Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
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FILED
J I'íARI | 2007
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IN THE TINITEDSTATESDISTRICTCOURT
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FORTHENORTHERNDISTRICTOF CALTFORNIA
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¡- ll NORDYKE,ET AL, No.C99-04389
MJJ
25 I. FactualBackground
28
r D o c k e t N o1
. 29.
zDocketNo. 144.
I OrdinanceCodeSection9.l2.1203(the"Ordinance")infringeson their free speechrightsin violation
I attendanceat one of Plaintifß' gun showsat the Fairgroundsis 4,000 people. Thesegun shows
t 0 involve the exhibition, display,and saleof firearms. rWhena gun is sold at Plaintifß' gun shows,
L 1 l both the seller and the buyer physicallyinspectthe gun to insurecorrectdocumentationof the serial
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(JE l 2 number,make,model, and caliber of the gun; and also to veriff that the firearm may be legally sold.
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O tJF Plaintiffs allegethat they "have historically broughtfirearms onto . . . the AlamedaCounty
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.2þ t 4 Fairgroundsfor various symbolic and expressivepurposes." They allegethat, by prohibiting
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l ) F l 5 possessionof firearmsat the Fairgrounds,the Ordinancepreventsthem from engagingin this
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Ø Í t 6 expressiveconduct,and makesgun showsvirtually impossible.
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! f ¡ l7 On July 4, 1998,a shootingoccurredat the AlamedaCounty Fairgroundsduring the annual
- l 8 County Fair resulting in gunshotwoundsto eight people. The shootingwas not associatedwith any
l 9 of the Plaintiffsor their gun showactivitiesat the Fairgrounds.On August 1.7,l999,theCounty
20 adoptedthe Ordinanceprohibiting the possessionof firearrnson County Property,including the
2l Fairgrounds.The Ordinancerecitedthe epidemicof gunshotfatalities or injuries in the countyas
Q E l 2 the County soughta written plan from Plaintiffs on how Plaintiffs would conducttheir gun showsin
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' oc FH 1 3 compliancewith the Ordinance.
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28 currentlybeforethis Court.
I Initially, Plaintiffs allegedthat the Ordinancepreventedthem from conductingtheir trade
6 11S9(9th Cir. 2003). In evaluatingPlaintiffs' claim,the Ninth Circuit notedthat gun possession
7 may qualifu as speechwhen thereis "an intent to conveya particularizedmessage,and the likelihood
I is greatthat the messagewould be understoodby thosewho viewed it." Id. (citing Spensev.
L 1 1 commonly associatedwith expression,the court held that Plaintiffs' facial challengefailed. Id. at
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T2 1190. In a footnote,the court indicatedthat its holding did not preventPlaintiffs from bringing an
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1 3 "as applied"challengeto the Ordinance.Id. at 1190n.3.
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T4 Plaintiffsfrled a SecondAmendedComplaint,re'castingtheir claim
Seizingon this language,
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1 5 as an "as applied"First Amendmentchallenge.óSpecifrcally,Plaintiffsallegedthat as appliedto
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Ø Í t 6 their useof the Fairgrounds,the Ordinanceviolated their freedomof expressionby making gun
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iaa ¡! t 7 showsimpossible. In supportof their position that gun possessionamountsto expressiveconduct,
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l 8 Plaintiffs allegedthat they havehistorically brought firearmsto the Fairgroundsto: (l) serveas
I 9 mediumsof political messagesthat are inextricably intertwinedwith the actual firearm; (2)
20 emphasizethe military and historicalimportanceof guns;(3) instruct othersabout safeand
2T responsiblegun storageand handling;and (4) facilitate legal educationof the public of their rights
22 and duties as gun owners.TDefendantsmoved to dismissPlaintiffs' claim pursuantto Rule
23
24
25 sDocketNos. I and 38.
4 Washington4lS U.S. 405, 410-l | (1974). This Court statedthat Plaintiffs' mererecitalsof
5 "political messagesthat are inextricablyintertwinedwith the actualfirearm" fail to allegethe
6 "particularized"natureof the political messagebeing communicatedby gun possession.
7 Furthermore,given the ambiguousnatureof the alleged"political message,"it was completely
I unclearfrom the faceof the complaintthat the likelihood was greatthat this allegedmessagewould
6 possessinggunsat a gun show servesto conveytheir firmly-held belief that individuals shouldhave
7 a protectedright under the SecondAmendmentto beararms,that they "suppoft[] the National Rifle
9 Amendment,"and that they disagreewith the Ninth Circuit's decisionholding that the Second
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U.E I2 In denyingDefendants'motion, this Court also found that Plaintiffs sufliciently allegedthat
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l 3 therewas a greatlikelihood that observerswould understandtheir message.For example,Plaintiffs
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A P 1 4 allegedthat the attendeesof a gun show,many of whom are membersof the "gun culture," would
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. F z 1 5 readily perceivethat the individual carryingthe weaponsuppofs the view that individuals should
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T 6 havea protectedright to beararmsunderthe SecondAmendment. Thus,this Court concludedthat
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i.J t 7 Plaintiffs had sufficiently allegedthat their conduct,at leastto the extentdescribedabove,
,) l 8 constitutedspeech.
19 Defendantsneverthelessarguedthat even if Plaintifß had sufüciently pled an as appliedFirst
6
1 appropriatelyraisedin a motionfor summaryjudgment.tl
2 Against this backdrop,the Court now examinesDefendants'motion for summaryjudgment
7 no genuineissueas to any materialfact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matterof
8 law. SeeAndersonv.LibertyLobby,lnc.,477U.5.242,247-48(1986). Themovingpartybearsthe
9 initial burdenof demonstratingthe basisfor the motion and identifuing the portionsof the pleadings,
l 0 depositions,answersto interrogatories,affidavits, and admissionson file that establishthe absence
I
¡- 1 l of atriableissueofmatenalfact.CelotexCorp.v.Catrett,477U.S.317,323(1986).Ifthemoving
25 A. Standing
26 Before reachingthe merits of Plaintiffs' claim, the Court must first addressthe threshold
27 issueof standing. The County contendsthat Plaintiffs may not make an as appliedchallengeto the
28
r r D o c k eNt o . l l 2 .
I Ordinancebecausethey did not subjectthemselvesto the regulationbeforebringing suit. Plaintiffs
4 Generally,one may not challengea rule or policy to which one "has not submittedhimself by
9 atl22l-22.
10 Here,the Court finds that the Ordinancehassufficiently affectedPlaintiffs. Following this
24 The thresholdinquiry for the Court is whetherthe act of possessinga gun amountsto speech
7 Here,the County doesnot contestthat gun possessionin the contextof a gun showmay
¡r 1 1 idea." O'Brien,39l U.S. at376. The protectionis not limited to the written or spokenword. A
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\-, tr I 2 personalso may expresshis thoughtsthrough conductin which he purposefullyengages.The
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l 3 SupremeCourt hasrecognizedthat such symbolic speechor expressiveconductlies within the
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â Ë L4 confinesof the First Amendment'sprotectionof freespeech.See,e.g.,Brown v. Louisiana,383
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1 5 U.S. 131(1966)(silentsit-in by black citizensdemonstrating library);Tinlcerv.
againsta segregated
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Ø 1 l 6 DesMoinesIndependentCommunitySchool Dist.,393U.S. 503 (1969)(studentswearingarmbands
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+a ¡! t 7 to protestAmericanmilitary involvementin Vietnam); Schachtv. United States,398U.S. 58 (1970)
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;) 1 8 (the wearing of United Statesmilitary uniforms during a dramaticperformanceto criticize American
t 9 interventionin Vietnam).
20 In light of the County's concession,and the existenceof competentevidencein the factual
22 possessionin the contextof a gun show can qualiff as speechand whetherPlaintifß intendedto
23 convey a particularizedmessagethat was likely to be understoodby thosewho observedit.
24
r2AlsobeforetheCourtis Defendants'MotiontoSnike Plaintiffs'ExpertReportand DeclarationsofDonaldKilmer,
25 Daryl Davis,DuaneDarr,JessB. Guy, Virgil McVicker, Mike Fournier,RussellNordyke,and SallieNoryke. (DocketNo.
153.) Becausethe County has concededfor purposesof their Motion for SummaryJudgmentthat gun possession may
26 constituteexpressiveconduct,the Court finds that Plaintiffs' expertreport is not relevant. Furthermore,the Court finds that
the expertreport doesnot containany specializedknowledgeto assistthe trier offact understandthe evidence.SeeDøubert
27 v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc,509 U.S. 579,591(1993);Fed.R. Evid. 702. For thesereasons,theCourtGRANTS
Defendants'Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Expert Report. Due to the County's concession,the Court finds that the contentof
28 the remainingdeclarationsis irrelevantto the remainingissues.For this reason,the Court DENIES Defendants'Motion to
Strike, as moot.
I Specifically,Plaintiffs have offeredevidencethat their act of possessinggunsat a gun show servesto
4 SecondAmendment;and that they object to the Ninth Circuit's decisionholding that the Second
5 Amendment"offers no protectionfor the individual'sright to beararms." Nordyke,3l9 F.3dat
6 1t9l (citing Hickmanv. Block,Sl F.3d 98,102 (9th Cir. 1996). The Courtnow tums to whether
7 the Ordinanceis relatedto the suppressionof that speech.
8 C. Is the County's Ordinance Relatedto the Suppressionof Free Expression
1 0 is not amenableto summaryjudgment on this record the Court now tums to evaluatewhetherthe
I
L ll of free expression.Nordylæ,319F.3d at I189. The
County'sOrdinanceis relatedto the suppression
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U E 1 2 partiesas an initial matter,disputethe standardof review that guidesthe Court's analysisof the
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' ( iJYE t 3 impact of the Ordinanceupon Plaintiffs' right of free expression.Plaintiffs maintain that the
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.2 .p t 4 assertedgovernmentalinterestof the Ordinance,as appliedto them, is relatedto the suppressionof
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. F Y l 5 their free speechand thereforethe Court should examinethe Ordinanceunderthe
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cnl t 6 standardset forth in Johnson. SeeJohnson, 491U.S. at 403. Defendantsarguethat the Ordinanceis
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f l f e t 7 not relatedto the suppressionofspeechand thereforethe lessstrict content-neutralstandardset forth
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Ð l 8 inO'Brienapplies.SeeO'Brien,39l U.S. at 376-77.Havingoutlinedtheparties'respective
l 9 positions,the Court proceedsto ar:rrlyzethesecases,in the contextof the curent record,to determine
20 the applicablesøndardof review which govemsthe Court's evaluationof the Ordinanceat issue.
2l 1. Texasv. Johnson
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I first held that Johnson'sflag-burningwas "conduct 'sufficiently imbuedwith elementsof
2 communication'to implicatethe First Amendment."Id. at406 (citationomitted). The Court
J rejectedthe State'scontentionfor the applicationof the lessstringentstandardannouncedin
4 O'Brien. Id. at 406. The Couf reasonedthat the State'sassertedinterest"in preservingthe flag asa
) of free
symbolof nationhoodandnationalunity," was an interest"related'to the suppression
24 Id. at377. In finding that the statutemet eachof theserequirements,the Court reasonedthat because
25 of the Government'ssubstantialinterestin assuringthe continuingavailability of issuedSelective
26 Servicecertificates,becausethe statutewas an appropriatelynanow meansof protectingthis interest
27 and condemnedonly the independentnoncommunicativeimpact of conductwithin its reach,and
28 becausethe noncommunicativeimpact of the act of burning a registrationcertificatefrustratedthe
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I Govemment'sinterest,a sufficient govemmentalinterestwas shownto justiff the defendant's
4 of the Ordinance. Unlike the State'sinterestin Johnson,the County hasan interestunrelatedto the
5 suppressionof free expression.In Johnson,the Texasstatutefocusedon the communicativeaspect
6 of the actor's conductby prohibiting desecrationof the flag in a way that the actor knew would
7 seriouslyoffendone or morepersonslikely to observeor discoverhis action. Johnson,49l U.S. at
8 400. There,the State'sassertedinterestedin preservationof the flag as a symbol of nationalunity
9 was an interestdirectly relatedto the suppressionof the actor's free expressionand communicative
1 0 conduct. Id. at 410. Here,the County's interestis not in suppressingPlaintiffs' messagesabout
¡r 1 1 guns. The interestthat fueledthe promulgationof the Ordinanceat issueis the preventionof
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r \ '= 1 2 violenceand the preservationof safetyon county property. Thus, in direct contrastto the State's
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' F l / 1 3 interestin Johnson,the County's interestis unrelatedto the communicativeaspectof the conductat
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.28 t 4 issue. Becauseof thesedifferences,this Court finds the Johnsonstrict scrutiny standard
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cnl l6 3. O'Bríen As Applied to Plainúiffs
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9 f r T7 The County contendsthat the Ordinancesatisfiesthe O'Brien test and that there areno
- l 8 factual issuesthat precludea grant of summaryjudgment on this record. According to the County,
1,9 there is an importantgovernmentalinterestin seekingto ensurepublic safetyon county property,and
20 that the governmentalinterestis unrelatedto the suppressionof Plaintiffs' free expression.The
2l County assertsthat the incidentalrestiction on Plaintiffs' ability to conducttheir gun shows,in the
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I ^, Constitutional Power of Government
2 The first prong of the O'Brien testrequiresthe regulationat issueto be within the
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J constitutionalpowerof the govemment.O'Brien,3gl U.S. at377. This Courtpreviouslyconcluded
4 that the Ordinancesatisfredthe first elementof the O'Brien test in the contextof a facial challenge.
5 (Order DenyingPlaintiffs' Motion for TemporaryRestrainingOrder and PreliminaryInjunction, at !f.
6 7-9.) Here,Plaintiffs argue,without any substantiveexplanation,that the California Supreme
7 Court's decisionin Nordylæv. King,Z1 Cal. 4th 875 (2002) demandsa different result. The Couf
I disagrees.The promulgationof the Ordinanceis certainly within the constitutionalpowersof the
9 County. Plaintiffs have failed to identiff any triable issuesof fact that could result in a different
1 0 conclusion.
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¡- ll b. SubstantialGovernmentInterest
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U F t2 The secondprong of the O'Brien test requiresthat the regulationfurther a substantial
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' 9c FH l 3 govemmentinterest.O'Brien,391 U.S. at377. In applyingthe secondstepof the O'Brien test,the
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l 4 SupremeCourt employsa balancingtest,askingwhetherthe allegedgovemmentalinterestis
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g E l 5 suffrcientlysubstantialto justiff the resultantimpact on free expression.See,e.g.,Membersof the
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Ø 4 for Vincent,466U.S. 789 (1984). In ruling on Plaintiffs' motion for a
t 6 City Councilv. Taxpayers
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+¡ te t 7 preliminary injunction, this Court previouslyconcludedthat the Ordinancesatisfredthe second
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1 8 elementof the O'Brien test in the contextof a facial challenge. Now, Plaintiffs arguethat "as
t 9 applied" to gun showsat the Fairgrounds,the Ordinancefails to further a substantialgovernment
20 interest. The Court disagreeswith Plaintiffs and finds that the Ordinancedoesfurther a substantial
2l govemmentinterestas appliedto them.
22 In supportof meetingtheir initial burden,the County points to its findings that during the
23 first five yearsof the 1990sin AlamedaCounty therewere 879 homicidescommittedusing firearms,
24 and an additional 7,647victims were hospitalizedwith gunshotinjuries. AlamedaCounty Gen. Ord.
25 Code,ch.9.12,$ 9.12.120,subd.A. The Countyalsofound that firearmswerethe leadingcauseof
26 deathamongpeoplebetweenthe agesof fifteen and twenty four in AlamedaCounty and that
27 betweenJuly 1, 1996and June30, 1997, 136juveniles were arrestedin Oaklandfor gun-related
28 offenses. Id. The July 4, 1998shootingat the Fairgroundsfurther evidencesthat the Ordinance
l3
I furthersa substantialinterestin promotingpublic safetyon county property,and especiallyat the
4 Indus.Co.,475U.S.at 586-87.
6 gun shows. Specifically,Plaintiffs point to the County's admissionthat thereis no evidenceof any
7 violent criminal activity occurringat any of Plaintiffs' guns shows. However,Plaintiffs cite no
I specificfactsindicating that the County's findings on gun violencewithin the countywere
9 inaccurate.SeeClarkv. City of Lakewood,zsgF.3d 996, l0l5 (9th Cir. 2001)(finding that city may
1 0 haveimproperlyrelied upon certainevidencein passingordinance,thereforea genuineissueof
l,
L l 1 materialfact existedwhetherthe regulationfurthereda significant governmentinterest). Similarly,
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U E t 2 Plaintiffs cite no specific facts rebuttingthe County's interestin promotingpublic safetyon county
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. - ( J 1 3 property. As a result, Plaintiffs havefailed to presentevidenceestablishingthe existenceof a triable
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â ã l 4 issueof materialfact. Therefore,the Court finds as a matterof law that the County'spublic safety
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1 5 interestis sufficiently substantialto justiff the resultantimpact on Plaintiffs' free expressionand
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Ø 4 t 6 thussatisfiesthe secondpart of the O'Brientest.
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I f ! t7 c. Ordinance's Relationshipto the Suppressionof Free Expression
- 18 The third elementof the O'Brien test requiresthe governmentalinterestbe unrelatedto the
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I Specifically,on May 20,1999,King senta memorandumto CountyCounselrequestingcounselto
6 O'Brien,
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r r : - l 5 Id. at 383-84. Despitethe SupremeCourt's guidanceto the contrary,Plaintiffs cite to four casesin
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Ø 1 t 6 supportof their contentionthat this Court should considerKing's statement.However,the authority
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t¡ t 7 relied upon by Plaintiffs doesnot supportthe propositionthat this Court may considerKing's
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,) l 8 statementin determiningwhetherthe County's interestis relatedto the suppressionof free
t 9 expression.
20 Plaintiffs cite UnitedStatesv. Eichman 496 U.S. 310 (1990). ln Eichman,the Supreme
2l Court foundthatthe Flag ProtectionAct of 1989,18 U.S.C.$ 700,was inconsistentwith the First
25 491 U.S. at 410). In analyzingthe government'sinterest,the Court did not look to statementsmade
26 by legislators,but insteadthe Court examined"the preciselanguageof the Act's prohibitions,
27 [which] confirm[ed] Congress'interestin the communicativeimpact of flag desecration."Id. at3l7.
28 Therefore,Eichmandoesnot supportPlaintiffs' argumentthat it is proper to considerKing's
l5
I statements.
2 The Court finds the remainingauthority cited by Plaintiffs regardingthe proprietyof King's
a
J statementsdoesnot supporttheir position either. SeeMembersof City Council v. Taxpayersfor
U F l 2 wheredefendants'only basisfor arrestwas that defendantswere using public park for Bible talks
¡¡È
'( i¿vF l 3 without a permit). The Court finds that it is not properto considerKing's statements.Accordingly,
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1 4 the Court finds that King's statementsdo not raisea triable issueof fact with respectto the third
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g =E 1 5 O'Brien factor.
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CAl t6 Turning to Plaintiffs' secondargument,regardingthe Ordinance'sexceptionfor
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ùa events,Plaintiffs claim that the timing and existenceof the exception
t 7 entertainment-related
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Ð 1 8 demonstatesthat the Ordinanceis relatedto the suppressionof Plaintiffs' free expression.
t 9 However,as the County points out, Plaintiffs fail to explain how the exceptionis groundedin any
20 disagreementwith any messagePlaintiffs conveyby possessingfirearms. Additionally, the
2 1 exceptioncontainsthe unqualifiedword, "event," that preseruesthe possibility that any numberof
22 eventscan satisff the exceptionprovided that the firearmsare securedwhen not in the actual
23 possessionof the participant,including Plaintiffs' gun shows.r3As the record indicates,the County
24 hasallowed "events," other than "motion picture, television,video, danceand theatricalproductions"
25 wherethe authorizedparticipantshavepossessedfirearms,and thosefirearmshavebeensecured
26 when not in the actualpossessionof the participant. (PickeringDecl., at 1 13.) Plaintiffs offer no
2l
ItAdmittedly,Plaintiffswould not be permittedto allow the attendeesto actuallypossessthe firearmswhile on
28 countyproperty. However,the Ordinance'sexceptiondoesnot proscribethe sale,exhibition,or discussionof firearmson
county property.
t6
I specific probativeevidenceestablishingthat as appliedto Plaintiffs, the Ordinance'sexceptionfor
2 entertainment-related
eventsis content-based.Nothing on the face of the statute,or its applicationin
3 the factual recordof this case,indicatesthat the County's interestis relatedto suppressionof
4 Plaintifß' First Amendmentrights of freeexpression.Thus,the Court finds that as a matterof law,
5 the County's Ordinance,as appliedto Plaintiffs, is unrelatedto the suppressionof free expression.
6 For thesereasons,the Court finds that the Ordinance,as appliedto Plaintiffs, satisfiesthe
17
I F.3d 1009,1013(9th Cir. 1996)(citing llard, statingthat the validity of an ordinancebanningsales
2 of message-bearing
T-shirts on city streetsdid not dependon the extentto which it furtheredthe
a
J city's interestwith regardto plaintiffs' sales,but dependedon the extentto which it furtheredthe
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I Super.Court of Ca|.,329 F.3d683,691 (9th Cir. 2003)(findingthat a municipalordinancethat
2 resultedin the prohibition of "wooden bull hooks" was narrowlytailored anddid not offend animal
a
J rights demonstrator'sFirst Amendmentrights, in part becausereplicasand picturescould be used.)
4 Plaintiffs havenot cited to, or proffered, any evidenceto suggestthat the Ordinanceis not
9 For thesereasons,the Court hnds that the Ordinance,as appliedto Plaintiffs, satisfieseach
1 0 part of the O'Brien test. The Court thereforeGRANTS Defendants'motion for summaryjudgment
Ð 1 1 as to Plaintiffs' First Amendmentclaim.
L
l9
I was not appliedto regulatethe plaintiffs' message.Id. at295. Second,the Court found the
20
I the city's zoning ordinanceprohibiting adult theatersfrom locatingwithin 1,000feet of any
2l
I right. Hodel,857F.2dat l33l (citingClarkv. Jeter,486U.S. 456,461(1988)
fundamental
22 necessarily
fails.
23 B. Fundamental Rights
22
I 1996)(finding that the regulationwas contentneutralandthereforedid not trigger strict scrutiny
.,
undereitherthe First Amendmentor the Equal ProtectionClause.)(citationsomitted). Whenthe
a
J regulationat issuedoesnot violate the individual's exerciseof a fundamentalright, the regulation
23
I For thesereasons,the Court finds that the Ordinance,on its face and as appliedto Plaintiffs,
2 doesnot violate the Equal Protectionclause. The Court thereforeGRANTS Defendants'motion for
a
J summaryjudgment asto Plaintiffs' Equal Protectionclaim.
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\/,E l 2 doesnot automaticallyoust the court of supplementaljurisdiction. ^SeeJudgeWilliam W. Schwarzer
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\J t 3 et al.,Federal Civil ProcedureBeþre Trial $ 2:145.2(2006). The dismissalis a factor for the court
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ò8, t 4 to considerin decidingwhetherto declineto exerciseits supplementaljurisdiction. A court has
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F t 5 discretionto retain the supplementalstatelaw claim and grantrelief thereon. 28 U.S.C. $
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o see(lnitedMine Workersv. Gibbs,383U.S. 775,728(1966);Bradyv. Brown,5l F.3d
1 6 1367(cX3);
E 5
o ä jurisdiction whereany of
! f t l 7 810,816 (9th Cir. 1995). The court may declineto exercisesupplemental
- 1 8 the following factorsexist: (l) the statelaw claim involvesa novel or complex issueof statelaw; (2)
l 9 the statelaw claim subsøntiallypredominatesover the claim on which the court's original
20 jurisdiction is based;(3) the districtcourt hasdismissedthe claimson which its originaljurisdiction
2l was based;or (4) "in exceptionalcircumstances,thereare other compelling reasonsfor declining
24
I CONCLUSTON
6
7 IT IS SO ORDERED.
I
9
l 0 Dated:March 31.2007 ¿¡,ui--r^\
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