!"#$%!

&$: Much o the public debate surrounding US policies

regarding Iran has been distorted by myths that obscure the actual
status o Iranian nuclear programs. Similarly, discussions about the
implications o a nuclear-armed Iran are oten built on question-
able assumptions requiring more thorough examination. 1his article
dispels these myths, questions these assumptions, and draws impor-
tant implications or US policymakers in this critical strategic debate.
!
nternational negotiations with Iran oer its nuclear program are once
again in limbo. At the conclusion o the lebruary talks in Almaty,
Kazakhstan, Iran`s loreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi characterized
them as a signiFcant milestone` that had reached a turning point,` and
let him ery optimistic and hopeul.`
1
Meanwhile, reactions rom rep-
resentaties o the so-called P5-1 ,United States, Great Britain, lrance,
Russia, China, and Germany, were notably more measured, but hinted at
an optimistic assessment as newly conFrmed US Secretary o State Kerry
characterized the lebruary sessions as useul.`
2
As so requently happened in the past, howeer, subsequent talks
in April crashed against the reality o signiFcant gaps in the substantie
negotiating positions o the P5-1 and Iranian teams. 1he Luropean
Union representatie to the talks, Catherine Ashton, cast a decidedly
downbeat assessment o the April sessions obsering that the positions
o the |P5-1| and Iran remain ar apart on the substance. . . . \e hae
thereore agreed that all sides will go back to capitals to ealuate where
we stand in the process.`
3
1his pause in negotiations oers American policymakers the oppor-
tunity to reassess strategic options regarding Iran`s nuclear program. 1he
recent election o lasan Rouhani as President o Iran gies the Obama
administration another reason to reconsider America's current approach.
A coherent strategy requires the establishment o clear objecties and
a design or employing the nation`s instruments o power to achiee
those objecties. In the case o Iran, the oerriding strategic objectie
o current US policy has been made exactingly clear by President Obama
and Vice President Biden. In his speech to the American Israel Public
Aairs Committee one year ago, President Obama said the objectie
o US policy is to preent Iran rom obtaining a nuclear weapon.`
4

Vice President Biden reiterated this position nearly erbatim to the same
1 Milestone Reached in Iran Nuclear 1alks,` !"#$"%&, lebruary 28, 2013, http:,,www.reuters.
com,article,2013,02,28,us-iran-nuclear-minister-idUSBRL91R1J\20130228
2 Ibid.
3 L3-3 Statement by LU lR Ashton lollowing 1alks with Iran,` '#%()"*+ -+.(+ / -+.$"0
1*$.(+&, April 6, 2013, http:,,www.eu-un.europa.eu,articles,en,article_13363_en.htm
4 Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at AIPAC Policy Conerence,` 23" 43.$" 5(#&"6
Offce of tbe Pre.. ecretar,, \ashington Conention Center, \ashington, DC, March 4, 2012, http:,,
www.whitehouse.go,the-press-oFce,2012,03,04,remarks-president-aljac-policy-conerence.
'(!)*+, .*$/ *%!+
:|e |.a.|a. ec|ea. ne|ace. ~.e ,c|
:|a. |acc
Christopher J. Bolan
Dr. Chris Bolan teaches
national security policies,
strategy ormulation, inter-
agency decisionmaking, and
Middle Lastern studies at
the US Army \ar College.
le sered as a strategic
intelligence oFcer and Middle
Last loreign Area OFcer in
1unisia, Lgypt, and Jordan,
and as an adisor to Vice
Presidents Gore and Cheney.
le receied his MA and PhD
rom Georgetown Uniersity.
s |a.aece. :.(z, see. zc+.
audience on 4 March 2013 saying the goal o US policy is to preent
Iran rom acquiring a nuclear weapon.`
5
\hile others outside the \hite
louse hae suggested alternatie US policy objecties ranging rom
preenting Iran rom acquiring a nuclear weapons caabitit, to ousting
the current regime in 1ehran, these statements by the President and Vice
President hae eectiely ended this portion o the strategic debate. US
policies under President Obama will be guided by the paramount objec-
tie o rerevtivg rav`. acqvi.itiov of a vvctear reaov.
Neertheless, the public and internal debates oer bor the United
States can best marshal its diplomatic, economic, inormational, and
military instruments o power to accomplish this expressed policy
objectie will continue or some time. 1he deault option would be to
maintain the current US dual-track approach o oering negotiations
while imposing eer-tightening economic and Fnancial sanctions in
the hope o compelling Iranian concessions on its nuclear program.
Others hae made the case or preemptie military attacks designed to
destroy Iran`s existing nuclear acilities or acilitate a regime change in
1ehran.
6
Still others hae adocated a strategy emphasizing a diplomatic
approach exchanging United States and international recognition o
Iran`s right to enrich uranium in return or commitments rom 1ehran
to limit enrichment actiities and subject them to an intrusie interna-
tional inspection regimen ensuring nuclear materials are not dierted to
military purposes.

It is the contention o this author that the quality o these public

and internal debates would be improed signiFcantly by dispelling
some o the most misguided myths surrounding Iran and clariying the
status o its current nuclear program. Additionally, this article examines
some o the more questionable assumptions about a nuclear-armed Iran
and oers some preliminary implications or US policymakers as they
struggle to implement a coherent strategic approach toward Iran.
!"#$%&'#()*
,c| +. |.a. | a. |..ac|~.a| acc~..
1his myth is especially popular among those pushing or immediate
military action to attack Iran`s nuclear inrastructure. 1heir argument is
that Iranian leaders are crazed, hot-headed, and messianic actors who
do not respond to logic or reason, thereore, they cannot be negoti-
ated with or trusted with weapons o mass destruction 1hese claims
are based on cultural ignorance and prejudices that would be routinely
dismissed as out o bounds in irtually any context outside US policy
debates on Iran. lortunately, seeral senior US and Israeli oFcials hae
5 Joe Biden, Remarks by the Vice President to the AIPAC Policy Conerence,` 23" 43.$" 5(#&"6
Offce of tbe Pre.. ecretar,, \ashington Conention Center, \ashington, DC, March 4, 2013, http:,,www.
whitehouse.go,the-press-oFce,2013,03,04,remarks-ice-president-alpac-policy-conerence.
6 See, or example, Matthew Kroenig, 1ime to Attack Iran: \hy a Strike is the Least Bad
Option,` 7(%".8+ 9::*.%& 91, no. 1 ,Jan,leb 2012,: 6-86.
See, or example, Dr. Seyed lossein Mousaian, Iran, the US and \eapons o Mass
Destruction,` vrrirat: Ctobat Potitic. ava trateg, 54, no. 5 ,October 2012,: 183-202, and also
\illiam l. Luers and 1homas R. Pickering, Nixon Option` or Iran Could Break Stalemate,`
23" ;*)*+ 2.<"&, June 5, 2012, http:,,www.japantimes.co.jp,opinion,2012,06,05,commentary,
nixon-option-or-Iran-could-break-stalemate-allow-u-s-to-strengthen-security-without-war,.
!"#$%&' )%*+ %,#& r~|a. s
publicly dismissed this myth as alse. America`s senior military oFcer,
the Chairman o the Joint Chies o Sta General Dempsey, asserted in a
teleision interiew with lareed Zakaria that we are o the opinion that
the |Iranian| regime is a rational actor.`
8
Israel`s retired Mossad director
Meir Dagan similarly opined that the regime in Iran is a ery rational
one.`
9
Lhud Barak, Israel`s Deense Minister, in a meeting with senior
Obama administration oFcials elaborated on this basic point, stating
I don`t think the Iranians, een i they got the bomb, |would| drop it
in the neighborhood. . . . 1hey are radical but not totally crazy. . . . 1hey
hae a quite sophisticated decision-making process, and they understand
reality.`
10
Moreoer, the US Director o National Intelligence recently
conFrmed the rational nature o the regime in 1ehran judging that
Iran`s nuclear decisionmaking is guided by a cost-beneFt approach.`
11
O course, een rational actors can make serious miscalculations
with horriFc consequences ,witness Saddam lussein`s ill-adised ina-
sion o Kuwait in 1990,. 1his problem is exacerbated by the opacity o
the decisionmaking regime in 1ehran. Nonetheless, recognizing leaders
in 1ehran are rational actors has important policy implications: namely,
that a negotiated compromise settlement is at least theoretically possible
assuming a minimum degree o oerlapping interests, and containment
and deterrence are iable strategies should Iran at some date decide to
acquire a nuclear weapon. In the meantime, it becomes critically impor-
tant or senior US oFcials to continue to communicate clear red lines`
o unacceptable actions to those rational actors in 1ehran. President
Obama`s obserable and measurable policy objectie o preenting Iran
rom acquiring a nuclear weapon while eschewing calls or broader
regime change in Iran or adopting the much more amorphous goal o
preenting Iran rom obtaining a nuclear weapons caabitit, is a positie
step in this direction.
,c| z. |.a. | a. e|ce.c|a| c|.eac c~ |.ae|.
1his is a claim requently accepted at ace alue in many American
circles, but is igorously debated in Israel. Israel is widely assessed to
hae seeral hundred nuclear bombs with the capability to delier them
anywhere in the region, and is demonstrably the region`s strongest and
most capable military power. Admitting to this basic reality, Lphraim
laley, ormer Mossad Director, noted, I think Israel is strong enough
to protect itsel, to take care o itsel. I think ultimately it is not in the
power o Iran to destroy the state o Israel.`
12
Similarly, Dan lalutz,
8 General Martin Dempsey, Martin Dempsey on Syria, Iran and China,` interiew with
lareed Zakaria, 7*%""0 =*>*%.* GPS, lebruary 1, 2012, http:,,globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.
com,2012,02,1,watch-gps-martin-dempsey-on-syria-iran-and-china.
9 Meir Dagan, Lx-Mossad Chie: Iran rational, Don`t attack now,` C ^er., interiew
by Lesley Stahl, March 9, 2012, http:,,www.cbsnews.com,8301-18560_162-539315,
ex-mossad-chie-iran-rational-dont-attack-now.
10 Israeli OFcial Doubts Iran \ould Nuke lis Country,` |. 1oaa,, lebruary 26, 2010,
http:,,usatoday30.usatoday.com,news,world,2010-02-26-israel-iran-nuclear_N.htm.
11 James R. Clapper, !ortariae 1breat ...e..vevt of tbe | vtettigevce Covvvvit,, 1estimony
beore the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence ,\ashington, DC: OFce o the Director o
National Intelligence, March 12, 2013, , http:,,www.dni.go,Fles,documents,Intelligence20
Reports,201320A1A20SlR20or20SSCI201220Mar20213.pd.
12 Iran Poses No Lxistential 1hreat` to Israel,` R1 ^er., lebruary 6, 2012, http:,,rt.com.
sc |a.aece. :.(z, see. zc+.
ormer Israeli Deense lorces Chie o Sta, has concluded that Iran
poses a serious threat but not an existential one.`
13
Busting both o these aorementioned myths allows policymakers
and intelligence analysts to deelop a more honest assessment o both the
scale and urgency o any potential threat rom Iran to either US or Israeli
interests. lor now, Iran is a middling regional military power with limited
capability to threaten its neighbors. lurthermore, any Iranian attack on
American or Israeli interests could be met quickly with a deastating
blow rom the superior conentional and unconentional military might
o either the United States or Israel. A nuclear-armed Iran would change
these calculations somewhat, but primarily by proiding Iran a meaning-
ul deterrent to a massie military interention designed to oerturn the
regime in 1ehran-something or which neither the American public
nor the Obama administration would likely hae any appetite.
At the same time, dismissing these myths does not mean that Iran
has not or will not aggressiely compete with the United States and Israel
or regional innuence. US military operations in Iraq and Aghanistan
eliminated two o Iran`s major regional competitors and hae conse-
quently proided 1ehran a relatie adantage. 1he misnamed Arab
Spring` has dislodged important American allies and created regional
instability that Iran will undoubtedly seek to exploit to its own adantage.
Iran will continue to oster its relationships with lezbollah in South
Lebanon and Syria, Shi`a political leaders and local militia orces in Iraq,
Shi`a communities in Bahrain and elsewhere in the Gul, and lamas
in Gaza as a means o extending its own innuence at the expense o
American and Israeli interests. loweer, such strategic gamesmanship
is not unique to Iran and irtually eery player in the competitie game
o international politics seeks to extend leerage oer other parties. It is
worth recalling modern Iran has no history o inading its neighbors.
Iran has thus ar pressed its adantages primarily by exploiting its sot
power` relationships with regional Shi`a groups and by seeking asym-
metric adantages through Fnancing, training, and equipping nonstate
actors such as lezbollah ,and more recently the Asad regime in Syria,
as a counter to the superior conentional military orces o the United
States and Israel.
,c| .. |.a.|a. c|.|||a. .ec|ea. acc|.|c|e a.e a c~.e. |~. .ec|ea. .ea~.
.~.a.
1his charge has been repeatedly dismissed by the best aailable US
intelligence assessments. 1he 200 US National Intelligence Lstimate
assessed Iran suspended its nuclear weapons program in 2003. 1hen
Secretary o Deense Panetta conFrmed the continued alidity o
this assessment in lebruary 2013 saying, the intelligence we hae is
they |Iranian leaders| hae +($ made the decision to proceed with the
deelopment o a nuclear weapon.`
14
Instead, the ultimate objectie or
Iran`s ciilian nuclear program, according to US Director o National
13 Gil Ronen, lormer IDl lead lalutz: Iran 1hreat Not Lxistential`,` .rvt bera, lebruary
2, 2012, http:,,www.israelnationalnews.com,News,News.aspx,152382.
14 Leon Panetta, Meet the Press, interiew o lebruary 3, 2013, http:,,
w w w. n b c n e w s . c o m , i d , 5 0 6 6 6 1 6 8 , n s , m e e t _ t h e _ p r e s s - t r a n s c r i p t s , t ,
ebruary-leon-panetta-martin-dempsey-robert-gibbs-ralph-redd-ana-naarro-daid-brooks.
!"#$%&' )%*+ %,#& r~|a. s+
Intelligence James Clapper, may be to deelop arious nuclear capa-
bilities that better position it to produce such weapons, should it choose
to do so.`
15
le went on, howeer, to emphasize that we do not know
. . . .: Iran will eentually decide to build nuclear weapons.`
16
In other
words, Iran ,like seeral other countries, may be seeking a latent nuclear
capability or what is oten reerred to as the Japan option`-the ability
to produce a nuclear weapon on a relatiely compressed timeline should
the security situation warrant a nuclear deterrent. It is in this sense that
repeated US and Israeli threats to attack Iran`s existing ciilian nuclear
acilities may well be counterproductie by underscoring the potential
need or just such a deterrent. In act, Britain`s ormer loreign Secretary
Jack Straw recently explained that the eiled military threat o keeping all
options on the table is a hindrance to negotiations, rather than a help.`
1
linally, Iran`s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei has ormally
and publicly renounced nuclear weapons in a binding religious ruling
or fatra that considers the possession o nuclear weapons a grae sin.`
Reersing such a pledge is, o course, not impossible. loweer, all aail-
able eidence conFrms that Khamenei has thus ar made good on his
pledge to neer pursue nuclear weapons.`
,c| :. |.a. |a e+c|e.c .ec|ea. |ee| c~ a|e a |~|.
1his claim has been adanced by sloppy analysts and others inter-
ested in hyping the urgency o an Iranian nuclear threat. loweer, there
is no eidence Iran has produced av, weapons-grade Fssile material.
All publicly aailable eidence suggests Iran is producing low enriched
uranium at roughly the 5 percent and 20 percent leels ,or energy pro-
duction and medical treatments,, but not to the 90 percent leel required
or weapons-grade Fssile material. Moreoer, while Iran is openly
increasing its capacity to produce more o this low enriched uranium
with additional centriuges, the International Atomic Lnergy Agency
,IALA, in lebruary and May eriFed Iran is simultaneously conerting
some o its enriched uranium to uel stocks thereby reducing the amount
o Fssionable material potentially aailable or a nuclear bomb.
18
Iran
is, thereore, deliberately limiting the amount o its enriched uranium
stocks below that required or a nuclear bomb.
15 James R. Clapper, !ortariae 1breat ...e..vevt of tbe | vtettigevce Covvvvit,, 1estimony beore
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence ,\ashington, DC: OFce o the Director o National
Intelligence, January 31, 2012,, 5, http:,,intelligence.senate.go,120131,clapper.pd.
16 Ibid. 1his same language is repeated erbatim in the 2013 \orldwide 1hreat Assessment`
aailable at http:,,www.intelligence.senate.go,130312,clapper.pd, page 3.
1 Jack Straw, Len i Iran Gets the Bomb, It \on`t be \orth Going to \ar,` 1be 1etegrab,
lebruary 25, 2013, http:,,www.telegraph.co.uk,news,politics,989242,Len-i-Iran-gets-the-
Bomb-it-wont-be-worth-going-to-war.html.
18 lredrik Dahl, U.N. Report May Show Slower Growth in Iran Nuclear Stockpile,` !"#$"%&,
lebruary 20, 2013, http:,,www.reuters.com,article,2013,02,20,us-nuclear-iran-iaea-idUSBRL-
91J1Al20130220, lrederik Dahl, "Iran acts to Lxpand Sensitie Nuclear Capacity," !"#$"%&, 21 May 2013,
http:,,www.reuters.com,article,2013,05,21,us-iran-nuclear-iaea-idUSBRL94K0LI20130521.
sz |a.aece. :.(z, see. zc+.
,c| -. |.a. | ~. c|e |.|.| ~| .~!ec|. a .ec|ea. .ea~..
US, Israeli, and other western intelligence agencies hae been pre-
dicting an imminent Iranian nuclear bomb since 199. A Cbri.tiav cievce
?(+.$(% article summarizes the lengthy history o these assessments:
Breathless predictions that the Islamic Republic will soon be at the brink
o nuclear capability, or-worse-acquire an actual nuclear bomb, are not
new. lor more than a quarter o a century \estern oFcials hae claimed
repeatedly that Iran is close to joining the nuclear club. Such a result is
always declared unacceptable` and a possible reason or military action, with
all options on the table` to preent upsetting the Mideast strategic balance
dominated by the U.S. and Israel. And yet, those predictions hae time and
again come and gone.
19

1his long and inconenient trail o errant predictions is not likely to
persuade those who are absolutely coninced Iran is bent on acquiring
nuclear weapons. Ater all, in Aesop`s able 1be o, !bo Criea !otf, the
wol is real and it does attack the shepherd`s nock. loweer, equally
plausible explanations or the act that Iran has thus ar ailed to acquire
a nuclear weapons capability include: ,a, Iran has no intent o doing
so, or ,b, existing policies, sanctions, and other actiities including sus-
pected coert operations ,assassinating Iranian scientists and inecting
Iran`s nuclear acilities with computer iruses, hae eectiely deterred,
delayed, or preented Iran rom producing a nuclear weapon.
,c| -. |.a. e..|c|e.c acc|.|c|e a.e a .|~|ac|~. ~| c|e ~.|.~|||e.ac|~.
:.eac, (|:,.
One could readily Fnd talented lawyers who persuasiely argue either
side o this case. lormer Secretary o State Clinton publicly claimed Iran
iolated the terms o the NP1. loweer, the international watchdog
responsible or monitoring nuclear deelopments stops short o describ-
ing Iranian actions as a ormal iolation o its NP1 obligations.
1he conusion on this score is a direct result o the ambiguity o the
deal struck by the NP1 and deseres an extended treatment here since
these diergent interpretations o the treaty explain the essence o the
current disagreements between Iran and the P5-1.
Article IV o the NP1 explicitly states, Nothing in this 1reaty
shall be interpreted as aecting the inalienable right o all the Parties
to the 1reaty to deelop research, production and use o nuclear energy
or peaceul purposes without discrimination and in conormity with
articles I and II o this 1reaty.` 1his article proides the statutory basis
or Iran`s insistence any negotiated outcome must, as a minimum, recog-
nize Iran`s unquestionable right to enrich uranium or ciilian purposes.
Recent polling suggests the Iranian public continues to endorse this
iew despite the current pain o sanctions.
20

19 Scott Peterson, Imminent Iran Nuclear 1hreat A 1imeline o \arnings Since 199,` 23"
Cbri.tiav cievce Movitor, Noember 8, 2001, http:,,www.csmonitor.com.
20 Mohamed \ounis, Iranians leel Bite o Sanctions, Blame U.S., Not Own Leaders: Most
Support Nuclear Program Despite Sanction,` Cattv !orta, lebruary , 2013, http:,,www.gallup.
com.
!"#$%&' )%*+ %,#& r~|a. s.
loweer, Article III o the NP1 simultaneously requires nonnu-
clear-weapons states to also accept saeguards as negotiated by the IALA
to eriy and preent diersion o nuclear energy rom peaceul uses to
nuclear weapons. US negotiators can cite this article and Iran`s ailure
to comply ully with IALA demands as a basis or claiming Iran has
iolated the NP1. Moreoer, the IALA does expressly criticize Iran or
ailing to implement its Additional Protocol. 1his bilateral agreement
was negotiated between the IALA and Iran in 2003 and proided or
more stringent saeguards including expanded access by IALA inspec-
tors to nuclear acilities beyond the original terms o the NP1. Iran
suspended its implementation in 2005 to protest continued sanctions
despite its cooperation with the Additional Protocol.
So who has the better side o the argument On balance, Iranian
nuclear actiities appear largely consistent with its NP1 obligations,
although 1ehran could do more to remoe existing doubts about prior
actiities and improe transparency with IALA inspectors. 1he latest
ormal IALA report on Iran neer uses the word riotate in assessing Iran`s
compliance with the NP1. In act, repeated IALA reports speciFcally
explain the Agency continues to eriy the non-diersion o declared
material.`
21
Additionally, the IALA continues to actiely monitor and
inspect Iran`s declared nuclear acilities with a system o installed cameras
and through physical on-site inspection teams. 1he IALA report o
22 May 2013 expressly conFrms that "all o these |enrichment related
actiities| are under Agency saeguards, and all o the nuclear material,
installed cascades, and the eed and withdrawal stations at those acili-
ties are subject to Agency containment and sureillance." v otber rora.,
after titeratt, tbov.ava. of bovr. of ivtervatiovat iv.ectiov. tbere i. ab.otvtet, vo
eriaevce tbat rav i. airertivg evricbea vravivv for a reaov. rograv.
More recently, disputes oer IALA access to an Iranian military
acility at Parchin hae added to international concerns about a lack o
ull transparency. 1hese conditions, along with Iran`s suspension o the
Additional Protocols, hae let the IALA ultimately unable to proide
credible assurance about the absence o undeclared nuclear material.
1hese uncertainties proide the immediate basis or recent UN Security
Council resolutions sanctioning Iran.
1his situation is eerily reminiscent o that conronting international
inspectors and Iraq in the atermath o Desert Storm throughout the
1990s. At the conclusion o this war, the United Nations demanded the
disarmament o Iraqi weapons o mass destruction and created an inter-
national inspections regime ,the United Nations Special Commission
and its successor United Nations Monitoring, VeriFcation and Inspection
Commission, to ensure the destruction o Iraq`s chemical and biological
weapons and to coordinate with the IALA to eliminate Iraqi nuclear
weapons acilities. Although much eriFable progress was made in
dismantling Iraq`s weapons o mass destruction ,\MD, stocks and acil-
ities, there were disagreements between Iraqi oFcials and international
inspectors oer the extent and degree o access required. 1hese rictions
21 International Atomic Lnergy Agency, Director General, vtevevtatiov of tbe ^P1 afegvara.
.greevevt ava reteravt rori.iov. of ecvrit, Covvcit re.otvtiov. iv tbe .tavic Revbtic of rav ,Vienna, Austria:
International Atomic Lnergy Agency, lebruary 21, 2013,, 12, http:,,www.iaea.org, http:,,www.
iaea.org,Publications,Documents,Board,2013,go2013-6.pd. 1his assessment was conFrmed
in the IALA's report o 22 May 2013, http:,,www.iaea.org,Publications,Documents,Board,
go2013-2.pd.
s: |a.aece. :.(z, see. zc+.
multiplied oer time and resulted in occasional stand-os as inspectors
were delayed or altogether denied permission to enter certain sensitie
acilities. 1hese delays and obstructions were used as justiFcation or
both imposing increasingly harsh sanctions and or limited bombing
attacks by the United States and Britain in 1998 ,Operation Desert lox,.
It was this lack o transparency and what came to be characterized as
a cynical game o cat and mouse` between Saddam and inspectors
that ultimately proided the rationale or the American inasion o Iraq
in 2003. US leaders and intelligence oFcials assumed Iraq`s ailure to
cooperate in the ace o stringent sanctions could only indicate Saddam
was actiely maintaining \MD stockpiles that would eentually target
American interests. In hindsight, o course, we know that the combina-
tion o international inspections and sanctions had eectiely contained
Saddam and preented him rom reconstituting his \MD programs.
1he present IALA stand-o with Iran oer access to Parchin is
a close parallel with the situation o Iraq in the 1990s. International
inspectors are demanding renewed access to a acility within the Parchin
military compound based on unattributed intelligence claiming that
Iran at one time conducted nuclear tests with possible military dimen-
sions. Iran has denied the IALA access noting that IALA inspectors
had conducted a successul isit to the acility in 2005 without incident.
Iran urther asserts this complex has no connection to nuclear programs
and is used only or conentional military purposes. \ithout renewed
access, howeer, the IALA argues it cannot conFdently conclude that
Iran is not conducting illicit nuclear actiities. Lssentially, this places
Iran in the extremely diFcult position o haing to proe a negatie. In
other words, it is not enough that the IALA Fnds no concrete eidence
o illicit nuclear weapons actiities. Instead, Iran must proide the IALA
unrestricted and immediate access to any and all Iranian acilities or an
undetermined amount o time beore the IALA will gie Iran anything
resembling a clean bill o health. O course, it is precisely the extent o
the cooperation required o Iran that has been and will continue to be
the ocus o ongoing negotiations with the IALA and P5-1. US policy-
makers must decide what leels o uncertainty regarding Iran`s nuclear
actiities they are willing to tolerate. Iran is simply unlikely to proide
international inspectors carte blanche to inspect eerywhere at any time.
linally, Iranian leaders make use o these disagreements oer NP1
obligations to attack US policies as imposing a double standard that
unairly targets Iran. Leaders in 1ehran requently point out that while
the United States is leading the charge to punish Iran or its |peaceul
ciilian| nuclear actiities, America simultaneously oers substantial
military, economic, and political support to nuclear-armed states such
as Israel, India, and Pakistan who are not signatories to the NP1 and
do not allow international inspections o their nuclear acilities. 1his
apparent double standard uels concern among Iranian politicians
that America`s true aim is to curb Iranian power and to oster internal
domestic dissent that will ultimately lead to the oerthrow o the current
regime in 1ehran. 1hese leaders also obsere that seeral other countries
with adanced ciilian nuclear programs, including Argentina, Brazil,
Lgypt, Israel, Pakistan, Syria, and Venezuela, reused to agree to the
Additional Protocols, howeer, these countries are not subjected to the
same rigorous scrutiny as Iran.
!"#$%&' )%*+ %,#& r~|a. s-
+&,'#(-).%/, 1''&23#(-)' 1%-&# #$, 4-)',5&,)6,' -7 .
8&6/,.9:192,; <9.)
Beyond these misleading myths about Iran and the current state o
its nuclear actiities, American policymakers would be well adised to
examine ully all assertions about the potential consequences o Iran`s
acquisition o nuclear weapons. 1he net eect o these dubious assump-
tions is a worst-case analysis that exaggerates the likely consequences
o a nuclear-armed Iran and thus increases prospects or an American
oerreaction leading to military conrontation.
/ec|~. +. / .ec|ea.a.e! |.a. .||| |ea! c~ .e|~.a| .~|||e.ac|~..
\hile it is possible that a nuclear-armed Iran could spur other
regional countries to acquire nuclear weapons o their own, policymak-
ers should not simply assume this will be the case. Recent analysis by the
Center or New American Security challenges conentional wisdom that
Iranian nuclearization will spark region-wide prolieration,` obseres
that historical cases o reactie prolieration are exceedingly rare,` and
ultimately concludes that neither Lgypt nor 1urkey, |nor Saudi Arabia|
is likely to respond . . . by pursuing the bomb.`
22
A recent study rom
the \ar Studies Department o King`s College London draws similar
conclusions noting 1urkey, Lgypt, and Saudi Arabia hae little to gain
and much to lose by embarking down such a route.`
23
Moreoer, there
is ample historical eidence both inside and outside the Middle Last
that one nation`s possession o nuclear weapons does not necessarily
lead to urther prolieration among presumed competitors. lor instance,
China conducted its Frst nuclear weapons tests in 1964 and neither
Japan nor South Korea hae yet opted to go-nuclear` although both
countries certainly hae long possessed the technical capability to do so.
Ironically, the most powerul incentie or nuclear prolieration among
Arab nations has been Israel`s undeclared nuclear weapons capability
since the late 1960s. Neertheless, despite seeral Arab-Israeli wars,
neither Iran nor any Arab state has deeloped nuclear weapons in the
subsequent 50 years. linally, there are any number o deliberate actions
US policymakers could take to minimize prospects or urther regional
prolieration including proiding riendly militaries with capable deen-
sie missile systems and perhaps een extending America`s nuclear
umbrella to threatened allies.
/ec|~. z. / .ec|ea.a.e! |.a. .||| !eca||||:e c|e .e|~.
As with the preious assumption, the prospect o urther desta-
bilization o the region in the wake o Iran`s deelopment o a nuclear
weapon cannot be ruled out. loweer, Kenneth \altz, a prominent
American international relations scholar, in a recent proocatie 7(%".8+
9::*.%& article entitled \hy Iran Should Get the Bomb` makes precisely
22 Colin Kahl, Melissa G. Dalton, and Matthew Irine, .tovic Kivgaov: f rav vita. tbe ovb,
!itt avai .rabia e ^et. ,\ashington, DC: Center or a New American Security, lebruary 2013,,
, http:,,www.cnas.org,Fles,documents,publications,CNAS_AtomicKingdom_Kahl.pd.
23 Straw, Len i Iran Gets the Bomb, It \on`t be \orth Going to \ar.`
s- |a.aece. :.(z, see. zc+.
the opposite argument.
24
\altz argues the oerwhelming preponderance
o historical eidence suggests nuclear weapons hae been a stabilizing
innuence on international politics imposing a tremendous degree o
rationality and caution on the part o nuclear powers. 1he most obious
case in point: 1he US-USSR nuclear arsenals contributed to what dip-
lomatic historian John Lewis Gaddis aptly dubbed 1be ovg Peace-a
period o history uniquely characterized by the ab.evce o iolent connict
between the major powers. Indeed, since the adent o nuclear weapons
there has not been a single major armed conrontation between nuclear
powers. 1he same logic would likely apply to Israel and Iran.
/ec|~. .. / .ec|ea.a.e! |.a. .||| !ec.~, c|e |~|a| .~..~|||e.ac|~.
.e|e.
1here is little doubt that the immediate impact o Iran becoming
a member o the nuclear club would represent a setback to global non-
prolieration eorts. loweer, it would be a huge distortion to suggest
this single eent would cause the collapse o the entire nonprolieration
enterprise. By any reasonable historic measure, international nonproli-
eration eorts hae been successul. In his third presidential debate with
Nixon in 1960, John l. Kennedy predicted that 10, 15, or 20 nations
will hae a nuclear capacity . . . by the end o the Presidential oFce in
1964.` Despite this alarming prediction, only 9 nations currently possess
a nuclear weapons arsenal ,Britain, China, lrance, Russia, United States,
Israel, Pakistan, India, and North Korea,. Not a perect record oer the
span o more than 50 years, but a substantial record o accomplishment
nonetheless. 1he addition o Iran would not upset this remarkable record.
<23/(6.#(-)'
1aken as a whole, the oregoing analysis strongly suggests there is
room or a diplomatic resolution to the issue o Iran`s nuclear programs.
OFcial US intelligence estimates indicate Iran suspended its nuclear
weapons research program in 2003. 1op US oFcials hae publicly
underscored their assessment that Iranian leaders hae not yet made
a decision to deelop nuclear weapons. lurthermore, Iran`s Supreme
Leader has issued a binding religious fatra declaring the possession o
nuclear weapons is a grae sin against Islam. In the meantime, interna-
tional inspectors remain actie at all o Iran`s declared nuclear sites and
continue to eriy enriched uranium is not being dierted to military pur-
poses. All o these indications suggest there is a window o opportunity
to conince 1ehran to accept eectie limits on its nuclear ambitions in
return or a meaningul easing ,and eentual liting, o sanctions.
Just how long this window o opportunity will last is open to debate.
Neertheless, the long trail o erroneous assessments by \estern intel-
ligence serices reaching as ar back as 199 that Iran will soon possess
a nuclear weapon should cause policymakers to approach present-day
alarmist calls with a high degree o skepticism. In any eent, there is
more to deeloping and deploying a nuclear weapon than assembling a
suFcient number o centriuges to produce an ample quantity o highly
24 Kenneth N. \altz, \hy Iran Should Get the Bomb: Nuclear Balancing \ould Mean
Stability,` 7(%".8+ 9::*.%& 91, no. 4 ,July,August 2012,: 2-5.
!"#$%&' )%*+ %,#& r~|a. s
enriched uranium. According to a recent analysis by seeral ormer
senior US oFcials and national security proessionals, Iran would need
seeral months to produce suFcient weapons-grade uranium or een
a single bomb and then up to two years, according to conseratie
estimates, would be required or Iran to build a nuclear warhead that
would be reliably delierable by a missile.`
25
1he report urther obseres
these actiities would likely be detected by US intelligence proiding
policymakers a month or more to respond. 1he US Director o National
Intelligence recently conFrmed the ability o the intelligence commu-
nity to gie policymakers adance warning noting, we assess Iran could
not diert saeguarded material and produce a weapon-worth o \GU
|weapons-grade uranium| beore this actiity is discoered.`
26
Clearly, there is time-perhaps years-to ashion a negotiated
solution that seres both American and Iranian interests. 1he essential
outlines o a negotiated deal are well known. 1he United States will
need to recognize ormally Iran`s right to enrich uranium while Iran will
hae to limit its enrichment actiities and agree to an intrusie regimen
o international inspections ,something along the lines called or in the
Additional Protocol preiously agreed to in 2003 by both Iran and the
IALA, in exchange or the graduated liting o sanctions.
As with any negotiation, the deil resides in the details. lor the
United States, howeer, a successul deal in the near term oers the best
prospect Iran will willingly remain a nonnuclear weapons state. Serious
negotiations now would take ull adantage o the current international
consensus behind sanctions-a consensus that history suggests will
likely only ray oer time. A diplomatic solution would also aoid the dan-
gerous pitalls o military strikes against widely dispersed, and in many
cases well protected, Iranian nuclear acilities. Many military analysts are
coninced these attacks would at best only delay Iran`s nuclear programs
or two years or so while simultaneously strengthening the position o
hardliners in Iran and bolstering their coniction that Iran desperately
needs a nuclear deterrent against uture military attacks.
2
lor Iran, a
negotiated resolution would ease the burden o sanctions and oer some
degree o alidation by the international community o nations.
US policymakers should also thoroughly scrutinize many o the
worst-case assumptions about a nuclear-armed Iran. Disastrous outcomes
are not preordained. In any case, the most signiFcant o these could be
mitigated through existing diplomatic, inormational, economic, and
military instruments. Allegations that other regional states will respond to
a nuclear Iran by seeking their own nuclear weapons capability hae been
reuted by recent analyses. States hae many reasons to eschew nuclear
weapons ,that is why only nine states hae chosen to do possess them,
and smart US policies could ampliy those costs ,sanctions, and proide
additional political and military incenties to reassure threatened allies
so they do not eel the need or an independent nuclear weapons capabil-
ity. Policymakers should also derie comort rom knowing the history
o the Cold \ar demonstrates that, by irtue o their massie destructie
25 Austin Long and \illiam Luers, !eigbivg eveft. ava Co.t. of Mititar, .ctiov .gaiv.t rav
,New \ork: 1he Iran Project, 2012,, 9, http:,,www.wilsoncenter.org,sites,deault,Fles,
IranReport_091112_lINAL.pd.
26 Clapper, !ortariae 1breat ...e..vevt of tbe | vtettigevce Covvvvit, ,2013,, .
2 lor an example o this analysis, see !eigbivg eveft. ava Co.t. of Mititar, .ctiov .gaiv.t rav.
ss |a.aece. :.(z, see. zc+.
power and the horriFc scale o likely retribution, nuclear weapons are ar
more likely to impose a stronger sense o rationality and caution on states
than they are to encourage reckless aggressie military action.
linally, een as policymakers remain ully committed to a policy o
preention, they would be well adised to recognize that containment
and deterrence remain iable strategic options should preention ail.
Iranian leaders hae proen themseles to be rational actors primar-
ily concerned with securing their own physical and political surial.
Deterrence and containment successully achieed US interests when
conronting ugly, iolent, and dictatorial leaders in Moscow and Beijing.
1here is little reason to suspect artul US strategy could not achiee
similar results is-a-is a nuclear-armed Iran.