupied by him at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, and as this John Doe was Jose Ma. Veloso, the manager of the club, the police could identify John Doe as Jose Ma. Velosowithout difficulty ELI LUI, ET AL. VS. MATILLANO, May 27, 2004 Right against unreasonable searches and seizures; Mission Order does not authorize an illegal search. Waiver of the right against an unreasonable search and seizure. In search of the allegedly missing amount of P45,000.00 owned by the employer, the residence of a relative of the suspect was forcibly open by the authorities by kicking the kitchen door to gain entry into the house. Thereafter, they confiscated different personal properties therein which were allegedly part of those stolen from the employer. They were in possession of a mission order but later on claimed that the owner of the house gave his consent to the warrantless search. Are the things admissible in evidence? Can they be sued for damages as a result of the said warrantless search and seizure? Held: The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived expressly or impliedly. BUT A WAIVER BY IMPLICATION CANNOT BE PRESUMED. There must be clear and convincing evidence of an actual intention to relinquish the right. There must be proof of the following: a. that the right exists; b. that the person involved had knowledge, either constructive or actual, of the existence of said right; c. that the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. d. Finally, the waiver must be made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently in order that the said is to be valid. The search was therefore held illegal and the members of the searching party held liable for damages in accordance with the doctrine laid down in Lim vs. Ponce de Leon and MHP Garments vs. CA. e. General or roving warrants