Gobenciong vs ca Facts: Dr.

Pedro Gobenciong was Administrative Officer IV in Eastern Visayas Regional Medical Center (the hospital), a public hospital. In 1996, the hospital planned to buy a hemoanalyzer / particle counter. A public bidding was had, where Alvez Commercial, Inc. won. A purchase Order was issued for 2 nebulizers and 1 particle counter. The nebulizers and hemoanalyzers appeared to have been delivered, as per: Certification of Acceptance signed by Engr. Jocano and supply Officer Babula. Sales Invoice signed by Supply Officer Babula acknowledging receipt of the goods in good condition. COA Inspection Report certified by Engr. Jocano and Gobenciong attesting that the goods had been inspected as to quality and quantity. As it turned out, the hemoanalyzer was never actually delivered. Dr. Flora dela Pena, head of the hospitals Laboratory Unit, filed anadministrative complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas(Ombudsman) charging Gobenciong, Babula, Jocano, and 3 other persons with Falsification of Public Document and Misconduct Upon Dela Penas motion, Ombud sman placed respondents, save one, under a six-month preventive suspension and directed the proper DOH Officer to immediately implement the Order. Gobenciong sought reconsideration of this order, but without awaiting the Ombudsmans action thereon, Gobenciong filed a peti tion for certiorari in the CA. Ombudsman eventually found Gobenciong, et al guilty of Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and imposed a penalty of 1 year suspension without pay. Gobenciong filed a motion for reconsideration, which Ombudsmandenied, prompting Gobenciong to appeal to the CA. A partially granted Gobenciongs appeal and set aside the Ombudsmans Decision in insofar as it imposed the penalty of 1 year suspension without pay. Relying on Tapiador v Office of the Ombudsman , it held that the disciplinary power of the Ombudsman in administrative cases is limited only to recommending to the disciplining authority the appropriate penalty to be meted out Issue: whether RA 6770, on the ground of undue delegation of legislative authority and under the equal protection clause, is unconstitutional insofar as it grants the Ombudsman and his deputies the authority to investigate, prosecute and penalize any act or omission, administrative or otherwise, of any publi c officer or employee, or to take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases. Ruling: As earlier discussed, the Office of the Ombudsman is a creature of the Constitution. The framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the office to be strong and effective, with sufficient bite and muscle to enable it to carry out its mandate as protector of the people against the inept, abusive, and corrupt in the Government. Thus, the authority of the Ombudsman to conduct administrative investigations is of constitutional origin, proceeding as it does from Sec. 13(1), Article XI of the Constitution,[37] which reads: Sec. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties: (1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.

At its most basic, the equal protection clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination; it does not demand absolute equality. The fundamental guarantee is not breached by a law which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class and provided further that there is a substantial distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.[27] InMiranda v. Sandiganbayan, where the issue of equal protection was raised, albeit the 60-day preventive suspension limit under the Local Government Code was involved, we ruled against any violation of the constitutional proscription against the equal protection of the law The Ombudsman Act of 1989 requires that the Ombudsman determine: (1) that the evidence of guilt is strong; and (2) that any of the following circumstances are present: (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression, or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondents continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.

League of cities vs COMELEC Facts: These cases were initiated by the consolidated petitions for prohibition filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treas, assailing the constitutionality of the sixteen (16) laws,[1] each converting the municipality covered thereby into a component city (Cityhood Laws), and seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the subject laws. During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, the mad rush of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence. After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29. During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009. On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the Presidents signature. The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city. Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code. Issue: 2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause. Ruling: no. As this Court has ruled, the equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification, provided that it: (1) rests on substantial distinctions; (2) is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) applies equally to all members of the same class. Congress intended that those with pending cityhood bills during the 11th Congress would not be covered by the new and higher income requirement of P100 million imposed by R.A. No. 9009. When the LGC was amended by R.A. No. 9009, the amendment carried with it both the letter and the intent of the law, and such were incorporated in the LGC by which the compliance of the Cityhood Laws was gauged. Notwithstanding that both the 11th and 12th Congress failed to act upon the pending cityhood bills, both the letter and intent of Section 450 of the LGC, as amended by R.A. No. 9009, were carried on until the 13th Congress, when the Cityhood Laws were enacted. The exemption clauses found in the individual Cityhood Laws are the express articulation of that intent to exempt respondent municipalities from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009. Even if we were to ignore the above quoted exchange between then Senate President Drilon and Senator Pimentel, it cannot be denied that Congress saw the wisdom of exempting respondent municipalities from complying with the higher income requirement imposed by the amendatory R.A. No. 9009. Indeed, these municipalities have proven themselves viable and capable to become component cities of their respective provinces. In the enactment of the Cityhood Laws, Congress merely took the 16 municipalities covered thereby from the disadvantaged position brought about by the abrupt increase in the income requirement of R.A. No. 9009, acknowledging the privilege that they have already given to those newly-converted component cities, which prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9009, were undeniably in the same footing or class as the respondent municipalities. Congress merely recognized the capacity and readiness of respondent municipalities to become component cities of their respective provinces.

People vs penaflorida

SPO3 Vicente Competente (Competente) narrated that in his capacity as chief of the Investigation and Operation Division of the Philippine National Police (PNP) station in Tigaon, Camarines Sur, that he received a tip from an asset that a bundle of marijuana was being transported by appellant to Huyon-huyon from another barangay in Tigaon, Camarines Sur. 4 Major Domingo Agravante (Agravante), chief of police of Tigaon, then organized a team composed of Competente as team leader, SPO2 Ricardo Callo (Callo), SPO1 Portugal, PO3 Pillos and PO2 Edgar Latam. The team boarded the police mobile car and proceeded to Sitio Nasulan in Barangay Huyon-huyon.5 They overtook appellant who was on a bicycle. The police officers flagged appellant down and found marijuana wrapped in a cellophane and newspaper together with other grocery items. The amount of P1550.00 was also found in appellant's possession. The police officers confiscated these items and took photographs thereof. Appellant was then brought to the headquarters where he was booked. Issue: whether or not the evidence is admissible

The confiscation of the marijuana subject of the instant case and the arrest of the accused Salvador Peaflorida[,Jr.] by the said police officers being lawful, having been caught in flagrante delicto, there is no need for the warrant for the seizure of the fruit of the crime, the same being incidental to the lawful arrest. Rightly so, because a person caught illegally possessing or transporting drugs is subject to the warrantless search. Besides, object in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.
Ruling: yes.

The police was tipped off at around 1:00 p.m. that appellant was transporting marijuana to Huyon-huyon. Certainly, they had no time to secure an arrest warrant as appellant was already in transit and already committing a crime. The arrest was effected after appellant was caught in flagrante delicto. He was seen riding his bicycle and carrying with him the contraband, hence, demonstrating that a crime was then already being committed. Under the circumstances, the police had probable cause to believe that appellant was committing a crime. Thus, the warrantless arrest is justified.