Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 1979 This book does not neatly fit into the IV-DV framework,

so I will break out a couple main themes. Waltzs book is as much a book about relations between states as it is a book on the philosophy of social science. Chapter 1 sets out the relationships between laws and theories. To Waltz, a theory is A theory is a picture, mentally formed, of a bounded realm or domain of activity. A theory is a depiction of the organization of a domain and of the connections among its parts. The infinite materials of any realm can be organized in endlessly different ways. A theory indicates that some factors are more important than others and specifies relations among them. TIP is essentially a more rigorous statement of themes developed in MSW. His crucial arguments build on why reductionist theories are inapplicable to international relations and that we must consider systemic theories as the main work horse in international relations. He argues this by setting up a theory of ordering principles by which any collection of agents might be organized. What are the ordering principles of the international system? All of them are derived from the structure of the system: 1) principal of ordering (hierarchial vs not) 2) specification of the functions of formally differentiated units 3) distribution of capabilities across those units For Waltzs theory, number 2 obtains for states only insofar as they vary on 3 His fundamental argument then becomes that anarchy prevents the ordering of states along a hierarchial pattern, unlike relations between actors in intra-state relations. Waltzs finds little room for international organizations that seek to supplant the anarchic system. They might exist, but they fundamentally do not change relations between states. Polarity Another major theme is what types of international systems, defined in terms of number of great powers, is more or less stable. Waltz argues that BIPOLAR systems are more stable, other neo-realists have argued that multipolar systems are more stable. Waltz argument is most clearly articulated from an information theoretic standpoint. Considerations of balancing, monitoring etc., are facilitated when there are fewer main players. The simplicity of the bipolar system reduces possibilities for friction. This position also falls out of Waltzs skepticism over alliances, which are forms of external balancing. Because states really should only care about relative gains, internal balancing (improving ones own capabilities) should be the only driving factor. Waltz also discusses themes about interdependence, and whether this is good or bad for countries. His discussion here is clearly influenced by the era in which he was writing, the mid to late 1970s with the oil crises. ________________________________________________________________________

Kenneth Waltz (1979). Theory of International Relations. Chapter 6-8 Chapter 6. Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power Anarchy does not imply that violence is common in the international system but rather that the threat of violence is ever present. Anarchy means that the international system is one of self-help. Waltz identifies two ways in which the structure of the international system limits cooperation. First, the condition of insecurity--at the least, the uncertainty of each about the others future intentions and actions--works against their cooperation. ... A state worries about a division of possible gains that may favor other more than itself (pp. 105-6). Second, a state also worries lest it become dependent on others through trade and/or cooperation, and therefore also chooses to limit its cooperation with other states (p. 106). States do not willingly place themselves in situations of increased independence. In a self-help system, considerations of security subordinate economic gain to political interest (p. 107). The structure of the system forces states into this kind of behavior; the only way out is structural change. Nevertheless, Waltz sees virtues in anarchy--principally that the high costs of organization in a hierarchic order are avoided and that states can preserve their autonomy. Balance of Power Theory (pp. 116-128) 1. States are unitary actors who seek, at a minimum, their own preservation and, at a maximum, universal domination. 2. States seek to achieve their goals either through internal balancing (increasing economic and military strength) or external balancing (creating alliances). 3. For this theory to operate, we must see two or more states in a self-help system with no superior authority over them. In seeking to test his theory, Waltz arguing that confirming cases (as opposed to just falsifiable cases) are acceptable, particularly if hard cases (those where you would not expect the theory to hold) are chosen. He also suggests that one should infer empirically verifiable predictions. However, he concedes that balance-of-power theorys predictions are indeterminate; it posits only a loose condition of balance, and thus it is unclear when that condition does not hold. Also, internal conditions may preclude states from balancing behavior, but this is outside the theorys purview. Nevertheless, Waltz argues that one does consistently see balancing behavior, even in cases where one would not ordinarily expect--he points to the French-Russian alliance of 1894 or the U.S. and Soviet decisions to rearm after WWII. Finally, Waltz contrasts balancing with bandwagoning, in which weaker states choose to ally with the stronger state. Waltz argues that because power is a means not an end, states prefer to join the weaker of two coalitions (p. 126). Again, the structure of the international system and the necessity of survival dictate this behavior. Chapter 7: Structural Causes and Economic Effects In this chapter, Waltz offers an argument to the question whether we should prefer a larger or smaller numbers of greater powers. He argues that interdependence tends to decrease as the number of great powers diminishes and two is the lowest possible number. Contrary to Morgenthau, he argues that bipolarity was more stable than multipolarity.

First, in order to identify variations of structure, Waltz offers how to count poles and to measure power. A systems theory requires one to define structures partly by the distribution of capabilities across units. States, because they are in a self-help system, have to use their combined capabilities in order to serve their interests (p. 131). He argues that [t]heir rank depends on how they score on all of the following items: size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence (p. 131). For him, counting the great powers is an empirical one (p. 131). Second, he argues that inequality is inherent in the state system and cannot be removed. In an economy, in a polity, or in the world at large, extreme equality is associated with instability. The inequality of states, though it provides no guarantee, at least makes peace and stability possible (p. 132). Third, he argues that the close interdependence means closeness of contact and raises the prospect of occasional conflict (p.138). Interdependence tends to decrease as the number of great powers diminishes and two is the lowest possible number. Therefore, he argues that bipolarity is more stable than multipolarity. Chapter 8: Structural Causes and Military Effects In this chapter, Waltz tries to show why bipolarity is the most stable structure in the selfhelp system. He argues that it is not due to the economic interdependence but because of national security reasons. To say that the international-political system is stable means two things: first, that it remains anarchic; and second, that there is no consequential variation in the number of principal parties in the system (p. 161-162). He argues that balancing is differently done in multi-polar and bipolar systems. With more than two, shifts in alignment provide an additional means of adjustment, adding flexibility to the system (p. 163). A two power system allows the two superpowers to focus on each other, and allows them to discipline their alliance members. Ex. Suez Canal crisis in 1956.