Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Inspector General Ervin, we wanted to thank you again for the time that you and your
staff spent with us earlier this summer to discuss the work of the Commission and the
ongoing efforts of the DHS Office of Inspector General.
As we mentioned during the meeting, several issues were raised with the Commission
that are in need and deserving of appropriate follow-up. You had noted your willingness
to receive such information.
We have attached three pieces of correspondence. The first regards serious concerns
about the status and management of the Federal Air Marshal Program. The second letter
regards concerns about the treatment of whistle blowers who raise issues of safety and
security which may bear on DHS and TSA. The third involves alleged security violations
by a commercial air carrier.
Finally, we would like to raise an issue that was raised by a former FAA security
inspector: 1) while explosives detection equipment is in place at all but a few airports, the
equipment is not being fully used to screen baggage for explosives; 2) the physical
placement of such equipment within certain airports is degrading the operational
capabilities of the equipment; and 3) the equipment may not be performing as efficiently
and effectively as it should. While TSA denies that there is any truth to the allegations,
this is an issue which merits additional scrutiny by your office.
Team 7
MnasHKean
CHAIR
Date:
H. Hamilton
VICE CHAIR
iiani Ben-Veniste
TO: TEAM
cOeland
i F.Fielding
FROM: Dianna Campagna
ie S. Gorelick
The threat that exists to aviation security and the American public is valid and ever-
present. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States
(also known as the 9-11 Commission) has revealed that neither the intelligence
community nor elected officials were prepared for the terrorist attacks that would
occur that day. This report is to make both those entities aware of the problems that
currently exist within the FAMS in order that changes occur before another tragedy
befalls us. Moreover, this report serves as your official notification of the perilous
situation with the FAMS and FLEOA's record of that notification.
FAMS management has elected to further jeopardize the safety of FAMs, impede
their ability to complete a dangerous mission the result is weakened defenses
against the unknown face of terrorism due to the following:
FLEOA members are outraged and shocked by the apparent lack of regard for
aviation safety by the DHS' Federal Air Marshal Service. The recent NBC Nightly
News two-part special documentary, entitled "The Day in the Life of a Federal Air
Marshal" (February 5th and 6th, 2004), not only jeopardized the flying public but
FAMs' safety as well.
FLEOA would like to think that a reputable news organization and journalist would
grasp the potential threat and liability that airing such an expose story could create.
Nonetheless, the responsibility of these pieces hitting the airwaves lands squarely
on the senior managers of the FAMS. In particular, Director Thomas Quinn was
featured in the article and apparently sanctioned the media coverage. Director
Quinn gave journalists' access to individual FAMs and approval to film those
FAMS during an actual mission while they were protecting the flying public and the
country.
Intricate details and security measures employed by FAMs during missions were
divulged to both the public and any organization desiring to do harm to the U.S in
another 9/11 style attack. Terrorist who undoubtedly had access to these programs
can now spot FAMs do to dress, seat assignment and are given a decent blue print
on how FAMs respond to a given situation. Modern technology ensures that
footage of the FAMs training in the background of certain segments can be
enhanced and exhibited for closer examination. This televised operational security
information gives further assistance to those terrorists who continue to monitor our
levels of aviation security in attempts to find weaknesses to exploit at a time and
manner of their choosing. FAMS executives and top-level government officials
within DHS who knowingly released this classified information need to answer for
this disclosure, not when or if there is another act of terrorism, but here and now.
Ironically, Director Quinn has warned FAMs about revealing FAM policies and
procedures under threat of termination, arrest and prosecution. Director Quinn
subsequently revealed the following on the NBC national TV report:
This NBC Nightly News segments was an utter breach of security that allows al
Qaeda, or any other fanatical terrorist organization, with the operational procedures
of the FAMS. Director Quinn is personally responsible for blowing the cover of
thousands of FAMs and putting the American public in an untenable situation. They
are given a false sense of security that their plane will be protected when, in fact,
FAMs identities all over the country are being compromised on a daily basis.
Concerned parent of a FAM who felt the need to contact his son's FLEOA representative after
viewing the NBC airing:
ll -would be Interesting to know who gave permission to NBC to do the feature. That person
is certainly not interested in the security of the air marshals. Has the motto of the Federal
Air Marshals been changed from "Invisus - Inaudiiits - Impavidus" (Unseen, Unheard,
Unafraid)? Is it now "Visas - Auditus - Patefaclus" (Seen, Heard, Exposed)? "
Show on air marshals draws fire; Gave 'step-by-step narrative' of security procedure. (NATION)
Date: 3/4/2004 Byline: Jerry Seper, THE WASHINGTON TIMES
The safely of federal air marshals and the flying public was compromised by Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) executives during a recent TV news program, says the
Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association, which wants a Senate committee to
investigate "unwarranted security disclosures."
ICE spokesman Dave Adams dismissed Mr. Adler's accusations, saying the TV piece was
"thoroughly veiled through the highest levels of Homeland Security" to ensure that no
sensitive security details were released. "We worked very closely with NBC in the filming
ofihe program la guard against the release of any security issues," Mr. Adams said, "ll
was carefully made la be sure it did not compromise the air marshals or the public.
Accusations la the contrary are totally false." Mr. Adams said ICE owes the public "a
snapshot of this very imporlanl agency," and the NBC program was an attempt to do that.
He said it also gave the agency an opportunity to show would-be terrorists and others
that the air marshals were a significant deterrence to hijackings. "The program provided a
deterrence for those who might think they could make an attempt to hijack an airplane,"
Furthermore, on November 5, 2003, the FAM Miami SAIC Jim Bauer filmed a
three-piece segment with local Miami station WSVN
rhttp://www.wsvn.com/features/articles/speciahieport/C106/)
• no beards;
• mustache will not extend past the vermillion of the lip;
o or ^ i 3n<t:<£» KM, <*ns/iw ^U^ aS3-b46"J hLEOA
Does DHS Director Ridge feel that this classification of "discreet" is enough to
protect the flying public? Do our elected representatives? Does our flying public?
Do the loved ones of the over 3000 civilians murdered on 9/11 feel this is the
program distinction that will ensure that this tragedy will never occur again? Al
Qaeda must appreciate the fact that the FAM is so easy to pick out; especially since
FAMS executives continually disclose top-secret operational procedures.
The Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), which the FAMS is
part of, does not require its plain-clothes investigators to follow a military style
grooming policy, nor that its agents wear suit coats and ties. In fact, when ICE
Special Agents are selected to fly FAM missions they are not required to adhere to
FAM grooming and/or dress standards. On the rare occasion that the FAM needs to
deploy and break out of his/her covert status, professional behavior and actions will
enforce and promote the FAM's authority, not the manner of dress. Due to their
manner of dress and grooming, FAMs are constantly getting the "thumbs-up" from
the public who easily recognize the identity of the "undercover" FAM. This
recognition is potentially deadly to the FAM, airline crew and passengers.
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On January 30, 2004, Philadelphia FAMS Field Office Special Agent in Charge Liu
Shiang Louw addressed a crowd of 300+ FAMs at the FAMS Atlantic City, NJ
training center. He stated the following regarding the FAMS national sport coat
policy: "In case you need to take over an aircraft during a hijacking, -we want you
wearing a sport coat or a suit so that the passengers do not mistake you as
terrorists and possibly turn against you. "
Not only is the present dress code the issue at hand, but the fact that various field
offices are misinterpreting the dress code is also a major concern. At many field
offices, management is capriciously implementing a more restrictive and potentially
dangerous dress code (i.e. wearing of sports coats, matching suits, ties, etc.
regardless of mission destination). FAMs consider a necktie worn during a mission
as a "hangman's noose" for a potential attacker coming from behind them.
This easily resolvable issue will ensure the safety of all in the future. FAMS
management needs to employ common sense and confidence in the individual FAM
that he/she will dress appropriately. FAMS management also needs to recognize
that passengers, regardless of class of seating, do not have a set standard of dress.
This is 2004, not 1964; airline passengers do not "dress up" for flights in suit and
ties.
FLEOA has consistently tried to address the safety hazards that resulted by the
implementation of these policies. These restrictive policies make the FAM easy to
pick out to a civilian eye, not to mention the trained surveillance teams terrorist
groups employ. FAMS Director Quinn has refused to meet with FLEOA on these,
or any other, issues.
This is not only a FAM concern, FLEOA suggests FAM executives consult with
airline ground security coordinators, gate agents, pilots, flight attendants and/or any
other airline personnel. They can corroborate the assessment that FAMs are easily
identifiable by their dress, grooming and boarding procedures. The ability to easily
identify the FAM by any potential terrorist puts all involved at considerable risk.
The public deserves and expects more than a FAM who is easily spotted. Easy
recognition of the FAM negates their entire purpose and puts all flight in danger.
Special Report with Brit Hume (Fox News Network); 8/15/2002; Tony Snow Special Report with
Brit Huine (Fox News Network) 08-15-2002
SNOW: Well, one of the others is, Cecl, that they (FAMs) all have to dress like Mori. They
have a dress code.
CONNOLLY: Exactly. And the complaint that you hear on thai issue, which is a legitimate
one Li, if we're all in a uniform of sons, we'll slick out. And potential hi/ackers and
terrorists will know who we are and they'll just grab us first, defeating the whole purpose of
being undercover.
Air marshal program in disarray, insiders say USA Today; 8/15/2002; Blake Morrison USA Today
08-15-2002
Although they work undercover, marshals at some regional offices have been ordered to
adhere to a dress code that requires them to wear "conservative male or female business
attire " during most of their trips, documents show. Without special permission, they cannot
dress more casually.
Quinn says working marshals reviewed the dress code before it was issued, and good
marshals "would clearly understand, respect and appreciate" the policy. He says marshals
who provided details of the dress code to USA TODAY "are pulling us all at risk."
But marshals say making them look and dress alike 'is what threatens their cover, "This is
really dangerous," says one marshal, who left the Justice Department for the air marshal
program five months ago. "We are so obvious, the terrorists don't need to bring guns on the
planes anymore. They just need to gang up on us and lake our guns."
AIR MARSHAL PROGRAM MAY NEED RETOOLING. (EDITORIAL)
The News & Record (Piedmont Triad, NC); 8/19/2002
The government requires a strict dress code for air marshals to wear "conservative male or
female business attire." Air Marshals claim the look-alike dress is a dead giveaway of their
identity.
If these allegations are accurate - and there is reason to think they are credible - then the
air mashal program's "growingpains" must he promptly treated. The program, good in
concept, must prove effective in performance.
Easy identification. Marshals say they stand out because they are required to wear
business attire. Rodriguez said passengers often gave him and his partner a thumbs-up sign.
Yet marshals are told to keep working even if their cover has been blown.
Mode Hijackings Help U.S. Air Marshals Train Source: Reuters US Online Plus Date: 12/3/2003
Author: Deborah Charles ATLANTIC CITY, N.J. (Reuters) -
Air marshals have complained of... unable to maintain their cover because of a
requirement they dress in business attire Quinn said the service has rectified many of the
problems, ... adjusting the dress code so an air marshal can belter fit in, for example
allowing marshals on flights to vacation spots to dress casually.
Congressional Quarterly Jan. 7, 2004 - Secret Service Role in Air Security
By Martin Edwin Andersen, CQ Staff
Dress Codes - Federal workers, union officials and others, meanwhile, reported thai the air
marshals had grown tired not only of what they said were long work hours and a lack of
overtime pay, hut also of demands thai they wear business attire, like the Secret Service
images or ^'i t>n<n^s KM, <tns/U4 fl)* ba3-B4b:i hLtOA
// difficult for them to anonymously blend In with the passengers they were
supposed to protect.
Air marshals press security issues Agents say dress code, boarding procedures put them at risk
By Brock N. Meeks MSNBC WASHINGTON, Nov. 2, 2003
httoV/www.nisnbc.cona/news/9980S6.aj5p
The head of the federal Air Marshal Service is being pressed to take action on issues
directly affecting the security of Us rank and file members, according to documents
obtained byMSNBC.com. The "issues are raised in a letter from an air marshal identified as
the service's national representative to the Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association,
an organization that Intercedes and lobbies for federal agents that are forbidden from
union representation. More than 800 air marshals have now joined the organization,
MSNBC.com has learned.
THE OCT. 28 LETTER from the FLEOA agency president to Thomas Qulnn, director of the
Air Marshal Service, raises longstanding concerns of rank-and-file air marshals such as
dress codes and airline mandated boarding procedures that potentially compromise their
undercover status. Although the air marshals are supposed to operate covertly, the airlines
insist on hoarding procedures that place convenience over security, the letter says
(MSNBC.com is not detailing those procedures because of security concerns}. "This
practice obviously puts the FAMs' (federal air marshals') cover status in jeopardy, " the
letter says.
'BUSINESS ATTIRE'
Air marshals have complained about the service's dress code almost from the first day they
began flying in the posl-9/11 era. Air marshals interviewed by MSNBC.com say they are
required to wear "business attire " even when flying to resort destinations and other areas
in which such clothing makes them stand out. Air marshals have told MSNBC.com that they
are routinely spotted In airports as federal agents simply because of their manner of dress.
The letter to Qulnn notes this issue with chagrin: "[T]he embarrassment It causes the FAM
to have people spot us, due to our manner of dress, and thank us for being there or give us
the 'thumbs-up' sign as they walk by, it is potentially deadly to the FAM, crew and
passengers, " because now their supposed covert status has been compromised.
A spokesman for Immigrations and Customs Enforcement, the agency that now houses the
air marshal service, did not respond to a request for comment.
However, a General Accounting Office report released this week that specifically reviewed
several mismanagement allegations within the air marshal service, including the dress
code and airline boarding procedure issues, is at odds with the complaints raised in the
letter to Qulnn.
BOARDING PROCEDURES
Without question, current airline boarding policies place FAMs and passengers at
risk. Airline gate personnel give FAMs no option but to publicly board in front of
the other passengers, through the same departure gate as general boarding, 3-5
minutes prior to general boarding. This practice obviously puts the FAMs' cover
status in jeopardy by parading the FAM in front of passengers who are waiting for
the very flight the FAM is conducting their mission. These hazardous and poorly
thought out policies prevent the FAM from retaining their covert status and
SS.S-etO.5
obviously place them at great risk during the mission. Airlines should not dictate
how FAMs board. The FAM's safety should be the first concern. Airline
employees should not compromise the FAM's mission due to laziness and/or
ineffective boarding policies. FAMS management exposed FAM boarding
procedures on the aforementioned NBC Dateline exclusive.
FAMs currently sign into the Law Enforcement Officers Log Book at the airport
security screening points. Each point is requiring that the "log officer" obtain the
following: Flight number, destination, airline, phone numbers, etc. This is done in
plain view of passengers transiting through these screening checkpoints. It is
obvious that even a novice surveillance agent could sit near a checkpoint and
determine who these logged individuals are and their destination.
FLEOA advocates FAMs board the aircraft along with passengers during general
boarding of a flight. FAMs can arrange a meeting with an airline supervisor or the
flights' Captain. This will allow the FAM to display their credentials in a discreet
place away from public view. The airline crew can have the FAM briefing in their
flight books for review and can instruct the crew that FAMs will be on board and
their seat locations. FAMs can be reached on their mobile phones prior to boarding
to answer any questions of crewmembers. If a Captain insists on seeing at least one
FAM face to face to view his credentials, the FAM can present their credentials
inside the flight deck during general boarding. If warranted, a ground based FAM
can conduct a search of the aircraft before the mission FAMs board. In compliance
with current FAMS policy, FAMs can also inspect lavatories during flight.
Currently, it is very rare that pre-flight searches are conducted. This is due to the
inaccessibility FAMs have at airports where they are not based. FAMs only possess
their respective airports' Secure Identification Display Area (SIDA) badges;
therefore, FAMs must rely on airline personnel for all other airport access and
r-ayc I I Ul e. I 3. <t.£.y I-IVI, m I 3/LW /U^ SSJ-OtOJ l~LtOA
boarding. In addition, high productivity air carriers also bar FAMs from conducting
pre-flight searches due to rapid flight turn-arounds between destinations. Obviously,
there is no perfect procedure, but this procedure best safeguards the FAM's
identification without capitulation to the airline industry.
Air marshals boarding battle By Brock N. Meeks MSNBC WASHINGTON, Dec. 1 1 , 2003
.com/news/ 1004 130.asp?Ocv=CB10
CONFRONTATIONS
The airline boarding issue resulted in documented confrontations between airline
employees and air marshals. "A detailed review of the data pointed to differences in the
service 's and the airlines procedures for boarding aircraft, " the GAO report says. A
"mutually agreeable solution" for hoarding procedures was negotiated with the airlines,
the report says, to resolve the differences. But several air marshals contacted by
MSNBC.com say that if there was any agreement made, no one contacted them for input.
"We 're still being paraded in front of the passengers, " one air marshal loldMSNBC.com.
"The only 'resolution ' in this whole matter was to make the process more convenient for
the airlines, " the air marshal said.
FLEOA FAMS Agency President Frank Terreri has attempted to contact FAMS
Director Quinn concerning these safety issues; Mr. Quinn summarily ignored these
requests. FAMS management continues to reject the notion that these illogical
policies create hazardous working conditions that place the public in harms way.
On March 12, 2004, FAMS Director Quinn publicly stated the following while
addressing a FAM Phase 2 training class in Atlantic City, New Jersey: "I delete all
email I get from 'FLEA' (sic) and throw away any thing I get from "FLEA" (sic).
They're nothing but a bunch of pea brains and disgruntled amateurs. I'm in charge
of this Agency, and they won't dictate how I run things. All the letters they write to
Senate and Congress won't do any good; this is my Agency and if you don't like it,
leave." Furthermore, high-level FAMS managers continually state during "question
and answer" sessions with FAMs that they don't care about FAM concerns, will not
recognize FLEOA and FAMs "are lucky to be working. If you don't like it, leave."
FAMS Director Quinn has misinformed senior DHS officials and elected officials
about the effectiveness of the FAM service. While it is recognized that the FAMS
has some of the best and highly trained individuals in the law enforcement
community, all that training will prove to be useless if the security of individual
FAMs is continually ignored. These officials need to realize the ineffectuality of
this service and resolve the problems immediately. This time, government officials
need to heed the warnings of the employees' who actually do the job and recognize
the FAMS shortcomings. Not only has Director Quinn jeopardized the safety of the
FAM, he has endangered every American soul that flies or resides in the U.S. (as
we saw on 9/1 1 , most casualties were from citizens who were not flying but merely
a "target" for fanatics.)
Over 250, 000 applicants applied to by FAA after 9/1 1 for the FAM position. The
qualifying process was arduous and many candidates immediately dismissed due to
P*IVI,
Once hailed as the saving grace and "heroes" of the skies, FAMS Director Quinn
has publicly denigrated these troops with the disparaging terms such as "disgruntled
amateurs" and "pea brains" to name a few. Obviously, these FAMs were not the
type to be "disgruntled" or whine at the drop of a hat. If that were the case, their
background investigations would have reflected this with derogatory information
and disciplinary histories and they would have never been granted Top Secret
security clearances.
These FAMs have realized what a farce this program has turned into directly
attributable to FAM Service executives and Director Quinn. FAMs have a job to do
and they want to be allowed to do it safely and effectively. FAM Service
executives are prohibiting this.
The American public (our mothers, fathers, sisters, brothers, sons & daughters) are
being mislead by this charade perpetrated by FAMS executives and DHS. Families
of the 9/11 tragedy victims and every American citizen should demand that their
representatives immediately incorporate policies that ensure the safety of the flying
public, not just the perception of safety. This issue cannot be subjected to a round
table discussion. A decision made next year is too late. Make no mistake, the
longer we wait, the longer our loved ones are at grave risk.
The proverbial ball is in your court. FLEOA is confident that the only way change
can occur to these ineffective practices and safely returned to the American skies is
through your direct and immediate intervention.
Please contact FLEOA 1sL Vice President and PIO John Amat with any inquiries at
(305) 491-4687.
Respectfully,
Jon Adler
Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association (FLEOA)
National Secretary
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March 3, 2004
Apparently, FAM executives have taktn the position that providing the world with a step-by-step
narrative of how Federal Air Marshals covertly pre-boi commercial flights and make threat
assessments is somehow going to imp ove public confid ice. Instead of bolstering public
confidence, I have concerns that they thay haive sacrific the safety of both passengers and Air
Marshals for several sound bites. Since making it easier terrorists to identify flights that do
not have federal air marshals on board will not help the •line industry or the American public.
Making it easier to identify whom the Federal Air Mi are on a particular flight does not
make their job any easier.
Obviously, the NBC news segments w ere not limited to viewing by Americans who might be
apprehensive about flying and interest id in the security ptagrams that protect tbem. Instead, after
viewing these segments, those who warit to do us harm will now have better knowledge on how
to assess whether FAM's are on a part cular flight. FAM executives - apparently contradicting
the media sanctions they imposed on t leir Air Marshals for <discussing matters with members of
the news media - need to continue to upport their employees in their efforts to make aircraft
travel safer, and not focus their attention on broadcasting information that should remain private.
It is important to note that FLEOA dii not wait until after the airing of the program to express
their concerns about these segments and the information that they would release about the
program. Prior to the airing, represenlatives from FLEO.JV attempted to meet with FAM Director
This situation is particularly puzzling when you consider the Transportation Security
Administration's (TSA) reaction to previous press reports regarding the inner-workings of the
Federal Air Marshal program. As you may recall, it was reported last summer that TSA was
planning on reducing the number of FAM's on certain flights due to budgetary concerns. This
information was provided to the press via anonymous FAJM's. The reaction to these reports was
twofold. Fiist, TSA made a swift reversal of the decision and did not cut FAM's on cross-
country flights which has made air travel safer. The second reaction was more troubling. Soon
after these press reports an internal investigation was launched and was widely described as a
witch hunt and TSA official vowed to find onl who was talking to the press and punish the
individual or individuals. Mr. Secretary, why is information that makes our air travel safer met
with a "witch hunt" while information that could compromise the safety of air travel fodder for
the network news?
Your swift attention to this letter is anticipated to ensure that our shared commitment to securing
air travel is met. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions or have an
appropriate staff member contact Edward Mills of my office at 225-7944 or
edward.mi llsfofrnail .house, eov.
C A R O L B . MALONEY
Member of Congress
Page 16 of 21 5:14:30 PM, 4/15/04 702993-8463 FLEOA
NATIONAL OFFICERS
President
TIMOTHY! DANAIIEY
Frank Terreri
Executive Vice-President Federal Law Enforcement Association
ARTHUR CiORDON
First Vice-President Federal Air Marshal Agency President
JOHN AM AT
Second Vice-president
P.O. Box 2311
CHARLES IIYACINTIIE
Treanurcr
Sun City, CA 92586
JOSEPH D'ORSANEO (909) 233-7345 MOBILE
AIRLINE PROCEDURES
ISSUES
>• Certain airline boarding policies place FAM's and passengers at risk.
FAM's are constantly boarded in front of the other passengers 3-5 minutes
before they board. This practice obviously puts the FAM's cover status in
jeopardy. These inept and potentially hazardous policies prevent the FAM
from properly briefing the crew, in addition to denying the FAM the
opportunity to search planes.
> Not being allowed the option of split briefings, especially on A320's
where FAM's cannot utilize any concealment.
> FAM's should not sign the Law Enforcement Officers Log Book at the
airport security screening points. Each point is requiring that the "log officer"
obtain the following: flight number, destination, airline, phone numbers, etc.
This is done in plain view of passengers transiting through these screening
checkpoints. It is obvious that even a novice surveillance agent could sit near
a checkpoint and determine who, what, and where these logged individuals
are and their destination.
RESOLUTIONS
> Airlines should not dictate how FAM's will board. The FAM's safety
should be the first concern, not political correctness. Airline employees
should not compromise the FAM's mission due to laziness and/or ineffective
boarding policies. If we cannot get the airlines to board us properly, assign
FAM's to airports to escort other transiting FAM's. This way we can ensure
FAM's are not compromised.
> To facilitate movement through airports and eliminate the need for
ground airport personnel, universal S1DA badges should be issued to FAM's
for all airports.
ISSUES/RESOL UTIONS
ISSUES
> There were many promises (real and/or implied) made when FAM's
were hired and obviously many of those promises have not been kept. FAM's
were promised new hubs would be opened and transfers would be readily
accommodated once the program was "set up".
> There is no standard set of guidelines on how to rank FAM's in order of
Seniority at the Field Offices.
RESOLUTIONS
> Solicit for non-paid moves (also known as no cost to government moves)
from current FAM's before placing new hires at these available locations.
> Set up a database at each hub, by seniority, of current FAM's preference
for relocation, i.e. 1. Miami 2. Los Angeles 3. New York. Compile this
information to facilitate non-paid/no cost to government moves/swap of
current employees who desire to relocate (i.e. FAM currently at Miami
-aye l^>UI£.l J. I t.-JU I-IVI, H/ 13/UH / U£ 33O-OHOO
wishes to transfer to Las Vegas is linked with a FAM at Las Vegas who
desires to work in Miami. They agree to "swap" their positions, get approval
from management and agree on non-paid move and timetable for move).
FAM's would utilize their annual leave time and fund the cost of the move to
their new duty location.
> A definitive set of rules on how to rank seniority needs to be established
and followed by all field offices
SCHEDULING
ISSUES
> Schedules are not consistent, i.e. one mission may start at 0530 and the
next at 1530 or vice-versa. This does not give the FAM or their family
members any kind of schedule for outside matters, i.e. childcare, spouse
work schedule, etc.
> FAM's would like to fly and train with either set partners or a very small
group of people.
RESOLUTIONS
> Dividing FAM's into shifts and allowing them to bid on shift preference
according to seniority. The shift breakdown can be as simple as start time
before or after OSOOhrs. 1400hrs. or ISOOhrs. (Or later if flights supported
this request). This would eliminate the irregularity of having to report one
day at 0530hrs.and the following day at 1400hrs. Especially when flying out
of your local HUB.
> Allow FAM's to bid on destination location, i.e. FAM #1 preference:
Honolulu, Dulles and Baltimore. FAM #2 preference: Miami, Orlando and
Atlanta.
> Allow trip swapping with another FAM. By allowing a trip swap, FAM's
can choose times and destinations that improve the quality of life and job
satisfaction for all involved.
> All FAM's to select overnight/same-day trip preference by seniority.
> Squads already divide FAM Field offices. It should be simple to make a
schedule that allows these squad members to fly and train together.
LEAVE
1SSUE/RESOL UTION
> FAM'S feel the time-line for submitting leave requests is excessive and
needs to be much more flexible.
I U. 9/ I I r-age
NATIONAL OFFICERS
President
TIMOTHY J. DANAIIEY
Executive Vice-President
ARTIIUROORDON
First Vicb-President
JOHN AM AT
Second Viiie.President
CHARLES HYACINTHE
Treasurer
JOSEPH D'ORSANEO
y
masHKeau
CHAIR
Date:
H Hamilton
ICE CHAIR
ard Ben-Veniste
TO: TEAM Q-
Oeland
F.Fielding
FROM: Dianna Campagna
5 S. Gorelick
$*$W^
Facshillt ItaiSBlsslM
FROM
Formerly,
Message: Pkase see the attached public request and FAA WHISTLE BLOWER CASE WB 0283;
US DOL OALJ CASE NOS. 2003-AIR-12; 2004-AIR-6; ARBCASE NOS. 04-095 A 04-066;
US DOL OALJ CASE NOS. 2003-CAA-08; 2003-CAA-16; ARB CASE NOS. 03-061 & 03-125
//,
04/11/2004 20:06 9013601038 COLEEN L POWERS PAGE 02
I.
PUBLIC REQUEST TO 9-11 COMMISSION: PLEASE INCLUDE IN YOUR 9-11
INVESTIGATIONS:
Ms. Powers respectfully requests this review and investigation on behalf of the public because
persons who work in the airline industry will not file security and safety complaints when they see
that the US DOL refuses to provide them denovo hearings that were timely requested.
If the US DOL OALJ is allowed to deny and refuse whistle blowers the right to a denovo hearing,
the intent of Congress in passing the Whistle Blower statutes has been usurped and the public
interest has not been served as Congress clearly intended.
If the US DOL ARB is allowed to continue to issue Orders that are not supported by the whole
technical record, the intent of Congress has again been usurped.
These are national concerns on the public's welfare as they relate to terrorism, commercial
air transportation safety and security, public investments, and terrorist threats on our
Nation's public water supplies, our hazardous materials storage and waste transportation
facilities, and other environmental regulations that were passed to protect our Nation's
resources, public Investments, and security and safety In the commercial aviation
Industry.
Please include a review of the Appearances of Conflicts of Interest within the staff at the US DOL
OALJ, the US DOL ARB, and the relationships with this Presidential administration and Board
Members ofNWA Airlines Corporation, {NWAC}, Pinnacle Airtines Corporation, {PNCL}, the US
DOL PWBA, and the corporate law firm of Piper Rudnick. LLP.
Our Congress delegated this important role in protecting our Whlstleblowers who report aviation
security, safety, and public accounting concerns to federal authorities including the US DOL. This
federal Department, as the evidence in the technical record of the cases shown below
demonstrates, the US DOL has not complied with the spirit and intent of Congress in passing
these whistle blowing laws.
II.
PUBLIC REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION BY THE 9-11 COMMISSION ON FAILURES OF US
DOL OALJ, US DOL OSHA Region 4 and Delays of the US DOL ARB
in Public whistle blowing on commercial airline security breaches and compromises to public
safety in commercial transportation as initially reported to the FAA and US DOL OSHA Region 4
04/11/2004 20:06 9013601038 COLEEN L POWERS
PAGE 03
on June 17. 2002 and Sarbanea Oxlev potential violations reported initially on August 28. 2002.
respectively.
Re: FAA Case WB 0283 filed June 17, 2002 and assigned to FAA Investigator in
July 2002; Aug 8,2002 Letter to whistle blower
PLEASE NOTE:
1) The whistleblower was DENIED a donovo hearing by the US DOL OALJ; this is US DOL
defiance and violation of Federal Law pursuant to 29 CFR Part 1979 and 29 CFR Part 1980.
2) The US DOL OSHA Region 4 never interviewed any of the complainant's witnesses
3) In the US DOL OALJ, ALJ Linda S. Chapman August 14, 2003 "Status Order", in US
DOL OALJ Whistle Blower case 2003-AIR-12 at page 2, paragraph 2, this federal
public official wrote, in part,
"Thus, it is not within the scope of these proceedings to determine if the Respondent
Has violated FAA or OSHA safety regulations, or committed breaches of airline
security..."
The Chief Administrative Law Judge at the US DOL OALJ, Mr. John M. Vittone, has an
employment history directly related to the airline industry, and, to the very best of Ms.
Powers' knowledge and belief, Mr. Vittone is the immediate supervisor of ALJ Judge
Linda S. Chapman.
Such appearances of conflicts of interest in the US DOL do not serve the public in the
full and complete investigation of airline security and safety whistle blowing complaints.
y0i3b0i03s coLEEN L POWERS PAGE 04
III. PUBUC CONCERNS AND INQUIRIES; PUBLIC REQUEST TO THE 9-11 COMMISSION:
Task Force Requested
Dear Honorable 9-11 Commission Chair, Mr. Thomas H. Kean, and US DOL Administrative
Review Board {ARB} Chair, Ms. Cynthia Douglass:
Good afternoon. The primary purpose of this public request is to communicate concerns on the
failures within the US DOL as it relates to the promotion of our Nation's airline security and safety
and our war on Terrorism. In this request for review, the entire record in ARB cases 04-066 and
04035, and especially on it's March 31,2004 Orders that fail to provide specific support to the
whole technical record in the matters of public Whistle Blowing relative to the National Public
Interest in Commercial Aviation Security and Safety as promulgated at 29 CFR part 1979, Final
Rule, March 21,2003.
This public communication request also politely requests the 9-11 Commission delegate »task
force to review and investigate the US DOL in it's unsupported Orders issued March 31,2004, to
Investigate the US DOL OALJ for conflicts o1 interest and its failure to conduct a denovo
hearing as required by Federal regulation, and the US DOL OSHA 4 office for their failure to
Interview and obtain testimony from the complainant's witnesses with regard to the June 17,
2002 FAA Safety / Security Complaint filed simultaneously with the US DOL OSHA 4 office
and Whistle blowing on Commercial Aviation Security and Safety matters. A brief summary of
these public concerns is outlined below: {Amendments were filed as shown in the public record}.
A.
BACKGROUND SUMMARY:
On May 18, 2002,1 was threatened with immediate termination if I did not continue my duties as a
crewmember which were violations of FAA Federal Aviation Regulations located at 14 CFR Part
121.467(b)(4)and(14).
On or about June 4, 2002,1 discovered that the air carrier had falsified required FAA time and
duty records for crewmembers, and times of aircraft departure were "whited out" on operational
paperwork;
On or about June 7, June 17, and 18,2002,1 located FAA required records that showed
the air carrier falsified records, they showed an aircraft, its passengers, and crew members in
another state and city for 2 hrs and 40 minutes, which is a major breach in commercial airline
security.
On June 20. 2002,1 was threatened with potential discipline and the false records of the air
carrier were provided to the air carrier. The air carrier then demanded to know
"how did you get these records?". Thereafter, in my interviews of certain employees, I learned
they were intimidated and threatened by management for disclosure to me of these required FAA
records and their location on company premises.
The air carrier breached security, and they did not make a good faith effort to investigate my
internal concerns within 30 days. Thus, the complaint was filed June 17, 2002 with the FAA and
OSHA Region 4 for compliance with the OSH Act of 1970 and its 30 day limitation to file a
complaint of discrimination for whistle blowing.
04/11/2004 20:06 9013601038 COLEEN L POWERS PAGE 05
The air carrier removed the FAA" AIR21* web pages I posted in our crew lounge in {Sept 2002}.
These were removed by the air carrier on or about Dec. 10, 2003.
On Dec 10.2003, the date of the US DOL OAU ALJ Linda S. Chapman" Recommended
Decision and Order" {RDO} which was issued on an unsupported and unethical Motion for
Summary Judgment filed by Piper Rudnidc without anv donovo hearing as required at the
regulations on 29 CFR Part 1979 and 29 CFR Part 1980.
This "RDO" was timely appealed on Dec 22.2003, and the appeal was supported with wholly
detailed and supported objections and exceptions taken to the RDO. {as required at 29 CFR
Parts 1979.110 and 1980.110} to the US DOL ARB and Noticed in an Order dated Jan ,8, 2004.
B.
On April 10, 2004 I received two {2} ORDERS . both dated March 31,2004 and signed by the
General Counsel, Ms. Janet Dunlop, for the Administrative Review Board. {ARB}
Upon close examination and review of these ORDERS. It does not appear that any Board
Member {i.e., Chair. Ms. Cynthia Douglass, Wayne Beyer, Judith Boggs, or Oliver Transue) had
any involvement in these Orders as evidenced by:
4)Additionally, the March 31,2004 Order Denying the Motions for Summary Reversal and
Default, does not accurately reflect the caption of the March 25,2004 filing of the petitioner and
complainant:
5) The March 31, 2004 Order also falls to address the "alternative motions" in the Feb 2, 2004
and March 25,2004 motions/ requests which were timely filed, pursuant to the terms of the
Jan. 6, 2004 and March 11, 2004 Orders in ARB case 04-035;
6) it is not signed by any Board Review Member and it vaguely references an "evaluation" made
by the Board of this Summary Reversal / Remand Motion that was filed February 2,2004
pursuant to the terms of the Jan 8, 2004 Order.
7) It falls to even cite or specifically reference Powers' March 25, 2004 Motion for Default and
rebuttal to named person Pinnacle's Feb 11, 2004 opposition filing;
8) On April 1, 2004 Powers' filed a Motion and Request For Expedited Review of her Feb 2,2004
and March 25,2004 Motions for Summary Reversal/ Remand of the Dec. 10, 2003 RDO
premised and grounded in authority by the Code of Federal Regulations at 29 CFR Part 1979
and 29 CFR Part 1980, DOL Secretary Orders, Executive Orders, as welt as the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedures, as specifically directed In the Board's own Jan. 8, 2004 and March
11, 2004 Orders
_04/H/20B4 20:06 9013601038 COLEEN L POWERS
PAGE 06
IV.
PUBLIC INQUIRY AND INFO REQUEST to THE US DOL ARB AND THE 8-11 COMMISSION:
Please kindly provide a copy of the "Board's evaluation" that would support the March 31, 2004
Order Denying The Motions for Summery Reversal end Default,
in ARB case 04-035
1) the details and specify with reference to the whole entire technical record in this case that
would support the March 31, 2004 Order Denying the Motions for Summary Reversal
and Default,
2) the ORDER itself is approximately 1 and 1/2 single spaced pages, and fails to show with
detailed and supported specificity by reference to the technical record on how the
Petitioner's Feb.2, 2004 Motion for Summary Reversal of the Dec. 10, 2003 RDO, and in
the Alternative Motion for Immediate Remand for a Denovo Hearing is insufficient;
3) There is no indication that the motions and their incorporated by reference exhibits and
citations to the technical record were even considered by the Board's General Counsel, Ms.
Janet Dunlop.
4) There is the inference and causal link that the Board's General Counsel did however, review
the named person Pinnacle's oppositions filed Feb 11,2004 and March 29, 2004 and based
the March 31,2004 Order Denying the Motions for Summary Reversal and Default .and the
referenced, "evaluation" on these opposing named person Pinnacle's Feb. 11 and March 29,
2004 illogical arguments. The vague and ambiguous language of this March 31, 2004 Order
shows the Order was issued without complete and thorough due regard , review, and
examination of Powers' motions and their cited specific references to the whole |ecfrr>/ca/
record.
5) On Feb 17, 2004, March 11, March 17, 2004, March 19.2004, Ms. Powers' initiated verbal and
written inquiries with the Board staff, Ms. Battle and her responses were that the Board had
not yet made a decision on Powers' February 2, 2004 Motion for Reversal/ Remand motion
that was timely filed Feb. 2, 2004.
6)The nexus of named person Pinnacle's March 29, 2004 opposition to Powers' March 25, 2004
Motion for Default on her Feb 2, 2004 Motions for Summary Reversal/ Remand (included an
alternative motion cited in the caption} and the Board General Counsel, Ms. Janet Durtop's
March 31, 2004 Order Denying the Motions for Summary Reversal and Default {Filed Feb 2,
2004 and March 25, 2004} plus
the contention of named person Pinnacle's March 29, 2004 opposition to the March 25, 2004
Motion for Default, that he received a voicemail from the Board General counsel on Feb 6,
2004 where he alleges the Board's General Counsel told him he could file a reply to the Feb. 2,
2004 Motion for Summary Reversal if he chose to do so. This certainly shows that named
person counsel consciously chose not to reply to Powers' Feb 2,2004 Motion for Summary
Reversal/ Remand for a denovo hearing on the grossly erred Dec. 10, 2003 RDO and this
material fact is nowhere in the March 31,2004 Order.
04/11/2804 20:06 9013601038 COLEEN L POWERS PAGE 07
In light of the current 9-11 Commission hearings, the relevance of Commercial Airline Security
and safety issues in these Federal FAA / US DOL Whistle Blower proceedings, these concerns
that the US DOL violated Federal regulations at 29 CFR Part 1979 and 1980 by the US DOL
OALJ refusal and failure to provide a whistle blower a denovo hearing as required by federal law.
the material fact that the US DOL ARB Board General Counsel appears to disregard tfie
preamble language of 29 CFR 1979 and 29 CFR Part 1980 and the petitioner's duty to file
specific objections and exceptions to the RDO with his Petition for Review, for the purposes of an
expedited review and to effectuate a less congested docket, are legitimate concerns that affect
all tax payers.
WHEREFORE, this public request to include these matters in the investigation and
Congressional mandates of 2002 to the 9-11 Commission should assist the 9-11 Commission
in it's review and prospective findings of fact, proposed conclusions of law, and the prospective
"Recommendations" for our future Homeland Security, our War on Terrorism and required
recommendations designed to guard against future attacks against the United States by requiring
the US DOL to be:
This would also include 9-11 Commission Findings that should ORDER the US DOL to
immediately comply with the proper and efficient administration of the Whistteblower laws passed
by Congress to protect fnot punish! those who report these activities that ultimately affect all
US citizens in the areas of public safety, security, health, welfare, and public investments.
Congress, our US American citizens, and the US DOL cannot allow States to discriminate against
whistle blowers for their State public servant/employees' nationally protected activities with their
unsupported reliance on bogus "sovereign immunity" claims, and the US DOL OALJ cannot be
allowed to continue to refuse to conduct denovo hearings that were timely requested by whistle
blowers in these matters of national public security, safety, and welfare and the effects on our
Homeland Security.
Thank you for your time and assistance. Please contact me at (901) 360-1038 if you have any
questions on these public concerns and the issues stated herein.
Fbnrwfy,
Supervisor, Trainer, and Lead RCRA Subtitle C {Hazardous waste} Inspector / Investigator
Commercial Treatment, Storage, and Disposal {TSD} Operations
Compliance and Enforcement
Memphis, TN
for the
Incorporated by Reference:
1) FAA Whistle Blower case no. WB 0283, assigned on about August 8, 2002
Mr. Phil Trenary, President and CEO, Pinnacle Airlines, Inc., d/b/a Northwest
Airlink as a contractor through an Airline Service Agreement with NWA; also
A Board Member of Pinnacle Airlines Corporation {publicly traded as
"PNCL", "IPO" on November 25,2003}.
Enclosed is a copy of a letter I sent to the FAA on February 24, 2003, concerning
Northwest Airlines violating FARs, and serious security violations allowing passenger
bags to stay on board after passengers deplane on international flights. I had previously
written to the FAA in July 2001 about these issues, but have never received a response.
Last week I contacted James Whitlow, Deputy Chief Counsel at the FAA, to find out why
the FAA had not responded to my letters and requests. After nearly an hour telephone
conversation, during which Mr. Whitlow made various excuses for the FAA's non-
responsiveness, Mr. Whitlow stated he believed the TSA was now handling such issues.
Mr. Whitlow was going to check to see if the TSA was actually now in charge. This did
not answer the question as to why the FAA had not responded to the safety concerns I
reported in July 2QOI, prior to 9-11 and the existence of TSA.
In my July 2001 letter, I referenced the bag match violations, and I brought up my
concern that letters and Air Safety reports such as mine could be accessed by terrorists
through FOIA; I specifically warned the FAA about Osama Bin Laden's organiaation. I
noted that such reports could allow terrorists the opportunity to become aware of the
various airlines' specific weaknesses, such as the fact that Northwest was violating FARs
in the passenger/bag match area. Logically, terrorists could use such information to
conclude which airlines could be targeted through their weaknesses. An area of concern
would be that the FAA has made a habit of summarily dismissing the security and safety
concerns of other airline pilots or crew.
Two years prior to my letter, a fallow Northwest Captain, Craig S. Friday, submitted
virtually identical safety reports about passenger/bag match concerns to the FAA. The
FAA investigated this through Nicholas A. Sabatini, who concluded that Northwest had
corrected all their problems. Since I experienced the same problem two years later on my
own flights, it is clear Northwest did not, in actual fact, fix the problems.
I find it disturbing that an FAA-certified Captain can make a security report concerning a
serious security issue to the FAA, but cannot get any written response from them for over
two years.
I understand that Captain Friday has contacted Senator Rollings about such security
information, and other safety issues, and that the FAA failed to respond to him. He is
waiting to hear from Senator Ho llihgs 'office about this issue, and other new information
he submitted.
Northwest Airlines retaliated against me for writing the July 2001 safety letter to the
FAA. I attempted to file for protection under the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Act (AIR 21)
with the Seattle OSHA office, citing whistleblower status, but District Administrator
Richard Terrill and Assistant District Administrator Dean Ikeda refused to accept my
AIR 21 complaint.
I would appreciate it if your commission could take the time to read the enclosed letter,
and could find out why the FAA does not feel it is necessary to investigate or respond to
safety concerns submitted by FAA-certified airline Captains. I am available to answer
any questions, and I am willing to testify about these concerns.
Enclosures
February 24,2003
I am sure you are aware of our yearly training program for all pilots, which
includes new security updates A few years ago, before 9/11, it was revealed to
pilots at NWA that the FBI had uncovered a scheme by a terrorist group to
attempt to blow up more than one major air carrier wide-body aircraft over the
pacific at the same time. We were told that Northwest Airlines was one of the
carriers targeted for this potential attack.
The refusal on the part of NWA to fully comply with FAA rules that all passengers
and bags must match is a serious concern. It concerns me that an investigation
was done in which the FAA found no violation in this area, when I personally
wrote up a violation myself a year or so ago. Upon further personal investigation,
I found that a fellow NWA pilot, Captain Craig S, Friday, was assisting In another
FAA Investigation by L. Nicholas Lacey and Nicholas A. Sabatini in 1998/98.
Captain Friday also witnessed and wrote up International incidents of NWA not
complying with the passenger bag matches on his own trips.
The findings from the report on Captain Friday's concerns were disturbing, The
FAA was satisfied that NWA knew there were passenger bag match problems,
and NWA and NWA Security stated they had already corrected those problems,
and that these problems would not occur again in the future. It is disturbing to
find that the FAA obviously did not follow up, as this report was in 1999, yet I was
experiencing the exact same problems on more than one occasion after this. It Is
even more disturbing that the FAA has apparently decided to ignore my more
recent reports, even after 9/11. In addition, Pan AM and Air India are both
examples/proof that terrorists put bombs on airlines in luggage.
Captain Friday wrote up this problem in 1998. I wrote this problem a year or so
ago. We both have whistleblower complaints filed with OSHA. I was just
informed by Captain Friday that he is being virtually attacked fay OSHA In Seattle
for filing his whistleblower complaint against NWA Involving airline safety I was
under the impression that the AIR21 bill was enacted to Improve airlines safety,
and protect airline employees from retaliation due to their safety concerns. For
the record, trie Seattle OSHA office has all of Captain Friday's and my safety
concerns on file. We were bath under the impression that the FAA used and/or
had access to this OSHA information.
Sincerely.