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The 9/11 Plot

Suggested Questions for 9/11 Plot Panel

Khalid Sheikh Mohamed (KSM). The idea for the September 11 attacks originated
with Khalid Sheikh Mohamed. KSM has spent considerable time in Afghanistan and has
lived in the United States. There have also been some claims that KSM was in the United
States in recent years.

a. (For all) How much is known about his family history?

b. (For all) When was he in the United States?

c. (For FBI) Apart from what he has told his interrogators, how much do we
know about the time he spent in the U.S.?

d. (For all) Looking back now, with all of the benefits of hindsight, is there
any indication that he would become a terrorist? When and how does it
appear that he first became interested and involved in terrorism? Did he
have any known contact with law enforcement during this time?

e. (For FBI) Have any of the claims that KSM was in the U.S. even after his
time in school been verified?

f. (For all) Apart from what has been disclosed in his interrogations, how
much is known about KSM's life after he left the United States?

KSM and the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. KSM had some role in the 1993
WTC bombing, which was planned by his nephew Ramzi Yousef. According to KSM, he
provided about $660 in funding to the conspirators in the bombing.

a. (For all) What was the nature of KSM's role in the 1993 WTC bombing?
When was this role discovered?

b. (For all) Is there any evidence that KSM participated in the 1993 bombing
beyond the provision of a small amount of money?

KSM and Bojinka. In 1994, KSM and Ramzi Yousef planned to bomb US commercial
jets over the Pacific. KSM claims that he and Yousef had the idea for the 9/11 plot at this
time.

a. (For all) What was the nature of KSM's involvement? Where was the
plot hatched? Who else was involved? How much time did KSM spend
in the Philippines while participating in the plot? How was KSM's role in
the Bojinka plot discovered?
b. (For all) Is there any corroboration for KSM's claim that he and Yousef
had the 9/11 idea as of 1994?

c. (For all) What efforts were made by the United States to apprehend KSM
once his role in Bojinka was discovered?

d. (For all) How much is known about where he traveled during 1995 and
1996?

Introduction of planes operation to Bin Ladin. KSM claims that he brought the idea
of the planes operation to Bin Ladin in a meeting in 1996.

a. (For Mr. Davis) What evidence is there of a relationship between KSM


and Bin Ladin, apart from the KSM interrogations?

b. (For Mr. Davis) How important was it for KSM to enlist al Qaeda's
support for the planes operation?

c. (For Mr. Davis) What was the nature of the "scaled-up" version of the
9/11 plot that KSM pitched to Bin Ladin?

Bin Ladin approves planes operation. KSM claims that he finally obtained Bin Ladin's
approval for the planes operation in 1998.

a. (For Mr. Davis) What did KSM do, according to what he has said, after
Bin Ladin approved the plan?

b. (For Mr. Davis) What is known about the reason why KSM favored the
World Trade Center as a target?

c. (For Mr. Davis) How much is known about the four original suicide
operatives who were picked for the operation (Nawaf al Hazmi, Khalid al
Mihdhar, Khallad and Abu Bara al Yemeni)?

d. (For all) Why was it more difficult for Yemeni passport holders to obtain
US visas?

e. What was the "smaller version of the Bojinka plot" intended for the
Yemeni operatives supposed to have entailed? How far does the Southeast
Asia part of the plot appear to have progressed?

f. What was the nature of the "elite training course" the four original
operatives participated in?
Kuala Lumpur. All four of the initial operatives selected for 9/11 traveled to Kuala
Lumpur in early 2000. Hazmi and Mihdhar, -who were on their way to the United States,
•were allegedly there to switch their passports before traveling to the United States.
Khallad was reportedly conducting surveillance on various flights.

a. (For all) What was the purpose of Hazmi and Mihdhar switching passports
in Kuala Lumpur? Has it been confirmed that they did so? Is there any
evidence that Hazmi and Mihdhar may have been pursuing some objective
beyond simply switching passports?

b. (For all) Who else has been confirmed as being present at the Kuala
Lumpur meeting? Is there any evidence to support open source claims
that Binalshibh and KSM attended?

c. (For all) Based on your review of all of the evidence, including the
detainee reporting, what do you believe was the purpose of the Kuala
Lumpur meeting?

d. (For all) Has any of Khallad's claimed travel in connection with his casing
of airline security been confirmed?

Bangkok. As disclosed in Staff Statement No. 2, after Hazmi, Mihdhar and Khallad
proceeded from Kuala Lumpur to Bangkok, Khallad met with some other operatives who
delivered money to him.

a. (For all) What is known about the Bangkok meeting?

KSM's original plans. KSM claims that he himself was to have played a leading role in
the planes operation as he originally proposed it to Bin Ladin. He also claims that the
proposal was not adopted because it was too complex.

a. (For Mr. Davis) Are you aware of any corroboration for this account?

b. (For Mr. Davis) Based on your understanding of KSM as a person and the
rest of the evidence concerning the 9/11 plot, how much credence do you
place in KSM's account about his original proposal?

Hazmi and Mihdhar's selection for the plot. KSM and Khallad say thatNawafal
Hazmi and Khalid al Mihdhar - two 9/11 hijackers who were on board American
Airlines Flight 77, which crashed into the Pentagon — were in the first group ofal Qaeda
suicide operatives picked for the planes operation, in 1999.

a. (For Mr. Davis) What can you tell us about the background of each of
these two operatives?
b. (For Mr. Davis) What evidence is there about how they were recruited to
join al Qaeda?

c. (For Mr. Davis) What qualified Hazmi and Mihdhar to participate in the
operation?

Initial changes in the operation. According to KSM, the planes operation -was modified
to include both a U.S. and Southeast Asia component, so that Yemeni operatives like Abu
Eara and Khallad would be able to participate.

a. (For all) How much evidence is there, apart from KSM's and Khallad's
statements, about the planning for the Southeast Asia part of the
operation? How far did the planning for the Southeast Asia part of the
operation advance?

b. (For all) If the Southeast Asia part of the revised plan simply had the
objective of destroying aircraft in mid-air, why was it necessary to include
hijacking as part of the operation?

Arrival of Hazmi and Mihdhar in Los Angeles. As the staff statement notes, Hazmi
and Mihdhar arrived in Los Angeles on January 15, 2000, ill equipped to deal -with life in
the United States. They spoke no English and neither had previously spent time in the
West. Once they were in San Diego, they received considerable assistance from
individuals in the Muslim community. Their friends in San Diego helped them in every
aspect of their daily lives, by serving as translators, helping them find flight schools and
housing, and assisting them in opening bank accounts.

a. (For FBI) Where did they stay in Los Angeles? If unknown, what
investigation was conducted to locate their residence?

b. (For FBI) Did Hazmi and Mihdhar receive the type of assistance they
received in San Diego during their time in the Los Angeles? Or did they
manage on their own?

Life in San Diego. In San Diego, Hazmi and Mihdhar lived quite openly, signing
apartment leases, obtaining cellphones and landlines, and they were even listed in the
San Diego phone book. As a result, the FBI has been able to learn a great deal about
their associations and living arrangements during their time in San Diego. By contrast,
it has been far more difficult to determine where the hijackers lived and with whom they
associated in Los Angeles. None of the hijackers' San Diego associates claim to know
where the hijackers lived in Los Angeles, and in fact, the hijackers went so far as to state
on a San Diego rental form that they had been in San Diego for those two weeks.
a. (For FBI) Why do you believe that it has been so difficult to investigate
this aspect of the hijackers' activities?

b. (For FBI) Do you believe that the hijackers intentionally covered their
tracks? If so, what is the reason for this and is there likely someone the
hijackers were trying to protect?

KSM's instructions to Hazmi and Mihdhar. KSMsays he recognized that Hazmi and
Mihdhar were not well prepared to stage an operation in the United States, since neither
one had much exposure to western culture or spoke English. KSM also says he instructed
them to seek help at mosques after they arrived in the United States and to enroll right
away in English classes so they could start flight training at the earliest possible time.

a. (For FBI) What sort of investigation was done to confirm the enrollment
of Hazmi and Mihdhar in schools in Los Angeles? In San Diego?

b. (For FBI) How well were Hazmi and Mihdhar remembered at the schools
they visited? Did anyone at any of the schools take any steps to alert law
enforcement when Hazmi and Mihdhar enrolled?

Mohdar Abdullah. According to the staff statement, Abdullah recently made comments
to fellow inmates indicating that he knew that Hazmi and Mihdhar were in the U.S. to
conduct a terrorist attack and that he had advance knowledge of the plot.

a. (For FBI) What sort of evidence has the FBI uncovered tending to support
the possibility that Abdullah or any of his San Diego associates may have
had advance knowledge of the attacks?

Abdullah and Los Angeles. Abdullah apparently told one inmate that he had received
instructions to pick up the future hijackers at the Los Angeles airport, and that he drove
them from Los Angeles to San Diego.

a. (For FBI) Do you have any evidence which corroborates these statements?
Do you have any evidence to the contrary?

b. (For FBI) For example: 1) what have you uncovered during your
investigation about how the hijackers traveled from Los Angeles to San
Diego? 2) what have you uncovered about who—if anyone—may have
picked them up at Los Angeles airport?

c. (For FBI) Do you have any information on who may have instructed
Abdullah to pick up the hijackers?
Abdullah's deportation. Abdullah -was deported by the U.S. government to Yemen
several weeks ago, only a short time after the FBI learned of Abdullah's alleged
comments to his fellow
fellow inmates.

a. (For FBI) Given the seriousness of the allegations, why did the U.S.
government allow the deportation to proceed?

b. (For all) What investigation was conducted by the FBI in an attempt to


corroborate the statements allegedly made by Abdullah? Was any
consideration given to prosecuting Abdullah? Was any consideration
given to declaring Abdullah an "enemy combatant?" What arrangements
have been reached with the Yemeni government to ensure that Abdullah
will still be carefully monitored now that he is out of U.S. custody?

Chance meeting with Bayoumi? As discussed in the staff statement, KSM claims that
he instructed the two future hijackers to live in San Diego, based on his initial research
regarding language and flight schools in the United States. If so, it appears odd that the
hijackers did not travel directly to San Diego, and that their chance encounter in Los
Angeles happened to be an individual who was well established in San Diego.

a. (For all) Do you believe that KSM's statement casts doubt on Bayoumi's
assertion that his initial meeting with the hijackers in Los Angeles was
accidental? During its investigation, has the FBI uncovered any other
information which suggests that the initial meeting between Bayoumi and
the hijackers was not an accident?

Bayoumi's assistance. As noted in the staff statement and has been widely reported in
the press, Bayoumi provided the two future hijackers with considerable assistance once
they arrived in San Diego.

a. (For FBI) To what extent was welcoming and assisting newcomers to San
Diego in this fashion something that Bayoumi did regularly?

b. (For FBI) During the course of the FBI investigation, what did the FBI
learn about how many others Bayoumi assisted in a similar fashion?

Who is Khallam? In a proffer session with the FBI in July of 2002, Abdullah also
acknowledged driving the two hijackers to Los Angeles in June of 2000. Abdullah said
that during this trip, they visited the King Fahd mosque—where the hijackers greeted
people they appeared to already know—and stayed at a motel near the mosque that night.
According to Abdullah, an individual named "Khallam " visited the hijackers at the motel
that night, and Abdullah said that he was asked to leave the room during the hijackers'
meeting with "Khallam."

a. (For FBI) Has the FBI been able to determine the identity of "Khallam?"
What investigative steps has the FBI taken in an effort to do so?
King Fahd mosque. As noted in the staff statement, it appears that the hijackers
frequented the King Fahd mosque and may have lived in an apartment near the mosque
during the time they lived in Los Angeles.

a. (For FBI) How would you rate the prospects for the hijackers to have
received assistance from someone at the mosque? For instance, were there
individuals who took on the role of helping visitors or newly arrived
Muslims in the area in early 2000?

b. (For FBI) What do you know about the presence of any extremist activity
at the King Fahd mosque, particularly among its leadership, as of early
2000?

Formation and development of Hamburg Cell. At a certain point in time, Mohamed


Atta, Marwan al Shehhi, ZiadJarrah and Ramzi Binalshibh became a group of radical,
extremist Muslims in Hamburg, determined to go on jihad.

a. (For all) When and how did Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah and Binalshibh first meet
one another? At what point did the four become such close associates?

b. (For all) What do we now know about how and when the members of the
"Hamburg cell" became radicalized? Who do you believe may have
played a particularly significant role in this regard? Was there a key event
that was a turning point?

c. As the members of the Hamburg cell grew more radical and focused on
fighting in the jihad, to what extent were their friends and family members
aware of and concerned about their transformation? Did any of these
friends and family members make efforts to dissuade them from pursuing
this lifestyle?

Search for Shehhi. In late 2000, Shehhi's family grew concerned that they had not
heard from him in some time. At this point, he -was already in the United States. We have
reviewed reports that a search for Shehhi ensued, and that U.A.E. government officials,
the Hamburg police and Shehhi's family and friends all participated in this search.

a. (For all) Can you provide additional details on the extent of this search,
when and why it was terminated, and why they were not able to locate
him?
b. (For all) Are there any other instances where there was an official search
for one of the hijackers due to the fact that contact with their families had
been cut off?

Other members of the circle in Hamburg. In addition to Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah, and
Binalshibh, there were a number of their associates in Hamburg who appeared to have
held similar views. They include Mounir el Motassadeq and Abdelghani Mzoudi, who
have faced criminal prosecution in Germany, as well as SaidBahaji andZakariya
Essabar, who remain at large. We now know that this larger group would frequently
meet and in the words of one witness, became something of a "sect."

a. (For all) How and when did the other members of the larger circle
become associated with the Hamburg cell members?

b. (For all) What do we know about: 1) where and when the larger group
would meet; 2) who was involved in these meetings; 3) what they would
discuss during these meetings; 4) the views of the members of the group
regarding the United States and the West; 5) evidence of increased
radicalization of the group over time?

The Hamburg group's travel to Afghanistan. Binalshibh claims that he and the rest of
the Hamburg group were recruited into al Qaeda and the 9/11 plot as a result of a
chance meeting with someone who directed the group to an al Qaeda member named
Mohamedou Ould Slahi.

a. (For Mr. Davis) What intelligence is there about how the Hamburg group
was induced to go to Afghanistan? What can tell us about Slahi and his
association with al Qaeda? Was he a recruiter for al Qaeda? Do you
know if he had knowledge of the 9/11 plot?

b. (For Mr. Davis) Is there anything to either corroborate or contradict


Binalshibh's claim that the Hamburg group went to Afghanistan at Slahi's
suggestion?

Binalshibh's failure to obtain a visa. Binalshibh, a Yemeni, did not obtain a U.S. visa.
According to KSM, he realized early on in the plot that it would be difficult to use
Yemenis for attacks within the U.S. due to difficulties in obtaining visas.

a. (For Mr. Davis) Do we know why KSM nevertheless planned to make


Binalshibh one of the pilots for the attacks in the U.S.?

Selection for the plot. It appears that the Hamburg group was selected for the 9/11
attacks and Atta as emir fairly quickly, as shown by the fact that when Binalshibh
reached the camps, Atta and Jarrah had already pledged bay at and Shehhi had already
left.
a. (For Mr. Davis) Is there anything you can tell us about the process of
selecting those in the Hamburg group for the attacks? Why was Atta
chosen as the emir? Is there any possibility that Atta had prior contact
with al Qaeda or Bin Ladin? If there is no indication of previous contact,
why did al Qaeda select the individuals from Hamburg so quickly?

Initial Target selection. There is reporting that in Atta's initial discussions with Bin
Ladin, the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, Congress and the White House were
mentioned as targets.

a. (For Mr. Davis) Can you elaborate on the target selection? Were they all
picked by Bin Ladin? Was Atta given orders to attack certain targets or
did he have discretion between targets?

Return to Germany. The Hamburg cell members presumably did not want most others
in Hamburg to know that they had traveled to Afghanistan. When they returned from
Afghanistan to Hamburg, there are reports that they behaved and dressed differently than
they had prior to their travel. There were also numerous press reports after the
September 11 attacks thatJarrah was detained by UAE law enforcement authorities on
his way back from Afghanistan, at the request of the US Government.

a. (For all) What role did their closest associates (Motassadeq, Mzoudi,
Essabar, and Bahaji) play in keeping their whereabouts a secret?

b. (For all) What can you tell us about the apparent change in behavior of
the Hamburg cell, and who may have instructed them to do so?

c. (For all) What can you tell us about the incident with Jarrah in the UAE,
particularly in terms of any role of the US government?

Ziad Jarrah. Jarrah's personal background makes it seem that he was an unlikely
candidate for a suicide attack. Jarrah also maintained close contact with his girlfriend
in Germany as well as his family in Lebanon throughout his time in the United States.

a. (For all) Do you have any information about when, and why, Jarrah
became an extremist? Are there people who may have influenced him to
become radical?

b. (For all) Did Jarrah disobey an order by Atta or the al Qaeda leadership
by taking so many foreign trips and maintaining contacts with his family?

c. (For all) What is your assessment as to whether Jarrah's girlfriend may


have known about the plot? What does the one-way ticket for Jarrah's last
visit to Germany indicate?
Hatching of the plot. During the Mzoudi and Motassadeq trials in Germany, evidence
was presented indicating that the Hamburg cell members planned to attack the United
States even prior to their travel to Afghanistan in late 1999. In fact, some of the evidence
presented appeared to support the proposition that the Hamburg cell members came up
with the plan for 9/11 and then traveled to Afghanistan to receive approval and funding
to carry it out.

a. (For all) Based on the evidence you have seen, do you believe that the
Hamburg cell members intended to carry out an attack against the United
States even before their trip to Afghanistan?

b. (For all) What evidence is there to indicate that the plan for 9/11 was
hatched in Hamburg?

Pre 9/11 Focus by U.S. and German governments on al Qaeda presence in


Hamburg.

a. (For all) What did the German government know prior to 9/11 about the
various members of the group, including Mohammed Haydar Zammar?
What information had the German government shared with the U.S. about
these individuals prior to 9/11?

b. (For all) How concerned were members of the U.S. Intelligence


Community prior to 9/11 that there might be an al Qaeda presence in
Hamburg? To what extent was this concern expressed to their German
counterparts, and how responsive were the German government officials
to the U.S. Intelligence Community's requests?

c. (For all) To what extent were German intelligence and law enforcement
agencies focused on Islamic extremism prior to 9/11?

Arrival of Hamburg pilots in the U.S. Atta andShehhi arrived without firm plans to
attend a particular flight school, while Jarrah did make plans to attend a flight school in
Florida. Atta and Shehhi looked at schools in the Northeast and in Oklahoma, but then
trained in the same small city in Florida as Jarrah.

a. (For all) What evidence is there regarding Atta and Shehhi's original
plans to get flight training? Did they plan to train in the Northeast?

b. (For all) Why did they travel all the way to Oklahoma? Have you found a
connection to the fact that Zacarias Moussaoui later trained at the school
in Oklahoma that Atta and Shehhi chose not to attend? Is there evidence
of any other al Qaeda figure training at that same school previously?

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c. (For all) Do you know why Atta and Shehhi rejected various schools they
looked into? Do you think that Atta and Shehhi originally planned to train
someplace distant from Jarrah?

d. (For FBI) Can you elaborate on the training of Atta, Shehhi, and Jarrah?
What did they tell their flight instructors? What types of students were
they? Did they progress in their training at a typical rate? Do their flight
instructors recall anything unusual about them?

e. (For FBI) Why did Atta and Shehhi keep switching flight schools? Do
you consider this simply to be a sign of their hurry to get licensed, or a
sign of tradecraft?

f. (For FBI) Is there any evidence that Atta, Shehhi and Jarrah had meetings
while they trained in Venice, Florida? How far apart were their schools
and residences? What evidence is there of any communication among
them?

Trips to Georgia. Investigation has not been able to identify'Atta and Shehhi's
whereabouts from March 1, 2001 through March 12, 2001. They were last reported in
Stone Mountain, Georgia on March 1, 2001 and are accounted for on March 13, 2001 in
Duluth, Georgia. Jarrah is unaccounted from March 5-14, 2001. Jarrah's phone
activity places him in Levittown, PA on March 5, 2001. He is accounted for in Decatur,
Georgia on March 15, 2001.

a. (For FBI) Has every possible investigative measure been taken to identify
their whereabouts and more importantly have any associates or new
telephone numbers pertaining to possible associates been identified?

b. (For FBI)Were Jarrah's girlfriend's telephone numbers queried for all


incoming calls during this time frame to identify Jarrah's whereabouts?

c. (For FBI) Atta also made several phone calls to his father, grandfather,
mother and sister in February 2001. Was a request made to the foreign
counterparts to have these telephone numbers queried for incoming calls
from US during this time period?

Hani Hanjour. Hanjour lived in the United States off and on since 1991, mostly in
Arizona. He seems to have spent much of his time flight training.

a. (For all) Why did he first come to the United States? What evidence is
there as to why he chose flight training, and why he chose to settle in
Arizona?

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b. (For all) Do you know what his views were when he first came to the
United States? How sure are you that he did not come to the United States
at the direction of al Qaeda? What do you know about his early trip to
Afghanistan in the 1980s?

c. (For FBI) What have you found about Hanjour's time in Arizona during
the 1990s? Did he spend all of his time flight training, or was he involved
in any other significant activities? How did he finance his education?

d. (For FBI) Who were his associates in Arizona? Were any of them
extremists? What do you know about the people he trained with in
Arizona? How likely is it, based on the evidence you have seen, that there
is a support network of extremists in Arizona?

e. (For FBI) To what extent did any of Hanjour's associates in Arizona have
ties to al Qaeda? Is it possible that one of his associates could have
recruited Hanjour into al Qaeda while in Arizona? Have you found any
connection with Hanjour's associates in Arizona and the 9/11 plot?

f. (For FBI) Did Hanjour have any relationship with any of the individuals
discussed in the "Phoenix memo" from July of 2001? What became of the
individuals named in the memo? Have you determined why they were
pursuing training in the aviation field?

The 1999 America West incident. There was a well-publicized incident in November of
1999 involving two Saudi students on an America West flight between Phoenix and
Washington, DC in which the students were briefly detained by the FBI due to reports
that one of the students was trying to get into the cockpit.

a. (For FBI) Have you determined whether the incident was related in any
way to 9/11 or to Hani Hanjour?

b. Did either of the two students involved in the incident have ties to
Afghanistan?

Recruitment into the Plot. It appears that Hanjour arrived in the al Qaeda camps in
Afghanistan in 2000 and was quickly recognized as an ideal candidate for the 9/11 plot.

a. (For all) Do you have any information on how and why Hanjour ended up
in the al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan in 2000? Do you know if he was
influenced by a certain individual or event to go to Afghanistan?

b. (For all) How long was he in the camps? How quickly was he selected for
the 9/11 attacks?

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c. (For all) Do you have any doubts that it was truly a coincidence that when
al Qaeda needed a pilot for the plot, Hanjour showed up in Afghanistan?

Hanjour's return. Hanjour returned to the United States in December 2000 to join with
Nawafal Hazmi. The two moved from San Diego to Phoenix so that Hanjour could
pursue additional flight training.

a. (For FBI) Do you know where Hanjour stayed when he arrived in San
Diego? How long was he in San Diego? What investigative steps have
you taken to try to answer these questions?

b. (For all) Did Nawafal Hazmi receive notification that another operative
was joining him in San Diego? If so, how was he informed, and by
whom?

Hanjour's training. Hanjour appears to have obtained a significant amount of flight


training, considering that he started in the 1990s. At least a few of Hanjour's flight
instructors seem to have discouraged him from continuing due to poor performance.

a. (For FBI) What have you found about his skills as a pilot? What do his
flight instructors in Arizona say about him in terms of skill and
personality?

b. (For FBI) Have you determined whether Hanjour had enough skill and
training to crash Flight 77 into the Pentagon?

Return to Arizona? There is some evidence that in June of 2001, Hanjour returned to
Arizona to obtain additional flight training.

a. (For FBI) What is the evidence suggesting that Hanjour returned to


Arizona at this time? Is there contradicting evidence? What is your
assessment on whether he returned to Arizona?

b. (For FBI) If Hanjour did return to Arizona, what would be the reason?
Were there certain key associates who could have helped Hanjour with his
training?

Atta and Shehhi in Georgia. The staff statement reports that Atta andShehhi spent a
considerable amount of time in the area surrounding Atlanta.

a. (For FBI) Have you been able to account for all of Atta and Shehhi's time
in Georgia? Have you determined why they spent time in Georgia? Have
you identified any individuals whom they met or associated with in
Georgia?

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Atta in Prague: The staff statement expresses a belief that the alleged meeting between
Atta and an Iraqi intelligence officer did not occur.

a. (For Mr. Davis) What can you tell us, in an open hearing, about the origin
of the report that Atta met with an Iraqi officer? Can you discuss what
has been done to attempt to corroborate the report? What is your
assessment of the report?

b. (For FBI) What has the FBI done to attempt to resolve the issue? What
gaps are there in Atta's travel during this time period? What has the FBI
done to investigate potential international travel by Atta during this time
period? What is your assessment about whether Atta went to Prague?

Investigation of April activities. Atta andShehhi are unaccounted for from April 4-10,
2001. They were last reported in Virginia Beach, VA cashing a check in the amount of
$8,000 on April 4, 2001. Atta andShehhi are accounted for on April 11, 2001 in Coral
Springs, Florida. It has been suggested Atta may have been in Prague on April 9, 2001.

a. (For FBI) Were the Canadians asked to query their immigration records
for departures from and arrivals to Canadian airports for Atta and Shehhi
in April 2001? Were foreign airline carriers operating from Dulles,
Norfolk and Richmond and surrounding areas asked to query their flight
manifests for Atta and Shehhi? (It is conceivable that they flew out of a
US airport and flew into an airport in Canada as all entries made in land
ports of entry were not always documented.)

b. (For FBI) If they did not travel abroad and remained in the US, were
hotels and businesses along the major thoroughfares between Virginia
Beach, Virginia and Coral Springs, Florida queried for Atta and Shehhi?

c. (For FBI) How likely is it that Atta and Shehhi had witting or unwitting
associates, who have not been identified, assist them during the periods
that they are missing?

Virginia Beach. In late February, Atta withdrew $4000from his joint account with
Shehhi while the two were in Virginia Beach. They also opened a mailbox in a private
mailbox facility, which they closed several weeks later.

a. (For all) Have you been able to determine the purpose of Atta and
Shehhi's travel to Virginia Beach? Or why they opened a mailbox there
temporarily? What evidence is there as to any mail that may have been
delivered there?

Shehhi's travel: Shehhi took unexplained trips to Casablanca and Cairo while he was
living in the United States.

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a. (For all) Have you found anything that possibly explains these trips?
Have you been able to verify reports that Shehhi visited Atta's father
during the trip to Cairo?

The Muscle Hijackers All but one of the so-called 9/11 "muscle hijackers " — those
operatives who would storm the cockpits and control the passengers on the four hijacked
planes — came from Saudi Arabia. Most appear to have been swayed to join the jihad in
Chechnya by contacts at local universities and mosques.

a. (For Mr. Davis) Based on the intelligence information you have seen, why
were nearly all of the muscle hijackers selected for the 9/11 attacks from
Saudi Arabia? Was it purely for practical reasons, i.e. ease of travel?
Does there appear to have been any larger strategic or symbolic purpose?

b. (For all) Have any of the contacts at local universities and mosques who
initially recruited many of the muscle hijackers in Saudi Arabia been
identified by U.S. or Saudi authorities? If so, who are they and what can
you tell us about them?

c. (For all) If most of the muscle hijackers left Saudi Arabia to join the jihad
in Chechnya, how did they end up becoming al Qaeda suicide operatives
in Afghanistan? Does this mean that they were not initially recruited for
the 9/11 attacks, or even for a suicide operation?

Background of muscle hijackers. The muscle hijackers had a variety of backgrounds,


and some were not even believed to be especially religious. Most appear to have broken
contact with their families by late 1999 and early 2000.

a. (For all) What do we know about how the muscle hijackers were
radicalized? What have their friends and families told U.S. and Saudi
authorities about any changes they noticed in these individuals?

b. (For all) Did any of the muscle hijackers know each other before they
were selected for the 9/11 operation? Were any a part of a similar circle
of associates?

c. (For all) What, if any, common traits exist among the muscle
hijackers?

d. (For all) Were any of them experienced al Qaeda operatives? Were any of
them known to Saudi authorities prior to September 11? Had any of the
muscle hijackers come to the attention of U.S. authorities prior to
September 11?

15
Recruitment of muscle hijackers into the plot. The muscle hijackers volunteered to
become suicide operatives for al Qaeda and were chosen by Bin Ladinfor the 9/11
operation. After being selected, they were sent to Saudi Arabia to obtain U.S. visas and
then returned to Afghanistan for special training.

a. (For Mr. Davis) Based on the intelligence you have seen, how did Bin
Ladin select the 9/11 muscle hijackers? What criteria did he use? Who
helped him choose the operatives? When did this process occur?

b. (For Mr. Davis) Why were the 9/11 muscle hijackers first sent to Saudi
Arabia to obtain U.S. visas and instructed to return to Afghanistan for
special training?

c. (For Mr. Davis) What kind of training did the muscle hijackers receive?
Was it different than the training provided to other al Qaeda operatives?
How so? How long did their training last? Who trained them?

Facilitators in the UAE. After their training, the muscle hijackers were sent to the
U.A.E., where they received assistance from two al Qaeda operatives, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali
and Mustafa al Hawsawi. The muscle hijackers were then sent to the United States in
pairs.

a. (For all) When were the muscle hijackers informed about the details of the
9/11 operation - the targets, timing, and means of attack? Who told them?

b. (For all) Why were the muscle hijackers sent to the United States via the
U.A.E.? What types of assistance did they receive? What did the
facilitators know about the 9/11 operation?

c. (For all) Why were the muscle hijackers sent to the United States in pairs?
Did any of them attract the attention of security officials along the way?

Unidentified male with Jar rah. The staff statement reports that Jarrah was in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania in June of 2001 attempting to fly the "Hudson corridor"
from a flight school at the Northeast Philadelphia Airport. He was accompanied to the
flight school by an otherwise unidentified Middle Eastern male. Jarrah then drove to
Baltimore/Washington International airport on June 7 and flew to Las Vegas, Nevada.
While renting an automobile at the Las Vegas airport Jarrah was accompanied by a
Middle Eastern male fitting the description of the person in Philadelphia.

a. (For FBI) Has the person who accompanied Jarrah been identified? If not,
what investigation is being conducted to determine his identity?

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Atta in Las Vegas. Atta traveled to Las Vegas on June 28, 2001 from Boston, MA, and
remained until July 1, 2001.

a. (For FBI) What was the purpose of Atta's trip? Was there an evaluation of
Atta's travel in the Las Vegas area?

Atta in Boston. Atta failed to complete his scheduled airline connections from Las
Vegas through Boston, MA and on to JFK airport in New York City on 07/01/2001.
Instead he remained in Boston and stayed at the Holiday Inn Express on the Fitzgerald
Expressway approximately 5 miles from Logan International Airport. Atta then flew to
New York the next day.

a. (For FBI) Has the FBI determined why Atta remained in Boston
overnight? Hamza al Ghamdi called the same motel several times on
09/09/2001. What is known, if anything about the interest in this motel by
the hijackers?

The July 2001 Spain Meeting In mid-July, Atta met Binalshibh at a small resort town
in Spain, where, according to Binalshibh, they discussed the status of the 9/11 plot. Atta
told Binalshibh that he would still need several weeks before he could finalize a date for
the attacks.

a. (For all) Why did Atta and Binalshibh meet in person? Were they
instructed to do so? By whom?

b. (For all) How did Atta and Binalshibh choose the location for their
meeting?

c. (For all) Did any others individuals meet with them while they were in
Spain?

d. (For all) Why did Atta need more time to finalize the date of the 9/11
attacks as of mid-July 2001? What else did they discuss at this meeting?

Spanish Indictment. The Spanish government has indicted a number of individuals


from the so-called "Spanish cell" ofal Qaeda led by an individual named Barakat
Yarkas on charges related to the September 11 attacks.

a. (For all) Based on what you have seen, was there a Spanish connection to
the 9/11 attacks involving the individuals named in the indictment? Is
there any connection between the individuals named in the indictment and
the meeting between Atta and Binalshibh in July of 2001?

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Would Be Muscle Hijackers. There were a number of operatives selected to be muscle
hijackers who did not end up being apart of the 9/11 attacks. These so-called
"candidate " muscle hijackers either backed out of their assignment, could not obtain the
needed travel documentation, or were removed from the 9/11 plot by al Qaeda leaders.

a. (For Mr. Davis) How many muscle hijackers per plane did al Qaeda think
would be necessary to carry out the 9/11 attacks successfully?

b. (For Mr. Davis) How much did these candidate muscle hijackers know
about the 9/11 plot?

c. (For all) Did any of them come to the attention of Saudi authorities prior
to 9/11? Were any of them known by U.S. authorities?

d. (For all) If these individuals were supposed to have taken part in the 9/11
attacks, where are they today? Are they in custody? If so, have they
admitted their potential role in the plot?

Saudi nationality. We have identified at least nine candidate muscle hijackers, all of
whom were Saudi nationals. We have named them in the Staff Statement and provided
the general reasons why they did not take part in the 9/11 attacks.

a. (For Mr. Davis) Ali Abd al Rahman al Faqasi al Ghamdi and Zuhair al
Thubaiti were removed from the 9/11 operation by the al Qaeda
leadership. Why?

b. (For all) Khalid Saeed Ahmad al Zahrani and Saeed Abdullah Saeed al
Ghamdi failed to acquire U.S. visas. Why were they unable to get U.S.
visas, unlike the other muscle hijackers?

Intervention of security officials. Qutaybah al Najdi was stopped and briefly


questioned by the airport security officials in Dubai, U.A.E., and both he and Saeed al
Baluchi got cold feet after this encounter.

a. (For all) Why was Najdi stopped? Did he raise any suspicions? Is there
any report of the incident?

Intervention of families. Saud al Rashid and Mushabib al Hamlan backed out of the
operation when their families interceded.

a. (For all) Please elaborate on these two stories. How did their families
know what they were involved with? Did they know that these individuals
were getting U.S. visas? How did their families prevent them from taking
part in the attacks? Did they notify the authorities?

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Saud al Rashid. Commission staff, along with the FBI, interviewed one of the candidate
muscle hijackers, Saud al Rashid, in Saudi Arabia. Rashid admitted going to
Afghanistan, but denied ever meeting Bin Ladin or KSM, being part of the 9/11 plot, or
even hearing about al Qaeda until after he had returned to Saudi Arabia. Commission
staff did not find Rashid's denials credible. Rashid, however, was released by Saudi
authorities.

a. (For Ms. Maguire) What was your evaluation of Saud al Rashid's


statements?

b. (For all) If Rashid was indeed slated to have been one of the muscle
hijackers for the 9/11 attacks, shouldn't he be in custody? Are U.S. or
Saudi authorities aware of his current activities?

Internal Disagreement: Atta, Jarrah, and Moussaoui. There appears to have been an
internal disagreement among the hijackers, specifically between two of the pilots,
Mohamed Atta and Ziad Jarrah. This disagreement stemmed from the extent of Jarrah's
autonomy from Atta - unlike any of the other 9/11 hijackers, he took frequent trips
abroad to visit his family and his girlfriend — and Jarrah's feeling of exclusion from the
decision-making by Atta.

a. (For all) How close were Jarrah and Mohamed Atta when they lived in
Germany?

b. (For all) To what extent were the other hijackers allowed to maintain
contacts with their friends and family once they had arrived in the United
States? Why was Jarrah allowed to visit his girlfriend and family so
often?

c. (For all) What have those who have been interviewed about Jarrah, like
his flight instructors, said about him? What was he like? Did he seem
particularly religious, intense, or extreme in any way?

d. (For all) Why did Jarrah spend so much of his time training in the United
States alone? Once it became clear that Binalshibh would not be able to
get a U.S. visa, why didn't Jarrah join Atta and train with him and
Marwan al Shehhi?

Possible second thoughts. During the summer of 2001, Jarrah may have had second
thoughts about participating in the 9/11 operation. Perhaps the most significant
evidence of this doubt was revealed in a mid-July conversation between KSM and
Binalshibh. KSM and Binalshibh had a number of communications about the plot during
the spring and summer of 2001.

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a. (For Mr. Davis) What more can you tell us about these communications
between KSM and Binalshibh about the 9/11 plot? When were U.S.
authorities aware of these communications? The summer of 2001 has
been dubbed the "summer of threat" - were any U.S. authorities aware of
these communications at the tune?

b. (For Mr. Davis) How explicit were the contents of these communications?
Do the communications appear to be operational in nature? Would there
have been any reason to suspect that the communications might concern
planning for a terrorist operation?

c. (For all) In retrospect, how many of these communications appear to have


concerned planning for the 9/11 plot? What exactly did KSM and
Binalshibh discuss during these communications?

d. (For Mr. Davis) What further details can you provide us about the mid-
July 2001 conversation between KSM and Binalshibh? What was
discussed about Jarrah and his role in the 9/11 plot?

Zacarias Moussaoui. There is reason to believe that KSM-wanted money sent to


Zacarias Moussaoui to prepare him as a potential substitute pilot in the event Jarrah
dropped out. Moussaoui was arrested on August 16, 2001, however, before completing
flight simulator training.

a. (For all) What can you tell us about Moussaoui's background? Was he a
trained as an al Qaeda operative? Had he traveled to Afghanistan like the
9/11 hijackers? Did he volunteer to be a suicide operative?

b. (For all) Had Moussaoui ever met any of the 9/11 hijackers? Did he
receive the same training as they had?

c. (For FBI) What kind of flight training had Moussaoui received prior to his
arrest? Could he have piloted a commercial jet?

d. (For all) How could Moussaoui have been incorporated into the 9/11 plot
as late as August 2001?

Second wave. Binalshibh says that KSM talked about Moussaoui as if he had been part
of the 9/11 plot. KSM denies that Moussaoui was ever intended to be part of the 9/11
operation and was slated instead to participate in a so-called "second wave " of attacks
on the West Coast after September 11.

a. (For all) What other information exists to support the idea that al Qaeda
may have been planning a second wave of attacks after 9/11?

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b. (For all) What would have been the targets for the alleged second wave
attacks? When were they supposed to occur?

c. (For all) Where is the other potential pilot that KSM says he recruited for
the second wave attacks, Faruq al Tunisi?

Timing and Targets The date of the attacks apparently was not chosen much more than
three weeks before September 11. Attapassed the date to Binalshibh in mid-August. Bin
Ladin, however, had been pressuring KSM for months to advance the date of the attacks.
Despite Bin Ladin's wishes, the attacks seem to have been delayed during the summer of
2001.

a. (For Mr. Davis) What intelligence do you have as to why Bin Ladin
wanted the attacks to occur sooner than September 11?

b. (For all) Could KSM simply disobey Bin Ladin? How about
Atta?

c. (For all) Why was the operation delayed during the summer of
2001?

d. (For all) Was there any particular significance attached to the date of
September 11?

White House or Capitol. Atta selected a date after the first week of September so that
the U.S. Congress would be in session. The Capitol was on the preliminary target list as
early as the spring of 1999, which also included the White House, the Pentagon, and the
World Trade Center. Bin Ladin preferred the White House over the Capitol. Based on
communications between Atta and Binalshibh as late as September 9, 2001, it appears as
if the hijackers planned to hit the White House if possible but kept the U.S. Congress as
an alternate target.

a. (For Mr. Davis) What other targets were on the preliminary target list
developed by al Qaeda?

b. (For all) Why did the hijackers believe the White House would be a
difficult target?

c. (For Mr. Davis) If Bin Ladin wanted to hit the White House, did KSM or
Atta have any choice?

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d. (For Mr. Davis) What more information can you provide about the
communications between Atta and Binalshibh in the late summer of 2001?
When did this information come to the attention of U.S. authorities?

Dissent Among al Qaeda Leaders Although access to details of the 9/11 plot was
carefully guarded, word started to spread during the summer of 2001 that an attack
against the United States was imminent. KSMwas widely known within al Qaeda to be
planning an attack against the U.S., and many were even aware that he was sending
operatives to the U.S., as was reported by a CIA source in June 2001. Bin Ladin,
moreover, specifically asked others in Afghanistan to pray for the success of an upcoming
attack involving 20 operatives.

a. (For Mr. Davis) How did so many al Qaeda members know that an attack
against the U.S. was coming, and that KSM was sending operatives to the
U.S.?

b. (For Mr. Davis) If this information was reported by a CIA source in June
2001, during the summer of threat, what was done with this information?

c. (For Mr. Davis) Were Bin Ladin or KSM at all concerned that the plot
might have been discovered during the summer of 2001, when word began
to spread about the upcoming attack?

Disagreement with the Taliban. With the news of an impending attack against the U.S.
gaining wider circulation, a rift developed within al Qaeda's leadership. Bin Ladin
wanted the operation to proceed as soon as possible, but several senior al Qaeda figures
thought they should follow the position of Mullah Omar, who opposed attacking the U.S.

a. (For Mr. Davis) Why did Mullah Omar oppose the attacks? Was he
concerned about the U.S. reaction?

b. (For Mr. Davis) Did Bin Ladin's senior advisors oppose the attacks solely
out of deference to Omar? Were they concerned about the reaction of
their Taliban host?

c. (For Mr. Davis) Did Bin Ladin generally ignore the views of his senior
advisors? Of Omar?

Final meeting in Las Vegas. On August 12, 2001, Atta booked airline tickets from a
computer terminal in an internet cafe in Ft. Lee, NJ, for a flight to Las Vegas. Hani
Hanjour was using the adjacent computer terminal to book flights to Las Vegas on a
different flight. Atta flew to Las Vegas on August 13, 2001 and met Nawafal Hazmi and
Hani Hanjour who had also flown to Las Vegas.

a. (For all) If known, what was the purpose of this meeting?

22
Equipment for the attacks: Shortly before the attacks, Jarrah purchased a Global
Positioning System (GPS) unit.

a. (For FBI) Do you know if he used the GPS unit during the attacks?
Would it have assisted the hijackers in any way?

Portland, Maine. Atta and al Omari drove a rental automobile from Newton, MA to
Portland, ME on September 10, 20011. They flew back to Boston, MA on US Airways
flight 5930 on the morning of September 11 and connected to American Airlines Flight
11.

a. (For FBI) Do you know what why Atta chose to fly from Portland to
Boston?

Final days in Boston. A housekeeper at the Park Inn, Newton, MA in room 433, which
was occupied by Wail and Waleed al Sheri attempted to clean the room on September 11,
2001 at 10:00 am. She was reportedly confronted by a Middle Eastern male, who was in
the room and stated that "someone is sleeping. "

a. (For FBI) Has the FBI determined if this is correct? Was the
housekeeper's key card used in room 433 at this time? Was the
housekeeper shown photographs of the known hijackers and their
associates?

Financing for the plot: The hijackers obtained funds for the plot through wire transfers
from facilitators in the UAE. The funds for the attacks -were deposited in a number of
bank accounts opened by the hijackers.

a. (For Mr. Drucker) Have you found violations of any laws or regulations
in the manner the hijackers received money through wire transfers?

b. (For Mr. Drucker) Were there any instances where the banks that the
hijackers used reported any suspicious activity? If so, how were those
incidents resolved?

c. (For Mr. Drucker) How do you know that there was no funding source for
the attacks within the United States? How confident are you in that
conclusion?

d. (For Mr. Drucker) Can you explain the FBI's investigation of the plot
financing? How were you able to determine how the hijackers got their
money?

23
e. (For Mr. Drucker) Could another group of terrorists use the same
financing methodology today?

f. (For Mr. Drucker) The total amount spent for the 9/11 attacks seems
rather low. How confident are you that the funds you have identified were
enough to carry out the attacks?

Detainee credibility. Much of the information about the plot is derived from
interrogations of detainees.

a. (For all) How much of the "inside view" of the plot represents the
combined statements of various conspirators, and how much relies simply
on the accounts of one or two?

b. (For all) How consistent have the statements attributed to conspirators in


the 9/11 plot been?

c. (For all) How should we go about assessing credibility of the


conspirators?

d. (For all) How conversant are the individuals performing the interrogations
in the facts surrounding the 9/11 plot and plotters?

Foreign government cooperation

a. (For all) How much of the 9/11 story that we've heard is the product of
investigation performed by officials of foreign governments?

b. (For all) To what extent have you been able to conduct investigation
abroad?

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