TOLENTINO V VILLANUEVA Facts: * Romulo Tolentino files an annulment case vs Helen Villanueva, alleging that his consent was

obtained thru fraud. Helen was pregnant when they didnt have sex. They never lived as husband and wife and actually left his house. * She was served with summons but didnt file a responsive pleading. Romulo filed a motion to declare her in default * Judge declared her in default. Referred the case to the fiscal for investigation re collusion * Fiscal required Romulo and counsel to bring documents * Romulo questioned the fact that fiscal has not submitted his report. Judge denied, Romulo must submit himself for interrogation * Judge eventually dismissed the complaint bec Romulo was not willing to submit himself for interrogation. MR denied Articles 88-101 (CC) expressly prohibit the rendition of a decision in suits for annulment for marriage and legal separation based on a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment: ART. 88. No judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the provisions of article 101, paragraph 2, shall be observed. ART. 101. No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated. The prohibition expressed in the aforesaid laws and rules is predicated on the fact that the institutions of marriage and of the family are sacred and therefore are as much the concern of the State as of the spouses; because the State and the public have vital interest in the maintenance and preservation of these social institutions against desecration by collusion between the parties or by fabricated evidence. The prohibition against annulling a marriage based on the stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment or by non-appearance of the defendant stresses the fact that marriage is more than a mere contract between the parties; and for this reason, when the defendant fails to appear, the law enjoins the court to direct the prosecuting

officer to intervene for the State in order to preserve the integrity and sanctity of the marital bonds LC, AFFIRMED

"Petition for the Presumption of Death of Nicolai Szatraw", 81 Phil., 461, a case similar to the present, the Supreme Court held: The petition is not for the settlement of the estate of Nicolai Szatraw, because it does not appear that he possessed property brought to the marriage and because he had acquired no property during his married life with the petitioner. The rule invoked by the latter is merely one of evidence which permits the court to presume that a person is dead after the fact that such person had been unheard from in seven years had been established. This presumption may arise and be invoked and made in a case, whether in an action or in a special proceeding, which is tried or heard by, and submitted for decision to, a special proceeding. In this case, there is no right to be enforced nor is there a remedy prayed for by the petitioner for the final determination of his right or status or for the ascertainment of a particular fact (Hagans vs. Wislizenus, 42 Phil., 880), for the petition does not pray for a declaration that the petitioner's husband is dead, but merely asks for a declaration that he be presumed dead because he had been unheard from in seven years. If there is any pretense at securing a declaration that the petitioner's husband is dead, such a pretension cannot be granted because it is unauthorized. The petition is for a declaration that the petitioner's husband is presumptively dead. But this declaration, even if judicially made, would not improve the petitioner's situation, because such a presumption is established by law. A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executory, would still be a prima facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a competent court has to pass. The latter must decide finally the controversy the right or status of a party or established finally a particular fact, out of which certain rights and obligations arise or may arise; and once such controversy is decided by a final judgment or such right or status is determined, then the judgment on the subject of the controversy, or the decree upon the right or status of a party or upon the existence of a particular fact, becomes res judicata, subject to no collateral attack, except in a few rare instances especially provided by law. It is, therefore, clear that a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he had been unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof cannot reach the state of finality or become final. Proof of actual death of the person presumed dead because he had been unheard from in seven years, would have to be made in another proceeding to have such particular fact finally determined. If a judicial decree declaring a person presumptively dead, because he

had not been heard from in seven years, cannot become final and executory even after the lapse of the reglementary period within which an appeal may be taken, for such a presumption is still disputable and remains subject to contrary proof, then a petition for such a declaration is useless, unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the petitioner. The Court should not waste its valuable time and be made to perform a superfluous and meaningless act. "Little effort is necessary to perceive that a declaration such as the one prayed for by the petitioner, if granted, may make or lead her to believe that the marital bonds which binds her to her husband are torn asunder, and that for that reason she is or may feel free to enter into a new marriage contract. The framers of the rules of court, by the presumption provided for in the rule of evidence in question, did not intend and mean that a judicial declaration based solely upon that presumption may be made. A petition for a declaration such as the one filed in this case may be made in collusion with the other spouse. If that were the case, then a decree of divorce that cannot be obtained or granted under the provisions of the Divorce Law (Act No. 2710) could easily be secured by means of a judicial decree declaring a person unheard from in seven years to be presumptively dead. This is another strong reason why a petition such as the one presented in this case should not be countenanced and allowed. What cannot be obtained directly under the provisions of the Divorce Law could indirectly be secured under the provisions of Rule 123, section 69 (x). Obviously, the latter must not be made to prevail over the former." In view of the foregoing and the doctrine of the Supreme Court laid down in the case above-cited, the Court hereby orders that this case be, as it is hereby dismissed, without pronouncement as the costs.

Donato v Luna An information for bigamy against petitioner Leonilo Donato was filed on January 23, 1979 with the lower court in Manila. This was based on the complaint of private respondent Paz Abayan. Before the petitioners arraignment on September 28, 1979, Paz filed with Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila, a civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with petitioner contracted on September 26, 1978. Said civil case was based on the ground that Paz consented to entering into the marriage which was Donatos second since she had no previous knowledge that Donato was already married to a certain Rosalinda Maluping on June 30, 1978. Donato defensed that his second marriage was void since it was solemnized without a marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation and undue influence were employed by private respondent to obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage. Prior to the solemnization of the second marriage, Paz and Donato had lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of wedlock for 5 years proven by a joint affidavit executed by them on September 26, 1978 for which reason, the requisite marriage license was dispensed with pursuant to Article 76 of the Civil Code. Donato continued to live with Paz until November 1978 where Paz left their home upon learning that Donato already previously married. ISSUE: Whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the lower court be suspended in view of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending before the juvenile and domestic relations court on the ground that latter constitutes a prejudicial question. HELD: Petitioner Leonilo Donato cant apply rule on prejudicial question since a case for annulment of marriage can only be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused if it was proved that petitioners consent to such marriage and was obtained by means of duress violence and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy. Pursuant to the doctrine discussed in Landicho vs. Relova, petitioner Donato cannot apply the rule on prejudicial questions since a case for annulment of marriage can be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused only if it is proved that the petitioner's consent to such marriage was obtained by means of duress, violence and intimidation in order to establish that his act in the subsequent marriage was an involuntary one and as such the same cannot be the basis for

conviction. The preceding elements do not exist in the case at bar. Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question shown to exit the order of denial issued by the respondent judge dated April 14, 1980 should be sustained. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. We make no pronouncement as to costs.