Al Qaeda in America: The Enemy Within Page 1 of 2

4) How Not to Reform Intelligence

By ROBERT M. GATES

Wall Street Journal

With Congress reconvening after summer recess and the presidential campaign heating up, we can
expect another round of proposals to reorganize U.S. intelligence agencies as a way to enhance our war
on terrorism. The newest round of ideas will draw heavily on the conclusions and recommendations of a
report on the actions of the CIA and FBI prior to Sept. 11.

Submitted by the two congressional intelligence oversight committees in late July, the recommendations
cover breaking down barriers among agencies, improving the flow of terrorist-related intelligence
information between law-enforcement and intelligence organizations, improved coordination and
integration of terrorist watch-lists, accountability, and improved Congressional oversight. They deserve
serious consideration and, in some cases, prompt action.

There is, however, at least one really bad idea in the report: reviving the old standby suggestion of
creating a director of National Intelligence. This would establish a position independent of any particular
agency, and with the authority to manage all U.S. foreign-intelligence agencies. On the surface the
approach may look logical, but the reality in Washington would be a far different scenario.

* **

Currently, the director of Central Intelligence oversees a dozen or so intelligence agencies. By law, he
establishes overall intelligence priorities for those agencies and prepares their budgets as part of the
National Foreign Intelligence Program. He actually "controls" only the CIA, however; with respect to
the others (such as the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National
Reconnaissance Office), he cannot appoint their leadership, control their day-to-day operations and
activities, direct changes in internal organization or structure, or influence the career services of the
employees.

While the director is held accountable for the performance of these agencies and for their expenditures,
he has no authority actually to manage those agencies. It is this that the Congress wishes to change. The
Scowcroft Commission, addressing intelligence structure last year, came to essentially the same
conclusion.

The rub is the reality of Washington bureaucratic and political life. The only way a director of National
Intelligence — or whatever the intelligence czar might be called ~ can exercise real authority over all
U.S. foreign intelligence agencies and make the changes the Congress and others urge is if he really
controls their money and appoints their leadership. Historically, 85% of National Foreign Intelligence
Program dollars have been spent by the Department of Defense, which runs all of the really big
intelligence organizations except the CIA. It's hard to imagine there's any chance a secretary of defense -
- particularly this one — would willingly give up control of a number of large organizations or their
multibillion-dollar budgets. Without that control, the position would be little more than expensive
window dressing.

A second problem with the recent proposals for an intelligence czar is that, in nearly all
recommendations, the czar would no longer serve as director of the CIA. In other words, the new
position would have no bureaucratic base in Washington — no troops. This, too, in the real world, is a
fatal weakness.

There are, however, ways to strengthen the director of Central Intelligence within the current structure
that would make a real difference in his ability to manage and bring together the intelligence agencies --

http://kinesis.swishmail.com./webmail/imp/view.php?thismailbox=INBOX&index=1650&id=... 9/4/03