Sanidad vs.

Commission on Elections Case Digest (Consti1)

Sanidad vs. Commission on Elections [GR L-44640, 12 October 1976]; also Guzman vs. Comelec [GR L-44684], and Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections [GR L-44714] En Banc, Martin (J): 1 concurs in result, 4 concur in separate opinions, 2 dissent in separate opinions, 2 filed separate opinions Facts: On 2 September 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 October 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers. 20 days after or on 22 September 1976, the President issued another related decree, Presidential Decree 1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree 991, by declaring the provisions of Presidential Decree 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of 16 October 1976. Quite relevantly, Presidential Decree 1031 repealed inter alia, Section 4, of Presidential Decree 991. On the same date of 22 September 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree 1033, stating the questions to he submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on 16 October 1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16. The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the October 1976 National Referendum-Plebiscite. On 27 September 1976, Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad, father and son, commenced L-44640 for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on 16 October 1976. They contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the ReferendumPlebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. On 30 September 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, docketed as L-44684, was instituted by Vicente M. Guzman, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, asserting that the power to propose amendments to, or revision of the Constitution during the transition period is expressly conferred on the interim National Assembly under action 16, Article XVII of the Constitution. Still another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed on 5 October 1976 by Raul M. Gonzales, his son Raul Jr., and Alfredo Salapantan, docketed as L-44714, to restrain the implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of October 16. Issue: Whether the President may call upon a referendum for the amendment of the Constitution. Held: Section 1 of Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains that "(1) Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by the National Assembly upon

a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or by a constitutional convention. (2) The National Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention or, by a majority vote of all its Members, submit the question of calling such a convention to the electorate in an election." Section 2 thereof provides that "Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months a after the approval of such amendment or revision." In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly instituted in the Transitory Provisions is conferred with that amending power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads "The interim National Assembly, upon special call by the interim Prime Minister, may, by a majority vote of all its Members, propose amendments to this Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect when ratified in accordance with Article Sixteen hereof." There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the nation, i.e., period of normalcy and period of transition. In times of normalcy, the amending process may be initiated by the proposals of the (1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by a Constitutional Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the National Assembly. However the calling of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the electorate in an election voted upon by a majority vote of all the members of the National Assembly. In times of transition, amendments may be proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of the interim National Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime Minister. The Court in Aquino v. COMELEC, had already settled that the incumbent President is vested with that prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly. The Constitutional Convention intended to leave to the President the determination of the time when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly, consistent with the prevailing conditions of peace and order in the country. When the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention voted on the Transitory Provisions, they were aware of the fact that under the same, the incumbent President was given the discretion as to when he could convene the interim National Assembly. The President's decision to defer the convening of the interim National Assembly soon found support from the people themselves. In the plebiscite of January 10-15, 1973, at which the ratification of the 1973 Constitution was submitted, the people voted against the convening of the interim National Assembly. In the referendum of 24 July 1973, the Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays") reiterated their sovereign will to withhold the convening of the interim National Assembly. Again, in the referendum of 27 February 1975, the proposed question of whether the interim National Assembly shall be initially convened was eliminated, because some of the members of Congress and delegates of the Constitutional Convention, who were deemed automatically members of the interim National Assembly, were against its inclusion since in that referendum of January, 1973 the people had already resolved against it. In sensu striciore, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals of amendment to a Constitution, that body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. It is not legislating when engaged in the amending process. Rather, it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by the fundamental charter itself. In thePhilippines, that power is provided for in Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution (for the regular National Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for the interim National Assembly). While ordinarily it is the business of the legislating body to legislate for the nation by virtue of constitutional conferment, amending of the Constitution is not legislative in character. In political science a distinction is made between constitutional content of an organic character and that of a legislative character. The distinction, however, is one of policy, not of law. Such being the case, approval of the President of any proposed amendment is a misnomer. The prerogative of the President to approve or disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The President has nothing to do with proposition or adoption of amendments to the Constitution.

Corro v. Lising 137 SCRA 341 (1985) F:

Respondent Judge issued a search warrant for the seizure of articles allegedly used by petitioner in committing the crime of sedition. Seized were printed copies of the Philippine Times, newspaper dummies, typewriters, mimeographing machines and tape recorders, video machines and tapes. The petitioner moved to quash the warrant but his motion was denied.

HELD: The statements made in the affidavits are mere conclusions of law and do not satisfy the requirement of probable cause. The language used is all embracing as to include all conceivable words and equipment of petitioner regardless of whether they are legal or illegal. The search warrant under consideration was in the nature of a general warrant which is objectionable.

Babst v. National Intelligence Board

FACTS: Petitioners are columnists, feature article writers and reporters of various local publications. Since July 1980, some of them have allegedly been summoned by military authorities who have subjected them to sustained interrogation on various aspects of their works, feelings, sentiments, beliefs, associations and even their private lives. The invitations were contained in letters sent by the National Intelligence Bureau (NIB) and were of the following tenor: Madam: Pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, you are hereby requested to appear before this Special Committee at Philippine Army Officers Clubhouse, Fort Bonifacio, Metro Manila (sketch attached), 9:00 A.M., December 22, 1982, to shed light on confidential matters being looked into by this Committee. Your failure to appear on the specified date and place shall be considered as a waiver on your part and this Committee will be constrained to proceed in accordance with law. Very truly yours, (SGD.) WILFREDO C. ESTRADA Brig. General, AFP (Ret.) Chairman Petitioners argued that the respondents do not have the authority to conduct the proceeding abovedescribed which are violative of the constitutional guarantee on freedom of expression since they have the effect of imposing restrictive guidelines and norms on mass media. Petitioners further claim that such proceedings are a punitive ordeal or subsequent punishment for lawful publications and that they amount to a system of censorship, curtailing the free flow of information and petition and opinion, indispensable to the right of the people to know matters of public concern guaranteed the Constitution. Finally they claim that such coercive invitations constitute intrusions into spheres of individual liberty. Respondents countered by claiming that no issue of jurisdiction exists since they do not pretend to exercise jurisdiction over the petitioners. They claimed that what were sent to petitioners were neither subpoenas nor summonses, but mere invitations to dialogues which were completely voluntary, without any

compulsion employed on petitioners. The dialogues themselves were designed simply to elicit information and exchange of ideas. Respondents contended that the that the expression of personal preferences and opinions by members of the respondent Board is not equivalent to the imposition of norms and guidelines to be followed by petitioners. Finally, they argued that the petition filed is moot and academic because the proceedings before NIB Special Committee No. 2 (which conducted the interrogations) have already been ordered terminated by General Fabian C. Ver in his capacity as Director General and Chairman of the NIB, and said proceedings have in fact been terminated. PERTINENT ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the present petition has become moot and academic. 2. Whether or not the issuance of letters of invitations and the subsequent interrogations that are conducted thereafter are valid under the Constitution.

ANSWERS: 1. Yes. 2. While the Court did not resolve such issue on its merits, it can be reasonably inferred from the dictum of the Court that under the facts of this case, such interrogations are unconstitutional.

SUPREME COURT RULINGS: 1. THE PETITION WAS MOOT AND ACADEMIC Effect of the termination of the proceedings Considering that the proceedings have been terminated and the acts sought to be prohibited have been abated, the petition has become moot and academic. 2. A MERE INVITATION TO ATTEND A HEARING WHICH A PERSON MAY REFUSE IS NOT ILLEGAL, HOWEVER, AN INVITATION WHICH HAS AN APPEARANCE OF COERCION IS CONSTITUTIONALLY OBJECTIBLE Invitation with coercion is constitutionally objectionable Be that as it may, it is not idle to note that ordinarily, an invitation to attend a hearing and answer some questions, which the person invited may heed or refuse at his pleasure, is not illegal or constitutionally objectionable. Under certain circumstances, however, such an invitation can easily assume a different appearance. Thus, where the invitation comes from a powerful group composed predominantly of ranking military officers issued at a time when the country has just emerged from martial rule and when the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has not entirely been lifted and the designated interrogation site is a military camp, the same can easily be taken, not as a strictly voluntary invitation which it purports to be, but as an authoritative command which one can only defy at his peril, especially where, as in the instant case, the invitation carries the ominous seaming that failure to appear . . . shall be considered a s a waiver . . . and this Committee will be constrained to proceed in accordance with law. Fortunately, the NIB director general and chairman saw the wisdom of terminating the proceedings and the unwelcome interrogation. DISPOSITIVE: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition.

MANUEL ELIZALDE, FRED J. ELIZALDE, PRUDENCIO R. EUROPA, petitioners, vs. HON. MARIO J. GUTIERREZ, Presiding Judge, CFI-Ilocos Sur, Branch III, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented in this instance by JESUS F. GUERRERO, Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Sur,respondents.

FERNANDO, J:

It was the refusal of respondent Judge Mario J. Gutierrez 1 to grant motion to quash of petitioners, who were the accused in a prosecution for libel, notwithstanding the invocation of their constitutional right to freedom of expression 2 that led to this suit for certiorari and prohibition. All that could be alleged in the information against them was the publication in the Evening News, a newspaper of general circulation, of an item reproducing in full a dispatch from the Philippine News Service, a reputable news-gathering agency. It summarized the testimony of Jaime Jose in a pending rape case wherein the name of Vincent Crisologo, the offended party in the information for libel, was mentioned. This excerpt from the recent case of Bocobo v. Estanislao 3 comes to mind: "This is contrary to the legal tradition of the Philippines dating back to the landmark case of United States v. Bustos, where Justice Malcolm emphasized that to prevent dilution of the constitutional right to free speech and free press, every libel prosecution should be tested by the rigorous and exacting standard of whether or not it could be violative of such fundamental guarantee. 4 It is easily understandable then why in the motion to quash, the main reliance was on the Bustos doctrine, although other grounds were alleged as warranting the dismissal of the information. 5When respondent Judge ignored such a fundamental constitutional principle, the proper basis for a certiorari and prohibition proceeding was laid. Petitioners are entitled to the remedies sought. The alleged offending news item was a reproduction of a news item coming from the Philippine News Service, furnished the Evening News, of which petitioners Manuel Elizalde and Fred J. Elizalde were the Publisher and Assistant Publisher and Prudencio R. Europa was the Editor-inChief. It reads thus: "Jaime Jose implicated Tuesday Vincent Crisologo, son of Rep. Floro Crisologo ( N, Ilocos Sur ) as among his four companions the night of the alleged rape of a former nightclub hostess last year. Jose, one of four principal accused in the celebrated Maggie de la Riva rape case, denied, however, the charges of forcible abduction with rape and robbery filed against him and his companions by Zenaida de la Cruz, 28, and Araceli Sy, both nightclub hostesses. Jose mentioned Vincent Crisologo as among his companions while testifying in his defense before Judge Francisco de la Rosa of the local court of first instance. Jose claimed that both Zenaida and Araceli went voluntarily with his group to the Queen's Court motel here in the early morning of July 4, 1966. Jose said Zenaida and Crisologo went to a room together. However, Jose said, the two girls complained when he and his companions failed to give the girls any money. ...6 This was the continuation of such news item: "The girls charged that they were robbed by Jose and his friends of cash and jewelry inside the hotel. In their original complaint filed with the fiscal's office, the two girls named Vincent Crisologo as among the accused. The taxi driver, whose vehicle was used by Miss de la Cruz, also Identified Vincent Crisologo among the five youths in the incident. But the girls later executed an affidavit saying that they were mistaken in Identifying Crisologo as among the five men who allegedly abused them. Jose testified that he and Tillman were about to go to a party in Mandaluyong, Rizal, on the night of July 3, 1966, when Crisologo with three companions arrived. Jose said that young Crisologo wanted to borrow his car since his car would be used by his congressman father. Jose said that after the party they proceeded to Pasay City where Crisologo and a companion went to Bayside nightclub to look for Crisologo's girl friend. Minutes later, Crisologo and his friend went out of the club and they all proceeded to the Barbecue Plaza where they drank liquor. Shortly before 2 a.m., July 4, the group allegedly started for home in Jose's twotoned Mercedez Benz car. On the way, a taxicab overtook them. The cab allegedly carried Zenaida and Araceli. Jose said that Zenaida called Vincent and shouted for them to stop. They then proceeded to Queen's Court motel, Jose said. 7 The alleged offended party, according to the information filed by respondent Provincial Fiscal, Jesus F. Guerrero, is Vincent Crisologo. The information is dated February 5, 1970. Thereafter, there was a motion to quash filed by petitioners on August 14, 1970. An opposition was then filed by an assistant provincial fiscal on September 25, 1970. The order by respondent Judge denying the motion to quash came on December 17, 1970. An extensive motion for reconsideration submitted on February 23, 1971 having proved futile in view of an order of denial a month later from respondent Judge, this petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed with this Court.

As noted at the outset, certiorari and prohibition lie. 1. Petitioners were prosecuted for libel because the Evening News carried in its issue of September 1, 1967 a news item furnished it by the Philippine News Service. It was a faithful and accurate summary of what was testified to by a witness in a pending rape case. That was all. The name of the alleged offended party, Vincent Crisologo, was repeatedly mentioned in such testimony. It would have been a plain and simple distortion thereof if such a fact were omitted by the Philippine News Service. The Evening News in turn published such item. This is a case therefore that falls squarely within the protection of the free press provision found in the Constitution. That such news item possessed a defamatory aspect is beside the point. It cannot justify a prosecution for libel. Even prior to the 1935 Constitution, under the previous organic act, the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, which contained a similar provision mandating a free press, this Court, in the epochal Malcolm opinion in United States v. Bustos 8decided almost sixty years ago, to be precise on March 8, 1918, enunciated the principle that the freedom of the press is "so sacred to the people of these Islands and won at so dear a cost, [that it] should now be protected and carried forward as one would protect and preserve the covenant of liberty itself." 9 Thus it is clear that a prosecution for libel lacks justification if the offending words find sanctuary within the shelter of the free press guarantee. This Court has since then been committed to such an authoritative doctrine. 10 The opinion of Chief Justice Paras inQuisumbing v. Lopez, 11 a 1955 decision, is even more explicit on the matter. Thus: "The newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively perform their important role in our democracy. In the preparation of stories, press reporters and edition usually have to race with their deadlines; and consistently with good faith and reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words. 12 At the beginning of this decade, this Court in Lopez v. Court of Appeals 13 expressed its commitment to such a principle in these words: "No inroads on press freedom should be allowed in the guise of punitive action visited on what otherwise could be characterized as libel whether in the form of printed words or a defamatory imputation resulting from the publication of respondent's picture with the offensive caption as in the case here complained of. ... If the cases mean anything at all then, to emphasize what has so clearly emerged, they call for the utmost care on the part of the judiciary to assure that in safeguarding the interest of the party allegedly offended, a realistic account of the obligation of a news media to disseminate information of a public attendant on the business of publishing cannot be ignored. 14 2. To be more specific, no culpability could be imputed to petitioners for the alleged offending publication without doing violence to the concept of privileged communication implicit in freedom of the press. As was so well put by Justice Malcolm in Bustos: "Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government have demanded protection for public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege. 15 He then quoted this excerpt from an American Supreme Court decision,Abbott v. National Bank of Commerce: "The doctrine of privileged communication rests upon public policy, 'which looks to the free and unfettered administration of justice, though as incidental result, it may in some instances afford an immunity to the evil-disposed and malignant slanderer. 16 Considering how ample is the protection afforded a person alleged to have injured another's reputation, it appears quite obvious that respondent Judge did infringe on the constitutional right of petitioners to press freedom when it denied the motion to quash. He apparently was equally unaware of this relevant paragraph in the Malcolm opinion: "A privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity. Such excessive scrutiny would defeat the protection which the law throws over privileged communications. The ultimate test is that of bona fides. 17 By no stretch of the imagination then could it be said that the Philippine News Service and the Evening News exhibited mala fides by the mere fact of narrating in a news item the testimony of a witness in a rape case just because it did cast a reflection on the conduct of a third party. The prosecution in its pleadings before the lower court could not deny the accuracy of what

was reported. Petitioners then ought not to have been subjected to the annoyance, inconvenience, and trouble of going to a distant province and defend themselves against a charge unwarrant under well-settled norms of constitutional dimension. The doctrine of privileged communication moreover is explicitly provided for in the Revised Penal Code, as an exception to the general principle that every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it is true in the absence of "good intention" and "justifiable motive" thus: "A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions. 18 3. There being a denial of a constitutional right, a jurisdictional issue was raised. It has been a wellsettled doctrine since Conde v. Rivera, 19 that under such circumstances, the competence of a court to continue with a pending case ceases. 20 Nor is it to indulge merely in general propositions. In People v. Andres, 21 this Court precisely sustained a court of first instance when it quashed an information for libel, the accused, respondent Andres, relying on press freedom to show that the fact charged do not constitute an offense. As pointed out in the opinion of Justice Barrera, it was argued by the prosecution "that the trial court erred in dismissing the case on a mere motion to quash, contending that the trial judge's conclusion on the face of the information that defendant-appellee was prompted only by good motives assumes a fact to he proved, and that the alleged privileged nature of defendant-appellee's publication is a matter of defense and is not a proper ground for dismissal of the complaint for libel ... ." 22 That contention was rejected in this wise: "While there is some point to this contention, yet when in the information itself it appears, as it does in the present case, that the communication alleged to be libelous is contained in an appropriate pleading in a court proceeding, the privilege becomes at once apparent and defendant need not wait until the trial and produce evidence before he can raise the question of privilege. And if added to this, the questioned imputations appear, as they seem in this case, to be really pertinent and relevant to defendant's plea for reconsideration based on complainant's supposed partiality and abuse of power from which defendant has a right to seek relief in vindication of his client's interest as a litigant in complainant's court, it would become evident that the facts thus alleged in the information would not constitute an offense of libel.23 Similarly, a motion to quash was sustained in the later case of People v. Alvarez, 24 In the opinion of Justice Regala, it was pointed out: "As heretofore stated, this Court has adopted a liberal attitude in favor of the writer in matter of the relevancy of allegedly libelous statements in judicial pleadings. In U.S. v. Bustos, et al., 37 Phil. 731, this Court found occasion to express ills opinion on privileged communications, to wit: ... A privileged communication should not be subjected to miscroscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity. Such excessive scrunity would defeat the protection which the law throws over privileged communication. ... It is worthy to mention here that in the information for libel, there is no allegation of the irrelevancy or impertinency of the questioned statements to the cause. Considering the above, We are of the opinion and so hold that no error was committed by the lower court in considering the questioned remarks of the appellee as privileged and in consequently dismissing the information for lack of cause of action. 25 In a third case, People v. Aquino, 26reference was made to People v. Andres to demonstrate that it is fitting and appropriate for a court of first instance to dismiss an information on a motion to quash where the privileged character of the, alleged offending publication is apparent. Respondent Judge ought not to have betrayed lack of sensitivity to the categorical pronouncements of this Court in the above three decisions that call for application, 4. Nor is a different conclusion called for just because the heading of the news item arising from the testimony of Jaime Jose was worded thus: "LINK CRISOLOGO SON TO PASAY RAPE CASE." How else could it have been expressed? That was to portray with accuracy what was contained in the news item. What was testified to was to that effect. It succinctly set forth the facts. There was no attempt to sensationalize. The tone is both neutral and objective. Again there is relevance to the following excerpt from Quisumbing v. Lopez: "The Court of Appeals found 'that the context of the article in question, is a fair, impartial and true report of official or public proceeding authorized by

law. The news item was the result of a press release in connection with an official investigation of the Anti-Usury Division, N. B. I., and was a substantial, if not a faithful reproduction of the said press release which was, in turn, an accurate report of the official proceedings taken by the Anti-Usury Division. The article merely reported a raid on the 'business offices of three alleged money lenders;' and related the steps actually taken or to be taken by the proper officials relative to the investigation. It did not go beyond the actual report of official actuations. The theory of the petitioner, stripped of incidentals, is that while the body of the news item may be considered as being fair, impartial and accurate report of an official investigation of the Anti-Usury Division of the National Bureau of Investigation and therefore privileged, its headline NBI MEN RAID OFFICES OF 3 CITY USURERS, admittedly not forming part of the basic press release but merely added by the respondents, is libelous per se, because the petitioner had thereby been branded and condemned as a 4 usurer' when as a matter of fact no criminal charge was even filed against him for the crime of usury in any court of justice. 27 Nonetheless, the newspaper publisher was not held liable. The Chief Justice then explained why: "We are of the opinion that the appealed decision is correct. The petitioner, while assuming that the article in question is privileged, argues that the headline (libelous per se) added by the respondents rendered the same actionable, because said headline is not borne out by the facts recited in the context. We believe that nobody reading the whole news item would come to the conclusion that the petitioner had been accused or convicted of usury. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the headline complained of may fairly be said to contain a correct description of the news story. The fact that the raid was conducted by anti-usury agents following receipt of a complaint against the petitioner and two others, coupled with the announcement by the Chief of the NBI Anti-Usury Division that criminal action would be filed in the city fiscal's office, naturally would lead one to think that the persons involved were usurers. Nothing in the headline or the context of the article suggested the Idea that the petitioner was already charged with or convicted of the crime of usury. 28 WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is granted and the order of respondent Judge denying the motion to quash of December 17, 1970 as well as the order of respondent Judge of March 25, 1971 denying the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners are set aside and nullified. The writ of prohibition is likewise granted and the restraining order issued on June 10, 1971 made permanent, respondent Judge or any person who may have taken his place being prohibited from taking any action in Criminal Case No. 11-V for Libel except for the purpose of dismissing the same. No costs.

LUMEN POLICARPIO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. THE MANILA TIMES PUB. CO., INC., CONSTANTE C. ROLDAN, MANUEL V. VILLA-REAL, E. AGUILAR CRUZ and CONSORCIO BORJE, defendant-appellees. Mario Bengzon for plaintiff-appellant. Alfredo Gonzales and Rafael M. Delfin for defendants-appellees. CONCEPCION, J.: Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing plaintiff's complaint and defendants' counterclaim, without special pronouncement as to costs. Originally certified to the Court of Appeals, the record on appeal was subsequently forwarded to us in view of the amount involved in the complaint (P300,000.00).

Plaintiff Lumen Policarpio seeks to recover P150,000.00, as actual damages, P70,000, as moral damages, P60,000 as correctional and exemplary damages, and P20,000, as attorney's fees, aside from the costs, by reason of the publication in the Saturday Mirror of August 11, 1956, and in the Daily Mirror of August 13, 1956, of two (2) articles or news items which are claimed to be per se defamatory, libelous and false, and to have exposed her to ridicule, jeopardized her integrity, good name and business and official transactions, and caused her grave embarrassment, untold and extreme moral, mental and physical anguish and incalculable material, moral, professional and business damages. The defendants are The Manila Times Publishing Co., Inc., as publisher of The Saturday Mirror and The Daily Mirror, which are newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines, and Constante C. Roldan, Manuel V. Villa-Real, E. Aguilar Cruz and Consorcio Borje, as the reporter or author of the first article and the managing editor, the associate editor and the news editor, respectively, of said newspapers. After its motion to dismiss the complaint had been denied by the Court of First Instance of Manila, in which the present action was initiated, the defendants filed a joint answer admitting the formal allegations of the complaint, denying the other allegations thereof, alleging special defenses and setting up a counterclaim for P10,000, as attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. In due course, later on, said court rendered the aforementioned decision, upon the ground that plaintiff had not proven that defendants had acted maliciously in publishing the aforementioned articles, although portions thereof were inaccurate or false. Plaintiff is a member of the Philippine bar. On August 11 and 13, 1956, and for sometime prior thereto, she was executive secretary of the local UNESCO National Commission. As such officer, she had preferred charges against Herminia D. Reyes, one of her subordinates in said Commission, and caused her to be separated from the service. Miss Reyes, in turn, preferred countercharges which were referred to Col. Crisanto V. Alba, a Special Investigator in the Office of the President. Pending completion of the administrative investigation, which began in June, 1956, Miss Reyes filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, on August 8, 1956, a complaint against the plaintiff for alleged malversation of public funds and another complaint for alleged estafa thru falsification of public documents, which were scheduled for investigation by said office on August 22, 1956, at 2:00 p.m. Meanwhile, or on August 11, 1956, the following appeared, with a picture of the plaintiff, in the front page of The Saturday Mirror: WOMAN OFFICIAL SUED PCAC RAPS L. POLICARPIO ON FRAUDS Unesco Official Head Accused on Supplies, Funds Use by Colleague By Constante C. Roldan

Lumen Policarpio, executive secretary of the Unesco national commission here, was charged with malversation and estafa in complaints filed with the city fiscal's office by the Presidential Complaints and Action Commission today. The criminal action was initiated as a result of current administrative investigation against the Unesco official being conducted by Col. Crisanto V. Alba, Malacaan technical assistant, on charges filed by Herminia D. Reyes, a Unesco confidential assistant. The Unesco commission functions under the Office of the President. Fiscal Manases G. Reyes, to whom the cases were assigned, immediately scheduled preliminary investigation of the charges on August 22 at 2 p.m. Colonel Alba, in turn, indicated that the administrative phase of the inquiry will continue Monday and then resume on August 21 at Malacaan Park. The Palace Investigator said there are other charges, but would not specify these. Alba said Miss Reyes had testified on circumstances supposedly substantiating the malversation charge. Testimony had allegedly indicated that the accused had used Unesco stencils for private and personal purposes. Specification reputedly said that Miss Policarpio had taken stencils from the Unesco storeroom and used these for French lessons not at all connected with Unesco work; for the preparation of contracts of sale of pianos in her business establishment; for preparation of invitations sent to members of the League of Women Voters of which she is one of the officers. Cited as witnesses on this charge are Miss Reyes, Francisco Manalo of Barrio Salabat, Taal, Batangas, Federico Vergara and Pablo Armesto both of the Unesco.1wph1.t Regarding the charge of estafa through falsification of public documents allegedly also committed sometime in 1955, Miss Policarpio was accused of having collected expenses for supposed trips. The accusation said the Unesco official had sought reimbursement of expenses for a trip to Baler, Quezon, on Aug. 19, last year, representing expenses of her car when in fact she supposedly rode in an army plane. Testimony indicated that a newspaper woman who was a supposed copassenger had even written about the plane trip in her newspaper column. The same voucher also allegedly collected expenses for going to a Unesco Bayambang (Pangasinan) project, although records reputedly showed that she was absent in that conferences. Witnesses cited on the charge include Aurelio Savalbaro, a Philippine Air Force pilot, Lt. Clemente Antonio and others, also of the PAF. Miss Policarpio becomes the second high-ranking woman government official to face charges involving financial disbursements in their office. The first was Sen. Pacita M. Gonzales who is still under charge mis-spending funds of the Social Welfare Administration and the UNAC while she had charge of these.

The complainant, Miss Reyes, was earlier ordered relieved from her Unesco post by Miss Policarpio on charges including conduct "unbecoming a lady", and as a result had not been paid her salary. She appealed to Malacaan which dismissed her suit and later she sued before Judge Rafael Amparo to compel payment of her salary. The court also rejected her plea on the ground that she had not exhausted all administrative remedies, the Palace not having made a clearcut decision on her case. The Daily Mirror of August 13, 1956, likewise, carried on its first page with a picture of plaintiff and of Miss Reyes, taken during the administrative investigation being conducted by Col. Alba another news item, reading: "PALACE OPENS INVESTIGATION OF RAPS AGAINST POLICARPIO Alba Probes Administrative Phase of Fraud Charges Against Unesco Woman Official; Fiscal Sets Prelim Quiz Of Criminal Suit on Aug. 22. The administrative phase of two-pronged investigation Miss Lumen Policarpio, head of the Unesco national commission here, opened in Malacaan before Col. Crisanto V. Alba. The judicial inquiry of charges filed by Herminia D. Reyes, also the complainant in the Malacaan case before the Presidential Complaints and Action Commission, will be conducted by Fiscal Manases G. Reyes on Aug. 22 at 2 p.m. Miss Policarpio stands accused by Reyes of having malversed public property and of having fraudulently sought reimbursement of supposed official expenses. Colonel Alba, at the start of his investigation at the Malacaan Park, clarified that neither he nor the PCAC had initiated the criminal action before the city fiscal's office. The complaint before the fiscal was started by an information she naming Herminia D. Reyes as complainant and citing other persons as witnesses. Fiscal Reyes set preliminary investigation of these charges for Aug. 22. Miss Reyes, technical assistant of the Unesco, stated at the Palace inquiry that during 1955 Miss Policarpio allegedly used several sheets of government stencils for her private and personal use, such as for French lessons, contracts of sale of pianos and for invitations of the League of Women Voters of which she (Miss Policarpio) is an officer. The Unesco commission here functions under the Office of the President. The charge was filed with the PCAC, and the PCAC endorsed it to Colonel Alba for investigation. Miss Policarpio this morning was not represented by an lawyer. Federico Diaz, lawyer representing complainant Miss Reyes, petitioned for the suspension of Miss Policarpio, executive secretary of the Unesco. Alba did not act immediately on the petition. He said he was holding a hearing on the petition on August 15.

During this morning's investigation three witness appeared. The first witness was Atty. Antonio Lopez of the PCAC who brought with him 18 sheets of stencil which were allegedly used by Miss Policarpio for her personal use. These sheets were admitted as temporary exhibits. The second witness was Federico Vergara of the Unesco who said that he received four of the 18 sheets, but he could not identify which of the sheets he had received. The third witness was Francisco Manalo who certified on the charge of oppression in office against Miss Policarpio. The other charge of Miss Reyes corresponded to supposed reimbursements sought by Miss Policarpio for a trip to Quezon Province and to Pangasinan. On the first, Miss Reyes' complaint alleged the Unesco official had asked for refund of expenses for use of her car when, Miss Reyes claimed she had actually made the trip aboard an army plane. Miss Reyes also said Miss Policarpio was absent from the Bayambang conference for which she also sought allegedly refund of expenses. The complainant had previously been ordered relieved of her Unesco post by Miss Policarpio and had later sued at the Palace and before the Court for payment of her salary. The title of the article of August 11, 1956 "WOMAN OFFICIAL SUED" was given prominence with a 6-column (about 11 inches) banner headline of one-inch types. Admittedly, its sub-title "PCAC RAPS L. POLICARPIO PIO ON FRAUD" printed in bold one-centimeter types, is not true. Similarly, the statement in the first paragraph of the article, to the effect that plaintiff "was charged with malversation and estafa in complaints filed with the city fiscal's office by the Presidential Complaint and Action Commission" otherwise known as PCAC is untrue, the complaints for said offenses having been filed by Miss Reyes. Neither is it true that said "criminal action was initiated as a result of current administrative, investigation", as stated in the second paragraph of the same article. Plaintiff maintains that the effect of these false statements was to give the general impression that said investigation by Col. Alba had shown that plaintiff was guilty, or, at least, probably guilty of the crimes aforementioned, and that, as a consequence, the PCAC had filed the corresponding complaints with the city fiscal's office. She alleges, also, that although said article indicates that the charges for malversation and for estafa through falsification against her referred, respectively, to the use by her of Unesco stencils allegedly for private and personal purposes, and to the collection of transportation expenses, it did not mention the fact that the number of stencils involved in the charge was only 18 or 20, that the sum allegedly misappropriated by her was only P54, and that the falsification imputed to her was said to have been committed by claiming that certain expenses for which she had sought and secured reimbursement were incurred in trips during the period from July 1, 1955 to September 30, 1955,

although the trips actually were made, according to Miss Reyes, from July 8 to August 31, 1955. By omitting these details, plaintiff avers, the article of August 11, 1956, had the effect of conveying the idea that the offenses imputed to her were more serious than they really were. Plaintiff, likewise, claims that there are other inaccuracies in the news item of August 13, 1956, but, we do not deem it necessary to dwell upon the same for the determination of this case. Upon the other hand, defendants contend that, although the complaints in the city fiscal's office were filed, not by the PCAC, but by Miss Reyes, this inaccuracy is insignificant and immaterial to the case, for the fact is that said complaints were filed with said office. As regards the number of sheets of stencil allegedly misused and the amount said to have been misappropriated by plaintiff, as well as the nature of the falsification imputed to her, defendants argue that these "details" do not affect the truthfulness of the article as a whole, and that, in any event, the insignificant value of said sheets of stencil and the small amount allegedly misappropriated, would have had, if set forth in said article, a greater derogatory effect upon the plaintiff, aside from the circumstance that defendants had no means of knowing such "details". It appears, however, that prior to August 11, 1956, Col. Alba had already taken the testimony of Antonio P. Lopez, Francisco Manalo and Federico Vergara, as witnesses for Miss Reyes. Hence, defendants could have ascertained the "details" aforementioned, had they wanted to. Indeed, some of the defendants and/or their representatives had made appropriate inquiries from Col. Alba before said date, and some "details" though not those adverted to above appear in the article then published, whereas the number of sheets of stencil allegedly misused was mentioned in the news item of August 13, 1956. Moreover, the penalty prescribed by law for the crime either of estafa or of embezzlement depends partly upon the amount of the damage caused to the offended party (Articles 315 to 318, Revised Penal Code). Hence, the amount or value of the property embezzled is material to said offense. Again, it is obvious that the filing of criminal complaints with the city fiscal's office by another agency of the Government, like the PCAC, particularly after an investigation conducted by the same, imparts the ideal that the probability of guilty on the part of the accused is greater than when the complaints are filed by a private individual, specially when the latter is a former subordinate of the alleged offender, who was responsible for the dismissal of the complainant from her employment. It is only too apparent that the article published on August 11, 1956, presented the plaintiff in a more unfavorable light than she actually was. It goes without saying that newspapers must enjoy a certain degree of discretion in determining the manner in which a given event should be presented to the public, and the importance to be attached thereto, as a news item, and that its presentation in a sensational manner is not per se

illegal. Newspaper may publish news items relative to judicial, legislative or other official proceedings, which are not of confidential nature, because the public is entitled to know the truth with respect to such proceedings, which, being official and non-confidential, are open to public consumption. But, to enjoy immunity, a publication containing derogatory information must be not only true, but, also, fair, and it must be made in good faith and without any comments or remarks. Defendants maintain that their alleged malice in publishing the news items in question had not been established by the plaintiff. However, Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, provides: Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases: 1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and 2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of other functions. In the case at bar, aside from containing information derogatory to the plaintiff, the article published on August 11, 1956, presented her in a worse predicament than that in which she, in fact, was. In other words, said article was not a fair and true report of the proceedings there in alluded to. What is more, its sub-title "PCAC RAPS L. POLICARPIO ON FRAUD" is a comment or remark, besides being false. Accordingly, the defamatory imputations contained in said article are "presumed to be malicious". Then too, how could defendants claim to have acted with good intentions or justifiable motive in falsely stating that the complaints had been filed with the Office of the City Fiscal by the PCAC as a result of the administrative investigation of Col. Alba? Either they knew the truth about it or they did not know it. If they did, then the publication would be actually malicious. If they did not or if they acted under a misapprehension of the facts, they were guilty of negligence in making said statement, for the consequences of which they are liable solidarily (Articles 2176, 2194, 2208 and 2219 [I], Civil Code of the Philippines; 17 R.C.L. sec. 95, p. 349). We note that the news item published on August 13, 1956, rectified a major inaccuracy contained in the first article, by stating that neither Col. Alba nor the PCAC had filed the aforementioned complaints with the city fiscal's office. It, likewise, indicated the number of sheets of stencil involved in said complaints. But, this rectification or clarification does not wipe out the responsibility arising from the publication of the first article, although it may and should mitigate it (Jimenez vs. Reyes, 27 Phil. 52). For this reason, we feel that the interest of justice and of all parties concerned would be served

if the defendants indemnify the plaintiff in the sums of P3,000, by way of moral damages, and P2,000, as attorney's fees. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and another one shall be entered sentencing the defendants herein to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiff the aforementioned sums of P3,000, as moral damages, and P2,000, by way of attorney's fees, in addition to the costs. It is so ordered.

NEW YORK TIMES v. SULLIVAN

Facts of the Case Decided together with Abernathy v. Sullivan, this case concerns a full-page ad in the New York Times which alleged that the arrest of the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. for perjury in Alabama was part of a campaign to destroy King's efforts to integrate public facilities and encourage blacks to vote. L. B. Sullivan, the Montgomery city commissioner, filed a libel action against the newspaper and four black ministers who were listed as endorsers of the ad, claiming that the allegations against the Montgomery police defamed him personally. Under Alabama law, Sullivan did not have to prove that he had been harmed; and a defense claiming that the ad was truthful was unavailable since the ad contained factual errors. Sullivan won a $500,000 judgment. RULING: The Court held that the First Amendment protects the publication of all statements, even false ones, about the conduct of public officials except when statements are made with actual malice (with knowledge that they are false or in reckless disregard of their truth or falsity). Under this new standard, Sullivan's case collapsed. Under Alabama law, a publication is libelous per se if the words tend to

injure a person in his reputation or to bring him into public contempt. The jury must find that the words were published of and concerning the plaintiff. Once libel per se has been established, the defendant has no defense as to stated facts unless he can persuade the jury that they were true in all their particulars. LIWAYWAY VS PCGG These two cases are jointly resolved because of the common identity of and related issues by the parties, without prejudice to the writing of an extended opinion. G.R. 77422 is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order filed on February 24, 1987 by Liwayway Publishing, Inc. (Liwayway hereafter) and U.S. automotive Co., Inc. (US Automotive hereafter) seeking to annul and set aside two writs of sequestration issued by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (Commission hereafter) on February 12, 1987 on the shares of stocks of U.S. Automotive in Liwayway, as well as the implementing directive addressed to the Central Bank Governor of even date and to prohibit the Commission from conducting proceedings in connection with the said sequestration. G.R. 79126 is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for preliminary writ of injunction and urgent ex-parte restraining order filed on July 27, 1987 by Bulletin Publishing Corporation (Bulletin hereafter) to set aside the April 14, 1987 order issued by the Commission which declared their intent to vote the "sequestered shares" in Bulletin; to prohibit the voting of Bulletin shares by respondents, their successors, on their representatives, to enjoin respondents, their successors, or their representatives from taking part or intervening, directly or indirectly, in any

acts, in the management of Bulletin; and to direct the immediate acceptance by the Commission of Bulletin's offer to debosit in cash, under escrow, so as to protect the interest of the government, if any, a specific amount for the value of sequestered shares in the Bulletin pursuant to the restrictions on their transferability as provided in its Articles of Incorporation, with any banking institution as may be designated by this Court, pending and subject to final determination/adjudication of the ownership of said shares and to lift the sequestration order of April 11, 1986. Liwayway and Bulletin are domestic corporations engaged in the business of publication of newspapers and magazines. The former publishes a daily newspaper, the "Balita," and three weekly vernacular magazines, namely, "Liwayway," "Bisaya" and "Bannawag," while the latter publishes the "Manila Bulletin" a daily newspaper and its weekly magazines, The "Philippine Panorama," all of general and national circulation. In both corporations, Mr. Emiho T. Yap is the biggest stockholder and Chairman of the Board of Directors. As of February 21, 1986, he held 2,617 Bulletin shares, while, U.S. Automotive, 1 a corporation wholly owned and controlled by him and his family, held 318,084 shares out of the total outstanding Bulletin shares of 567,808.5 with 198,052.5 thereof as treasury shares and 765,861 subscribed shares. 2 In Liwayway, "(B)y April, 1986, ... U.S. Automotive Co. owned almost 70% of total Liwayway issued shares ... 3 I. LIWAYWAY CASE In G.R. 77422, the Commission had issued on February 12, 1987 two writs of sequestration, one addressed to the President/Chairman of the Board of the U.S. Automotive sequestering the President/Chairman's shares of stocks in the Liwayway as of April 15, 1986, and the other addressed to the President/Chairman of the Board of Liwayway sequestering all shares of stocks pertaining to U.S. Automotive in Liwayway Publishing, Inc. as of April 15, 1986. On the same date, the Commission requested the Central Bank to instruct all commercial banks and non-bank financial institutions not to allow any withdrawals, transfers or remittances from funds or assets under any type of deposit accounts, trust accounts, and/or money market placements, including safety deposit boxes, stocks and bonds, bearer certificates and unnumbered accounts, except those which may pertain to payment of regular salaries and wages of Liwayway and HM Holding and Management, Inc. (hereafter HMH&M). Petitioners' plea for a temporary restraining order was heard on February 26, 1987, the hearing being limited to whether a restraining order should issue to restrain the commission against denying Liwayway the use and availment of its funds in the banks to put out its regular publications as well as against the Commission's interference or intervention in the management or operations of Liwayway, considering the Central Bank's blanket memorandum, at the Commission's behest, to all banks not to allow any withdrawals or remittances from its funds, except for "payment of regular salaries and wages" which would virtually shut down its publications. The then Solicitor General, now Secretary of Justice, Sedfrey Ordoez, as well as the Commission's then Vice-Chairman, now Chairman, Ramon Diaz, assured the Court that Liwayway's funds would not be choked off and that the Commission would not in any way interfere or intervene in the management or operations of the publication nor with its editorial policy or reportage or in any way impinge upon its freedom. It was brought out that Liwayway made over P8 million in 1986 and paid more than half of that in income tax, and they agreed further to preserve the status quo ante pending joining of the issues on the merits or a showing of some irregularity that would warrant the Commission's intervention. On February 27, 1987, the Solicitor General filed his manifestation as undertaken by him, submitting a copy of the Commission's letter dated February 26, 1987, to the CB Governor, Jose Fernandez,

modifying its previous memorandum of February 12th and asking him to instruct all banks to honor all checks of Liwayway and further stating that "(A)lthough mention is made in the letter of the naming of a fiscal agent, respondent Commission is not naming anyone at this time. On the issue of freedom of the press, the Court noted with commendation the Solicitor General's pledge at the hearing that the Commission will not in any way act in such a way as to impinge upon the freedom of expression or freedom to publish the newspaper. The Court gave due faith and credence thereto and the above-cited undertakings of the Commission. Accordingly, in lieu of a temporary restraining order which has been rendered unnecessary by the Commission's manifestation and undertakings, the Court enjoined faithful compliance therewith by all concerned. This renders moot this particular issue of unwarranted intervention of the Commission and impairment of press freedom. But with the closing out of this case, as hereafter ordered and the denial of petitioner's plea to lift the sequestration orders, the Court will formalize the parties' agreement through the issuance of an injunction to the same effect, to assure compliance regardless of any change in the composition of the Commission or of other public officials concerned. As to the sequestration orders, the Commission claims that Emilio Yap, founder of U.S. Automotive Co., organized long before martial law, is a "crony" if not downright "dummy" of the deposed President Ferdinand Marcos. Mr. Yap, in turn, has strongly countered the Commission's allegations as to his alleged business association with Mr. Marcos and their prima facie sufficiently in this wise: On March 2, 1987, petitioners filed its manifestation and reply to the opposition alleging the following: 1. Mr. Yap admits that he owns 2,508 shares of stocks of BASECO which constitute less than 2% of the total 218,819 outstanding shares of stocks of the company. He acquired the original 240 shares by subscription at the time of incorporation and augmented by stock dividends to the present stockholding of 2,508 shares. 2. Regarding the BASECO certificates of shares of stocks purportedly belonging to Yap and endorsed to "someone" whose name was left in blank this Court should require the respondents to produce the originals of said stock certificates in order to verify the claim that they have been endorsed in blank. 3. He had resigned from the chairmanship of BASECO since October 20, 1983. Out of his duly paid investment of P60,000, he never received any cash dividend nor profited from BASECO. 4. He has never been a stockholder nor an officer of the Jai-Alai Corporation. 5. He owned only one qualifying share in the Manila International Port Terminals, Inc.(MIPTI) which he later endorsed to the new MIPTI Chairman. He resigned as chairman of the Board before the Aquino administration. 6. He invested in the Bulletin in 1961, as second biggest stockholder on the invitation of Gen. Menzi long before Mr. Marcos became president. 7. All original stock certificates issued to U.S. Automotive and treasury shares are all in the respective possession of the registered owners and have not been endorsed to anyone.

But as the Court has consistently held and reiterated in PCGG vs. Pea, G.R. No. 77663, decided also this month, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and the parties' conflicting factual contentions have to be threshed out and adjudged in the Sandiganbayan, which is vested with exclusive jurisdiction over the case. II. BULLETIN CASE In G.R. 79126, the Commission issued on April 22, 1986 an order sequestering the shares of former President Marcos, Emilio Yap, Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., their nominees or agents in the Bulletin Publishing Corporation. In an order dated April 14, 1987, the Commission declared their intent to vote the sequestered shares. Thus, on July 27, 1987, the instant petition was filed seeking the nullification of the above mentioned order. It is petitioner's contention that what is at stake here is the freedom of our press institutions to independently manage their own affairs and effectively preserve editorial policies and objectives, without the shadow of government participation in the same, that governmental presence in petitioner's board will most certainly cast that shadow and threaten the independence of the press as an institution of mass media protected and guaranteed by the Constitution. The Court issued a temporary retraining order on July 28, 1987 ordering the respondents, their successors, agents or representatives to cease and desist from voting Bulletin shares, or otherwise from taking part or intervening, directly or indirectly, in any acts in the management of the Bulletin daily newspaper. Respondents' comment alleged that the Commission will vote only the shares of Cesar Zalamea (121,178 shares), Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. (46,626 shares), and Jose Y. Campos (46,620.5 shares) for a total of 214,424.5 shares which were the subject of the sequestration order and that the shares of Emilio Yap were excluded by virtue of the Commission's order dated March 16, 1987. Subsequently, however, petitioner alleged 4 in its memorandum of January 2, 1988 that on July 31, 1987, the Commission sold to it 46,620.5 Bulletin shares of Mr. Jose Y. Campos for a total price of P8,173,506.06 per PTC Check No. 606380 and voucher and 121,178 Bulletin shares of Cesar Zalamea for a total price of P21,244,926.96 per PTC Check No. 607887 and voucher issued on October 15, 1987. As to the remaining 46,626 Bulletin shares of Mr. Cojuangco, Jr., under sequestration, the petitioner has offered to deposit in cash the value of the shares with the Commission, in the amount of P8,174,470.32 per PTC Check No. 607590, issued on October 15, 1987 which awaits the Commission's acceptance. Respondents' memorandum of January 26, 1988, however, stated that only Mr. Campos' shares were voluntarily surrendered, hence, they were accepted by the Commission. On the matter of the shares of Cojuangco and Zalamea, it contended that unless there is a confession or admission that the said shares are "ill-gotten assets" of Mr. Marcos and/or his cronies, the true ownership of the shares has still to be determined by the Sandiganbayan where Civil Case No. 0022 entitled "Republic ... vs. Emilio T. Yap, et al." is pending. Petitioner, however, denies being a party therein. Subject to said admission, the Commission considers it premature to enter into any transaction affecting those shares pending determination of their ownership. In their Memorandum, respondents Commission and members expressly have declared that the Commission no longer intends to exercise its right to vote the sequestered shares, that the Commission's present role is confined largely to monitoring Bulletin's activities in terms of preventing any dissipation and disposition of funds and assets and does not extend to the exercise of the voting of the shares, unless subsequent events or circumstances call for such exercise pursuant to law. Thus, respondents urge the dismissal of the petition "for want of factual basis." As in the Liwayway case, the Commission concedes that it may not lawfully intervene and participate in the management and operations of a private mass media such as Bulletin for the purpose of maintaining

its freedom and independence as guaranteed by the Constitution and therefore the temporary restraining order heretofore issued on July 28, 1987 ordering the Commission or its representative to "cease and desist from voting the shares or otherwise from intervening directly or indirectly in the management of petitioner Bulletin" will be made permanent. The issue left for resolution is whether the Commission may continue to refuse to accept the cash deposit offered for the present balance of 46,626 minority sequestered shares in the name of Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco as prayed for in the petition. It is admitted of record that the Sequestration Order of April 22, 1986 is limited to a minority of 214,424.5 shares in the name of Messrs. Cesar Zalamea, Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and Jose Y. Campos at the time of its issuance, as follows: Cesar Zalamea 121,178 shares Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. 46,626 shares Jose Y. Campos 46,620.5 shares Total 214,424.5 shares and that the Bulletin shares of Emilio Yap owned by him since 1961 were excluded from the said sequestration, by virtue of the Commission's order of March 16, 1987. Likewise, in consonance with the Commission's very purpose and objective of preserving the assets and ill-gotten wealth that may be recovered, pertaining to the deposed President Marcos, and converting them into cash to be returned to the people in government projects such as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), it has acknowledged the recognized vested right of the Bulletin to purchase Bulletin shares that may be put up for sale, since the government is barred anyway from acquiring ownership and management of private mass media such as the Bulletin Publishing, Inc. under Art. XVI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution which provides: "Sec. 11(1). The ownership and management of mass media shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations, cooperatives or associations, wholly-owned and managed by such citizens." In the letter dated July 8, 1987 of Commission Chairman Diaz to Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa Media ng Pilipinas (KAMMP), he recognized the restrictions on the transferability of Bulletin shares accruing in favor of petitioner Bulletin when he wrote. In view of the foregoing, when and if we dispose of those shares, the first step to take is to offer the same to the corporation, and the corporation may offer it to the other stockholders if it so desires. But we cannot avoid the circumstance that the corporation itself will desire to buy the stocks and therefore, the transaction will end here. (1) Thus, on July 31, 1987, PCGG sold to petitioner Bulletin 46,620.5 Bulletin shares of Mr. Jose Y. Campos for a total price of P8,173,506.06 per PTC Check No. 606380 and Voucher (pp. 11-12, Petitioner's Addendum). (2) The PCGG also sold to petitioner Bulletin 121,178 Bulletin shares of Mr. Cesar C. Zalamea for a total price of P21,244,926.96 and accepted PTC Check No. 607887 and Voucher issued on October 15, 1987 (pp. 12-13, Petitioner's Addendum), now as (Annex 'A'). As already noted hereinabove, there is a counter-allegation on the part of the Commission that it had not sold the Zalamea shares

but there are indications that it had accepted the check and voucher therefor as stated herein. Whatever be the case, this is immaterial in the light of the resolution of the case providing for the exercise of petitioner Bulletin's right of preemption over such shares. (3) As to the remaining 46,626 Bulletin shares of Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. under sequestration, petitioner Bulletin has consistently offered to deposit in cash the value of the shares with respondent PCGG, in the amount of P8,174,470.32 per PTC check No. 607590, issued on October 15, 1987, and which awaits PCGG acceptance. (pp. 13-14, Petitioner's Addendum). Petitioner correctly maintains that its offer in good faith to PCGG of the cash deposit for the sequestered shares will protect the interest of the government, if any, pending final determination/adjudication of the matter. The offer of cash deposit is in line with the government program on privatization and in keeping with constitutional guarantee of press freedom and to maintain private mass media free from government intervention in its management directly or indirectly. The Commission has nothing to lose and everything to gain by accepting the cash deposit offered by petitioner for the shares in the name of Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. The cash deposit being offered by petitioner is similar in nature and purpose to a cash bond put up for a litigant during the pendency of the case. In both situations, the rights of the parties and of the government, are adequately protected. This cash deposit including interest earning is to be applied on the said 46,626 shares under any of the following two (2) alternatives specifically proposed by petitioner: Alternative "A" To standby as full payment plus whatever interest earnings thereon upon final judgment of the Court declaring the Republic of the Philippines as owners of the 46,626 shares, accompanied by the corresponding original stock certificates, issued in the name of the government, duly endorsed in favor of the Bulletin Publishing Corporation, free from liens and encumbrances; or Alternative "B" To immediately return to Bulletin Publishing Corporation the cash deposit in the amount of P8,174,470.32 plus whatever interest earnings thereon upon final judgment by the Court declaring that Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. is the true owner of the 46,626 shares. This Resolution is issued to uphold the freedom of our press institutions to independently manage their affairs and effectively preserve their editorial policies and objectives, without the shadow of government participation and intervention. The Commission itself has recognized that government presence in petitioner's Board will most certainly cast that shadow and threaten the independence of the press which is protected and guaranteed by the Constitution, and hence had given up its initial Idea to vote the sequestered shares in petitioner Bulletin. ACCORDINGLY, in the Liwayway case, G.R. No. 77422, judgment is rendered. 1. As per agreement of the parties as set forth in the Resolution of March 3, 1987, enjoining the Commission from any act interfering or intervening in any way or manner with the management or operations or afffirms of petitioner Liwayway Publishing, Inc.; and

2. Dismissing the petition for a writ of prohibition to enjoin respondents from enforcing in any manner the writs of sequestration heretofore issued over the questioned Liwayway shares whose ownership will have to be tried and determined in the Sandiganbayan. In the Bulletin case, G.R. No. 79126, judgment is likewise rendered. 1. Making permanent the temporary restraining order heretofore issued on July 28, 1987; 2. Directing the Commission to accept the cash deposit of P8,174,470.32 offered by petitions; for the 46,626 sequestered shares in the name of Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. expressly subject to the alternative conditions (A and B) hereinabove set forth, and likewise directing the Commission to accept the cash deposit, if it has not actually sold the Cesar C. Zalamea Bulletin shares to petitioner (supra, p. 13, par. [2]) of P21,244,926.96 for the sequestered shares of Bulletin in the name of Mr. Cesar Zalamea under the same alternatives already mentioned; and 3. Remanding the case regarding the issue of ownership of the said sequestered Bulletin shares for determination and adjudication to the Sandiganbayan.