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Chapter 5 Organizational Development and Change

Chapter Overview
The organizational development (OD) tradition is a practitioner-driven interventionoriented approach to effecting organizational change via individual change, with view to increasing effectiveness. It is implemented within a problem-solving model, places a heav accent on surve -based problem diagnosis and subordinates people to a vision of the future. !ommitment-based strategies of effecting change assume that the impetus for change must come from the bottom up, whilst compliance-based strategies involve the creation of behavioural imperatives for change. "arious #emplo ee involvement$ strategies are reviewed, but there is little evidence for their effectiveness either as a means of securing commitment or enhanced performance, or as a means of leverage for change. !ulture is assumed to be the primar vehicle for change within the OD tradition, although the relationship between culture and the change process is ill understood. %inall , the assumptions underpinning team development, and its implementation, are criticall e&amined. The organizational culture literature itself is fraught with epistemological debate. 'ractitioners are interested in management b measurement and manipulation of culture. Theoreticians of culture, however, aim to understand the depth and comple&it of culture. (nresolved issues remain regarding how to define culture, the difference between culture and climate, measurement)levels of anal sis, and the relationship between organizational culture and performance. Interest in corporate identit is relativel recent, and is mainl driven b mar*eting and strategic management considerations. +ore ps chological approaches to the anal sis of corporate identit include an interest in how corporate identit is reflected in the identit and self-esteem of emplo ees, and the implications of this for managing organizational change. The classic OD approach to organizations and organizational change has been somewhat #side trac*ed$ toda in favour of #*nowledge management$, where *nowledge and its creation is seen as critical to organizational sustainabilit and competitive advantage in toda $s constantl changing global econom . ,nowledge management raises issues about the potentiall highl comple& relationship between structure, technolog and people. The dangers of a too tightl coupled understanding of the relationship between organizational structure and technolog are highlighted.

Chapter Thought Bytes and Examples

Diagnosticorganizationalmethods Questionnaires and other instruments (for example, The Managerial Grid)
Data is canned, anonymous, economical and readily analysed, but not itself conducive to creating the kind of personal involvement and discussion necessary to changing hearts and minds.

This involves the skilled and impartial elicitation of opinion and sentiment on a wide range of subjects, including personal concerns that are rarely aired. However, they are time-consuming and labour-intensive to analyse.

This involves unstructured group interviews designed to explore group issues, concerns, needs and resource requirements. Sampling members from different parts of an organization affords the OD researchers a feel for the whole. Alternatively, it can be used to identify problems and concerns pertaining to one particular subsection. Sensing generates rich data and people come away feeling that they have been listened to. However, people will not disclose their real concerns if there is no trust.

A group is polled by questionnaire, or a structured round robin exercise, on issues or agendas otherwise unspoken (for example, interpersonal conflict, the future of the group and its place in the organization). Full and balanced involvement of all members is essential to ensure ownership of the results. It is important that the results are followed-up rather than left open and unaddressed.

Individuals or groups prepare collages on a theme (for example, my feelings about the team or the organization). If a single collage is produced by a group it can elicit deep but burning issues for discussion. Fun, but at first might not be taken seriously.

One or more members of a group make a drawing about an aspect of the organization or organizational life. Common themes are identified, discussed and posted on flip-charts. Can unearth issues otherwise buried alive (p.157) for example, interpersonal conflict, inappropriate competition. Must be framed by clear objectives.

Physical representation of organizations

Group members sculpt themselves physically according to some issue of worry to them (for example, cliques, inappropriate influence, competition). Can yield dramatic results, creating strong motivation for improvement but must be sensitively managed.

Diversitymanagement do not conflatenationalboundarieswith culturalboundaries

National boundaries are often inappropriately used as surrogate definitions of culture. However, the nominal and impoverished use of culture in this sense stems from a lack of a theoretical framework for investigating culture at a broader level. It is common to use Hofstedes (1980) work to describe cultural variation based on national differences. He identified (based on data from over 116,000 employees of IBM across 40 countries) four cultural dimensions: power distance (the degree to which members accept an unequal distribution of power); avoidance of uncertainty (the degree to which members are able to cope with ambiguous or anxiety-provoking situations); individualismcollectivism (an emphasis on striving and initiative versus belonging and following) and masculinityfemininity (the relative extent to which members value traits conventionally associated with masculinity and femininity). Some multinational corporations like IBM have responded to the diversity issue by seeking to create a homogenous and unifying culture transcending national boundaries. Other organizations allow cultural differences to flourish, seeking only to exert financial regulation and control.

Predictingbehaviour a misleadingenterprise?
Myers (1993) argues that predicting behaviour is almost impossible because it is influenced by so many individual, situational and chance factors. However, if we look at average behaviour over a long period of time then the influence of attitudes is more apparent. For instance, knowing someones attitude towards an organization poorly predicts whether he or she will stay behind to finish an assignment, because many other things also influence this such as family circumstances, mood, feeling and so on.

However, organizational attitude does predict quite well the total quantity of extra-mile behaviours demonstrated by someone over time. The influence of attitude on behaviour is thus not something that is evident in any one isolated act. Conditions that improve the predictive accuracy of attitudes are described below.

General versus specific attitudes

Azjen has found that the correspondence between attitudes and actions is high in studies where measured attitude is directly relevant to the situation. To change organizational behaviour through persuasion, we should therefore seek to alter attitudes towards specific organizational or job factors and practices .

Attitude Potency
When people operate by habit, there is little or no reflection engaged. Attitudes are likely to be brought especially to mind in non-familiar situations. Evidence shows that attitudes guide behaviour if they come to mind. Self-conscious people who are highly self-aware are usually well in tune with their own attitudes. High self-consciousness is associated with consistency of words and actions.

Central routestrategiesto changingattitudes

An effective communicator cares not only about the content of the message, but also about how their audience is likely to react to it. The following strategies can be used: 1. 2. 3. Know the audience, identify and address the issues of concern to them. Get into the mind of the audience and keep them on their toes. Make people feel responsible for evaluating the message and allow them to draw their own conclusions from the facts presented. Participative vs confrontational style: a participative style that involves people is more likely to elicit ownership of the issue(s) at stake than a dogmatic and argumentative style, presenting only one side of the story. Repeating the message with examples and case -studies.

-. Level of organizationalimpactevaluation

It is common within the OD evaluation literature to apply the Kirkpatrick (1959) hierarchy of impacts: initial reactions, attitude/perceptual changes, behavioural changes, and organizational changes.

Initial reactions
Many OD intervention evaluation studies begin and also end with testimonial types of assessment, from participants.

Attitudinal/perceptual changes
Most published studies measure attitude/perceptual change (for example, team cohesiveness, leadership styles, organizational climate, job satisfaction). The use of questionnaires constructed specifically for the purpose of each particular evaluation is common, thus undermining meaningful cross-study comparison. Studies also rarely provide details of scale reliability and validity, even for established measures.

Behavioural changes
Some studies document changes in behaviour (for example, turnover, absenteeism). Reliability and validity statistics are rarely provided, making it difficult to judge the stability of findings at this level of analysis.

Organizational changes

Studies rarely examine the impact of OD intervention on organizational effectiveness.

Chapter Case Studies

Case Study 5.1: British Airways Unveils New Identity
The stor of .ritish /irwa s is described as one of the most widel used inspirational accounts of changing culture (0rugulis 1 2il*inson, 3443). .ritish /irwa s brought together thousands of people in the shape of a globe to create a compelling image for one of its television commercials, and more recentl imposed a giant model of !oncorde on Times 56uare. /ccording to ./, the compan $s new identit was #based on what is believed to be the largest consumer research e&ercise in the histor of the travel industr $. It was introduced through #what is believed to be the world$s largest satellite corporate television broadcast$ using 78 satellites, transmitting pictures from almost 39 different places to 73: locations in :8 countries across five continents. /ccording to !;O .ob / ling, #5ome people abroad saw the airline as staid, conservative and a little cold$ < characteristics used to describe .ritain as a whole. #2e need a corporate identit that will enable us to become not =ust a (, carrier but a global airline that is based in .ritain,$ said / ling. #The identit we unveiled is that of a global, caring compan , more modern, more open, more cosmopolitan, but proud to be based in .ritain.$ >owever, it is now well *nown that the whole enterprise was a big flop (0rugulis 1 2il*inson, 3443).

Case Study 5.2: Traditional Top own! "r#ani$ational Chan#e via Culture Chan#e usin# the Un%ree$in#&'e%ree$in# (odel
;ngineering culture change is becoming an increasingl popular (and lucrative) role for occupational and organizational ps chologists. 2hilst m riad obstacles to change e&ist in a t pical organization, man writers have attempted to provide the practitioner)manager with advice on how to achieve a successful change in a compan $s culture. /ll of these assume a perspective on culture as a measurable and manageable aspect of an organization The culture change literature also assumes a direct lin* between culture and performance, which is as et merel a h pothesis rather than an established fact. These assumptions need to be ta*en into consideration when reviewing #recipes$ for culture change. !ummings and >use (7?@?), for e&ample, suggest implementation and careful management of the following stagesA

Clear strategic vision:

>ave a clear view of the direction and purpose of the proposed change. Often, this will be embodied in the organization$s mission statement. This should be a clear and precise statement of operationalizable and achievable goals. Top management must be committed to change and must be seen to be committed. Onl top management have the power to ma*e changes in the values and deeper structures of the organization.

anagement commitmentA

Sym!olic leadershipA

5enior managers must behave in wa s that are consistent with the new culture, for e&ample, management by walking about, and so on.

Supporting organizational changes: !hanges to organizational structure, reporting procedures, management st les, organizational processes, etc, are li*el to be re6uired. Changing organizational mem!ership: .ringing in new organizational members who subscribe to the re6uired new organizational values and practices is li*el to consolidate and #freeze$ the change. ;&isting organizational members, it should be mentioned, can be encouraged to bu into the change through consultation, training and development, ensuring visible senior management commitment, and so on. Organizations are becoming increasingl concerned with their effectiveness within the mar*etplace. The reasons for this derive largel from the advent of widescale use of information technolog (IT), and the increase in service orientation for man industries. /s a result, companies have begun toA outsource non-core and peripheral activitiesB shed la ers of middle management as the strive to be more competitiveB become increasingl concerned with production)profits than with their staffB fre6uentl restructure and downsizeB become involved in ac6uisitions of competitors and in amicable mergers.

5uch wide-ranging changes have enormous potential implications for the wor*force and for the managerial staff responsible for them. /s such measures have grown in popularit , so interest has increased in their influence on the #soft$ aspects of organizational life, such as wor*er attitudes and organizational #culture$. !ulture, in this conte&t, has been described asA
(a) a pattern of basic assumptions, (b) invented, discovered or developed b a given group, (c) as it learns to cope with its problems of e&ternal adaptation and internal integration, (d) that has wor*ed well enough to be considered valid and, therefore (e) is to be taught to new members as the (f) correct wa to perceive, thin* and feel in relation to those problems.(5chein, 7??4)

The relationship between such a construct and the hard e&ternal realit of continuous organizational change is embodied in the stud and implementation of OD, defined asA
/ s stematic effort appl ing behavioural science *nowledge to the planned creation and reinforcement of organizational strategies, structures and processes for improving an organization$s effectiveness. (>use and !ummings, 7?@9)

OD has become a vital component in the management of change for man organizations, and has resulted in the increased emplo ment of e&ternal (and, increasingl , internal) #change agents$, responsible for planning, implementing and evaluating organizational changes.

The following model is an example of how man cultural change programmes are pursued using a variet of methods. The model assumes thatA the change agent has zero *nowledge of the compan prior to commencement of the pro=ectB the cultural change to be effected is compan -wideB the change agent has been re6uested to assist in effecting the change b senior managementB the budget for the programme is large and the timescale rela&edB replacing managerial staff is outside the remit of the change agent. !learl , these assumptions ma , in some cases, not be accurate for all change management pro=ects. The basic model is as followsA

Dialogue with management

Cultural audit

Inception Report and Action Plan

Management Training

Unfreeze the organi ation

Commence the change

Reinforce the change and refreeze the organi ation


Clo e down

The portion of the above model which directl addresses the process of culture change is based on Cewin$s (7?97) #unfreezing<change<refreezing$ model of change, the detail of which forms part of the following discussion. ;ach of the above stages contains a variet of substages, some of which are effected directl b the change agent and others of which are achieved through the training and empowering of management to communicate the prescribed changes to the organization. ;ach of the above stages will be discussed in detail below, including, where appropriate, consideration of particular issues which must be attended to at each stage.

Stage ": Dialogue with senior management#decision$ma%ers

This stage of the process is primaril concerned with establishing a functional relationship with the management staff proposing the cultural change programme. Ideall , this should include the followingA ;stablishing a contractual agreement (legal and ps chological) that management must ta*e ownership of the change process, and that an input b the change agent will be purel in facilitating and informing that process. ;stablishing single points of contact within the >uman Desources department, an other departments of relevance and within senior management for the reporting of progress and re6uesting of information. ;stablishing the nature and perceptions of the problem through as*ing 6uestionsA 2hat do the perceive as the problem(s)E 2hat do the e&pect to gain from cultural changeE 2hat measures)steps have alread been ta*en to improve the situationE 2here is the compan nowE 2here should the compan beE 2hat do the e&pect from the change agentE 2hat alternative solutions to the problem have been discussed)re=ectedE 'rovision of basic compan information re6uired for the subse6uent cultural audit. /greement of information to be gathered through the cultural audit, and agreement that the process of data collection will be promoted b management whenever possible. Identification of an specific problems which ma present themselves during the cultural audit)an later stage of the pro=ect. It should be noted that, throughout the pro=ect, dialogue with management should be continuous, through appointed contacts within the organization, to ensure that the pro=ect remains focused and that additional information can be transmitted from change agent to management and vice versa as easil as possible.

Stage &: 'Cultural audit(

/ssuming the full agreement and support of senior management, a cultural audit is conducted, which should attempt to access and anal se the following data sourcesA 5taff attitudes and perceptions of the e&isting culture (via 6uestionnaires and structured interviews). /non mit of respondents should be guaranteed to facilitate candid responses. Dimensions of interest ma be selected depending on initial discussions with management, but should includeA ps chological climateB level of teamwor*)conflictB supervision)managementB role)goal ambiguit )clarit B information flowB nature)depth of support, and so on. These data should provide a means of b passing #managerial rhetoric$ li*el to have been obtained during 5tage 7, in order to tap into the #true$ culture of the organization. 5taff views on how things should)could be changed (via 6uestionnaires and structured interviews). This will promote a sense of #involvement$ for staff at an earl stage in the change process. !ompan information, includingA financial dataB e&ternal mar*et situationB human resources data, for e&ample, performance appraisals, absenteeism)turnover figures, and so onB compan proceduresB

other factors identified in initial dialogue with management as being #problematic$ Organizational structure, includingA #t pe$ of management structureB communication processes)linesB position of compan within overall corporate structure. It should be noted that prior to this stage, management ma be re6uired to provide some introductor information to staff in order to facilitate the data collection process. 2ithout this, activities of the change agent ma be treated with suspicion and ma result in obstruction of the audit, or in biased (and therefore useless) selfreport responses to 6uestionnaires)interviews, if staff are suspicious)nervous about the anon mit of responses. This ma be especiall evident in an e&isting culture based on #fear$ and on directive, authoritarian management.

Stage ): *nception report

On the basis of anal sis)interpretation of data from 5tage 3 and of discussions conducted in 5tage 7, an inception report should be produced and discussed with management, to ensure that details and focus are accurate and appropriate. The report shouldA identif the principle characteristics of the compan (as detailed above)B identif the ma=or driving forces and restraining forces prevalent in the compan ((mstat, 7?@@)B identif an practical resistance to changeB identif the principle affective components of the wor*force, that is, attitudes, beliefs, and so on.

Stage +: ,ction plan

On the basis of the inception report and on the initial discussions with management, an action plan is developed in order to cr stallize the proposed cultural change in terms of goals and ob=ectives. 5hould the #fit$ between management$s identified problems, aims and ob=ectives and the results from the inception report be poor, it ma be necessar to suggest alternative solutions to those proposed b management, and point out results from the cultural audit of which management were unaware. %or e&ample, 5n der (7?@@), in an e&ample from a cultural change which too* place in Coc*heed during the earl 7?@4s, points out that technical barriers were presenting the most significant barriers to performance within a particular factor , and that reduction of these barriers was li*el to be far more important to increasing production than the prevailing culture of the organization. (ltimatel , the change agent and management must agree on definition of the problem and on the ob=ectives for cultural change. This agreement should ta*e the following formA recommendations to management on the basis of agreed information obtained during stages 7-8B actions for *e staff members < unanimous support is crucial here. ;mphasis is on the role of management in achieving cultural change < management must ta*e ownership.

Stage 5:

anagement training

/ssuming that support for the action plan has been secured, a series of briefing sessions)seminars)training sessions are conducted with *e management staff, that is, those people who are crucial to the successful adoption and acceptance of the proposed changes. These training sessions t picall compriseA e&planation of process of cultural change (as illustrated in the flow chart above)B emphasis on the importance of empath , communication and participation with wor*ersB e&planation of *e aspects of process for management, includingA clear articulation of desired visions and associated practicesB translation of vision into memorable realit , for e&ample, #attac* the problem, not the person# (5n der, 7?@@)B endorsement of top management and #modelling$ b management, resulting in, for e&ample, #vicarious learning$ (.andura, 7?:?) through meeting wor*ers, #spreading the word$, and so onB .uilding a new team, if necessar , to reinforce the new values)approachB engaging in s mbolic acts, for e&ample, team)compan presentations, changing uniforms to s mbolize team spirit, and so onB e&planation of proposed goals and aims to be achieved through change and how these will impact on the organization and, ultimatel , on organizational performance, that is, translation of a #soft$ process into #hard$ financial resultsB training management in #transformational$ leadership s*ills, and in the understanding of group processes and group d namics.

Stage -: '.n/reeze( the organization

. 5tage :, this process, as envisaged b Cewin (7?97), should be well underwa . +anagement, with the assistance of the change agent, now ta*e responsibilit for the following, in order to prepare the organization for changeA application of the principles learned during 5tage 9 in order to ma*e the organization aware of the need for changeB ensuring that a climate of openness is developed between management and staff, regarding aims and conse6uences of proposed changes, b A presenting the change programme to wor*ers (and ensuring that this is pitched correctl )B adopting an open door polic B increasing the visibilit of management in the wor*placeB encouraging participation of wor*ers through seminars, wor*shops, and so onB 0oteA facilitating an atmosphere of openness ma be difficult to achieve, especiall if the previous climate has been one of distance and conflict between management and staff. highlighting threats to the organization if change does not ta*e place, while encouraging wor*ers to believe that change is possible and desirable (5chein, 7?@F)B ensuring a climate of participation is developed b involving staff, especiall influential supervisor staff, and so on, b involving them earl in the change processB 'romoting worker ownership of the change b encouraging participation (to allow internalization b wor*ers of new values).

Stage 1: Commence the change

+anagement, with the assistance of the change agent, will t picall change process, b A begin the

communicating aimsA e&plaining goals and ob=ectives to the wor*forceB retaining openness and willingness for discussionB building e&pectations for successB utilizing methods such asA presentations)seminarsB wor*shops for team and s*ill buildingB training)retraining programmes, following =ob anal sis, especiall if the change involves technical considerationsB continuous modelling of the change b senior)middle management .

Stage 2: 3ein/orce the change and 're/reeze( the organization

In order to effect a transition of values, norms and wor*ing practices, management is e&pected toA s stematicall reward adoption of new wor*ing practicesB s stematicall punish adherence to old directions (while retaining useful aspects of the old s stem)B promote adoption of re6uired behaviours throughA incentive programmes (remuneration)B staff presentations concerning progress and feedbac* with the change programmeB provision of personal counselling to wor*ers who re6uire itB implement new rituals and artefacts, for e&ample, new uniforms, and so on.

Stage 4: Evaluation
The initial post-change evaluation is usuall conducted b the change agent, in consultation with management. The evaluation sets initial agreed aims and ob=ectives against the current, post-change situation, and t picall comprises criteria such asA behaviours (observational)absenteeism or turnover figures)B performance ratings (peer)supervisor )B financial)production (turnover)profit)production)sales)mar*et share)B wor*er attitudes and satisfaction.

Desults from this evaluation should be presented to management, summarizingA areas where change has been successfulB recommendations for areas for improvement and suggestions as to how improvements could be achieved using in-house resourcesB unsuccessful elements of the programme compared against original ob=ectivesB areas re6uiring monitoringB suggested rolling evaluation programme.

Stage "5: Close down

/t this final stage, the change agent should e&plain the following to managementA !ultural change is an ongoing process which is evaluated and monitored on a continuous basis. Got underta*ing this ma result in a slow slide bac* into the #old methods$. This involvesA presentations to staff on feedbac* and progress, both with change and with mar*et successB provision of personal counsellingB climate of openness and trustB #management b ob=ectives$ and #management b wal*ing about$, if possible.

The above model describes a staged process for effecting a cultural change within an occupational setting. !learl , different industries will re6uire emphasis to be placed on different aspects of the culture, which would need to be built in to the programme. It is also clear that in the case of man organizations, internal politics ma present the greatest barrier to cultural change < the above model assumes that agendas of management and staff are stated openl , and that subversive or sabotaging behaviours are minimized. In practice, such factors ma re6uire drastic measures such as replacement of staff or disciplinar procedures. >owever, through preparing ade6uatel for cultural change, entering into a continuous dialogue with management, ensuring management support for proposals and ob=ectives and b providing the necessar human resources support during the change process, a change agent can prove a valuable facilitator to the organizational development of companies re6uiring significant cultural, and other, change.

Case Study 5.): Culture Chan#e at Chrysler (Source: ANSOM, ebruary !""# $ %avi& A' (atz)
+an companies have turned themselves around, converting imminent ban*ruptc into prosperit . 5ome did it through financial gimmic*r , but the ones who have become stars did it b changing their own culture. %ew remember that companies li*e .ritish /irwa s or "olvo once had a poor reputation. That$s a credit to their drastic changes in customer (and emplo ee) satisfaction, 6ualit , and profits. The underl ing causes of man companies$ problems are not in the structure, !;O, or staffB the are in the social structure and culture. .ecause people wor*ing in different cultures act and perform differentl , changing the culture can allow ever one to perform more effectivel and constructivel . This applies to colleges and schools as much as it applies to businesses. In the earl 7??4s, !hr sler had terrible customer service and press relations, with a histor of innovation but a present of outdated products. Its mar*et share was falling, and its fi&ed costs and losses were high. .ob Cutz, the president, wanted !hr sler to become the technolog and 6ualit leader in cars and truc*s < a clear, globall applicable vision. / program of cultural change, !ustomer One, was built around it.

The results were impressiveA overhead was cut b H-.3 billion in under four ears, the stoc* price has 6uadrupled, and the compan reversed its slide into ban*ruptc and became profitable. / completel new and competitive line of cars or truc*s has appeared each ear since. Gew engines produce more fuel econom and power as new cars provide more comfort, performance, and space, and the dependence on a former partner (+itsubishi) is being phased out. The did this with the same people, but wor*ing in different wa s.

Training6 visions6 and culture

!ustomer One is designed for Idramaticall JchangingK the business culture.I The multi-million dollar effort is, according to training director Thomas +arinelli, Ia complete cultural change in the wa our dealers do business....L2hatever ou do, do it with the customer in mind first, and the ancillar benefits will follow.$I

*nvolvement o/ people
In four ears, -:44 ideas have been solicited from suppliersB :4 percent were used, saving over H389 million. !ustomers were also called in during #virtuall ever stage$ of the development of new models, to provide suggestions (rather than =ust ratings of what the li*ed). One designer was sent to photograph the interiors of about 344 pic*ups, to see where cups, maps, and so on were being stored, so the could tailor the interior of the new truc*s to the needs of the drivers. !hr sler has also been listening to customers who write to the compan B the designers even respond to some letters b phone. Dather than have a small number of people control new products, Meep)Truc* product manager Meff Trimmer said planners are #spea*ing out for customer wants and needs in the initial stages ... and wor*ing along with each of the various functional groups ... The role becomes more advisor .$ ;ver one who will be involved participates to #harness the best ideas and creativit $. ;ven the assembl line wor*ers are includedB with the new Dam truc*s, the were wor*ing with engineers si& months before production started. +echanics are consulted earl , to help prepare the cars and truc*s for real-life maintenance. 'roduct teams follow vehicles process issues. #Toda , we feel of information that comes from to do,$ reported Dobert Mohnson through their development to identif s stems and we have a lot more facts, and more of a groundswell groups of people who *now e&actl what we$re tr ing of Dodge Truc*s.

,greeing on o!7ectives
One change that helps to *eep pro=ects pure is setting down ob=ectives clearl , at the beginning. !ore ob=ectives are agreed on at the beginning b all partiesB because #;ver bod agrees up front and we stic* to the plan$ (.ernard Dobertson, Meep)Truc* team), there are no last-minute changes in focus, which can result in e&pensive disasters (such as the !orvair, "ega, and %iero). .ecause ever one is involved in setting goals, the ta*e responsibilit for living up to them.

!hanges in the wa cars were made began with help from >onda, which developed a successful line-up in 34 ears, generall using its own technolog . %ourteen oung engineers were told to learn how >onda designed carsB .ob Cutz and engineering chief %rancois !astaing then reorganized their departments into >onda-st le teams.

5ince then, !hr sler changed its teams b learning from its achievements and mista*es. #2e do a Nwhat went right, what went wrongO anal sis at various points,$ said Mames 5orenson of the Meep)Truc* Team. #/nd we transmit this information to the other platforms.$ 'ilot vehicles in the new Dam program were read 78 months ahead of time. The number of improvements made each ear, even to cars about to be discontinued, has increased dramaticall each ear since !ustomer One started, as learning has spread.

Emphasis o/ 9uality
+ost people li*e building a 6ualit product. It$s natural to want one$s labors to produce something of 6ualit and beaut . That might be one reason wh wor*ers tend to support 6ualit efforts, if the see them as being sincere. !hr sler$s steps to improve 6ualit started with calling in customers, suppliers, mechanics, and assembl line wor*ers earl in the design process. The continue b surve ing all customers and basing dealer incentives on 6ualit and support. The dealership rating process has been e&amined and improved at various points, to ma*e sure their customer satisfaction inde& is valid and reliable. !omplaints are followed through, and negative surve s are returned to dealers for resolution (however, man dealers do not follow through on this valuable feedbac*).

!ultural change is neither eas nor foolproof. It can ta*e time < at least one ear, more li*el between three and si& ears < and it ta*es effort and vigilance. / great deal of patience and long-term support is needed. !ommunication ma be *e , as small successes are used to support larger efforts. 5ometimes, it is necessar to start changing small parts of an organization first, later e&panding efforts. !hr sler did this b starting with their engineering teams and moving on to other areas. The proponents of change must carefull model the behavior the want to see in others. If the do not send a consistent message and *eep that message clear and dominant over time, cultural change ma be seen as =ust another fad. %re6uentl , change becomes harder when the organization starts to turn around. /t !hr sler, the pace of change dropped off dramaticall when profits started to appear regularl . The result is that the corporation is rated about average in dealer satisfactionB some new models, particularl the Geon, were plagued with minor problems when the were introducedB and man new customers have become alienated from the compan again. !omplacenc is an ever-present danger when changes start to ta*e effect.

,ppendix "" 8i%ert(s 8in%$:in ':articipation(


Ci*ert (7?:7) offered a model of the effective organization on the basis of which much of what we currentl call OD is founded. Ci*ert focused in particular on the structure of the organization, advocating that the most effective structure is one comprised of participative workgroups, each lin*ed to the organization as a whole through overlapping memberships. 2or*ing from a >D perspective, he believed that supportive wor*groups were a critical source of need satisfaction and as such provides the source of all organizational potential and success. Ci*ert described clusters of st le characteristics *nown as #s stems 7, 3, 8 and -$ referring to #e&ploitative authoritative, benevolent authoritative, participative consultative and participative group management$ s stems respectivel (Ci*ert, 7?:7A ?F<77@). Ci*ert argued that s stem -, describing participative group

management was the most appropriate insofar as it could most effectivel harness emplo ee motivation and commitment. The intervention format derived from this conceptualization of organizations is described below (derived from ,lein, 7?F:)A diagnosis b surve of the dominant schema operating in the organization, using the #cluster$ ideaB intervention designed to shift behaviour towards #s stem -$B post-intervention surve so ascertain shifts in perceived management st leB performance measurement. The concept of #participation$ is central to the Ci*ert approach to intervention, geared to involving emplo ees in decision ma*ing and affording them a sense of responsibilit and control without the need to ma*e fundamental changes to the basic conditions of wor*. The contemporar popularit of #6ualit circles$ is a case in point. The fashion of #participation$ can also be traced in part bac* to the e&periment conducted b Cippitt and 2hite (7?8?) on the conse6uences for morale of different st les of leadership. This indicated the superiorit of the democratic approach. The discourse of democrac that swept across post-war /merica nurtured this finding, and an form of authoritarian method met with resentment and opposition. The problem of output regulation and control was in part e&acerbated b this cultural imperative to be democratic, and can be said to have spawned attempts to control the wor*force in more subtle (#manipulative$) supposedl more #humanistic$ wa s. The assumption thus too* hold that wor* motivation could be increased b changing the st le of the manager or leader into one characterized as #democratic$. In distinguishing between two contrasting sets of management models (+c0regor, 7?:4), theor & became e6uated with the principles of scientific management whilst theor was e6uated with the principles of >D thin*ing. The distinction became infused with value =udgements such that theor became the universall prescribed #ideal$ with theor z being the approach to both avoid and disparage. These assumptions were upheld irrespective of the structural conditions of the organization.

,ppendix "& ;ormulation and ,nalysis o/ *mplications /or *ntervention

*ntroduction to erger Scenario

erger with

/ merger can be defined asA The combining of two or more entities through the direct ac6uisition b one of the net assets of the other, either friendl or hostile, for cash or for stoc*.$ It is often e&pected that the merging of organizations will result in an increase in profitabilit due to there being an increase in efficienc and economies of scale. >owever, the realit is often a different matter, with mergers resulting in lower productivit , higher levels of absenteeism and a higher accident rate. In both the (5/ and the (,, between 94 and @4 percent of organizational mergers are regarded as unsuccessful financiall (+ar*s 1 +irvis, 3443). Of all mergers regarded as failures, #emplo ee problems$ are estimated to be responsible for between a third and a half. The present merger involves a large corporation with two other (smaller) corporations and can be termed a horizontal merger, as all three corporations operate in the same mar*et. This merger involves the re-integration of people, which contrasts with, sa , the conglomerate merger, which pertains to merger onl at the administrative and financial level between otherwise unrelated firms. 2ithin a merger between related firms, integration is necessar to prevent the duplication of functions and will re6uire the re-organization of operations and wor* groups. The author is assuming that the large corporation is the ac6uiring firm and the two smaller corporations the ac6uired, and that the companies will absorb each other culturall spea*ing. This merger could therefore be viewed as a traditional organizational #marriage$ in which there will be wide-scale change with the ac6uired firms adopting and becoming absorbed into the procedures, practices, philosoph and culture of the ac6uiring firm.

Con*eptuali$ation o% the +er#er s*enario

+erger can be conceptualized b drawing upon two theories of identit A social identit theor (5IT) (Ta=fel, 7?F3) and process identit theor (I'T) (.rea*well, 7?@:). This is onl a partial conceptualization, focusing on the people side of mergers. To add weight to this formulation, notions of cultural integration will also be drawn upon. Identit is to do with meaning, the meaning ou give ourself, and is tied to different aspects of our e&perience. Organizational identit , is organization specific, and can be defined simpl as #an individual$s perceived oneness with the organization.$ (/shforth 1 +ael, 7?@?A 38). 5IT proposes that individuals classif themselves and others into a variet of social categories, one of which is organizational membership. Identit is divided into personal identit (abilities, interests, ps chological traits, and so on) and social identit (salient group classifications). Organizational identit is a form of social identit (as the organization can be viewed as a social categor )grouping) in which the distinctiveness of an organization$s values and practices (in comparison to other organizations) increases a person$s tendenc to identif with their organization. Identif ing with one$s organization serves to enhance an individual$s self-esteem. I'T assumes there are a set of processes that underpin identit , namel , self-esteem (feeling of worth and value), self-efficac (perceived abilit ), self-evaluation (monitors

self-esteem and self-efficac ), distinctiveness (from others) and continuit time). Delating both 5IT and I'T to the merger scenarioA


/ccording to 5IT, the re-organization of operations and wor* groups, as a result of the merger, could potentiall pose a threat to the emplo ees$ social identit . Therefore, a merged compan can be understood to impl a new organizational i&entity involving, in effect, that emplo ees are re6uired to abandon their old social identities and accept a new one. In this instance, wor*ers from the ac6uiring organization (usuall superior in success terms) ma fear that their social identit ma be diluted or undermined b the ac6uisition of companies the perceive to be inferior to their own. 2or*ers from the ac6uired companies (usuall wea*er in success terms) ma on the other hand feel stripped of their identit , feeling e&posed, insecure and unclear of their location and significance within the merged organization. If emplo ees re=ect the new organizational identit , clinging on to those identities with which the are most comfortable and familiar, the merged companies might fail to integrate.

+ore specificall A In accordance with both 5IT and I'T, the merger ma pose a threat to positive &istinctiveness (at the wor* group level and the organizational level). The ac6uired firms are more li*el to fear a loss of distinctiveness perceiving (somewhat realisticall ) the merger as re6uiring them to be absorbed within the larger firm. /ccording to I'T, continuity (between the past, present and future) at the organizational level of identit is also under threat. ;mplo ees from all three companies will feel this threat as the begin to lose their sense of continuit over time. Threats to organizational identit can also occur through challenges to sel*+ esteem and sel*+e**icacy (.rea*well, 7?@:). This ma be more evident with emplo ees from the larger (stronger) firm fearing their success will be undermined b the wea*er #inferior$ companies.

2hereas identit is to do with meaning, culture can be understood to pertain to the wa this meaning is lived and breathed, the wa identit is enacted. The s mbols and shared meaning of an organization$s culture are assimilated over time b organizational members and therefore become an important part of organizational identit (.uono, .owditch, 1 Cewis, 7?@9). The merger process attempts to integrate different organizational cultures hence, a merger can be viewed as a threat to cultural &istinctiveness (.uono et al., 7?@9). +embers of the ac6uired companies ma have to abandon their e&isting culture and adopt the culture of the ac6uiring firm. 5uccess of the merger depends in part on their willingness to do this and on perceptions regarding the nature of their e&isting culture and the attractiveness or superiorit of the ac6uirer$s culture.

,ey so*ial psy*holo#i*al issues at sta-e

<roup con/lict
. definition, a merger scenario will heighten the salience of issues pertaining to organizational and personal identit b the ver fact that it is concerned with the redefinition of the organizational groups and their boundaries. ;mplo ee$s awareness of the in-group (own organization) and out-group(s) (the two other organizations) will

be heightened, which ma lead to in-group favouritism (in order to maintain a positive social identit and to protect their self-esteem). The ac6uiring firm ma be more li*el to e&press in-group favouritism in order to emphasize their distinctiveness and superiorit over the ac6uired firms. !onflict in the form of ingroup)out-group biases has been shown in a merger between two ban*s when, for e&ample, man wor*ers blamed people from the #other$ ban* for failures in group outcomes and credited people from their #own$ ban* for successes (.uono et al., 7?@9). Due to the high degree of integration involved in this merger, the more change that is needed, the greater the threat to positive distinctiveness and hence the greater the degree of conflict that can potentiall arise.

<eneral con/lict
/ general form of conflict can also occur due to the differing cultures of these corporations, the emplo ees$ perceived loss of autonom , and a general ignorance regarding the other corporations concerns. The uncertaint and ambiguit often associated with the pre-merger phase can lead to subse6uent conflict during integration, when things start to become clearer for emplo ees. ;mplo ees in all three corporations ma start to contest decisions made to do with the merger, feeling that the contradict their own interests.

Culture shoc% and negative expectations

The absorb pattern of cultural integration to be underta*en means that the two ac6uired organizational cultures will in effect disappear as their emplo ees are absorbed and incorporated into the ac6uiring organization. The wor*ers ma not realize the e&tent to which their organization$s culture influences their wor* behaviour. This can result in a feeling of shoc* due to suddenl wor*ing in a different organizational #world$ which, in turn, can influence how the wor*ers respond to the merger and ma interfere with the entire running of the newl merged compan . The cultural integration to be underta*en ma engender negative e&pectations (derived from whatever information is available to the emplo ees) regarding relations between the three corporations (contact conditions), and how the emplo ees will be treated b the merged organization$s management (organizational support). ;mplo ees from the two ac6uired firms are more li*el to have lower, more negative e&pectations than those from the ac6uiring firm regarding power and =ob securit . The negative e&pectations felt b the ac6uired emplo ees ma result in increased feelings of threat and lower levels of commitment to the merged organization, which can affect the success of the merger.

*ntra$organizational cohesiveness
The aforementioned threats to cultural distinctiveness and identit ma increase intra-organizational cohesiveness resulting in a resistance to change. +embers from the same pre-merger organization (in-group) ma become ver cohesive (closing ran*s from out-group members) in the merged organization in an attempt to retain their distinctiveness. This will affect the level of collaboration and cooperation with colleagues from different pre-merger companies, and hence hinder development of organizational citizenship behaviour.

Stress and anxiety

The loss of identit , threats to positive distinctiveness, and difficulties with cultural integration, ma engender stress in emplo ees. 5tress ma also occur as a result of the present merger due to lac* of securit and unclear promotion prospects, a lac* of communication, wor* overload (due to voluntar and involuntar turnover), and wor*-related an&ieties spilling over into the wor*ers home lives (!artwright 1 !ooper, 7??3). /ccording to the transactional model of merger stress individuals ma

negativel appraise the merger situation b perceiving it as potentiall threatening, whereas others ma perceive the merger as a challenging opportunit . In line with the identit model utilized here, it could be argued that the greater the degree of threat to identit and positive distinctiveness, the more li*el negative appraisal of the merger situation will occur. ;&periencing the merger as stressful is li*el to occur with negative appraisal. The resulting stress and an&iet could lead to absence, lateness, turnover and a decrease in productivit , all of which negativel affect the merger$s success (!artwright 1 !ooper, 7??3).

The integration of operations and wor* groups implies that redundanc for some emplo ees (from all three firms) is inevitable. "oluntar turnover will also occur. +ethods that bring about voluntar turnover in smaller corporations involved in a merger are often used b the larger corporation involved, which is applicable to the present merger. This will affect the attitudes and behaviour of the surviving emplo ees from the two ac6uired firms and also increase the prevalence of future voluntar turnover.

.ra*ti*al I+pli*ations %or /nsurin# a Su**ess%ul (er#er

%rom the conceptualization and identification and discussion of *e following need to be addressedA %rom the conceptualizationA o organizational identit B o positive distinctivenessB o continuit B o self-esteem and self-efficac B o cultural integration. %rom the *e issuesA o group conflict and general conflictB o culture shoc*B o negative e&pectationsB o commitmentB o intra-organizational cohesivenessB o stress and an&iet (that is, through negative appraisal)B o redundanc )turnover. issues the

The above list enables several practical implications to be deduced.

3e$esta!lish sense o/ continuity

;mplo ees need to be given a sense of past and future, the need to have a notion of end time and not =ust a sense of stabilit . Detailed information about wh the merger is happening, what the merger will entail, and the timeline involved should be provided, along with information regarding what the new organization$s long-term plans will be.

Esta!lish organizational identity /or the 0E= organization

The new organization needs to be seen b its members asA distinctiveB prestigiousB


Define the new organization in terms of distinctive and enduring characteristics. 5tress the distinctiveness of the organization$s values and practices in relation to comparable organizations, hence providing the new organization with a uni6ue identit . To enable members to identif with the new organization, ma*e it appear prestigious. Identif how the new organization is #bigger and better$ than comparable firms as a result of combining the good 6ualities from all three pre-merger companies. The salience of the new organization can be heightened b ma*ing the organization appear to be in competition with other organizations (or merel ma*e emplo ees aware of other organizations). . introducing a #common enem $, the emplo ees of the #other$ organization ma be viewed as an out-group b the merged organization emplo ees, who ma then begin to regard one another as a single ingroup. Identif ing with one$s organization can in itself lead to the enhancement of self-esteem as well as support for and commitment to the new organization and its culture.

Out with the old6 in with the new >

/s well as the new organization being seen as distinctive, prestigious and competitive, removing s mbols of previous identities and imposing new identification s mbols is a *e implication to ensure merger success. . the manipulation of s mbols (that is, traditions, rituals, metaphors) individuals$ membership in the organization can be made salient and can provide powerful images of what the new organization represents. 5 mbols of an organization are also one aspect of organizational culture, therefore, b imposing new s mbols, this ma be a step towards emplo ees understanding and internalizing the culture of the new organization.

;rom 'them ? us( to 'we(> a colla!orative wor%/orce

This is more of a specific implication than that mentioned above regarding organizational identit , and is to do with reducing conflict and increasing cooperation and collaboration between members from the pre-merger companies. The !ommon In-group Identit +odel (0aertner, Dovidio, /nastasio, .achman, 1 Dust, 7??8) suggests that to reduce bias and it will be necessar to recategorize the group members$ mental representations of separate groups (#them$ and #us$) to a onegroup representation (#we$). This can be done b ma*ing the boundaries between the three organizations less salient through introducing e6ual status contact and mutual respect b stressing to emplo ees the notable, outstanding 6ualities of the other organizations and emplo ees involved. This will also reduce the threat to self-esteem and self-efficac b ma*ing emplo ees less li*el to feel their status)worth)abilit will be undermined b an #inferior$ organization. Informal interaction and communication between emplo ees from the three firms should also be implemented in order to individuate out-group members. . transferring emplo ees between the three corporations or more specificall , moving the merged wor*groups to a new location or giving them new names, situational cues in the wor* setting, that ma be associated with pre-merger group membership, will be eliminated. These, as well as continual reassurance about preserving professional distinctiveness, and creating clearl specified super-ordinate goals, will hopefull result in an organization where there is cooperation and collaboration (see .rown, 7??:).

Turn the negative into positive @or at least realityA

The negative e&pectations (due to cultural integration) and negative appraisals of the merger situation (which ma lead to stress) can be addressed b presenting realistic

merger previews (D+'s) (!artwright 1 !ooper, 7??3). The implications here are similar to the continuit solution regarding suppl ing information to emplo eesB however, the proposed content is slightl different. The D+'s should provide information regarding what one can e&pect the #new$ organization to be li*e, stressing aspects of organizational support (how the will be treated b the merged organization) and what the contact relations will be between emplo ees from the three pre-merger companies. This will enable emplo ees to ma*e realistic cognitive appraisals which in turn ma reduce the level of stress e&perienced and the level of threat, and ma even increase subse6uent levels of commitment towards the merged organization.

Success/ul cultural integration

The implications for ensuring as smooth as possible cultural integration include emplo ees perceiving the new culture as more attractive and superior to their old one. This can be done b suppl ing emplo ees with culture-relevant information (which alone can reduce culture clash issues), stressing the superior nature of the newl integrated culture, and preferabl indicating that there will be an increase in autonom and emplo ee participation (more attractive).

3educe merger stress

The above implications (re-establishing identit , distinctiveness and reducing the difficulties with cultural integration) are li*el to have some effect in reducing the stress e&perienced during the merger. To effectivel reduce the stress e&perienced b the emplo ees, specific stress interventions should be matched to different phases of the merger implementation. %or e&ample, in the earl stages there should be open communication, followed b stress management wor*shops, and individual counselling during the middle stages. In the final stages, an integration team should be set up with managers from all three corporations (to increase feelings of fairness and also the feeling that the have an influence on the changes that will result from the merger).

Turnover ? the surviving employees

The problems identified regarding turnover (both voluntar and involuntar ) impl that career advice and retraining opportunities should be made available to those leaving the organization. This not onl provides the remaining emplo ees with information about the organization$s values but also how fairl emplo ees will be treated in the future.

0i+itations to the So*ial .sy*holo#i*al Approa*h to (er#ers

There are, however, a few limitations to the social-ps chological approach to mergers that need to be pointed out, including the lac* of comprehensive theor . /t present, research tends not to be theoreticall driven with regards to merger processes and outcomes. /lso, much of the literature has focused on =ust one process variable or outcome of mergers (for e&ample, culture or commitment), however, no two mergers are the same and variables found to be important in one merger situation ma not be so in another. Therefore, in evaluating processes and outcomes, the specific ob=ectives and goals of each merger need to be considered. +easures of the man constructs investigated are also limited b the problem of general agreement in definition (for e&ample, there is no one accepted definition of culture). The ps chometric properties of the measures themselves ma also be 6uestionable. 5tudies have used case-stud approaches and others have used student samples, et this 6uestions the reliabilit and validit of findings and generalizabilit to

emplo ees, respectivel . +ore research is also needed into the long-term effects of a merger (once change has been implemented).

It is clear that a merger is not something that happens merel to organizations, but something that happens to people in the organizations. It is necessar for people implementing mergers to focus on the human side as much as the financial side. >opefull then we ma see a decrease in the number of failed mergers.

,ppendix ") Some Change

anagement Tools

Bey =or%ing ,ssumptions within an ,ppreciative *n9uiry ,pproach to Change anagement

7. 'eople respond to their map of realit and not to realit itself. 2e operate and communicate from those maps. !hange begins with a change of map. 3. >uman behaviour is purposeful though we are not alwa s conscious of what purpose is. 8. /ll behaviour has a positive intention. Our behaviour is alwa s tr ing to achieve something valuable for us. / person is not their behaviour. Our intention or purpose is not the action itself. 2hat ma appear to be a negative behaviour is onl because we do not see the purpose. -. 'eople ma*e the best choice the can at the time. Go matter how selfdefeating, bizarre or unacceptable the behaviour, it is the best choice available to that person at the time given their map of the world. 0ive them a better choice in their map and the will ta*e it. 9. 'eople wor* perfectl . Go one is wrong and nothing is bro*en. It is a matter of finding out how the )it functions so that it can effectivel be changed to something more constructive and desirable. :. The meaning of a communication is the response ou get. This ma be different from that ou intend. There are no failures in communication, onl responses and feedbac*. ;ver e&perience can be used. If ou are not getting the result ou want, do something different. F. 2e alread have all the resources we need or we can create them. There are no un-resourceful people onl un-resourceful states. @. +odelling successful performance leads to e&cellence. If one person can do something, it is possible to model it and teach it to others. ?. If ou want to understand, act. The learning is in the doing 74. .uild on what is going well and wor*ing o*a rather than what is wrong or problematicA be aware of amplif ing the problem b ma*ing an issue of it and using the language of d sfunction (principles of appreciative in6uir ) so use positive language (what wor*s, what we are doing well, what we could do more of or better). Canguage influences realit so we can reframe realit with the words we use. The envisioned organization or future realit must be perceived as attractive and something with which people can identif and move naturall towards. 5ome practical wa s of doing this are given below.

0an#ua#e as a sour*e o% *han#e

/ppreciative in6uir highlights the power of language in framing our perception and e&periences of the world. This is a potentiall ver powerful tool in itself for

generating change. !hange the language, and change the wa realit is perceived. This also e&tends to the wa we #categorize$ the world. 'roblems of inter-operabilit (diversit management) are not directl traceable to differences per se, but the wa these differences are used and managed b people in the wa the interact and communicate on a dail basis. These differences are not fi&ed realities < the are interpretations o* reality. Thus, gender differences and other categorical differences signified b terms li*e ethnicit and se&ualit are not fi&ed indisputable realities but important sources of identification and are thus strategic resources from which to draw in the sense-ma*ing process. Differences are fundamentall sel*+re*erential (that is, self-defining, self-protective, self-e&pressive). (nderstanding self and identit processes are critical to understanding how differences are interpreted and managed. These processes are ine&tricabl lin*ed with group considerations and are at wor* in ever da interaction and communication practices. (nderstanding this is one *e to leveraging immediate change. %or instance, if difference is tal*ed about in categorical terms (recognizing diversit across groups < gender, ethnicit , se&ualit and so on), the identities evo*ed b this will be amplified (and accordingl also, stereot pical assumptions and attributions will be made). If, on the other hand, differences are tal*ed about and addressed at the individual level (for e&ample, b valuing the individual and e&plicitl recognizing individual differences), categorical differences will become less salient and people will act accordingl on this basis. This does not den the realit or validit of categorical differences, it merel de-emphasizes them in favour of an appreciation of #individuals$. To this e&tent, a meritocratic s stem can thrive in which individuals are appreciated irrespective of their categor memberships and identities. 2hen we appreciate individuals, we accept that the will define themselves in man different wa s, with reference to man different categorical or role identities. Decognizing this diversit of self-representation is to some e&tent more important than recognizing diversit across individuals because the latter puts people into bo&es, whilst the former ac*nowledges that there is no one bo& in which an one person can be slotted. Diversit management practices can thus to some e&tent both simplif differences and perpetuate false differences, rather than regarding diversit as a concept to illuminate and herald individual differences. There is no substitute for getting to *now the individual as an individual with a uni6ue personal histor and profile. >ow can our organization move be ond the language of categories to the language of individualsE >ow can individual differences be applauded and nurtured whilst also being appropriatel and realisticall contained within organizational framewor*sE >ow does our organization tal* about and address differenceE To what e&tent does this perpetuate false differencesE >ow are categories used in e&planations of organizational eventsE 2hat stereot pes, images, #stories$ and assumptions abound in association with differenceE 2hat *ind of language is embedded in our policies and guidelines that unwittingl focus our attention on differences that are otherwise not relevant to the wa we go about our businessE >ow do assumptions about categor differences impact on perception and behaviourE +erel reflecting on the language we use to describe, e&plain and organize situations can be sufficient to illustrate the power of language to frame perception and action.

Conversation /or change

True change comes about naturall and constantl through people in their attempt to ma*e sense of their e&periences. This involves dialogue. !hange cannot be imposed, it must be generated through people in the course of their ever da interaction. /n increasingl common and highl effective strateg for facilitating transformational change is to simpl get people in conversation with each other about the *ind of organization the wish to wor* for, about what wor*s well and how to ta*e this forward. !ompanies li*e .', I.+, I!C, and .T have all successfull used #conversation for change$, rolling out change through the creation of forums designed to get people from different levels of the hierarch , across different functions)departments and division, and geographical, even national divided, tal*ing to each other about organizational practices. !onversation opportunities are created through informal and formal (staged) means, all with the purpose of engaging people from all parts and levels of the compan in discussing, envisioning and translating rhetoric into their ever da realit . %or e&ample, an aspired to organizational image of #valuing diversit $ can be unpac*ed (made sense of) in focus group discussions and translated into real ever da =ob terms.

Cisualization and the use o/ metaphor

"isualization is a strateg used b athletes to pro=ect themselves into a game, to mentall simulate themselves performing at their best and, ultimatel , to represent their win. "isualization can be self-fulfilling, because it creates a positive mind-set in which people come to appreciate the authorship of their own success and because it affords mental rehearsal and preparation for difficult situations. "isualization involves a pro=ection of self into the future and creates a self-fulfilling #stor $ with a particular (positive) ending in which self ta*es ownership of the success process. It encourages goal setting (setting specific achievable and realistic targets or milestones) and as such has a focusing and energizing effect. The same strateg can be used to create the momentum for change (and success) in organizational terms. 'eople can be encouraged (as part of a group e&ercise) to visualize the future of the organization in desirable and attractive terms, pro=ecting themselves into it and mentall rehearsing the practicalities of what this would mean in practice. In so doing, a self-fulfilling process is spar*ed. One wa of helping this process along, is to use metaphor. +etaphors can capture the essence of something in simple, concrete terms, and, as such, are eas to engage with and internalize as a wa of thin*ing and seeing. +etaphors can also constrain and limit, so the need to be selected carefull and unpac*ed to identif their energizing potential within a visualization e&ercise. 2hen attempting to generate a change-inducing #stor $ metaphor, decide on the outcome that ou want the metaphor to achieve (or agree, in a group setting, the desired outcome). The outcome must e&press the needs and desires of the group (that is, it must be something with which the group can collectivel identif and invest in). There are no right or wrong meanings to metaphors. Go matter how much people might as* ou to tell them the #meaning$, this is our meaning, not theirs. +etaphors ma be single words, e&pressions or stories. !ommon metaphors areA #being in the firing line$, #aiming at the target$, #I need to overcome his ob=ections$, #business has died down$, #steaming ahead$. +etaphors e&press e&perience, and also perpetuate it, through behaviour that is congruent with this. +etaphors pro=ected into the future can be grounded with reference to #stories$ about what has wor*ed well in the past (appreciative in6uir ), thereb retaining a sense of

continuit from past, present to the future. +oreover, the metaphor can be grounded in meaningful practical terms and is easier to engage with.

;orce$/ield analysis
The assumption behind force-field anal sis is that there are alwa s going to be various tensions to deal with in association with change, tensions in particular that arise from conflicting pressures to move one wa rather than another. ,urt Cewin described these conflicting pressures as #push and pull$ factors. 'ush factors constitute the drivers of change, whilst pull factors constitute the inhibitors. %or e&ample, a *e driver for change underpinning diversit management initiatives is a legal imperative on companies to demonstrate that the are abiding b ;6ual Opportunit legislation. /nother driver is the increased pluralit of societ combined with the need for front-line behavioural s nerg . /n inhibitor, however, in this instance, would be deepl ingrained stereot pes about people who belong to particular categories or groups. ,urt Cewin argued that in an situation of planned change, it is essential to map the push and pull factors (of all t pes and at all possible levels of anal sis) to get a handle on the field. . mapping the field in this wa , sources of potential resistance can in principle be pre-empted or addressed, and the natural drivers of change can be mil*ed. In identif ing the push and pull factors it is useful to categorize them as #legal$, #environmental$, #economic$, #technological$, #people$, and so on. (nder #people$, one wa to start the process is to identif all of the sta*eholders and to perform a #sta*eholder$ anal sis. 2ho are sta*eholders and what are their interestsE 2hat might their role be in the process of changeE

,ppendix "+ Bnowledge


;irst generation < focus on timel information provision for decision support and in support of business process re-engineering (.'D) initiatives. Ci*e .'5, it failed to deliver on is promised benefits. Second generation management. < tacit-e&plicit *nowledge conversion < content

Third generation < re6uires a clear separation of conte&t, narrative and content management and challenges the orthodo& of scientific management. !omple& adaptive s stems theor is used to create a sense-ma*ing model that utilizes self-organizing capabilities of the informal communities and identifies a natural flow model of *nowledge creation, disruption and utilization. >owever, the argument from nature of man comple&it thin*ers is re=ected given the human capabilit to create order and predictabilit through collective and individual acts of freewill.

,nowledge is seen, parado&icall , as both a thing and a flow re6uiring diverse management approaches. The assumptions underpinning *nowledge management is that there are inherent uncertainties of s stems comprised of interacting agents. 'h sical and biological models do not ta*e into consideration the uni6uel human capacities of freewill, awareness and social responsibilit . ,nowledge management is about engaging human comple&it in its man manifestations, including the ancient collective and emergent patterns of narrative, ritual, negotiation of identit and truth, selfrepresentation and *nowledge e&change.

The .arado1i*al Nature o% ,nowled#e

5ome of the basic concepts underpinning *nowledge management are now being challenged. ,nowledge is not a thing (awaiting to be discovered through scientific investigation), or a s stem, but an ephemeral, active process of relating. If one ta*es this view, then no one, let alone a corporation, can own *nowledge. ,nowledge itself cannot be stored, not can intellectual capital be measured, and certainl neither of them can be managed. The #thing$ metaphor of *nowledge is the underpinning of the content mgt tradition of *nowledge management. In third-generation *nowledge management, *nowledge is managed as a flow, re6uiring attention to conte&t and narrative rather than content. The 6uestion about the manageabilit of *nowledge is not =ust academic. Organizations have increasingl discovered that the tacit and e&plicit distinction tends to focus on the container, rather than the thing contained. Three heuristics illustrate the change in thin*ing re6uired to manage *nowledgeA Bnowledge can only !e volunteered < it cannot be conscripted for the ver simple reason that I can never trul *now if someone is using his or her *nowledge. I can *now I have complied with a process or a 6ualit standard. Pet to some e&tent, managers have been trained to be conscripts not volunteers.

=e can always %now more than we can tell6 and we will always tell more than we can write down < the nature of *nowledge is such that we alwa s *now, or are capable of *nowing more than we have the ph sical time or the conceptual abilit to sa . I can spea* in five minutes what it would otherwise ta*e two wee*s to get round to spending two hours writing it down. The process of writing something down is reflective *nowledgeB it involves both adding and ta*ing awa from the actual e&perience or original thought. Deflective *nowledge has high value, but is time-consuming and involves loss of control over its subse6uent use. =e only %now what we %now when we need to %now it < human *nowledge is deepl conte&tual, it is triggered b circumstances. In understanding what people *now we have to recreate the conte&t of their *nowing if we are to as* a meaningful 6uestion or enable *nowledge use. To as* someone what he or she *nows is to as* a meaningless 6uestion in a meaningless conte&t, but such approaches are at the heart of the mainstream consultanc method.

The three heuristics partiall support our view of *nowledge as an #active process of relating$. >owever, it does not mean that we abandon second-generation practice, merel that we recognize its limitations. 'hilosophers have long seen parado& as a means of creating new *nowledge and understanding. 'h sicists brea*ing out of the Gewtonian era had to accept that electrons are parado&icall both waves and particlesA if ou loo* for waves ou see waves, if ou loo* for particles ou see particles. 'roperl understood *nowledge is parado&icall both a thing and a flowB in the second age we loo*ed for things and found things, in the third age we loo* for both in different wa s and embrace the conse6uent parado&. !ulture is *e to the flow of *nowledge within an organization. !ulture is the wa in which humans provide standards for deciding what is what can be, how one feels about it, deciding what to do about it and for deciding how to go about doing it. 5uch cultures are tacit in nature, networ*ed, tribal and fluid. The are learning cultures because the deal with ambiguit and uncertaint originating in the environment, or self-generated for innovative purposes. 2e need to transfer *nowledge to new members, in both societ and the organization, *nowledge that has painfull been created at cost over previous generations. The mechanisms for learning are ver different from those for teaching. In the case of teacher there is little ambiguit between teacher and taught. In learning, such ambiguit is often a precondition of innovation. The costs and scalabilit are also different. In the case of teaching, the population of taught can be large, var ing to some degree with the level of abstractionB reliabilit , scalabilit and economies of scale are both realistic and sensible. Cearning is more about providing space and time for new meaning to emerge, research facilities are not cheap and not all emplo ees can realisticall be provided with space of learning, as opposed to the application of what can be taught.

iversity over Ti+e and Spa*e

C#nefin (*un-ev$n) is a 2elsh word with no direct e6uivalent in ;nglish. /s a noun it
denotes a habitat, as an ad=ective, ac6uainted or familiar, but this does not do it =ustice. 5inclair (7??@) sa s it #describes a relationshipA the place of our birth and of our upbringing, the environment in which ou live and to which ou are naturall acclimatised$. It differs from the Mapanese word #.a$ denoting a #shared space for emerging relationships$, in that it lin*s a communit into its shared histor < or

histories < in a wa that parado&icall both limits the perception of the communit while enabling an instinctive and intuitive abilit to adapt to conditions of profound uncertaint . In general, if a communit is not ph sicall , temporall and spirituall rooted, then it is alienated from its environment, and will focus on survival rather than creativit and collaboration. In such conditions, *nowledge hoarding will predominate and the communit will close itself to the e&ternal world. If the alienation becomes e&treme, the communit ma even turn in on itself, atomizing into an incoherent babble of competing self-interests. !riticall , it emphasizes that we never start from a zero base when we design a *nowledge s stem, all pla ers in that s stem come with the baggage, positive and negative derived from multiple histories. %our open spaces or domains of *nowledge can be envisaged, all of which have validit within different conte&ts. The are domains not 6uadrants as the create boundaries within a centre of focus, but the do pretend to full encompass all possibilities. Common$sense ma%ing Informal interdependent Social networks (ncharted innovative .emporary communities 'rofessional logical ,ommunities o* practice, membership an& ob-ectives .ureaucratic structured ,oherent groupings known

istin*tion 2etween Co+ple1 and Co+pli*ated

/n aircraft is a complicated s stemB all of its thousands of components are *nowable, definable and capable of being catalogued, as are all of the relationships between those components. If necessar , it can be ta*en apart and e&amined to discover the nature of the components and their relationships. !ause and effect can be separated and b understanding their lin*ages we can control outcomes. >uman s stems are comple&B a comple& s stem comprises man interacting agents, an agent being an thing that has identit . 2e all e&ist in man identities. /s we fluidl move among identities, we observe different rules, rituals, and procedures unconsciousl . In such a comple& s stem, the components and their interactions are changing and can never be 6uite pinned down. The s stem is irreducible. !ause and effect cannot be separated because the are intimatel intertwined. Two e&amples ma*e this clearA !onsider what happens surfacesB the comple& un*nowable wa sB new other hand, if ou wal* nothing changes. in an organization when a rumour of reorganization human s stem starts to mutate and change in patterns form in anticipation of the event. On the up to an aircraft with a bo& of tools in our hand,

/ feature of a comple& s stem is the phenomenon of retrospective coherence in which the current state of affairs alwa s ma*e logical sense, but onl when we loo* bac*wards (post hoc rationalization). The current pattern is logical, but is onl one of man patterns that could have formed, an one of which would be e6uall logical.

Organizations tend to stud past events to create predictive and prescriptive models for future decisions based on the assumption that the are dealing with a complicated s stem in which the components and associated relationships are capable of discover and management. This arises from Ta lor$s application of Gewtonian ph sics to management theor in the principles of scientific management (5+). 5ubse6uentl , a whole industr has been built between business schools and consultancies in which generalized models are created from anal tical stud of multiple case histories. 5+ served well in the revolutions of total 6ualit management and .'D and continues to be applicable in the domain of the complicated. >owever, =ust as Gewtonian ph sics was bounded b the understandings of 6uantum mechanics, so 5+ has been bounded b the need to manage *nowledge and learning. The second distinction is between a comple& s stem comprising man interacting identities in which one cannot distinguish cause and effect relationships but can identif and influence patterns of interactivit and a chaotic s stem in which all connections have bro*en down and are in a state of turbulence or eternal boiling. It is dangerous to confuse comple& and chaotic. In the comple& domain, we manage to recognize, disrupt, reinforce and seed the emergence of patternsB we allow the interaction of identities to create coherence and meaning. In a chaotic domain, no such patterns are possible unless we intervene to impose themB the will not emerge through the interaction of agents. 2hat to one organization is chaotic, to another is comple& and *nowable. In the chaotic domain, the most important thing is to actB then we can ma*e sense and respond.

The ,nowled#e Spiral

The law of re6uisite variet is well understood in ecolog B if the diversit of species falls below a certain level then the ecolog stagnates and dies. ;&cessive focus on core competence, a single model of communit of practice or a common investment appraisal process are all e&amples of wa s in which organizations can destro variet .

ependen*e on In%or+al Networ-s

/ mature organization will recognize that informal networ*s are a ma=or competitive advantage (%or e&ample, #swarming$ < li*e bees in a hive).

,ppendix "5 0ewcomer Socialization

Gew organizational recruits represent a particular t pe of emplo ee to an organization, often displa ing high e&pectations, motivation and a desire to achieve within their new role. >owever, the initial perceived ps chological contract between emplo ees and emplo ing organization ma alter mar*edl during the earl period of tenure for newl recruited staff (Dobinson, ,raatz, 1 Dousseau, 7??-). The fulfilment of new recruits$ e&pectations of the wor*place and the organization is fundamental to ma&imizing satisfaction, commitment levels, desire to sta with the compan and =ob performance. 2hilst later researchers have 6uestioned the size of relationship between met e&pectations and these wor*-related outcomes, there is general agreement that an emplo ing organization fulfilling contractual obligations and e&pectations will lead to more positive outcomes for new recruits(/nderson, 3447). it can be argued that hast establishment of ps chological and emplo ment contracts at the outset of an individual$s tenure within an organization are largel responsible for subse6uent feelings of disillusionment and possible attrition, suggesting provision of ade6uate =ob-relevant information as a possible mediator of this outcome.

Becoming an Organizational


The infusion and maintenance of strong corporate cultures begins with selection and training. /t 5outhwest /irlines, for instance, onl prospective emplo ees who fit with the culture are hired. In companies such as 'rocter and 0amble, Daft describes the process of acculturationA #new emplo ees are assigned minor tas*s while the learn to 6uestion their prior behaviours, beliefs and values. Through e&tensive training, new recruits constantl hear about the compan $s transcendent values and overarching purposes, about watershed events in the compan $s histor , and about e&emplar individuals < the heroes.$ The wa in which an individual becomes a full integrated member of the organization is ordinaril addressed as an issue of socialization. >ebden (7?@:) tal*s of socialization as the infusion of organizational culture within newcomers (the #transmission of culture#), as does 5impson (7?:F) that is, #learning the cultural content (s*ills, *nowledge, wa s of behaving) of a role and self-identification with the role which leads to internalization of certain values and goals$. 5ocialization has been studied from a number of different perspectives and conceptual orientations including, for e&ample, information gathering approaches (for e&ample, Ostroff 1 ,ozlows*i, 7??3), cultural approaches (for e&ample, >ebden, 7?@:), and social identit approaches (for e&ample, /shforth 1 +ael, 7?@?). 5chein (7?F7) describes socialization as individual movement within and between organizations. 2henever an individual crosses an organizational boundar (for e&ample, moving from one ran* to another) he or she is re-socialized to learn or construct a public self around the re6uirements of their changing roles. The focus of this model is, however, on structural and strategic aspects if socialization to the neglect of the cognitive and affective side of becoming an organizational member. 5ocialization into a profession or organization ma ta*e place through informal and)or formal channels. %ormall , induction courses ma be run for new organizational recruits, which #sell$ the organization$s identit and culture through the compan mission statement, provision of compan literature (often branded and communicating the #flavour$ of the organization through specific use of language, phrasing and st le) and via training. Informal channels of socialization ma includeA

observation of e&isting wor*ersB initiation rites (where a recruit is tested b emplo ees)B #budd ing$ or #mentoring$B and being corrected for mista*es and organizational *aux pas at the outset of one$s tenure. The socialization process thus results inA specifications for behaviour (the appropriate rules and norms to follow)B change in attitude (to reduce cognitive dissonance resulting from mismatch between one$s own attitudes and those of the group)B and, if professional socialization, active internalization of ideologies, values and norms representing that profession. (ntil recentl , it has been assumed that the individual is a passive recipient of socialization practices regulated and controlled b a socializing agent. Gowada s, however, it is common to ac*nowledge that the recruit ta*es a proactive role in the socialization process via mechanisms such as #self-to-protot pe matching$ (5etterland 1 Giendethal, 7??8) and anticipator self-stereot ping. %or e&ample, Giendethal and colleagues have shown that individuals see* out situations the believe to be selfdefining and in which the receive self-verif ing feedbac*. Individuals imagine the t pical person found in a particular situation then compare the defining traits of the protot pes with those of him- or herself and select the product, situation or institution associated with the greatest similarit between the self and the protot pic person-insituation (5etterland 1 Giendenthal, 7??8A 3:?<3F4). >owever, it is important to recognize that selection and internalization of protot pe value sets ma result in an idealized (and not realistic) perception of the group (and the self) during the socialization process. Thus, #realit shoc*$ ma occur upon the realization that their stereotypical behaviours, norms and values are not consistent with realit . The mechanisms that ma be used to reduce cognitive dissonance in such situations have been little studied. It is possible that such *nowledge- and e&perience-based matching is under a constant review process, and is sub=ect to change on a continuous basis over time, as suggested b +oreland and Cevine (7?@3). Desearch has demonstrated a clear lin* between perceived socialization e&periences and commitment (+e er, 7??FA 7?F). Desearch has tended to rel heavil on the si&dimensional classification scheme of "an +aanan and 5chein (7?@:). The dimension most strongl associated with commitment is #investiture versus divestiture$, which reflects the #degree to which newcomers received positive (#investiture$) or negative (#divestiture$) support after entr from e&perienced organizational members$ (. Investiture is found to be more strongl predictive of commitment that divestiture. One potential problem with #instilling commitment$ is its conse6uences for emplo ee inclination to be innovative. /nother problem associated with the use of socialization practices to instill commitment is the tendenc to focus on the form (that is, processes, practices), rather than the content (that is, messages) of commitment, and on organizationall initiated rather than emplo ee-initiated (for e&ample, information see*ing) socialization strategies. !ommitment ma also arise from the provision of training, although this is more of a *noc*-on conse6uence of training rather than an intended conse6uence. Desearch shows that commitment ma result from perceptions of training efforts, as opposed to the training e&perience itself (+e er, 7??F). !ommitment can, in turn, increase motivation to participate in training. It is commonl e&pected that perceived provision for, and actual upward progression, will have a positive impact on emplo ee commitment. Decent research indicates that this assumption should be 6ualified with reference to considerations of =ustice < that is, whether promotion procedures are perceived to be fair. The implication of this for

organizations is the need to conve clear messages to emplo ees about promotion opportunities and in particular how promotion decisions are made (+e er, 7??FA 344). 2ithin this conte&t, the ps chological contract has been seen both as a potential mediator of disillusionment in new recruits to organizations, and as a metaphor for career structure and development. .a*er and .err (7?@F) cited improved entr -level career counselling, combining dissemination of =ob-relevant information and recruit self-assessment in the pursuit of increased self-*nowledge as resulting in improved person<=ob)organization match and an improved ps chological contract between emplo ee and emplo er. %eller (7??9) discussed wa s in which emplo ment counsellors could assist clients in planning and ta*ing action to enhance personal competitiveness in a wor*place undergoing ma=or structural change, using the ps chological contract construct as a useful descriptor of that change process.