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Matthew Condie Dr. Pat Beach Philosophy 103-2 20 November 2013 Analyses of two essays In his essay, Whats Wrong With Adultery, Don Marquis presents several premises under the thesis that our conventional concepts of marriage (and the way these affect our views of the wrongfulness of adultery) are somewhat skewed. The normal ideas of marital fidelity and infidelity, according to Marquis, stem from the belief that adultery is morally wrong because it constitutes the breaking of a promise. This, he claims, is weak as it, by itself, does not account for the seriousness of the wrong of adultery (Marquis, 209). After critiquing this and other explanations of the harms of adultery, Marquis first presents his explanation of why adultery is wrong. He then presents cases wherein adultery is morally permissible. Marquis begins his essay by affirming that the simple breaking of a promise is not what makes adultery wrong, as Wasserstrom claims. He also discounts other claims made by Wasserstrom and by Wreen as to why adultery is wrong. In the case of Wasserstrom, if what makes adultery wrong is the pain caused to others upon knowing of it, one could claim that adultery is morally permissible inasmuch as it is not discovered. He then identifies a flaw in Wreens premise that, a commitment to sexual exclusivity is a necessary condition for being married (cited in Marquis, 210). From this he draws the conclusion that Wreen is, in fact, presenting adultery as being logically

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impossible as one who is not married (by not satisfying the necessary condition of sexual exclusivity) cannot possibly engage in extramarital sexual activity. When stating his explanation for the moral wrongness of adultery, Marquis affirms that its wrongness is based upon the breaking of a promise, as Wasserstrom claims, but that the breaking of the promise is not always wrong. For Marquis, when adultery is wrong it is wrong because it violates a marriage contract (Marquis, 211). When two people decide to marry, they pledge to one another they they will fulfill one anothers desires for love, companionship, friendship, and sexual fulfillment until one or the other dies. If such is the case, it is seriously morally wrong for one party to violate the contract to which the other is being faithful. For one to violate his or her marriage contract knowing full well that his or her partner is faithful to it is seriously wrong as this action constitutes a betrayal of the faithful actions of the other and of the contract itself, which was meant to be lasting, mutual, and voluntarily life-changing. Having established that under these circumstances, adultery is seriously morally wrong, Marquis then identifies circumstances under which he claims that adultery is morally permissible. If two persons have formally promised one another that they will satisfy the other romantically, sexually, and otherwise as a life partner, yet one of the parties does not uphold his/her end of the contract, the other is under no obligation to keep the terms of the contract. This is the case with any contract. An employer promises to pay an employee pending the employees execution of the tasks assigned to him. If the employee fails to perform his work, the employer is under no obligation to pay him. So Marquis claims that if a man does not keep his promise of sexual exclusivity to his

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wife or otherwise fails in his contractual obligations as her husband, she is under no obligation to fulfill her promises made to him as his wife. I completely agree with the basis of his claim. I think it is reasonable and logically sound for one to have no obligation towards a contract which has been violated by the party with whom the contract was entered into. However, a key premise of Marquis argument is that even sexual dissatisfaction is justification for an extramarital affair. He claims that ones pledge not to commit adultery is entirely dependent on ones spouse keeping all of the contractual obligations and that if such is not the case, adultery may freely be committed by both parties. If an employer is dissatisfied with an employees work, he is justified in not paying him. However, he would not be justified in paying another employee for the work not done by the first. In the same way, we cannot assume that because I am dissatisfied with my wife I will give to another woman what I am now withholding from my wife. If neither woman has given me any reason to please her sexually (my wife by violating our marriage contract, the other woman by having no such contract with me) then I am equally not justified in seeking sexual satisfaction where it has not been earned through my commitment to another. If the aforementioned employer fires his lazy employee, the now-former employee cannot expect payment from any other employer until he complies with the terms of a new contract. As such, I cannot leave my wife on the grounds of her breaching our contract (by leaving me sexually dissatisfied) and expect sexual satisfaction from another woman with whom I have no such contract as doing so creates a double standard.

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In The Vulnerability of Men in Polyamorous Marriages, Hallie Liberto begins by citing the same account of the wrongness of adultery that Marquis began with. That is, that adultery is morally wrong in that it consists of breaking a promise and deceiving a loved one. Under Libertos concept of a polyamorous marriage, this is eliminated as an account of the wrongness of extramarital affairs. Under the very principle of a polyamorous marriage, neither spouse has promised fidelity to the other; so long as any and all extramarital affairs entered into are made known, there is no promise-breaking or deception of ones partner. Liberto maintains that a member of a polyamorous marriage is obligated to inform all sexual partners that he/she is married and that the marriage is polyamorous. In this way there is likewise no deception of any sexual partner. Having established that under this particular account adultery is no moral question in a polyamorous marriage, Liberto begins to address her thesis, which is that, whereas women in traditional marriages are made vulnerable by gender roles and limited opportunities for personal fulfillment, and whereas this vulnerability is morally problematic, we cannot accept that open marriage is an unproblematic alternative to adultery within a traditional marriage. Liberto heavily cites Susan Moller Okins The Vulnerability of Women in Marriage. Okins thesis is essentially that women in traditional marriages lose opportunities to advance their careers and that they do not have equal power and influence in their marriages because of the gender roles to which society encourages them to conform. Liberto equates this to men in poly-amorous marriages who, she claims, are less likely to find as many extramarital partners as their wives are. This she bases on studies

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showing that men are less interested in commitment with the potential to result in marriage than are women. The inequity in life-goods, whether material or otherwise (being able to influence decisions, feelings of self-worth, etc.) causes a moral dilemma for the partner who has more. There is a natural obligation for the empowered partner to rectify the situation, but doing so would deprive him/herself of some life-goods and negatively impact personal well-being. I believe that Liberto is correct in recognizing the problems associated with this inherent inequality. If an individual in any relationship- marital, professional, platonic or otherwise feels that he or she is contributing less than another person in the relationship, this will certainly create feelings of powerlessness and that the other is entirely in control. If I finds myself in the position of the empowered, my moral obligation is to find a way of giving more opportunities to the other member of the friendship, marriage, or professional association. Feelings of too much dependency on another will eventually result in loss of self-worth. From a strictly utilitarian standpoint, this must be resolved in order to maximize happiness in the relationship. Polyamorous marriages, just like monogamous or traditional marriages, have their disadvantages. While I believe it is safe to say that one partner or the other will be more vulnerable in a given marriage (regardless of the type) I dont believe that in modern society we can make the generalization that men will usually be more vulnerable in polyamorous marriages and that women are usually more vulnerable in traditional marriages. Circumstances are now such that many cases could be found to demonstrate the opposite of what Liberto and Okin seek to establish, that is that men

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can be found to be more vulnerable in traditional marriages and women in open marriages. There are now more women earning the majority of a household income than ever before, with male homemakers also on the rise. Regardless of this, I believe Libertos thesis to be completely sound. A couple has no more reason to enter into a polyamorous marriage than a monogamous marriage in an effort to avoid problems caused by adultery. Marquis and others present convincing evidence of the negative impacts of adultery in a monogamous marriage, but these are neither greater nor lesser than the strain that would be placed on a polyamorous marriage by feelings of inequality and very low self-esteem resulting from being less sexually desirable than ones spouse.