KANT HANDOUT

Kant Extract from the Groundwork of the Metaphy !c of Mora" # 1. It is impossible to conceive anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which can be taken as good without qualification, except a good (=excellent, powerful ! will. Intelligence, wit, "udgment, and any other talents of the mind we may care to name, or courage, resolution, and constancy of purpose, as qualities of temperament, are without doubt good and desirable in many respects# but they can also be extremely bad and hurtful, when the will is not good which has to make use of these gifts of nature. It is exactly the same with gifts of fortune. $ower, wealth, honour, even health and that complete well%being and contentment with one&s state which goes by the name of happiness, produce boldness and as a consequence often over%boldness as well, unless a good will is present by which their influence on the mind may be corrected and ad"usted to universal ends. '. ( good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes ) because of its fitness for attaining some proposed end* it is good through its willing alone ) that is, good in itself. +onsidered in itself it is to be esteemed beyond comparison as far higher than any thing it could ever bring about ,-ven if , this will is entirely lacking in power to carry out its intentions# if by its utmost effort it still accomplishes nothing, and only good will is left (not, admittedly, as a mere wish, but as the straining of every means so far as they are in our control!# even then it would still shine like a "ewel for its own sake, .. ,reason/0s1 true function must be to produce a will which is good, not as a means to some further end, but in itself /it is uncond!t!ona"1# ,2uch a will need not on this account be the sole and complete good, but it must be the highest good and the condition of all the rest, even of all our demands for happiness, the cultivation of reason,may in many ways, at least in this life, restrict the attainment,of happiness ) which is always conditioned# and indeed that it can even reduce happiness to less than 3ero* for reason, which recognises as its highest practical function the establishment of a good will, in attaining this end is capable only of its own peculiar kind of contentment , 4. 5e have now to elucidate the concept of a will estimable in itself and good apart from any further end. 5e will therefore take up the concept of duty which includes that of a good will,I will here pass over all actions already recogni3ed as contrary to duty, I will also set aside actions which in fact accord with duty, yet,which men,perform because impelled to do so by some other inclination. ,6or example it certainly accords with duty that a grocer should not overcharge his inexperienced customer# and where there is much

competition a sensible shopkeeper refrains from so doing and keeps to a fixed and general price for everybody...7hus people are served honestly# but this is not nearly enough to "ustify us in believing that the shopkeeper has acted in this way from duty or from principles of fair dealing# his interests required him to do so,the action was done neither from duty nor from immediate inclination, but solely from purposes of self%interest. 8. 9n the other hand, to preserve one&s life is a duty, and besides this every one has also an immediate inclination to do so. :ut on account of this the often anxious precautions taken by the greater part of mankind /to preserve their lives1 for this purpose have no inner worth, and the maxim of their action is without moral content. 7hey do protect their lives in conformity with duty but not from the motive of duty. 5hen on the contrary disappointments and hopeless misery have quite taken away the taste for life# when a wretched man, strong in soul,longs for death and still preserves his life without loving it, not from inclination or fear but from duty# then indeed his maxim has a moral content. ;. 7o help others where one can is a duty, and besides this there are many spirits /who1 find an inner pleasure in spreading happiness around them ,<et I maintain that in such a case an action of this kind, however right and however amiable it may be, has still no genuinely moral worth. 7he inclination for honour is the same. =. 2uppose then that the mind of this friend of man were overclouded by sorrows of his own which extinguished all sympathy with the fate of others, but that he still had power to help those in distress, though no longer stirred by the need of others because sufficiently occupied with his own# and suppose that, when no longer moved by any inclination, he tears himself out of this deadly insensibility and does the action without any inclination, for the sake of duty alone# then for the first time his action has its genuine moral worth, >. 7o assure one&s own happiness is a duty,:ut here also, all men have already of themselves the strongest and deepest inclination,but when the universal inclination towards happiness has failed to determine a man&s will,what remains,is a law ) the law of furthering his happiness, not from inclination, but from duty# and in thus for the first time his conduct has a real moral worth. ?. It is doubtless in this sense that we should understand too the passages from 2cripture in which we are commanded to love our neighbour and even our enemy. 6or love out of inclination cannot be commanded# but kindness done from duty ) although no inclination impels us, and even although natural and unconquerable disinclination stands in our way ,it is this practical love alone which can be an ob"ect of command. 1@. 9ur second proposition is this* action done from duty has its moral worth, not in the purpose to be attained by it, but in the maxim in accordance with which it is decided upon, 11. 9ur third proposition, as an inference from the two preceding, I would express thus* Auty is the necessity to act out of reverence for the law. ,Bow an action done from duty has to set aside altogether the influence of inclination, and along with inclination every ob"ect of the will# so there is nothing left able to determine the will except ob"ectively the law and sub"ectively pure reverence for this practical law, and therefore the maxim of obeying this law even to the detriment of all my inclinations,(ll moral interest so called consists solely in reverence for the law. 2

1'. :ut what kind of law can this be,(which! without regard to the results expected from it, has to determine the will,2ince I have robbed the will of every inducement that might arise for it as a consequence of obeying any particular law, nothing is left but the conformity of actions to universal law as such, and this alone must serve the will as its principle. 7hat is to say, I ought never to act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law. Cere bare conformity to universal law as such is what serves the will as its principle, and must so serve it if duty is not to be everywhere an empty delusion and a chimerical concept. 1.. 7ake this question, for example. Day I not, when I am hard pressed, make a promise with the intention of not keeping it Cere I readily distinguish the two senses which the question can have ) Is it prudent (=practically wise!, or is it right, to make a false promise 7he first no doubt can often be the case. I do indeed see that /because the consequences are hard to foresee1,it may be a more prudent action to proceed here on a general maxim and make it my habit not to give a promise except with the intention of keeping it. <et it becomes clear to me at once that such a maxim is always founded solely on fear of consequences. 7o tell the truth for the sake of duty is something entirely different from doing so out of concern for inconvenient results, 5hen I deviate from the principle of duty, this is quite certainly bad# but if I desert my prudential maxim, this can often be greatly to my advantage, though it is admittedly safer to stick to it. 14. 2uppose I seek, however, to learn in the quickest way and yet unerringly how to solve the problem 0Aoes a lying promise accord with duty & I have then to ask myself 02hould I really be content that my maxim (of getting out of a difficulty by a false promise! should hold as a universal law (one valid both for myself and others! (nd could I really say to myself that every one may make a false promise if he finds himself in a difficulty from which he can extricate himself in no other way & I then become aware at once that I can indeed will to lie, but I can by no means will a universal law of lying# for by such a law there could properly be no promises at all,others would not believe me or would pay me back in like coin* and consequently my maxim, as soon as it was made a universal law, would be bound to annul itself, 18. Bow I say that man, and in general every rational being, exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means for arbitrary use by this or that will* he must in all his actions, whether they are directed to himself or to other rational beings, always be viewed at the same time as an end,non%rational beings /have1 only a relative value as means, and are consequently called things. Eational beings, on the other hand, are called persons because their nature already marks them out as ends in themselves ) that is, as something which ought not to be used merely as a means ) and consequently imposes to that extent a limit on all arbitrary treatment of them. $ersons, therefore, are not merely sub"ective ends whose existence as an ob"ect of our actions has a value for us* they are ob"ective ends ) that is, things whose existence is in itself an end, and indeed an end such that in its place we can put no other end to which they should serve simply as means# for unless this is so, nothing at all of absolute value would be found anywhere. :ut if all value were conditioned, ) that is, contingent ) then no supreme principle could be found for reason at all. 1;. If then there is to be a supreme practical principle, and ) so far as the human will is concerned ) a categorical imperative, it must be such that from the idea of something 3

which is necessarily an end for every one, because it is an end in itself, it forms an ob"ective principle of the will, and consequently can serve as a practical law. 7he ground of this principle is this* Eational nature exists as an end in itself. 7his is the way in which a man necessarily conceives his own existence# it is therefore so far a principle of human actions. :ut it is also the way in which every other rational being conceives his existence on the same rational ground which is valid also for me# hence it is at the same time an ob"ective principle, from which, as a supreme practical ground, it must be possible to derive all laws for the will. 7he practical imperative will therefore be as follows* (ct in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end. $ead!n% &ue t!on on the extract from the Groundwork# 1. Eead paragraphs 1 and '. Cow does Fant describe the 0good will& him to mean by it 5hat do you take 5hich in

'. Eead paragraph .. 5hat difference is there between reason and happiness Fant&s view should be dominant, and what might this mean practically

.. $aragraphs 4 to 11 talk about duty, or the practical application of the 0good will&. a. 5hat is the example of the shopkeeper, and what does it demonstrate b. 7hinking about para. 8, what does Fant say about those who 0preserve their lives in conformity with duty but not out of duty& c. 5hat about helping others, discussed in paras. ; G = d. 5hat is Fant&s view about 0love out of inclination&, discussed in para. ? 5hat might be peculiar about this, to you e. In para.11., how does Fant define 0duty&, and what does moral interest consist in, on his account 4. Cow ought you never to act, in para. 1' 5hat 0alone serves the will as its principle&

8. 5hat is the account of breaking promises that Fant gives in para. 1. and 14 ;. Eead over para. 18. Cow must rational beings be treated, from a moral standpoint =. Hook at the last paragraph. 5hat is the practical imperative that arises out of the +ategorical Imperative

Kant on one !de of A'

(nf"uence 7he -nlightenment I Aare to knowJ Bewton I Kniversal laws reality Eousseau I 7he fundamental dignity of humans $lato I 7wo realms of

Fant is a deontologist I Dorality is based on DUT). Fant focuses on motivation and intention. 5hat matters is that a person does their duty out of the sense that they have a GOOD *(++ ,techn!ca" I doesn&t mean that you are well%inclined. Fant says that we are half animal, half angel because we are influenced by both reason and instinct % but because we have $EA-ON, and so are able to choose, we should be AUTONOMOU- (self%governing! in our morality. (Cowever, as Fant believed that because rationality and reason are common to us all, we should reach the same conclusions about right and wrong.! 2o how do we know what to do Fant distinguishes between Hypothet!ca" (Ao this if you want this to happen! and .ate%or!ca" (Ao thisJ! (mperat!/e . (ny right action must conform to three formu"at!on of the .ate%or!ca" (mperat!/e0 1. (ct in such a way as you would be willing to make your action into a universal law. -.g. Aon&t lie because you can&t desire that everyone lie. '. (ct in a way that treats people always as an end in themselves and never only as a means to an end. -.g Aon&t torture an innocent person to get information you need. .. (ct as if you were a universal lawmaker in a kingdom of ends. -tren%th Lives people autonomy I we are rationally equipped to work out right and wrong for ourselves. $romotes equality I you can&t make decisions to "ust benefit yourself. <ou must think of everyone. -mphasises the value of human life. (voids the utilitarian problem of treating people as a means to general happiness. Eecognises the importance of motivation and not "ust consequences. *eakne e 7oo rigid. 2ometimes consequences can change the rightnessMwrongness of an action. Ignores the importance of human emotions. Cume said that morality should be determined by our passions. 5here is the role of sympathy in morality 5hat about when duties conflict e.g. If I need to lie to save a life* Fant cannot offer a way to decide# utilitarianism can. 7he first formulation of the +at&Imp& could make almost anything a moral duty. -.g. I may break promises in a leap year when I&m wearing a green 7%shirt and my cat has a cough. 7he second formulation only includes humans but what about the pain of non%rational beings Ktilitarianism can include them. 5

(voids problem of calculating consequences. <ou can know you&re doing a right action before you do it.

Kant!an Eth!c !n more deta!" DE1(N(T(ON O1 KANT(AN ETH(.-2 ( person who acts out of a sense of the good
will, following reason, which is a priori (innate!# doing duty for duty&s sake and so acting according to the categorical imperative.

H(-TO$(.A+ 3A.KG$OUND
1. 4+ATON(. T$AD(T(ON ,'th .ENTU$) 3.E52 Fant worked within a $latonic tradition and, like $lato, believed in two realms of human existence* (1! 7he intelligible world which Fant called the Boumenal realm, (7he inaccessible world of things in themselves# constant and unchanging! and ('! 7he sensible work which Fant called the phenomenal realm. (7he world as it appears to us, changing and transient! '. +UTHE$AN 3A.KG$OUND ,67th .E3TU$) .E52 7he Hutheran background of Fant&s parents emphasi3ed intrinsic values such as sincerity, honesty and integrity as opposed to church doctrine (official teachings!. 7he foundation for Fant&s universal idea of duty was also a feature of the pietism of the Hutheran church and so may have influenced this feature of Fant&s categorical irnperative. .. 8EAN98A.:UE- $OU--EAU ,6;th .ENTU$) .E52 2upposedly the only time Fant was late for his midday walk was when he was reading Eousseau&s Social Contract, which talks of the freedom and dignity of all human beings. 7his influenced Fant&s ideas, as only by having free will and following their rational selves are people truly autonomous. $eople are capable of establishing their own code of morality# as opposed to having morality imposed upon them by a moral law giver, be it Lod or the church. 4. (-AA. NE*TON ,6;th .ENTU$)52 Bewton explained the physical world as being governed by universal laws of nature. Fant accepted Bewton&s laws of nature as governing the sensible, empirical world (which Fant called the phenomenal realm! <et Fant also asserted the existence of the intelligible realm (which he called the noumenal realm! accessible by reason alone. 2ince reason is widely possessed, the moral law, like Bewton&s laws of nature, is universal. 8. DA<(D HUME ,6;th .ENTU$)52 Fant was greatly impressed by the 2cottish philosopher, yet wished to part company from much of his work. 6or Cume sympathy and benevolence were essential for human moral development as opposed to the dictates of reason* Nreason is and ought to be the slave of the passionsO (Cume!. Cowever, for Fant, reason was paramount, NKnless reason takes the reins of government into its own hands, the feelings and inclinations play the master over the man.O Duch of Fant&s moral philosophy is a re"ection of Cume&s ideas which place emotions at the centre of human moral decision making. ;. THE EN+(GHTENMENT ,6;th .ENTU$)!* Fant was writing at the dawn of the -nlightenment, the (ge of Eeason* N-nlightenment is man&s emergence from self%imposed immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one&s understanding without guidance from another. 7his immaturity is self% imposed when its cause lies not in lack of understanding. but in lack of resolve and courage to use it without guidance from another. 2apere (udeJ (Aare to Fnow! Cave courage to use your own understandingJ 7hat is the motto of enlightenment.O(0Was ist Aufklarung? 1784)

KANT#- <(E* O1 MO$A+-2 -OME E+EMENT=. HUMAN NATU$E2 DE-($E <E$-U- $EA-ON In order to fully appreciate Fant&s ethical approach it is essential to have awareness of his view of human nature. (ccording to Fant human beings experience a tension between two parts of their nature* desires and inclinations /er u reason. (nimals follow their desires only# they have no reason, so behave in accordance to the empirical realm of cause and effect, led by their appetite and instincts. 9n the other hand Fant believed that Lod and angels are perfectly rational beings,

without appetites and desires to lead them astray from following reason and ob"ective moral laws. In the middle of these two is human nature, experiencing the tension of desires (the animal self! versus the voice of reason (their Lod%like self!. Cuman beings may only be moral when they freely decide to follow their rational selves. >. THE 4HENOMENA+ $EA+M AND THE NOUMENA+ $EA+M Fant worked within a $latonic tradition, and, like $lato, believed in two realms of human existence. 7he intelligible world is the inaccessible world of things in themselves, constant and unchanging ) such a world Fant called the noumenal realm. 5hereas the sensible world is the world as it appears to us, changing and transient, this Fant called the phenomenal realm. Fant&s view of human nature (sharing the 0animal self& of desires M appetites and an 0angelic self& of reason! means that humans have access to both the noumenal (through reason alone! and phenomenal (sensual! realms. Fant argued that "ust as Bewton&s laws of science explained how the phenomenal world is governed by universal laws of nature, so the moral law, based on reason, a priori, is also universal and absolute, though it operates within the noumenal realm. ?. AUTONOM) <E$-U- HETE$ONOM) Fant asserted that human beings are rational and therefore may use their freedom to act according to the good will and are therefore autonomous moral agents. 7he rational person is not influenced by their desires or inclinations and does not have moral laws imposed upon them by an external body* be it the church, state or Lod ) such heteronomy (law imposed by another! is re"ected by Fant. N7he ground for obligation must be looked for, not in the nature of man nor in the circumstances of the world in which he is placed. but solely a priori in the concepts of pure reason.O (Fant, Groun !ork of the "etaph#sic of "orals) 6or Fant moral freedom comes when we transcend the phenomenal realm and by following reason enter the noumenal realm, N5hen we think of ourselves as free, we transfer ourselves into the intelligible world and recognise the autonomy of the will together with its consequences ) morality* whereas when we think of ourselves as under obligation, we look upon ourselves as belonging to the sensible realm.O (Fant Groun !ork of the "etaph#sics of "orals) +learly, central to Fant&s moral philosophy is the premise that human beings are creatures who can act rationally, N-verything in nature works in accordance with laws, 9nly a rational being has the power to act in accordance with his idea of laws ) that is in accordance with principles ) and only so has he a will.O (Fant, Groun !ork of the "etaph#sics of "orals) 1@. =THE GOOD *(++ -H(NE- 1O$TH +(KE A 4$E.(OU- 8E*E+> Fant maintained that the good will is the sole intrinsic good as it is good in itself and requires no further qualification. It is different from other goods, such as pleasure or courage, as other goods can be misused by wicked people and so they cease to be good. :y contrast the good will always adopts a motive of willing the good for its own sake, according to reason. 7he good will is grounded in the freedom of the individual. It is not imposed upon someone by the state, church or any other organi3ation. 7he individual follows the instruction of their moral, noumenal, self and so is free from the causal necessity of the phenomenal realm. 7he good will is known a priori through reason and not a posteriori through sense experience. 7his is because sense experience, the empirical realm, is dependent on peoples& desires and inclinations and as such it is no basis for the moral law. 7he moral law acts in accordance with reason and is therefore universal and absolute. :eing known a priori, through reason, the good will is a democratic ethic ) open to every rational human being and is therefore not elitist ) unlike some aristocratic regimes who imposed moral laws on the under%class. 7he good will acts out of a sense of duty towards the moral law which is understood by reason, a priori. 7he good will does not act out of a desire to pursue happiness, as Fant recognised that happiness is*(a! not an unqualified good i.e. a person wishes to be happy for a purpose and (b! happiness without good will is undeserved luck merely.

11. THE .ATEGO$(.A+ (M4E$AT(<E <E$-U- THE H)4OTHET(.A+ (M4E$AT(<E

7he categorical imperative is an unconditional command, willed as an end in itself* NAo 0x& for the sake of x.O It is an intrinsic good, discerned a priori, through the use of reason, thus its commands

are universal and absolute. 7he categorical imperative adopts a deontological approach to ethics* duty for duty&s sake. In contrast the hypothetical imperative is a conditional command, willed as a means to an end* Ao 0x& if you wish to achieve y. Cypothetical imperatives are concerned with instrumental goods, influenced by desires and inclination# their commands are relative to the situation. Cypothetical imperatives are consequential# where the Nend "ustifies the means.O Fant identifies three main categorical imperatives*

12. A.T ON+) ON THAT MA?(M TH$OUGH *H(.H )OU .AN AT THE -AME T(ME *(++ THAT
(T -HOU+D 3E.OME A UN(<E$-A+ +A*0 7his ensures that moral "udgements are impartial and ob"ective and so avoid the dangers of appealing to self%interest. Eeason maintains that the moral law be applied universally# to admit to exceptions to the rule would be inconsistent and therefore illogical.

13. T$EAT OTHE$ HUMAN 3E(NG- A- AN END (N THE($ O*N $(GHT@ NE<E$ A- A MEANTO AN END0 $eople should be treated with respect and dignity as all human beings are rational beings and therefore are worthy of the respect of the moral law. Fant deliberately asserts a moral law that upholds equality and does not treat people differently according to class, wealth or race. 2uch a forward looking ethic of equality was counter cultural, challenging the hierarchical structure of eighteenth century 5estern -uropean society.

14. A.T A- THOUGH )OU A$E A MEM3E$ O1 A +A*9MAK(NG K(NGDOM O1 END-0 Fant
regarded the moral community as a kingdom of people who should apply moral maxims in such a way that showed respect for others (based on their rationality! and, in line with reason, moral maxims should be universal in application ) thus maintaining the "ustice of impartiality.

15. KANT#- MO$A+ 4$O3+EMA

Cowever, there are a number of significant problem for Fant&s moral philosophy. Fant maintained that* $he uni%erse is rational& A'( )irtuous people !ill *e happ# A'( Wicke people !ill suffer % but in the world* Wicke people +uite often prosper A'( )irtuous people suffer,7herefore the universe is not rational, it would seem,.so to resolve this inconsistency and to maintain a belief in a rational universe where the summum bonum (highest good! is achieved Fant postulates 1.7he -xistence of Lod, '.7he immortality of the soul ..Cuman beings have free will. 6or Lod acts as a moral guarantor ) a "ust authority which makes sure that those who have been virtuous are rewarded, therefore guaranteeing the rationality of the universe. Knderstanding the word postulate is vital to appreciating Fant&s moral reasoning. Fant is not saying that he has proven the existence of Lod. Eather, the term 0postulate& means 0to assume without proof, especially as the basis of an argument.O 2o, for Fant, in order for the universe to be rational it is necessary to postulate that humans have an immortal soul which, after bodily death, is "udged by Lod. Lod&s existence therefore is a necessary postulate# as Lod acts as a moral guarantor ) ensuring that "ustice occurs. 7hose who have lived a moral life on earth in accord with the good will receive eternal happiness.

3ENE1(T- O1 KANT#- .ATEGO$(.A+ (M4E$AT(<E

16. HUMAN 3E(NG- A$E MO$A++) AUTONOMOU-@ AUTHO$- O1 THE($ O*N MO$A+(T)
In the phenomenal realm Fant respected the determined universal laws of nature, as outlined by Isaac Bewton. Cowever, in the noumenal realm Fant asserted humanity&s freedom to decide for themselves the good will, a priori, through the use of reason. (ccording to Fant&s view of human nature (rational and empirical selves! it is up to the individual whether to assert their freedom by acting rationally, or let themselves be governed by empirical desires and inclinations. 7herefore morals are not imposed upon the rational individual by external sources of authority, e.g. church, state, Lod. It really is up to the individually to decide their own morality.

1=. THE .ATEGO$(.A+ (M4E$AT(<E 4$OMOTE- E:UA+(T) AND (- (M4A$T(A+ 7wo of Fant&s categorical imperatives state that people should treat other human beings as an end in their own right, never as a means to an end and that, secondly, one should Nact only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.O 2uch a philosophy was radical, challenging the accepted social convention of the eighteenth century which practised social discrimination. Eather, Fant&s vision was to replace such a hierarchical outlook with a morality which was grounded in reason and was impartial and egalitarian. 1>. THE .ATEGO$(.A+ (M4E$AT(<E 4$O<(DE- A DEONTO+OG(.A+ -T$U.TU$E *H(.H ENA3+E- 4EO4+E TO DE.(DE 1O$ THEM-E+<E- -4E.(1(. MO$A+ .ONTENT 7he deontological structure of the categorical imperative offers a uniform basis for people&s actions but has the significant benefit of being content free, so people may autonomously decide the content of their own specific moral maxims. Haws are not imposed by external authorities, such as the +hurch or Lovernment# rather the individual decides rationally, a priori, what action to follow, being led by the good will and whether the maxims they act by comply with the categorical imperatives* universal application and treating people as an end in their own right. N7wo things fill the mind with ever new and increasing wonder and awe* the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me.O (Immanuel Fant! 1?. KANT#- EM4HA-(- ON $EA-ON AND DUT) O11E$- AN A+TE$NAT(<E <(-(ON 1O$ A MATE$(A+(-T(. -O.(ET) 7oday we often think of goodness in monetary terms. 7he individual in today&s secular society is faced with brands, labels and images which promote an egotistical, materialistic life%style in the manner of the mid%'@th century writer and egoist (yn Eand (1?@8%1?>'! who believed N7he achievement of his own happiness is man&s highest moral purposeO!. 7he idea of duty counteracts egoism by encouraging people to think again about their obligations to others, instead of placing ease above desires and inclinations. '@. KANT <A+UE- (NT$(N-(. HUMAN GOOD- E0G0 1$EEDOM AND D(GN(T) Fant was deeply influenced by Eousseau&s philosophy which emphasised the inherent dignity and freedom of humanity. 2uch goods are not dependent upon consequential gain or benefits, but logically discerned through reason according to the good will. 7he value and importance of intrinsic goods enable a society to function effectively ) e.g. freedom of speech.

4$O3+EM- O1 KANT#- .ATEGO$(.A+ (M4E$AT(<E

21. Too $(G(D AND A3-O+UTE
:y adopting a rigid deontological approach which focuses exclusively on the universal moral law Fant&s theory produces exceptionless moral maxims which lead to terrible consequences. In many respects it seems unreasonable to ask people to abdicate their moral responsibility in regard to consequences that are likely to occur simply because they are following a rule that states 0duty for duty&s sake& in an absolute way. 6or example when asked by a fanatical gunman where your teacher is hiding, should you adopt the maxim Nnever tell a lie O 9ne might desire such an outcome, of course I but would one be able to escape culpability for a negative outcome were it to arise

22. 1A(+- TO A..OMMODATE HUMAN EMOT(ONFant focuses too much on reason and should accept that desires and inclinations are important qualities of what it is to be a human being. 5hilst one might not agree that Nreason is and ought to be a slave of the passionsO it does seem that people are highly influenced by their motions when taking moral decisions and that there are often good reason why this is the case. 9ur emotional responses might be convoluted and sometimes confusing but they are hugely important to our capacity for moral action. 5ould we really desire to be emotionless androids

'.. $EA-ON (- .O+D AND (M4E$-ONA+ Auty, without guidance from human benevolence and sympathy, can lead to rigid moral fanaticism e.g. during the trial of (dolf -ichmann, +hief (dministrator of the Colocaust, Perusalem 1?;1* N-ichmann suddenly declared with great emphasis that he had 0lived his whole life according to Fant&s moral precepts, and especially according to a Fantian definition of duty... I meant by my remark about Fant that the principle of my will must always be such that it can become the principle of general laws.&O -ichmann also cited, in support of his Fantian attitude to his duty, the fact that out of the millions of cases that passed through his hands, he allowed sympathy to sway him from his path of duty on only two occasions. 7he implication clearly is that on other occasions he felt sympathy for the Pews he was sending to the gas chambers, but because he believed one should do one&s duty unaffected by sympathy, he steadfastly stuck to his duty, instead of being tempted to bend the rules and help the Pews.& (quoted in ,o! Are We $o -i%e?& by $eter 2inger! 9ther approaches such as (ristotle&s virtue ethics recognise the importance of practical reason (phronesis! but are also very much aware of the need to complement reason with appropriate emotions and a balanced appetite* N5e may even go so far as to state that the man who does not en"oy performing noble actions is not a good man at all. Bobody would call a man "ust who does not en"oy acting "ustly, nor generous who does not en"oy generous actionsO ('icomachean .thics)

24. A .ONT$AD(.T(ON2 (- <($TUE NOT (T- O*N $E*A$DB

Fant&s Ngood willO emphasises that one ought to do the good will simply because reason shows that it is good. 9ne&s motive is that of the categorical imperative, upholding intrinsic values, and not that of hypothetical or consequential gain. Cowever, an analysis of Fant&s philosophy suggests that at the last moment Fant seems to appeal to a consequential, hypothetical imperative, as "ustification for behaving in a virtuous way I in that he involves Lod in his moral system. 7his consequential "ustification, that virtue will be rewarded by happiness after bodily death, suggests that the good will is not followed purely for its own sake ) but rather for the posthumous pri3e of eternal happiness, so undermining the whole of Fant&s supposedly deontological ethic. 6urthermore, it seems ironic that Fant should re"ect belief in Lod as the authority for ethics (on the grounds that human beings would cease to be autonomous! and yet, in order to make sense of his belief in "ustice, Fant ends up postulating the existence of Lod as a divine moral guarantor. 9ne may also ask 05hy does one need a Go to act as a moral guarantor 5hy not simply a po!erful angelic *eing?

25. THE GOOD *(++# (- NOT ENOUGH@ .ON-E:UEN.E- DO MATTE$A

Hike Fant, Farl Darx considered that as people are rational they are capable of making free choices and should be treated with respect, ends in their own right, not as means to a capitalist end. $eople should collectively act as though they were a member of a law making kingdom of ends. Cowever, a crucial difference between Fant and Darx was Darx&s historical materialism manifested in the belief that it was essential to change people&s social situation. Caving a goo !ill is not enough* for Darx, moral action focused on social goals and which results in a fairer society is extremely important.

26. KANT (- -4E.(E-(-T AND HA- A +A.K O1 $E-4E.T 1O$ AN(MA+ $(GHTFant&s view of human nature reflects his view that human beings are superior to animals due to their rational ability. N:ut as far as animals arc concerned., we have no direct duties, (nimals are there merely as a means to an end. 7hat end is man.O Cowever, Peremy :entham would have strongly disagreed with Fant as :entham considered, N7he question is not can they reason, can they talk, but can they suffer O +entral to utilitarianism is the criterion of personhood# in particular sentience* the ability to feel pleasure or pain. Dore recently $eter 2inger, a preference utilitarian, has developed :entham&s thinking* 2inger argues that Fant&s ethical philosophy is ill%informed as many animals do have rationality and other important attributes of personhood such as sentience (the capacity for sense experience!, self consciousness, enduring relationships and culture (e.g. chimps and dolphins!.

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'=. (- DUT) $EA++) A UN(<E$-A+ .ON.E4TB M(GHT (T 3E (N1+UEN.ED .U+TU$A++)B Fant&s generali3ed understanding of 0doing one&s duty& is not as universal to human nature as he might have one believe. Eather it seems to have its basis in the particular historical and social context of the pietism of Fant&s Hutheran background which many people consider to be no longer relevant in a secular age. :y completely separating the concept of 0duty 0 from any intended results Fant&s view of duty becomes vague and contentless, as 0duty& is usually understood within a specific context or tradition. Fant&s idea that one has an innate, a priori understanding of duty which is discerned through reason is challenged by different cultural and anthropological practices where contrasting moral maxims are universali3ed e.g. some societies are polygamous where others are monogamous. In such societies 0duty& is understood through one&s culture and tradition# reason alone is unable to offer universal guidelines. '>. UN(<E$-A+ MO$A+ MA?(M- MA) 3E UNDE$M(NED Pames Eachels argues that by offering specific categorical imperati%es it is possible to overcome the rigidity of Fant&s universal application of moral maxims. (lasdair Dacintyre has argued a similar point, Nwith sufficient ingenuity almost every precept can be universali3ed. 6or all that I need to do is characteri3e the proposed action in such a way that the maxim will permit me to do what I want while prohibiting others from doing what would nullify the maxim if universalised. e.g. I may break promises onl# !hen//// 7he gap is filled by a description devised so that it will apply to my present circumstances but to very few others. In practice the test of the categorical imperative imposes restrictions only on those insufficiently equipped with ingenuity.O (( Short ,istor# of .thics! '?. THE .ATEGO$(.A+ (M4E$AT(<E (- O1 +(TT+E HE+4 *HEN DUT(E- .ON1+(.T0 7ake the issue of abortion, with the conflict of interest between groups who campaign for the rights of the unborn child versus pressure groups who appeal for the right to self determination of the pregnant woman over her body and pregnancy. (pplying the categorical imperative Dother 7eresa would have argued that one has a duty to protect innocent human life yet others would argue that a woman has a duty to fulfil her own potential and that an unexpected pregnancy should therefore be terminated. In such circumstances 0doing ones duty& is of little help# as both moral maxims could be universali3ed and the issue begs the question* is a foetus a potential life or a life with potential In such a situation the categorical imperative is of little help.

30. U+T(MATE+)000
5A Eoss argues that in order to avoid the rigidity of Fant&s categorical imperative one ought to follow prima facie obligations ) duties which, on first appearance, ought to be followed. Cowever, if in a particular situation there arises a more compelling duty then the original duty may be overridden. 6or example, take the case of Fant&s would%be murderer ) if asked by this person where his next intended victim is then one ought not to follow the prima facie duty None should not lieO, but lie ) as the importance of saving innocent human life (i.e. his intended victim! is more important. Cowever, in normal situations the prima facie duty ) in this case, not lying, is something that one ought to follow. Eoss therefore has the advantage of offering a framework of duties ) but has the important quality of being flexible, taking likely consequences into account.

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-tren%th and weakne of Kant!an Deonto"o%!ca" Eth!c "aCe" each@ pro/!de a hort examp"e@ %!/e Kant# re pon e ,!f appropr!ate5 1. (chieving good ends by despicable means is ruled out. '. <ou can imagine circumstances where contingent circumstances really matter .. 7here are circumstances where imperatives might clash. 4. Aoesn&t duty sound rather like habit Isn&t it better to do things from inclination

8. -xceptionless rules are extremely dangerous or cause great hurt. 7hink of granny&s knitwear, ;. In the modern world, where we often don&t know people well, aren&t we compelled (in our haste! to sometimes treat others as instruments Is it possible not to use people in order to obtain your goals or seek an edge or unfair advantage Cow far should respect for persons go =. 7he standard is an inhuman one against which to "udge our actions. Bot for nothing does Fant use the image of the fixed stars. >. Dorality is a universal prescription and is therefore transcultural. Fant allows us to "udge abhorrent behaviour wherever we find it. ?. Fantian deontology provides compelling arguments about why people cannot be exploited. 1@. $eople have rights which would supersede, for example, the tyranny of the ma"ority in utilitarianism. 11. 2urely our natural desires are worthy as immoral 5ould Fant really view parental love for children

1'. 7he choices necessary to live a good life could involve actions which entail results incompatible with happiness. 1.. Fantian deontology explains and makes important our moral autonomy. 14. 5e avoid the many problems to do with weighing up and working out consequences. 18. 5e don&t have the issue of explaining why or how we have moral intuitions or feelings. 1;. Fant assumes that the world makes rational sense and virtue is rewarded and sin punished. :ut in reality we all know that the wicked and selfish reap great reward, implying that the world is not rationally organised.

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-tarter2 Kant# Cack%round0 *ho or whatB 1. a cultural movement of intellectuals beginning in the late 1=th and 1>th century -urope emphasi3ing reason and individualism rather than tradition. It challenged superstition, intolerance, and ideas grounded in tradition and faith, and promoted the scientific method, skepticism, and intellectual interchange. '. Lerman theologian and leader of a reform movement in 1;th century +hristianity. 7aught that salvation is not earned as a consequence of good deeds but is a free gift of LodQs grace through faith in Pesus +hrist. $iety and obedience matter. 7aught that the :ible is the only source of divinely revealed knowledge from Lod (not the $ope, tradition!. 7ranslated :ible into the vernacular. Fant&s parents were followers. .. 2wissM6rench political philosopher. Influenced 6rench Eevolution, politics, education, sociology. 6ocused on sub"ectivity and introspection and the development of the individual. 4. 2cottish thinker interested in philosophical empiricism and skepticism. 5orked on creating a naturalistic Rscience of manR that examined the psychological basis of human nature. +oncluded that desire rather than reason governed human behaviour* REeason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passionsR and we are governed by custom instead. Eeading him woke Fant from his Rdogmatic slumbersR. 8. an -nglish physicist and mathematician. Fey figure in the scientific revolution. 6ormulated laws of motion and universal gravitation that dominated scientistsQ view of the physical universe for the next three centuries. Aemonstrated that the motion of ob"ects on the -arth and that of celestial bodies could be described by the same principles and so removed the last doubts about the validity of the heliocentric model of the cosmos. ;. Influential classical philosopher who pri3ed rationality above all things and thought that a supra%sensible world formed or was the origin of the physical one. 7hought that this noumenal world could be known via reason.

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