FLORES vs. COMELEC ( 184 SCRA 484 ) Election Contests, A.

Jurisdiction over Election Contests Facts: Petitioner Roque Flores was declared by the board of canvassers as having the highest number of votes for kagawad on the March 1989 elections, in Barangay Poblacion, Tayum, Abra, and thus proclaimed punong barangay in accordance with Section 5 of R.A. 6679. However, his election was protested by private respondent Rapisora, who placed second in the election with one vote less than the petitioner. The Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tayum sustained Rapisora and installed him as punong barangay in place of the petitioner after deducting two votes as stray from the latters total. Flores appealed to the RTC, which affirmed the challenged decisio n in toto. The judge agreed that the four votes cast for Flores only, without any distinguishing first name or init ial, should all have been considered invalid instead of being divided equally between the petitioner and Anastacio Flores, another candidate for kagawad. The total credited to the petitioner was correctly reduced by 2, demoting him to second place. The petitioner went to the COMELEC, which dismissed his appeal on the ground that it had no power to review the decision of the RTC, based on Section 9 of R.A. 6679, that decisions of the RTC in a protest appealed to it from the municipal trial court in barangay elections on questions of fact shall be final and non-appealable. In his petition for certiorari, the COMELEC is faulted for not taking cognizance of the petitioners appeal. Issue: Whether or not the decisions of Municipal or Metropolitan Courts in barangay election contests are subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC considering Section 9 of R.A. No. 6679? Held: The dismissal of the appeal is justified, but on an entirely different and more significant ground, to wit, Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the Constitution, providing that the COMELEC shall Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the el ections, returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts o f limited jurisdiction. Municipal or Metropolitan Courts being courts of limited jurisdiction, their decisions in barangay election contests are subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC under the afore-quoted section. Hence, the decision rendered by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, should have been appealed directly to the COMELEC and not to the RTC. Accordingly, Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679, insofar as it provides that the decision of the municipal or metropolitan court in a barangay election case should be appealed to the RTC, must be declared unconstitutional.

GALIDO vs. COMELEC ( 193 SCRA 78, 1991 ) Counting of Votes, A. Rules for Appreciation of Ballots Facts: Petitioner Galido and respondent Galeon were candidates during the January 18, 1988 local elections for the position of mayor in Garcia-Hernandez, Bohol. Petitioner was proclaimed as winner by the municipal board of canvassers. Galeon filed an election protest before the RTC of Bohol. The lower court upheld the petitioners proclamation by a majority of eleven votes. Galeon appealed and the First Division of Comelec reversed the decision. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the Comelec en banc. The Commission ruled that fifteen ballots containing the letter C after the name Galido were marked. Issue: Whether or not the ballots were marked. Held: In several cases decided by the Supreme Court, it was held that in the appreciation of ballots where there is no evidence aliunde of a purpose to identify the ballots, the same should not be invalidated as marked ballots. The Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when it disregarded the cited decisions of the Supreme Court and declared that the suffix C after the name of Galido was in reality a countersign and not a mere erroneous initial.

DE JESUS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ( 120 SCRA 760, 1983 ) COMELEC, B. Powers and Functions Facts: After the local elections of January 18, 1980, Ananias Hibo, defeated candidate of the Nacionalista Party for the office of mayor of the Municipality of Casiguran, Sorsogon filed with the COMELEC a complaint charging petitioner Rogelio de Jesus, then COMELEC registrar of Casiguran, with violation of the 1978 Election Code. Asst. Fiscals Manuel Genova and Delfin Tarog, in their capacity as deputized Tanodbayan prosecutors, conducted an investigation. A prima facie case against petitioner for violation of section 89 and subsections [x] and [mm] of Section 178 of the Election Code of 1978 was found to exist. The following information, was filed before the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information, contending that neither the Tanodbayan nor the Sandiganbayan has the authority to investigate, prosecute and try the offense. In its opposition, the prosecution maintained the Tanodbayans exclusive authori ty to investigate

and prosecute offenses committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, and consequently, the Sandigan bayans jurisdiction to try and decide the charges against petitioner. Issue: Whether or not the Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan have the power to investigate, prosecute, and try election offenses committed by a public officer in relation to his office. Held: The evident constitutional intendment in bestowing the power to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of election and the concomittant authority to investigate and prosecute election offenses to the COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly and honest conduct of elections, failure of which would result in the frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public officials in relation to their office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this clear constitutional mandate. From a careful scrutiny of the constitutional provisions relied upon by the Sandiganbayan, We perceive neither explicit nor implicit grant to it and its prosecuting arm, the Tanodbayan, of the authority to investigate, prosecute and hear election offenses committed by public officers in relation to their office, as contradistinguished from the clear and categorical bestowal of said authority and jurisdiction upon the COMELEC and the courts of first instance under Sections 182 and 184, respectively, of the Election Code of 1978.

PEOPLE vs. INTING ( 187 SCRA 788 ) COMELEC, B. Powers and Functions Facts: Mrs. Editha Barba filed a letter-complaint against OIC-Mayor Dominador Regalado of Tanjay, Negros Oriental with the COMELEC for allegedly transferring her, a permanent Nursing Attendant, Grade I, in the office of the Municipal Mayor to a very remote barangay and without obtaining prior permission or clearance from COMELEC as required by law. After a preliminary investigation of Barbas complaint, Atty. Lituanas found a prima facie case. Hence, on September 26, 1988 , he filed with the respondent trial court a criminal case for violation of section 261, Par. (h), Omnibus Election Code against the OIC-Mayor. In an Order dated September 30, 1988, the respondent court issued a warrant of arrest against the accused OIC Mayor. However, in an order dated October 3, 1988 and before the accused could be arrested, the trial court set aside its September 30, 1988 order on the ground that Atty. Lituanas is not authorized to determine probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The trial court later on quashed the information. Hence, this petition. Issue: Does a preliminary investigation conducted by a Provincial Election Supervisor involving election offenses have to be coursed through the Provincial Prosecutor, before the Regional Trial Court may take cognizance of the investigation and determine whether or not probable cause exists? Held: The 1987 Constitution empowers the COMELEC to conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving election offenses for the purpose of helping the Judge determine probable cause and for filing an information in court. This power is exclusive with COMELEC. The evident constitutional intendment in bestowing this power to the COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly and honest conduct of elections, failure of which would result in the frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public officials in relation to their office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this clear constitutional mandate. Bearing these principles in mind, it is apparent that the respondent trial court misconstrued the constitutional provision when it quashed the information filed by the Provincial Election Supervisor.

SANCHEZ vs. COMELEC ( 153 SCRA 67, 1987 ) Counting of Votes, A. Rules for Appreciation of Ballots Facts: Augusto Sanchez filed his petition praying that respondent Comelec be directed to conduct a recount of the votes cast in the May 11, 1987 senatorial elections to determine the true number of votes to be credited to him on the ground that the votes intended for him were declared as stray votes because of the sameness of his surname with that of disqualified candidate Gil Sanchez, whose name had not been crossed out from the election returns. Issue: Whether his petition for recount and/or re-appreciation of ballots filed with the Comelec may be considered a summary preproclamation controversy falling within the Comelecs exclusive jurisdiction. Held: Petitioner contends that the canvassed returns discarding Sanchez votes as stray were incomplete and therefore warrant a recount or re-appreciation of the ballots under Section 234. A simple reading of the basic provisions of the cited section shows readily its inapplicability. By legal definition and by the very instructions of the Comelec, an election return is incomplete if there is omission in th e election returns of the name of any candidate and/or his corresponding votes or in case the number of votes fo r a candidate has been

omitted. Here, the election returns are complete and indicate the name of Sanchez as well as the total number of votes that were counted and appreciated as votes in his favor by the boards of inspectors. The fact that the some votes written solely as Sanchez were declared stray votes because of the inspectors erroneous belief that Gil Sanchez had not been disqualified as a candidate, involves a n erroneous appreciation of the ballots. It is established by law as well as by jurisprudence that errors in the appreciation of ballots by the board of inspectors are proper subjects for election protest and not for recount or re-appreciation of ballots. The appreciation of ballots cast in the precincts is not a proceeding of the board of canvassers for purposes of pre-proclamation proceedings, but of the board of election inspectors who are called upon to count and appreciate the votes in accordance with the rules of appreciation provided in section 211 of the Omnibus Election Code.

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ( 211 SCRA 315 ) Pre-Proclamation Controversy, A. Defined Facts: On May 5, 1992, this Court issued a Resolution in GR No. 104704, disqualifying Melchor Chavez, private respondent therein, from running for the Office of Senator in the May 11, 1992 elections. Petitioner filed an urgent motion with the Comelec praying that it (1) disseminate through the fastest available means this Courts Resolution dated May 5, 1992 to all regional election directors, provincial election supervisors, city and municipal election registrars, boards of election inspectors, the six (6) accredited political parties and the general public; and (2) order said election officials to delete the name of Melchor Chavez as printed in the certified list of candidates tally sheets, election returns and to count all votes cast for the disqualified Melchor, Chavez in favor of Francisco I. Chavez. On May 8, 1992, the Comelec issued Res. No. 92-1322 which resolved to delete the name of Melchor Chavez from the list of qualified candidates. However, it failed to order the crediting of all Chavez votes in favor of petitioner as well as the cancellation of Melchor Chavez name in the list of qualified candidates. Issue: Whether or not the law allows pre-proclamation controversy involving the election of the members of the Senate. Held: A simple reading of the petition would readily show that petitioner has no cause of action, the controversy presented being one in the nature of a pre-proclamation. While the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies involving local elective officials (Sec. 242, Omnibus Election Code), nevertheless, pre-proclamation cases are not allowed in elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives. Sec. 15 of Republic Act 7166 provides: For purposes of the elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns or the certificate of canvass, as the case may be. However, this does not preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing body motu propio or upon written complaint of an interested person to correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns before it.

LAGUMBAY vs. COMELEC ( 16 SCRA 175, 1966 ) Pre-Proclamation Controversy, C. Issues Which May Be Raised Facts: This is a petition for revision of the order of the COMELEC refusing to reject returns of certain precincts of some municipalities in Mindanao which were obviously manufactured. It appeared that all the 8 candidates of the Liberal party garnered all the votes, with each of them receiving exactly the same number of votes while all the 8 candidates of the Nacionalista party getting zero. Issue: Whether the COMELEC was correct in not rejecting obviously manufactured election returns of certain questioned precincts. Held: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. There is no such thing as blockvoting now-a-days. The election returns showing all 8 candidates of the Liberal party getting all the votes, with each one of them getting the same number of votes while the 8 nacionalista candidates got zero are evidently false or fabricated because of the inherent improbability of such a result. It is against statistical improbabilities especially because al least 1 vote should have been received by the Nacionalista candidates, i.e. the Nacionalista inspector. While it is possible that the inspector did not like his partys senatorial live -up, it is not, however, possible that he disliked all of such candidates and it is also not likely that he favored all the 8 candidates of the Liberal party. Hence, most probably, he was made to sign an obviously false return by force or duress. If he signed voluntarily, then he betrayed his party and any voting or counting of ballots was a fraud and a mockery of the popular will. Rejecting such returns on the ground that they are manifestly fabricated or falsified would constitute a practical approach to the COMELECs mission to insure a free and honest elections.

GUEVARA FACTS:

VS.

COMMISSION

ON

ELECTIONS

(104

SCRA

268)

The facts which gave rise to the present contemptuous incident are: The Commission on Elections, on May 4, 1957, after proper negotiations, awarded to the National Shipyards & Steel Corporation (NASSCO), the Acme Steel Mfg. Co., Inc. (ACME), and the Asiatic Steel Mfg. Co., Inc. (ASIATIC), the contracts to manufacture and supply the Commission 12,000, 11,000 and 11,000 ballot boxes at P17.64, P14.00 and P17.00 each, respectively. On May 8, 1957, both the NASSCO and the ASIATIC signed with the Commission on Elections the corresponding contracts thereon. On May 13, 1957, the Commission cancelled the award to the ACME for failure of the latter to sign the contract within the designated time and awarded to the NASSCO and the ASIATIC, one-half each, the 11,000 ballot boxes originally alloted to the ACME. The corresponding contracts thereon were signed on May 16, 1957. Then followed a series of petitions filed by the ACME for the reconsideration of the resolution of the Commission of May 13, 1957. The first of these petitions was filed on May 14, 1957 which, after hearing, was denied by the Commission in its resolution of May 16, 1957. The second petition was filed on May 16, 1957 and was denied on May 17, 1957. The third petition was filed on May 20, 1957, and because of the seriousness of the grounds alleged therein for the annulment of its previous resolutions, the Commission resolved to conduct a formal investigation on the matter ordering the NASSCO and the ASIATIC to file their respective answers. Thereafter, after these corporations had filed their answers, the Commission held a formal hearing thereon on May 24, 1957. On May 28, 1957, the ACME filed a memorandum on the points adduced during the hearing, and on June 4, 1957, the Commission issued its resolution denying the third motion for reconsideration. The article signed by petitioner was published in the June 2, 1957 issue of the Sunday Times, a newspaper of nationwide circulation. ISSUE: The question to be determined is whether the Commission on Elections has the power and jurisdiction to conduct contempt proceedings against petitioner with a view to imposing upon him the necessary disciplinary penalty in connection with the publication of an article in the Sunday Times issue of June 2, 1957 which, according to the charge, tended to interfere with and influence said Commission in the adjudication of a controversy then pending determination and to degrade and undermine the function of the Commission and its members in the administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections. HELD: It would therefore appear that the Commission on Elections not only has the duty to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections but the power to try, hear and decide any controversy that may be submitted to it in connection with the elections. And as an incident of this power, it may also punish for contempt in those cases provided for in Rule 64 of the Rules of Court under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein. In this sense, the Commission, although it cannot be classified as a court of justice within the meaning of the Constitution (Section 13, Article VIII), for it is merely an independent administrative body (The Nacionalista Party vs. Vera, 85 Phil., 126; 47 Off. Gaz. 2375), may however exercise quasi-judicial functions in so far as controversies that by express provision of the law come under its jurisdiction. As to what questions may come within this category, neither the Constitution nor the Revised Election Code specifies. The former merely provides that it shall come under its jurisdiction, saving those involving the right to vote, all administrative questions affecting elections, including the determination of the number and location of polling places, and the appointment of election inspectors and other election officials, while the latter is silent as to what questions may be brought before it for determination. But it is clear that, to come under its jurisdiction, the questions should be controversial in nature and must refer to the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of election. The difficulty lies in drawing the demarcation line between a duty which inherently is administrative in character and a function which is justiciable and which would therefore call for judicial action by the Commission. But this much depends upon the factors that may intervene when a controversy should arise. RULING OF COURT: Wherefore, petition is granted. Respondent Commission is hereby enjoined from proceeding with the contempt case set forth in its resolution of June 20, 1957, without pronouncement as to costs. The preliminary injunction issued by this Court is made permanent.

DIMAPOROV.HRET FACTS: This is a petition brought by Congressman Dimaporo seeking tonullify the twin Resolutions of the HRET which denied his Motion for Technical Evaluation of the Thumbmarks and Signatures Affixed in theVoters Registration Records and Motion for Reconsideration of ResolutionDenying the Motion for Technical Examination of Voting Records.P u r s u a n t t o t h e 1 9 9 8 H R E T R u l e s C o n g r e s s i o n a l candidate Mangotara Petition of Protest (Ad Cautelam) seeking thetechnical examination of the signatures and thumb the protested precinctsof the municipality of Sultan Naga Dimaporo (SND). Mangotara alleged thatthe massive substitution of voters and other electoral irregularitiesperpetrated by Dimaporos supporters will be

uncovered and proven. Fromt h i s a n d o t h e r p r e m i s e s , h e c o n c l u d e d t h a t h e i s t h e d u l y - e l e c t e d representative of the 2ndDistrict of Lanao del Norte.Noting that the Tribunal cannot evaluate the questionedballots because there are no ballots but only election documents to consider HRET granted Mangotara's motion and permitted the latter toengage an expert to assist him in prosecution of the case, NBI conductedthe technical examination. ISSUE: 1. W/N Dimaporo was deprived by HRET of Equal Protection whenthe latter denied his motion for technicalexamination.2. W/N Dimaporo was deprived of procedural due processor the right to present scientific evidence to show themassive substitute voting committed in counter protested precincts. RULING: 1. Resolution of HRET did not offend equal protectionclause. Equal protection simply means that all persons and thingssimilarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights conferredand the liabilities imposed. It follows that the existence of a valid andsubstantial distinction justifies divergent treatment. According to Dimaporo since the ballot boxes subject of hispetition and that of Mangotara were both unavailable for revision, hismotion, like Mangotaras, should be granted.The argument fails to take into account the distinctionsextant in Mangotaras protest vis--vis Dimaporos counter-protest whichvalidate the grant of Mangotaras motion and the denial of Dimaporos. First. The election results in SND were the sole subjects of Mangotaras protest. The opposite is true with regard to Dimaporos counter-protest as he contested the election results in all municipalities butSND.Significantly, the results of the technical examination of the election recordsof SND are determinative of the final outcome of the election protestagainst Dimaporo. The same cannot be said of the precincts subject of Dimaporos motion. I t s h o u l d b e e m p h a s i z e d t h a t t h e g r a n t o f a m o t i o n f o r technical examination is subject to the sound discretion of the HRET.In this case, the Tribunal deemed it useful in the conduct of therevision proceedings to grant Mangotaras motion for technicalexamination. Conversely, it found Dimaporos motion unpersuasiveand accordingly denied the same. In so doing, the HRET merely actedwithin the bounds of its Constitutionally-granted jurisdiction. After all,the Constitution confers full authority on the electoral tribunals of theHouse of Representatives and the Senate as the sole judges of allcontests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members. Such jurisdiction is original and exclusive. 2. Anent Dimaporos contention that the assailed Resolutions denied him the right to procedural due process and to present evidence tosubstantiate his claim of massive substitute voting committed in thecounter-protested precincts, suffice it to state that the HRET itself mayascertain the validity of Dimaporos allegations without resort to technicalexamination. To this end, the Tribunal declared that the ballots, electiondocuments and other election paraphernalia are still subject to its scrutinyin the appreciation of evidence.It should be noted that the records are replete with evidence,documentary and testimonial, presented by Dimaporo. Dimaporos allegation of denial of due process is an indefensible pretense.The instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit

G.R. No. L-52749 March 31, 1981 SOTERO OLFATO, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FRANCISCO E. LIRIO, FACTS: In the local elections held last January 30, 1980,petitioner Olfato and the other petitioners werethe official Nationalista Party (NP) candidates for Mayor and Sanggunian Bayan, respectively, of Tanauan, Batangas.Respondent Francisco E. Lirio was the official candidate of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) for mayor of said town.On the basis of the results of its canvass of votes, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Tanauan, Batangas, proclaimedpetitioner Olfato and the rest of the petitioners as the duly elected Mayor and Members of the Sangguniang Bayan,respectively.Earlier, on February 2, 1980 or three (3) days before petitioners were proclaimed, respondent Lirio, together with thecandidates on his ticket for Vice Mayor and Members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tanauan, Batangas, filed withrespondent COMELEC a petition for suspension of canvass and of proclamation of "Winning candidates" for the electivepositions of Tanauan and they alleged as grounds the following: fake voters, fake voters identification cards, flyingvoters, substitute voters and massive disenfranchisemenConsequently, respondent urged for the suspension of the canvass of election returns prior to the identification and thesegregation of the alleged fake ballots from the genuine ballots. Respondent filed with respondent a supplementarypetition which averred, among others "... that these election irregularities involving fake voters and massive disenfranchisement are proper grounds for a pre-proclamation , because they affect the very integrity of the electionreturn.Hence, respondent Lirio prayed for the annulment of the proclamation of herein petitioners and further prayed thatthe matters raised in the petition for suspension of canvass and of proclamation filed on February 2, 1980 be set for hearing after respondents of said petition, Municipal Board of Canvassers and Sotero Olfato have filed their answers.Respondent Commission issued Minute Resolution No. 9092, suspending the effects of the proclamation of hereinpetitioners as duly elected Mayor and Members, Sangguniang Bayan of Tanauan, Batangas. Subsequently, petitionersfiled with respondent Commission, an urgent motion for reconsideration of Minute Resolution No. 9092 and COMELEC,acting on said urgent motion for reconsideration issued Minute Resolution No. 9306. dismissing the petition andreinstated the proclamation made by the Provincial Board of Canvassers in favor of the respondent and his entire ticket.ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC has jurisdiction over the pre-proclamation controversiesRULING: Yes. It is now our submission that the respondent COMELEC has jurisdiction over the nature of P.P. Case No.118.The Constitution grants respondent COMELEC the general power to 'enforce and administer all laws relative to theconduct of

elections, 'makes it the sole judge of all contests relating to the elec- tions, returns, and qualification of elections ... provincial and city officials,' and mandates it to 'perform such other functions as may be provided by law'(sec.1, pars. 1, 2 and 8, Art. XII, Constitution).The 1978 Election Code, provides that 'the Commission shall be the sole judgeof all pre-proclamation controversies and any of its decisions, orders or rulings shall be final and executory' (Sec. 175) andthat it shall 'have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of insuring free, orderly and honest elections' (lst par., Sec. 185), with power and authority to 'enforce andexecute the decisions, directives, orders and instructions on any matter affecting the conduct of any electoral process(Sec 185[c]).Previous court rulings that respondent Commission on Elections has the power and authority to inquire into the allegationof fake voters, with fake Ids Identification slips in a pre-proclamation controversy in order to determine the authenticity or integrity of the election returns or whether such election returns faithfully record that only registered or genuine electorswere allowed to vote.While admittedly the Commission on Elections has no jurisdiction over election contests involvingmunicipal or municipal offices (Sec. 190, 1978 Election Code), WE must not lose sight of the fact that the instant suitinvolved a pre- proclamation controversy filed by the private respondent before the respondent Commission. AZNAR VS. COMELEC, digested Posted by Pius Morados on November 9, 2011 GR # 83820, May 25, 1990 (Constitutional Law Alien, Loss of Citizenship) FACTS: In the case at bar, petitioner challenged respondents right to hold public office on the ground that the latter was a n alien. Respondent maintains that he is a son of a Filipino, was a holder of a valid subsisting passport, a continuous resident of the Philippines and a registered voter since 1965. He was, however, also a holder of an alien registration certificate. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is an alien. HELD: No, because by virtue of his being a son of a Filipino, it is presumed that he was a Filipino and remained Filipino until proof could be shown that he had renounced or lost his Philippine citizenship. In addition, possession of an alien registration certificate unaccompanied by proof of performance of acts whereby Philippine citizenship had been lost is not adequate proof of loss of citizenship.

ROCES vs. HRET Mrs. Harry Ang-Ping case Miles Roces & Harry Ang-Ping competitors for 3 rd Leg.Dist. of Manila, registered voter Alejandro Gomez challenged Ang-Pings qualification (being not anatural-born citizen), responded by withdrawing candidacy, substituted by wife Zenaida. COMELECdenied due course, votes in favor not counted. Case was pending before 1 st Div. when COMELEC enbanc (motu proprio) issued assailed Res. striking out Ang-Pings name & denying Mrs. Ang-Pingssubstitution before the expiration of the reglementary period. Filed case before HRET w/c gave duecourse & permitted substitution. Roces files Certiorari. HRET exercises sole jurisdiction & haspower to determine jurisdiction, procedure, etc. COMELEC Res. was void for violating duep r o c e s s ( o p p o r t u n i t y t o b e h e a r d w a s s y s t e m a t i c a l l y d e n i e d ) . D i d n o t c o m m i t g r a v e a b u s e o f discreti on. Certiorari DISMISSED