Int. J. Psychoanal.

(2002) 83, 851

THE NEED FOR TRUE CONTROVERSIES IN PSYCHOANALYSIS:

THE DEBATES ON MELANIE KLEIN AND JACQUES LACAN IN O DE LA PLATA THE RI
RICARDO BERNARDI
Santiago Va zquez 1142, Montevideo 11300, Uruguay (Final version accepted 9 Jan 2002)

Controversies are part of the process of scienti c knowing. In psychoanalysis, the diversity of theoretical, technical and epistemological positions makes the debate particularly necessary and by the same token dif cult. In this paper, the author examines the function of controversies and the obstacles to their development, taking as examples the debates held in the R o de la Plata (Buenos Aires and Montevideo) during the nineteen seventies, when the dominant Kleinian ideas came into contact with Lacanian thought. The author examines different examples of argumentative discourses, using concepts taken from the theory of argumentation. The major dif culties encountered did not hinge on characteristics pertaining to psychoanalytic theories (i.e. the lack of commensurability between them), but on the defensive strategies aimed at keeping each theorys premises safe from the opposing partys arguments. A true debate implies the construction of a shared argumentative eld that makes it possible to lay out the different positions and see some interaction between them and is guided by the search for the best argument. When this occurs, controversies promote the discipline s development, even when they fail to reach any consensus. Keywords: Baranger. Controversies, argumentation, incommensurability, Klein, Lacan,

Introduction
Certain methodological and epistemological problems of present-day psychoanalysis emerge quite clearly when situations of theoretical or technical dissent among analysts are studied. Confronted with discrepancies, each of the positions is invitedat least in principleto substantiate its af rmations, elucidating the reasoning that supports them. The study of this reasoning should make it possible to better understand the problems under discussion, evaluate the different solutions

that were proposed and identify any consensus or points where there is no agreement and further research is needed. As analysts, too, we know that it is necessary to remain aware of the unconscious forces that can in ect the apparent rationality of a given discourse. Examining the substantiations used in situations of dissent should open the way to greater understanding of how the problem of narcissism and alteritywhich any discussion stirs up is being managed at the unconscious level. That would also lead every participant to self-examination of his/her unconscious
Copyright # Institute of Psychoanalysis, London, 2002

852

RICARDO BERNARDI
proves to be of the greatest importance, for the integrity of the eld of psychoanalysis, to examine those debates that break out between psychoanalytic conceptions differing substantively in their theoretical, technical and epistemological suppositions. Such research should centre on particular instances, though it should at the same time arrive at conclusions that could be generally valid. From a historical perspective, Freuds inuence did not make it easy to create a culture of debate and free examination of differences; instead, the use of authoritybased arguments and the exclusion of divergent positions were favoured. Only recent decades have witnessed slow but sure progress in the recognition of the fact of, and right to, theoretical and technical pluralism in psychoanalysis. However, the existence of a diversity of positions made it necessary to clarify the points of agreement and disagreement between them, to identify, not only instances of real consensus, but also points open to discussion. Scienti c controversies thus become unavoidable paths opening the way for the discipline to advance through an array of opinions. For controversy to be possible there must exist minimum prior agreement regarding the methodological procedures and epistemological bases that will govern the discussion, so that the arguments offered by each party can be evaluated by mutual consent. But arriving at shared criteria is no easy matter. Studying the editorial policies of psychoanalytical journals, Tuckett reached the following conclusion: For those who believe in psychoanalysis, the disciplines frequent failure to develop an ongoing methodology of rigorous debate to sustain it should be a major

relationship with analytic theories and with whatever signi cance particular authors or ideas might have in each individuals personal history. If events did happen in the way I have just described, we would be looking at a heartening panorama where successive generations of analysts would have ready access to a clear vision of the previous generations advances, of the different theoretical and technical paths opening the way to possible new steps and of the reasons proffered for preferring certain paths over others. At the same time, the experience of personal analysis would make it possible to more ef ciently manage the uncertainty and hostility debate generates, and also the unconscious con icts and remnants of transference in ecting the choice of theory. I believe that at this point no one doubts that I am describing a panorama more ideal than real, which in this post era sounds like a dream of the Enlightenment. 1 The fact is that scienti c debates or controversies are possible, though dif cult. If we observe the debates that take place in psychoanalysis, whether in written or oral form, or internally (when a person examines a topic in his/her own mind), we discover that there are a series of factors tending to restrict the scope of the exercise. The number and heterogeneity of positions existing in our discipline, and the indeterminate character of the limits between them, make it quite dif cult if not impossible to consider all positions when entering into a debate. Even those controversies that have had the greatest international repercussions, like those of the British Society in the nineteen forties, were limited to the ideas dominant within the local tradition. But even though it is necessary to accept the restricted nature of debates, it

We must, withal, be cautious in surrendering the dreams of the Enlightenment. The critique of a too narrow conception of reason does not mean that all forms of rationality must be given up. Psychoanalysis itself was born of, and continues tied to, a certain form of rationality, as Steiner states: In fact, both the scienti c and the curative norms of psychoanalysis imply the acceptance and the use of logical presidia and moral values which stem from a particular blending of the liberal radical tradition with the Enlightenment and Romantic traditions of Western European culture without which psychoanalysis could not have been born (1995, p. 442).

THE NEED FOR TRUE CONTROVERSIES IN PSYCHOANALYSIS

concern (1998, p. 446). The rst requirement, then, is to have procedures that make it possible to discuss procedures. Freud had advised taking instances of dissent to the court of clinical experience, testing divergent positions on the basis of particular cases and clinical problems. He stated:
As a rule, however, theoretical controversy is unfruitful. No sooner has one begun to depart from the material on which one ought to be relying, than one runs the risk of becoming intoxicated with ones own assertions and, in the end, of supporting opinions that any observation would have contradicted. For this reason it seems to me to be incomparably more useful to combat dissentient interpretationsby testing them upon particular cases and problems (1918 [1914], p. 48).

853

Facts and all, it is not easy for the clinical court to reach unanimous and incontrovertible decisions, and discrepancies regarding the correct interpretation of a particular material are frequent. The insuf cient reliability of clinical judgements constitutes a problem when basing theoretical developments on them. This problem becomes more manageable when one speci es the different contexts to which clinical judgements may pertain and, in light of those contexts, the different paths forward that become available. I will now discuss three types of contexts. First, psychoanalytical clinical judgements can be used to support decisions in the eld of health sciences. Medicine has met with a similar problem of lack of consensus in the clinical area. The evidence-based medicine movement (Sackett et al., 1997) attempts to confront the disparity in clinical judgements bearing on the ef cacy of treatments, deve-

loping methodological procedures that make it possible to evaluate the degree of scienti c support accorded to different therapeutic approaches. The idea of empirically supported treatments is a current subject of discussion for the different psychotherapies, and psychoanalysis is also involved. 2 It is probable that advances in systematic research on the process and the results of treatments will make it possible to answer certain kinds of questions with increasing precision, such as which therapeutic approach bene ts, in what evidence-based way, what types of patients and by what means does it achieve this. It is probable, too, that neighbouring elds (the neurosciences, the study of child development, cognitive psychology, epidemiological studies etc.) could contribute useful knowledge on a number of other issues that psychoanalysis is questioning at present (though certainly not on all of them). It is worth noting that in all these cases, knowledge is supported by well-de ned methodological procedures and, when discrepancies arise, the procedures themselves become the focus of the discussion, for they supply the criteria that support the argumentation. 3 Second, other issues pertaining to psychoanalytical controversies, however, are not amenable to this type of standardised procedure. Some of these issues are irresolvable; that is, with the present state of knowledge, it is not possible to reach decisions regarding their truth. While these questions may refer to problems of undoubted ultimate or philosophical interest (i.e. many meta-psychological topics such as the nature of the unconscious, or of drives etc.), there are no procedures within the discipline that make it possible to answer these questions conclusively.

For example, at the 42nd Congress of the International PsychoanalyticalAssociation (Nice, 2001) there was a Panel devoted to Evidence-based Medicine. 3 See, for example, the discussion on empirically based treatments in the Special Section devoted to the topic in Psychotherapy Research (1998, vol. 8, No. 2: 115171). See also Fonagy et al., 1998: 5258, An open door review on outcome studies in psychoanalysis. Electronic publication of the International Psychoanalytical Association at www.ipa.org.uk.

854

RICARDO BERNARDI
and humanities, Connolly & Keutner (1988, pp. 578) noted that, although there are decidable and non-decidable issues in both the sciences and the humanities, there is a difference between them on this point. While decidability occupies a central position in the matters with which science is concerned (at least normal Kuhnian science), in the humanities non-decidable issues predominate. The fact that psychoanalysis should include both types of issue prominently quite often leads to discussions being conducted not in a common language but in different ones with different regimes for truth. This impels us to examine the extent to which the participants in a debate share the same premises.

Mentioning them in the course of the debate, however, can prove useful in providing information about each partys premises or frame of reference, or for heuristic purposesto encourage the emergence of new ideas. A third type of issue, located at the heart of clinical research and psychoanalytical theory, elicits another class of problem, giving rise to questions referring to the unconscious meaning of the subjective and inter-subjective experiences that occur in analysis, and to the best way of conceptualising these clinical discoveries. In the disciplines present state, discussion of these topics takes place mostly on a hermeneutical plane, and arguments are supported by clinical intuition enhanced by the personal experience of analysis, and by critical re ection on the concepts used. When divergent interpretations arise there are no standardised procedures for resolving the issue, nor is there agreement about whether this would be possible or even desirable, given the distortion these methods could introduce in the consideration of certain problems. Thus, we nd that different types of questions have a place in psychoanalysis and, in each case, the pertinent answer is supported by evidentiary criteria that are also different. Frequently in psychoanalytic controversies issues of different natures are discussed at the same time, without having previously established what procedure to consider valid when approaching each class of problem. To understand this dif culty we must remember that historically psychoanalysis has drawn from both the scienti c and the humanistic traditions, and the literature of psychoanalysis is sometimes closer to one or the other of these traditions. Yet the criteria governing controversies and also the procedures for achieving consensus are different in each tradition. The humanities do not aspire to the same type of consensus that the sciences seek. The problem of what is decidable plays an important role here. Discussing Rortys ideas about problems of commensurability in the sciences

The conditions necessary for a true debate

To argue implies enunciating something in a form that will be supported by or grounded in other statements, which are taken as premises. When arguments that are convincing for one of the parties in a debate have no value for the other, this frequently stems from each of them having started from different premises and suppositions, and may not have been made explicit in the debate. When speaking of premises I refer to the general principles and categories that organise knowledge in a particular theory; by personal suppositions I mean each authors own context of ideas, re ecting his/her vital experiences, including experience as analyst and as patient. It is not easy for the participants in a controversy to accede to discussing their premises and suppositions. The reasons for this are of different natures: some are of a logical and rational order, while others can be best understood from a psychoanalytical perspective. From a logical point of view, for each partys premises to enter in the discussion there must at least be some shared criteria providing a neutral arena, that is, a eld for

THE NEED FOR TRUE CONTROVERSIES IN PSYCHOANALYSIS

discussion that does not favour one position or the other. This makes it possible for the participants to convert any of the discrepancies arising in debate into a subject of debate itself; thus in principle all the truths accepted by the different psychoanalytical schools can be questioned. At the beginning of the debate these minimum shared criteria need not go beyond the processes governing the secondary process. It is a function of the controversy itself to esh out these premises, establishing progressive agreements about the nature of the issues discussed and the criteria governing the validity of the reasoning. However, these minimum initial agreements about premises can be dif cult or impossible to establish when the basic rules governing the use of scienti c language are being discussed, as has occurred in a number of recent controversies (Sokal & Bricmont, 1997; Bouveresse, 1999). The dif culty of including personal premises and assumptions in the discussion can be better understood if we examine the problem from a psychoanalytical perspective. Controversies challenge a persons conscious and unconscious relation with his/her assumptions and theories. In the case of an analyst, his/her theoretical and technical ideas not only have an intellectual value but are also linked to personal history and analytic experience as patient and analyst. To call into question these assumptions and premises generates strong feelings of uncertainty, reactivates remnants of the transference dating back to analytical training and institutional life, and mobilises narcissistic con icts. All this tends to limit the analysts capacity to operate with a reversible perspective, that is, to adopt, if only as a methodological exercise, the positions of the other parties. For to do so is tantamount to accepting the possibility that the solutions he/she has adopted in his/her own lifeas analyst or patientcould be incomplete or provisional. Elsewhere (Bernardi, 1992; Bernardi & Nieto, 1989; Bernardi & de Leo n, 1992), I have referred extensively to the analysts

855

unconscious relation with his/her theories, and also to the need for examining this relation in personal analysis or in a re ection open to self-analysis. It is worth adding that such personal willingness is necessary if the analyst wishes a scienti c controversy to enrich him/her. If there is no attitude open to examining the unconscious signi cance of ones own certainties, these can give rise to processes of identi cation that lead to narcissistic withdrawal. In a controversy, a number of personal issues are at stakeamong them the hunger for power or prestige, loyalties and enmities of different sorts etc. But controversies also make it possible for something of the love for truth to come to light. In the eld of psychoanalysis, love for truth starts with being willing to think about oneself from the vantage point the other offers us. Thus, we reach a point where the epistemological perspective and the psychoanalytical one proper converge: for any true debate to exist, the existence of an intersubjective eld must be accepted where the different parties can be governed by common laws. Ultimately, to be guided by the logic of the best argument is to show interest for something new that the other can tell us, and be willing to change if necessary. In this paper I propose to demonstrate the usefulness of the ideas of the theory of argumentation for examining some of the problems elicited by controversies in psychoanalysis and to identify possible paths forward.

The theory of argumentation

The theory of argumentation has grown apace in recent times. This branch of philosophy is part of the tradition of Greek dialectics and rhetoric, and epistemological, linguistic, psychological, sociological and other approaches now converge there. It studies how to proceed if one wants agreement in a eld where it is impossible to obtain the necessary demonstrations in the modes of

856

RICARDO BERNARDI
dimension and a normative or ideal one, which makes it possible to do a rational reconstruction of the argumentative discourse and also construct an ideal model of the critical discussion. The critical discussion model is a theory of how discourse would be structured if it were purely resolution oriented (van Eemeren et al., 1993, p. 26). Argumentation is seen as a special kind of regulation of disagreements: Our particular choice has been to develop a model that construes argumentation as a methodical exchange of speech acts among cooperative discussants (p. 22). Returning to Toulmins idea about argumentative elds, he de nes them as institutional frameworks that give content to the conduct of argument (p. 143). Argumentative elds: provide standards or authority, legitimacy, objectivity, rationality, and acceptability. The eld notion, then, stresses that all argumentative deliberation occurs within some socio-historical context and that all reasoning is reasoning-in-context (p. 143). This path for resolving discrepancies implies a number of steps: 1) identify the disagreements between the two parties; 2) establish agreements regarding the means by which the disagreement can be settled; 3) allow inde nite exploration of the merits of each position; which culminates in step 4) reach agreement, or mutually recognise that it is not possible to achieve one for the time being. In my opinion, the agreement provided for in point 2 (procedures for managing divergences) is often lacking in psychoanalytical discussions, with the problem never becoming a topic for discussion. In consequence, there is no way of proceeding with the inde nite exploration, as wide ranging as necessary, of the different positions (as point 3 stipulates), because the prior issues to be clari ed before the dialogue could continue were not identi ed and accepted (p. 26). Van Eemeren et al. consider that a dialectical reconstruction of the argumentative

logic or geometry (Toulmin, 1985). As Perelman states, The very nature of deliberation and argumentation is opposed to need and evidence, because there is no deliberating when the solution is necessary and no arguing against the evidence (1983 [1958], p. 1). In his opinion, if we forget that the proofs used in argumentation are not logically necessary truths, we fall into the fanaticism that strains to impose such proofs as universal truths or into the scepticism that rejects the validity of any adhesion or commitment in the absence of this type of truth. Toulmin points out that epistemology must study the arguments as they appear really in the different scienti c elds. He states:
In the natural sciences, for instance, men such as Kepler, Newton, Lavoiser, Darwin and Freud have transformed not only our beliefs, but also our ways of arguing and our standards of relevance and proof: they have accordingly enriched the logic as well as the content of natural science (1958, p. 257).

In consequence, what Toulmin proposes is to look at the history, the logic, the structure and the modus operandi of the sciences through the eyes of a naturalist, without prejudices imported from outside. In a word, what is required, in his view, is not epistemological theory but epistemological analysis. Toulmin uses the idea of argumentative eld to designate the logical ambit where the different arguments can interact. He notes that depending on the logical nature of the arguments used, the argumentative elds can become non-reducible (pp. 1438). Sandler took note of the same problem in other terms:
To the extent that different psychoanalysts share the same meaning-space for a concept or theoretical term, they can communicate relatively satisfactorily in that particular area. However, it may happen that their meaning-spaces for the concept are different, and then problems of lack of communication or pseudo-communication may arise (1983, p. 36).

The Dutch School, analysing argumentation, posits the convergence of a descriptive

THE NEED FOR TRUE CONTROVERSIES IN PSYCHOANALYSIS

discourse must include appropriate consideration of the following aspects: a) the points to be questioned in the debate; b) the positions of the parties with regard to these points; c) the explicit and implicit arguments the parties bring to bear in support of their points of view; d) the structure of the argumentation, that is, the relations between arguments (1993, p. 60). The debate should then be governed exclusively by the value of the arguments. It is well known that in reality controversies involve not only ideas in con ict but also confrontations of human interests of different orders, among which are issues of power. For the controversy to be fruitful there must be a willingness to accept a series of prior conditions of diverse psychological, social, epistemological and ethical natures, guaranteeing that the value of the argumentation will be recognised. This is hard, but not impossible. The dimensions lying just beneath the discussion itself (reason, truth, communication) are on the agenda of contemporary philosophic thought. The possibility of a search for truth through communication between the speakers has been analysed both in the Continental hermeneutic tradition (Dilthey, Heidegger, Habermas, Gadamer), and in the school inspired by Frege, Wittgenstein, Quine and Davidson. The very idea of truth, for Habermas, must be enlarged in such a way as to give a central place to the communicative processes that, through dialogue and confrontation, make it possible to reach uncompelled consensus where truth follows the logic of the best argument. Davidson has reviewed the philosophical problems of the nature of the interpretation of what goes on in other minds; from the

857

externalist position he assumes, interpersonal understanding serves as a model for selfknowledge. From a similar perspective, Cavell (1993) notes that the idiolect of any person can, in principle, be translated into that of any other: the difference in points of view would make no sense if there was not something common to both of them; something true for both of them even if they state it in different ways (Davidson, 1984, in Cavell, 1993), which reduces the pretensions of scepticism and relativism. I should like to return, from these different contributions, to the topic of controversies in psychoanalysis and especially to the dif culties that exist when constituting a shared argumentative eld.

Incommensurability as a defensive strategy

In previous articles (Bernardi, 1989, 1992), I have noted the dif culty of determining with any precision to what extent different psychoanalytic theories are coincident, opposed (or even contradictory) or complementary. I also explored the possibility that certain aspects of the theories could be in a relation of incommensurability, in Kuhns (1962) sense: that because they start from different premises they will lack common measure.4 It seemed to me then that incommensurability depended on the nature of the theories themselves, each of which constitutes a heterogeneous paradigm or disciplinary matrix organised according to its internal need for logical and semantic coherence. Today I am willing to revise this opinion in the case of psychoanalysis.

Kuhn (1962) noted that during periods of normal science there is a single dominant paradigm. Scienti c revolutions are characterised by the appearance of a new paradigm, which may not be commensurate with the previous one, in which case logical compatibility or semantic congruency between them is not assured. Disciplines having multiple paradigms constitute a situation of another type (Masterman, 1972), which could be that of psychoanalysis(Bernardi, 1989).

858

RICARDO BERNARDI
What looks like incommensurability can thus be explained as a strategy to defend ones own position. This strategy makes it possible to limit the argumentative eld to the circle of certain ideas and exclude rival hypotheses. The controversy is interrupted when it reaches the points of greatest intellectual and emotional tension, that is, when each partys premises and hypotheses should be questioned. 5 The situation of incommensurability can be masked by an apparent integration or pseudo-integration of theories. This is the case when highly different psychoanalytic theories are used with no comparison of any sort and no attention paid to the reasonings internal coherence. True integration among theories, on the other hand, implies the existence of a debate, at least in ones mind, ensuring the interaction of different ideas and the possibility of mutual transformation.

Psychoanalytic theories become incommensurable when it is accepted that their hypotheses can only be discussed from the premises on the basis of which they were formulated. Instead of what should occur in a hermeneutical circle, where theory and experience are each in turn enhanced by the other, in the above-mentioned case each premise ends up providing the basis for its own validity, limiting the possibility of being questioned from outside, or from the dimension of observable facts. Britton and Steiner (1994) noted the difference between selected facts, which are patterns arising from experience and overvalued ideas, where the facts are forced to t into an analysts prior hypothesis or theory. In this last case, each theorys postulates and premises end up determining what is and what is not to be considered true psychoanalysis. In consequence, circularity is engendered, whereby to question certain ideas one must rst agree with them. Here the premises of each position elude any radical critique, for anyone starting from different premises can nd no common eld for discussion. Any psychoanalytic idea, no matter how valuable (i.e. the unconscious con ict, primary de cits, early anxiety, the role of language etc.) can become a barrier to discussion if taken as an incontrovertible premise instead of being recognised as a hypothesis that must be submitted to scrutiny. In a related way, it is interesting to note that frequently those who do not agree with certain premises tend to both reject them and ignore them en bloc , without treating them as alternates to be tested against the hypotheses of those standing in disagreement. As a result of this reduction of the eld of discussion, discourses become incommensurable.
5 From

Why do psychoanalytic ideas change?

Controversy supposes a willingness to search for the truth, and thus to receive new ideas and modify the previous ones. In fact, psychoanalytic ideas change through time. This change elicits a number of questions: Which ideas change? When and why? With what effects or consequences? The problem of change is not exclusive to psychoanalysis but is a concern in science, leading both to normative discussions (When should an old theory be abandoned? When should a new one be accepted?) and also descriptive ones (How does the change in ideas really happen? What does history teach about this?). In a quite simpli ed way, we can look to

the perspective of the theory of argumentation, this closing of the eld of debate shows up a aw in the debates pragmatic preconditions,that is, in both parties willingness to continue to examine the foundations of the positions and be guided by the logic of the best argument. Analysing fundamentalistdiscourse from the viewpoint of the theory of argumentation, van Eemeren at al. stated: Incommensurability and the apparent closure of each eld to the objections and challenges of the other are aspects of the way that representatives of those elds manage their encounters with one another (1993, p. 164). Regarding this point, where purely logical analysis is insuf cient, psychoanalysis,as we have seen, has much to contribute.

THE NEED FOR TRUE CONTROVERSIES IN PSYCHOANALYSIS

three models to explain the mechanisms that lead to the substitution of certain ideas by others: A) The classical scienti c model, whereby new hypotheses are accepted when they are able to resist attempts at contrasting (Popperian falsi cation), or adduce more compelling evidence than rival hypotheses (eliminative inductivism). B) The Kuhnian model, whereby a dominant paradigm persists despite the anomalies it does not explain until entering a phase of exhaustion in its capacity to explain new evidence, which leads to the emergence of a new generation of scientists with other paradigms. C) Hermeneutical models, where different ideas coexist without either coming into con ict or totally replacing one another, though they can lose their dominance. There are no decisive proofs, or refutation, neither does a previous theory become exhausted, but there is competition among diverse interpretations of reality, where those demonstrating a heuristic power more in accordance with the demands of the moment triumph. Metaphors and analogies play an important role in the processes of understanding. These models, markedly metaphorical and analogical in nature, can be seen in all sciences in the context of discovery, but are especially important in the arts, the humanities and in elds with incipient status as disciplines. Each of these models guides the argumentation through different courses. I will examine the debates in the R o de la Plata at a time (the nineteen seventies) when changes in dominant ideas occurred. I will attempt to identify the reasons advanced for preferring some ideas to others, with the support of a dialectical reconstruction of the argumentative process. Studying the context in which the debates took place also makes it possible to understand the potential value of debate in the process of receiving new ideas.

859

o de T he historical context of the R la Plata debates

Two moments in the history of psychoanalysis in the R o de la Plata are especially apt for studying the processes through which ideas change. The rst of them was characterised by the reception and development of the Kleinian ideas, which happened for the most part in the nineteen fties. These ideas made it possible to develop a local psychoanalysis, with noteworthy original contributions. The second moment was when those dominant, locally in ected Kleinian ideas gave way to a diversity of in uences, including a number of authors (Winnicott, Bion, Kohut etc.) and especially French psychoanalysis, accompanied by the higher valuation of the Freudian canon. I will refer particularly to the debate between Kleinian and Lacanian ideas that continued throughout the nineteen seventies, a decade characterised by crisis and change in psychoanalytical institutions and society at large. The rst ascertainable fact that results from revising the Revista de Psicoana lisis (APA) and the Revista Uruguaya de Psicoana lisis (APU), as well as other publications of the period, is that while the above-mentioned changes are noticeable, there were few articles where the author discussed the new ideas, examined how they related to previous ones, described changes in his/her own ideas and made explicit the reasons for changing. Etchegoyens (1986) volume on technique is among those that most clearly present a systematic comparison of different positions, but it belongs to a later decade than the one we are considering. The reception of new ideas can be followed through a number of indicators: changes in journal indexes, in the frequency of descriptive terms or in authors mentioned in bibliographies etc. In general, references to Melanie Klein or local authors decreased while quotations from Freud and the other authors mentioned increased. While there was no systematic quantitative research into

860

RICARDO BERNARDI
ing paths conducive to obtaining evidence for or against particular ideas. It is a fairly general truth that new currents emerging in psychoanalysis are not for the most part submitted to systematic comparison with other existing currents; in general, only the most salient points of discrepancy or coincidence with some of the others receive any notice. In the case of Lacanian ideas it was not even easy to establish their relation to Freudian ideas or to the rest of French thought. Even today in France, for those who are not followers it is not easy to delimit the in uence of these ideas, as Wildlo cher (2000) noted.

how much quotation there was, a study of this for the term countertransference (de Leo n et al., 1998) makes it possible to con rm the impression. The changes were not only theoretical but also affected analytic practice. Research conducted in Uruguay (Bernardi et al., 1997) on the types of interpretation mentioned in the articles of associate members shows appreciable changes in several aspects. Between the nineteen sixties and the nineteen nineties transference interpretations and those referring to aggression decreased in a statistically signi cant manner. Interpretations referring to sexuality or narcissism or those occupied with the patients infantile experience also decreased, though not by a statistically signi cant amount. From the qualitative standpoint the change of style was marked, and this is quite apparent in interpretations that the researchers evaluated as badly adjusted to the patients material. Interpretations having little clinical precision in the nineteen sixties sought to impose the Kleinian theory on the patient: the language was direct, assertive and favoured a ping-pong style of dialogue. Inadequate interpretations in the nineteen nineties were open, shaky and diluted, giving the impression that the analyst expected the patient to reach some conclusion on his/her own; defences were excessively considered and the negative transference was more tranquillised than worked through. Questions, virtually non-existent in the nineteen sixties, constituted nearly one-third of all analyst interventions in the nineteen nineties. It is possible that not only the new currents or authors in uenced these changes, but also the circumstance of theoretical and technical pluralism itself. The existence of diverse frameworks probably induced a more cautious attitude and perhaps introduced some discom ture at having to choose among them. It is probable that the controversies that occurred at the time between old and new ideas proved insuf cient for the purpose of clarifying the differences between the various theoretical and technical options, and propos-

The initial controversies between Kleinian and Lacanian thought

One of the rst confrontations between Kleinian thought (as known in the R o de la Plata) and Lacanian thought occurred in the conversations held on the occasion of the visit of Leclaire (a disciple of Lacan) to Buenos Aires and Montevideo. The discussions at the Asociacio n Psicoanal tica Uruguaya in August 1972 were compiled in two volumes that include Leclaires conferences and the dialogues with the members of the Association (Leclaire, 1972). There was already a measure of knowledge of Lacans thought, which several analysts had been studying for some time. And that same year, O. and M. Mannoni had visited the region. The activity consisted of seven theoretical seminars and ve meetings to discuss clinical material, which was supplied by the participants. As to the seminars, they did include dialogue, though, except for Leclaires, the names of speakers were not recorded. A remark of Leclaires from the second of these seminars shows how the focus of interest was established:
Somebody (at the rst meeting) wanted me to speak about our theoretical conception of fantasy. The other question . . . was about the possible relation between

THE NEED FOR TRUE CONTROVERSIES IN PSYCHOANALYSIS

language and the force of the drive . . . In any case, I thought the conferences I was to give would be devoted to the problem of drives, of the object of the drive, the force of the drive and its relation with . . . words.

861

The third of the seven seminars introduced the topic of how to conceive the body and the mechanisms of introjection. Leclaire, who had just discussed similar topics at the Argentine Psychoanalytical Association, directly interrogated the audience in the following terms, inviting controversy:
Serge Leclaire: Do you represent the body to yourselves in any other way than as a recipient equipped with some openings. . .? If I ask you this question it is because I believe that this representation is too ingenuous by far and, above all, does not correspond to the psychoanalytic data of our experience (p. 29). Intervention: The problem, it seems to me, is that when you use the term Ko rper-ich [as synonym of] vessel-body you murder the metaphor, you objectify it, because a closed vessel, a closed body, is not presupposed . . . So I do not believe that there is an outside and an inside, though I do know that I incorporate something. It is the way the ego-body expressed this act, but not in a vessel that closes (p. 33). SL: I am glad to hear you say [that], but I cannot help having the impression that the digestive reference of the fantasy of happiness continues to mark your way of using, at least, the term introjection. For my part, I believe that it is far more important to consider what is being played out in the process called introjection, as an attempt or a modality of integration in the structure, of introducing an element that could modify its structure . . . (p. 33). I: . . . When you speak of the introduction of an element in the structure, are you thinking of an intrapsychic system or structure? SL: Here again we nd that intra that always annoys me (p. 34).

gure from topology to demonstrate his conception of certain relations that at rst seem to constitute binary oppositions. The Moebius strip is a three-dimensional gure or ring that is made by joining the points of a rectangle or a strip of paper after twisting one of them 180 8. In the case of the body, this gure shows that it is not possible to oppose outside and inside because in the Moebius strip both faces appear in a continuum. Phenomena related to the body are thus seen as if they were elements in a structure. This structure is of a particular nature, that is, it is a system determined fundamentally as an attempt to organise its own de cit (manque ) (1972, p. 28). By using this model, Lacan was also distancing himself from the way in which the Kleinians were using unconscious fantasy to support their theoretical constructs:
In the Moebius strip model there is only one face. I prefer this as a model and image of the body. It is at any rate the only model that permits us to not enter into the fantasy-laden contradictions of the patient we have to analyse. And as I have said, it is always preferable to not enter into fantasy if we are to be able to analyse it (pp. 356).

The discussion subsequently centred on the importance of unconscious fantasy, or structural models, for conceptualising the body:
I: The phrase element in a structure. . . is not the language of the ego-body, ego-patient. My heart is aching, that is quite clear, but I do not know how or why, because neither do I know what an element is. Yet I do know that it devours me, here, inside. This is the language of the ego-body, this is how I speak and make myself intelligible. On this level, that is the advantage of such language (pp. 367). SL: But I would put it another way. You were evoking the problem of elements. I just spoke to you about the representation of a surface, which seemed preferable to me for speaking of the body, to delineate, to represent the function of the body (p. 37).

At this juncture, Leclaire explained his conception of the body with the support of the Moebius strip as a model. Lacan used this

[There was then an explanation of Lacans conception of the body.]

I: When you proposed this role of the surface, I

862

RICARDO BERNARDI
reiterated his opinion about the digestive aspect of the metaphor of incorporation, and proposed as an alternative the metaphor of introducing an element into a structure (elsewhere in the text he noted the need to distance oneself from biology to differentiate the object of necessity from the object of desire). But before continuing along this path, which is the one the discussion took, we might well examine the arguments that were used at greater length. Leclaires rst argument was about the ingenuity of the other position. In this context the word can have several meanings. At one extreme, ingenuous implies a disparagement, connoting a lack of sophistication or worldliness (as when one says that someone from the provinces is ingenuous compared to an inhabitant of the metropolis). Nothing explicit alludes to this meaning, yet it cannot be totally disregarded, for it is present in many controversies that crop up between the metropolis and the periphery. Explicitly, the word ingenuous seems rather to refer to philosophic ingenuousness, in the sense of insuf cient critical re ection about problems. The listeners appear to have taken it in this sense, for at another moment one of the participants said:
I: I believe we must completely separate the meaning of splitting in the Lacanian school and the Kleinian school. Klein imagines an ingenuous level, one might say from a philosophical viewpoint, while Lacan is much closer to what Heidegger called the ontological difference . . . (p. 111).

thought that you would continue speaking of the surface, but as a membrane, as a place of exchange. And that perhaps here lies the source of the differences between the thinking you explained and what we are closest to admitting. This situation of exchange, I think it is the origin of the pre-eminence of the oral model (p. 43). SL: Im going to tell you why I dont do this [speak of the body in the manner suggested to him]. Because I believe that there is no other substance in the body . . . I believe that the substance itself is made with these coincident and antinomian elements. It is this that constitutes the very texture of the surface, that is, of the body . . . (p. 43).

I would now like to comment on these dialogues, emphasising not so much the content of the discussion but the way of arguing and especially those aspects that facilitated or made it dif cult for the two hypotheses to be examined in depth and on equal footing. I will limit myself to the initial exchanges. Leclaires initial question had a particular rhetorical form: Do you represent the body to yourselves in any other way than. . .? This question encloses two aspects: the way he understands the other partys position, and an argumentation against this position, understood in that way. This argumentation centred on two criticisms: ingenuity and distance from the clinical. Among several answers, the one I transcribed is the one that answered Leclaires question most directly: Whoever was speaking rejected the attributed position and the way of describing it (You murder the metaphor. . .),6 and reformulated the question in terms of unconscious fantasy, expressed in experiential language. Leclaire

This attribution of philosophical ingenuousness, to all appearances, was accepted tacitly since it elicited no further discussion.

Regarding the treatment of the metaphor, it is possible to state, in the terms of Lakoff and Johnson, that Leclaire was considering as a simple physical metaphor what was originally a structural metaphor expressing an experiential gestalt (1980, p. 101). This argumentative procedure converts the adversary into a straw man. In consequence, examination and discussion of the differences at the level of the premises was interrupted, that is, in respect of the role the experiences of projection and introjection play in psychoanalyticaltheorising about the body.

THE NEED FOR TRUE CONTROVERSIES IN PSYCHOANALYSIS

This is noteworthy because the preceding re ections had placed the discussion at a philosophical level that was not ingenuous. A number of remarks noted that the Kleinian internal object is an object endowed with intentionality, which would situate the problem in a tradition of the philosophy of mind, stretching from Brentano to contemporary authors like Dennet, Davidson etc. Why was the attribution of philosophical ingenuity not rejected? To avoid a direct controversy? Leclaire, however, did not appear to expect that this sort of confrontation would be eluded, as the following exchange proves:
I: The Kleinian school postulates intentionality as a primary fact, and you present as a primary fact the difference established by the division of the subject (p. 26). SL: To present some intentionality as fundamental is a remnant of religiosity, a way of placing a divine intention somewhere in the body, as vitalism does there is a vital energy that goes toward something. Its super uous (p. 26).

863

Or, at another moment:

I: . . . possibly the closest af liation of the Kleinian conception is with thought like Brentanos, in the sense of the object constituting the subject, or the object relation constituting the subject. SL: The privilege granted to the object as the sole constituent of the subject tries to push into the background the logical pre-eminence of the signi cant (p. 27).

In reality, we found no true examination of grounds for preferring the concepts of intentionality and unconscious fantasy, on the one hand, to signi cant and division of the subject on the other, or vice-versa. Each party took for granted the intrinsic superiority of certain concepts over others, with no possible recourse to the source of this evidence. If we now look at Leclaires second argument (correspondence with psychoanalytic data arising from our experience), the absence of references to clinical material

throughout the discussion is striking, despite its being invoked by Leclaire in support of his position. When Leclaire developed his understanding of incorporation as the introduction of elements into a structure, contributing the metaphor of the Moebius band, the side of the participants argued the advantage of a relational model based on the movements of projection and introjection (I thought that you would continue speaking of the surface, but as a membrane, as a place of exchange . . .), and a language more attached to clinical experience (This is the language of the ego-body, this is how I speak and make myself intelligible). Several questions sought to specify the term structure in relation to intrapsychic structures, or in relation to family structure, but Leclaire did not accept these approximations as valid. There was no adequate translation from what was understood by the trans-individual character of the unconscious or the sphere of action of the signi cant into the lexicon and categories of the other party. Nor was there the open road required to create a eld for discussion that would have made it possible to elucidate the different premises. Ultimately, examination of the two arguments (ingenuousness and the relation with the clinical) ceased, and the discussion became a presentation of alternate metaphors. The dif culty of establishing a common clinical reference was again present in the discussions on the clinical materials the participants presented. The ve meetings devoted to this material made it impossible to progress with this, demolished by the fact that there were different ways of considering the material. For the local Kleinian tradition, clinical listening should give rst place to the transference and countertransference fantasies because these expressed changes in the patients unconscious object relations. But for Leclaire, following Lacan, the accent should fall on those modi cations of the patients discourse through which unconscious desire manifested. In the fourth of the ve meetings Leclaire

864

RICARDO BERNARDI
character, they make it possible to study the type of argumentation used. One of the rst topics discussed was the relation between the early Oedipus described by Melanie Klein and the late Oedipus as it emerged from Lacans rereading of Freud. One of these papers considers the Kleinian contribution valuable, but holds that it must be reformulated from Lacanian premises:
It is important to note that these considerations do not imply devaluing or ignoring the profound and important Kleinian contributions, but only point to the need to place them in the context of images to which they belong and so be able to connect them more adequately with the pertinent symbolic structure (Szpilka, 1976, p. 295).

summed up the differences in outlook as follows:

SL: On the whole, to give you an idea of how we work, we intervene in a much less systematic way, and there are sessions where we do not intervene at all. [We intervene] when something has begun to be dominantsomething of the order of repetition, or a certain insistence, in words, gures, formulas, evocations of situations. My impression here is that a series of interventions [by the analyst] do not allow the patient s discourse to develop. That would end up adding something to the patient s own personal imbroglio (p. 181). . . . We do not believe that the transference is the presence of real feelings. We consider as transference what is displayed in the eld of our non-response to the patient s desire. . . We do not respond as a human person (p. 182). . . . If we ourselves reintroduce representations of inter-personal relations, we attenuate and in certain cases annul the speci city of the analytic relation . . . He (the patient) speaks, that is what we ask of him and it is suf cient to know that the words really are carriers of the drive-based tensions, to not have to appeal to that kind of sentimental ambiance. Feeling, by de nition, is confusion (p. 183).

The author noted what in his opinion constituted the weakness of the Kleinian position:
The concept of early Oedipus or late Oedipus dissolves the Oedipus itself . . . The Oedipus is or it is not. We are, then, [in the case of the Kleinian early Oedipus] at the centre of a theoretical and methodological error that we could call inverting and making empirical the times of determination (p. 294).

In fact, Leclaires comments about the previously presented clinical cases had been limited to general aspects of the patient and his psychopathology, or to theoretical issues, even though the audiences questions were aimed at very concrete matters related to the moment-by-moment of the session. But these differences in the way of considering clinical material were not included in the discussion points.

The subsequent discussion

The comparison of Kleinian and Lacanian ideas reappeared sporadically in certain publications of the decade. The instances I have found are not of a true debate between two contestants but of accounts from within one of the perspectives. Despite this unilateral

We see that in this case the point of departure is the superiority of certain premises (which make empirical or chronological descriptions look insuf cient and uphold the need for a structural perspective) and from these the bankruptcy of the other position is inferredthe result of not taking these premises into account in the same way. A somewhat different position of the same period held that while in Klein the concept of the fathers symbolic function remained absent, this did not make her way of working with the problem at the clinical level any less valid. For Faimberg, the treatment of Richard demonstrated that Klein was able to accord symbolic signi cance to her patients war experience despite not having the concept of the fathers symbolic function. Thus, Klein was able to provide a response from the

THE NEED FOR TRUE CONTROVERSIES IN PSYCHOANALYSIS

clinical angle to the question she did not ask at the theoretical level (1976, p. 161). I believe that the concept which is lacking in Kleinian theory is the one that dynamically connects the idea of absent penis with that of phallus (p. 157). In this article, though the author explicitly disregarded the problems of compatibility between the different referential schemes (p. 149), she proposed a solution implying a measure of complementation, where Lacan offered the general theoretical framework inside which certain aspects of Kleinian clinical practice could once again be given value, and formulated in another way. Baranger was the author who compared the ideas of Klein and Lacan in the deepest and most systematic way in that period. I will mention only some fragments of his publications, especially those where he returned to the polemic with the ideas of Leclaire.7 Baranger (1976, 1980a, 1980b) tried to delimit the zones of validity of the Kleinian and Lacanian theories. He began by noting the zones of divergence between Klein and Lacan: the Oedipus complex, the oralisation of instinctual life, the total object as synthesis of partial objects, the process of symbolformation, the role of introjection and projection in the modi cation of the object, locating the breast as the prototype object, the concept of partial object as the sole primitive type of object relation. He also noted coincidences, for example the description of the fantasy of the fragmented body (1980a, p. 133). He believed to be Lacan right in his criticism of the notion of passage from the partial object to the total object, or in marking the difference between demand and desire, or showing the fetishs character of being a decoy. Yet he did not believe that this made it possible to consider resolved the problem of the diversity

865

of the possible categories of object, or even less, abandon all the concepts of one author for the others. He resumed the dialogue with Leclaire, comparing the clinical scope of ideas like internal object, signi cant or representation:
To speak of representation, as Freud did, or of signi cant, as Lacan does, or Letter, as Leclaire does, stops short of what Freud meant in Mourning and Melancholia regarding the existence of objects. Do not say that these phantoms are metaphorical, that it is a matter of imaginary objects. Freud sometimes uses the term imaginary object (or imagined, or fantasised object), but he leaves us in no doubt that he is then referring to something quite different from what he describes in the process of mourning, or something that does belong to the order of the representation (1980b, pp. 31617).

For Baranger different types of objects exist, and none can be reduced to any other: One cannot treat a fetish like a living-dead 8, or like an omnipotent self-image. This is a clear example of cases where prematurely uni ed theory can engender simplistic technique (1980b, p. 319). Baranger tried to nd support in arguments taken from clinical experience, resuming the discussion with Leclaire on that basis:
If we were to give up working on the object, give up reducing splitting, give up the movement that is the inverse of projective identi cation, we would at the same time be giving up not only the Kleinian concept of internalised object but also the Kleinian and Freudian concept of internal world. Why, Leclaire asked us, the phenomena always in terms of outside and inside, introjection and projection, when there are other possible categories . . .? Because, we might answer, an entire aspect of our work, a very important one, consists of managing this type of ambiguous existence, endowed with a certain substantiality that is different from representation and

7 An

analysis of the way in which Baranger compared the ideas of Klein and Lacan in the case of the countertransference can be found in de Leo n (2000) and in de Leo n & Bernardi (2000). 8 Baranger uses this term to describe a particular kind of object characteristic of mourning processes, which transforms this kind of object in a group of memories similar to the other representations(1980b, p. 316).

866

RICARDO BERNARDI Characteristics of the argumentation

Are there any reasons, based on what has been described, explaining when and why the development of the argumentation halted? Is it possible to offer hypotheses about the paths that might have made the debate advance? I believe that these questions are fundamental, for they speak to the practical usefulness of this kind of analysis. Let us return to the discussion with Leclaire. A signi cant advance was had there in identifying and stating certain important points of discrepancy. As we saw, the exploration of both parties arguments made it possible to confront concepts like intentionality and unconscious fantasy, on the one hand, and structure and divided self, on the other. But from that point advance was halted: the question remained formulated in terms of the intrinsic superiority of certain concepts over others, and that, in the abstract, turns out not to be a decidable question for psychoanalysis. And what happened when the confrontation was stated at the level of the premises? The attempt to generate conviction no longer rested on the dialectical argumentative process but on the persuasive power of enunciates, as occurs in the epidictic style used in preaching or proclamations (Perelman, 1958, p. 62). Af rmations became selfevident and, to produce adhesion to them, reliance was placed on their expressive power alone, which leads to reason in a circle (petitio principii). What paths might have permitted an advance? There were two possible paths, but both of them led nowhere, for reasons I will explain. If it was a matter of discussing the concepts (intentionality, structure etc.) in their philosophic dimension, then it was necessary to situate the controversy in the eld of philosophy and avail oneself of its methods. But this placed the discussion outside the purview of psychoanalysis, formulating questions that could not be resolved from its method. This does not mean that

closer to the type of existence of the subject . . . that we call internalised object (p. 320).

Both the quoted texts and later ones leave the impression of a controversy that was not at all argued out, or that only managed to develop by ts and starts, or even in a circular way. During a recent debate in Buenos Aires (2000) between Lacanian analysts (Miller, Laurent and others) and Kleinians (Etchegoyen, Zysman and others), some of the topics mentioned above reappeared with little change. Miller, for example, stated:
. . . the idea of introjection and projection presupposes the differentiation of the external and the internal, and I know that for many people present [at the debate] thinking about these terms implies a particular mental framework. They must know that Lacan does not think in those terms, and his use of topology is used precisely to express another con guration, not suited to the difference between the internal and the external (Stagnaro & Wintrebert, 2001, p. 122).

Despite the efforts of different participants, and especially Etchegoyen (ibid., pp. 83, 84), to focus the debate on the points where there existed a clear discrepancy (the role of the patients resistances, of envy and voracity, of the relation with the body and biology etc.), the confrontation of ideas did not manage to advance compared to similar exercises of the nineteen seventies. Though the meeting as announced was to include shared clinical research, references to patients material were virtually non-existent and it is possible to infer that it would have been quite dif cult to nd common criteria for clinical evidence. Certainly, these dif culties are not only features of debate in the R o de la Plata. If one reviews the literature from anywhere else in the world, it becomes apparent that the absence of systematic confrontation between different psychoanalytic approaches has been the general case. It is therefore convenient to examine more closely the processes obstructing progress in argumentation.

THE NEED FOR TRUE CONTROVERSIES IN PSYCHOANALYSIS

psychoanalysis cannot include a philosophical dimension; but for psychoanalysis to be able to express well-founded judgements there, problems must be formulated in a language that makes it possible to refer to the empirical sources of evidence that are part of the psychoanalytic method. Now this shifted the debate towards the second alternative: discussion of the clinical usefulness of the concepts under discussion. However, this clinical dimension could not be developed either, because there was no shared language making it possible to discuss at that level. The sorts of observations about patients Leclaire proffered during the discussion of the clinical material required prior acceptance of Leclaires technical-level premises, which were different from theirs. In turn, Leclaire experienced the same constraint when requested to conduct a momentby-moment analysis of the session, something he considered irrelevant and inappropriate. This left out of the discussion an entire series of concepts and approaches to understanding that had had essential signi cance in R o de la Plata psychoanalysis, like the concepts of eld, link, analytic situation, countertransference, communicative interaction etc. Would it have been feasible to constitute a eld for debate with room for manoeuvre for both perspectives? Yes, but this would have required both parties to accept discussing their way of considering clinical material and weigh the advantages and disadvantages of both approaches. Judgement of the appropriateness or relevance of moment-by-moment analysis of movements of the transference, or of having a longer time-frame for listening to the patients discourse, should not proceed from any previously formed judgement but from examining the effects of these technical positions on the analytic process and the analytic results. For this, there had to be discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of one or another way of considering the material, or of considering important affects or signi cants, or of the analysts intervening in one way or another etc.,

867

allowing both positions to be displayed on an equal footing throughout the debate. We have seen that this kind of openness held true only at certain moments, but was quickly lost. Thus, because it was incapable of generating any further exploration of each positions suppositions, the controversy foundered on a point that could have relaunched it. In later confrontations, a signi cant change did occur. In the discussion with Leclaire, differences had been stated in terms of counterpoised positions, leading to arguments favouring one position exclusively at the expense of the other. But in later published material, though certain areas of opposition or contradiction between the two approaches were noted, there was also an attempt to nd some complementary or coincidental points in them. Taking these debates as a whole, we see that the successive steps prescribed by van Eemeren et al., that is, agreement about how to proceed regarding disagreements, and as broad an exploration as necessary of the positions, met with dif culties of different sorts. Regarding the rst point, we found no clear statement of the procedures or criteria making it possible to demonstrate the superiority of certain ideas or technical approaches over others. The different lines of argument except for Barangersrested on the evident character that each party attributed to their premises. Closer examination of the type of argument used shows that it cannot be af rmed that any explicit or implicit appeal was made to the Popperian criteria of refutation or to those of eliminative inductivism. Possibly some clinical references used by Baranger in his argument could at a pinch be further developed in this direction (1980c, p. 55), though the author did not take that route. Nor did we nd that the Kuhnian model of scienti c revolutions could be applied here. Observing the subsequent evolution of Kleinian and Lacanian ideas, both in the R o de la Plata and other regions, it would not be true to say

868

RICARDO BERNARDI
(Bouveresse, 1999), if their use is not accompanied by an examination of what in clinical experience they allow us to apprehend, and how they facilitate translating this into theoretical terms. For psychoanalytic controversies to advance, they must be able to examine simultaneously what each position allows us to gain in terms of theoretical intelligibility and clinical understanding. Exclusively theoretical discussions tend to veer off into philosophical speculation, and for its part the search for purely empirical evidence can ignore the way theoretical concepts in uence the observation of the facts. Critical re ection on theoretical concepts must then be coupled with empirical research, whether clinical or extra-clinical. Incommensurability between theories was not an argument used in the discussion but one that arose as an effect of the collapses in communication. When Leclaire noted that the patients emotions were not relevant in his clinical listening (which was attuned to another type of signi er) he was saying that he took into account aspects of the clinical facts that were different from those Klein placed rst; for her, any anxiety surfacing during the analytic session played the essential role. In consequence, the re ned fact (that is, the one taken into account in formulating the theory) is not the same one in the two cases; this could lead to thinking of a situation of empirical incommensurability in Stegmu llers (1979) de nition, because the two theories are not, strictly speaking, referring to the same facts (Bernardi, 1989). However, it is evident that in principle nothing hindered Leclaire and his interlocutors from overcoming this situation of mutual isolationby examining the clinical

that a new paradigm substituted a preceding one, because the new ideas coexistedand, to a great extent, coexistwith the previous ones. Returning to analysis of the argumentation, we see that no effort was made to demonstrate the lack of coherence of one or another of the positions. At most, the weakness or inconsistency of certain approaches (i.e. the Kleinian) to theoretically explain particular phenomena (i.e. the fathers symbolic role) was noted; or the limitation of the Lacanian approach for registering the emotional qualities of the analytical experience was noted. But it was not, properly speaking, a question of internal criticism, being predicated on the postulates of the other theory and not on the basis of common premises. Arguments based on external consistency that is, on concordance with the present state of knowledge in other areasmight be implicit in Leclaires af rmation of the superiority of the structuralist position. As in previous cases, this superiority depends on the point of view adopted at the outset, and the argumentative strategy then consists in placing the burden of proof on the other party (Gaskins, 1992). But if both parties employ this strategy, communication is necessarily severed. To a great extent, the debates examined above can be described as a competition between analogical metaphors and models (the body as recipient or as Moebius strip, the Oedipus complex as structure etc.). Metaphors and analogies can play a double role in the discussion. On the one hand they serve to express clinical intuitions that could not be communicated by other means.9 But those same metaphors can become cliche s or stereotypes that promote the isolation of theories, or empty them of their concepts

9 From

a perspective inspired by Davidson, it is possible to state that the creation of metaphors expresses passing theories that the interpreter must develop to understand unusual verbal behaviour. While in general there is insistence on the role metaphors play in transmitting meaning, for Davidson metaphors ful l a function of conceptual creation and are instances of radical interpretation(Quintanilla, 1999, p. 81).

THE NEED FOR TRUE CONTROVERSIES IN PSYCHOANALYSIS

consequences of both positions, that is, the pros and cons of paying attention to the affects arising in the moment-to-moment evolution of the session, or else abstaining from interfering to favour the patients free association. The barriers are not of a logical nature, but psychologicalthat is, the reluctance to place oneself, even experimentally, at a vantage point that one does not consider truly psychoanalytical. Thus, the controversy oscillated between two poles. At certain moments it was possible to explore the ideas and clinical foundations of both parties, but for the most part each position remained barricaded inside its own premises, and the opportunity of examining them all from a shared argumentative eld was lost. Signi cant, too, as a phenomenon, were those arguments that were not used. Absent, for example, was the question about the possible effects on the outcome results of the analysis of the analysts adopting one or another position. Leclaire noted that each position would create differences in the analytic process, yet no mention was made of how these differences in the process could lead to differences in achieving the objectives of the analysis. Yet the issue of evaluating the results of analysis was being discussed just then in the R o de la Plata, as publications from the period show. Finally, it is striking that the original contributions from the R o de la Plata did not become part of the discussion of the new ideas. With the exception of Baranger, the discussants appealed to Kleins original ideas without the bene t of the additions and modi cations introduced in the R o de la Plata by authors like Pichon Rivie ` re, Racker, Liberman, Bleger, Baranger, etc. Not to put too ne a point on it, psychoanalysis from the R o de la Plata did not play any role in that dialogue, and never spoke its true mind about certain issues. Yet to include those concepts in the controversies would have helped to impart greater historical continuity to psychoanalytic thought in the region.

869

Conclusions
A review of the case presented here elicits some thoughts of a more general character. Scienti c controversies are necessary, despite their dif culties. Some of the dif culties mentioned above probably crop up in all elds of knowledge. Other problems, which I will concentrate on here, are typical of debates between theories that, though they belong to a single discipline, diverge in their way of comprehending the particular disciplines methodological and epistemological criteria. This is frequently the case with psychoanalysis and with the social sciences. The possibility of true debates between members of different psychoanalytical cultures challenges psychoanalysis on two fronts. From the epistemological side, it tests the disciplines capacity to create a unitary eld for argumentation when there are differences in premises. But, at the same time, this invites us to work on the psychoanalytic understanding of whatever unconscious factors encumber the dialogue. When controversies erupt between psychoanalytic approaches differing in their premises, it becomes so dif cult to circumscribe the discussion to particular theoretical or technical problems. Though not always explicitly, examining argumentative discourses reveals that what is being discussed, too, is each partys way of conceiving the rationality and scienti c nature of psychoanalysis, that is, the type of scienti c reasoning each party uses to substantiate its theoretical and technical postulates. For their part, the points where the discussion founders indicate problems the discipline cannot resolve because it has not been able to establish pertinent procedures acceptable to all parties. Two situations of this kind deserve special notice. First, there is the dif culty of discerning the particular nature of each issue that could be included in the debate. Absent this, there is no way of identifying the most appropriate methodology for approaching each issue. For example, in the

870

RICARDO BERNARDI
acquire better foundations. This is the way to further the development of the discipline. We might also expect that the effort of looking at the problem from different perspectives should lead to personal development. Debate can materialise only if there is the willingness to engage in it, that is, if desire and hope predominate, so that in the course of the discussion we nd something we had not thought about previously, or at least not thought about in that way. If as analysts we lose the desire and hope of nding something new, perhapsto avoid the consequences of professional burnout (Cooper, 1986)the time for reanalysis has arrived. Controversies demand a particular intellectual and emotional effort, connected to the acceptance of the other as different. The reward we can expect from such effort does not reside exclusively in a reduction of disagreements; indeed, controversies are also good for developing better substantiated theories, encouraging more careful examination of our clinical evidence and reminding us that there always are alternate hypotheses, whose careful consideration can both lead us to strengthen our previous convictions or see the need to revise and modify them, in both cases carrying us forward in the search for new ideas.

above-mentioned discussion on structuralism and Brentanos philosophy, for the debate to advance it would have been necessary rst to specify the different levels of the problem, and then separate the purely philosophical debate from the consequences for psychoanalytical practice of particular philosophical ideas. This distinction would have also made it possible to take the discussion on to a terrain accessible to analytical experience. Let us mention a second example: if the discussion had considered the consequences of the two ways of conducting an analysis, it would then have been pertinent to debate the different methodologies that could be used to ascertain the results of analysis, thus broadening the scope of the discussion. Emphasising methodological problems imparts a particular direction to the debate, for it implies debating not so much what is known as how we get to know (Tuckett, 1998, p. 445). A second obstacle jeopardising progress in the controversies was how dif cult it was for each party to include their premises and suppositions in the discussion. When each position locks itself into its suppositions, the situations of seeming incommensurability that I have analysed here are created. In this case, divergences at the epistemological level made it dif cult to nd common criteria for evaluating the quality of the argumentation. Even soas we have seenit is possible to create a shared argumentative eld if people accept comparing the different positions on the basis of what each of them contributes in terms of theoretical intelligibility or clinical ef cacy. More than a comparative confrontation of theoretical or clinical arguments piecemeal, what proves useful in these cases is a comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of the way each position interweaves theoretical ideas with clinical practice. At this juncture, we can see that reaching consensus is not the sole aim of controversies. Rather, we must manage them so that the different hypotheses interact and in so doing

Translations of summary
Kontroversen sind Teil des Prozesses wissenschaftlichen Wissens. In der Psychoanalyse macht die Mannigfaltigkeit der theoretischen, technischen und epistemologischen Positionen die Debatte besonders notwendig und gleichzeitig entsprechend schwierig. Es werden die Funktion von Kontroversen und auch die Widersta nde gegen ihre Entwicklung ero rtert und als Beispiele werden die Debatten genommen, die in Rio de la Plata (Buenos Aires und Montevideo) wa hrend der 70-er Jahre gehalten wurden, als die dominierenden Kleinianischen Ideen mit Lacanianischen Gedanken in Kontakt kamen. Die verschiedenen argumentativen Diskurse werden u berpru ft und dafu r werden Konzepte der Argumentationstheorie benutzt. Die dabei auftretenden Hauptschwierigkeiten drehten sich nicht um Besonderheiten, die psychoanalytischen Theorien zu eigen sind der

THE NEED FOR TRUE CONTROVERSIES IN PSYCHOANALYSIS

Mangel an Kommensurabilita t zwischen ihnen, sondern um Abwehrstrategien, die darauf abzielen, die Pra missen jeder Theorie vor den Argumenten der Gegenpartei zu schu tzen. Eine wahre Debatte heisst, ein gemeinsames argumentatives Feld zu konstruieren, das es ermo glicht, die verschiedenen Positionen darzulegen und einige Interaktionen zwischen ihnen zu sehen. Dies ist von der Suche nach dem besten Argument geleitet. Wenn dies auftritt, dann fo rdern Kontroversen die Entwicklung der Disziplin, auch bereinstimmung zu wenn sie es nicht schaffen, U erzielen. Las controversias forman parte del proceso de conocimiento cient co. En psicoana lisis, la diversidad de posiciones teo ricas, te cnicas, y epistemolo gicas hace que los debates sean particularmente necesarios a la vez que dif ciles. La funcio n de las controversias, as como los obsta culos para su desarrollo, son examinados tomando como ejemplo debates ocurridos en el R o de la Plata (Buenos Aires y Montevideo) durante la de cada de 1970, cuando las ideas kleinianas dominantes entraron en contacto con el pensamiento lacaniano. Se examinan los diferentes discursos argumentativos, utilizando conceptos tomados de la teor a de la argumentacio n. Las dicultades mayores halladas no depend an de caracter sticas propias de las teor as psicoanal ticas (por ejemplo, la falta de conmensurabilidad entre ellas), sino de estrategias defensivas destinadas a mantener las premisas de cada teor a a salvo de los argumentos de la otra parte. Un verdadero debate implica la construccio n de un campo argumentativo compartido, que permita el despliegue y la interaccio n de las distintas posiciones, y se gu e por la bu squeda del mejor argumento. Cuando esto ocurre, las controversias constituyen un est mulo para el desarrollo de la disciplina, au n cuando no logren llegar a consensos. La controverse fait partie du processus du savoir scienti que. En psychanalyse, la diversite des positions the oriques, techniques et e piste mologiques rend le de bat particulie ` rement ne cessaire et donc dif cile. Le ro le de la controverse et les obstacles a ` son de veloppement sont examine s en prenant comme

871

exemple les de bats qui ont lieu dans la re gion du Rio de la Plata (Buenos Aires et Montevideo) au cours des anne es 70 quand les ide es kleiniennes dominantes entre ` rent en contact avec la pense e lacanienne. ` partir de la the A orie de largumentation, les diffe rents discours argumentatifs sont examine s. Les principales dif culte s rencontre es ne de pendaient pas de caracte ristiques relatives aux the ories psychanalytiques leur incommensurabilite mais des strate gies de fensives visant a ` sauvegarder les pre misses de chaque the orie face aux arguments du parti oppose . Un de bat authentique implique la construction dun univers argumentatif partage qui rend possible de concevoir les diffe rentes positions et de voir leurs interactions; il est guide par la que te du meilleur argument. Quand cela arrive, la controverse favorise le de veloppement de la discipline, me me si elle e choue a ` trouver un consensus. Le discussioni fanno parte del processo di conoscenza scienti ca. In psicoanalisi la diversita ` delle posizioni teoriche, tecniche ed epistemologiche rende il dibattito particolarmente necessario e, per la stessa ragione, dif cile. Qui sono presi in esame la funzione delle discussioni e gli ostacoli al loro sviluppo prendendo come esempio i dibattiti tenutisi al Rio de la Plata (Buenos Aires e Montevideo) negli anni settanta del secolo scorso, quando le idee kleiniane dominanti vennero in contatto con il pensiero lacaniano; sono esaminati, mediante concetti tratti dalla teoria dellargomentazione, i diversi discorsi argomentativi. Le principali dif colta ` incontrate non dipesero allora da caratteristiche relative alle teorie psicoanalitiche la mancanza di commensurabilita ` reciproca ma da strategie difensive miranti a salvaguardare le premesse di ognuna delle teorie dagli argomenti della parte opposta. Una vera discussione implica la costruzione di un campo dargomentazione comune, che renda possibile lesposizione delle diverse posizioni per vedere se esista tra loro qualche punto di contatto, ed e ` guidata dalla ricerca dellargomento migliore. Quando cio ` avviene, le discussioni favoriscono lo sviluppo della disciplina, anche quando non riescono a trovare nessun punto di consenso.

R eferences
Baranger, W. (1976). El Edipo temprano y el complejo de Edipo. Revista de Psicoana lisis, t. XXXIII, n. 2: 303 314 (1980a). Acerca del concepto lacaniano de objeto. In W. Baranger, Aportaciones al concepto de objeto en psicoana lisis. Buenos Aires: Ed. Amorrortu: 130 152. (1980b). Conclusiones y problemas acerca del objeto. In Baranger, Aportaciones al concepto de objeto en psicoana lisis. Buenos Aires: Ed. Amorrortu: 306 321. (1980c). Validez del concepto de objeto en la obra de Melanie Klein. In W. Baranger, Aportaciones al concepto de

872

RICARDO BERNARDI
Specht . Indiana: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, Indiana. Cooper, D. (1986). Some limitations on therapeutic effectiveness: the burn-out syndrome in psychoanalysts. Psychoanal. Q., 55: 576 598. Davidson, D. (1984). Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon Press. de Leon, B. (2000). The countertransference: a Latin American view. Int. J. Psychoanal ., vol. 81, 2: 331 351 [Tambie n publicado como: de Leo n, B. (2000): Contratransferencia: una perspectiva desde Latinoame rica. Revista Uruguaya de Psicoana lisis, 92: 71104]. & Bernardi, R. (2000). Contratransferencia. Buenos Aires: Ed. Polemos. et al. (1998). Cambios en la frecuencia del uso de la nocio n de contratransferencia, y su relacio n con los cambios en las teor as dominantes. (Paper presented to the South American Chapter of the Society for Psychotherapy Research (SPR): Investigacio n Emp rica en Psicoterapia. Montevideo, 25 al 27 de setiembre de 1998.) Etchegoyen , R. H. (1986). Los fundamentos cnica psicoanal tica. Buenos Aires: de la te Amorrortu Ed. Faimbe rg, H. (1976). Richard a la luz de la guerra y de la estructura ed pica. Revlisis, t. XXXIII, n. 1: ista de Psicoana 149 68. Freud, S. (1918). From the history of an infantile neurosis. S.E . 17. Gaskins, R. H. (1992). Burdens of Proof in Modern Discourse. Yale Univ. Press. Kuhn, T. (1962). La estructura de las cas. Me revoluciones cient xico: Fondo de Cultura Econo mica, 1971. Lakatos , I. (1970). La historia de la ciencia y sus reconstrucciones racionales. In Lakatica y el tos y Musgrave (eds), La cr desarrollo del conocimiento. Barcelona: Ed. Grijalbo, 1975: 455 510. Lakoff , G. & Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors we live by. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press. Leclaire , S. (1972). Visita del Prof. Serge Leclaire de la Escuela Freudiana de Paris. n PsiTrabajo realizado en la Asociacio

objeto en psicoana lisis. Buenos Aires: Ed. Amorrortu: 4663. Bernardi, R. (1989). The role of paradigmatic determinants in psychoanalytic understanding. Int. J. Psychoanal. , 70: 341 7. (Also published as: El papel de las teor as. El papel de los determinantes paradigma ticos en la comprensio n psicoalisis, XLVI, 6 nal tica. Revista de Psicoana (1989): 904 22.) (1992). On Pluralism in Psychoanalysis. Psychoanal. Inq., vol. 12 (4): 506 25. (Spanish translation: Pluralismo en psicoalisis. APdeBA, vol. XVI, na lisis. Psicoana n. 3: 433 56. Asociacio n Psicoanal tica de Buenos Aires, 1994.) Bernardi, R. & Nieto, M. (1989). What makes a training analysis good enough? 4th IPA Conference of Training Analysts, Rome. (Publicado por la IPA en ingle s, ol, alema espan n y france s.) Tambie n publicado en: Int. Rev. Psycho-Anal. , V. 19 (1992): 137 146. Bernardi, R. et al. (1997). Cambios de la interpretacio n en el psicoana lisis del Uruguay entre 1960 y 1990. Revista Uruguaya de Psicoana lisis, 84/85: 89 102. Bernardi, R. & de Leon, B. (1992). Incluimos nuestros presupuestos en la actividad de autoana lisis? Revista Uruguaya de Psicoana lisis 76: 243 260. Also published as: Does our self-analysis take into consideration our suppositions? In J. W. Barron, Ed. Self-Analysis. Critical Inquiries, Personal Visions. New Jersey: The Analytic Press. Bleger, J. (1973). Criterios de curacio n y objetivos del psicoana lisis. Revista de Psicoana lisis, v. XXX, n. 2: 317 350. Bouveresse , J. (1999). Prodiges et Vertiges de lAnalogie. Paris: Editions Raisons dAgir. Britton , R. & Steiner, J. (1994). Interpretation: Selected Fact or Overvalued Idea? Int. J. Psychoanal ., 75: 1069 78. Cavell, M. (1993). The Psychoanalytic Mind: From Freud to Philosophy. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press. Connolly, J. M. & Keutner, T. (Eds) (1988). Hermeneutics versus Science. Three Germans Views. Wolfgang Stegmu ller, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Ernst Konrad

THE NEED FOR TRUE CONTROVERSIES IN PSYCHOANALYSIS

coanal tica del Uruguay (Agosto 1972). Tomo I- Seminarios; Tomo II- Seminarios nicos. cl Liberman , D. (1972). Comentarios y contribuciones al trabajo de Jose Bleger. Revista lisis, XXX, 2: 343 5. de Psicoana Masterman , M. (1972). La naturaleza de los paradigmas. In I. Lakatos y A. Musgrave, tica y el desarrollo del conocimiento. La cr Barcelona: Ed. Grijalbo: 159 202. Perelman, C. & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1958). Traite de lArgumentation. La thorique. Editions de lUniNouvelle Rhe versite de Bruxelles, 1983. Quintanilla , P. (1999). La hermene utica de Davidson: meta fora y creacio n conceptual. In Carlos E. Caorsi (ed.) Ensayos sobre Davidson: 75 98. Montevideo: Fundacio n de Cultura Universitaria. Sandler, J. (1983). Re ections on sSome relations between psychoanalytic concepts and psychoanalytic practice. Int. J. Psychoanal ., 64: 3545. Sackett, D. L. et al. ( 1997) . Evidencebased medicine. How to practice & teach EBM. New York: Churchill Livingstone .

873

Stagnaro, J. C. & Wintre bert, D. (Eds) (2001). Encuentro de Buenos Aires. El n psiefecto mutativo de la interpretacio coanal tica. Buenos Aires: Polemos. Stegmu ller, W. (1979). La concepcio n as. Un posible . estructuralista de las teor Steiner, R. (1995). Hermeneutics or Hermes Mess? Int. J. Psychoanal ., 76: 435 45. Szpilka, J. I. (1976). Complejo de Edipo y a lisis, t. posteriori. Revista de Psicoana XXXIII, n. 2: 285 300. Sokal, A. & Bricmont, J. (1997). Impostures Intellectuelles. Paris: Odile Jacob Toulmin, S. E. (1958). The Uses of Argument. Cambridge Univ. Press, 1969. Tuckett. D. (1998). Evaluating psychoanalytic papers. Towards the development of common editorial standards. Int. J. Psychoanal ., 79: 431 48. van Eemeren, F. H. et al. (1993). Reconstructing Argumentative Discourse. Univ. Alabama Press. cher, D. (2000). Que Widlo ha ocurrido con las v as del psicoana lisis? Evolucio n de las pra cticas en Francia. Revista Uruguaya de Psicoana lisis, 92: 159 174.