Ethics, adaptation & mitigation

Equal per capita entitlements to greenhouse gas emissions: ajustice based-critique

J. Dirix, W. Peeters and S. Sterckx 1Department of Philosophy and Moral Sciences, Free University of Brussels (VUB), Pleinlaan 2, 1000 Brussels, Belgium; jo.dirix@vub.ac.be

Abstract
Climate Change has made us aware of the finite absorptive capacity of the atmosphere. Moreover, a fifth of the emissions that overstep our earths boundaries result from meat and dairy consumption, which is estimated to double by 2050. In this paper we question whether an equal per capita (EPC) allocation of emission entitlements, and Contraction and Convergence (C&C) approach that is derived from the EPC model, meets the demands of distributive and participatory justice. We first explain that the EPC ignores historical responsibility for the problem and prefers the use of a benchmark emissions year on the basis of which emissions are measured and entitlements are distributed. We argue that the use of a benchmark favours the largest culprits and harms the development of non-industrialized nations. Nevertheless, whilst advocating the inclusion of historical responsibility, we refrain from promoting negative allocations, for this would violate premises of egalitarian moral theory. Furthermore, the EPC model ignores existing geographical and interpersonal differences that seem to require a differentiated allocation, for it disregards the moral difference between subsistence and luxury emissions. It thus centres on the means instead of the ends of energy use. Moreover, we observe that the equal allocation proposal isolates goods, and argue that theories of justice relate to packages of goods, rather than to separate goods. Finally, we question whether the EPC scheme meets the requirements of participatory justice. The proponents of an equal allocation assume the state to be the aggregate rights bearer, yet in our view such an assumption implies certain potentially harmful generalisations. With regard to the responsibility-based efforts that nations should undertake, we propose to differentiate between groups within nations so as to enhance the participatory justice of bearing responsibility for the problem. Keywords: distributive and participatory justice, contraction and convergence, meat and dairy emissions

Introduction
In view of the anthropogenic forcing of the earths energy balance and the resulting climate change, direct action is desperately needed to avoid harming both the worst-off among the currently living and the future generations of the world. The limited absorptive capacity of the earth needs to be treated as a common good and allocated in an equitable manner. Therefore, principles of distributive and participatory justice need to be examined in order to obtain the most equitable distribution of emission entitlements that takes account of the differential, i.e. unequal, needs of people. However, for us to live in a sustainable manner the overall environmental impacts of human activities should be reduced significantly, even more so since the world population grows and the per capita consumption of meat and dairy products is set to double by 2050 (FAO, 2006). Since the latter production plays a crucial role in overstepping the planetary boundaries of biodiversity loss, nitrogen cycle disruption and carbon cycle disruption, and given that the meat industry is responsible for a fifth of global GHG emissions, we will need to redirect our food consumption in a world of 800 million malnourished and 1,6 billion overweight individuals (Aiking, 2010: 4; FAO, 2006; McMichael et al., 2007: 1253).

T. Potthast and S. Meisch (eds.), Climate change and sustainable development: Ethical perspectives on land use and food production, DOI 10.3920/978-90-8686-753-0_16, Wageningen Academic Publishers 2012

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Allocation of entitlements: EPC

Introduction

Starting from an egalitarian philosophy, many authors consider equal per capita entitlements (EPC) as the most equitable model to allocate emission entitlements, since, in their view, it represents the only way to overcome the climate change paradox: while the industrialized nations are responsible for the high levels of GHGs, the non-industrialized nations on the whole refuse to reduce their emissions even though they are already bound to be climate changes most prone victims (inter alia: Agarwal, 2002; Aslam, 2002; Bode, 2004; Grubb, 1989, 1995; Jamieson, 2010; Moellendorf, 2009; Singer, 2010). However, since it is estimated that the emission levels of the non-industrialized nations will top the rates of their northern counterparts in the third decade of this century, for a serious reduction effort to succeed, the non-industrialized nations cannot be allowed to emit ad infinitum. The proponents of the EPC model argue that it would promote the development of the non-industrialized nations, while offering the industrialized nations a soft transition (Baer et al., 2010a: 220). How then would an equal share proposal benefit these two groups alike? As a more specific avenue towards the allocation of equal entitlements, the Contraction and Convergence approach (C&C) was suggested in the early 1990s by Aubrey Meyer from the London based Global Commons Institute (Meyer, 2000). Under a C&C approach every individual is granted an equal right to emit GHGs since every individual has the right to use the benefits provided by a shared resource. Second, a global cap is placed on emissions, on the basis of a scientific analysis of the amount of GHGs the global environment can withstand. Third, each nation is awarded an emissions budget consistent with the capacity of the global environment to absorb GHGs (Page, 2006: 177). This implies that the industrialized nations have to contract GHG emissions while the non-industrialized nations can raise their emissions for a limited time in the future. The non-industrialized countries can sell the emission permits that they do not require to industrialized nations in need of additional permits, thereby creating revenues to fund adaptation, development and poverty reduction, while the industrialized nations use the permits to soften their transition towards a renewable energy economy. Thus, after the contraction of the emissions by industrialized nations and the increase in emissions of non-industrialized nations, the emissions trajectory of both converges to an equal level. A sine qua non for this scenario to be successful is the collective political will to determine the start and length of the convergence period (Simms, 2005: 178-179). Needless to say, the longer the transitions starting point is postponed, the more the problem is exacerbated and the more invasive the convergence trajectory will need to be. Current estimates show that to stabilize atmospheric levels of CO2 at 440 ppm, which would correspond with a rise of 2 C, a CO2 peak should occur between 2020 and 2030 and the CO2 emissions should decline to zero by 2052 (GCI, 2011).
Negative allocations

The advocates of the EPC presuppose the egalitarian premises of moral equality and argue that it would be inequitable to let responsibility for the problem determine the allocation of entitlements, for the simple reason that no person or nation has a valid claim to larger shares than his/her counterpart (Baer, 2002: 401; Singer, 2010: 190). Proponents of the EPC therefore reject Sven Bodes (2004: 311) suggestion that an emissions allocation based on historical responsibility for the climate problem can result in a negative allocation of entitlements. Steven Vanderheiden nuances Bodes view and notes that if each nation is allocated the same per capita share of the atmosphere, nations with a high level of past emissions can be assigned a lower per capita emissions cap while nations with lower past emissions should then be allowed higher caps (Vanderheiden, 2008: 229-230, 249). According to Vanderheiden historical
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responsibility for climate change may be an appropriate factor when allocating responsibility for the problem and determining the duties that accompany such a responsibility. It is nevertheless complicated, he adds, by knowledge problems under a fault-based liability and it is entirely inappropriate for equity-based allocation issues that are properly based on egalitarian distributive principle and grounded in current rather than past claims (Vanderheiden, 2008: 230). So, the culpability for the problem must be considered via the responsibility-based component, rather than through the assignment of national emissions shares.
Benchmark

Although the EPCs exclusion of historical responsibility for the problem is grounded in premises of moral equality, such an omission sets the EPC up for an injustice. If the allocation of entitlements is not based on historical responsibility for the problem, but on the emissions of a baseline year, for example 1990, which functions as the benchmark from which emissions are measured and distributed, nations that were the largest polluters receive the highest number of emission entitlements, whereas those who emitted the least at the time the benchmark was set obviously receive less. In our view, this is unfair for three reasons. First, if a benchmark is used, non-industrialized nations will have to cut emissions at a much lower baseline of emissions than the industrialized nations had in 1990 (Agarwal, 2002: 384). Second, the non-industrialized nations will already have to develop with a significantly smaller amount of emissions than the industrialized nations obtained. (Baer, 2010: 224) Third, asking non-industrialized nations to start cutting emissions over the next four decades presumes that by then they will have escaped from poverty. If they have not, and mitigation targets are imposed on them, they will be required to freeze their standard of living, thereby also freezing inequality. This would ensure that some nations will remain more developed while others remain trapped in poverty (Agarwal, 2002: 377). If an emissions benchmark is used, a countrys social and economic situation at the transitions starting point becomes highly relevant and this is even more so if the allocations are grandfathered or handed out for free (Vanderheiden, 2008: 238). Such models lock both rich and poor nations into their current situations, thereby freezing the world economic hierarchy. Even when a convergence path is pursued, the starting position will determine the situation of both groups. Vanderheiden points out that starting from a benchmark is impossible to justify by any standard of international fairness establishing de facto pollution rights that are distributed in a highly inequitable manner and locked in over time (Vanderheiden, 2008: 238). Thus, although historical responsibility for the problem should not determine the allocation of entitlements in view of moral equality, using a benchmark year also has substantial flaws.
Ignoring heterogeneity: luxury and subsistence

In this section we will argue that the EPC is overly egalitarian, to such an extent that it ignores the unequal geographical and personal needs of people (Starkey, 2008: 47). Hence, a standardization of the EPC would be a threat to diversity since it proposes to hand each person an equal share in a world marked by inequality (Aslam, 2002: 190; Ott and Sachs, 2000: 169-170). The EPC ignores the difference between luxury and subsistence emissions; hence it disregards the role of emissions in human lives, as a result of its focus on the means instead of the ends of energy usage (Gardiner, 2010: 16; Shue, 2001, 2010). Steven Vanderheiden suggests allocating modified equal shares; i.e. the portion of available global emissions to be subject to egalitarian distribution ought to be luxury emissions, not total emissions (Vanderheiden, 2008: 226). In other words, we would first allocate subsistence emission rights to every individual. Vanderheiden notes, referring to Ronald Dworkin, that differences that lie outside an agents control can form the basis for valid claims for unequal or differentiated resource allocation, and must do so insofar as these affect opportunities for welfare (Vanderheiden, 2008: 227). But what qualifies as
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being within an agents control is not easy to ascertain, and since the agency of the individual is limited in this context, it is hard to determine which of the factors at work are subject to government responsibility or dependent on luck (Vanderheiden, 2008: 227). Since the deprivation of subsistence as a consequence of climate change lies outside an agents control and significantly affects her opportunities for welfare, guaranteeing subsistence emissions to everybody seems only fair.
A fair package of goods: isolating carbon

Elaborating on this argument regarding the difference between luxury and subsistence emissions, Simon Caney refers to Amartya Sen and claims that our resourcist fetishism blurs our notions of what we seek to accomplish through emissions since they are merely a means to an end. In other words, emissions only have value when they enable people to enjoy capabilities. It is therefore implausible to focus on distributing one particular resource equally if doing so will leave people unequal in their ability to pursue various goals (Caney, 2009: 130). Moreover, as Caney explains, the EPC focuses on one good (emission entitlements) and isolates that good from peoples access to all other goods. Why examine distributive principles for this one particular good when our principles of ethics focus on whole packages of goods (Caney, 2009: 131)? When focusing on capabilities, not only emission entitlements matter but rather peoples overall access to energy. This non-atomist argument becomes imperative when we consider the intertemporal dimension of climate change injustice, for intergenerational justice requires that the finiteness of our resources be addressed by creating energy availability that is not dependent on the production of GHGs.
A fair package of goods: isolating food

The critique of the resourcist view reappears when we look at nutritional needs. Various commentators have considered a C&C approach with regard to the overconsumption of meat and dairy products and the resulting rise of NH4 (methane) (Garnett, 2009: 493; McMichael et al., 2007: 1260). They propose to first contract the meat and dairy overconsumption in the industrialized nations, while allowing increased levels in non-industrialized nations where consumption is currently low, so as to, after a transition period, lower the ceiling consumption level to which low-income countries would then have to converge (McMichael et al.: 2007: 1260). Such a C&C approach, they suggest, should be combined with technologies that would limit GHG emissions from meat and dairy production. However, Simon Caneys refutation is as valid here as in the case of emission entitlements. Those who focus on CO2 or on meat and dairy consumption overlook the fact that principles of justice focus on peoples overall package of goods and not on each individual component (Caney, 2009: 133). In other words, what justice requires is a fair division of benefits and burdens. Simply contracting and converging meat and dairy consumption is a generalization that ignores the unequal needs of people, since individual requirements and personal tastes are heavily influenced by cultural preferences and regional economic potential (Aiking, 2010: 1). If not the former then surely the latter lies outside an agents control and hence nutritional requisites qualify for a differentiated allocation. Although the World Health Organizations (WHO) recommendations include standard intake levels for fat, protein, iron, calcium and so forth, it does not specify levels of meat and dairy intake. A number of studies have affirmed that a plant based diet is perfectly able to provide the full range of nutrients needed to maintain a healthy diet while producing a substantially lower rate of emissions (Garnett, 2009: 496-497). However, in non-industrialized nations the access to a varied selection of foods is limited and attempts to alter cultural preferences by monetary incentives would harm the availability of nutritional requisites for the worst-off. While it is important that meat and dairy prices internalize the societal and environmental costs of deteriorating land, water, biodiversity and atmosphere, it would be unfair to simply leave it to a pricing mechanism to strive for a reduction in meat and dairy products consumption. Hence, a package
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of goods approach would ensure that every individual receives the nutritional requisites needed for a healthy diet (Garnett, 2009: 498).
Participatory justice

Although both the EPC and C&C model propose to allocate entitlements to individuals, they regard the state as the aggregate rights bearer. The underlying assumption is that the average properties of citizens form an adequate justification for state-based rights and responsibilities (Baer et al., 2010a: 219). Such an assumption, of course, raises questions of participatory justice. If emissions are granted to the government, how will we make sure every individual receives what she is entitled to? For, as Simon Caney notes, if our approach assumes that individuals possess a set of human rights, then what arguments do the proponents of EPC have to install the state to govern these rights? Moreover, who vested in the state the power to sell emission grants (Baer, 2002: 403; Caney, 2009: 135)? What guarantees do citizens have that their government will allocate emissions fairly in a world in which rights and responsibilities are applied to countries and negotiated by persons nominally representing countries but actually significantly representing the interests of particular classes (Baer et al., 2010: 221). When considering the responsibility-based efforts that industrialized nations will have to undertake, it would enhance participatory justice if we no longer focused on nations, but rather on groups within a nation. For, appointing the state as the aggregate right bearer ignores the vast differences of emission levels within states (Baer, 2010b: 247; Caney, 2009: 136). This is especially so since the GDP-standard on which we rely to determine a nations wealth discards the gap between rich and poor, in both industrialized and non-industrialized nations. Focussing on groups within a nation: (1) would result in a higher contribution by the North, allowing the funding of mitigation and adaptation initiatives; (2) would enhance the level of fairness; and (3) would, quite possibly, persuade a larger number of the public to agree with the imposition of the required efforts. Why is this so? To differentiate between groups rather than imposing an equal per capita tax would result in demanding more from the most affluent, and since a strong correlation exists between income and emissions, the ability to contribute and the culpability of the richest groups are higher than those of the poor (Baer, 2010b: 255). Therefore, it is simply unfair to demand as much from the poor as from the rich, even within a fairly wealthy nation. Moreover, if the public, on a national level, would see that the burdens are being carried relative to the strength of the shoulders, people will be less reluctant to pay the imposed tax.

Conclusion
In this paper we focused on the most frequently suggested model for the allocation of emissions entitlements, the EPC, and its practical implementation, C&C. We identified some flaws of the EPC. Although we consider that negative allocations for those with the most historical responsibility would be unfair, in our view the caps placed on emissions need to be differentiated relative to the historical responsibility of the nation in question. We found that the alternative of benchmarking also results in an injustice, since it is likely to perpetuate the current gap present between industrialized and non-industrialized nations. The EPC turns out to be overly egalitarian, since it does not distinguish between luxury and subsistence emissions. We agree with Vanderheidens proposal to allocate a priori subsistence emissions, since climate change lies outsides an agents control but affects her opportunities for welfare greatly. Our main critique concerns the EPCs and C&Cs resourcist fetishism which ignores that theories of justice should focus on packages of goods rather than on separate goods. Therefore, as regards the future expansion of the production of meat and dairy products, peoples nutritional needs should not be treated in isolation of other fundamental needs.

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