Security Threats in The Tri Border Area

Security Threats in the Tri Border Area
Maria Soledad Figueroa 10/12/2013 Washington DC, United States
Maria Soledad Figueroa Transnational Security Challenges Garret Martin December, 2013
The tri-border area (TBA), the zone composed by the north-east of Argentina the south-east of Paraguay and the south-west of Brazil is well-known for its reputation of lawlessness and historical presence of terrorist elements, as well as the political corruption that allows the multitude criminal activities and illegal markets to overlap with the legitimate economic activity. Extended for 2500 Km of subtropical jungle, countless rivers and falls live around 700.000 people between the cities and the rural areas1; and excluding some big cities, this is one of the most diverse areas of Latin America in terms of race and culture, converting this area into a perfect place for the development of illicit activities and international organized crime organizations. This paper will characterize the TBA, and discuss the main criminal activities developed. Moreover, it will look for the responses in from the countries involved and in the region to this increasing threat to security. To do that, the paper will be divided into two sections: first, a description of the zone taking into consideration elements of geography, demography, economy and the criminal networks trying to identify how this are deeply connected in every days life; and secondly, will look into the different mechanisms the governments as Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay had put in action to stop the threat as individual sovereign states and in cooperation under the frame of MERCOSUR.
Bartolom, Mariano Csar, and Elsa Llenderrozas. Redes (2002)
Characterization of the Tri-Border Area Geography The TBA borders are defined by three slightly new urban centers, Puerto Iguaz in Argentina, Foz do Iguau in Brazil and Ciudad del Este in Paraguay. These three are connected by two international bridges, Puente de la Amistad (Paraguay- Brazil) and Puente Internacional Tacaredo Neves (Argentina- Brazil), only taking into account around 20 thousand cars (around 30 to 40 thousand individuals) cross the first bridge daily, which means that border controls are reduced to minimum and only less of than 10% of the cars and bagged are checked. And this is only one example of how everything works in the TBA2. Puerto Iguaz it the farther city of the region, besides there is no bridge or road that connect the city to Ciudad del Este. Therefore, its the most remote to the illicit world, and even though it plays an active role in the criminal activities this is minor to the ones playing both of its partners. In addition, its the smallest city with only 32 thousand citizens while Ciudad del Este has 239500 citizens and Foz do Iguau has 300 thousand3. The Brazilian city, Foz, its the leading of the group; founded as a military colony and in the 60s with the construction of the hydroelectric dam and the increasing commercial activity with Paraguay over the 80s shifted its course. At the same time, Foz do Iguau is the most dangerous of
2 3
Bartolom, Mariano Csar, and Elsa Llenderrozas. Redes (2002) Lynn, Josefina, Triple Forntera, Realidad o Mito?.
the three with 275 homicides register in 20024.Lastly, Ciudad del Este was founded by a political act in 1957 because of the need to join Paraguay with Brazil, with the construction of the city, both governments build the Pan-American Highway that connects Asuncion with Curitiba. Society Looking into the qualitative demography of the area you can see that only in Foz there are 65 different nationalities living together, the cultural diversity is one of the key things that define the TB. In Ciudad del Este there are three main ethnic groups: Chinese which by the 2001 was the largest with about 30 thousand individuals, which probably less than a 30% would be formally registered; Lebanese, and Korean. Also there are thousands of native communities in the rural areas of the Tri-Border Area, who have very close and poor self-sufficient settlements. In the city of Foz do Iguau live the second biggest and oldest Arab community of Brazil, around 12 thousand approximately according to the data of the illegal immigration amnesty in 1998, and in Ciudad del Este there are around 2 to 3 thousand but this number increase to 10 thousand if you take into account the Arabs that work there but live in Foz do Iguau; but in majority they stay out of Argentina because discrimination problems. About its composition, 90% of it its Lebanese, also in the second wave of immigration in the 60s came Libyans, Syrians, Jordanian and Palestine among others. These communities are very
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Hudson, Rex. TERRORIST AND ORGANIZED CRIME GROUPS IN THE TRI-BORDER AREA (TBA) OF SOUTH AMERICA
traditional and tightly knit, having their own schools, clubs and keeping their own language; in the area you can hear Arabic as much as Spanish or Portuguese (you can frequently hear also Chinese, Korean and Guaran).5 Economy Puerto Iguaz suffer the distance in the economic activity but what suffers the most is the unfavorable exchange rate; thanks to this, the Argentine small town lives out of tourists because its the city of one of the seven wonders Iguazu Falls, the area also attract people for sport fishing and other outdoor activities. The main economic interaction happen between Ciudad del Este and Foz do Iguau. The first one, has more of the 90% of the economy as an informal economy; as a consequence the citys retail economy ranked third worldwide (behind Hong Kong and Miami)
in volume of cash transactions, peaking at US$12 billion in 1994.6 These illegal markets are composed by drugs, weapons, humans and organ trafficking as well as fake or stolen products. All these bring a new type of tourists to both countries, Shopping tourism, which is one of the
pillars for Foz and Ciudad del Este growth in the last years.
Hudson, Rex. TERRORIST AND ORGANIZED CRIME GROUPS IN THE TRI-BORDER AREA (TBA) OF SOUTH AMERICA 6 Hudson, Rex. TERRORIST AND ORGANIZED CRIME GROUPS IN THE TRI-BORDER AREA (TBA) OF SOUTH AMERICA
Illegal Activities: Terrorist cells: Since the terrorist attacks in Buenos Aires in 1992 to the Israel Embassy and to the AMIA (Asociacin Mutual Israel-Argentina)7 in 1994 there was no doubt of the terrorist presence in the Tri-Border Area. The SIDE (Secretara de Inteligencia de Estado Secretariat of State Intelligence) had linked the attacks all the way back to Amad Barakat and Imad Fayed Mugniyah two Lebanese citizens who were living in Ciudad del Este. According to SIDE investigations, Baraket played an essential role in financing the bombing and Mugniyah is considered responsible of the logistics of the attacks. Consequently, there was a bigger concern to the situation in the TBA and an increase in the demand of security. Moreover, media from all over the world starting talking about the phenomenon and sparked off academic studies and policies about it. After all this, they liked the Lebanese population in the area with international terrorist organizations like Hezbollah, especially because a considerable number of the immigrants came from Bekaa Valley which is the epicenter of Hezbollah activities. But also you can find members of Al Qaeda ,Al- Jihad and al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya among others. The linkage to the TBA with terrorist activities related to the political agenda of Middle East made it become one of the most important issues of the moment in Argentina and in the international community. After September 11 attacks in New York, the interest in the issue became grater and grater and it evolved into two different theories:
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Israeli-Argentine Mutual Association
Maxim: the terrorist in the TBA had knowledge and access to the information to the attack to the World Trade Center before it happened.
Minimum: the TBA is used only a logistic presence and dominium of the zone and control of one of the most scare assets, drinkable water.
Another discovery was the permanent flow of money in and out of the TBA to the Middle East between U$D 60 to 100 million yearly)8 product of the narcotrafficking of cocaine by plane through one of the more than a hundred clandestine airports in the TBAand marihuana by illegal roads. However this has decline significantly due to the surveillance efforts from Brazil and Argentina and in a lower level Paraguay. Meanwhile they launder money by the different legal loopholes in the countries, also by the financial system, gambling and the buying and selling of real state; afterwards, the local Arab community get together these funds to send it to their relatives in the Middle East through some mosques. Smuggling and forgery: For these types of crimes Ciudad del Este is the epicenter. Just counting music, image and video forgery it values up to U$D 150 million/ year. For this crime Brazil and Argentina are on the priority list of the Copyright International Intellectual Alliance. But this is not the only type of forgery, there is also, car parts, appliances, brand clothes, even cigarettes (40% of the cigarettes consumed in Brazil are fake); in Ciudad del Este if its not fake its stolen, in Argentina 6000 cars are stolen and sell in Para guay, it takes hours for an
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Hudson, Rex. TERRORIST AND ORGANIZED CRIME GROUPS IN THE TRI-BORDER AREA (TBA) OF SOUTH AMERICA
organization to get a car in Buenos Aires and take it to Ciudad del Este where is sold for less than half of the actual price. The Triple Frontier is a perfect spot where you have easy access in and out to the entire world, and that is the main reason for becoming so important in narcotrafficking, human trafficking or weapon smuggling. If the goods are going to the United States or Europe they go from Ciudad del Este to Montevideo, Rosario or Buenos Aires and are shipped from there, the same route is made when they come in. If on the contrary are coming or going to Asia (Hong Kong, Taiwan or Malaysia), they uses the ports in Santo or Paranagua in Brazil. Any of these different roads can be made by air, roads or by the numerous rivers that connect all these places. At the same time, through Paraguay and Bolivia the good can access Colombia and later Venezuela. This is especially beneficial for the FARCs that one of the three discovered heavens of the Colombian organization is in Guara which is only 100 miles from Foz do Iguau.
Other criminal activities: Among other distinguish criminal organizations are the Argentine local Connection a criminal group made up from corrupt politicians, former member of the military regime and dirty cops who are linked to the fundamentalist Islamic movements and benefit from bribes and in some situation make the illicit.
Paraguay city, Ciudad del Este is controlled by different mafias dedicated to arms trafficking and money laundering. Moreover, has a serious issue with Chinese Triads these are especially dangerous because they are young groups that do not follow traditional rules such as staying in their own world. Chinese organizations either provide protection to local Chinese business or/ and impose taxes to the Asian containers coming into the country. Another ethnic mafia that its settled in the TBA is the Russian mafia involved mainly in drug trafficking and cybercrime; illicit activity which Brazil with its epicenter in Foz do Iguau is known for, being the highest exporter of internet crime in the entire world.9 Government Corruption: According to Hugo Antolin Almiron, corruption in Argentina has penetrated deep within the public offices and has affected every stratum of the society and has further generated various types of misconduct.10 In 2004 a witness (Abdolghassem Mesbahi, an Iranian intelligence officer) in the case of the AMIA attack in Buenos Aires( July 1994) testified against the former president of Argentina at that time Carlos Sal Menem; saying that the Iranian government carried out the attack and had paid the Argentine president the sum of U$D 10 million to cover up. The charge against these acts have never been verified,
10
Rex, Hudson. Various authors, NATIONS HOSPITABLE TO ORGANIZED CRIME AND TERRORISM (The Library of Congress)
and despite the fact that for obvious reasons Menem denies them, he acknowledge that he has a bank account in Switzerland since 1986.1112 Brazil also plays its part in governmental corruption. A report released by the Drug Trafficking Investigating Commission of Brazils Congress incriminates 827 indivudials evolved in organized crime, drug-trafficking and tax evasis. Among those individuals ther are 12 federal congressmen, 2 state governors, 15 state deputies and a large number of mayors, police officers, lawyers and judges. As a conclusion, the Commission agreed that the drug-related corruption is so extensive that it is nearly impossible to clean up in a short period of time without calling in the military and restructuring and rearming the countrys police13 Later on in mid-2002 another Congressional report implicated the highway robberies of truck cargo to about 100 politicians, police and entrepreneurs already involved in the theft of the cargo.14 Numerous signs show that despite the corruption in Argentina and Brazil is the one in Paraguay who contributes the most and the key to the whole criminal network in the TBA. Due to the amount of open causes that the Public Administration itself has related to this issue. The Governmental, political and diplomatic corruption in the TBA and
especially in Paraguay allows criminals to bribe judges or purchase entry visas unpunishably.
11
Curios is it too that coming from a Syrian family in the North-West of Argentina Carlos Sal Menem is the only Christian in an Muslim family Requisite for presidency till 1994. 12 Rex, Hudson. 13 Rex, Hudson. 14 Various authors, Nations hospitable to organized crime and terrorism.
Accorging to an investigation by the Paraguays National Directorate of Civil Aeronautics (-DINAC-Direccin Nacional de Aeronutica Civil, National Directory of civil Aeronautics) found that 570 individuals/ yearly on average had enter the country though Ciudad del Este either without or with fake documents paying bribes around 5 thousand US dollars. One of the most distinguish acts of Paraguayan corruption is the issues of fake visas. By the end of 2001 Carlos Ccena a Paraguayan judge charged some consulates that had become into offices of illegal visas issues. The most famous case is the one of the Consulate in Miami with Carlos Weiss in charge, he solely sold more thaN 300 passports and visas shipping them to individuals heading to the TBA; one of them was Ahmad Assad Barakat who enter the county in 1989 using a visa from the Paraguayan Consulate in Panama, office that was not authorized to issue visas.15 Police Corruption: The effectiveness of a countrys security forces in combating organized crime and terrorism is clearly a factor in determining whether conditions are conducive to allowing these illicit activities to flourish. The efforts of the security forces of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay have been ineffective in this regard because they have been of hindered by corruption, human rights abuses, and inadequate funding and training.16 On the hand, the effectiveness of Brazils police forces while fighting to organized crime and terrorist groups in the TBA its almost nule, thanks to the lack of respect for
15 16
Various authors, Nations hospitable to organized crime and terrorism. Various authors, Nations hospitable to organized crime and terrorism.
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human rights and the vast distribution of corruption/ involvement in crime of all the Brazilian public officers. The state police officers of the country had committed several abuses to human rights, including torture, arbitrary arrest and detained persons, and also extra- judicial killings. However its not only the police involved in this activities, these goes up all the way within the military police and politicians. The police has been involved in criminal activities of all kind from killing for hire, death squad executions, kidnappings and narcotrafficking. Brazils politicians play an active role in these activities and that is the reason why they have demonstrated lack of will in the need to reform the police force, the penal code or any aspect of the criminal justice system. In overall, the entire situation has created in Brazil a climate of impunity that only works to encourage more human rights abuses. In Argentina the situation is not much better. There are three main reasons why the police have no motivation to combat crime. First, their objective is to maintain social order not investigating serious international crime. Second, the slow motion of the justice system has frustrated the majority of the officers that wanted to do something; as a consequence some them have taken law into their own hands when they considered that the sentences were too light. Last, but not least is the poor wage police officers receive, their pay starts around U$D 400 per month17. This leaves a gap open, and the satisfaction they dont receive from the State they get it from bribes and other forms of corruption. This have been like this for years, according to Maria del Carmen Verd statement (from the Center of the Prevention of Police Repression), In the last decade, there has not
17
Various authors, Nations hospitable to organized crime and terrorism.
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been any major illegal business without police participation, from prostitution to gambling, robbery, or kidnapping.18Like in Brazil, there is no change coming in the horizon in this matter for Argentina. Finally Paraguay has not bright future in this matter either. Paraguayan polive has been continually involved in extra-judicial killings, torture and abuse of convicted prisoners among other criminal activities. In October 2001, Paraguayan Congress increased surveillance on the countrys Arab communities, after this; there were charges that the police were extorting large amounts of money from them in return for not reporting their activities as they were supposed to. And that is only one example of all their work. The lack of trust in the national police in Ciudad del Este is the reason why, every shop, bank or money exchange office has its own private security.
What has been done about the TBA? Las propias necesidades del MERCOSUR como proceso de integracin regional no han sido suficientes para consensuar medidas efectivas para enfrentar los problemas de seguridad de esta regin fronteriza.19 Although the different policies that the three countries have implemented have some kind of effectiveness, the TBA is far for being consider a safe area. Argentina and Brazil have coordinated several security policies that helped decease the level of criminality in the
18 19
Various authors, Nations hospitable to organized crime and terrorism. Bartolom, Mariano Csar, and Elsa Llenderrozas. Redes (2002) [ The own needs of MERCOSUR as an regional integration process have been not enough to reach an consensus in effective ways to face the security problems of this borderland.
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area but there is still a long way to go through. Paraguay also plays its part, but in a minor way because its the one who benefits the most with the situation in the TBA. After the attacks in Buenos Aires, the issue became urgent, and together with the rush of MERCOSUR and the different integration processes, in 1996 the countries involved developed the Tripartite Command of The TriBorder, with the participation of Paraguayan National Police, Argentine Gendarmerie and Federal Police (and the Misiones provincial Police) working along with the SIDE (today SI), and the National Aeronautical Police of Brazil and the Federal Police of Brazil. This tri-national organization has as objective increase the cooperation for security of the TBA, by exchange of information and creating s databank and, leading simultaneous operatives in the three countries. In the same year, the three signed and agreement Acuerdo de Seguridad y Facilidad de Transito de last tres fronteras- in order to coordinate de action against terrorism and narcotrafficking and crating another databank. And later in 1997 two
different reunions of MERCOSUR happening having the TBA as the main issue of their agenda. The first meeting was oriented to the cooperation and coordination of policies relatives to the security in the region and the creation of a mechanism of semiannual meeting system. The second one by the end of the year developed the Plan de Cooperacion y Asistencia Recproca para la Seguridad Regional Plan for the Cooperation and Reciprocal Assistance for the Regional Security- by this the countries of MERCOSUR seek uniform legislation that helps punish the different complex and transnational crimes that affect the TBA.
13
However the Tri-Border Area has not only been under the scope of the countries that are involved, since 90s all the international community has an eye on what is happening in the South-Cone. In addition, after the 2001 the US has paid special attention to what is going on and in 2002 has implemented the mechanism 3 + 1, were the US plays an active role in the analysis of the security issues of the TBA. Finally in 2006 MERCOSUR release and agreement over the frame of cooperation in terms of regional security between the States involved, by this put into action several coordinated simultaneous operatives in the TBA that fight against terrorist activities and narcotrafficking; at the same time this program train special officers and generate different mechanisms to maintain the coordinated efforts in the field of public security and security of individuals and goods.
Conclusions The Tri-Border Area present a sample of a reduce scenario were a great number of the new transnational threats work and interact all together. There, in only 2500 km you can find terrorists interacting and making business with the FARCs selling, trading weapons and narcotics, but also the Russians with all kind of internet crime, or the Chinese with its mafias, money laundering from all of them, and all types of criminal activities and the government in small or great amount participating of these in some kind of way. Therefore, the intrinsic complexity of the area is in great part due to the bond between the criminal organizations and the corruption of the public officers from police to politicians.
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However, there are some other aspects of Latin American countries that create the perfect climate as to develop these types of organizations. The institutional instability, the weakness of the State as a structure, as an organization, only leads to crisis in the within the countries and lead only to more and more social and economic deterioration. Many individual seek the satisfaction the State cant provide in the internal structure of these organizations. Moreover, the fragmentation of Latin American scenario makes it very hard to construct regional consensus to what to do about the TBA. Brazil and Argentina are historical enemies, and many times this complicates the decision-making; there will always be level of competition between them. Meanwhile Paraguay, takes some steps in the correct way in combating the illegality in Ciudad del Este; while does some criminal move on the backstage. The only way to solve or attack the situation is to present a united front, is to get not one but three political decisions that this is what they want and get into a consensus of how they are going to do it. Taking the words of Elsa Llenderrozas, es necesario reforzar mutuamente dinmicas democrticas e institucionalizadas para la resolucin de los conflictos internos y utilizar la capacidad poltica y la importancia de los liderazgos regionales para proyectar estabilidad institucionalidad en la regin20 while looking for common position in terms of security.
20
Llenderrozas, Elsa. Democracias dbiles y factores de inseguridad: nuevos desafos para los pases sudamericanos. [ it is necessary to mutually strengthen the democratic dynamics e institutionalize them for
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Bibliography Aravena, Francisco Rojas. "Ingobernabilidad: Estados colapsados, una amenaza en ciernes." Nueva sociedad 198 (2005): 56-73. Bartolom, Mariano Csar, and Elsa Llenderrozas. "La Triple Frontera desde la perspectiva argentina: principal foco terrorista en el Cono Sur americano."Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies: REDES (2002). Calle, Fabin. "La evolucin reciente de las polticas y estructuras de defensa en el cono sur: Argentina, Brasil y Chile." Coleccin 16 (2005): 147-170. Dreyfus, Pablo. "Agenda de Seguridad en el MERCOSUR: La Triple Frontera como espacio de inseguridad regional." (Rio de Janeiro, enero de 2005). Flemes, Daniel. "Respuestas del MERCOSUR a las amenazas transnacionales." Revista Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad 20.1 (2006): 163-180. Fuentes, Claudio. "Fronteras calientes." Foreign Affairs Latinoamrica 8.3 (2008): 12-21 Hudson, Rex. TERRORIST AND ORGANIZED CRIME GROUPS IN THE TRIBORDER AREA (TBA) OF SOUTH AMERICA, (Library of Congress, July 2003) Llenderrozas, Elsa. "Democracias dbiles y factores de inseguridad: nuevos desafos para los pases sudamericanos." (Universidad de Buenos Aires, 2003).
the resolution of the internal conflict and to use the political capacities and the importance of regional leadership to project institutional stability in the region]
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Lynn, Josefina. "La Triple Frontera y la amenaza terrorista realidad o mito? in Seguridad Multidimensional, ed. Felasco, Ecuador (2008): 57. Nations hospitable to organized crime and terrorism. Defense Technical Information Center, 2003. Perotti, Javier. "La cooperacin argentina en la lucha contra el terrorismo en el contexto internacional e interamericano." UNISCI Discussion Papers 20 (2009): 50-58.
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Security Threats in the Tri Border Area

Maria Soledad Figueroa 10/12/2013 Washington DC, United States

Bartolom, Mariano Csar, and Elsa Llenderrozas. Redes (2002)

Israeli-Argentine Mutual Association

Various authors, Nations hospitable to organized crime and terrorism.

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