IN RE: DISBARMENT OF ARMANDO PUNO. FLORA QUINGWA vs.

ARMANDO PUNO, LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; REINSTATEMENT; CIRCUMSTANCES CONSIDERED, CASE AT BAR. Where the petitioner has striven to lead and has led a model and exemplary life despite the hardships undergone by him and his family, and his exemplary conduct, since his disbartment is attested by public officials and civic organizations, in which he has served as officer, of Zamboanga City; and considering that the complainant has expressed no objection to his reinstatement in the practice of the law, provided said respondent supports his child by the aforesaid complainant, to which condition respondent has expressly agreed; and considering that this Court is now convinced that said respondent has evidenced his moral reform and willingness to atone for the misconduct that led to his exclusion from the bar, and will endeavor in the future to lead an upright and irreproachable life, assiduously avoiding occasion to bring the profession into disrepute, respondent Punoshould be reinstated in the practice of the law as a member of the Philippine Bar. FACTS: Flora Quingwa filed a verified complaint charging Armando Puno, a member of the Bar, with gross immorality and misconduct . Complainant is an educated woman, having been a public school teacher for a number of years. The respondent took her to the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, signing the hotel register as "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno," and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her on the promise of marriage. Complainant submitted to respondent's plea for sexual intercourse because of respondent's promise of marriage and not because of a desire for sexual gratification or of voluntariness and mutual passion. Complainant gave birth to a baby boy supported by a certified true copy of a birth certificate and to show how intimate the relationship between the respondent and the complainant was, the latter testified that she gave money to the respondent whenever he asked from her. The respondent denied all the material allegations of the complaint, and as a special defense averred that the allegations therein do not constitute grounds for disbarment or suspension under section 25, Rule 127 of the former Rules of Court. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Puno should be disbarred/suspended. HELD: YES. One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the Bar is that the applicant must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character (Section 2, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court). It is essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege to maintain good moral character. When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is expected of him. With respect to the special defense raised by the respondent in his answer to the charges of the complainant that the allegations in the complaint do not fall under any of the grounds for

disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar as enumerated in section 25 of Rule 127 of the (old) Rules of Court, it is already a settled rule that the statutory enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent powers of the court over its officers cannot be restricted. Times without number, our Supreme Court held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of court states that: A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. The respondent has committed a grossly immoral act and has, thus disregarded and violated the fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, it is important that members of this ancient and learned profession of law must conform themselves in accordance with the highest standards of morality. As stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics: The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to the profession of candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient in either moral character or education. He should strive at all times to uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession and to improve not only the law but the administration of justice. Wherefore, respondent Armando Puno is hereby disbarred and, as a consequence, his name is ordered stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.

PILAR ABAIGAR, complainant, vs. DAVID D.C. PAZ, respondent. Pilar Abaigar filed this administrative case for disbarment against David D. C. Paz, a member of the Philippine Bar. Complainant sought the aid of a legal counsel regarding her divorce case filed by her husband in the Superior Court of California, County of Alameda, U.S.A.; that she called on the telephone the office of Congressman Bagatsing in Manila; that the respondent David D.C. Paz, answered the telephone call and volunteered his legal services; that believing that the respondent had the necessary legal experience, the complainant confided her legal problems to him; that after the termination of the divorce case, the respondent became exceedingly friendly with the complainant and started to profess his love for her; that at the start, the complainant was hesitant in continuing the cordial relations between her and the respondent but the respondent made her believe that although he was living with another woman, his relations with said woman were no impediment; that the respondent convinced the complainant that he had been compelled to contract a civil marriage with the woman and that since it was not a marriage under the church laws, it was no bar for him to get married under the church laws with the complainant; that the respondent proposed marriage to the complainant; that believing in his good faith, the complainant accepted the proposal of the respondent; that sometime in the latter part of November 1970, an application for the issuance of a marriage license to the complainant and the respondent was made and executed; that thereafter, the respondent convinced the complainant that since they were going to get married anyway, they should act as husband and wife; that because of the confidence which the complainant reposed upon the respondent, she reluctantly acceded to said demands; that as a result of their being together, the complainant became pregnant but due to causes beyond her control, the pregnancy was lost; that sometime in the third week of April 1971, one Virginia Paz was introduced to the complainant by the respondent; that said Virginia Paz was the woman previously referred to by the respondent as his wife with whom he had contracted a forced civil marriage; that said Virginia Paz, in the course of the meeting, informed the complainant that there had been actually two marriages between Virginia Paz and the respondent, one under the civil law and one under the church law ; that upon being confronted by the complainant, the respondent made no explanation whatsoever and merely kept silent; that since that time, the respondent had done nothing to make amends for having deceived the complainant and for having taken advantage of her; and that the complainant has no other recourse but to ask for the disbarment of the respondent who is a member of the Philippine Bar and an officer of the courts of justice. In his answer filed on June 10, 1971, the respondent denied having had any illicit relations with the complainant and alleged that when the complainant called by telephone Congressman Ramon D. Bagatsing, the respondent advised complainant to come to the office; that on the next day when the complainant came to the office of Congressman Bagatsing, she was at first referred to Atty. Geronimo Flores of the Legal Assistance Service to handle the case; that two or three days thereafter, the complainant requested the respondent to personally handle her case; that on October 30, 1970, the respondent prepared a letter to complainant's husband, Samuel L. Navales, which letter was signed by Congressman Bagatsing; that sometime in the latter part of October 1970, the complainant borrowed from the respondent the sum of P200.00 to complete the payment for the hospitalization and treatment of her brother, Eric, at the Makati Medical Center; that as an act of pity, the respondent gave her the loan ; that after the election for delegates to the Constitutional Convention in November 1970, the complainant called at the residence of the respondent and asked help in filing a case against the assailant of her brother who was stabbed in Olongapo City; that the wound sustained by complainant's brother was

only superficial and he could not identify his assailant, hence, no criminal case was filed; that after the trip to Olongapo, the complainant requested the help of the respondent to recommend her admission to a hospital because of abdominal and chest pains; that the respondent recommended complainant to be admitted to the Singian Clinic located at General Solano Street, San Miguel, Manila; that on December 20, 1970, the complainant called up the respondent at his residence by telephone and requested him to assist her mother, Mrs. Cecilia Abaigar, to file a criminal action against her minor sister, Vilma Abaigar, for disobedience; that the respondent prepared a complaint on the same night and a sworn statement of her mother, Mrs. Cecilia Abaigar; that he accompanied the complainant to the Fiscal's Office at Pasig, Rizal and to the Municipal Court of Mandaluyong Rizal, where Criminal Case No. 23994 entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Vilma Abaigar" was filed by her mother; that the respondent also helped the mother of the complainant to prepare and file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Court of First Instance of Rizal; that by reason of said petition for habeas corpus, the mother of the complainant was able to take Vilma Abaigar into her custody although the petition was denied; that the respondent had never informed the complainant that he was compelled to contract a civil marriage with his wife; that the respondent never proposed marriage to the complainant; that the respondent has no recollection of the supposed application for the issuance of a marriage license in the latter part of November 1970; that respondent and complainant had never acted as husband and wife; and that the respondent had not deceived complainant nor taken advantage of her. 2 In a resolution dated August 20, 1971, this Court referred this case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. 3 After hearing the parties, the Solicitor General submitted on June 30, 1973 his report and recommendation containing the following findings: LexLib "The complaint seeks the disbarment of respondent Paz on grounds that may properly fall under the category of deceit and grossly immoral conduct as found in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. "Assuming for the moment that there had been sexual intercourse between complainant and respondent, the first inquiry, we respectfully submit, is whether respondent Paz practiced deception on complainant by making her believe that notwithstanding their subsisting marriages to their respective spouses, they could legally get married to each other and based on his promise of marriage, she consented to go to bed with him. "Complainant admitted that during her alleged romantic liaison with respondent, she was married to a certain Samuel Navales, also a Filipino, who divorced her in the U.S.A. sometime in the middle of 1970 (par. 2, Complaint; p. 46, t.s.n., November 18, 1971). She also admitted that before she submitted herself to his sexual desires, she was informed by him that he had a wife with whom he was civilly married but that the marriage was void because it was either 'fake' or 'forced' (sic) "Whether there was deceit hinges on whether complainant actually believed the representation of respondent that they could legally marry. Highly intelligent that she is and with the educational background that she has, it is difficult to accept the proposition that she swallowed hook, line and sinker his supposed assurances that notwithstanding full awareness by both of the existence of each other's previous marriages, no legal impediment stood in the way of their getting married ecclesiastically. It is worthwhile repeating that complainant was a fifth placer in the Board Examinations for Chemical Engineering. She was licensed as a chemical engineer in 1964 or 1965, after which she taught at one time or another in different schools and colleges in Manila. In 1970 or 1971 when she was supposedly tricked into surrendering her body on a promise of marriage, she was already in her late twenties. It is improbable that at this age, she was still ignorant of the law regarding indissolubility of marriage. Before jumping headlong into accepting respondent's proposal that they act as husband and wife, she should have pondered upon the serious legal implications

and complications of a second marriage for both of them. She could have easily asked a lawyer for advice on the matter. Complainant's own neighbor in Mandaluyong, Rizal, is a lawyer by the name of Atty. Paler whose wife testified on her behalf. According to Mrs. Paler, her husband and complainant used to converse (p. 18, t.s.n., November 23, 1971). In these conversations, complainant could have asked, perhaps in a casual manner, Mrs. Paler's husband as to the legal effects of a divorce obtained abroad by a Filipino citizen or the effects of a marriage brought about through the use of force and intimidation in order to settle whatever doubts she had in her mind. "The truth, however, of the matter is that complainant did not even have to consult a lawyer to know that she could not legally marry respondent. It is of no little significance that some persons utilized by complainant as witnesses on her behalf because of their supposed knowledge of her relations with respondent, were themselves aware that divorce is not recognized in this country. Thus Mrs. Paler categorically stated that she knew for a fact that divorce obtained abroad is not recognized in the Philippines (p. 19, t.s.n., November 23, 1971). The same admission was elicited from Fr. Troy de los Santos, another witness for the complainant. Fr. de los Santos who used to be her spiritual adviser admitted at one point of his testimony that divorce obtained abroad cannot be recognized in the Philippines insofar as state laws are concerned and complainant knew about this (pp. 33-34, t.s.n., November 23, 1971). Thus, the Jesuit priest declared under cross-examination: 'QDo you know that complainant's husband is still alive? AYes. QUp to the present? AYes. QDo you know that divorce is not recognized in the Philippines? AI know, but the church does not recognize divorce. QHow about the State, do you know that the State recognize divorce? AAs far as my knowledge, I do not think that our laws permit divorce.' Continuing with his testimony, Fr. de los Santos stated: 'QDid not the fact that complainant's husband is still alive and that divorce is not recognized in the Philippines be considered an impediment to complainant's marriage to anyone? AYes. QDid you inform her so? AShe knows about that.' (pp. 33, 34, t.s.n., id.) "Again, granting that complainant did not actually comprehend to existence of a legal bar to her remarriage, 'not being steeped in the intricacies of the law', just the mere realization that both respondent's wife and her own husband being still alive was enough to stir her mind and to impel her to make her own investigation . She could have, for instance, made discreet inquiries as to who was the woman respondent was married to and verified his claim whether he was forced into the marriage. Or, perhaps, she could simply have asked Congressman Bagatsing about respondent's personal status. After all, she was competent enough to prepare, without anyone's help her own affidavit, Exhibit 'A', and resourceful enough to make research in the Supreme Court's Library on the subject of disbarment (pp. 63, 89, t.s.n., November 18, 1971) "What conclusion then can a reasonable mind draw from the given premises? Either complainant was so helplessly naive as to be beguiled by respondent's blandishments, or, comprehending fully the legal impossibility of the fulfillment of his marriage

proposals, she unconditionally laid herself prostrate to his charms, too much enamored of him to care about anything else. For, as philosopher Blaise Pascal has so pithily stated of the profundity of human love, 'love has reasons that reason cannot explain.' Since complainant cannot hide behind the camouflage of innocence, considering her intellectual capacity and educational background, no other conclusion is possible except that she voluntarily submitted to sexual intimacy with respondent without entertaining any illusion or hope of sublimating the illicit relations by legal union. "The question is intriguing whether respondent ever made vehement protestations of love and actually made an offer of marriage to complainant. If there was, the evidence adduced does not clearly show. Complainant asserted that she had evidence in the form of love letters and the marriage application form showing respondent's sustained courtship and offer of marriage. However, such purported documents were not presented, complainant making the excuse that respondent tricked her into giving him the envelope containing the evidence. Such explanation, however, staggers human credulity considering that the supposed documents were vital to establish the case. It is simply preposterous that she would easily part with the documents and give them to no other than the respondent himself. Be that as it may, if respondent had made an offer of marriage, it is not clearly established that complainant's submission to his sexual desires was not on account of the offer but for the gratification of her mundane human longings. "The next question is whether there was sexual intimacy between complainant and respondent. Complainant testified that she acceded to his proposal that they live as husband and wife and as a matter of fact they had three sexual intercourses that took place in the Tower Hotel and Singian Clinic in Manila and in the Sulo Hotel in Quezon City. While there is no proof that sexual intimacy took place in Singian Clinic except her testimony, her allegation that they had trysts at the Tower Hotel and Sulo Hotel was supported by the guest cards at said hotels, Exhibits 'A' and 'B'. Notwithstanding respondent's denial that the 'Mrs.' stated in the entry in said guest cards was a 'good-time' woman, not the complainant, common sense will tell us that complainant could not have known that respondent lodged in said hotels on those particular dates unless she was the woman whom respondent brought there. On this score, we are inclined to believe that evidence has been sufficiently adduced to establish that intimacy between complainant and respondent took place once in the Tower Hotel and once in the Sulo Hotel. As the Honorable Court has stated, when the lawyer's integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issues and overcome the evidence for the relator and to show proof that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity which at all times he is expected of him (Quingwa vs. Puno, Adm. Case No. 389, Feb. 28, 1967; 19 SCRA 439). Insofar as this point is concerned, the evidence of the complainant as to the trysts they had in the two hotels has not been met and overthrown by respondent." 4 Upon considering the report and recommendation filed by the Solicitor General, this Court, in a resolution dated July 29, 1972, resolved to require the Solicitor General to file the corresponding complaint against the respondent, David D.C. Paz, pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 139 of the Revised Rules of Court.5 On September 4, 1975, the Solicitor General filed the corresponding complaint against David D.C. Paz praying that the respondent be suspended for a period of at least six months from the practice of law, with a warning that similar transgressions in the future will be dealt with more severely. llcd Meanwhile the complainant sent a verified letter-petition dated March 29, 1974 to the then Chief Justice Querube C. Makalintal wherein the complainant asked this Court to look into the suspicious activities of a certain Rodolfo del Prado, who allegedly in connivance with the respondent, David D.C.Paz, made her sign an affidavit prejudicial to her interest. Among other allegations, the complainant stated in her verified complaint the following:

"6.That there never is an illicit relationship between Atty. Paz and me at present because I believed all along that he was single and able to marry me. In fact, our relationship is aboveboard just like any engaged couple. 7.That I was made to understand by the Citizens Legal Assistant Office that the tenor of the affidavit made by Mr. Rudolfo Del Prado is such that the consideration for the illicit relationship was promissory note which to all intents and purposes is immoral and illegal. 8.That I am only after the collection of the loan which Atty. Paz got from me and not revenge for his deception." 6 The foregoing portions of her letter militate against the credibility of the complainant. In her complaint for disbarment, she pictured the respondent as morally perverse. However, in the aforementioned letter, she states that there never was an illicit relationship between her and the respondent, Atty. David D.C. Paz, and that their relationship was above-board just like any engaged couple. And finally, she avers that she was only after the collection of the loan which the respondent got from her and not for revenge for his deception. It has been held that the power of this Court to disbar a lawyer should be exercised with caution because of its serious consequences, 7 The burden of proof rests upon the complainant and the case against a respondent must be established by convincing proof. 8 In Arboleda vs. Gatchalian, this Court held: "The Court has held that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant and the charge against the lawyer must be established by convincing proof (Go vs. Candoy, A.C. No. 736, Oct. 23, 1967, 21 SCRA 439; Toquib vs. Tomol, Jr., A.C. No. 554, March 25, 1970, 82 SCRA 156; in re Atty. Felizardo M. de Guzman, A.C. No. 838, Jan. 21, 1974, 55 SCRA 139). The record must disclose as free from doubt a case which compels the exercise by this Court of its disciplinary powers. The corrupt character of the act done must be clearly demonstrated. Moreover, considering the serious consequences, of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, We have consistently held that clearly preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of either penalty (De Guzman vs. Tadeo, 68 Phil. 554; Lim vs. Antonio, A.C. No. 848, Sept. 30, 1971, 41 SCRA 44). This Court likewise held that where there is no proof that respondent lawyer was guilty of any unethical conduct, harassment and malpractice, the disbarment case against him should be dismissed (Ricafort vs. Baltazar, A.C. No. 661, June 26, 1967, 20 SCRA 418; Delos Santos vs. Bolaos, A.C No. 483, July 21, 1967, 20 SCRA 763). 9 The evidence adduced by the complainant has failed to establish any cause for disciplinary action against the respondent. As the Solicitor General said in his report, "From all indications, there is little room for doubt that she filed his disbarment case not in redress of a wrong, for there was no wrong committed. It was a voluntary act of indiscretion between two counting adults who were fully aware of the consequences of their deed and for which they were responsible only to their own private consciences ." WHEREFORE, the administrative complaint for disbarment is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

MARIA ELENA MORENO, complainant, vs. ATTY. ERNESTO ARANETA, respondent. Complaint for disbarment against Atty. Ernesto S. Araneta for deceit and nonpayment of debts. The second cause of action involved Araneta's nonpayment of debts in the amount of P11,000. Moreno alleged that sometime in October 1972, Araneta borrowed P5,000 from her, purportedly to show to his associates, with the assurance that he would return the said amount within the shortest possible time. Again in May 1972, Araneta borrowed P6,000 for the same purpose and with the same assurance. Thereafter, since he failed to make good on both promises, Moreno sought repayment in the aggregate amount of P11,000. Araneta issued two Bank of America checks in her favor, the first dated 30 June 1972 for P6,000, and the other dated 15 July 1972 for P5,000. However, when Moreno tried to encash the checks, the same were dishonored and returned to her marked "Account Closed." She referred the matter to a lawyer, who sent Araneta a demand letter. Araneta, however, ignored the same. In his defense, Araneta claimed it was in fact Moreno who sought to borrow P2,500 from him. To accommodate her, he allegedly endorsed to her the Treasury Warrant in question, worth P2,177, which he received from Lira, Inc., as part of his attorney's fees, and gave her an additional P323 in cash. aATCDI Araneta also denied borrowing any amount from Moreno. He admitted that he issued the two undated checks in her favor, but maintains that he had no intention of negotiating them. He avers that he gave them to Moreno, allegedly upon her request, only so she could show the bank where she was working that she "had money coming to her." Araneta further claims that he warned her that the checks belonged to the unused portion of a closed account and could not be encashed. To protect himself, he asked the complainant to issue a check in the amount of P11,000 to offset the two "borrowed" checks. The respondent offered this check in evidence. Moreno, however, contended 2 that this check for P11,000 "belonged" to the Philippine Leasing Corporation, which she managed when her father passed away. She claimed she signed the check in blank sometime in 1969 when she fell seriously ill and gave them to Araneta who was then helping her in the management of the corporation. She concluded that Araneta falsely filled up the check "in a desperate bid to turn the tables on her." 3 On 01 December 1972, the case was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. 4 The case was first set for hearing on 22 January 1973 at nine o'clock in the morning, when the complainant and her counsel appeared. Araneta was absent despite due notice. Upon motion, however, of Moreno, and to give the respondent a chance to defend himself, the hearing was reset to 23 and 24 January 1973, both at nine o'clock in the morning. Service of the notice for the new dates of hearing were effected to the respondent through a certain Mely Magsipoc on 22 January 1973. 5 On 23 January 1973, Araneta once more did not appear, so the case was called again the following day, 24 January 1973.

In the absence of respondent Araneta, an ex-parte hearing was conducted on 24 January 1973 with the complainant, Moreno, taking the stand. 6 On 27 February 1973, Araneta appeared for the scheduled hearing, only to ask for a postponement to prepare his defense. 7 No further hearings appear to have been conducted thereafter. A hearing is shown to have been scheduled on 28 May 1973, however, on said date, Araneta filed a joint motion for postponement with the conform ofMoreno's lawyer, as he, Araneta, was "earnestly pursuing a possible clarification of complainant's basic grievance." Thereafter, nothing was heard from respondent Araneta. On 14 September 1988, records of the case were forwarded to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. Two days later, the Commission notified 8 both parties of a hearing to be held on 2 November 1988, on which date neither of the parties nor the complainant's counsel appeared despite due notice. It appears that notice could not be served on Araneta, as he no longer resided in his indicated address, and his whereabouts were unknown. An inquiry 9 made at his IBP chapter yielded negative results. The Commission reset the hearing to 18 November 1988 at two o'clock in the afternoon. 10 Again on this date, none of the parties appeared. Thus on the basis of the evidence so far adduced, the case was submitted for resolution on such date. 11 On 28 December 1988, IBP Commissioner Concepcion Buencamino submitted her Report, 12 which reads in part: The evidence of the complainant was not formally offered in evidence. Be that as it may, it is worthwhile considering. The "stop payment" of Treasury Warrant No. B-02997354 was an act of Lira, Inc. and not that of the respondent. There was a subpoena issued for the appearance of Lilia Echaus, alleged President of Lira, Inc. and Simplicio Uy Seun, the alleged Secretary/Treasurer of Lira, Inc. to explain about why the "stop payment" of the treasury warrant was done but neither witness appeared (as evidenced by the records) before the Office of the Solicitor General to testify. At the dorsal portion of Exh. "B," the photocopy of the Treasury Warrant is a signature which complainant claims to be that of the respondent beneath which is the word "President" and above the signature are the words Lira, Inc. but an ocular examination of said signature in relation to the signature on the checks Exhibits "G" and "H" do not show definitely that they were the signatures of one and the same person, so there is no basis to form the conclusion that the respondent did sign the treasury warrant as president of Lira, Inc. The testimony of the complainant was merely that [the] same treasury warrant was given to her by Atty. Araneta, which she deposited [in] her account. There is no evidence to prove that she saw him sign it. There is no evidence of a letter of the complainant informing the respondent about the "stop payment" or even any written demand by the complainant to the respondent that the payment of the treasury warrant having been "stopped" he should reimburse her with what he received as consideration for this check. Same considered, there is no cause to fault the respondent for the first cause of action. On the other hand, the respondent admits having issued the two checks, one for P5,000.00 and the other for P6,000.00 to the complainant for her to show to her creditors that money was coming her way, when in fact he is presumed to have been aware when he issued said checks that his account with the bank against which [these] checks were drawn was already closed, as was discovered from the fact that the checks were dishonored for said reason. Even disregarding the complainant's evidence and considering the answer of the respondent, the act of the respondent in issuing the two checks, one for P5,000.00 and the other for

P6,000.00 which he gave to the complainant for her to show to her creditors that money was coming her way, when there was none and the respondent knew such fact was an act of connivance of the respondent with the complainant to make use of these useless commercial documents to deceive the public. However beneficial it may have been to the complainant, this act of the respondent as a lawyer is abhorrent and against the exacting standards of morality and decency required of a member of the Bar. The personal actuations of a member of the bar the like of which was, as in this case, committed by the respondent, belittles the confidence of the public in him and reflects upon his integrity and morality. In the Bar, moral integrity as a virtue is a necessity which the respondent lacks. The above considered, it is respectfully recommended that as a lesson the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three (3) months arising from his irresponsible conduct as a member of the bar to take effect upon notice by him of the decision of suspension. The IBP Board of Governors adopted 13 the above report, but increased its recommended period of suspension from three months to six months. Over ten years later, on 15 October 2002, IBP Director for Bar Discipline Victor C. Fernandez, transmitted 14 the records of this case back to this Court pursuant toRule 139-B, Sec. 12(b) of the Rules of Court. 15 On 8 July 2003, the Office of the Bar Confidant filed a Report 16 regarding various aspects of the case. The Report further made mention of a Resolution 17 from this Court indefinitely suspending the respondent for having been convicted by final judgment of estafa through falsification of a commercial document. The Resolution, which was attached to the report, states: L-46550 (Ernesto S. Araneta vs. Court of Appeals, et al.) Considering that the motion of petitioner Ernesto S. Araneta for reconsideration of the resolution of September 16, 1977 which denied the petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. No. 18553-R which affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila convicting the said petitioner of the crime of estafa thru falsification of commercial document, was denied in the resolution dated October 17, 1977 of the Second Division of this Court for lack of merit, which denial is final, the Court Resolved: (a) to SUSPEND petitioner Ernesto S. Araneta from the practice of law and (b) to require the said petitioner to SHOW CAUSE within ten days from notice why he should not be disbarred.

Verification conducted by the Office of the Bar Confidant revealed that the above case had been archived on 20 November 1992. It therefore appears that in the intervening time between herein respondent's last filed pleading dated 28 May 1973, when he sought a postponement of the scheduled hearing on this case to settle matters amicably between himself and Moreno, and the present, Araneta had been found guilty and convicted by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude, and indefinitely suspended. We find no reason to disturb the findings of Commissioner Buencamino. However, we disagree with the penalty sought to be imposed.

Whether or not the complainant sufficiently proved that Araneta failed to pay his debts is irrelevant, because by his own admission, the respondent issued two checks in favor of Moreno knowing fully well that the same were drawn against a closed account. And though Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 had not yet been passed at that time, the IBP correctly found this act "abhorrent and against the exacting standards of morality and decency required of a member of the Bar," which "belittles the confidence of the public in him and reflects upon his integrity and morality." Indeed, in recent cases, we have held that the issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct, 18 as the effect "transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public" since the circulation of valueless commercial papers "can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. Thus, paraphrasing Black's definition, a drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on his private duties he owes his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or good morals." 19 Thus, we have held that the act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment, is also a manifestation of moral turpitude. 20 In Co v. Bernardino 21 and Lao v. Medel, 22 we held that for issuing worthless checks, a lawyer may be sanctioned with one year's suspension from the practice of law, or a suspension of six months upon partial payment of the obligation. 23 In the instant case, however, herein respondent has, in the intervening time, apparently been found guilty by final judgment of estafa thru falsification of a commercial document, a crime involving moral turpitude, for which he has been indefinitely suspended. AIECSD Moral turpitude "includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals." 24 It involves "an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals." 25 Considering that he had previously committed a similarly fraudulent act, and that this case likewise involves moral turpitude, we are constrained to impose a more severe penalty. In fact, we have long held 26 that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude. As we said in In The Matter of Disbarment Proceedings v. Narciso N. Jaramillo, 27 "[t]he review of respondent's conviction no longer rests upon us. The judgment not only has become final but has been executed. No elaborate argument is necessary to hold the respondent unworthy of the privilege bestowed on him as a member of the bar. Suffice it to say that, by his conviction, the respondent has proved himself unfit to protect the administration of justice." 28 WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ernesto S. Araneta is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondent's record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for

circulation to all courts in the country.

SO

ORDERED.

ROBERTO SORIANO, complainant, vs. Atty. MANUEL DIZON, respondent. Before us is a Complaint-Affidavit 1 for the disbarment of Atty. Manuel Dizon, filed by Roberto Soriano with the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Complainant alleges that the conviction of respondent for a crime involving moral turpitude, together with the circumstances surrounding the conviction, violates Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and constitutes sufficient ground for his disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Because of the failure of Atty. Dizon to submit his Answer to the Complaint, the CBD issued a Notice dated May 20, 2004, informing him that he was in default, and that an ex-parte hearing had been scheduled for June 11, 2004. 4 After that hearing, complainant manifested that he was submitting the case on the basis of the Complaint and its attachments. 5 Accordingly, the CBD directed him to file his Position Paper, which he did on July 27, 2004. 6 Afterwards, the case was deemed submitted for resolution. On December 6, 2004, Commissioner Teresita J. Herbosa rendered her Report and Recommendation, which was later adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XVI-2005-84 dated March 12, 2005. In his Complaint-Affidavit, Soriano alleged that respondent had violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and that the conviction of the latter for frustrated homicide, 7 which involved moral turpitude, should result in his disbarment. The facts leading to respondent's conviction were summarized by Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City in this wise: ". . . . The accused was driving his brown Toyota Corolla and was on his way home after gassing up in preparation for his trip to Concepcion, Tarlac with his wife. Along Abanao Street, a taxi driver overtook the car driven by the accused not knowing that the driver of the car he had overtaken is not just someone, but a lawyer and a prominent member of the Baguio community who was under the influence of liquor. Incensed, the accused tailed the taxi driver until the latter stopped to make a turn at [the] Chugum and Carino Streets. The accused also stopped his car, berated the taxi driver and held him by his shirt. To stop the aggression, the taxi driver forced open his door causing the accused to fall to the ground. The taxi driver knew that the accused had been drinking because he smelled of liquor. Taking pity on the accused who looked elderly, the taxi driver got out of his car to help him get up. But the accused, by now enraged, stood up immediately and was about to deal the taxi driver a fist blow when the latter boxed him on the chest instead. The accused fell down a second time, got up again and was about to box the taxi driver but the latter caught his fist and turned his arm around. The taxi driver held on to the accused until he could be pacified and then released him. The accused went back to his car and got his revolver making sure that the handle was wrapped in a handkerchief. The taxi driver was on his way back to his vehicle when he noticed the eyeglasses of the accused on the ground. He picked them up intending

to return them to the accused. But as he was handing the same to the accused, he was met by the barrel of the gun held by the accused who fired and shot him hitting him on the neck. He fell on the thigh of the accused so the latter pushed him out and sped off. The incident was witnessed by Antonio Billanes whose testimony corroborated that of the taxi driver, the complainant in this case, Roberto Soriano." 8 It was the prosecution witness, Antonio Billanes, who came to the aid of Soriano and brought the latter to the hospital. Because the bullet had lacerated the carotid artery on the left side of his neck, 9 complainant would have surely died of hemorrhage if he had not received timely medical assistance, according to the attending surgeon, Dr. Francisco Hernandez, Jr. Soriano sustained a spinal cord injury, which caused paralysis on the left part of his body and disabled him for his job as a taxi driver. The trial court promulgated its Decision dated November 29, 2001. On January 18, 2002, respondent filed an application for probation, which was granted by the court on several conditions. These included satisfaction of "the civil liabilities imposed by [the] court in favor of the offended party, Roberto Soriano." 10 According to the unrefuted statements of complainant, Atty. Dizon, who has yet to comply with this particular undertaking, even appealed the civil liability to the Court of Appeals. 11 In her Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Herbosa recommended that respondent be disbarred from the practice of law for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. The commissioner found that respondent had not only been convicted of such crime, but that the latter also exhibited an obvious lack of good moral character, based on the following facts: "1.He was under the influence of liquor while driving his car; "2.He reacted violently and attempted to assault Complainant only because the latter, driving a taxi, had overtaken him; "3.Complainant having been able to ward off his attempted assault, Respondent went back to his car, got a gun, wrapped the same with a handkerchief and shot Complainant[,] who was unarmed; "4.When Complainant fell on him, Respondent simply pushed him out and fled; "5.Despite positive identification and overwhelming evidence, Respondent denied that he had shot Complainant; "6.Apart from [his] denial, Respondent also lied when he claimed that he was the one mauled by Complainant and two unidentified persons; and, "7.Although he has been placed on probation, Respondent has[,] to date[,] not yet satisfied his civil liabilities to Complainant." 12 On July 8, 2005, the Supreme Court received for its final action the IBP Resolution adopting the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

We agree with the findings and recommendations of Commissioner Herbosa, as approved and adopted by the IBP Board of Governors. Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment or suspension. By such conviction, a lawyer is deemed to have become unfit to uphold the administration of justice and to be no longer possessed of good moral character. 13 In the instant case, respondent has been found guilty; and he stands convicted, by final judgment, of frustrated homicide. Since his conviction has already been established and is no longer open to question, the only issues that remain to be determined are as follows: 1) whether his crime of frustrated homicide involves moral turpitude, and 2) whether his guilt warrants disbarment. Moral turpitude has been defined as "everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals." The question of whether the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude has been discussed in International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) v. NLRC, 15 a labor case concerning an employee who was dismissed on the basis of his conviction for homicide. Considering the particular circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime, this Court rejected the employer's contention and held that homicide in that case did not involve moral turpitude. (If it did, the crime would have been violative of the IRRI's Employment Policy Regulations and indeed a ground for dismissal.) The Court explained that, having disregarded the attendant circumstances, the employer made a pronouncement that was precipitate. Furthermore, it was not for the latter to determine conclusively whether a crime involved moral turpitude. That discretion belonged to the courts, as explained thus: ". . . . Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime . Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances. . . . ." 16 (Emphasis supplied) TcHDIA In the IRRI case, in which the crime of homicide did not involve moral turpitude, the Court appreciated the presence of incomplete self-defense and total absence of aggravating circumstances. For a better understanding of that Decision, the circumstances of the crime are quoted as follows: ". . . . The facts on record show that Micosa [the IRRI employee] was then urinating and had his back turned when the victim drove his fist unto Micosa's face; that the victim then forcibly rubbed Micosa's face into the filthy urinal; that Micosa pleaded to the victim to stop the attack but was ignored and that it was while Micosa was in that position that he drew a fan knife from the left pocket of his shirt and desperately swung it at the victim who released his hold on Micosa only after the latter had stabbed him several times. These facts show that Micosa's intention was not to slay the victim but only to defend his person. The appreciation in his favor of the mitigating circumstances of self-defense and voluntary surrender, plus the total absence of any aggravating circumstance demonstrate that Micosa's character and intentions were not inherently vile, immoral or unjust." 17 The present case is totally different. As the IBP correctly found, the circumstances clearly evince the moral turpitude of respondent and his unworthiness to practice law.

Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he pursued and shot complainant when the latter least expected it. The act of aggression shown by respondent will not be mitigated by the fact that he was hit once and his arm twisted by complainant. Under the circumstances, those were reasonable actions clearly intended to fend off the lawyer's assault. We also consider the trial court's finding of treachery as a further indication of the skewed morals of respondent. He shot the victim when the latter was not in a position to defend himself. In fact, under the impression that the assault was already over, the unarmed complainant was merely returning the eyeglasses of Atty.Dizon when the latter unexpectedly shot him. To make matters worse, respondent wrapped the handle of his gun with a handkerchief so as not to leave fingerprints. In so doing, he betrayed his sly intention to escape punishment for his crime. The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the earmarks of moral turpitude. By his conduct, respondent revealed his extreme arrogance and feeling of self-importance. As it were, he acted like a god on the road, who deserved to be venerated and never to be slighted. Clearly, his inordinate reaction to a simple traffic incident reflected poorly on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession. His overreaction also evinced vindictiveness, which was definitely an undesirable trait in any individual, more so in a lawyer. In the tenacity with which he pursued complainant, we see not the persistence of a person who has been grievously wronged, but the obstinacy of one trying to assert a false sense of superiority and to exact revenge. It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously transgressed Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility through his illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm 18 and his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities. 19 He has thus brazenly violated the law and disobeyed the lawful orders of the courts. We remind him that, both in his attorney's oath 20 and in the Code of Professional Responsibility, he bound himself to "obey the laws of the land." All told, Atty. Dizon has shown through this incident that he is wanting in even a basic sense of justice. He obtained the benevolence of the trial court when it suspended his sentence and granted him probation. And yet, it has been four years 21 since he was ordered to settle his civil liabilities to complainant. To date, respondent remains adamant in refusing to fulfill that obligation. By his extreme impetuosity and intolerance, as shown by his violent reaction to a simple traffic altercation, he has taken away the earning capacity, good health, and youthful vigor of his victim. Still, Atty. Dizon begrudges complainant the measly amount that could never even fully restore what the latter has lost. AICTcE Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may relate, not to the exercise of the profession of lawyers, but certainly to their good moral character. 22 Where their misconduct outside of their professional dealings is so gross as to show them morally unfit for their office and unworthy of the privileges conferred upon them by their license and the law, the court may be justified in suspending or removing them from that office. 23 We also adopt the IBP's finding that respondent displayed an utter lack of good moral character, which is an essential qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice of law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty. 24

In the case at bar, respondent consistently displayed dishonest and duplicitous behavior. As found by the trial court, he had sought, with the aid of Vice-Mayor Daniel Farias, an out-ofcourt settlement with complainant's family. 25 But when this effort failed, respondent concocted a complete lie by making it appear that it was complainant's family that had sought a conference with him to obtain his referral to a neurosurgeon. 26 The lies of Atty. Dizon did not end there. He went on to fabricate an entirely implausible story of having been mauled by complainant and two other persons. 27 The trial court had this to say: "The physical evidence as testified to by no less than three (3) doctors who examined [Atty. Dizon] does not support his allegation that three people including the complainant helped each other in kicking and boxing him. The injuries he sustained were so minor that it is improbable[,] if not downright unbelievable[,] that three people who he said were bent on beating him to death could do so little damage. On the contrary, his injuries sustain the complainant's version of the incident particularly when he said that he boxed the accused on the chest. . . ." 28 Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No moral qualification for bar membership is more important than truthfulness. 29 The rigorous ethics of the profession places a premium on honesty and condemns duplicitous behavior. 30 Hence, lawyers must not mislead the court or allow it to be misled by any artifice. In all their dealings, they are expected to act in good faith. The actions of respondent erode rather than enhance public perception of the legal profession. They constitute moral turpitude for which he should be disbarred. "Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals who are competent intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally. Because they are vanguards of the law and the legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach." 31 The foregoing abhorrent acts of respondent are not merely dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral flaw. Considering the depravity of the offense he committed, we find the penalty recommended by the IBP proper and commensurate. The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function be competent, honorable and reliable lawyers in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. 32 Thus, whenever a clear case of degenerate and vile behavior disturbs that vital yet fragile confidence, we shall not hesitate to rid our profession of odious members. We remain aware that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and that disbarment should never be decreed when any lesser penalty would accomplish the end desired. In the instant case, however, the Court cannot extend that munificence to respondent. His actions so despicably and wantonly disregarded his duties to society and his profession. We are convinced that meting out a lesser penalty would be irreconcilable with our lofty aspiration for the legal profession that every lawyer be a shining exemplar of truth and justice. We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege demanding a high degree of good moral character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as a continuing requirement for the practice of law. Sadly, herein respondent has fallen short of the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal profession.

In sum, when lawyers are convicted of frustrated homicide, the attending circumstances not the mere fact of their conviction would demonstrate their fitness to remain in the legal profession. In the present case, the appalling vindictiveness, treachery, and brazen dishonesty of respondent clearly show his unworthiness to continue as a member of the bar. WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT MANUEL DIZON is hereby DISBARRED, and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys

SAN JOSE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION INC., as represented by REBECCA V. LABRADOR, complainant, vs. ATTY. ROBERTO B. ROMANILLOS,respondent.

Disbarment against Atty. Roberto B. Romanillos for allegedly representing conflicting interests and for using the title Judge despite having been found guilty of grave and serious misconduct in Zarate v. Judge Romanillos.[2] The facts are as follows: In 1985, respondent represented San Jose Homeowners Association, Inc. (SJHAI) before the Human Settlements Regulation Commission (HSRC) in a case [3] against Durano and Corp., Inc. (DCI) for violation of the Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protection Act (P.D. No. 957). SJHAI alleged that Lot No. 224 was designated as a school site in the subdivision plan that DCI submitted to the Bureau of Lands in 1961 but was sold by DCI to spouses Ramon and Beatriz Durano without disclosing it as a school site. While still the counsel for SJHAI, respondent represented Myrna and Antonio Montealegre in requesting for SJHAIs conformity to construct a school building on Lot No. 224 to be purchased from Durano. When the request was denied, respondent applied for clearance before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) in behalf of Montealegre. Petitioners Board of Directors terminated respondents services as counsel and engaged another lawyer to represent the association. Respondent also acted as counsel for Lydia Durano-Rodriguez who substituted for DCI in Civil Case No. 18014 entitled San Jose Homeowners, Inc. v. Durano and Corp., Inc. filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134. Thus, SJHAI filed a disbarment case against respondent for representing conflicting interests, docketed as Administrative Case No. 4783. In her Report[4] dated August 3, 1998, Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) made the following findings: Respondent failed to observe candor and fairness in dealing with his clients, knowing fully well that the Montealegre case was adverse to the Complainant wherein he had previously been not only an active board member but its corporate secretary having access to all its documents confidential or otherwise and its counsel in handling the implementation of the writ of execution against its developer and owner, Durano and Co. Inc. Moreso, when Respondent acted as counsel for the substituted defendant Durano and Co. Inc., Lydia Durano-Rodriguez; the conflict of interest between the latter and the

Complainant became so revealing and yet Respondent proceeded to represent the former. For his defense of good faith in doing so; inasmuch as the same wasnt controverted by the Complainant which was his first offense; Respondent must be given the benefit of the doubt to rectify his error subject to the condition that should he commit the same in the future; severe penalty will be imposed upon him.[5] The Investigating Commissioner recommended dismissal of the complaint with the admonition that respondent should observe extra care and diligence in the practice of his profession to uphold its dignity and integrity beyond reproach. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, which we noted in a resolution dated March 8, 1999. Notwithstanding the admonition, respondent continued representing Lydia Durano-Rodriguez before the Court of Appeals[6] and this Court[7] and even moved for the execution of the decision. Thus, a second disbarment case was filed against respondent for violation of the March 8, 1999 Resolution in A.C. No. 4783 and for his alleged deceitful conduct in using the title Judge although he was found guilty of grave and serious misconduct. Respondent used the title Judge in his office letterhead, correspondences and billboards which was erected in several areas within the San Jose Subdivision sometime in October 2001. In his Comment and Explanation,[8] respondent claimed that he continued to represent Lydia Durano-Rodriguez against petitioner despite the March 8, 1999 Resolution because it was still pending when the second disbarment case was filed. He maintained that the instant petition is a rehash of the first disbarment case from which he was exonerated. Concerning the title Judge, respondent stated that since the filing of the instant petition he had ceased to attach the title to his name. On July 7, 2003, the matter was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation.[9] Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. reported that respondent did not violate the admonition because it referred to future cases only and not to cases subject of A.C. No. 4783. Besides, petitioner never questioned the propriety of respondents continued representation of Lydia Durano-Rodriguez on appeal until the case was terminated. The Investigating Commissioner, however, believed that respondent was deceitful when he used the title Judge, thus creating a false impression that he was an incumbent. The Investigating Commissioner recommended thus: In view of the foregoing considerations, this Commissioner respectfully recommends the following penalty range to be deliberated upon by the Board for imposition on Respondent: minimum penalty of reprimand to a maximum penalty of four (4) months suspension. It is further recommended that in addition to the penalty to be imposed, a stern warning be given to Respondent in that should he violate his undertaking/promise not to handle any case in the future where the Complainant would be the adverse party and/or should he again use the title of Judge which would create an impression that

he is still connected to the judiciary, a more severe penalty shall be imposed on him by the Commission. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED. The IBP Board of Governors approved with modification the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, thus: RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A, and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondents violation of Rule 1.01 and Rule 3.01 of the Cod e of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Roberto Romanillos is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months with a WARNING that should he violate his undertaking/promise a more severe penalty shall be imposed against him. Undoubtedly, respondent represented the inconsistent interests of SJHAI, DCI as substituted by Lydia Durano-Rodriguez and the Montealegres. Respondent was admonished yet he continued to represent Durano-Rodriguez against SJHAI. It is inconsequential that petitioner never questioned the propriety of respondents continued representation of Lydia Durano-Rodriguez. The lack of opposition does not mean tacit consent. As long as the lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two (2) or more opposing clients, he is guilty of violating his oath. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility specifically mandates that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure. Incidentally, it is also misleading for respondent to insist that he was exonerated in A.C. No. 4783. We agree with the IBP that respondents continued use of the title Judge violated Rules 1.01 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in deceitful conduct and from using any misleading statement or claim regarding qualifications or legal services. The quasi-judicial notice he posted in the billboards referring to himself as a judge is deceiving. It was a clear attempt to mislead the public into believing that the order was issued in his capacity as a judge when he was dishonorably stripped of the privilege. Respondent did not honorably retire from the judiciary. He resigned from being a judge during the pendency of Zarate v. Judge Romanillos, where he was eventually found guilty of grave and serious misconduct and would have been dismissed from the service had he not resigned. In that case, respondent was found guilty of illegal solicitation and receipt of P10,000.00 from a party litigant. We ruled thus: Considering the foregoing, respondent Judge Roberto B. Romanillos is hereby found guilty of grave and serious misconduct affecting his integrity and honesty. He deserves the supreme penalty of dismissal. However, respondent, in an obvious attempt to escape punishment for his misdeeds, tendered his resignation during the pendency of this case. Consequently, we are now precluded from dismissing respondent from the service. Nevertheless, the ruling in People v. Valenzuela (135 SCRA 712 [1985]), wherein the respondent judge likewise resigned before the case could be resolved, finds application in this case. Therein it was held that the rule that the resignation or retirement of a respondent judge in an administrative case renders the case moot and academic, is not a hard and fast rule.

 ACCORDINGLY, in view of our aforestated finding that respondent Judge Romanillos is guilty of grave and serious misconduct which would have warranted his dismissal from the service had he not resigned during the pendency of this case, and it appearing that respondent has yet to apply for his retirement benefits and other privileges if any; the Court, consistent with the penalties imposed in Valenzuela (supra.), hereby orders the FORFEITURE of all leave and retirement benefits and privileges to which herein respondent Judge Romanillos may be entitled WITH PREJUDICE to reinstatement and/or reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of government, including government-owned or controlled agencies or corporations. SO ORDERED.[10] The penalty imposed upon him in said case included forfeiture of all leave and retirement benefits and privileges to which he may be entitled with prejudice to reinstatement and/or reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of government, including government-owned or controlled agencies or corporations. Certainly, the use of the title Judge is one of such privileges. We have previously declared that the use of titles such as Justice is reserved to incumbent and retired members of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan and may not be used by any other official of the Republic, including those given the rank of Justice.[11] By analogy, the title Judge should be reserved only to judges, incumbent and retired, and not to those who were dishonorably discharged from the service. As correctly pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, the right to retain and use said title applies only to the aforementioned members of the bench and no other, and certainly not to those who were removed or dismissed from the judiciary, such as respondent. Membership in the legal profession is a special privilege burdened with conditions. [12] It is bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in law, but also known to possess good moral character.[13] Lawyers should act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the publics faith in the legal profession. [14] To say that lawyers must at all times uphold and respect the law is to state the obvious, but such statement can never be overemphasized. Considering that, of all classes and professions, [lawyers are] most sacredly bound to uphold the law, it is imperative that they live by the law. Accordingly, lawyers who violate their oath and engage in deceitful conduct have no place in the legal profession.[15] Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction. We are mindful that the power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution, for only the most imperative reasons,[16]and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and as a member of the bar.[17] This is not respondents first infraction as an officer of the court and a member of the legal profession. He was stripped of his retirement benefits and other privileges in Zarate v. Judge Romanillos.[18] In A.C. No. 4783, he got off lightly with just an admonition. Considering his previous infractions, respondent should have adhered to the tenets of his profession with extra fervor and vigilance. He did not. On the contrary, he manifested undue disrespect to our mandate and exhibited a propensity to violate the laws. He is thus unfit to discharge the duties of his office and unworthy of the trust and confidence reposed on him as an officer of the court. His disbarment is consequently warranted. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto B. Romanillos is DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in respondents record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 148482. August 12, 2005]

JOSEPH DORMAN D. TAMAYO, LAUREANA D. TAMAYO and LINAFLOR D. TAMAYO, petitioners, vs. JOSE D. TAMAYO, JR., FLORITS TAMAYOMAGNO, LUZMINDA TAMAYO-ANTHONY and FORTUNA TAMAYOENRIQUEZ, respondents. DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

For our resolution is the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court, as amended, assailing the (a) Resolution dated April 5, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. UDK-6185 dismissing petitioners appeal for their failure to pay the docket and other lawful fees; and (b) Resolution dated June 8, 2001 denying their motion for reconsideration, thus:
[1]

The failure of the appellants to pay the appellate docket fee within the period to perfect the appeal is fatal. This Court cannot accept the excuse proffered by appellants in their Motion for Reconsideration that they were not aware of the rule that they were supposed to pay said fees with the Clerk of Court of the court a quo within the time for taking an appeal pursuant to Sec. 14, Rule 41 of the Rules of Civil Procedure because these Rules have been in existence for almost four (4) years now. WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Court DENIES the appellants Motion for Reconsideration.
[2]

A brief factual background of the case follows: Petitioners and respondents are half-blood siblings. Their mother is Dorothela Dayanghirang-Tamayo. Respondents are Dorothelas legitimate children with Dr. Jose Tamayo, Sr. Petitioners, on the other hand, are her illegitimate children with Jose Matuco. Dorothela eventually separated from Jose Matuco. Respondents thereafter took care of Dorothela and petitioners. Respondents sent petitioners to school and even caused the issuance of their birth certificates, allowing them to use the surname Tamayo. On November 15, 1977, spouses Tamayo executed, in favor of respondents, a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos of their two parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 830 and 5868 of the Registry of Deeds, Davao City. Thus, these titles were cancelled and in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T61159 and T-61160 were issued in their names on April 5, 1978. On October 7, 1990, Dr. Jose Tamayo, Sr. died. Thereafter, or on June 13, 1996, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Davao City, a complaint for the revocation of the said donation, alleging they were preterited from the estate of Dr. Tamayo; and that respondents fraudulently caused the execution of the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos. The trial court dismissed the complaint, holding that: 1. Plaintiffs (petitioners now) never offered any evidence of the subject document (Donation Inter Vivos) which they seek to nullify. Neither documentary nor testimonial evidence of the plaintiffs show that, indeed, there was such a document and they, the plaintiffs, were omitted therefrom. Plaintiffs concentrated on offering evidence to prove their legitimacy and filiation to Dr. Jose Tamayo, Sr. xxx 2. Assuming arguendo that the subject document was properly offered and proven by plaintiffs, this Court cannot resolve the issue of preterition since there has been no determination of heirs yet of Dr. Jose Tamayo, Sr. No settlement of his estate had been instituted, in which forum, issue like determination of heirs, preterition, and collation may be properly addressed. 3. Again, assuming arguendo that plaintiffs properly offered and proved that there was such a donation and that, as they claimed, fraud was present, the right to bring the case of revocation or reduction of an inofficious donation must be brought within five (5) years from the donors death, in this case, Dr. Jose Tamayo, Sr., who died in October 1990. This case was filed in June 1996 way beyond the five-year period. The action for revocation on the ground of fraud had prescribed. Feeling aggrieved, petitioners interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, but failed to pay the corresponding docket fees. Hence, their appeal was dismissed. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration and tendered two

managers checks both dated April 23, 2001, one in the amount of P452.00, and another in the sum of P73.00. They explained that they failed to pay the docket fees because they were not advised by the trial court and the Court of Appeals when to pay the docket fees, thus: x x x neither the court a quo nor this Honorable Court advised or gave notice to plaintiffs-appellants or their counsel when the docket fee for the appeal of the subject case be paid. Unlike previously, when this Honorable Court, after taking cognizance of an appealed case, gave notice to the appellant when the docket fee will have to be paid x x x.
[3]

The Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, the present petition. Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals should have considered the merits of this case, not the technical rules of procedures. The nonpayment of the docket fees does not automatically result in the dismissal of the appeal, as the word may under Section 1(c), Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, indicates that the dismissal is merely directory, not mandatory. The right to appeal is a statutory privilege and must be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law .
[4]

Section 4, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides: SEC. 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Within the period for taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of said fees shall be transmitted to the appellate court together with the original record or the record on appeal. In relation thereto, Section 1(c), Rule 50 of the same Rules, states: SECTION 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds: xxx (c) Failure of the appellant to pay the docket and other lawful fees as provided in section 4 of Rule 41. x x x It is a doctrinal rule that the perfection of appeals in the manner and within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional. Thus, the payment of docket fees within the prescribed period for taking an appeal is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal. Anyone seeking exemption from the application of this Rule has the burden of proving that exceptionally meritorious instances exist which warrant such
[5]

departure. However, the Court of Appeals did not find any compelling reason to relax the rules. Neither we.
[6]

Petitioners only justification for their failure to pay the docket fees is the lower courts failure to advise them when the fees shall be paid. Obviously, they are blaming the courts for their counsels negligence. This, we cannot tolerate. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, took effect about three years prior to the filing of their appeal on July 14, 2000. Verily, to grant their petition would be putting a premium on their counsels ignorance or lack of knowledge of existing Rules. He should be reminded that it is his duty to keep abreast of legal developments and of prevailing laws, rules and legal principles. Unfortunately, his negligence binds his clients, herein petitioners. Consequently, we cannot grant their plea considering that the loss of their remedy was due to their own negligence.
[7] [8] [9]

The bitter consequence of such grave inadvertence is to render the trial courts Decision final and executory. We thus rule that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing petitioners appeal. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. petitioners. Costs against