Two Commentaries on the End of IR Theory?

Debate
Felix Berenskoetter Department of Politics and International Studies SOAS, University of London fb12@soas.ac.uk

(1) The End of IR Theory as We Know It

This essay was posted on the Disorder of Things Blog on 3 August 2012 (http://thedisorderofthings.com/2012/08/03/the-end-of-ir-theory-as-we-know-it) In case you missed it, recent ISA and BISA conferences saw panels contemplating whether IR Theory has come to an end. This question, posed by the editors of EJIR, was discussed by a range of distinguished scholars whose answers ranged from yes to no, in the process reflecting on the meaning of theory and end. While state of the art exercises can be tiring, the contributions will be worth reading when they appear in an EJIR special issue dedicated to the topic. Yet I could not help wondering what the answers would have been had the panels featured not established professors, but junior scholars at the start of their career. Indeed, would it not be more adequate to have the latter group engage this question? After all, they tend to be the ones teaching introductory IR courses, which are expected to give an overview of theoretical arguments and debates. And they enter the profession with a significant research project under their belt (the PhD), which informs their first wave of publications and likely influences future projects that will shape the field. So what does that generation think of 'IR Theory'? What theories and what kind of theorizing is prevalent in their teaching and writing? These questions are important, not least because they can illuminate where the field of IR to the extent that it is constituted by (shared) theoretical knowledge is heading. Related, they might tell us whether junior scholars form a new generation of IR theorists, i.e. if they are advancing new theories, ways of theorizing and theoretical debates that mark them as a distinct generation. While I count myself amongst this group, I do not have the answer(s). But let me share some observations and reflections. On the face of it, there is no escape from IR Theory represented by the isms and associated debates, traditionally dealing with conflict and cooperation in interstate relations. They are locked into introductory courses and textbooks and are rehearsed in classrooms year by year. Yet how do we teach these theories (or paradigms)? Are we affirming them, or are we telling our students they are outdated? Are we treating them as part of a tradition that gives us timeless truths, or as historical artefacts that are no longer relevant? If the latter, do we provide our students with alternatives? The answers probably hinge on what theories we use in our own work, and how we use them. Surely, as students we learned about the dominance and critical dismantling of neorealism, the ascent of constructivism, feminism, post-structuralism, the enduring prominence of rationalism and institutionalism. Some of us are also familiar with theories of European integration, the English School, or Marxism. Sure, attention to and treatment of those theories varies from place to place. But lets assume we the junior scholars know the core arguments and understand their impact, their analytical value as well as their limitations. The question is, do we find them useful?

One way to get to the answer would be to survey the theoretical content of PhD dissertations, conference papers and publications by junior scholars over the past five years or so. I did not do that, but from what I read and from chatter at conferences, it seems that the majority of my peers find the isms and associated debates inadequate, if not irrelevant. They don't inspire to ask new questions and they don't have good answers to the questions we are interested in (a sentiment echoed in youtube polemics and in a recent survey noting a declining popularity of the core paradigms). This is not really surprising as all theories are products of and for particular socio-historical contexts. The established theories we find in textbooks were developed by previous generations and, for the most part, by white men based in the US. While those of us now entering the profession cannot escape the socialization effect entirely, my sense is that few have invested in, or feel particularly attached to, these theoretical debates. Instead, we engage the study of world politics on the back of experiences and with outlooks and commitments that dont resonate with the isms. In that sense, IR Theory is at an end. Yet, of course, that holds true only if we employ a particular understanding of IR Theory. There is no lack of theorizing amongst junior scholars whose background and outlook is arguably less American than that of previous generations, and whose conceptual work draws on political theory, philosophy, sociology, history, psychology, religion, geography, media studies, literary studies, etc the list goes on. These creative endeavors offer fresh angles on world politics, its very conception and how to study it. The question is, do the authors still identify with 'IR' as an intellectual home? Here I am not sure. I often hear some of my most creative colleagues who also regular attend ISA conferences saying I dont do IR. When pressed, this stance is explained with the aforementioned dislike of or, more precisely, disinterest in the isms and associated debates. In a way, this rejection of the IR label is a logical move for those seeking to distance themselves from established thinking. And yet it also has the unfortunate effect of perpetuating a narrow reading of (theorizing within) IR. This does not have to be the case. For one, the isms are not closed, static paradigms with clear arguments set in stone. Everyone who has ever tried to comprehensively survey an ism knows they are diverse and dynamic bodies of thought. And they are not owned by anyone, least of all by those generally cast as representatives. Furthermore, many classic works in the field, even if written some time ago and from a particular point of view, contain sophisticated insights about politics and the human condition. Their authors often practiced multi-disciplinarity, that is, they were well read in a range of fields of knowledge, and many would not be able to locate their work amongst the isms. Textbooks and standard literature reviews tend to ignore this in their attempt to simplify theories and core authors for easy digestion, downplaying context and ironing out creative tensions and contradictions so students dont get confused. Similarly, the scientific-methodological ambitions underpinning much (mainstream) IR scholarship tend to cast theories in a rather sterile light. We should not forget their richness, however, and their potential for conceptual inspiration. More importantly, I dont think it is necessary to engage with literature considered part of the canon to be part of the field of IR. It would be a tragedy if creative scholars concerned with issues of word politics shun the association with IR because they feel that the field is defined and dominated by theories they dont find useful. After all, the label IR does not belong to a particular set of theories, but to a scholarly community. Theoretical inspiration can come from anywhere, and professional organizations such as ISA now showcase a variety of interests and outlooks at their conferences, suggesting that one can belong to an IR community without being disciplined by a particular conception of the international.

Indeed, if anything, a hallmark of IR as a field of knowledge is that its boundaries are unclear. And while there will always be some who, in their attempt to clarify these boundaries, try to keep the theoretical scope narrow, there will be others who open new doors and offer new ways of seeing, widening the field in the process. To ensure the latter, however, it is crucial for junior scholars to consciously, and visibly, claim theoretical space within IR. If this happens, talk about 'the end' makes no sense. At best, its the end of IR Theory as we know it. PS: The essay sparked a discussion with, among others, Colin Wight (then EJIR editor-in-chief) at the Disorder of Things: http://thedisorderofthings.com/2012/08/03/the-end-of-irtheory-as-we-know-it/

(2) Theories Never Die

This essay was posted on the Duck of Minerva Blog on 18 September 2013 (http://www.whiteoliphaunt.com/duckofminerva/2013/09/19951.html) Having been invited to offer an overall response to the EJIR special issue, I decided to take a look at how the contributors deal with the editors claim that we are witnessing the end of IR Theory. But let me preface this with an observation. The EJIR editors decision to compile this special issue, taken at the 2011 ISA conference in Montreal, occurred parallel to the creation of the ISA Theory Section (in which I was closely involved). While this was not a consciously coordinated effort, neither was it a coincidence. Both initiatives were motivated by a similar concern, namely a sense that there were not enough substantial/creative theoretical discussions in two primary fora of IR discourse: in journals (the EJIR editors view) and at ISA conferences (my view). And yet, the observations spurring the two initiatives are slightly different. The EJIR editors saw a retreat from theory in IR indicated by missing inter-theoretic debate and lack of theory development. My view was that there is quite a bit of theorizing going on, but that it is either happening in inward-looking cliques, or has difficulties making it onto the ISA program because it does not fit the outlook of existing sections. Accordingly, the two initiatives were framed in contrasting ways, namely as (i) debating stagnation, crisis and end (EJIR), and as (ii) supporting and bringing together new thinking (Theory Section). One reason for this contrast lies, I think, in different conceptions of theory and theoretical debate. Whereas the EJIR brief refers to an end of great debates and paradigm wars, that is, a lack of debate between and development of isms, I see fruitful theoretical discussions taking place both inside and outside the isms, albeit not in terms of competition. Related, there is a generational factor. The EJIR editors are established professors and so were the contributors initially selected for the EJIR project; the panels at ISA and BISA did not include a single young scholar [I commented on this elsewhere see above]. So I was curious to read this special issue and see what authors made of the diagnosis that IR theory is at an end. I was pleasantly surprised that the editors themselves ended up answering their own question with No and in the process shifted their diagnostic frame from endism to theoretical pluralism. The picture is supported by two subsequently commissioned pieces, by Jackson/Nexon and by Epstein, which point to areas of thriving theoretical discussions. So does the article by Lake, although his understanding of theory is very different from the aforementioned. Indeed, I think the basic (and not surprising) take home point of this special issue is that the way one addresses the question largely depends on ones conception of theory.

This is already reflected in the confusion about the reality, relevance and impact of the socalled great debates. The picture emerging from the special issue is that these debates existed but also are a distracting fabrication, that they were useful but also stifling, that they captured something important but that most research happened outside them. As for whether there is an end in sight, it appears the one between positivists and nonpositivists is still upon us, but actually it is not a debate but a complete disconnect, with significant disagreements, including over conceptions of theory, in each camp. In this regard the various typologies offered by a few articles capturing different understandings of theory are quite useful. Guzzini advocates what he terms ontological theorizing and similar sounds are made by Reus-Smit and Jackson/Nexon, perhaps also Epstein. I sign up to this approach as well and think Guzzini puts it nicely when saying that theorizing in IR is squeezed between the popularity of empirical theory (translating into hypothesis testing) and the aim to line up with practical knowledge (translating into policy relevance). While not all contributors seem to agree, these two threads are running through the special issue in interesting ways. The first thread deals with the tension between theory and empirical science. Notably, the clearest stance in favour of the former comes from John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt who argue that IR in the United States is experiencing a poverty of theorizing due to the popularity of an instrumental approach to knowledge expressed in the procedure of simplistic hypothesis testing. I think this is an important article. Their candid discussion of the attraction of instrumentalism and the problems arising from it is certainly refreshing, and the call to restore theory to its proper place is likely to raise some heads in the US community. That said, Mearsheimer/Walt do not address that the positivist mindset prevalent in American IR may have something to do with the situation. And while their pessimism regarding improvement beholds proper realists, they might feel better by recognizing that outside the US the theorist is not an endangered species. Michael C. Williams complements Mearsheimer/Walt in holding that good IR theory is a political project that seeks to defend the enlightenment project from the scientists. His claim that classical realism has done that and, consequently, that Waltz killed good IR theory inverses the usual account, but fits with Williams recent work on Morgenthau. Unfortunately, Williams deliberately forgets about critical theory and various IR approaches inspired by it, which arguably pursued the good theory path since the 1980s and more forcefully so than classical realist have. Chris Brown adds yet another reading by suggesting not only that realism and liberalism are alive and kicking, but that out of all major schools of thought they remain the strongest. In comes David Lake, who (as we know) welcomes an end of the isms. Of course, this needs to be taken with a grain of salt, as much of Lakes own work moves within the liberal paradigm. That said, for Lake getting rid of isms means getting rid of bad theory and giving more recognition mid-level theory, which he applauds for its eclecticism and its focus on causal mechanisms. Fair enough. Not everybody needs to engage grand designs of the international or ontological foundations, and thinking through a causal logic is important for making an argument and linking theory to empirical research. And yet, Andrew Bennetts theories of causal mechanisms are micro theories, at best. In fact, I struggle to see more in it than a demand to make hypotheses more specific. This might allow Bennett to portray it as a bridge between schools of thought and even across epistemological gulfs, exemplified in his attempt to sell the approach to interpretivists. But in the end the purpose of the mechanisms approach is to reduce abstraction and bring us closer to accurate measurement. This is not a bridge to theory, it brings us into methodland.

I am split regarding the issue of eclecticism endorsed by Lake and making rounds in American IR via Katzenstein and Sil. Of course, a creative mind needs to be able to ignore and move across boundaries, especially in the process of theory building. But I am on board with Chris Reus-Smit when he criticizes the lack of meta-theoretical reflection in current eclectic approaches. Notably, Reus-Smits call to introduce a deeper level of theorizing to eclecticism pulls the approach in the opposite direction from Bennetts call for paying more attention to causal mechanisms. Whether eclectic analysts can satisfy both demands will be interesting to watch! Inevitably, evaluating the end claim is also tied up with an understanding of the purpose of theory. This is the second thread running through the contributions. Most contributors agree that the purpose is knowledge production, more precisely the generation (and accumulation) of practical knowledge. But what exactly is practical knowledge? I think the answer to this question largely shapes ones conception of and attitude towards theory. As Guzzini points out, building theory through practical knowledge and then making such knowledge the aim of theory also creates a dilemma, at least for those reflecting about this process. And the circle can be taken even further: if we accept that IR theories live on in the mindset of practitioners and, thus, take on a performative life outside the ivory tower, academic discourse might be the wrong place to determine their vitality. But let us return the fold (only to leave it again). For Mearsheimer and Walt, proper theory plays an important role in guiding policy. Brown seems to agree and points out that realist and liberal scholars have been most active in addressing issues of US foreign policy/grand strategy. Thats true, however this hardly makes them more reality based than others. Surely those late-modern theorists Brown mentions in passing that have critically scrutinized the war on terror have been just as reality based. And so, while one should welcome Browns call for critical problem solving theory, aimed at addressing the problem of the underdog, this call is also a bit cheeky given that his article pays limited attention to approaches which characteristically deal with that reality, such as feminism and post-colonialism. Then again, the place of theory in those approaches is far from clear. Indeed, it is revealing that Christine Sylvesters article, in its concern with experiences of ordinary people, hardly discusses theory, or theorizing. Sylvester emphasizes the normative and the practical, but does not seem to care much about theory; for her abstractions stand in the way to the understanding of experience. So I wonder what she makes of Jackson/Nexons notion of experience-near theorizing? And what about Arlene B. Tickners observation that among scholars in the non-Western world theory is either considered unimportant or looks quite different, a thin copy of popular Western approaches at best? For one, together with Sylvesters article, it reminds us that not everybody interested in practical knowledge agrees that creation and refinement of theory is the most important activity (Mearsheimer/Walt). Moreover, it reminds us that any assessment of the end claim must take into account the changing scope and configuration of the field of IR. To capture this, I think Tickners core-periphery framework is too crude and its portrayal of the US as the theory-producing core seems outdated. But then again, some theories never die. PS: The discussion deals with articles published in European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 19, No. 3, September 2013 (http://ejt.sagepub.com/content/19/3.toc)