Sources

(b/hwi) Peter Bergen, Holy War, Inc.

(ms/c) John Miller and Michael Stone, The Cell, (New York - Hyperon; 2002)
(rg) Rohan Gunaratna, Inside al-Qaeda, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002)
(bensim) Daniel Benjamin and Steve Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror, (New York: Random
House, 2002)
(nydc -- 01) New York District Court: Records of Trial of Usama Bin Laden et al (African
Embassy Bombings) beginning 5 Feb. 2001. Opening statements,
(fadl) Testimony of Jamal Ahmed al-Fadl, 6, 7 Feb. 2001, NYDC

[See list of "Players" at end of chron.]

 The March to War Against the United States1

The Critical Juncture

In February 1989, the last Soviet troops pulled out of Afghanistan. The Islamist
leaders of the Jihad confronted the question of "where to go next," where to direct the
"Islamic Army" (as bin Laden himself then titled it) that had evolved in the decade-long war
with the Soviets. This brought to the forefront a growing split between bin Laden, who had in
the recent years become increasingly influenced by a group of militant Egyptians, and his
erstwhile mentor Abdullah Azzam. This would prove to be a decisive fork in the path to
declaration of war against the United States by the transnational terrorist force we now know
as al Qaeda.

Both factions affirmed adherence to the long-standing Islamist goal of re-establishing the
global Caliphate under pure Quranic law (which as a universal given would require eliminating
the Israeli state). Their division was over how to get there.

The Egyptian militants had long ago declared the "apostate" Middle Eastern regimes
to be the principal obstacle to the ultimate objective of re-establishing a pure Islamic
Caliphate, and they saw the emergent Islamic Army as a new force for their long standing
Jihad. By the time the Soviets pulled out bin Laden had come to fully espouse this position.
He was already creating his own organization, (including the central "foundation" - "al
Qaeda") distinct from what he had until then shared with Azzam, and arranging for the
movement of operational resources back to the Middle East. Nearly all of the key positions in
his new organization were held by present or former members of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad.

Azzam did not quarrel with the principal that bringing down these apostate regimes was
essential to the ultimate objective. But he strongly opposed what he considered a diversion of
forces,' funds and other resources from what he insisted was the more immediate task -
completing the establishment of an Islamic state in Afghanistan (although the Soviets had
withdrawn their troops they had left in place a proxy regime). He also argued that the next
priority for the Islamic Army should be expunging the Israeli "occupiers" from the sacred
Muslim lands of Palestine. Whatever resistance might have been sustained by Azzam and his
remaining supporters was taken care of on 24 November 1989 when he was assassinated, along
with two sons, in a car bombing in Peshawar.

Adopting the path of Jihad against the apostate rulers of the Muslims lands would have
almost certainly led inevitably to attacks on those whom the Islamists viewed as the sources, "the
props," of the apostate leaders' power - the U.S. and other western states. The U.S. was in fact
charged with being the prop for both the "far enemy" - Israel - and "near enemies" such as the

' Sources: Hwi, Ch.2, p. 40-62; Bensim, Ch. 3, pp. 95-109; rg, Ch. 1, pp. 16-26. ms/c ... ).
2. In addition to the general sources listed above, the debate between Azzam and bin Laden and the Egyptian
groups is described in testimony by Jamal al-Fadl, an al Qaeda member who was there at the time. (See details
on Fadl in "Players Registry " attached at the end of the Chron) (nydc/6feb01/l 89-95). Re "Islamic Army," see
rg 22-24. Contrary to common wisdom, bin Laden did not form his organization under the title of al-Qaeda. It
was Azzam who conceptualized it in 1987, and his article describing "Al-Qa'aidah al Sulbah," The Solid
Foundation," was laid out in an article of the Arabic Journal Al Jihad in April 1988. Some Arabists have
described it as the "founding document" for the organization that has become known as "al Qaeda." See also hwi
60ff. Fadl has said in his testimony that when bin Laden was initially forming his group, the members referred
to it both as al Qaeda and the Islamic Army, and only later adopted use of the single term al Qaeda. (Fadel
testimony, NYDC 6 February 2001, p.212.)
Mubarek regime in Egypt. (And by this time bin Laden had put the Saudi regime in the same
category.) In this situation, the deployment and ultimately sustained basing of U.S. forces in Saudi
Arabia and the Gulf States in 1990 was a match in an already smoking pit, and provided a
"billboard" for bin Laden's evocations for Jihad.

Thus the evolving "bin Laden doctrine" added a new layer to the hierarchy of targets.
Before the apostate regimes could be brought down, the U.S. military forces had to be evicted
from the region. And as the focus of the Jihad became the U.S., the objectives of the Jihad
would soon expand beyond eviction from the Muslim lands to global attack against the U.S.

The Path

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan provided a common cause for Islamists whose
militancy and motivations had diverse origins. The Afghan battlefield offered a focus for
recruitment of "troops," acquisition of weapons, and the development of a command and
logistic pipeline, including transnational financial sources and movement channels. Many of
the individuals who came from the Middle East to play key leadership roles in the "Afghan
Arab" forces had been engaged in some form of their own Jihad movements long before the
Soviet invasion. These included bin Laden's initial mentor and partner in Pakistan, Abdullah
Azzam, and the Egyptian Islamists that would later comprise most of the inner circle.

Bin Laden linked up with Azzam in Pakistan in 1984, where they jointly
established the Maktab al-Khidmat (MAK, "Bureau of Services"). The MAK served as a
recruiting network hub - bringing fighters to Peshawar, putting them up in guesthouses, and
then dispatching them to training camps in Afghanistan. Azzam had already been a
prominent figure among Islamists long before he moved to Pakistan, preaching for Jihad to
return the historic Muslim lands to the governance of pure Islamic law. He was virulently
anti-Israel, having been born in Palestine in 1941, and after receiving a degree at a Damascus
university in 1966 he had returned to fight against Israel in the 1967 war. In 1973 he took up
studies in Egypt at the al-Azhar University, the most prominent center of Islamic studies,
before becoming professor of Islamic law at Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah. His experience
in Palestine and immersion in the doctrine of ancient Muslim teachers had committed him to
Jihad. Bin Laden was a student at Abdul Aziz in 1981 and many believe he began to be
influenced by Azzam's doctrine then. Azzam was dropped by Abdul Aziz about this time
because of his rhetoric, and migrated to Pakistan where he became a lecturer at the Islamic
University in Islamabad.

According to most accounts, when the MAK was initially formed Azzam was its
doctrinal leader while bin Laden served as his deputy and provided much of the funding.
One of the first branch offices of the MAK was set up in the mid-1980s on Atlantic
Avenue in Brooklyn, under the title al-Kifa, and would become a hub for many of the
participants in the terrorist activities undertaken in the New York area in the early

3. Another teacher at Al-Aziz at the time was Muhammad Qutb, brother of Sayyid Qutb, who had been
executed by Nasser in 1966, but who, as described below, continued to be the most widely read Islamist in the
Middle East and author of what is still considered by many militant Egyptians to be the "manifesto" of their
Islamist groups.
1990s. Azzam assigned his protege Mustapha Shalabi as the initial chief of the Brooklyn
office.4

Azzam also traveled the globe on recruitment and fundraising missions, which
included some 20 trips to US. In 1989, [What month? Must have been before November, for
reasons described below] he made a speech in Oklahoma at a convention of the Muslim
Arab Youth League and Islamic Association for Palestine.5 This convention was the occasion
of an introductory meeting of Wadih el-Hage and Mahmud Abouhalima, both of whom
would later be tied to the terrorist cell associated with the MAK branch in New York. Bin
Laden, meanwhile, essentially confined himself to shuttling between Saudi Arabia and
Pakistan (with occasional ventures into Afghanistan to make his bones as a warrior.) (Bensim
99-101)

In 1987-89 Bin Laden became increasingly influenced by the leaders of the

Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ).6 Most prominent among these was Ayman al-Zawahiri, a
medical doctor, described by some as the leader of EIJ, by others as leader of a "faction" of
the EIJ.7 He had been imprisoned for three years on weapons charges following the
assassination of Sadat on 6 October 1981, and when released he went to Pakistan to provide
medical services to Mujahidin waging Jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Also in
Pakistan at this time was Sheikh Omar Ahmad Abdel Rahman (the "Blind Sheikh"), who
was generally considered to be the spiritual guide of Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ). Many
accounts claim he simultaneously served as spiritual leader for a parallel, similar
organization known as the Egyptian Islamic Group (EIG), headed by Rifai Ahmed Taha.
Rahman had for many years issued public "Fatawas" justifying the terrorist actions of both
groups. He publicly praised the assassination of Sadat in 1981, and was subsequently arrested
and tried for his role, but ended up being acquitted. (Mubarak apparently viewed imprisoning
a/the top Muslim cleric as likely to incite more trouble that it would solve.)

Both the EIJ and the EIG were in effect "rebellious offspring" of the Muslim
Brotherhood. The Brotherhood had emerged in the Middle East in the late 1920s in the
tumultuous post-WWI situation - the Ottoman dominion gone, much of its former territory
placed under control of League of Nation "mandates" (seen by much of the populace in the
region as extension of European colonialism), and Palestine erupting into what would prove
to be an unending conflict. The Muslim Brothers propagated the doctrine that only
"Salafiyya" Islam - Islam purged of impurities and Western influences — could save
Muslims from the colonial powers.

By the 1950s, as the colonial powers begin pulling out, the focus of animosity turned
on leaders of Muslim states who were seen as having accepted western law as a
substitute for the Sharia, ~ "abandoning God's law" and submitting to "man-made law."
(These "apostate" leaders were labeled as "Jahiliyya," a term originally used to described the
"barbarians" existing before the Prophet's message began to be propagated.) Some scholars
framed this issue in terms of the need to deal first with the "near enemy" in their own lands

4. One of Shalbi's early aides was Jamal al-Fadl, who would later go to Afghanistan, and become one of the
early member of al-Qaeda in 1989.
5. A videotape of another of Azzam's recruitment lectures in the U.S., given in 1988, was described in the New
Yorker in 1995.
6. Many who have studied the history of the emergence of al Qaeda have pointed out that the evidence suggests
that the organization was as much a product of the Egyptians Islamists drawing in bin Laden as is was a matter
of his incorporating them into his inner circle. See, for example, rg 25, hwi 199-204; bensim 103.
1'. The "faction leader" description is by Benjamin and Simon, p. 103.
before moving to combat the "far enemy" in Israel. While the "Brothers" first emerged in
Palestine/ Jordan, their doctrine had its most potent appeal and attracted most followers
in Egypt. The Al-Azhar Islamic study center in Cairo became the main site of its
transnational gatherings.

The Brotherhood doctrine nominally did not call for violence, but rather preached a
"bottom up" approach, in which conversion of the masses was seen as the way to create
power that would eventually topple the "Jahili" leaders. Nonetheless, this declared position
did not prevent the movement from engaging in significant incidents of violence in the
ensuing decades.

By the late 1960s factions within and outside the Brotherhood were explicitly rejecting
the "bottom up" concept, declaring that experience demonstrated there was no way the
apostate leaders in the historical Muslim lands would accede to a peaceful transition to a true
Caliphate. This fueled the break off the groups that formed the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and
the Egyptian Islamic Group. While the doctrine of these groups started at the same point as
the Brotherhood - immersion in the Koran - they described it as a basis for forming a
"Revolutionary Vanguard" whose mission was "Jihad" against the existing political
leaders in the lands of the Prophet. (The most influential preacher in this development was
Sayyid Qutb, who was eventually executed by Nasser in 1966, but whose books are still the
most widely read in the militant Muslim world. His "Signpost" treatise is generally
considered to be the manifesto of the militant Egyptian movements. As noted above, his
brother was teaching at Al-Azziz University in Jeddah at the time bin Laden was a student
there.)

Bin Laden and his Egyptian colleagues saw the Islamic Army that matriculated from
the Jihad against the Soviets as having created this "vanguard," and the main question was
where to employ it next. (Bin Laden, in fact referred to his organization as the Islamic Army,
of which al Qaeda was only a central leadership "foundation.") With the defeat of the
Soviets, the Egyptians not surprisingly wanted to take the army back to pursue their
fundamental objective of ousting the apostate leaders in the lands of Islam, starting in
Egypt, but extending through the region.

Azzam's insistence on focusing the Islamic Army's resources on finishing the job
in Afghanistan and then turning to the enemy in Palestine presumably was at least in part
because of his experience in Palestine. According to some sources he also was skeptical
about the reality of prospects - at least under the existing circumstances - for ousting the
Middle Eastern rulers through militant actions. This was a form of the debate among the
Islamists that scholars had in earlier years described as contesting priorities between the "near
enemy" and the "far enemy."

Bin Laden was conveniently back in Saudi Arabia at the time Azzam was
assassinated. He has since routinely praised Azzam, but many suspect he was behind the
killing. (Or perhaps it was the Egyptians who initiated and pulled it off, while bin Laden
adopted a "don't ask, don't tell" position.)

By this time bin Laden was already well down the road in forming his organization.
Its inner circle was dominated by members of Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Zawahiri was his
principal deputy. Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri, former Egyptian police officer and prominent
participant in the Jihad battlefield in Afghanistan, was the first "military chief," while
Muhammed Atef, (aka Abu Hafs al Masry) another EU member, was deputy chief of
operations, and ultimately would succeed Banshiri after his death a few years later.
According to several sources with direct access, at the same time Zawahiri held this
principal deputy position in al Qaeda's Shura, he continued to run EIJ,8 and the two
organizations pursued a common agenda in Egypt. (Members of al Qaeda who have since
defected or been apprehended have said many key players belonged simultaneously to both al
Qaeda and a terrorist entity in their countries of origin.)

According to an al Qaeda defector who formally joined the organization in its

founding stages,9 other members of the initial inner circle or "Shura," whom the source knew
only by their pseudonyms, included:
• An additional Egyptian - Sheikh Sayyid el Masry.
• Three Saudis (in addition to bin Laden - Abu Musab al Saudi, Abu Saad al
Sharif Abu Mohamed Saudi, and Abu Fadl al Makkee)..
• Three Iraqis - Mamudh Salim, aka Abu Hajer who managed finances and
weapon procurement; Abu Ayoub and Abu Burhan.
• A Yemeni (Abu Farij); a Libyan (Saif al Liby); an Omani (Khalifa al
Muscat), and a Nigerian (Qaricrpt al Jizaeri).

Beneath the Shura were a series of committees, usually chaired by one or more
members of the Shura. These included
• The military committee, initially chaired by Banshiri with Atef as his deputy
(and ultimate successor).
• A finance or "business" committee, initially chaired by Abu Fadhl al Masry.
• A Fatawa Committee, chaired by Abu Saad al Sharif Abu Mohamed Saudi.

This composition, and the linkages and affiliations that the organization has since
demonstrated suggest that the most apt title for it would the one under which it has issued its
"Fatawa" enjoining it Muslim "brothers" to holy war against the "crusaders" - "The
International Islamic Front."

Meanwhile, at the same time that the contest over the future of the Afghan Arab
Islamic Army is taking place in Afghanistan/Pakistan, a cell was cementing its ties in New
York and contesting the same issues.

1989

July 89; In New York, law enforcement officials had received a tip that a "Palestinian
group" associated with the al-Kifah Center was planning bombings of Atlantic City casinos.
[Bensim say the group was identified as fellow-worshippers of the Farouq Mosque, but this is
not a significant distinction because the mosque was the "spiritual office" of al-Kifa.] A Joint
Terrorism Task Force (JTTF, established by the FBI and NYPD in 1980, according to ms/c -
34) assigned an NYPD group (headed by Tom Corrigan) to put the al-Kifah/Farouq subjects
under surveillance. This led to the observation, and photographing, of a dozen of them
engaging in shooting exercises at Calverton range on eastern Long Island. Photos were

*. Testimony of Jamal Ahmad al-Fadl, NY District Court, 6 February 2001, p221.

9. Jamal al Fadl Testimony, pp. 193-211.
taken on four consecutive weekends. The participants, whose identities were not all
determined at the time the photographs were obtained, included El-Sayyid Nosair,
Mohammed Salameh (Palestinian), Nidal Ayyad, Clement Hampton-El (aka "Dr. Rashid
because of his job as a hospital worker) Mahmud Abouhalima (Egyptian, aka "Mahmud the
Red" because of his hair). Some participants wearing T-shirts with Jihad slogans, some with
title "Services Office," and some with a map of Afghanistan. One of the instructors
[according to ms/c] was a tall African-American identified a year and a half later as Richard
Smith, who in late 1990 became a suspect in a gun running investigation. Another instructor,
not identified at the time, was AH Mohamed, who had been a sergeant at Fort Bragg, N.C.
[Was he still in the army at that time?] The weapons being used included AD-47s, 357 and
9mm pistols, shotguns, and other rifles, (ms/c 51, 58; Bensim 5.)
• This group [according to ms/c, p. 50] began to be pulled together by Nosair as early as
1987. In addition to those seen in the photos at the firing range, the group included a
person named Bilall Alkaisi, a Palestinian who had also trained in Afghanistan. The
weapons training, (again according to ms/c) had already begun a year earlier, in various
upstate NY sites.
• Nosair was by this time already having regular conversations with the Blind Sheikh,
informing him of the Nosair group's training, and he would later assistjhe Sheikh in
settling into New York. (Tapes of some conversations, that had been played in the Farouq
mosque, reportedly are in possession of NYPD or JTTF.). The contacts had begun a year
earlier, (1988) according to the same sources, (ms/c 50ff; bensim 3-6.) [How did Nosair
initially get in contact with Rahman ?]

October 89, Bin Laden bribed Pakistan parliamentarians to support a no confidence

resolution against Benazir Bhutto. She narrowly survived the vote on 1 Nov. In a later
interview, Bhutto said some parliamentarians who had been offered money told her the
money was coming from come from Saudi sources. She said she queried the Saudi
government and they told her bin Laden put up the money. She said that was the first she had
heard of bin Laden. She believed the scheme had been set up by chief of Pakistani intelligence
(ISI)., who had been running the CIA support channels to the Afghan mujahidin and who had
both the motivation and the necessary connections to set up the scheme, (hwi 61-62)

24 November 89: Azzam assassinated. Bin Laden has returned to Saudi Arabia.

[Note: Another person in Pakistan at this time for whom there is no record of a role in the
debates then taking place, but who would subsequently emerge as a significant operative in
the al Qaeda organization, was Wadih el-Hage. He had in fact been there on previous stints,
e.g. living there in 1983-84 at the time the MAK was formed, when he is said to have been
Azzam; back in 86-87, then back in late 89-90. (nydc/5febO 1/32-37, 57-58)]

Late 1989/early 1990: The Sudanese National Islamic Front, which had come to
power in collaboration with a military junta in mid-1989, sent a small delegation to bin Laden
to invite him to move his organizational base to Sudan. Jamal al-Fadl, (joined al Qaeda in
1989 but later broke with it and sought asylum in the US) says he attended a meeting with this
delegation, and later learned that it had connections to Sudanese intelligence services.) Fadl
says that bin Laden and the Shura members saw some clear advantages to the offer - e.g.,
support from Hassan al-Turabi, Emir of what was in effect the most successful effort, outside
Iran, of establishing an Islamist state, and proximity to the middle eastern states which were
the focus of the Jihad against apostate regimes. Some Shura members, including bin Laden,
felt a need to learn a bit more before making a final decision. So bin Laden dispatched a
reconnaissance team to Sudan (Abu Hamman al Saudi, Abu Hajer al Iraqi, Abu Hassan al
Sudani, and Abu Rida al Suri, a Syrian). They gave a favorable report on their return,
according to what Fadl says he heard in the guesthouse discussions. (nydc/6feb01/219, 233)

1990

Early 1990: Bin Laden is in Saudi Arabia, already laying groundwork for move to
Sudan. Fadl is one of those sent there to begin renting houses, etc. (Discussed at length in
Fadl testimony, described below re end 90/beginning 91. Also versions given in hwi 78-79
rg29, bensimllO)

July 1990; Sheik Omar Abdel-Rahman, spiritual leader of EU, GAI, arrives in
the US, on visa obtained in Sudan. Has initial welcome from Shalabi, [rg says Rahman's
visa was in fact sponsored by Shalabi] but the two soon split over where the Alkhifa money
should be devoted - essentially the same debate as taking place between Azzam and bin
Laden/Egyptian groups. Shalabi wanted the money to go to Afghanistan refugees, while
Rahman - and the Nosair group, who had in fact had been clashing with Shalabi even before
Rahman arrived - wanted if to go to a global jihad. Nosair and his supporters, and had been
lobbying Rahman since his arrival to change the al-Kifah leadership. Rahman moves to
Jersey City, (ms/c 53, 64; bensim 6. rg 101)

5/7? August 1990. Following Iraq invasion of Kuwait, bin Laden offers himself and
his holy warriors to fight Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, turned down by Saudi regime. Launches
verbal attack on US presence, supported by some Islamic preachers, (hwi 77)

5 November 1990: Rabbi Meir Kahane, founder of Jewish Defense League,

assassinated at Marriott Hotel in Manhattan, by Nosair. Nosair was accompanied by co-
conspirator Bilall Alkaisi who chickened at last minute and ducked out. Getaway car was to
be driven by Mahmoud Abouhalima ("red"). Missed connection because of parking
confusion, Nosair hijacks taxi, but it quickly runs into blockage, Nosair wounded in shootout,
arrested. Alkaisi meanwhile gets to Nosair's own car in lot, where Mohammed Salameh
waiting. Escape.
» Within hours, JTTF agents Napoli and Anticev review photos of training at Calverton
range, recognize Nosair. (No others identified for some months.) Early morning, NYPD
arrive at what they believe is Nosair's apt.in Jersey City (also by then saying they knew
Nosair had accomplices. [How did they know that soon? Did they have a record because
of earlier suspicions? If so, what led to that? ms/c claim Napoli and John Antichev
reviewed Calverton photos within hours of shooting, recognized Nosa, r, but did not then
ID others.] At Jersey City apartment, find Abouhalima and Salameh, who are not yet
identified as the accomplices but who are nonetheless taken in for questioning. Admit
they had been at hotel at time of shooting, say Nosair no longer lives at their address. (The
records would subsequently confirm that in 1988, when Nosair got his janitor job in
Brooklyn, he had changed his address to his cousins apt. (Cousin name Ibrahim el-
Gabrowny, who would later also be identified as a player.) Abouhlima and Salameh were
released next day on grounds evidence insufficient to charge them, (ms/c 42-43)
* 6 November 90: NYPD identify Nosair's true address (Cliffside, N.J.) [Again, how?]
Find and remove 16 boxes of materials, including training manuals from Fort Bragg,
teletypes between high-level US officials, all believed [when?] to have been provided by
Ali Mohamed. [When?]. Bomb making manuals, maps of landmarks like Statue of
 Liberty, Times Square, Rockefeller Center and World Trade Center. Also in apartment
was notebook on Jihad objectives, "attacking all those who waged war against Allah," and
passages alluding to destruction value of big buildings versus "symbols." Also included
were tapes of various speeches by Azzam. Boxes taken to 17th Precinct, (ms/c 45, bensim
100, 235) [Check press coverage?] [rg 101-02 says assassination done under Rahman's
orders, and that Rahman convicted of this in NY.]
* 8 November 90: The 16 boxes that had been found by NYPD in Nosair's apartment are
picked up by FBI, and returned to Manhattan DA three days later. Most documents were
not translated, nor were the taped speeches by Azzam reviewed, for next 3 yrs, until the
TERRSTOP trial, (ms/c 45-46; bensim 100, 235; hwi 131ff)

End 1990/Beginning 1991: Preparations well along for move to Sudan. Many of bin
Laden's troops already moved from Pakistan, much of logistic and support structure in place.
By this time Fadl, using money from Zawahiri, has purchased a farm north of Khartoum for
$250,000 and a salt farm near Port Sudan for $180,000 with money given him finance
committee chairman Abu Fadhl al-Makkee. The instructions for these purchases were from
Banshiri. Fadl says the process of setting up the move was facilitated by Sudanese
intelligence officers who provided letters enabling things to be brought in without customs
inspections. Says bin Laden told him Sudanese were "opening doors." (nydc/6feb01/234-39)
• There are also reports that in this time period bin Laden dispatched equipment, money
and training materials to assist the MILF in the Philippines, and helped set up there the
Abu Sayyaf Brigade, named after one of the dominant Afghan Jihadists. (Bensim 112)
Other sources (Philippine police tape of Abu Sayyaf member's confession) say Ramzi
Yousef was one of those whom bin Laden sent to the Philippines for this purpose.
(See Manila Times, 26 April 2002.)

1991

.Tan.-Feb. 1991: NY JTTF beginning to identify others in photos of Calverton

shooting range. Is at this time that they identify one of trainers as Richard Smith, who is by
that time a suspect in gun running case in Brooklyn black Muslim community. Gun running
case had been underway since fall of 1990, about time of Kahane assassination. Early 1991,
NYPD leam Smith tied to Brooklyn gun dealer Edward Ransom, security operator at a radical
mosque (al-Taqwa) located near Farouq mosque where al-Kifah based, and obtain a picture of
two together. Poses question for police of extent of association between black Muslim
gunrunners and militants, and Arabs from al-Kifah Services center. Within next few months,
would tie the gunrunners to a robbery crew known as the "forty thieves" led by person named
Marcus Robinson, who would later be discovered to have connections with "Dr. Rashid," a
person also photographed at Calverton shooting range, (ms/c 60-63)

1 March 1991: Al-Kifah Emir Shalabi found dead. Last seen alive 26 February, the
day before he had been slated to leave for Egypt. A few days before the body was found,
Wadjh al-Hage had arrived there from [Tucson according to hwi and ms/c, Texas according to
bensim, and nydc trial record] and assisted in the taking over of Alkhaifa by bin Laden
loyalist. [According to ms/c] a Yemeni named Abdul Wali Zindani also had already arrived
in Brooklyn to "investigate" Shalabi's handling of finances, and would ultimately take charge
of running Alkhifa. (Hage would depart for Sudan about a year later.) (ms/c 64, hwi 134-135,
bensim 104, rg p. 24)
 10

April 1991. Bin Laden leaves Saudin Arabia for Pakistan. Stage in move to Sudan,
(hwi 79)

May 1991: Group of Saudi Islamic scholars that became known as "the Awakened
Sheikhs" send "Letter of Demands" to Saudi regime, includes demand for return to Sharia
and shedding western influence. Many jailed in ensuing years. Bin Laden would later (e.g. in
CNN interview of May 1997) express support he said he felt at the time. (Bensim 107-08.
Note below that Bergen p.88 identifies this as having been sent in the "summer of 1992, and
becoming the catalyst for formation of Advice and Reformation Committee.)

Summer 1991: Bin Laden arrives Sudan. Reportedly quickly establishes "symbiotic
relationship" with Turabi. Engages in multiple economic ventures, building roads, etc.
Global bank accounts, mega bucks. Simultaneously setting up training camps, while keeping
guest-houses operating in Pakistan. Sources put number of al Qaeda members in Sudan at
this time at 1,000 to 2,000. [Seems high, but depends on definition of "member."]
• Process begins of establishing companies under bin Laden aegis to serve both as
sources of revenue and as channels for holding and moving financial support for
terrorist operations. [Following is Fadl description of what was established over the
next few years. Does not give dates for individual companies so this list should be
read as what unfolded beginning about this time and was filled out by about 1994.]
• "Mother company" is Wadi al-Aqiq. Others included Bin Laden International, used
for importing and exporting materials, Taba Investment, one of whose functions was
conversion of currency for the operators, Hija Construction for building roads and
bridges (as part of the deal with the Sudanese regime for providing the base) and that
served as a channel for buying explosives:Themar al Mubaraka. a farming enterprise
earning revenues and at the same time providing turf for training camps, including for
production and employment of explosives; also a vegetable company which would
eventually have five farms; and the Al Qudurat Transportation company, serving as a
means for buying and dispensing trucks. Among individuals involved at the camps for
training in weapons and explosives were Salem al Masery, Saif el Adel, [most
recently identified as the primary suspect in masterminding the multiple bombing
attacks in Saudi Arabia on 12 May 2003] and Abu Talha al Sudani.
(nydc/6feb01/240-246)
• Also actively setting up Khartoum guesthouses, offices and residences for al Qaeda
members, eventually will purchase building in the Riyadh City section of Khartoum.
(nydc/6feb01/pp. 243-249)
• Assigns Harun Fazil. a Camoran islander and head of the Nairobi cell, to prepare
ground for "militarizing" East African cells. Farms used as bomb training bases.
• Sets up office in Baku to support Chechens; sends fighters to Tajikistan; supports
Philippine Moro group, smuggles arms to Yemen and Egypt. Linked to Vienna-based
Third World Relief Agency, which funneled money to Bosnians, and sets up NGO in
Baku. Bin Laden established a branch of the "Services Office" in Zagreb. Forged
alliances with other Egyptian groups, Algerian Armed Islamic Group, Libyan group,
Yemen's Saif Islamic Jannubi, and Syrian Jamaat al-Suri. (hwi 79-86; rg 32-33;
bensim 27, 111-13) [Note: the descriptions by all three authors are sufficiently
general as to time that they could also be interpreted as summarizing developments
over the next few years. The unambiguous "done by' date is mid 1995, based on Fadl
testimony described below.]
 11
Also in Summer 1991: JTTF agents Napoli and Anticev find evidence that
Abouhalima is working on bomb making materials in his apartment, (ms/c 65) At this time
the FBI has on its payroll an informant named Emad Salem, (bensim 17)

[Note: Bin Laden contributed $20,000 for Nosair's trial defense, presumably sometime in this
period.1

End 1991/beginning 1992: Fadl told by Banshiri, "need you to work in Nairobi," Kenya.
Told to take his family along and settle in. Told he would meet two persons, (incl. Abu
Oaidba al Masrv) who would provide him a house and help settle in. Was given envelop for
delivery, and was asked for it on his arrival in Nairobi. Shortly after that, was told by Abu
Qaidba that after a phone conversation with bin Laden it had been decided he should proceed
to Pakistan. Returned for a few months, with wife, and was then told by Atef that bin Laden
and Abu Fadl al Makkee had decided that they "need [him] in Sudan." Returned to Sudan but
was told not to take his wife with him. (nydc/6feb01/310-13)

1992

Early 1992: Discussions are beginning to be held in Sudan guesthouses on forming a

Fatawa calling for the eviction of the U.S. forces from the Gulf area, according to Fadl.
(nydc/6feb01/266)

Summer of 1992. Sometime in this period Hage leaves NY for Sudan to become bin
Laden's secretary, (hwi 135.) [Note: This according to Bergen p.88 is when "letter of Demand" is sent.]
Also about this time, according to bensim p. 26-27, the various front companies and money
moving channels bin Laden has been setting up includes an off-shore subsidiary in Nairobi,
Kenya. [Check statements of Fadl, et al.]

August 1992: Fadl instructed by bin Laden and Shura to travel to Budapest, meet
with person there named Abdallah Izzeldine. Has now Hungarian visa, and thus is jailed for
five days upon arrival, until Izzeldine shows up with visa. Is then sent to Zagreb to study
some "business," and bring back report. (nydc/6febO 1/314-16)

August 1992: Rahman dials number (810604) in Pakistan. (Bensim 7. [How and
when did we know this?])

1 September 1992: Ramzi Yousef arrives at Kennedy Airport, from Peshawar via
Karachi. Iraqi passport arouses suspicions. (See Mylroie for details of passport
inconsistencies.) Responds to questions by immediately asking for asylum, is taken aside for
an interview, fingerprinted, given a court appearance date, let go. (Obviously did not meet
court date.)
* Accompanied by person named Ahmad Ajaj whose poorly forged Swedish passport
results in a search of luggage, discovery of bomb manuals, video of instructions, includes
statements about waging "war" against "enemies of God," and depicting demolition of an
American building. Ajaj was a Palestinian who had been deported from Israel to Jordan in
April 1991. In September of that year he went to the U.S. and applied for asylum, taking
residence in Houston. In April 1992, with the asylum request still unresolved, he went to
Pakistan, worked at the MAK. July 1992 traveled to Islamabad seeking a visa to return to
U.S. Encountered Yousef, who said he too was going to the U.S., offered to help him.,
(bensim 7-8, 235; 1m 95) [Get more detail from Ajaj trial and appeal hearing.)
 12

1 September 1992: Ramzi Yousef arrives at Kennedy Airport, from Peshawar via
Karachi. Iraqi passport arouses suspicions. (See Mylroie for details of passport
inconsistencies.) Responds to questions by immediately asking for asylum, is taken aside for
an interview, fingerprinted, given a court appearance date, let go. (Obviously did not meet
court date.)
* Accompanied by person named Ahmad Ajaj whose poorly forged Swedish passport
results in a search of luggage, discovery of bomb manuals, video of instructions, includes
statements about waging "war" against "enemies of God," and depicting demolition of an
American building. Ajaj was a Palestinian who had been deported from Israel to Jordan in
April 1991. In September of that year he went to the U.S. and applied for asylum, taking
residence in Houston. In April 1992, with the asylum request still unresolved, he went to
Pakistan, worked at the MAK. July 1992 traveled to Islamabad seeking a visa to return to
U.S. Encountered Yousef, who said he too was going to the U.S., offered to help him.,
(bensim 7-8, 235; 1m 95) [Get more detail from Ajaj trial and appeal hearing.)
» "Within two days" (bensim 7, compare with ms/c) Yousef moves into Salameh's Jersey
City appartment, contacts Abouhalima. Shortly thereafter gatherings are also joined by
Ayad and Eyad Ismoil, and an upstairs neighbor named Abdul Yasin, who is of Iraqi
origin.
* Yousef has frequent phone conversations with Sheikh Rahman and both regularly dial the
Pakistan number 810604. (How and when did we know this?) (Bensim 8-9)

Fall 1992: Salem role as informant suspended over dispute with FBI over his
unwillingness to agree to testify in court, and reportedly some suspicions that he was
manufacturing some of the information he was passing on. He is thus off the payroll at time
ofWTCI. (bensim 18)

November 1992: Over a 12-day stretch, Yousef and team purchase from City
Chemical company in Jersey City some 1500 Ibs. of Ureal [check what this is], 30 gallons of
nitric acid, other chemicals. Process of building the bomb, bringing together the crew, and
surveying the target was underway, (bensim 9-11)

Late 1992: A Fatawa is again formulated on the need to evict the U.S. from the
Islamic lands, according to Fadl. This was followed by another after the U.S. troops deployed
to Somalia. ((nydc/6febO 1/266)

December 1992: Bombing outside hotels in Aden where US troops are staying
enroute to Somalia. Bergen says al-Qaeda "affiliates" carried it out One source says person
who managed bombings was Tariq al-Fadhili, son of deposed sultan of a region near Aden.
Fadhili fought in Afghanistan in 1980s, reported to have linked up with bin Laden then.
Returned to Yemen in 1989, known as leader of affiliation of Afghan Arabs. Got funding
from bin Laden. Initially arrested by Yemen authorities after December 92 bombing, but no
action taken. Later, following 1994 North Yemen defeat of communist south, Afghan Arabs
folded into new regime. Fadhili now holds position in Yemeni government, (hwi 81-82, 172-
73.)
 13

1993

Early 1993: Bin Laden sets up cell in Nairobi, channel for sending weapons trainers
into Somalia. One trainer sent at this time was Mohamed Odeh, who had joined bin Laden
organization in early 90s, trained in Afghan camps on explosives, weapons, and guerilla
combat operations. Also deeply involved in supporting the Somalia efforts was Atef. (Abu
Hafs) (nydc 5feb01/26-27; 6feb01/281-83)
• About this same time yet another Fatawa discussion takes place, this time on
the presence of U.S. forces in "the land of the two sacred sites."
• Also discussions on the longstanding duty to attack apostates who cooperate
with the occupiers. Includes discussion of killing civilians, which is said to be
justified if in the larger cause. (nydc/6feb01/266-68)

Also Early 1993: After returning to Sudan to deliver his report from the Balkans, Fadl
is sent to Jordan to deliver $100,000 cash, drawn from a bin Laden account in the Shami Bank
in Sudan, to someone named Abu Akram Urdani (Urdani means Jordanian). Cash was to go
to the Abu Ali group, which Fadl describes as an "al Qaeda member" working inside
Palestine and Jordan. Says when he arrived at Amman, Akram arranged for bag not to be
checked at customs. (nydc/6feb01/316-19) ~
Also somewhere in this time frame, Fadl was involved in using camels to smuggle AK-47
rifles to EIJ in Egypt. (nydc/6feb01/316

February 1993: WTC I

> Mid-February: Bomb nearly complete, vehicles being rented.
> 23 February: Ayyad uses corporate account of employer Allied Signal to rent getaway
car (to be driven by Salameh, who has already had two driving accidents in the past 30
days) and Salameh rents bomb delivery van from Ryder in Jersey City.
> 25 February: Explosives, loaded into three cylinders, delivered to storage bin, then
loaded onto ban. Yousef and Ismoil move into Motor Inn, Brooklyn, to be closer,
with van parked out front. Meanwhile, Salameh reports to police that van he rented
has been stolen
> 26 February: Van parked in delivery lane at WTC, Yousef and Ismoil get in getaway
car, bomb goes off at 12:18. Six killed, over 1,000 injured, $.5 billion in damages.
That evening, Yousef boards Pakistani international Airways to Karachi [according to
Mylroie, under name and passport of Basil. Check her source.] Couple hours later,
Ismoil flies to Amman, (bensim 10-11)
• Earlier same day: (about 1500) Salameh goes to DIB Ryder leasing, informs of
"theft," asks for rebate of $400 deposit. Told to present police report.
Meanwhile, investigators find vehicle identification number on piece of
demolished van frame, begin tracing that leads to DIB leasing. (Bensim 12)
> 27 February: Ayyad calls NY Daily News, claims responsibility [under name of 5th
Battalion, Liberation Army] mails letter to NYT.
> 1 March: Salameh again goes to Ryder rental, again turned away. By now FBI
knows of rental. (Meanwhile, Ajaj is mistakenly released because he has served his six
months incarceration for illegal entry.)
> 4 March: Salameh (has plane ticket to depart next day to Germany) again returns to
Ryder rental, again turned away. By now, under surveillance. Arrested as leaves
Ryder office.
• Same day, FBI interviews Abdul Rahman Yasin (upstairs neighbor of
Salameh), conclude he is cooperative, do not detain.
 14

> 5 March: Yasin flies to Amman. (Same day Salameh had planned to leave. (Bensim
12-13)
> 10 March: Ayyad arrested.
> 12 March(approx.) At request of FBI, who had been tracking Abouhalima, Egyptians
arrest him and, after some torture interrogation, turn him over to U.S. (Picked up by
FBI aircraft and returned to U.S.) (ms/c 109; bensim 15)

Shortly after attack and arrests, Salem put back on informant payroll. [See Miller.]

April/May 1993: Investigators begin to link Ajaj to conspiracy, arrested and charged
along with the others. (Im95)

23 June 1993: FBI TERRSTOP operation, pre-empts scheme for bombing multiple
NY landmarks, sweeps up Blind Sheikh, 10 other members of plot. By this time the plotters
had already begun mixing the explosives. In a pre-emptive move, the FBI (with benefit of
Salem info, sweeps them up. (Bensim 18-19)
In months following WTC 93, Rahman entourage seeking to design follow-up. Consultations
with Nosair in Attica prison. (How and when did we know this?) Players include Nosair
cousin Ibrahim el-Gabfowny, Clement Hampton-El (aka Dr. Rashid who had fought in
Afghanistan and had been wounded in leg), Sudanese Siddiq AH, another Sudanese Amir
Abdelgani. Latter two begin casing targets.
Salem, back in the informant role, had been an Egyptian army officer and used his experience
with arms and a means of ingratiating himself with the plotters, and thus was able to provide
necessary info to FBI. Lincoln and Holland tunnels among targets selected.
More volunteers: Fares Khallafalla; Mohammed Saleh; Victor Avarez, Puerto Rican convert.
Four more for total of 11.

Mid-late 1993: Al Qaeda operatives begin casing U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Par
e-salaam. Plan would be called "Operation Kaaba," (Nairobi) and "Operation al-Aqsa" Dar e-
Salaam). Acquisition of bomb vehicles asigned to Sheikh Ahmad Slim Swedan [when?].
Bomb making actions under supervision of Abdel Rahman [not Sheikh] an Egyptian with
long experience in Afghanistan and Somalia. Ali Mohamed and Anas al-Liby go to Nairobi to
take photos. [Discs of surveillance photos discovered years later, after bombings. Where
found? Where are they now?] (According to testimony of Mohamad in NY. Also Bensim 27-
28)

Late 1993: Fadl says he was told sometime in the last part of 1993 that he should be
prepared to be sent to Somalia, to "cut off the head of the snake (the U.S. army) who has
come to the Horn of Africa. (nydc/6feb01/281-83)

3-4 October 1993: "Black Hawk Down" incident in Somalia, 19 U.S. troops killed.
Bin Laden would later tell Bergen and Arnett in CNN interview aired 10 May 1997 that his
"Afghan Arabs" had played a major role in training, equipping Somalis who carried it out. Al
Qaeda operational planner Atef said to have traveled to Somalia twice in 1993 to case options,
(hwi 81-82, citing his own interview of Fadl and Fadl testimony Feb 2001, and court record
May 2001)

[When?] 1993 Bin Laden named as "unindicted co-conspirator" in WTC attack.

although not much known of his connection, because his name "cropped up" several times.
 15

Name not included in that year's report for Congressional Task Force on Terrorism, (hwi 115;
DM check of CTF list.)

1993: Egyptians initiate pressure on Pakistan to crack down on militants. Ultimately

leads to retaliatory attacks in 1995. See below.(hwi 90-91)

1994

Feb/March 1994: . Saudi regime freezes Bin Laden assets, ((hwi 89 March, rg34
Feb.)

March 1994: U.S. completes withdrawal from Somalia. Odeh has been sent back to
Kenya (perhaps as early as the end of 1993) where he sets up a fishing business (cover op) in
Mombasa. Atef also there, and Banshiri is already established in Nairobi (arrived late
93/early 94?]. (bensim 130; nydc5feb01/pp20-27, 30-31) [Note: hwi 106 has all of this
taking place around mid-1995.)

1994 FWhen?1: Muslim north Yemen attacks, defeats secular socialist south Yemen.
Spiritual leader is Sheikh Abdul Majid al-Zindani, who with Tariq al-Fadhili become part of
the new Yemen under President Salih's government. Bin Laden ties close. At one time in
1997 considered moving his base back there, (rg 27 says bin Laden financed Fadhili from
start in 89-90)

April 1994; Group of Saudi exiles sets up in London the "Committee for the Defense
of Legitimate Rights, " which becomes a major voice of criticism of Saudi regime. Bin Laden
gives support, follows soon with his own organization in London. (Bensim 131.)

July 1994: Bin Laden forms Advice and Reformation Committee (ARC) "only for
Arabs" [according to Fadl] as platform for propagating opposition to Saudi regime. Main
office in London, Khalid al-Fawwaz. who had been in Nairobi, is appointed to head it. Fadl
knew him only under alias, but did know that his first name was Khalid. the firstr (hwi 88; rg
34; bensim 131.)

[When?11994: Ali Mohamed returns to U.S. from Sudan in response to summons for
interview in connection with trial of Blind Sheikh et al in Landmarks case. Afterward, Atef
tells him not to return to Sudan to avoid leading American authorities to al-Qaeda's "front
step." (Bensim 131, 236. note: 236 gives date of return as 1993 - apparent error as it doesn't
fit with other records of Ali Mohamed movements, and is contradicted by bensim's own
statements on p. 131.)

Late 1994: Hage sent to Sudan to set up support base as businessman, heads office of
a relief agency called "Help African People," bankrolled by German muslim money. (Bensim
130; nydc5feb01/30-31) [Kenya cell will remain in place after bin Laden leaves Sudan.]
Hage works for relief agency "Help African People," bankrolled by German Muslim money.
(nydc5feb01/61) (Court statements make reference to some document that Hage presented in
1997 calling for "military activity?" p62. Check)
 16

14 December 1994: Bomb explodes on Philippine airlines flight from Manila to

Tokyo, killing one Japanese businessman. Parts include Casio watch wiring device (Yousef
signature technique) found. (Bensim 23))

1995

7 January 1995: Manila, Philippine police respond to fire in apartment on President

Quirino Avenue, discover "bomb factory," papers indicating terrorist targeting of Pope
(scheduled to visit Manila 20 January), also a schedule of various airline flights. Deduce plan
to attack some 12 commercial flights. Initially thought to be Abu Sayyaf plot. Following
days US FAA notified. Apartment rented by Yousef. Papers found include business card of
Jamal Khalifa, Saudi businessman, NGO official, brother-in-law of bin Laden; learn he had
paid for Yousef s apartment. Plot would become known as "Bojinka." .[In following days,
Philippine authorities would deduce that the December 94 aircraft bomb was carried out by
Yousef, as an experiment. Carried bomb on plane in Manila, left it when he got off airplane
at stopover in Cebu.] (Bensim 21-22. Much detail left out - see DM paper for Australia
venture.)

25 February 1995: Combined U.S. - Pakistani forces in Islamabad raid apartment,

capture Yousef, go straight to airport and fly him to U.S. (One source says tip came from
Yousef associate assigned earlier in February to deliver explosives to aircraft leaving
Bangkok, saw that a rigorous baggage check was underway, left and dispensed explosives,
called in tip re Yousef. (Bensim 25)

8 March 1995: ARC issues communique charging Saudi regime with array of sins,
especially use of "Man made laws" not part of sharia. (hwi 89)

May 1995 attempt at Mubarak assassination at meeting in Abbas Ababa. [Believed to

have been generated by Egyptian pressures on Pakistan to crack down on terrorist entities.]
[rg 38 says it was June 95?]

1995. Reports that bin Laden meets with Imad Mughniyeh, Iran-based head of
Hizballah (some say member of Iranian intelligence) that had arranged 1983 truck bombing of
marines in Lebanon (killing 241) and leading to the American pull out of Lebanon. Witness
says Bin Laden said he wanted to follow that model, (hwi 85, citing Ali Mohamed plea
agreement in NY, October 2001; and Hala Jaber, Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance, [NY:
Columbia University Press, 1997) pp. 115-20)
 17

Connections and collaborative relationships. [nydc/6feb01/290-295, 299, ] By this

time frame, according to Fadl, discussions were underway among al Qaeda leadership
circles on the need to persuade Sunni and Shiites to put aside differences to fight the
common enemy, "the westerns." Fadl said the two senior al Qaeda members, Saif al
Islam el Masry and Abu Talha Sudani, told him they had already gone to Lebanon to
receive training from Hizbollah Shiites there on how to use explosives, and that he
knew that others trained there included Abu Jaffer al Masry, Salem al Masry, and Saif
al Adel.
Fadl also describes ongoing collaborative relations with other Islamist groups.
He claims that from the early days of al Qaeda's foundation it and the Egyptian
Islamic Group (GAI) helped each other in carrying out their agendas. (Says in early
1990, the GAI leadership base was in Sudan, and that at that time Sheikh Rahman was
its spiritual leader, succeeded by Abu Talal el Masry. Also, the Emir, or operational
leader, of GAI organization in Sudan was Abu Yasser al Masry (spelling used by rg, p.
38 is Yasir. GAI signature on '98 Fatawa is Rifia Ahmed Tana? Need to sort out)
Other groups that were part of the al Qaeda consortium included the Algerian
GIA, and an entity he called the Libyan Fighting Group, some of whose members,
including Jaffer al Liby, Abu Anas al Liby, Abu Abdel Qader al Liby, and Ham/allah al
Liby (who had worked in Pakistan helping with passports and travel documents), held
dual membership. Fadal also said Zawahiri headed a separate group of Egyptians called
Talah e Fatah. Fadel also claims he was at one time being considered as one of the
persons to be dispatched to join efforts underway to support the rebels in Chechnya with
training and weapons. The support channel for this, according to Fadl, ran through
Turkey and Baku, Azerbaijan, where al Qaeda had a relief organization. Hage made
visits to the Baku relief agency, and to one on Cyprus.
Al Qaeda also incorporated the Eritrea Jamaat e Jihad, which was seeking to
change the regime there. Fadl says he accompanied Banshire in funneling money to
this group. (nydc/6feb01/328-327)

1995: Bin Laden's name comes up in trial of Sheikh Rahman, and nine others for plot
to blow up WTC, other NY landmarks. Bin Laden's name comes up in passing, at least one
of witnesses asked if he knows name. Concerns about bin Laden at that time were based on
his public statements - soliciting violence against American soldiers, (hwi 115)

[When?] 1995: Kalafan Kamis Mohamed. Tanzanian national, returns to Dar e-

Salaam after having gone to Afghanistan the previous year to join the Jihadist movement and
undergoing training and "vetting." When departing Afghanistan he is told to leave a "contact
number." (nydc5feb/108-09)

13 Nov. 95: Car bomb outside US-Saudi joint facility in Riyadh, the National Guard
building, killing five Americans and two Indians. Perpetrators confessions indicate influence
of Bin Laden, (hwi 116) [Executions prevent further inquiries.]

20 November 1995: Bombing of Egyptian embassy in Islamabad, killing 15, injuring

80. Yet again retaliation for Egyptian pressures for terrorist crackdown.

By late 1995/early 1996: As bin Laden's name keeps popping up in investigations of

various incidents, CTC forms special branch to focus on him. (hwi 116, DCI open testimony
11 June 2002)

May 96: Bin Laden is discovered to have moved to Afghanistan. By this time, is on
the U.S. list of terrorist threats. A NY Grand Jury has been impaneled to investigate him.
 18

21 May 1996: Banshiri dies in ferry accident on Lake Victoria, (hwi 106, rg 26.)

25 June 1996. Khobar Towers in Dhahran, kills 19 American troops .

23 August 1996: Bin Laden issues "Declaration of Jihad on the Americans occupying
the country of the two sacred places." Says "Muslims have realized they are the main target
of ... Jews and Crusaders ... God willing, I will expel the Jews and Christians from Arabia."

September 1996: Taliban takes over Kabul. US initially makes no objection [Bergen
makes much of US efforts, Unocal energy corporation, to set up oil line through to Indian
ocean] but by early 1997 SecState Albright in visit to Pakistan makes public statement of
opposition.

1996ff: After bin Laden's move back to Afghanistan, Hage traveling back and forth
from Nairobi to meet with him and members of his top circle. (nydc01/5feb/20-27) [Note:
hwi 135 says back and forth to Arlington, Texas, where he was nominally employed at Lone
Star Tires. Both could be correct.]

1997: Haroun Fazil dispatched to Nairobi to replace Banshiri and continue

preparations on embassy bombing plot. Shares house there with Wadjh al-Hage. (hwi 106)

February 97: Another Fatawa? (See rg 42-44)

March 1997: Bin Laden interviewed by CNN (Arnett a'nd Bergen).

21 August 97: As Hage returned from one of his trips to Pakistan/Afghanistan, JTTF
agents stopped him at Nairobi airport and, informing him that they were fully aware of his
activities in Kenya, "recommended" that he return to the U.S. Meanwhile, FBI accompanies
Kenyan police search of his apartment, finds laptop with letter describing existence of Kenya
cell and knowledge of call for attacks on Americans. Nothing specific, (ms/c 200-01, hwi
117, citing court testimony of 21 Feb. 2001.) [What led to the search? What were the
leads? Fadl information? ]

fdate?1 September 97: Hage returns to U.S. after selling his properties in Kenya, is
picked up by U.S. authorities at entry airport in U.S., questioned at length and then sent before
a Grand Jury next day. [Unofficial accounts that JTTF objective was to "turn" him. He made
no disclosures, however, and in fact a year later his statements to the Grand Jury would result
in his conviction of perjury.] (See nydc/5feb01/64; ms/c 201; hwi 135-36)

November 1997: Egyptian attack at Luxor, kills 58 tourists, 4 Egyptians.

24 Dec. 97: Egyptian [Mustafa Mahmoud Said Ahmed] walks into Nairobi embassy,
says plot being hatched to drive truck bomb into underground embassy garage. US Amb.
Prudence Bushnell cables Washington expressing concern over need for additional security in
face of threats of terrorists, (hwi 117, citing NYT 23 October 1998)

22 Feb. 98 Fatawa "World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders."
Co-signers were Zawahiri, listed as head of EIJ; Rifia Ahmed Taha of Egyptian Islamic
Group; Mir Hamzah of Jamiat-ul-e-Pakistan; Fazul Rahman, emir of Jihad Movement of
 19

Bangladesh (also identified by other sources as head of Harrakat ul-Mujadin, militant

Pakistani group involved in Kashmir fighting). (Printed in London, Al-Quds al'Arabia, on 23
February. See FBIS doc. Have text.) This is followed by many similar public statements and
Fatawas by other groups including Afghans, Pakistan and Saudi clerics. Some published in
western press, esp. in London Al-Quds Al-Arabi. Message had been phoned in to Al-Quds al-
Arabia in London the evening of 22 Feb., through channel of ARC chief Khalid al-Fawaz.
(Bensim 26)

April 1998: Kalafan Kamis Mohamed. (KK) who had been living in Mombassa for
the past year [and whose travel record is something that seems worth further scrutiny) was
contacted by a "friend" [whom he knew only by the name "Hussain." Hwi 110-12)] about a
"Jihad job," [claims in testimony he did not know what job was]. Was subsequently told to
rent an apartment in Dar e-Salaam, was given money to pay for it, and did so under his own
name. He and his "friend" and their families together moved into what was envisaged as a
site for assembling the explosive devices for the embassy attack in Dar e-Salaam four months
later. (nydc5feb/112-14)

26 May 98 Press conference at camp in Afghanistan. Says there would be "good news
in the coming weeks." (hwi 186, who attended.) The press conference was attended by
Mohamed Rased al-Owhali. He would later testify that he had by this time already
approached the top al Qaeda leadership volunteering for a "martyr mission," and that by the
time of the press conference he had already been informed of the general nature of a mission
to which he was being assigned against U.S. facilities in Africa. He also had been videotaped
declaring himself a martyr, (hwi, quoting court testimony of 7 March 2001. Check original.]

28 May 98 ABC interview in Afghanistan. Bin Laden made clear was calling for
death of Americans. "...Do not differentiate between those ... in military uniforms and
civilians... ." (hwi 110-112)

May 29,1998: On or about this date, UBL issues statement entitled "The Nuclear
Bomb of Islam" under the banner of the "International Islamic Front for the Fighting the Jews
and the Crusaders" in which he states that "it is the duty of the Muslims to prepare as much
force as possible to terrorize the enemies of God." (May 2003 indictment in US v. Al-Badawi
& Al-Quso).]

June 1998: Kalafan Kamis Mohamed is told to buy a truck, again with money given
him by the person who told him to do so. Same month, people start bringing TNT into
apartment. (nydc5feb/114)

July 1998: Kalafan Kamis Mohamed told to rent another apartment in Dar e-Salaam,
because a "better site" is needed. Again, with money provided by the person who issued the
instructions. (nydc5feb/114)

1 August 98: Another person delivers a new truck to the newly rented Dar e-Salaam
apartment. Vehicle has already been altered to enable explosives to be inserted "around it." At
about the same time a "technical expert" arrives at the apartment, gives KK instructions on
"grinding" the TNT into powder. Explosive efforts joined by designated
driver.(nydc5feb/116.)
 20

2 August 98: Mohamed Rashed al-Owhali, who is assigned to carry out the suicide
bombing in Nairobi, arrives there from Afghanistan. Joined by person he had said he met in
Afghanistan named Azzam All gathered at the Hilltop Hotel, from which they could case the
embassy. (nydc5feb01/36)
* According to Bensim Fp. 29-301 Azzam was aware that al-Owhali asked for a
martyr mission and approached him in Afghanistan in March 98 offering his
services for a whatever mission was undertaken. After some additional training the
two of them went to Yemen for a short while, then were called back to
Afghanistan in the summer, given a full brief on their mission, and then left for
Nairobi at the beginning of August.
* This was also the same time that Hamdan Khalif Alal (Egyptian who had been a trainer in the
Afghan camp) turned up in Dar-e-Salaam. [Get details, sources.] ??

3 August 1998: Odeh arrives in Nairobi from Mombasa, from where he had been
summoned the previous day. Had already been told several months earlier (nydc5feb/75) that
all AQ members must leave Africa by 6 August. Stays in apartment with several others
engaged in plot, reconnoiters embassy, works in apartment on 4th 5th, part of 6th August,
(nydc 5feb01/36-37)

5 August 98 letter from Zawahari to Egyptian newspaper Al-Hayat saying American

interests about to be attacked, (hwi, 109 citing Guardian 12 August 1998.)

6 August 98: Odeh leaves Nairobi in evening night (with false passport from Yemen)
for Pakistan, "with another member." [Who?] (nydc 5feb01/37)
In Dar-e-Salaam, all but two of the al Qaeda operatives - Kalafan Kamis Mohamed and the
"designated driver" - have also departed. (At least all those that Kalafan knew of.) The truck
has been fully loaded. When the "leader" departed, he left some money for Kalafan to use
"when it's time for you to go." Kalafan also was given a list of three phone numbers to call if
needed. Kalafan was needed at this point because the designated driver did not speak Swahili.
(Story of truck getting stuck in sand, get it out with help from another rented truck)
(nydc/5feb/l 16-21)

7 August 98: Embassy bombings.

> Nairobi: At about 10:30 am Owhali and Azzam drive up to embassy parking lot gate.
> Owhali jumps out, screws up, (according to some but so far not nydc accounts, forgot
gun, throws grenades, et al) Bomb goes off 10:35 , 201 Kenyans and 12 Americans
killed. (Bensim 29-30)
> Par es Salaam: Truck bomb hits at 10:39 am, kills 11 Tanzanians, no Americans.
Kalafan rode part way to the embassy, then got out and remained in Dar e-Salaam for
the day to perform what authorities charge is "clean-up" of apartment, trail, etc.
(nydc/5feb/120-21)

Same morning, Mohamed Odeh . who had fled Nairobi the night before the bombing,
stopped as arrived at Karachi airport because of irregularities in Yemen passport
photo. Turned over to intelligence, confessed, (hwi 113, bensim 29-30.)

8 August 98: Kalafan departs for Capetown, South Africa. For travel, uses false
papers he had been given ahead of time, but once in Capetown he lives under his own
papers. [Soon gets job there in Burger World.] (nydc/5feb/124).
 21

12 August 98 Owhali. who backed out of the suicide move but was nevertheless
seriously injured in the blast, is captured. He had checked into a hospital, where he was
subsequently arrested by Kenyan authorities. He also confesses. Also tells of Bin Laden
group desire to bomb US ship in a Yemen port, (hwi 118, citing court record 7 March 2001,
and affidavit of David Coleman 25 August 1998.)

20 August 1998: U.S. air attacks on Sudanese chemical plant, Khost camp in
Afghanistan.

25 August 1998 Sanctions are imposed by the President under the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act on UBL, the Islamic Army (aka Al-Qaida, Islamic
Salvation Foundation, The Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places, The World
Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, and The Group for the Preservation of
the Holy Sites), Abu Hafs al-Masri, and Rifa'I Ahmad Taha Musa.

September 1998: Ali Mohamed also arrested. He also will go on to spill beans.

29 December 1998: Kidnapping of 16 western tourists in Yemen by Islamic Army of

Aden (IAA) which had trained with al-Qaeda. Group was headed by Abu Hassan and
Egyptian Abu Hamza [who resided in London]. Botched rescue results in deaths of 3 Brits
and 1 Australian. Hassan later arrested, makes some confession, then executed. Secrets die
with him. (bergen - get page refs, source citations.)

February 1999: Because recruits/trainees are having difficulty getting to landlocked

Afghanistan after embassy bombings, bin Laden confers with Hashim Salamat, leader of
MILF in Philippines, makes a deal whereby al Qaeda will provide additional trainers for
camps in Abu Bakr complex and MILF will set aside some space for al Qaeda training, (rg 6)

Summer 1999: Millennium plots underway: Jordanian authorities detect unfolding

plot for multiple bombings on millennium eve, centerpiece Radisson Hotel, booked mainly
with Americans, Christians for 2,000th anniversary of Christian calendar. Large Jordanian
cell of approx 30 people.
* Ahmad Ressam preparing construction of bomb to be delivered at LA airport. (Algerian
who had been illegal immigrant in France, moved to Montreal [when?] where petty thief
and welfare liver, eventually heads to Afghanistan, trained at Khalden camp - Yousef's
alma mater - and then in advanced bombs and chemicals at Derunta camp outside
Jalalabd. [Any details re when, etc.?] [Bensim talk about experiments with dogs - is this
connected to films captured in Afghanistan later?] Sent back to Canada on mission,
[when?] was given $12,000 for operating costs [from whom?]
* Preparations by Yemeni cell for attack on US vessel scheduled to arrive in Aden for
refueling (a recently initiated US practice.) USS Sullivans becomes specific target
[when?] (Bensim 30-31)
* Abu Zubaida (Palestinian living then in Peshawar) in overall ops command, (according to
Bensim 32)

5 October 1999: Dar e-Salaam bomber Kalafan Khamis Mohamed requests political
asylum in Capetown, under false identification, arrested, questioned on 5th, 6th 7th' jailed.
(nydc/5feb/125] [Four months earlier, in June, had tried to use the "emergency numbers"
given to him just before the bombing. All three fail to have anyone on other end.
)nydc/05feb01/124]
 22

8 October 1999: Al Qaeda officially designated for the first time as a foreign terrorist
organization (FTO) by the Secretary of State under 8 USC 1189.

December 1999: Jordanians intercept Zubaida message to carry out millennium plan,
roll up conspirators.
* 14 December 1999: Ahmed Ressam arrested at Washington State border crossing.
Found carrying pile of explosives and maps with circles around airports in Los
Angeles, Long Beach, and Ontario (CA). After convicted, started to talk. [Bensim
32]

26 December 1999: Hijacking of Indian airliner by Harakat-ul-Mujahideen, and

Jaish? By 30 December Indian government makes deal for release of Azhar, Ahmal Omar
Saeed Sheikh, and Mustak Ahmed Zargar [leader of lesser known Kashmir group Al-Umar].
[Not evidence of al Qaeda involvement, but included on chron as reminder tobe on
lookout for any evidence of support.]

3 January 2000: Attempt at bombing USS The Sullivans fails because boat
overloaded with explosives, begins to sink, forced to turn back to shore. (Bensim 32)

12 October 2000: Cole bombing. Attackers from group led by Omar al-Harazi,
Afghan fighter of Yemen family but born in Saudi Arabia. [Like Bin Laden.] [YT Note: I did
not get sense of al-Harazi leading the attack from the indictment.] Other attempt in Jan. 2000
failed. [YT: According to 2003 indictment, unindicted coconspirator al-Nasheri indicated that
UBL had planned the attack. Prior to the attack, al-Nasheri had tested the explosives"and
refitted the boat that had sunk in January; other, uncharged coconspirators included Saif Adel
and Tafiq Bin Attash, aka Khallad. (May 2003 indictment in US v. Al-Badawi and Al-Quso.)
 23

PLAYERS

Osama bin Laden: Born 1957. Exact date in dispute. Bergen, drawing on press interview,
says 10 March. Gunaratna says 30 July but acknowledges in footnote that there is not formal
registration. "Osama" means "young lion." Son of the "rotating" wife slot, mother Syrian.
Osama has roughly 50 siblings, of which he is 17th in birth sequence. At age 24, (1981?)
attended Abdul Aziz university in Jedda, came under "spell" of two teachers Abdullah
Azzam and Muhammad Qutb. (hwi 44,47) Accounts differ on studies, achievements.
Some say he studied economics and engineering, and received a degree. (Bensim 98) Some
say he did not, however, study engineering, nor did he complete his degree in economics.
(rg!7) Most sources describe his initial activities in Pakistan in the early 1980s as essential a
"rich kid" helping with supplies and money. Several sources cite a battle with the Soviet
forces in 1987 near his first Afghanistan base, Jali, as the occasion when he earned his
credentials as a warrior. Another participant in that battle was senior EIJ figure Abu Ubaidah
al-Banshiri. (See also bensim 96-97)

Abdullah Azzam Osama teacher, later partner in Peshwar, where he set up the Mekhtab al -
Khadamat, or Services Office in 1984. Born in Palestine in 1941, Graduated 1966 from
University in Damascus, fought in 1967 war. Early 70s was student [doctorate] at al-Azhar
University in Cairo, at same time as Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman. Also befriended family of
Sayyid Qutb, "sage" of Islamist doctrine, who had been executed by Nasser in 1966. (His
brother was on faculty of Al Azhar at the time in 1970s.) Late 1970s taught for a while in
Amman, later dismissed, met with Afghan mujahidin members, moved to Pakistan where he
became lecturer at Islamic University. Assassinated in car bombing 24 November 89.
Late 70s taught for a while in Amman, later dismissed, met with Afghan mujahideen
members, Early 1980's met with Afghan mujahidin members, moved to Pakistan where he
became lecturer at Islamic University in Islamabad. Exponent of Jihad as absolute necessity
to restore Caliphate. " ... the rifle alone ... no conferences and no dialogues." (hwi 52-53)

Muhammad Outb: Teacher at Al-Azhnar in Cairo same time as Azzam and Sheikh Rahman
studying there in early 197s. Brother of Sayyid Qutb who wrote a key text of the jihad
movement in Egypt and was executed in 1966. (hwi 52)

Abdul Rasool Sayyaf: Afghan commander, whose name would later be used by a returning
Philippine volunteer to form the Abu Sayyaf Muslim secessionist group, (hwi 52)

Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman: "Blind Sheik," jailed as result of 1993 [YT: landmarks plot].
Residing in Peshwar in 1980s, set up a "guesthouse" there, made trips into Afghanistan under
aegis Hekmatyar. (hwi 53) Studied in England in early 1980s, entered US [in 1987?] and
1990 under visas granted allegedly by "computer mistake." But one was by CIA officer
operating under cover of consular officer in Sudan.

Muhammad Abdurrahman Khalifa: Jordanian, head of branch there of Muslim

brotherhood, also supporting recruitment for Afghan jihad, later worked in Peshwar as head of
Saudi Muslim World league office during Afghan jihad. Married Bin Laden daughter, (hwi
54)

Khaled al-Fawwaz: [aka Abu Khalil al Madani; Abu Mahdi] Bin Laden's "London
contact,." In July 1994 appointed by Bin Laden as head of London office of ARC, Saudi
regime opposition org. Arrested by Brits in Sept. 98
 24

Abu Khadija al Iraqi [who is he?] Fadl describes as al Qaeda member with both Israeli and
German citizenship. (nydc/6febO 1/307]

Hashed al-Owhali, offspring of wealthy Saudi family, born in Liverpool 1977, recruited
through Afghan jihad. Goes to Afghanistan in 1996. (NYDC 7 March 2001) Asks to meet
bin Laden in [early 1998?] asks for martyr mission. Is given further training (appears
background of May 98 filmed press conference). I sent to Nairobi in early August to be part
of suicide team, meets person who is to be his partner, Azzam, (not same as Emir) whom he
had already met at the camp in Afghanistan. (NYDC 5 Feb. 2001)

Mohamed Odeh: African embassy bombings. Jordanian, married Kenyan woman, lived on
Kenya coast in town of Witu. (nydc/5feb/75) Studied engineering in Philippines, recruited for
Afghan Jihad in part from film by Azzam. Ultimately swore allegiance to bin Laden, (hwi
53)

Kalafan Khamis Mohamed: Impoverished family, recruited to Afghanistan training camp in

1994, returned to Tanzania in 1995 as "sleeper." Contacted for "jihad job" about same time as
Bin Laden's Feb. 98 fatawa. [Jerry Post testified for his defense, on psychological grounds.]
(hwi 110-111) Kalafan Kamis Mohamed (aka KK) rents house in Dar e-Salaam, which is
used a bomb-building site. Buys suicide car. (5feb01/38) In months before attack,
participates in making bomb, (nydc 5feb01/91. Arrested 5 October 1999. (nydc/5feb01/100)
Born 1973 on island of Pemba, off coast of Tanzania, moves to Dar e-Salaam in 1990.
(nydc/5feb01/104) goes to Afghanistan 1994 (nydc/5feb01/108) Returns to Dar e-Salaam
1995. Is told to leave a "contact number." Goes to Mombasa in 1997. (nydc/5feb01/109)
Then goes to Somalia, to "see if he could help ... in the tribal wars. Goes back second time
same year. In 1998, again goes to Mombasa.. Then tries to get passport to "visit bother " in
London, uses fake information. (nydc/5feb01/l 11) June 1999 makes phone call on one of
numbers he had been given, cut off. Second number says "wrong number." Third doesn't
work. (nydc/5feb/125] [Who was he supposed to ask for on these numbers?]

All Mohamed: Egyptian, arrested in September 1998 in connection with al-Qaeda's

"conspiracy to kill Americans." Has given lengthy information. [Bergen has suspicions as to
who he really was.] Joined Egyptian army in 1971 at age 19, served to 1984, reaching rank of
major. (During this service he got BA in psychology from U. Alexandria in 1980.) Contacted
CIA as volunteer informant, [sometime in first half of 1980s] shortly dropped because
unreliable. After leaving army, took position on counterterrorism for Egyptair. Then came to
U.S., got job in surety company in California, married U.S. citizen, sped up application for
citizenship and U.S. passport (which facilitated his global travels.) Enlisted in US Army 1986
[age 34] attended Special Forces training facility at Fort Bragg, N.C., became teacher there of
ME issues. (Multilingual - Arabic, Hebrew, English, French.) While on leave from army
went to Afghanistan to fight with bin Laden's troops. Discharged 1989, became a "sleeper,"
became connected with the Alkhifa Refugee Center in Brooklyn. "Afghan Refugees Services
Inc." created in 1987, ostensibly to help those who suffered from Soviet invasion, in fact a
recruitment, money channel for the mujahidin. Mohamed gave training to Islamist militants
in NY in 1989. [Among sources Bergen cites court record of Rahman trial, testimony of
Khalid Ibrahim. Check also identify of Roger Stavis.] Provided military and weapons training
manuals to Nosair, Kahane assassin, [hwi 131, m/s —] He went back to Afghanistan in
September 1992, serving as a trainer. Sent to Kenya 1993 to case embassy and report back to
bin Laden in Khartoum. [YT: Per The Cell, page 145, had contact with FBI in 1993 in
California after Canadians alerted FBI that Mohamed was claiming to work for FBI while
 25

trying to get Al Qaeda operative with fraudulent papers into US. Mohamed told FBI that bin
Laden was determined to drive US off Arabian Peninsula. DOD Intel, was called in, but NY
FBI/JTTF was not informed.] Trained Bin Laden's bodyguards in Khartoum in 1994. All
this time, maintained official residence in California. House there (Santa Clara) searched in
August 1998, uncovered documents on assassination techniques. Arrested Sept. 1998 on
suspicion of being part of bin Laden "conspiracy to kill Americans." [hwi 132-33, drawing
extensively on records from NY trials.)

Abu Zubaida: reportedly headed al Qaeda's connections with various regional groups. Was
identified by confessed conspirator as having been the principal operational planner for the
thwarted plot to bomb U.S. Embassy in Paris 1995. Has been tied to many additional attacks,
was believed to succeed Atef as main military operations coordinator after the latter's death in
Afghanistan. Captured in March 2002 in Karachi, (rg 98, also NYT, 28 Dec. 2001, article by
Erlanger and Hedges.)

Wadih el-Hage: Born in Lebanon 1960, Catholic family. Converts to Islam while a teenager.
Comes to US in 1978 after finishing high school, settles in Lafayette, attends University of
South Louisiana. In 1983, goes to Pakistan to assist Afghan mujahidin as a "relief worker."
(Infancy defect resulted in shriveled arm, thus could not really be a warrior.) Reportedly
(NY/SD Feb. 2001) met with some UBL associates. Returned to U.S. 1985, marries
American who converted to Islam. Moves with wife and first child back to Pakistan
(Quetta) in 1986. (Hwi says mother-in-law accompanies them, is source for much of hwi
info, some of which conflicts with info in court hearings.) In 1987 Hage back to U.S., this
time in Tucson. Hwi 135 says Hage makes several trips to Brooklyn 1987-1990, and that he
was working for Azzam at this time, and made several trips to Afghanistan. NY court
statement says in 1989 or '90 went back to Pakistan with wife and now three children. Then
family back to Arlington Texas 1990 or '91. (NY court records do not mention, in
preliminary statement, Hage's service at NY al-Kifah.) Called to NY from Texas on 27 Feb.
91 to replace Shalabi. (Before Shalabi body found on 1 March.) In 1992 goes to Sudan to
join bin Laden's new set up there, takes cover job as businessman and also serves as bin
Laden secretary. In 1994 is assigned to Nairobi cell. After bin Laden moves back to
Afghanistan in 1996, Hage travels between Nairobi and Afghanistan for meetings with bin
Laden. While on one of his trips to Afghanistan his apartment is searched August 1997.
Causes him to pull up stakes and return to U.S. Is stopped at airport entry, taken off for
questioning, again the next day, and then in September appears before Grand Jury
investigating bin Laden, statements later determined to be perjury. Returns to Arlington,
Texas by end of year. (nydcSFebOl, pp20-28; 48-52.) Initially charged with perjury in
September 1998, [DM: later superceded by full list of charges relating to embassy bombings.]
Trial begins Feb. 2001; hwi 135-36)

Mustafa Shalabi: Head of Alkhifa from outset, (rg ... says appointed by Azzam),helped
Rahman get settled in US in 1990. Assassinated 1 March 1991, after falling out with
Rahman.

Jamal al-Fadl: Born 1963 in Sudan south of Khartoum, studied English in middle/secondary
school. Lived briefly with friend in Saudi Arabia 1981, caught pot smoking escapes back to
Sudan. Moved to US on student visa 1986, married American. Settles in Brooklyn, continues
to travel, works at under Shalabi at Alkifa/Farouq Mosque (which he describes in testimony
as part of a "larger MAK group under Azzam/bin Laden in Pakistan) to support Afghan Jihad
- raising money, recruiting, facilitating acquisition of travel documents. (Fadl/6feb/l 62-65))
 26

"Under direction of Shalabi," leaves for Peshawar 1988 with three other "brothers" to join
Afghan Jihad. Shalabi provides money, travel tickets. Describes function of "guesthouses"
as point where new recruits/volunteers drop off their papers and money, get a pseudonym.
(His was Abu Bakr Sudani.) Then proceeded to Afghan camp "Khalid Ibn Walid," for about
45 days training in small arms, rpgs. (Fadl/6feb/166-74). Goes to "front line" at Jaji. Says
met Abu Hajer al Iraqi (true name Mamudh Salim. see below) and also bin Laden. After two
months on front line returned to Peshawar. Describes guesthouse as "back and forth way
station." Several more back and forths, including to Camp Farouq in Khost area, and a bomb
making camp called al Jihad, designed for training individuals for specific missions. One
person there giving training is Abu Mohamed al Masry. (Fadl/6feb/175-184) In 1989,
attends what seems from his description to be a sort of ceremony, at which various individuals
swear a "bayat" to bin Laden's new organization, which he understands will be called "al
Qaeda." Later would be involved in bin Laden move to Sudan, and subsequent planning for
African embassy bombings. Split with bin Laden over money issue, (charged by bin Laden
with embezzeling more than $100,000, became star informant and witness for U.S. in
embassy bombing trials, (hwi 60)

Ihab Ali: American citizen, dead end jobs in Florida at inter alia Disney World. Goes to
Peshewar 1989. 1993, assists in purchase of aircraft for al Qaeda, which is flown to Sudan.
Studied flying at Norman, Oklahoma. Moves to Kenya in mid-1990s, communicates with el-
Hage. (hwi 139)

Essam al-Ridi: Person described by rg in almost exactly the same terms as hwi describes
Ihab Ali. Are they reporting the same person under different names? (rg 59)

Raed Hijazi: California born 1969, Palestinian heritage. Travels to Afghanistan training
camps near Khost in 1990s. Stint in Boston as cab driver, goes to Jordan to work on bomb
materials for thwarted millennium plot of December 1999. Arrested in Syria October 2000,
still in custody, still no confession [to date?] (hwi 139)

Mahmud Abouhalima - WTC I participant. Worked at Alkhifa. Fought in Afghanistan

1990. (hwi 134,136.)

El-Sayyid Nosair: Born '55 Port Said, Egypt. Family displaced in 1967 war. Grew up in
Cairo. Graduated Helwan U., Cairo, 1978, degree industrial design/engineering. 1981
immigrates US, Pittsburgh. 1982 marries American recently converted to Islam. Becoming
more Islamistic. Fired from job as diamond cutter in 1983, part because of job performance,
partly because of proselytizing on the job. 1985 two separate charges of rape lodged; charges
dropped after intervention of local Iman, but moves to Jersey City address where police would
pick up Abouhlima and Salameh 5/6 November. 1988 (spring) gets job in Brooklyn -
essentially janitor — giving address as that of cousin Ibrahim el-Gabrowny. Becomes
"fixture," full time worker, at al-Kifah Refugee Services Center (U.S. Branch of Office of
Services set up in Peshawar. Emir is Mustafa Shalabi. Nosair falls under liturgy of Abdllah
Assam - "scholar, soldier, orator, organizer, prophet, and propagandist." Azzam frequently
traveled to US to raise funds, preach global Jihad. (E.g. speech in 1988 at Farooq mosque
where al Kifah located.) (ms/c 50ff.)

Ramzi Yousef: Leader of 1993 bombing. Flew to NY from Peshwar in Sept. 92. On arrival,
his companion was arrested on immigration charges. Search turned up explosives manual,
titled "Al-Qaeda" The Base. [NYT translation.] Uncle had been regional manager of Mercy
 27 !

International Relief, Peshwar based charity working closely with Bin Laden, issued identity
cards to Bin Laden, Ali Mohamed. Trained in Afghanistan in camp of Sayyaf, where Fadl
claims to have seen him sometime in 1989-90. Moved to Philippines in early 1990s,
contacted Abu Sayyaf group, collaborated with group. (Some sources, including the Manila
police, say Yousef served as bin Laden's agent in helping to found Abu Sayyaf, and
bensiml 12, while not mentioning Yousef by name, also say bin Laden detailed agents and
money to found Abu Sayyaf brigade in Mindanao.) Caught after explosives experiment in his
Manila apartment went awry, ran away leaving smoke coming out of window. Computer
revealed plans for plans to blow up 11 passenger jets and kill Pope. Abu Sayyaf involved.
When captured had address of Bin Laden guest house.

Khalid Sheikh Mohammed: [(hwi 137 calls him Zahid Sheikh) Yousef s uncle (according
to hwi, 137) regional manager of Mercy International, in Pesawar, during mid-1990s. Is said
to have run Islamic Coordination Council in 1993, which had been established by Azzam to
coordinate activities of 20 other charities in city. Own statements and Fadl description have
him in 1989-1991 at the Sadda bomb-making training camp in Afghanistan, run by Abdul
Sayyaf.. Later info says Yousef had been in Philippines in early 1990s initiating creation of
Abu Sayyaf Brigade there. Later, 2000, Abu Sayyaf used hostages to demand Yousef release
from NY. (hwi 138-39; also independent sources identified in dm memo.)

Ahmed Ressam: Algerian arrested at border crossing in Washington state on 14 December

1999. Another recruit from the mosques. Bounced around in late 80s, early 90s, went to
Montreal in 1994, went to Afghanistan in 1998, trained and indoctrinated. Went back to
Montreal, met with some fellow Algerians, made preparations for strikes in US, with money
from al-Qaeda, meanwhile serving as point for Algerian recruits/volunteers from Montfeal.
(hwi 139)

Abu Hassan and

Mohammed Omar al-Harazi Leaders of Yemeni terrorist groups reportedly cooroperating
with al Qaeda on Cole bombing, (hwi 177ff.)

Al-FadI al-Makke: One of the top managers of al Qaeda financial channels, (hwi 66)

Mamdouh Mahmud Salim; Aka Abu Hajer al Iraqi. Al-Qaeda operative involved in
efforts to acquire weapons grade nuclear materials, (hwi 85, citing Grand Jury testimony of
Hage, entered into record 22 February 2001.) [YT: Extradited to US from Germany in 1998,
convicted of stabbing prison guard in US, I believe he's awaiting trial on East Africa
bombings.]

Abu Hamza. Egyptian, leader of IAA, met Rahman in UK while as student there in mid-
1980s. 1987 while on a Hajj to Saudi Arabia met Abdullah Azzam. Spent much of 1989-93
in Afghanistan. After an accident with a land mine, returned to London as a preacher and
recruiter in 1993. Operated from there as the "mastermind" behind IAA, had satellite commo
and broadcasts.

Anas al-Liby: Computer expert for al-Qaeda, escaped London just ahead of police raid.
Had made 1993 trip to Nairobi to develop photo surveillance of embassy.
 28

L'Hossaine Kherchtou: Moroccan, attended catering school in France. Went to Afghanistan

in 1991, went through camp training, (hwi 89) Later broke with bin Laden in dispute over the
latters refusal to provide money for wife's cesarean treatment. (Bensim 114)

Harrakatt- ul-Mujahdin of Kashmir led by Fazal-ul-Rehman Khalil. This could be the

same person who signed the Feb. 98 Fatawa, listed in the FBIS report as Fazal Rehman, but
as Emir of Jihad of Bangladesh.

Abu Ayoub al-Iraqi: An early founding member of bin Laden's inner circle, called "Emir"
at the time (rg 56)

Muhammed Atef true name Subhi 'Abd-al-'Aziz-Sittah (rg26)

Haroun Fazil dispatched to Nairobi in 1997 to replace Banshiri and continue preparations on
embassy bombing plot. Shares house there with Wadih al-Hage. (hwi 106)

Abu Muaz al Masry: EIJ person with double membership in al Qaeda. (nydc/6feb01/3234-
27)-

Abu Anas al Liby: computer specialist. (nydc/6feb01/3234-27)

Usama Azmarai aka al Assad: Known for performance in fighting against Soviets in
Afghanistan. (nydc/6febO 1/3234-27)

Abu Diiana al Yemeni: Trainer (nydc/6feb01/3234-27)

Khalid al Masry: member of both EIJ and al Qaeda, specialist in employment and
maintenance of tanks, was member of military committee along with Banshiri and Atef.
(nydc/6feb01/3234-27)

Some inserts:

Other connections: Qater charitable organization run by an al Qaeda member who is

alos a member of the NIF and had served in the Afghan Jihad, i