PANEL 1: (CHRIS' NAME)

MAIN QUESTIONS (See Workplan):

1. Prior to September 11, 2001, what did the U.S. aviation security systems know
about terrorist threat to civil aviation? How did the different elements of the
system respond to any such information in their possession?

2. What aviation security policies and procedures were in effect as of September 11,
2001? How did these measures comply with relevant laws and regulations?
What was known of the effectiveness of this system, and how was this measured?

3. What were the major policy and budgetary priorities for civil aviation security
prior to 0/11/01? How was security prioritized among other aviation policy
considerations? What risk management techniques were used in making aviation
security determinations? How did financing of the aviation security system
impact the system?

QUESTIONS BY WITNESS:

Jane Garvey (Former FAA Administrator)

1) When you came to the FAA as administrator what was your assessment of the
Aviation Security System and its effectiveness? By what means and what criteria
was effectiveness measured? What did you see as the security system's biggest
shortcomings?

2) Did you establish a formal agenda for improving the security system? Did this
agenda include formal goals, benchmarks and timelines? What were your
priorities and why?

3) How did you stay up-to-date with respect to both the general effectiveness of the
aviation security system and specific terrorist threats to aviation security? What
was the process by which you received aviation security information, alerts and
updates? From what agencies and internal personnel did you receive this
information?

4) When you received security system warnings or improvement recommendations

either from the Inspector General, the GAO or other sources, what was the
process for responding to the alert and considering the recommendations? What
criteria were used in determining whether to implement the suggestions?
 5) How specifically did FAA weigh security in relation to competing agendas
relative to its mission, including security vs. cost containment? What was the
organizational attitude in the FAA with respect to security vis a vis other priorities
when you arrived? What was your philosophy and how was that implemented?

6) What was the role of the industry in decision-making about security matters?

7) What exactly did you know about the nature and timing of terrorist threats prior to
September 11, 2001? What actions did you take in response to this information?

8) Where were you when the incident occurred and what did you do?

9) Were your actions and responses following the incident guided by any prepared
protocol, or did you have to react spontaneously using your best judgment?

10) After 9/11, what steps did the FAA take to ascertain the facts about how precisely
the aviation security system functioned with respect to the hijackings? What
analytical, corrective and disciplinary actions were taken in response?

11) There are reports that an executive summary exists describing activity in the
FAA Command Center on 9/11 and suggestions that the report includes
indications there was a gun on one of the planes. What do you know about this
report?

Kenneth Mead (Inspector General, Department of Transportation)

1) At a Congressional hearing on September 25, 2001 you said the following:

The Department of Transportation Inspector General and

the GAO "have issued numerous reports identifying weak-
nesses in the aviation security system and recommending
corrective action. Many of these weaknesses are still present
and need to be addressed without delay."

What were the biggest weaknesses you identified in the Aviation Security System
prior to 9/11?

2) Why were problems in the system so persistent?

3) Over the 12 years you audited aviation security under the auspices of the GAO
and as Inspector General how would you describe the Department of
Transportation and the FAA's responsiveness to your aviation security audits,
alerts and recommendations?
4) To what extent does the statement you made at the September 25, 2001 hearing
still apply?

5) What was the Department's formal process for addressing problems you raised
and for considering the corrective actions you recommended?

6) In your view, were there any recommendations you made as Inspector General
that the FAA did not implement or insufficiently implemented, that if adopted
would likely have stopped the hijackings from occurring?