An Implicit Distinction Between Free Choice and Freedom in Anselm's Thought Anselm's treatises On Freedom of Choice, The Fall

of Satan, and The Compatibility of Foreknowledge, Predestination, and the Grace of God with Free Choice are intriguing discussions in themselves, but they are of particular interest for the light they shed on Anselm's notion of freedom. Early in On Freedom of Choice, in discussing how Satan and Adam fell, Anselm tells us: They sinned through their own choice, which was free, and not through that by which it was free, namely, the ability not to sin and not to serve sin. Rather, they sinned by the ability they had for sinning, which neither helped them towards the freedom of not sinning nor compelled them into the service of sin.1 It is very clear from this passage that Anselm believes Satan and Adam have free choice by virtue of possessing "the ability not to sin and not to serve sin." Elsewhere in his writings, he describes this ability as the "ability to keep uprightness of will for the sake of this uprightness itself."2 For Anselm, "uprightness of will" seems equivalent to "what God wills" and so freedom of choice seems to be the ability to follow the will of God because it is the will of God.3 It is important to emphasize that Anselm in the quotation stresses that an agent can have free choice and use free choice for sin without the sin involving what makes choice free. This separation allows one to distinguish freedom of choice from the ability to sin even in beings that never possess one without the other. The separation is, of course, useful for maintaining that there is a univocal concept of "free choice" between beings who have free choice and can sin and beings who have free choice but cannot sin. That there is a univocal concept of "free choice" is a position Anselm explicitly endorses in the opening paragraphs of On Freedom of Choice Anselm's defining of freedom of choice as an ability is suggestive. Since we separate ability from the exercise of ability, one can have the ability to keep uprightness for the sake of uprightness without actually keeping uprightness for the sake of uprightness.4 One can even sin, and thus effectively choose against uprightness, and never lose the ability to follow uprightness for its own sake. Moreover, one can be necessitated or coerced in an action and still retain free choice since in cases of necessitation or coercion one still retains the ability to follow uprightness for the sake of uprightness.

Anselm's careful focus on freedom of choice allows us to speculate whether free choice is to be separated from or identified with freedom. Is a being free solely by possessing free choice? Hopkins in his A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm indicates that free choice is to be identified with freedom.5 He is certainly not alone, for many people understand Anselm to define 'freedom' as "the ability to serve uprightness for the sake of uprightness," which is Anselm's explicit definition of free choice.6 If we do identify free choice with freedom, however, many problems arise. In the first place, all the acts a human being performs would be free acts - even those acts that are necessitated or performed under coercion.7 But Anselm thinks such acts are not free acts.8 Moreover, Anselm talks about different degrees of freedom: Which will seems the more free to you: the will whose ability not to sin is such that it can in no way be turned away from the uprightness of not sinning, or the will which can in some way be turned to sinning.9 But if freedom is the ability to keep uprightness of the will for the sake of uprightness, it is difficult to see how there can be degrees of freedom. One either has this ability or lacks the ability. There thus seem to be reasons not to identify free choice with freedom. What then is the relationship between free choice and freedom? Anselm never explicitly tries to distinguish them. In the texts, he tends to use voluntas libera, arbitrium liberum, and libertas interchangeably. But there might be an implicit distinction between 'free choice' and 'freedom' at work in the texts. To see if this is the case, we need to turn to Anselm's distinction in The Fall of Satan between the affection for benefit and the affection for justice. Anselm claims that there are two dispositions found in the wills of human beings and all angels before some of them fell. The first disposition, "the affection for benefit" (affectio ad commodum), is the ability of an individual to will what seems to benefit it, in the sense of bring it happiness. This disposition is in play, for example, whenever a human being wills to eat, wills to protect itself, wills to gather possessions, and so on. The second disposition, "the affection for justice" (affectio ad justitiam), is the ability to will what an individual should do. In particular, according to Anselm, it is the ability to follow the commands of God. In an intriguing thought experiment, Anselm considers the creation of Satan in a series of distinct steps. If Satan were created with neither of the dispositions, he would be unable to

will at all. For the only way to move from the state of not willing to the state of willing is to will, and without an already existing ability to will one cannot will. So, Satan must possess one of the two abilities in order to will at all. If, however, Satan were created with only the disposition to will what is beneficial (affectio ad commodum), he would not be free, for he could only will what seemed beneficial to him. Likewise, if he were created with only the disposition to will what is just (affectio ad justitiam), he would not be free since he could will only what is just. Satan can be free only if he possesses both dispositions since choice is possible only with the possession of both dispositions. Thus, Satan's freedom requires the choice between what is beneficial and what is just. The same is true of human beings. One fascinating aspect of Anselm's claim that the possession of both dispositions is necessary for the freedom of human beings and Satan is that, according to him, an agent must be in a state of ignorance about the exact relationship between the two affections.10 If the agent were to know for certain, for example, that his ultimate benefit lies in following justice, the agent would not be free to act in accordance with what seemed beneficial; he could only act in accord with what is just. Likewise, if an agent knew that he would be punished for acting in accord with what seems to be beneficial (in distinction to what was just), he would know that choosing the seemingly beneficial would not ultimately benefit him and so he could only choose what is just. Consequently, he would not be free. It follows, then, that Satan before he fell, and all angels before they fell, as well as all human beings when they act freely, must possess the two abilities in ignorance of what is of ultimate benefit. Moreover, the angels who did not fall and saw the punishment of the angels who did fall now understand that acting in accord with justice (the will of God) is in their ultimate interest. They are therefore not able to will anything but what is just. This ability, of course, gives them freedom of choice, but it effectively eliminates any freedom in the sense that human beings have freedom. Human beings, ignorant that it is to their ultimate benefit to act in accord with justice, retain both the affection for benefit and the affection for justice. They are able to choose between the two affections, and, consequently, they are able to sin. (Once human beings are numbered among the blessed, they lose their ignorance and no longer have a choice between the affections.) As Anselm points out at the end of On Freedom of Choice, human beings have the freedom to retain uprightness of will (by serving justice) or to lose it (by rejecting justice). Once they have lost uprightness of will, they can regain it or never regain it. God's grace plays an important

role here in addition to the choice to follow justice.11 The fallen angels, on the other hand, are never able to regain uprightness of will. Even though they, presumably, possess the two affections, they will not receive God's grace and be restored to uprightness of will. Their fall is irrevocable. According to Anselm, God does not have the ability to sin. It is less clear whether God has the two affections found in human wills. In a sense, God's situation is a heightened version of the situation of the good angels. Given that he is omniscient, he knows that ultimate benefit is really the same as acting in accordance with justice - at least with regard to creatures. Since his will is the measure of justice, it makes no sense to think that his affection for benefit is other than his affection for justice. He cannot choose between them because they are identical. It is impossible for him to lose his uprightness of will. It is thus clear that while God and free creatures have the same free choice, the freedom they enjoy is different. The freedom of human beings (and the evil angels) is a freedom inextricably linked with the choice between following the affection for justice and the affection for benefit. Another way of putting this is to say that human freedom is the ability to follow justice or to reject justice (and follow benefit).12 God's freedom, and that of the good angels as well as the blessed in heaven, is the ability to follow justice. This freedom seems to be equivalent to freedom of choice, but there is an important difference. In addition to having the ability to follow justice, God, the good angels, and the blessed are also unable not to follow justice. Their freedom consists, then, of the ability to follow justice and the inability not to follow justice. The univocal concept of free choice - the ability to follow uprightness of will for the sake of uprightness itself - is thus consistent with both the ability to not follow justice (and pursue benefit) and the inability not to follow justice. Free choice is thus linked to the different freedoms God and human beings possess, but it should not be equated with either type of freedom. Both freedoms together, however, cover all the possible situations where free choice can be exercised.13 Footnotes 1 This translation is from Truth, Freedom, and Evil: Three Philosophical Dialogues by Anselm of Canterbury, translated and edited by Jasper Hopkins and Herbert Richardson (Harper and Row; New York; 1967), p. 124. The Latin text is to be found in Opera Omnia, Volume I, edited by F.S. Schmitt (Friedrich Frommann Verlag;

Stuttgart-Bad Cannsatt; 1968), p. 120. 2 Truth, Freedom, and Evil, p. 127; Opera Omnia, Volume I, p. 212. 3 See Truth, Freedom, and Evil, pp. 156-57; Opera Omnia, Volume I, pp. 241-42. 4 Throughout chapter four of his A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm (Univ. of Minnesota Press; Minneapolis; 1972), Jasper Hopkins criticizes Anselm's separation between ability and the exercise of the ability (especially pp. 145 ff.). 5 A Companion, p. 141. 6 For other examples, see B. M. Bonansea's Man and His Approach to God in John Duns Scotus (University Press of America; New York; 1983), chapter two; Stanley Kane's Anselm's Doctrine of Freedom and the Will (Edwin Mellen Press; Toronto; 1981); Joseph Incandela's "Duns Scotus and the Experience of Human Freedom" in The Thomist, Volume 56, #2, April 1992, pp. 229-56. 7 Compare Hopkins's remarks in A Companion, pp. 152-53. 8 This is clear from his discussion of the case of a man confronted with a forced option in On Freedom of Choice, Chapter 5 (Truth, Freedom, and Evil, p.132: "Will you deny that a thing is free from another if it cannot be forced or restrained by that other thing except as it wills to be?") as well as from the thought experiment of making Satan in various stages in The Fall of Satan, chapters 12-14. It is also affirmed in Chapter 2 of On Freedom of Choice (Truth, Freedom, and Evil, p. 124) when Anselm distinguishes choice that is free from choice that is compelled or necessitated. 9 Truth, Freedom, and Evil, p. 123; Opera Omnia, p. 208. 10 This position is made very clear in The Fall of Satan, chapters 21-25. It is difficult to ascertain precisely what Anselm means by

'know' when he talks about knowing what one's ultimate benefit is the same as following justice. Believing Christians, for example, hold that their ultimate benefit (the beatific vision) is achieved through doing what is just. Presumably, this does not qualify as the knowledge Anselm has in mind. This knowledge seems to be something like an absolute certainty from seeing it to be the case that one's ultimate benefit is to serve justice. God has this knowledge, of course, as do the angels and the blessed. 11 Stanley Kane treats the role of God's grace in Anselm's Doctrine of Freedom and the will, pp. 160 f. But see also Jasper Hopkins's negative analysis of Kane's treatment of Anselm: "Anselm on Freedom and the Will: A Discussion of G. Stanley Kane's Interpretation of Anselm," Philosophy Research Archives, Volume 9, 1983, pp. 471-94. 12 There is no necessary conflict between benefit and justice. It is often the case that doing what is just benefits a person. The choice here occurs when there is a conflict between benefit and justice. 13 Hopkins in A Companion talks about there being two different uses of freedom: God's and human beings' (p. 157).It seems more appropriate to talk about two different uses of free choice and to say that God and human beings have different types of freedom. In writing this paper, I have also benefitted from other discussions of Anselm's notion of freedom. Of particular note are: Paul A. Streveler "Anselm on Future Contingencies: A Critical Analysis of the Argument of the De Concordia," Anselm Studies, Volume 1, 1983, pp. 165-73; William L. Craig "St. Anselm on Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingency," Laval theologique et philosophique, Volume 42, #1, February 1986, pp. 93-104; Robert F. Brown "Some Problems with Anselm's View of Human Will, " Anselm Studies, Volume 2, 1988, pp. 333-42; Richard Campbell "Freedom as Keeping the Truth: The Anselmian Tradition," Anselm Studies, Volume 2, pp. 297-318.