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EPZA v. DULAY GR No. L-59603, April 29, 1987 FACTS: The President of the Philippines issued Proclamation No.

1811 reserving a parcel of land of the public domain situated in the City of Lapu-Lapu, Mactan, Cebu to establish an export processing zone by petitioner Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA). However, not all the reserved area was public land, but included 4 parcels of land owned by private respondent. Petitioner offered to purchase the land but they failed to reach an agreement about the valuation of the purchase price. The respondent judge then issued an order of condemnation declaring petitioner as having the lawful right to take the properties sought to be condemned upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the filing of the complaint. Respondent judge also appointed commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the properties sought to be expropriated. The commissioners then submitted a report recommending the reasonable amount for just compensation of the property. However, petitioner filed an Objection to Commissioners Report on the grounds that P.D. No. 1533 has superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court on the ascertainment of just compensation through commissioners and that the compensation must not exceed the maximum amount set by P.D. No. 1533. Petitioner assails that respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion because P.D. No. 1533 vested on the assessors and the property owners the power of duty to fix the market value of the properties and therefore there is no more need to appoint commissioners to consider other highly variable factors in order to determine just compensation. Petitioner then filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary restraining order from further proceeding in hearing the expropriation case. ISSUE: Whether or not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in PD No 1533 is valid and constitutional HELD: The court held that the provisions of the decrees of just compensation are unconstitutional and void. The decrees constitute an impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogative by giving the court no other choice but to choose from the lower value stated by the owner or administrator which would render appointing commissioner under Rule 67 of Rules of Court useless. The court, therefore, cannot exercise its discretion or independence in determining what is just or fair. The courts still have the power and authority to determine just compensation, independent of what is stated by the decree, and can still appoint commissioners

for such purpose. The determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination will prevail over the courts findings. DISMISSED! Note: Just Compensation- the value of the property at the time of the taking. A fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities, should be considered. P.D. No. 1533- The basis of just compensation shall be the fair and current market value declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower. Just compensation shall not exceed the value declared by the owner or administrator.

Reyes v. NHA G.R. No. 147511

FACTS: Petitioners sugarcane lands were ordered expropriated in favor of respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) for the public purpose of the expansion of the Dasmarinas Resettlement Project to accommodate the squatters relocated from the Metropolitan Manila Area. The trial court ordered the expropriation of said lots and the payment of just compensation. Respondent allegedly failed to follow court orders as they allegedly did not relocate the squatters to the expropriated land in violation of the stated public purpose for expropriation and had not paid just compensation fixed by the court. Petitioners also questioned the public nature of the construction of low cost housing units on the expropriated land. Petitioners further aver that the land should be returned to them for the failure of respondent to pay just compensation. Petitioners then prayed for respondent NHA to be enjoined from disposing and alienating the expropriated properties and that judgement be rendered forfeiting all its rights under the expropriation judgment. The trial court dismissed the decision which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the expropriation of the sugarcane lands constitutes taking for public purpose HELD: The court held that the expropriation of the sugarcane lands constitutes taking for public purpose as it is in compliance with the public use requirement. The constitution determined two cases which connote public use: 1. the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into smaller lots for resale at cost to individuals and 2. the transfer of utilities and other private enterprises to the government through the exercise of his power. At present, whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. The expropriation of private property for the purpose of socialized housing for the marginalized sector is in furtherance of the social justice set in the constitution. The constitution provides for the exercise of the power of eminent domain over private properties upon payment of just compensation. However, the court ruled in several cases that non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private landowners to recover possession of their expropriated lots. Petitioners are not entitled to recover possession of their expropriated lots devoted for public use but

may only demand for the market value of the same. However, respondents refusal to pay just compensation because of the alleged failure of petitioners to pay capital gains tax is unjustified. The expropriation judgment to pay just compensation is not subject to any condition. And, although the right to enter upon and appropriate the land to public use is completed upon payment, title to expropriated property shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation. If property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the court, the final compensation must include interests on its just value to be computed from the time the property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid. Therefore, petitioners are not entitled to the return of the expropriated property. However, respondent should pay the outstanding balance of the property plus legal interest at 12% per annum.

Note: Constitutional restraints of the power of eminent domain: 1. 2. Public use Just Compensation

Concept of Public use- synonymous with public interest, public benefit, public welfare, and public convenience. Whatever may be employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. Constitutional limitation of just compensation- the sum equivalent to the Market Value of the property

Eslaban v. Onorio G.R. No. 146062. June 28, 2001 FACTS: Petitioner Eslaban in his capacity as project manager of the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) approved the construction of the main irrigation canal of the NIA on respondents land in South Cotabato. Respondents husband agreed to the construction of the NIA canal provided that they be paid by the government for the area taken after the processing of documents by the Commission on Audit. The NIA then paid respondent for Right-of-way damages then offered an amicable settlement pursuant to Executive Order No. 1035. Respondent then demanded payment from petitioner for taking her property, but petitioner refused to pay. Respondent thereafter filed a case before the trial court praying for just compensation which was granted. Petitioner was ordered to pay respondent just compensation for the land taken for the construction of the NIA canal. ISSUE: Whether or not the value of just compensation shall be determined from the time of the taking or from the time of the finality of the decision HELD: The court held that the value of the property must be determined either as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, whichever came first. Just compensation means not only the correct amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Compensation cannot be considered just without prompt payment because then the owner would suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. What respondent loses is the actual value of the property at the time it was taken and shall not extend beyond it. With this type of valuation, compensation can be deemed just on the part of t he individual whose property is taken and on the part of the public who pays for it. The previous decision is affirmed and petitioner is ordered to pay respondent with compensation amounting to P16,047.61 per hectare with interest at the legal rate of 6%. Note: The rule is that where private property is needed for conversion to some public use, the first thing that the government should do is to offer to buy it. A voluntary transaction can be concluded and the transfer effected without the necessity of a judicial action if the owner is willing to sell and the parties can agree on the price and the other conditions of the sale. Otherwise, the government will use its power

of eminent domain, subject to the payment of just compensation, to acquire private property in order to devote it to public use.

Manosca v. CA G.R. No. 106440 FACTS: Petitioners inherited a land in Taguig which was soon after declared by the National Historical Institute (NHI) as a national historic landmark. The said piece of land was allegedly the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia ni Cristo. Felix Manalo admittedly made substantial contributions to Philippine history and culture which urged NHI to declare his birthsite a national historic landmark. It has been held that places with unusual historical interest is a public use for which the power of eminent domain may be authorized. Respondent Republic then filed for a motion for the issuance of an order to permit it to take immediate possession of the property which was opposed by petitioners on the ground that the expropriation was not for a public purpose but only for the benefit of Iglesia ni Cristo. ISSUE: Whether or not the setting up of the marker in commemoration of the founder of Iglesia ni Cristo constitutes public use HELD: The court held that the setting up of the marker in commemoration of the founder of Iglesia ni Cristo constitutes public use. The meaning of public use should not be limited and restricted, but rather be broad and inclusive. Public use is one which confers some benefit to the public and is not confined to the actual use by the public. Public use restricts the exercise of the right to take private property in virtue of eminent domain and is defined as a use concerning the whole community as distinguished from particular individuals. The significant factor to be considered in eminent domain is the principal objective of the exercise of power. In this case, the purpose in setting up the marker is to recognize the contribution of Felix Manalo to the culture of the Philippines and the benefit of the religious sect of Iglesia ni Cristo is merely incidental. Therefore, it falls under the definition of public use and may be expropriated in favor of respondent. Note: Eminent domain is an inherent power of sovereignty. The constitution does not need to expressly grant this power, but should only provide provisions to regulate the exercise of said power. Eminent domain is generally so described as the highest and most exact idea of property remaining in the government that may be acquired for some public purpose through a method in the nature of a forced purchase by the State. It is a right to take or reassert dominion over property within the state for public use or to meet a public exigency.

The constitution qualifies this power by stating that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. This proscription is intended to provide a safeguard against possible abuse and so to protect as well the individual against whose property the power is sought to be enforced.