PROPOSITIONAL FAITH: WHAT IT IS AND WHAT IT IS NOT

Daniel Howard-Snyder Dept. of Philosophy, Western Washington University

Abstract: Propositional faith is the attitude picked out by typical uses of the locution S has faith that p, where p takes declarative sentences as instances. What is propositional faith? any people identify it with propositional belief. ore precisely, they think that faith that p !ust is belief that p, or at least that it re"uires belief that p, or #ust be partly constituted by belief that p. $his thou%ht is co##on enou%h& call it the Common View. ' have two ai#s in this paper: (i) to e*hibit the falsity of the +o##on ,iew and the paucity of reasons for it, and (ii) to %ive a #ore accurate account of what propositional faith is.

Super owl !"V. 't-s Super .owl Sunday, /011. Pittsbur%h-s down to 2reen .ay, /134& it-s near the end of the second "uarter. '-# takin% in the %a#e at #y favorite dive, workin% on so#e nachos and a super3si5ed #ar%arita. '-# a partisan of neither tea#. ' !ust want to see a %ood %a#e. $he %uy sittin% ne*t to #e, however, is a loyal Pittsbur%h fan, as indicated by the %ri# look on his face. $he Packers have possession& they-re #ovin% steadily toward Steelers territory, a%ain. 6urin% a break in the action, ' strike up a conversation: e: ' was hopin% the %a#e would be close. 7h well8another Super .owl blowout. ' think '-ll head ho#e at halfti#e. 9an: .e patient& be patient. $he Steelers-ll win. e: :ou can-t be serious. ;o tea# has ever overco#e #ore than a <3point deficit to win a Super .owl. And look at the Packer-s position: Pittsbur%h-s => with a first down. 9an: ' am serious. ' have faith that they-ll win. e: What? :ou #elieve they-re %oin% to win? 9an: ;o, ' don$t believe they-ll win& ' said ' have faith that they will. y topic is faith. ore specifically, #y topic is propositional faith, the attitude picked

out by typical conte#porary uses of the ?n%lish locution S has faith that p, where p takes declarative sentences as instances as in, e.%., @e has faith that they-ll win. What is propositional faith? any people identify it with propositional belief. ore precisely, they think that faith that p !ust is belief that p, or at least that it re"uires belief that p, or

#ust be partly constituted by belief that p. $his thou%ht is co##on enou%h& call it the Common View. ' have two ai#s in this paper: (ii) to e*hibit the falsity of the +o##on ,iew and the paucity of reasons for it, and (ii) to %ive a #ore accurate account of what propositional faith is. .efore ' %et down to work, ' need to clear so#e brush and set the sta%e. 1. Clearing the brush, setting the stage $here are #any thin%s labeled faith that are clearly not propositional faith. $o avoid error and to circu#scribe #y topic, ' be%in by clearin% the# away. 'n %he &pistle of 'ude, the author e*horts readers to earnestly contend for the faith, that is, the propositions constitutive of the basic +hristian story and ethic.1 Propositional faith is not those propositions, or any others. 't is an attitude that has a proposition as its ob!ect, or a state of affairs. 7ccasionally, one hears that faith is a process. 9or e*a#ple, accordin% to Alvin Plantin%a, the ter# Afaith-8denoteBsC the whole tripartite process of co#in% to believe the %ospel as a result of the @oly Spirit-s insti%atin% such belief upon encounterin% the %ospel./ Propositional faith is not this process, or any other. Dike propositional fear and propositional hope, it is a propositional attitude. So#eti#es people speak of believin% or takin% so#ethin% on faith. ' believe on faith that @alf3 ile-s Pacific +rest $rail #aps are accurate& ark takes it on faith that devotion to A#itEbha will result in enli%hten#ent. $hat is, we believe or take these thin%s on testi#ony or authority.4 Propositional faith is not to be identified with believin% or takin% so#ethin% on testi#ony or authority. 9rances has faith that her sons will live lon% and fulfillin% lives but she does not believe or take it on testi#ony or authority. Accordin% to artin Duther, faith is confidence and (nowledge of 2od-s %race.= Fohn +alvin concurs: faith is a fir# and sure (nowledge of the divine favor toward us.G $he Catholi) &n)y)lopedia speaks of faith as a kind of (nowledge.H Propositional faith is not to be identified with knowled%e. @ud can have faith that the President will lead us to victory without knowin% she will. Inowled%e is factive, propositional faith is not.

Accordin% to $ho#as A"uinas, says ?leonore Stu#p, propositional faith is assent Bto a propositionC %enerated by the will-s actin% on the intellect, held with certainty, without any hesitation or han%in% back.> $his is false, for four reasons. 9irst, if propositional faith is assent, then, since assent is a #ental act and not even partly constituted by belief, propositional faith cannot be partly constituted by beliefJbut it can. Second, if propositional faith is assent, then, since assent lasts about as lon% as a handshake, propositional faith is a fleetin% affairJbut it typically isn-t. $hird, althou%h propositional faith #i%ht have an act of will in its causal %enesis, it need not. 9ourth, propositional faith does not re"uire certainty, without any hesitation or han%in% back. A wife #i%ht have faith that her #arria%e will survive a crisis while harborin% doubts about it. 'ndeed, propositional faith is precisely that attitude in virtue of which she #i%ht possess the inner stability and i#petus that enables her to contribute to the reali5ation of that state of affairs, despite her lack of certainty. oreover, her faith #i%ht well involve so#e hesitation or han%in% back. We #ust not identify what we re%ard as an ideal instance of propositional faithJsay, one that e*hibits certainty, without any hesitation or han%in% backJwith a real instance of it. $he real need not be the ideal. We so#eti#es say thin%s of the for# S has faith in *, where * takes as instances the na#e of a person or so#e other entity. So said, faith in so#ethin% is relative to so#e do#ains but not others. ' have faith in #y hikin% sticksJas stabili5ers, not bear deterrents. ' have faith in #y wifeJas a friend, wife, and lover, not a horticulturalist. So#e people say that propositional faith cannot be the attitude picked out by uses of faith in * since one can have faith that * is thus3and3so even if * does not e*ist, but one can no #ore have faith in * when * does not e*ist than one can !u#p in a lake when there are no lakes. 9aith in * i#plies the e*istence of *& faith that * is thus3and3so does not.K ' suspect these people are wron%. Fust as faith3that is nonfactive, so faith3in lacks e*istential i#port. .ut even if they-re ri%ht, we can still ask whether propositional faith is the attitude one would have if * e*isted and one had faith in *. Althou%h, in that case, it #i%ht see# natural to identify faith in so#ethin%, as thus3and3so, with faith that it is thus3 and3so, faith in so#ethin% re"uires #ore: entrustin% one-s welfare to it in so#e way. .ut one can have faith that so#ethin% is thus3and3so without entrustin% one-s welfare to it in

any way, as when ' have faith that ?#ily will survive breast cancer but ' do not entrust #y well3bein% to her or her survival. Propositional faith is neither a proposition nor a state of affairs nor a process& it-s an attitude, an attitude that is not to be identified with knowled%e or assent& it need not be based on testi#ony, and it need not involve certainty, ea%erness, %eneration by an act of will, or entrustin% one-s welfare to so#eone or so#ethin%. @owever, to say what so#ethin% is not is not to say what it is. $hus, our "uestion re#ains: what is propositional faith? $o set the sta%e for assessin% the +o##on ,iew-s answer, a word on belief and doubt are in order. What ' have to say will be contentious and unconscionably brief. .elief is so#ethin% #ental, specifically a #ental state, not a #ental occurrence like an act of #ental assent or a process of deliberation. dispositional profile Willia# Alston provides: 1. 'f S believes that p, then if so#eone asks S whether p, S will tend to respond affir#atively. /. 'f S believes that p, then, if S considers whether it is the case that p, S will tend to feel it to be the case that p. 4. 'f S believes that p, then, if S takes " to follow fro# p, S will tend to believe ". =. 'f S believes that p, then, if S en%a%es in practical or theoretical reasonin%, S will tend to use p as a pre#ise when appropriate. G. 'f S believes that p, then, if S learns that not3p, S will tend to be surprised. H. 'f S believes that p, then, %iven S-s %oals, aversions, and other co%nitive stances, S will tend to act in appropriate ways.< ;ote that the conse"uent in each e#bedded conditional involves a tendency to a certain #anifestation. $hat-s because whether any such #anifestation is forthco#in% will depend on whether any psycholo%ical or other obstacles are present. ;ote also the ter# feel in (/). .y it, Alston does not #ean a sensation or e#otion. Lather, he #eans to convey the = ore specifically still, it is a dispositional state that #anifests itself under certain conditions like those in the partial

idea that Bthe #anifestation in "uestionC possesses a kind of immedia)y, that it is so#ethin% one e*perien)es rather than so#ethin% that one thin(s out, that it is a #atter of bein% stru)( #y (a sense of) how thin%s are rather than decidin% how thin%s are.10 7thers, he observes, call it consciously Bor occurrentlyC believin% p.11 oreover, ' cannot !ust by an act of will stop believin% so#ethin% ' now believe, nor can ' !ust by an act of will be%in to believe so#ethin% ' do not now believe. .elief is not under our direct voluntary control. 9inally, folk psycholo%y is ri%ht: there really are beliefs. 7f course, there is #uch to be said in favor of tradin% in belief for %raded confidence or credence, as #any .ayesians do. So it would be wise to put what ' have to say in ter#s of both views. $o do that, however, would co#plicate the discussion too #uch. $herefore, with apolo%ies, '-ll stick with the folk psycholo%ical characteri5ation of the relevant terrain. As for doubt, we #ust distin%uish #eing in dou#t about whether p fro# having dou#ts about whether p, and both of the# fro# dou#ting that p. 9or one to have doubts about whether pJnote the As-Jis for one to have what appear to one to be %rounds to believe not3p and, as a result, to tend to be less inclined to believe p. 6oubts about whether p can sit well with believin% p since one can have doubts about one-s doubts& that is, one can have defeaters for one-s doubts. @owever, as undefeated doubts #ount, their cu#ulative wei%ht #ay increase so that one awakes one #ornin% to find that they have borne so#ethin% alto%ether new: bein% in doubt. 9or one to be in doubt about whether p is for one neither to believe nor disbelieve p as a result of one-s %rounds for p see#in% to be rou%hly on a par with one-s %rounds for not3p. ;either bein% in doubt nor havin% doubts is to be identified with doubtin% that. 'f one doubts that so#ethin% is so, one is inclined to disbelieve it& bein% in doubt and havin% doubts lack that i#plication. @avin% doubts about so#ethin% can sit well with believin% it, not least because one can have defeaters for one-s doubts. .ein% in doubt, however, never sits well with belief. 9or if one believes p, then one will have certain tendencies that one will lack if one is in doubt about whether p, e.%. a tendency to assert p when asked whether p. $hese re#arks #ust suffice to indicate how ' will be thinkin% of belief and doubt. ' should add, thou%h, that while so#e thin%s ' have to say in what follows depend on #y characteri5ation of belief and doubt, others do not. ;otably, the structure of faith on offer

by essay-s end, and the basic thrust of the rationale for it, #i%ht be wed to other characteri5ations of belief and doubt. ' now turn to the +o##on ,iew. Mnless ' indicate otherwise, ' will hereafter use faith to #ean propositional faith, faith that. . The C!""!n #ie$ ' be%in with an instance of the +o##on ,iew that so#e people find attractive, both reli%ious and secular. @ere are three secularists espousin% it. Accordin% to Steven Pinker, faith is believin% so#ethin% without good reasons to do so.1/ ;ot to be outdone by his fellow bri%ht, Lichard 6awkins insists that BfCaith is belief in spite of, even
perhaps because of, the lack of evidence.14

.ut neither co#es close to

ark $wain:

faith is believin% what you (now ain$t so.1= Set aside the e*cesses of 6awkins and $wain and focus on Pinker& and assu#e for the #o#ent that faith is belief. 'f Pinker-s ri%ht, then one who has faith that p cannot at the sa#e ti#e have %ood reasons for p. .ut surely one can. aria can have faith that her new venture, Prairie Load 9ar#, will succeed and base her faith on an esti#ation of her resolve, her partner-s support, and an analysis of the #arket. 't is #ore plausible that faith is believin% so#ethin% on insuffi)ient reason. @owever, if this is ri%ht, then one who has faith that p cannot at the sa#e ti#e have sufficient reason for p. .ut a%ain, one can. y faith that ' will survive #y ly#pho#aJ constituted as it is, let-s i#a%ine, by #y belief that there-s a %ood chance '-ll #ake itJ #ay well fit the statistical evidence and other pro%nostics available to #e. ?very other co#ple* propositional attitude can fit one-s total evidence, e.%. 6ennis-s hope that, while lost southeast of Dake Ann near t. Shuksan, Whatco# +ounty Search and Lescue will find hi#, and his fear that they won-t. So why sin%le out faith as ne)essarily evidentially subpar, as re+uiring insufficient reasons? $wo reasons, ' con!ecture. 9irst, Pinker thinks of faith only with reli%ious content, and every instance of it is evidentially subpar, by his li%hts. Second, he #istakes the false nothin% is faith unless it is evidentially subpar for the true nothin% is faith unless it is evidentially suboptimal (#ore on the latter shortly). 'f #y con!ecture is correct, Pinker

would do well to reflect on instances of secular faith, and to reco%ni5e the i#port of the subpar3subopti#al distinction. ;ow to the +o##on ,iew, pure and si#ple. We be%in with this version of it: faith that p !ust is belief that p. 'f this is true, then one cannot believe p without havin% faith that p& but one can, for three reasons. 9irst, one can believe so#ethin% and not be for its truth, but one cannot have faith that so#ethin% is so and not be for its truth. Alston illustrates the point well: Bif so#eoneC is said to have faith that de#ocracy will eventually be established everywhere, that i#plies8that BsheC looks on this prospect with favor.1G Lobert Ada#s concurs: BtCo have faith is always to be for that in which one has faith. 't is perfectly consistent to say you believe that .ill +linton will win but you are still plannin% to vote for 2eor%e .ush& but a %enuine .ush supporter could hardly have faith that +linton will win.1H And Lobert Audi too: if ' do not have a favorable attitude toward so#ethin%-s happenin%, ' cannot have faith that it will.1> $his is why ' do not have faith that terroris# will occur fre"uently in the /1st century, althou%h ' believe it will. $o be for the truth of a proposition minimally re"uires considerin% its truth to be %ood or desirable, and ' do not consider the truth of the proposition that terroris# will occur fre"uently in the /1st century to be %ood or worthy of desire.1K Second, one can believe that p while re%ardin% oneself as bein% in an evidentially opti#al position vis3N3vis p-s truth& that-s not the case for faith, however. 9or we co##only contrast si%ht and knowled%e with the co%nitive stance i#plicit in faith. oreover, the closer so#eone ver%es on what we re%ard as an evidentially opti#al position, the #ore we hesitate to attribute faith to the#. 9inally, if one has faith that p only if one does not re%ard oneself as bein% in an evidentially opti#al position vis3N3vis p-s truth, we can e*plain two curious facts: you can-t have faith that you e*ist, and a fully o#niscient, co%nitively unsurpassable 2od can-t have faith at all. (' have !ust put the su#optimality )ondition, as '-ll call it, in a ne%ative sub!ective #ode: one has faith that p only if one does not re%ard oneself as bein% in an evidentially opti#al position vis3N3vis p-s truth. We #i%ht instead put it in a positive sub!ective #ode: one has faith that p only if one re%ards oneself as bein% in an evidentially subopti#al position vis3N3vis p-s truth. .ut can-t a child have faith that p even thou%h she lacks the >

capacity to re%ard herself as bein% in an evidentially subopti#al position vis3N3vis p-s truth? Alternatively, we #i%ht put it in an ob!ective #ode: one has faith that p only if one is not in an evidentially opti#al position vis3N3vis p-s truth. .ut can-t you mista(enly re%ard yourself as not bein% in an evidentially opti#al position vis3N3vis p-s truth, and so still have faith?1<) A third reason to think that one can believe p without havin% faith that p is that one can believe p even thou%h one has no tendency at all to feel disappoint#ent upon learnin% that it-s not so, but one cannot have faith that p without at least so#e tendency to feel disappoint#ent upon learnin% that it-s not so. $hat-s because one can have faith that p only if one cares that p& and one can care that p only if one has so#e tendency to feel disappoint#ent upon learnin% that it-s not so. 7b!ection: you can care that p without havin% any tendency to feel disappoint#ent upon learnin% that it-s not so. $he far#er cares that the drou%ht will continue but she has no tendency to feel disappoint#ent upon learnin% that it won-t. 'n reply, we #ust distin%uish carin% that fro# carin% a#out. 7ne can care about whether p even thou%h one has no tendency to feel disappoint#ent upon learnin% it-s not so, since carin% about is co#patible with ne%ative valence toward its truth. +arin% that p, however, re"uires positive valence toward its truth. So althou%h the far#er cares about whether the drou%ht will continue, she does not care that it will continue %iven her ne%ative valence toward its continuin%. 'f you find this distinction specious, substitute one can care3with3 positive3valence that p only if one has so#e tendency to feel disappoint#ent upon learnin% that it-s not so for the pre#ise and ad!ust the ar%u#ent here and elsewhere when relevant./0 $he +o##on ,iew, thou%ht of as the clai# that faith that p !ust is belief that p, is false. .ut we #i%ht think of it differently, e.%. as the clai# that faith that p re+uires belief that p, or that it #ust be partly )onstituted by belief that p. While this is #ore plausible, four considerations tell a%ainst it. 9irst, the con!unction test. 'f we were talkin% about the sour econo#y and our retire#ent plans and ' said, ' a# in doubt about whether '-ll recover #y retire#ent losses, but ' still believe ' will, you-d be perple*ed about #y state of #ind. 7r if ' confided in you, #y friend, ' don-t know what to believe, whether she-ll stay with #e or K

not, but ' believe she-ll stay, you-d be bewildered. 7r if ' disclosed to you, ' can-t tell whether what '-ve %ot to %o on favors the e*istence of 2od or not, but ' believe 2od e*ists nonetheless, you-d be baffled, or at least suspicious of #y intellectual virtue. .ut if ' said, ' a# in doubt about whether '-ll recover #y retire#ent losses, but ' still have faith that ' will, or ' don-t know what to believe, whether she-ll stay with #e or not, but ' have faith that she-ll stay, or ' can-t tell whether what '-ve %ot to %o on favors the e*istence of 2od or not, but ' have faith that 2od e*ists nonetheless, you need not #e perple*ed, bewildered, baffled, or suspicious at all. $his su%%ests that one can have faith that p without belief that p& indeed, that one can have faith that p while bein% in doubt about whether p./1 Second, one can have faith that p but lack a tendency to be surprised upon learnin% it-s not so& disappoint#ent, yes, but not surprise. @owever, one cannot believe p while lackin% a tendency to be surprised upon learnin% it-s not so. $hus, one can have faith that p without belief that p. $hird, one can have faith that p even if one does not believe p but rather p is li(ely, or p is twi)e as li(ely as not, and so on. 9or e*a#ple, @arvey #i%ht know that his colon cancer will %et the best of hi# before the season-s end& nevertheless, he #i%ht yet have faith that he will face death %raciously even if he only believes that he will probably succeed& after all, it can be difficult to die. 'n this respect, faith is like hope and fear: it allows probabilistic beliefs to stand in for the co%nitive stance it re"uires. A "uestion naturally arises at this point: if faith that p does not re"uire believin% p, is it co#patible with disbelievin% p? ;o. 9or if you disbelieve p, you will have tendencies to behavior, feelin%, and so on that are at odds with faith that p. 9or e*a#ple, if ' disbelieve that #y #arria%e will last, '-ll tend to say it won-t when asked, '-ll tend to feel it to be the case that it won-t when ' consider the #atter, '-ll tend to use the proposition that it won-t as a pre#ise in #y practical reasonin%, and '-ll tend to do thin%s appropriate to its not lastin%, e.%. look for another place to live, shop for another set of household ite#s, and so on. $he incon%ruity of faith and disbelief su%%ests that faith re"uires a #ore positive co%nitive stance toward its ob!ect precisely because the dispositional profiles of ne%ative stances like disbelief are incon%ruent with faith. $his opens the door to stances distinct <

fro# belief to stand in for the positive co%nitive stance faith re"uires, provided that their dispositional profiles are con%ruent with faith. Are there any such stances? 7ne #i%ht think so& after all, notice the plethora of folk psycholo%ical ter#s for positive co%nitive stances: acceptance, acknowled%e#ent, affir#ation, assent, assu#ption, belief, confidence, conviction, credence, etc. Althou%h it would be hasty to suppose that each ter# stands for a different stance, it would be e"ually hasty to suppose that every ter# stands for the sa#e stance. 'nterestin%ly, #any philosophers think so#e of the# stand for different stances. 9or e*a#ple, #any think that belief differs fro# acceptance, althou%h they disa%ree over the difference. $his isn-t the place to enter that dispute. 'nstead, '-ll #ake #y point on the assu#ption that there is a difference and that Alston-s account of it is near enou%h true to serve #y purpose.// Accordin% to Alston, belief differs fro# acceptance in three ways. (i) .elief is a dispositional #ental state while acceptance is a #ental act. 7ne finds oneself with a belief, whereas to accept p is to adopt or take on a positive attitude toward p. (ii) .elief is not under our direct voluntary control while acceptance is. (iii) $he a)t of acceptance nor#ally en%enders a dispositional state #uch like belief, a state also labeled acceptance, unfortunately. $his state differs fro# belief. Lecall Alston-s partial dispositional profile of belief, ite#s (1)3(H) on pa%es ***3*** above. +ontrastin% belief and the state of acceptance with reference to that list, he writes: .elief will involve #ore confident, unhesitatin% #anifestations of these sorts than acceptance will. .ut in the #ain, the story on these co#ponentsJspecifically (1), (4), (=), (G), and (H)Jwill be sa#e for acceptance. ('n (4), substitute tend to accept for tend to believe.) .y far the lar%est difference is the absence of (/). $he co#ple* dispositional state en%endered by acceptin% p will definitely not include a tendency to feel that p if the "uestion of whether p arises./4 .y way of illustration, Alston asks us to consider a field %eneral who #ust dispose his forces for battle with infor#ation insufficient to believe any of several co#petin% views about how he #i%ht best do so. What does he do? @e adopts the view that see#s #ost likely to succeed, takes a stand on its truth, and acts on that basis. 'n short, he accepts it, 10

which en%enders dispositions to appropriate troop dispersal, and the like./= Alston describes his stance on libertarian freedo# si#ilarly. @e doesn-t believe we have it& he takes ob!ections #uch too seriously for that. Lather he adopts it, re%ards it as true, and draws inferences fro# it in his theoretical and practical reasonin%./G So, accordin% to Alston, the state of acceptance differs fro# belief in two ways: its #anifestations will tend to be less confident and #ore hesitatin% than those of belief and its dispositional profile lacks a tendency to feel that p if the "uestion of whether p arises. 6espite these differences, the profile of the state of acceptance is con%ruent with faith since, first of all, one instance of faith can be weaker than another because it is less confident and #ore hesitatin%Jweak faith is faith nonetheless. Secondly, any concern due to the lack of a tendency to feel that p co#es fro# the thou%ht that faith re"uires a disposition to take a stand on the truth of its ob!ect and only belief suffices for that. .ut one can be disposed to take a stand on the truth of a proposition in #any ways, one of which is to tend to assert it when asked whether it-s so. 7ne need not have a tendency to feel that it-s so as well. So, acceptance suffices for the positive co%nitive stance faith re"uires. We have, then, our fourth reason to think that one can have faith that p without belief that p: acceptance is not belief, and it can stand in for the positive co%nitive stance faith re"uires. $he +o##on ,iew is false even in its #ore plausible for#. $he difference between acceptance and belief also provides a basis for assessin% reasons for the +o##on ,iew, to which ' now turn. %. Reas!ns &!r the C!""!n #ie$ 'n oral 9aith, Lobert Ada#s focuses on a sort of faith typified by faith that a ter#inally ill friend-s life is still worth livin%. 't is characteristic of such faith, he says, that one reco%ni5e the possibility of error, that one reco%ni5e that BoneC could be tra%ically #istaken, #istaken in a way characteristic of false beliefs. @e continues, We do %ive and entertain reasons for and a%ainst ite#s of #oral faith8. And the structure of %ivin% and entertainin% reasons for the# is at least very si#ilar to the 11

structure of reasonin% about other sorts of belief. 'n thinkin% about ite#s of #oral faith, one uses lo%ic, one ai#s at consistency and at coherence with oneOs beliefs on other sub!ects, and one is responsive to oneOs sense of Pplausibility,P as we so#eti#es put it. All of that is %rounds for classifyin% #oral faith as a sort of belief./H ,eply. ' don-t see it. ' don-t see why BaCll of that is %rounds for classifyin% #oral faith as a sort of belief. Acceptance is not belief, and our acceptances can be in error or #istaken. oreover, in thinkin% about what one has accepted, one can reflect on its plausibility, use lo%ic, and ai# for consistency and coherence with other ite#s on which one takes a co%nitive stance. Acceptance, therefore, has the features of faith on the basis of which Ada#s classifies it as a sort of belief. $hus, those features do not support that classification. @ere are five #ore reasons for the +o##on ,iew found in the literature./> 1. 'f you have faith that p, you will tend to assert p when asked whether p (absent contravenin% influences). .ut you have that tendency only if you believe p. $hus, you have faith that p only if you believe p. ,eply: ' will ar%ue later that a certain #ental state whose dispositional profile lacks a tendency to assert p can stand in for the positive co%nitive stance re"uired by faith. 'f '-# ri%ht, then one can have faith that p and yet have no such tendency. .ut even if '-# wron%, faith that p does not re"uire belief that p. 9or one need not believe p in order to have a tendency to assert p. 7ne #i%ht accept p instead. /. 'f you have faith that p, then you are disposed to believe p& and, since a disposition to believe p -ust is believin% p, you have faith that p only if you believe p. ,eply: 9irst, one can have faith that p without bein% disposed to believe p since one can have faith that p while believin% it is likely that p, instead of p. Second, acceptin% p can stand in for the positive co%nitive stance re"uired by faith and, since you can accept p without believin% p, you can have faith that p without bein% disposed to believe p. $hird, one can be disposed to believe p without believin% p. 9or e*a#ple, on so#e occasion ' #i%ht be disposed to believe that '-# talkin% too loudlyJi#a%ine #e talkin% e*citedly with you about faith in a "uiet cafeJbut it does not follow that at that ti#e ' 1/

believe that ' a# talkin% too loudly. 'ndeed, if you brou%ht it to #y attention, ' #i%ht say sheepishly, and truly, 7ops, sorry& ' didn-t reali5e ' was blatherin% so loudly. $hanks for lettin% #e know. '-ll pipe down./K 4. 'f one has faith that p, one does not disbelieve p& so, if one has faith that p, one believes p. ,eply: $he pre#ise is true, but the conclusion does not follow. At least one other option distinct fro# belief and disbelief can stand in for the positive co%nitive stance re"uired by faith, na#ely acceptance. 7ne #i%ht insist that, even if faith that p in %eneral does not i#ply believin% p, reli%ious faith does. $he ne*t two reasons take this tack. Althou%h ' a# concerned with propositional faith per se, assessin% these reasons will prove instructive. =. 'f you have reli%ious faith that p, then you are totally co##itted in a practical way to p-s truth and to what you see follows fro# itJeven to the point of #akin% funda#ental sacrifices. .ut you can-t be totally co##itted in a practical way unless you believe p and what you see follows fro# it. $herefore, you have reli%ious faith that p only if you believe p. ,eply: Det-s pretend we have a %ood enou%h %rip on what a practical total co##it#ent is. $wo replies see# apt. 9irst, reli%ious faith that p does not re"uire a total practical co##it#ent to p-s truth. aybe at its best it does, but it does not as such. We #ust not #istake what is re"uired by an ideal instance of a kind for what is re"uired by a real instance. Second, reli%ious faith that p at its best #ay well not re"uire a total practical co##it#ent to p-s truth, at least in so#e situations. Suppose that ark, a .uddhist, has so#e undefeated doubts about whether devotion to A#itEbha will result in enli%hten#ent, but he still has faith that it will. 'n that case, if he were to di% in his heels and believe it anyway, he-d e*hibit intellectual vice, pi%headedness or close3#indedness perhaps. 'n the circu#stances in which he finds hi#self, he would be an overall better person if he adopted so#e other positive co%nitive stance that is #ore at ho#e with his doubts and yet also at ho#e with his faith, in which case a de%ree of practical co##it#ent #ore consonant with that stance and his doubts would be, all else bein% e"ual, #ore virtuous for him in his parti)ular situation, a de%ree that #i%ht fall short of a total practical co##it#ent. 14

G. Authentic reli%ious faith involves a lon%in% for 2od as the all3do#inatin% lon%in% of one-s life, one-s #aster passion. .elief3less reli%ious faith would involve no such thin%. 't would at best involve a lon%in% to know whether or not 2od e*ists. Leli%ious faith that p, therefore, re"uires belief that p. ,eply: 9irst, authentic reli%ious faith need not involve a lon%in% for 2od that constitutes one-s #aster passion, one-s all3do#inatin% lon%in%. Perhaps at its best it does, but it need not as such. A%ain: we #ust not #istake the ideal for the real. Second, a lon%in% for 2od central to one-s life can be wed to acceptance& as such, a faith without belief can involve a lon%in% for 2od suitable to be one-s #aster passion. Another ar%u#ent for the +o##on ,iew %oes like this. $he +o##on ,iew is aptly na#ed. After all, people do co##only think that the psycholo%ical attitude they pick out when they say thin%s of the for# S has faith that p re"uires belief that p. Fust ask the#Q Dikewise, they co##only intend to pick out so#ethin% that involves belief that p when they use such talk. 9urther#ore, a vast rule3%overned way of usin% faith3that talk has %rown up around this thou%ht and intention, a way of speakin% that spans #any centuries and cultures. 'n that case, the way in which people co##only use faith that p must pick out so#ethin% that re"uires belief that p, if it picks out anythin% at all. $herefore, faith that p re"uires belief that p./< ,eply. Suppose that by belief the proponent of the ar%u#ent #eans what ' earlier said belief was: an involuntary #ental state with a partial dispositional profile indicated by (1)3(H) on pa%es ***3*** above. 'n that case, it is dubious whether people co##only think that faith re"uires belief. 9or, first of all, people do not co##only think that the attitude they pick out with belief is an involuntary #ental state. Second, people do not co##only think that the attitude they pick out when they use faith3that talk has the dispositional profile indicated by (1)3(H). $he profile of acceptance would be %ood enou%h. .ut now suppose that by belief the proponent of the ar%u#ent does not #ean what ' said belief was but rather what so#e scholarly account says it is.40 'n that case, the sa#e pre#ise would be false for the sa#e reasons, %iven the appropriate chan%es. 9or on virtually every scholarly account, belief is involuntary& and on every scholarly account,

1=

belief has necessary features not co##only thou%ht to be necessary for the attitude people intend to pick out with their faith3that talk. 9inally, suppose that by belief the proponent of the ar%u#ent #eans what ' e*pect #ost people co##only have in #ind when they use the ter#, so#ethin% they-d report as belief, assent, acceptance, !ud%#ent, affir#ation, decision, assu#ption, confidence, credence, etc. for a lon% list of ite#s that fall under the rubric of positive co%nitive stance. 'n that case, the conclusion of the ar%u#ent is that faith that p re"uires a positive co%nitive stance toward p. With this conclusion ' a# in co#plete a%ree#ent. 6espite the fre"uency with which one encounters the +o##on ,iew, there is little to be said for it. '. Faith an( (esire 7ne can have faith that so#ethin% is so only if one is for it, only if one considers its truth to be %ood or desirable. $he bein%3for3it re"uire#ent of faith re"uires #ore, however. 9or consider this. :ou have faith that p only if you consider p-s truth to be %ood or desirable, but you cannot do that unless you want it to be the case that p& so you have faith that p only if you want it to be the case that p. $o be sure, you #i%ht have conflictin% desires& indeed, you #i%ht only want it a little bit. ;evertheless, unless you want p to be the case, you cannot have faith that p. any will deny the pre#ise that you cannot consider p-s truth to be %ood or desirable unless you want it to be the case that p. $his is an ancient dispute, one that ' will sidestep. 9or, even if you )an consider p-s truth to be %ood or desirable without wantin% it to be the case that p, three other considerations re#ain for thinkin% that faith that p re"uires at least so#ethin% in the nei%hborhood of desire for the truth of p. 9irst: one has faith that p only if one cares that p, but one cares that p only if one has so#e desire for p to be true. After all, if ' have no desire that you finish your novel or that our friendship continues, ' a# indifferent to these thin%s, ' don-t care that they are so. $herefore, one has faith that p only if one has so#e desire for p to be true. We #i%ht resist. '#a%ine a #eth addict who has no desire whatsoever to stop but who, upon co#in% to reco%ni5e how #uch better his life #i%ht be if he were to stop, 1G

wants to want to stop. 'n that case, if he-s disposed to do so#ethin% about chan%in% his first3order desire and his behavior, say, by seekin% therapy, then, even if he has so far failed, he is not indifferent to stoppin%, he cares at least so#ewhat that he stops.41 ;otice that the first3 and second3order desire cases share so#ethin% in co##on: havin% a desire in virtue of which one cares that p. i%ht one have a desire in virtue of aybe. which one cares that p without havin% a first3 or hi%her3order desire for p-s truth? order desire to live due to the depression3inducin% side3effects of the treat#ent. ;evertheless, she cares that she survives since she considers her survival desirable for the sake of her children and she lon%s for the# to flourish. She wants what her detestable life can brin%, their flourishin%& but she has no desire to live, first3 or hi%her3order. 'f this is possible, one can have faith that so#ethin% is so while havin% no first3 or hi%her3order desire for its truth. ;evertheless, one #ust have a desire in virtue of which one cares that it is so. $his is what faith re"uires. @ere-s a second ar%u#ent. Dike other co#ple* propositional attitudes, e.%. fear and hope, faith #otivates behavior. 'n the case of fear, this is indicated by the fact that all you need to know to understand why the hiker is beatin% the %rass as she walks throu%h the #eadow is that she fears that rattlesnakes lie nearby. 'n the case of hope, it-s indicated by the fact that all you need to know to understand why the cli#ber is wavin% toward the sky is that he hopes that he-ll catch the eye of the search3and3rescue pilot. 9ear and hope have built in to the# what it takes to #otivate behavior& that-s why they e*plain it. $he sa#e %oes for faith. All you need to know to understand why :ehuda continues to study $orah despite his doubts is that he has faith that the basic Fewish story is true. All you need to know to understand why a couple seeks #arital counselin% is that they have faith that they can work thin%s out. Dike fear and hope, faith #otivates behavior& that-s why it e*plains it. .ut co%nition alone cannot #otivate behavior& desire is re"uired. Dike propositional fear and hope, therefore, propositional faith has desire built into it. $hird: 7ne can have faith that so#ethin% is so only if one has a tendency to feel disappoint#ent upon learnin% that it-s false. .ut if one has a tendency to feel disappoint#ent upon learnin% that it-s false, then one cares that it-s so. @owever, if one cares that it-s so, one desires its truth, or at least has a desire in virtue of which one cares 1H

'#a%ine a youn% #other battlin% a recurrence of breast cancer& she has no first3 or hi%her3

that it-s so. So one can have faith that so#ethin% is so only if one has a desire in virtue of which one cares that it-s so. 'f any of these considerations is on tar%et, then, even if one can have faith that p without desire for the truth of p, one cannot have faith that p without a desire in virtue of which one cares that p. As we-ve !ust seen, different sorts of desires #i%ht satisfy that description& so let-s %ather the# all under the rubric of a positive )onative orientation and say that faith that p re"uires a positive conative orientation toward the truth of p. ). Faith an( (!ubt .elief and acceptance are distinct& nevertheless, each can stand in for the positive co%nitive stance faith re"uires. @owever, each is at odds with bein% in doubt& if one believes or accepts so#ethin%, one will have tendencies that one will lack if one is in doubt about it, e.%. a tendency to assert it. $herefore, since faith need not be at odds with bein% in doubt, so#ethin% else can stand in for the positive co%nitive stance faith re"uires. What is it? $o be%in to answer this "uestion, consider the followin% three very short stories. .orth#ound. 't-s $rail, the ay H, /010. '-# at the southern ter#inus of the Pacific +rest ost ni%hts, after two e*ican border with +alifornia. After so#e %oodbyes, ' start to walk to

+anada, /,HGG #iles north. A lot can %o wron% in /,HGG #iles.

do5en up3and3down #iles in the sun, '-# beat. ;ow, nearly four weeks and G00 #iles later, '-# terribly ho#esick. 6o ' believe ' won$t #ake it to +anada? ;ot at all. ' feel stron%er every day& trail ca#araderie is pleasurable, as is #eetin% de#andin% daily %oals& and the beauty of the hi%h desert in Sprin% is astoundin%. walk fro# oreover, #y fa#ily is plannin% a rende5vous. .esides, what better way to e*press %ratitude at #idlife than a e*ico to +anada? So then, do ' believe ' will #ake it? ;ot at all. A lot can %o wron% in /,1GG #iles. 'ndeed, %iven what '-ve %ot to %o on, ' can-t even ha5ard a %uess as to how likely it is that ' will #ake it. ;evertheless, each #ornin% ' picture onu#ent >K at the +anadian border !ust north of @art-s Pass with #e standin% ne*t to it s#ilin%, and ' head north on the assu#ption that, co#e Septe#ber, that picture will be reality.

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Captain /organ. 7n the trail, there-s a sayin% about the relationship between a sleepin% trailside rattlesnake and a %roup of hikers passin% by: the first wakes it up, the second pisses it off, and the third %ets bit. ' was the third. 9ortunately for #e, this unseen rattler, coiled deep in the sand under so#e scrub, did not bite #e. +aptain or%an was not so fortunate. 't-s dusk and four paces behind #e he speaks of his new ri%ht hip and shoulder, replace#ents for the ones he lost to a roadside bo#b in 'ra" nine #onths earlier. @e tells #e how he ai#s to continue his recovery on his walk to +anada, whenJ all of a suddenJhe stops and says #atter3of3factly, 't bit #e. 't didn-t even rattle, pointin% to a =03inch o!ave 2reen, silent and still. We inspect his wound. ' dial <11& no reception. $wenty #inutes later, at $yler @orse +reek, he-s cal# with no sy#pto#s. Lattlesnakes control enveno#ation, so#eti#es deliverin% Adry bites- to ani#als too lar%e to eat& #oreover, a snake-s ti#in% can be off so that it releases its veno# before sinkin% its fan%s. aybe +aptain %ot lucky. $he ne*t #ornin% he says he feels fine, so the other hikers con%re%ated at the creek #ove on. ' stay. $hirty #inutes later, he heaves up his breakfast and continues to wretch every two #inutes or so& he "uickly beco#es weak and feverish, breathin% with difficulty& si%ns of deliriu# appear.4/ @e needs help8fast. .ut which way should he %o? Should he backtrack /= #iles to @i%hway 14K, or for%e ahead /= #iles to @i%hway GK? 7ur #aps %ive us no reason to prefer either route. $hree #iles ahead, there-s a two3#ile side3trail to a trailhead& #i%ht we find a vehicle to hotwire at #idweek? 9ive #iles back there-s a dirt road into the hills& #i%ht it lead to a ho#e? aybe he should stay put at the creek, the only sure source of water in this =K3#ile stretch& perhaps a hiker with a workin% phone will arrive and we can call in an airlift. $i#e is short& he needs to decide. @e rules out stayin% put, and decides that #ovin% ahead is sli%htly better than %oin% back. So he stu#bles forward on the assu#ption that help lies ahead. &liotwright. 'n an insi%htful autobio%raphical essay, Willia# Wainwri%ht characteri5es his stance toward 2od as one filtered throu%h a con%enital skepticis# that renders it difficult for hi# to e#brace any controversial BpropositionC without some hesitation.44 ;evertheless, he writes, classical theistic #etaphysics has co#e to see# #ore reasonable to #e, on the whole, than its alternatives and it survives criticis# at least as well as, and probably better than, its co#petitors.4= oreover, sensitive to what 1K

he describes as the frailty of hu#an effort, thou%ht, and ideals when confronted by what BPaulC $illich called the threat of death, #eanin%lessness, and sin, he has lon% been attracted to what the +hristian story has to say about these #atters. 'n li%ht of these and other considerations, he says that even if +hristian theis# isn-t #ore probable than not, it is still reasonable to e#brace it since, by his li%hts, it best addresses the whole of hu#an e*perience and the evidence favors it over its co#petitors.4G @e concludes the essay with this para%raph: y attitude is in #any ways si#ilar to $.S. ?liot-s. ?liot appears to have co#bined a deeply serious faith with both irony and skepticis#. (When asked why he accepted +hristianity, he said he did so because it was the least false of the options open to hi#.)8 ' do not re%ard #y stance as e*e#plary. 'f +hristianity (or indeed any for# of traditional theis#) is true, a faith free fro# doubt is surely better. ' suspect, however, that #y reli%ious life #ay be fairly representative of the lives of #any intelli%ent, educated, and sincere +hristians in the latter part of the twentieth century.4H 'n personal correspondence, Wainwri%ht indicates that he hi#self thinks +hristianity is #ore likely than not. ?liot, however, is a different story. @e thinks +hristianity is the least false of the credible options, which su%%ests that by his li%hts it is #ore likely than each of the# but less likely than their dis!unction. '#a%ine, then, so#eone with Wainwri%ht-s evaluative, conative, and behavioral orientation to +hristianity but with ?liot-s co%nitive stance. +all hi# &liotwright. 9ive observations about our prota%onists are relevant to our concerns. 9irst, it see#s apt to say that each of the# has faith. ' have faith that ' will #ake it to +anada& +aptain or%an has faith that help lies ahead& ?liotwri%ht has faith that the basic +hristian story is true. Second, we neither believe nor accept these thin%s. ' have no tendency to feel it to be the case that '-ll #ake it to +anada. +aptain or%an not only lacks that tendency, he lacks any tendency to assert that help lies ahead, and he lacks any tendency to be

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surprised upon learnin% that it doesn-t. We can easily i#a%ine that the sa#e %oes for ?liotwri%ht. $hird, each of us is in doubt about the ob!ect of his faith. ' think that what '-ve %ot to %o on puts #e in no position to say whether '-ll #ake it to +anada, not even very rou%hly how likely it is. +aptain or%an thinks stayin% put has the least %oin% for it, and that #ovin% forward is sli%htly better than backtrackin%. ?liotwri%ht thinks +hristianity is the least false of the credible options, which su%%ests the he dee#s his evidence for +hristianity to be no better than the evidence for their dis!unction. 9ourth, despite our lack of belief and acceptance and despite our doubt, each of us acts on a certain assu#ption. ' act on the assu#ption that ' will #ake it to +anada. +aptain acts on the assu#ption that help lies ahead. ?liotwri%ht acts on the assu#ption that the basic +hristian story is true. $ake note: there really is something that ea)h of us a)ts on& it-s called an assumption. 9ifth, in virtue of our assu#ptions, each of us tends to behave in e*pectable ways. ' assu#e ' will #ake it to +anada, and so ' pick up ca#p each #ornin% and head north, whittlin% away at the si* #illion steps between borders, schedulin% resupplies, drea#in% of fa#ily rende5vouses, and so on. +aptain or%an assu#es help lies ahead, and so he rises fro# his knees, slin%s his pack onto his back, and sta%%ers forward. ?liotwri%ht assu#es the basic +hristian story is true, and so he #akes confession, %ives thanks, kneels to receive the .ody of +hrist, and so on. 't see#s, therefore, that we have found so#ethin% distinct fro# belief and acceptance, so#ethin% that is at ho#e with bein% in doubt, so#ethin% that can stand in for the positive co%nitive stance faith re"uires: assu#in%. *. Faith an( assu"ing What, e*actly, is assu#in%? $his is a difficult "uestion. Mnlike belief and acceptance, assu#in% has received little attention. Still, perhaps a half a do5en useful observations #i%ht not fall too far fro# the truth. 9irst, we use assu#e in different ways. We so#eti#es use it with reference to thin%s we believe or accept& and we so#eti#es use it with reference to thin%s we disbelieve and re!ect. .ut, as with our prota%onists, we so#eti#es use it with reference to /0

thin%s we neither believe nor accept, and thin%s we neither disbelieve nor re!ect& thin%s we are in doubt about. ' #ean to e#ploy that use of the word. Second observation: we #ust not identify assu#in% with actin% as if. 7ne can act as if p while disbelievin% p, but one cannot assu#e p while disbelievin% p. 9or when one assu#es p, one has not settled on not3p& but when one disbelieves p, one has settled on not3p, even thou%h one #i%ht disse#ble and act as if p. $hird, perhaps the relation between actin% as if and assu#in%Jor, #ore accurately, perhaps the relation between a disposition to act as if and assu#in%Jis that of %enus to species. 'f it is, then actin% as if need not involve pretense. 9or althou%h so#e species of actin% as if #i%ht re"uire pretense, e.%. actin% as if you-re a fro% while playin% charades, the assu#in%s of our prota%onists involve no pretense. ' a# not pretendin% ' will #ake it to +anada& +aptain or%an is not pretendin% that help lies ahead& and ?liotwri%ht is not pretendin% that +hristianity is true. 9ourth observation: since assu#in% of the sort at issue is at ho#e with bein% in doubt, its dispositional profile will differ fro# those of belief and acceptance. 'n particular, if S assu#es p, she will la)( a tendency to feel it to be the case that p upon considerin% whether p& she will la)( a tendency to assert that p when asked whether p, unless it is clear to her that she will not be #isunderstood for e*pressin% a #ore positive co%nitive stance& and she will la)( a tendency to be surprised upon learnin% not3p. 9ifth, despite these differences, assu#in% functions si#ilarly to belief and acceptance in reasonin% and other behavior. Specifically, if one assu#es p, then, if one takes " to follow fro# p, one will tend to assu#e ". And if one assu#es p, then, if one en%a%es in practical or theoretical reasonin%, one will tend to use p as a pre#ise when appropriate. And, in %eneral, if one assu#es p, then, %iven one-s %oals, aversions, and other co%nitive stances, one will tend to act in appropriate ways. 9inally, althou%h the dispositional profile of assu#in% differs fro# that of acceptance, it is nonetheless con%ruent with propositional faith. $hree considerations !ointly su%%est this. (i) Dike the profiles of believin% p and acceptin% p but unlike the profile of disbelievin% p, the profile of assu#in% p lacks the tendencies to feel not-p is the case

/1

upon considerin% p, to affir# or assert not-p when asked whether p, and to be surprised upon learnin% p. 'n these respects, the profile of assu#in% p is con%ruent with faith that p. (ii) 7ne can be in doubt about so#ethin% and still have faith that it-s so. .ut one can be in doubt about so#ethin% only if one lacks a tendency to be surprised upon learnin% it-s not so and one lacks a tendency to assert it (absent so#e special #otive to assert it, e.%. to deceive so#eone). $hus, one can have faith while lackin% both of these tendencies, in which case the difference between the profiles of acceptance and assu#in% do not render assu#in% incon%ruent with faith. (iii) Althou%h the profile of assu#in% lacks these two tendencies, it includes other tendencies that constitute a disposition to take a stand on the truth of what is assu#ed. 9or !ust as when one accepts p, when one assu#es p, one will tend to use p as a pre#ise in practical and theoretical reasonin% when appropriate and one will, #ore %enerally, tend to act in appropriate ways %iven one-s %oals, aversions, and other #ental states. $his is why we e*pect that, when ?liotwri%ht assu#es the basic +hristian story, he will have a tendency to infer that there is no un!ustified evil and that he should confess his sins and the like& this is why we e*pect that, when +aptain or%an assu#es that help lies ahead and he wants to %et help, he will walk forward. .y perfor#in% these actions rather than their relevant contraries, they #anifest their disposition to take a stand on the truth of their assu#ptions, albeit a weaker stand than that of acceptance (or belief). +. Pr!,!siti!nal &aith: $hat it is An account of propositional faith e#er%es fro# the fore%oin% reflections. 9aith that p is a co#ple* propositional attitude consistin% of (i) a positive evaluation of p, i.e. considerin% p to be %ood or worthy of desire, (ii) a positive conative orientation toward p, and (iii) a positive co%nitive stance toward p, all under the subopti#ality condition. Althou%h nothin% can be faith without these constituents, different ite#s can stand in for each. $o clarify the proposal, consider Diagram 0: A positive evaluation of p

//

A positive conative orientation toward p A positive co%nitive stance toward p ?ach bo* to the left is filled to convey the idea that nothin% is propositional faith unless it answers to those descriptions. ?ach bo* to the ri%ht is e#pty to convey the idea that different thin%s can answer to those descriptions. ;othin% that fills in an e#pty bo* is a necessary constituent of faith& rather, so#e fillin% in or other that answers the description to its left is re"uired. .elief that p can stand in for the positive co%nitive stance, and desire for p-s truth can stand in for the positive conative orientation. @ence Diagram 1: A positive evaluation of p A positive conative orientation toward p A positive co%nitive stance toward p Acceptance and a second3order desire can stand in as well. @ence Diagram 2: A positive evaluation of p A positive conative orientation toward p A positive co%nitive stance toward p ' have su%%ested that assu#in% can stand in too, which is displayed in Diagram 3: Acceptin% p Wantin% it to be the case that one wants p +onsiderin% p-s truth to be %ood or desirable .elievin% p Wantin% p to be the case +onsiderin% p-s truth to be %ood or desirable

/4

A positive evaluation of p A positive conative orientation toward p A positive co%nitive stance toward p

+onsiderin% p-s truth to be %ood or desirable Wantin% p to be the case Assu#in% that p

Althou%h it has %one un#entioned, a variety of positive co%nitive stances can stand in for considerin% p to be %ood or desirable, the positive evaluation of p. And there #ay be other ite#s that can stand in for the re"uired constituents of faith. -. The Oba"a Ob.e/ti!n Suppose you believe that .arack 7ba#a will win the election& #oreover, you think that his winnin% would be a %ood thin%, and you want hi# to win. (' use the political preferences of the person who presented the ob!ection to #e.) 'f the account of propositional faith on offer is co#plete as it stands, then you have faith that 7ba#a will win. $he proble# is you don-t, and so the account is inco#plete.4> What-s #issin% is resilience in the face of new contrary evidence. What if une#ploy#ent increased? What if it ca#e out that 7ba#a pulled a lewinsky? What if his popularity ratin%s took a dive? Det your i#a%ination ripQ 'n the face of increasin% counter3evidence, would you still want hi# to win? 7f course, you say. Would you still think it a %ood thin%? Absolutely, you reply. After all, the econo#y is .ush-s fault and adultery isn-t relevant to presidential leadership& #oreover, consider the alternative. $he crucial "uestion, thou%h, is this: would you still #elieve that he-ll win? :esQ, you say. $hen you have faith that he will. ;othin% counts as faith unless one-s co%nitive stanceJin this case, your beliefJis resistant to what one re%ards as contrary evidence. $his line of thou%ht is #istaken. 9or althou%h ' a%ree that what-s #issin% in the account on offer is resilience in the face of what one re%ards as new counter3evidence, it is a #istake to understand that resilience solely in ter#s of the resistance of one-s co%nitive stance to what one re%ards as new counter3evidence. $hat-s one way the resilience faith re"uires can be instantiated, but it isn-t the only way& nor is it necessary. /=

9or one can instantiate resilience in the face of what one re%ards as new counter3evidence by #aintainin% enou%h of the behavioral dispositional profile one had prior to learnin% of it. $o illustrate the point, consider a variation on the 7ba#a story. As before, you believe he-ll win the election, you think his winnin% is a %ood thin%, and you want hi# to win. And, as before, if you were to discover what you re%ard as counter3evidence to his winnin%, you would still think his winnin% is a %ood thin%. Mnlike before, however, suppose that your co%nitive stance, your belief that he-ll win, is not resistant to what you re%ard as new counter3evidence. 9or e*a#ple, if you were to reco%ni5e new evidence that led you to think that the election was a toss3up, you would not di% in your co%nitive heels and believe despite the counter3evidence& you would #ove fro# belief downward. ?ven so, you #i%ht yet have faith that 7ba#a will win. 9or it #i%ht be that, in the relevant counterfactual situations, like the one we are i#a%inin%, despite your doubt, you would take so#e other positive co%nitive stance toward the proposition that he will win and, #ore to the present point, you would re#ain resolvedJas you presently are, let-s supposeJto spend an evenin% each week talkin% with undecided voters, to tithe your earnin%s to his ca#pai%n, to plaster your public space with ca#pai%n slo%ans, and so on. (Ad!ust the illustrative dispositions as you see fit.) $he point is that if you have faith that he-ll win, contrary evidence would not co#pletely dishearten you& it wouldn-t take the wind out of your sails& it would not discoura%e you to inaction. 'f so#ethin% like that constitutes your present dispositional profile, then you have faith that 7ba#a will win. :ou satisfy faith-s de#and for resilience in the face of counter3evidence even thou%h your co%nitive stance is properly responsive to new counter3evidence. 0. C!n/lusi!n Accordin% to the account on offer, faith that p is a co#ple* propositional attitude consistin% of (i) a positive evaluation of p, (ii) a positive conative orientation toward p, (iii) a positive co%nitive stance toward p, and (iv) resilience to counter3evidence to p, all under the subopti#ality condition. '#portantly, assu#in%Jassu#in% of the sort displayed aboveJcan stand in for the positive co%nitive stance faith re"uires. Since assu#in% is at ho#e with bein% in doubt, bein% in doubt is no i#pedi#ent to faith. 6oubt /G

is not faith-s ene#y& rather, the ene#ies of faith are indifference, hostility, and faintheartedness. ;aturally, #any "uestions re#ain about the account on offer, especially %iven its characteri5ations of belief, doubt, and acceptance. @ow #i%ht an account of propositional faith differ fro# it %iven different characteri5ations of these states, or %iven their eli#ination alto%ether in e*chan%e for %raded confidence? 'n addition, there are #ore ob!ections to consider. 9or e*a#ple, haven-t ' si#ply confused faith and hope? 9urther#ore, alternative accounts of faith si#ilarly at odds with the +o##on ,iew have be%un to sprout up. Why prefer the one on offer here over the#? 9inally, i#plications of theoretical and practical si%nificance have %one un#entioned. 9or e*a#ple, what does the account on offer i#ply for the a%e3old proble# of faith and reason in the philosophy of reli%ion? What does it i#ply for how we should %o about evaluatin% the overall rationality or reasonableness of faith? What does it i#ply for faith thou%ht of as a virtue? ' ai# to address these "uestions, ob!ections, alternatives, and i#plications elsewhere.4K @ere, however, ' #ust rest content with a first pass at sayin% what propositional faith is and what it is not.4< Department of Philosophy Western Washington University

/H

NOT1S

Fude 1:4, IF,, e#phasis added& cf. Acts H:>, Philippians 1:/>.
2 3

Plantin%a /000, /G/. Plantin%a notes that this isn-t the only thin% that faith denotes. Fohn Docke: faith is assent to a proposition8upon the credit of the proposer8, &ssay Con)erning

Human Understanding, ',, *viii, /. Catholi) &n)y)lopedia: faith rests on %rave authority, online at http:RRwww.catholic.or%RencyclopediaRview.php?idS=GG=.
4

An 'ntroduction to St. PaulOs Detter to the Lo#ans, in DutherOs 2er#an .ible of 1G//& online at: %he 4nstitutes of Christian ,eligion, .ook ''', chapter /, section >& online at 7nline at http:RRwww.newadvent.or%RcathenR0G>G/c.ht#. ?leonore Stu#p, 5+uinas (;ew :ork: Loutled%e, /004), 4H4& cp. Summa %heologi)a ''a''ae.1.= and See, e.%., W. Dad Sessions, %he Con)ept of 6aith ('thaca ;:: +ornell Mniversity Press, 1<<=), /<340. .elief, Acceptance, and Leli%ious 9aith, eds. Feff Fordan and 6aniel @oward3Snyder, 6aith, 6: Low#an U Dittlefield, 1<<H), =, sli%htly altered for

http:RRwww.iclnet.or%RpubRresourcesRte*tRwittenber%RlutherRluther3faith.t*t, e#phasis #ine.

5

http:RRwww.vor.or%RrbdiskRht#lRinstitutesR4T0/.ht#, e#phasis #ine.

6

>

''a''ae.=.K.
8 9

6reedom, and ,ationality (Danha# readability.

10 11 12

4#id., 43=. 4#id., /=1, n=. Dess 9aith, ore Leason, %he Harvard Crimson, 7ctober />, /00H, #y e#phasis& online at:

http:RRwww.thecri#son.co#RarticleR/00HR10R/>Rless3faith3#ore3reason3there3isR. Pinker has evidence in #ind, not pra%#atic reasons.

13 14 15 16 17

7nline at http:RRwww.brainy"uote.co#R"uotesRauthorsRrRrichardTdawkins.ht#l, #y e#phasis. 7nline at http:RR"uotationsbook.co#R"uoteR1=0=0R, #y e#phasis. Alston 1<<H, 1/. Lobert Ada#s, oral 9aith, 'ournal of Philosophy (1<<G), KK3K<. Lobert Audi, .elief, Acceptance, and 9aith, 4nternational 'ournal for Philosophy of ,eligion H4 +f. F. D. Schellenber%, Prolegomena to a Philosophy of ,eligion ('thaca: +ornell Mniversity Press, $hanks to Lobert Audi here. $hanks to 2erald arsh here.

(/00K), <>.
18

/00G), 1/Kff.
19 20

21

Cf. Lara Buchak, Can it be Rationa to !a"e #aith,$ in eds. Fake +handler and ,ictoria

S. @arrison, Pro#a#ility in the Philosophy of ,eligion (;ew :ork: 7*ford Mniversity Press, /01/), //G3/=K& #anuscript, pa%e /, note 1.
22

See Alston 1<<H and Willia# Alston, Audi on ;ondo*astic 9aith, in eds.

ark $i##ons, Fohn

2reco, and Alfred

23 24 25 26 27

ele, ,ationality and the 7ood8 Criti)al &ssays on the &thi)s and &pistemology of

,o#ert 5udi (;ew :ork: 7*ford Mniversity Press, /00>), 1/434<. Alston 1<<H, <, sli%htly altered for readability. Alston /00>. Alston 1<<H, 10. Ada#s 1<<G, K=3KG. So#ethin% like (1)3(4) are stated and re!ected in Lobert Audi, 9aith, .elief, and Lationality,

Philosophi)al Perspe)tives (1<<1), /1434<& (=) and (G) are affir#ed by 2ary 2uttin%, ,eligious elief and ,eligious S(epti)ism (South .end ';: Mniversity of ;otre 6a#e Press, 1<K/), 10Gff.
28 29 30

See Audi (1<K/) and (1<<=). $hanks to 9rances @oward3Snyder here. 9or the sorts of accounts ' have in #ind in philosophy, see the ite#s listed by ?ric Schwit5%ebel in $hanks to Fohn Schellenber% and $erence +uneo here. Wikipedia: C. s)utulatus is widely re%arded as producin% one of the #ost to*ic snake veno#s in the o!ave rattlesnakes (those outside the relatively s#all

the biblio%raphy of .elief, %he Stanford &n)y)lopedia of Philosophy.

31 32

;ew World8. 'n people bitten by ,eno# A

,eno# . area in south3central Ari5ona), the onset of serious si%ns and sy#pto#s can be delayed, so#eti#es leadin% to an initial underesti#ation of the severity of the bite. Si%nificant enveno#ation8 can produce vision abnor#alities and difficulty swallowin% and speakin%. 'n severe cases, skeletal #uscle weakness can lead to difficulty breathin% and even respiratory failure.
33

Willia# F. Wainwri%ht, Skepticis#, Lo#anticis#, and 9aith, in $ho#as ,. 4#id., >K. 4#id., K0. 4#id., K>. $hanks to Wes orriston here.

orris (ed), 7od and

the Philosophers (;ew :ork: 7*ford Mniversity Press, 1<<=), >K.

34 35 36 37 38

' be%in so#e of this work in Schellenber% on Propositional 9aith, ,eligious Studies (/014). ' hope

others will !u#p in and take a crack at it too.

39

$hanks %o to the late Willia# Alston, Lobert Audi, ;athan .allantyne, Ienny .oyce, Dara .uchak, ark @eller,

6ou% .unnell, Andrew +hi%nell, Andrew +ortens, $o# +risp, $erence +uneo, Feanine 6iller, .rett 6ison, Andrew 6ole, $he 9or%e, Andre 2allois, Allan @a5lett, 9rances @oward3Snyder, @ud @udson, Fon Ivanvi%, Steve Day#an, +hristian Dee, 2erald survived), Wes arsh, +aptain orriston, Anthony ;ault, $ed Poston, Foshua Las#ussen, or%an (who

ichael Lea, Ale* Livera,

Fohn Schellenber%, $o# Senor, Foshua Spencer, Steve Steward, ;ancy $aylor, Willia# Wainwri%ht, Peter van 'nwa%en, ark Webb, 6ennis Whitco#b, ?d Wieren%a, two anony#ous referees for this ay /010, for which ' a# also !ournal, and the southern#ost H41.= #iles of the Pacific +rest $rail, on whose terrain this paper was born durin% a leave funded by Western Washin%ton Mniversity in thankful.