UNIVERSITATEA DIN CRAIOVA FACULTATEA DE ECONOMIE I ADMINISTRAREA AFACERILOR SPECIALIZAREA INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

LUCRARE DE DISERTATIE

ndrumtor tiin ific: Asis. univ.dr. George Ciobanu

Absolvent: Alina Sabina BOGHEANU

CRAIOVA 2013
1|

UNIVERSITATEA DIN CRAIOVA FACULTATEA DE ECONOMIE I ADMINISTRAREA AFACERILOR SPECIALIZAREA INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LABOUR MIGRATION

ndrumtor tiin ific: Asis. univ.dr. George Ciobanu

Absolvent: Alina Sabina BOGHEANU

CRAIOVA 2013
2|

TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. Introduction 1.1.Recruitment 1.2 Movement and job placement 1.3. Circulation 2. Labour Migration Trends and Characteristics 2.1.Trends in Labour Migration 2.2.Driving forces 2.3.Type of flows 3. Labour Migration in the European Union 3.1. Economic growth in the EU 3.2. EU fragmentation and sub-regional bloc formation 3.3. EU Labour Markets 3.4. Xenophobia, racism and identity policies 3.5. Mobility in Europe 3.5.1. Levels of mobility 3.5.2. Main reasons for moving 3.5.3. Socio-economic factors of migration 3.5.4. Advantages and disadvantages of geographical mobility 3.5.5. Migration intentions 3.5.6. Barriers to geographical mobility 3.5.7. Forced and voluntary mobility 4. The Future of Job Mobility 4.1. EU Policies 4.2. Migration trends in an enlarging European Union 4.3. Migration flows 5. Study Case: Romanians Migration within the EU Framework Conclusions References Page 4 Page 6 Page 8 Page 9 Page 10 Page 10 Page 10 Page 11 Page 12 Page 12 Page 13 Page 13 Page 14 Page 15 Page 17 Page 19 Page 19 Page 28 Page 30 Page 32 Page 35 Page 37 Page 40 Page 42 Page 47 Page 50 Page 60 Page 61

3|

1.Introduction
Recent globalization trends have been characterized by the greater integration of global markets for goods, services and capital across borders while their impact on the cross border movement of people and labour remains much more restricted, regulated by immigration laws and policies that uphold the principle of state sovereignty.1 Yet globalization has had important implications for international labour migration, acting as a 'push' and 'pull' factor. It has facilitated linkages of international labour markets through vast improvements in information and communications technology. The demand for high tech skills has expanded opportunities for mobility of skilled labour. Concurrently, expanded trade would reduce the need for migration by creating jobs in source countries. Virtual mobility enabled by ICT has similarly promoted outsourcing and more jobs in source regions. 2. At the same time, globalization has led to widening disparities of employment opportunities, incomes and living standards, and human security across the globe. 2 In some countries, globalization has adversely affected jobs and livelihoods in traditional sectors. The failure of globalization to create new jobs where people live is a prime factor in increasing migration pressures. "When people cannot find work at home in their communities and societies they look elsewhere. 3 3. Each year millions of women and men leave their homes and cross national borders in search of greater security for themselves and their families. "Throughout human history, migration has been a courageous expression of the individual's will to overcome adversity and to live a better life.4 Most are motivated by the quest for higher wages and better opportunities, but some are forced to do so because of famine, natural disasters, violent conflict or persecution.5 Labour migration has increasingly become a livelihood strategy for women and men because of the lack of opportunities for full employment and decent work in many developing countries. Almost half of the international
4|

migrants are women, now mostly migrating on their own and not as family members. In the face of numerous immigration barriers in receiving countries, an increasing proportion choose to, or are forced to migrate in irregular status which has been a cause of concern for the international community.6 4. Most of the world's migrants - estimated at 191 million in 20057- are migrant workers - those who migrate for employment- and their families. In 2000 economically active migrants were estimated to number some 81 million, and with their families accounted for almost 90 percent of total international migrants. Refugees and asylum-seekers account for about 10 per cent of migrants. 5. Global economic, social, political and demographic trends indicate clearly that international labour migration is likely to increase in the future, and not decrease. Thus the challenge is how to manage migration in such a way that the positive effects are maximized, making it a win-win phenomenon for all concerned. Since the onset of the 1990s, skilled labour migration has been a burgeoning and everdeveloping field of research. Here, skilled migrants most broadly defined as those in possession of a tertiary degree or extensive specialized work experience include architects, accountants and financial experts, engineers, technicians, researchers, scientists, chefs, teachers, health professionals, and increasingly specialists in information technology (IT, including computing professionals, computing engineers, managers, sales reps, etc.). Social and professional characteristics, industrial needs and strategies and government policies surrounding this field will be addressed by other participants in the workshop. This brief contribution outlines some concepts, patterns and issues surrounding kinds of globallystretched, or transnational, networks involving highly skilled workers. Several researchers have pointed out that particularly with regard to the highly skilled migration may now not be the most accurate term. Instead, movement or mobility may be more apt terms. This is because migration has connotations of permanency or long-term stay,whereas the movement of many highly skilled persons tends, today, to
5|

be intermittent and short-term. It is transnational networks that precondition, arise out of, and perpetuate the intermittent and short-term patterns of movement typifying contemporary skilled workers. The paper is organized into sections highlighting (a) the role of networks in migration,(b) the nature of transnationalism today, and (c) patterns, processes and impacts of transnational networks with regard to the movement of skilled workers. The paper concludes by pointing to a few key issues concerning the future of field. As already mentioned in passing, the networks utilized by skilled migrants often tend to be of a different nature, and may have different migratory outcomes, than those characterizing low or unskilled migrants. In three sub-sections below, various aspects of skilled labour networks are sketched. Before embarking on a description of such networks, however, it is important to underscore the fact that migration networks among skilled or unskilled workers are significantly gendered. Gender and gender relations have much to do with conditioning who ones contacts are, what ones relationship to them is, and how networks are accessed,managed and taken advantage of. This needs highlighting particularly in current discussions of skilled labour, since most recent literature on the topic has been marked by the invisibility of women and gender relations (Kofman 2000)9.

1.1 Recruitment The differential networks characterizing various kinds of workers influences, first of all, ways in which skilled migrants are recruited. Schools and universities are a foremost source of skilled migrant networks, especially among people who have completed degrees abroad. Many studies show that the experience of being a foreign student significantly increases the likelihood of being a skilled migrant at a later stage. The networks that foreign students develop may also serve subsequently to provide opportunities for colleagues and friends from the home country as well.
6|

Meyer (2001) indicates that general researchers tend to enter the migration stream through their own ad hoc networks of colleagues and project collaborators; engineers and information technologists, for example, tend instead to move through more institutional migration channels such as recruitment and relocation agencies. Skilled migration processes have also witnessed an ever-increasing role taken by global professional organizations in providing access to migration channels and jobs abroad. The role of global professional associations in augmenting migration has, in many occupations, eveloped alongside regulatory agencies that oversee the accrediting and licensing of professional qualifications and the right to practice in different countries. Such professional and official frameworks provide an important prerequisite and a kind of guarantee to employers that importantly facilitates the creation of skilled migration systems. Other facets of recruitment have globalized, as it were, by way of setting up conditions that simplify and speed up the search for, and employment of, skilled workers from abroad. Within the area of IT, to take one noteworthy example, worldwide opportunities and competition is stimulated by the extension of a kind of common playing field. The following characteristics prevail within the industry: it is highly fluid in terms of skill requirements; international and with little impact of particular cultural contexts; dominated by English language as the basis; on-the-job experience as the most important means of acquiring human capital or becoming multiskilled; a high level of intra- and inter-company and inter-region/country mobility; potential for return migration and investment, and a profession that is largely unregulated by unions or other mechanisms11.

7|

1.2 Movement and Job Placement The migration of professionals often necessitates the interaction of several intermediaries involved in: checking immigration rules and procedures, dealing with immigration authorities, ensuring employability and transportability of qualifications, negotiating wages, facilitating travel, arranging accommodation. Today there are numerous specialist agencies that take care of exactly such forests of red tape. The recent proliferation of professional international intermediaries of this kind confirms the fact that globalization of the highly skilled labour market does not occur without massive network investments A highly notable example, especially within the IT industry, is the agency work known as body shopping. The basic idea behind body shopping is for local recruiters (in India for instance) to supply on-site, just-in-time labour abroad at an economical price for employers. The rationale follows developments within an industry in which short-term projects predominate; it usually doesnt make sense for IT employers to invest (in terms of money, administration and legal responsibility) in 1-4 year visas for workers when there will suffice a short-term contract overseen, in practically all its parts, by an intermediary agency. As detailed, agencies which supply firms with short-term IT workers can: address employers needs quickly, follow labour market trends closely, provide a buffer between the labour market and employer, and relieve both employer and employee of considerable hassles surrounding the administration of immigration (acquiring visas, monitoring rules, filling-out applications, etc.). The agents themselves whether small, middle or large are substantially networked transnationally amongst themselves (with smaller agents providing workers for larger ones, who in turn supply industrial firms). On the negative side, many such body shops have been shown to involve various kinds and degrees of fraud, mostly by making claims that workers are needed

8|

for jobs which dont exist (in order to bring IT workers into a country to sit on the bench until a specific for a client firms arises) or by falsifying workersqualifications14.

1.3 Circulation As the concept suggests, transnational networks of skilled workers are not merely binational avenues of movement. They regularly entail the mobility of workers throughout an international arena (such as Indian IT workers who work, at one time or another, in Singapore, Australia and the USA as well as in India). For a number of years, the migration of skilled workers from developing countries was regarded as a problem of brain drain. With the recognition of networks of skilled worker circulation, many social scientists and national policymakers have tended to shift from a discourse of brain drain to notions of the globalization of human capital, brain exchange, brain circulation and the creation of a global mobile workforce. The idea is to accept the fact that skilled persons may want to migrant for personal, familial and career development, while seeking to encourage the skilled migrants return, mobilization or association with home country development. Indeed, it is transnational networks of professionals that are deemed crucial to realize such goals. There have emerged a number of schemes and types of transnational networks of expatriate professionals that can be tapped to enable their effective and productive role in a home countrys development even without any physical temporary or permanent return.

9|

2.Labour Migration Trends and Characteristics

2.1 Trends in labour migration Over the last 45 years, the number of persons living outside their country of birth has more than doubled, from an estimated 75 million in 1960 to nearly 191 million in 2005 Worldwide, one in every 35 persons is a migrant. This trend of increasing international migration and migrants in absolute terms can be expected to continue in the coming decades. Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that, during the same period, the worlds population also grew two- fold and the proportion of migrants in the total population remains about 3 per cent Estimates put the number of migrant workers at over 86 million and, although there has been an increase, migrant workers represented no more than 4.2 per cent of the industrialized countries total work-force in 1998. While the majority of international migrants originate from developing countries, it is not only a South-North or East-West phenomenon. Nearly half of all reported migrants move from one developing country to another. Intra-regional ows are also signicant.

2.2.

Driving forces the

Three key determining factors will continue to fuel international labour migration;

pull of changing demographics and labour market needs in high income countries; the push of wage dierentials and crisis pressures in less developed countries;

established inter-country networks based on family, culture and history. From the migrants point of view, migration is often a livelihood strategy, since most migration is for economic purposes. It is an outcome of decisions made by individuals

10 |

and families that are seeking the best solution, given the opportunities and constraints they face.

2.3.Type of flows A large proportion of labour migration is unauthorized. The labour market needs both skilled and lower skilled workers. While destination countries are now competing for highly skilled workers, many host societies are becoming more hesitant about admitting lower skilled workers. Nevertheless, there are frequently acute shortages of labour in lower skilled sectors in some countries, given that these are jobs that nationals are reluctant to take and that, consequently, governments are designing temporary worker programmes to meet labour needs in these sectors. Almost half of the 191 million migrants in the world today are women. While women have always migrated as spouses and family ently. Women migrants take up both skilled and less-skilled employment in destination countries, although in both cases, these tend to be gender-specic jobs or jobs in sectors where women predominate. As skilled migrants, women frequently work in the welfare and social professions, as teachers, social workers and nurses. As less-skilled migrants, they are mainly employed as domestic or care workers, as entertainers, in the garment manufacturing industry and, to a lesser extent, in agriculture. In a number of European countries (particularly in France, Italy and Spain), the Gulf States, and in some countries in the Middle East (e.g. Jordan and Lebanon), the domestic service sector remains the most important employment category for migrant women.

11 |

3. Labour Migration in the European Union

In the context of North Africa, the Global Migration Futures (GMF) team applied them to examine future migration in Europe. Existing research on the future of international migration tends to focus on demographic change, and ignores key migration drivers which are more difficult to predict. The very purpose of the scenario methodology is to expand current thinking about future developments by creating scenarios around key uncertainties. Scenario-building exercises identify which factors deserve the most attention when examining potential future migration patterns and trends and appropriate policy responses.

3.1.Economic growth in the EU It is difficult to predict economic growth in the region in 2035, as this depends on a combination of factors, including, but not limited to, the paths taken by various European countries to attempt full recovery from economic recession; the future of the Eurozone; and any future economic restructuring of Europes main trading partners. What we do know is that there is a strong, positive relationship between economic growth and immigration. In Germany, France, and the Netherlands, annual data on immigration rates and GDP from the early 1970s to the late 2000s reveal that increases and decreases in GDP directly correspond to increases and decreases in immigration rates. Thus, if economic growth is strong in the coming decades, we can expect immigration to increase and to remain a vital factor in meeting expanding European economies demand for labour. The impact of economic growth on European emigration appears smaller than on immigration, for during times of economic decline, migrants in Europe tend not to leave the region at rates that significantly correspond to declining labour market demand.

12 |

3.2 EU fragmentation and sub-regional bloc formation Tensions between state policies and disparities in the financial health of European states in particular, the difficulties facing countries like Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain in managing their primary deficits reveal challenges to the economic and political cohesion of the European Union. While it is unlikely that the EU and Eurozone will entirely fragment by 2035, the future strength of EU cohesion, the position of the less prosperous members in the Union, and the future of the process of EU expansion remain highly uncertain. Future EU cohesion can impact immigration and intra-regional migration in various ways. If cohesion weakens on an economic level, whether or not states withdraw from the Eurozone, and markets become increasingly depressed in the weakest European states while others remain stable or experience growth, a process of economic divergence will occur and the EU may experience increases in intra-regional migration. If EU cohesion persists or strengthens in the future, the Union may continue to accept new members, which may also become new sources of (free) labour migration.

3.3 EU labour markets The future of EU labour markets depends on future age distribution within and outside Europe, labour market policies, skills levels, possible rises in the retirement age, the structure and level of pension schemes, employment benefits, foreign workforce policies, and advancements in labour mechanization, to name a few factors. The combination of these factors and their complex interplay makes the future of EU labour markets highly uncertain15. We do know that in 2035, Europe will confront an aged population and a high dependency ratio, which, particularly under conditions of economic growth, are likely to result in an increased labour demand in particular sectors as well as strained or reduced pension and welfare systems. At the same time, we know that, overall,
13 |

educational attainment and skill levels are increasing. Thus, EU countries may face an increasing scarcity of higher and lower skilled labour in 2035. However, the significance of this shortage will depend on levels of economic growth, changes to production systems, advances in labour mechanization, and the off-shoring of industrial and service-sector operations. EU governments may design new temporary or permanent labour immigration schemes to meet market demands, increase migration quotas, and alter migration policies to increasingly allow the lower skilled to immigrate. EU governments may also respond by increasing minimum wages to attract nationals to lower skilled jobs.

3.4. Xenophobia, racism, and identity politics If the emergence of nationalist and xenophobic rightwing political parties in Europe is a signal of a larger trend towards increasing xenophobia in the future, it is possible that we may see more restrictive and selective immigration policies. We may see evidence of this trend in the culture of denial existing in asylum processing and bilateral migration agreements with North African states, for such processes and agreements assume migrants are not legally entitled to refugee protection16. However, it is highly uncertain whether and to what degree these trends will occur. Future improvements in the integration of immigrant groups might cause a decline in xenophobia or Islamophobia. Moreover, Europes commitment to international legal norms and principles and multicultural aspirations may suggest a future in which, despite incidences of xenophobia, most migrants will be welcomed and incorporated into society. Consequently, the future of xenophobia, racism and identity politics in Europe remains highly uncertain. It is often assumed that the level of restrictiveness of immigration policies reflects sentiments towards outsiders. However, past research tells us that a significant gap often exists between the number of migrants European states say they want to admit and the number of migrants who are admitted, because of the real benefits that labour
14 |

migration brings to European economies.4 Moreover, past migration research tells us that despite public support for deportation policies, the public often opposes their enforcement17.

3.5. Mobility in Europe A cornerstone of the European agenda is the right of freedom of movement throughout the EU a basic human and social right. Since the Treaty of Rome in 1957, freedom of movement for EU citizens and their families has been one of the core acquis of the European Communities. This also means that EU citizens be equally entitled to employment opportunities, public housing, tax advantages and social benefits, regardless of their Member State of origin. This right is of central importance to European citizens: when asked what the EU represents to them, 53% say freedom to travel and work in the EU. This answer comes first, well ahead of the introduction of the euro as a common currency (44%) and safeguarding peace (36%) - Eurobarometer survey. The importance of mobility to European policymakers is evident from the decision to designate 2006 as European Year of Workers Mobility. To learn more about the extent of European citizens geographical and job mobility, and their future intentions, the European Commission funded a special Eurobarometer survey (EB 64.1), which was carried out at the end of 2005 in the 25 Member States then forming the Union. The Foundation conducted the analysis of the data in cooperation with the Commission, looking at the drivers of, and barriers to, mobility in Europe, and the economic and social effects of mobility patterns. Despite their approval of mobility as a concept, EU citizens are unlikely to show a dramatic increase in actual mobility in the near future. Moving across borders represents a challenge for potential migrants: they risk losing the support of their social

15 |

networks and finding a new job is a challenge, as is dealing with the administrative systems of another country. Concerns about an exodus from the NMS to the EU27 are overly simplistic: citizens in different countries in the NMS have very different intentions in terms of their willingness to move within the EU. In four of these countries, indeed, citizens have much lower mobility intentions than their fellow citizens in the EU27. The majority of migrants are young, and have significantly higher levels of education than those who have no intention of moving. An inflow of energetic and skilled workers would be a gain for the recipient country, but a loss for the home country. For national economies, higher levels of geographical mobility and job mobility are associated with higher rates of GDP growth, higher employment rates and lower rates of long-term unemployment. For the individual, job-related inter-regional mobility is associated with higher employment rates and better access to permanent employment, while job mobility is associated with upwards occupational mobility. Although the national proportions of those intending to leave the NMS are low, the absolute numbers may be quite substantial. Between 2.4% and 3.6% of the working age population in Poland expressed a firm intention to move to another EU country in the next five years. With a working-age population of around 25 million, this could translate into a potential outflow of between 600,000 and 900,000 people over the period 2006 to 2010. Moreover, findings indicate that future levels of geographical mobility may be higher than at present. While European citizens view geographical mobility very positively, an overwhelming majority (almost 70%) have no intention of moving in the near future. Countries that have high levels of geographical mobility also have high levels of job mobility. Liberal welfare states (Ireland and the UK) and social-democratic type regimes (the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries) have the highest levels of job mobility.
16 |

A dual labour market appears to exist, with more vulnerable workers being exposed to more involuntary job changes than their higher-skilled or better protected counterparts.

3.5.1 Levels of mobility The overall picture of geographical mobility gained from the Eurobarometer data is that Europeans are not very mobile. Figure 1 illustrates that the extent of mobility decreases as the distance to be moved increases. Longdistance mobility is not common: only 18% of Europeans have moved outside their region, while only 4% have ever moved to another Member State and 3% outside the Union. However, almost a quarter have moved within their region. This level of mobility is frequently contrasted with the levels of geographical mobility seen in the US, where almost a third of citizens (32%) live outside the state in which they were born, substantially more than the 22% of Europeans who have ever lived in another region or Member State. However, migration between states in the US takes place within the same linguistic, political and cultural context, unlike long-distance migration in Europe.

Figure 1: Past mobility, by distance of move (%)

35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% Mobile within Mobile within Mobile across Mobile within Mobile outside town/city region regions EU EU

Source: Eurobarometer (2005)

17 |

Fig.2. Mobility by demographic characteristics (%)

Female Male 19,00% 19,50% 20,00% 20,30% 20,50% 21,00% 21,50% 22,00% 22,50% 22,20%

Source: Eurobarometer (2005)

Age

30,0% 20,0% 10,0% 0,0% 15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64

65+

Source: Eurobarometer (2005)

Education

Still studying High Average Low/none 0,0% 5,0%

23,8% 33,7% 20,4% 17,3% 10,0% 15,0% 20,0% 25,0% 30,0% 35,0% 40,0%

Note: Fig. 2 indicates past geographical mobility levels in the EU by gender, age and education; that is the percentage of people in each of those categories that has ever moved between regions in the EU.

18 |

3.5.2. Main reasons for moving The survey data reveal that long-distance moves (to another region or Member State) are most often related to the labour market. A new job or job transfer was cited by 34% of respondents as being their reason for moving. Another key reason was a change of partnership or marital situation (18%). Strong gender differences are apparent in these findings: men report moving because of a new job or job transfer far more often than do women (44% as against 27%);women more often seem to make a longdistance move in order to follow their partner.

3.5.3 Socio- economic factors of migration 3.5.3.1 Education level Well educated individuals are substantially more likely to have moved than those with a low or average level of education. This difference in mobility may be because workers with a lower level of education face significantly higher employment risks: as a result, they are more dependent upon their social networks (in particular their extended families) if they should become unemployed. This is not surprising: economic globalisation has tended to result in highly-skilled workers being more mobile on the international labour market. High educational attainment is regarded as a positive factor influencing migration. According to human capital theory, higher levels of education offer increased income returns on specific segments of the labor market. It is also argued that higher levels of education provide a greater ability to collect and process information, which lowers the risk and therefore increases the propensity for migration. The prevalence of low-skilled labor markets for migrants in the destination countries makes migration less beneficial for high-skilled individuals.

19 |

Some observers see the migration of students as a form of migration of young and qualified labor. In several receiving countries it has proven easier to switch from student to worker status than to migrate as a fully qualified employee. As far as tertiary education is concerned more than 15 percent of the Turkish respondents want to migrate. The other three country groupings, with 3 to 4 percent, are significantly lower. Thus, as far as the general intention to migrate is concerned Turkey faces a serious threat of a brain drain in the years to come. Fig.1 Intention to migrate by education
16% 14% 12% 12% 10% 8% 6% 4% 4% 2% 0% Turkey Poland NEW9 AC2 3% 3% 5% 9% University degree Student 15% 13%

3.5.3.2 Age Age is clearly important in terms of past mobility: the youngest age group, those aged between 15 and 24 years, are too young and have not yet had the time to move to another country. However, the next youngest (2534 year olds) have moved as much as the older generations in a shorter time span, indicating that there may be a general, EUwide increase in mobility taking place.

20 |

Younger cohorts are regarded as more mobile, whereas beyond the age of 40 there is a significant drop of intended migration. From an economic point of view, two main explanations are given. Younger cohorts usually have better labor market prospects in the receiving country, in particular when they are prepared to take up lower-paid jobs mainly in the service sector. They often increase their labor market chances in the receiving countries by accepting work beneath their actual level of qualification, thus providing local employers with a lower wage rate combined with higher productivity. The second economic argument comes from human capital theory, which suggests a better return on investment in migration with decreasing age. Older workers have a lower economic incentive to migrate, as the amortization period for their investment is shorter. Figure 2 focuses on the people willing to migrate as a percentage of a specific age group. For NEW9 and ALL13 one out of ten of the youngest age cohort wants tomigrate into the EU. The highest tendency to migrate is shown in AC2, where nearly one in five wants to migrate. Poland reaches 12 percent and Turkey has a share of around 8 percent in the youngest age group. Overall, this has the potential of a massive youth drain from these countries. As far as the second youngest cohort (2539) is concerned, between 4 and 5 percent in NEW9, Poland and AC2 want to migrate. The highest percentage is in Turkey, where 7 percent of the 2539 year old age group have a general intention to migrate to the EU. In this respect Turkey has a slightly higher age profile than the other three country groupings.

21 |

20% 18% 16% 14% 12% 12% 10% 8% 8% 6% 4% 4% 2% 0% Turkey Poland NEW9 4% 7% 8%

19%

15 - 24 years 25 - 39 years 5%

AC2

Fig.2 Intention to migrate by age

3.5.3.3 Gender Approximately equal percentages of men and women have lived elsewhere, women being slightly more mobile. Long-distance mobility is undergoing a process of feminisation, due to: womens increasing education and professional training; better job opportunities for women in specific parts of the services sector, such as care for children and the elderly; emancipation of younger women from traditional family or partnership structures. Traditionally, the largest proportion of migrants has been male. Younger men were sent out to look for work to finance the remaining family through remittance payments back home, whereas younger women stayed at home taking over family responsibilities. If female migration occurred it was family-linked and was seen in policy terms as a secondary type of migration. It is estimated that previously 65 percent of all female permanent migration into the EU was family-linked. The increasing level of education of women in many countries, the frequent loss of employment due to economic transformation, the search for new employment
22 |

opportunities and a changing role model, which challenges the traditional male breadwinner model, has triggered a reverse trend. This is, however, based on the assumption that higher educational attainment and changed labor market conditions in the sending countries goes hand in hand with a higher propensity to migrate. In addition, female migration could be increased by better labor market opportunities for women in specific segments of the expanding service sector, e.g. in health, care and household-related services of the receiving countries. New groups of migrants are emerging, which include young single women or female family breadwinners. An increasing number of women move independently rather than under the authority of older relatives or integrated into a family strategy. Migration takes place more and more within female networks which are separated from those of men. The group of female migrants differs in regard to their socio-economic background. There have been four groups identified: (1) women from rural backgrounds migrating on their own or as part of family reunification; (2) low-skilled women from urban backgrounds migrating due to divorce, increasing poverty and deprivation levels; (3) more highly educated women motivated by the lack of appropriate job opportunities in the country of origin; and (4) women fleeing civil unrest in their home countries.

23 |

10% 9% 9% 8% 7% 7% 6% 6% 5% 5% 4% 4% 3% 3% 2% 1% 0% Turkey Poland NEW9 AC2 3% 4% Male Female

Fig.3 Intention to migrate by gender Figure 3 shows the percentage of men and women with a general intention to migrate as part of the whole population of 15 years of age and older. In Poland and the AC2 between 6 and 7 percent of all men want to migrate, in the NEW9 this is reduced to 3 percent. Turkey, with 9 percent, has the highest proportion of a male population which is mobile. As far as women are concerned, the country differences are less pronounced. Between 3 percent (Poland) and 5 percent (AC2) of the female population are mobile. The highest absolute share is in Romania and Bulgaria with 5 percent. However, the NEW9 are the only country grouping where we have a slightly higher percentage of women (4 percent) than men (3 percent) with a general intention to migrate. The situation in Turkey is completely the opposite: Here the proportion of men (9 percent) is more than double that of women (4 percent) with an intention to migrate.

24 |

3.5.3.4 Location Geographical mobility in general tends to be higher in the Nordic countries; by contrast in most of the NMS and in most of the southern European countries, mobility within or outside the region is relatively low. There is a longstanding debate on whether migration comes mainly from rural areas of the sending countries or to a higher extent from urban areas and larger towns. Again the four country groupings show some important structural variation on the same lines, as we have observed in the previous section. Turkey is the only country grouping in which we find a higher rural migration rate than an urban rate. Accordingly, in Turkey 7 percent of the respondents in rural areas and only 5 percent in cities have a general intention to migrate. The situation in Poland and the NEW9 is different. Here the location-specific migration rate is double in cities compared to rural areas. The AC2 are in the middle with only a slightly higher propensity to migrate in urban areas. The bivariate analysis confirms the particular migration pattern of Turkey in comparison to the other country groupings. Potential Turkish migrants have a stronger rural background, are more often in the lowest income quartile and have a relatively high mobility rate within the unemployed. The combination of all three dimensions indicates additional challenging problems of labor market integration in the receiving countries. But there is also another structural feature of Turkish migrants, as they present the relatively highest proportion of migrants with a university degree and a significant proportion of migrants who are still studying. This part of the Turkish migration potential provides a lesser challenge for a successful economic integration. The structure of potential migrants in the AC2 also has a particular feature. Migrants represent an exceptionally high percentage of students, singles and very young people in comparison to the other three country groupings. From a labor market perspective, potential migrants from the AC2 are probably the most promising group for successful
25 |

integration in the receiving countries. At the same time, the stronger brain and youth drain creates a particular challenge for the future economic and social development of Bulgaria and Romania. Figure 4. Intention to migrate by location.

8% 7% 7% 6% 6% 5% 5% 4% 4% 3% 3% 2% 2% 1% 0% Turkey Poland NEW9 AC2 Rural Large town 6% 7%

The NEW9 countries have their most specific feature in the relatively high percentage of female migrants. In addition, they have a similar profile to the AC2 but have a significantly lower level of intention to migrate. Poland is in the middle between Turkey on one side and the AC2 and NEW9 on the other. It shares with Turkey the higher mobility rate of the unemployed and of men. Poland has more in common with NEW9 and AC2 in regard to the importance of youth, being a student and single and belonging to the highest income quartile. However, the results of this bivariate are only of limited importance. They have to be tested in the final step of our analysis within a multivariate analysis.

26 |

3.5.3.5 Unemployment Labor market theory emphasizes income differentials as the strongest and employment differentials as the second strongest factors influencing migrationsome scholars reverse the order.33 As income and employment differentials cannot be measured within the remit of this contribution, we will concentrate on the behavior of the unemployed. In some countries with a high unemployment rate, the unemployed are more mobile than employed people. A counter-argument is developed based on socioeconomic concepts, which stress the importance of a minimum of resources to provide the capability for migration as a realistic option. Both hypotheses suggest some crosspressure on the intention to migrate for the unemployed, who may face the necessity but lack the resources for migration. The combined hypothesis would lead to a migration threshold: below the threshold one is too poor to migrate and above one is too comfortable. Economic concepts, focusing on search and information costs, predict that the unemployed have lower opportunity costs during the search process and less constrained time budgets for preparatory search and information behavior related to
14% 12% 12% 10% 8% 6% 4% 4% 2% 0% Turkey Poland NEW9 AC2 7% 6% Unemployment rate

Fig.5 Intention to migrate by unemployment rate

27 |

migration. This would suggest a higher propensity for migration by the unemployed in comparison to employed people with higher opportunity costs. The share of potential migrants among the unemployed also shows large variations between the four country groupings. In Turkey, 12 percent of the unemployed want to migrate. Also the unemployed in Bulgaria/Romania and Poland have a higher propensity for regional mobility (6/7 percent). The lowest mobility among the nemployed is in the group of new Mediterranean and Central European member states (4 percent). These are countries with better current and future labor market conditions. Immobility may, under those conditions, be a more rational option for the unemployed.

3.5.4 Advantages and disadvantages of geographical mobility Greater job mobility appears to result in higher overall levels of upward mobility. Of those who were working at the time of the Eurobarometer survey, around 15% had experienced occupational upward mobility during their career moving jobs, but simultaneously moving to a higher-level occupation. Only 6% had experienced downward mobility. The majority had experienced horizontal occupational mobility moving to a different job, but remaining at the same occupational level. A more indepth analysis found that the greater the levels of job mobility, the greater was the increase in overall occupational mobility. Hence, more movement overall in the labour market increases, at least statistically, a persons chances of upward occupational mobility. The overall perception on the part of those who had moved long distances was that it was a positive outcome: 45% felt that nothing had got worse (only 11% felt that nothing had improved). The single largest improvement was in housing: 36% felt that their housing conditions had improved. 25% felt that the job situation of one of the household members had improved (as against only 4% who felt it had got worse) and household income: 22% felt it had improved, as against 7% who felt it had got worse.
28 |

Just because mobility delivers benefits, it is not correct to say that more mobility is always a good thing. Moving region or country poses challenges to individual citizens, their families, employers and wider societies. Workers take a risk when moving they may suffer a loss of material conditions, or find that their new job is less suitable than they may have hoped. They may also find that their previously valued skills are no longer applicable, and that the support of family and community networks is gone. The large scale emigration of younger, better educated workers would represent a substantial loss to a country or a region a so-called brain drain. One of the most important aspects of geographical mobility for EU labour markets is the potential it holds for offering a way to balance labour shortages and surpluses across the Union. However, whether such potential is likely to be realised in the near future is open to question. Only 31% of respondents said they would move to another region or country to find a job in the event of unemployment. This may be explained by concerns over loss of social support networks, and potential language barriers. At the macroeconomic level, higher levels of geographical mobility are associated with higher rates of GDP growth, higher employment rates and lower rates of long-term unemployment. Greater geographical mobility also seems to be associated with fewer regional labour market imbalances. While it is not possible to establish a causal relationship on the basis of this, it is highly significant that such geographical mobility is not associated with lower GDP or rates of employment. Similar positive associations are seen at the microeconomic level. Job related interregional mobility is associated with greater individual labour force participation, higher employment rates and better access to employment on permanent contracts. Intercountry migration appears to improve the employment opportunities for those moving for job-related reasons.

29 |

3.5.5. Migration intentions European citizens are broadly in favour of mobility. Of those surveyed, 49% think mobility is beneficial for individuals, 50% think is beneficial for the labour market and 62% think it is beneficial for European integration. Despite this largely positive view of mobility, however, almost 70% of respondents have no intention to move in the near future (the next five years). A key part of the debate concerning migration and mobility is the potential effect of migration from the NMS upon the former EU27s labour markets. Hence, the expectations of citizens from the NMS regarding moving to other Member States are crucially important to current policy and debate concerning future migration flows. Analysis of the findings from the Eurobarometer survey indicated that between 1% and 1.5% of the working-age population of the EU25 have a firm intention to move to another country in the Union over the next five years. Between 2.8% and 3.5% have a similarly firm intention to move to another region of their country of residence. Such low percentages do not point to a mass exodus of workers to other Member States. European citizens who do express an intention to migrate tend to be younger and better educated. Single people are most inclined to move long distances. Next most likely to move are those who are divorced and separated. Single parents are the most prepared to move. In general, citizens in the EU27 express greater intentions of moving than their counterparts in the NMS. However, when individual countries are looked at, a pattern emerges of four groups of countries, with distinct profiles of mobility expectations. These four groups are listed in descending order of the expressed intentions of their citizens. 1. In four high mobility NMS (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland), more citizens have firm intentions of moving between 2.4% and 4.2%.

30 |

2. In four high mobility EU27 countries (Denmark, Ireland, Finland and Sweden) between 1.4% and 2.9% of citizens have firm intentions of moving: more than twice the level in the low-mobility NMS; In the 11 low-mobility EU27 countries, citizens display a slightly higher intention of moving than those in the low mobility NMS. 4. In four low mobility NMS (Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and Slovenia) few citizens have firm intentions of moving between 0.5% and 1.8%. The distinction between the high and low mobility groups of countries in the NMS is an important one, in light of concerns in the EU27 regarding potential inflows from these countries. Given the low levels of stated mobility intentions in the low-mobility NMS, it is unlikely that future migration from these countries would challenge labour markets in the EU27. On the basis of the stated intentions, it is possible to estimate likely migration flows from the NMS. For the low mobility countries, it isbetween 0.5% and 1.8% of the working population. For the high mobility countries, it is between 2.4% and 4.2 %. (For a large country such as Poland, this small percentage does represent a considerable absolute number of individuals). The Foundations analysis of the Eurobarometer findings compared the data with those obtained in an earlier survey (from 2001). Between 2005 and 2009, in the high mobility NMS, there was an increase of between two and three percentage points in the numbers of those with a firm intention to migrate. Actual labour market figures on economic migration from these countries to the EU27 in particular, Ireland and the UK confirm a substantial movement of people. In turn, the developing social networks of migrants who have already made a move create an additional pull for potential migrants. This tends to show that migration flows in the future are likely to be greater than in the past. This may well be a direct consequence of EU enlargement. Furthermore, the mobility intentions of citizens in the NMS are rising relative to those of their EU 27 neighbours.

31 |

As with the profile of those who moved in the past, those who plan on moving from the high mobility NMS are young (75% are aged less than 35) and well educated (one third is still studying and one third is highly educated). For these countries, cross-border mobility could represent a significant brain drain.

3.5.6. Barriers to geographical mobility While long-distance mobility may deliver clear economic benefits for individuals, the numbers who intend staying where they are indicate that citizens have broader concerns about mobility than solely economic considerations. Responses to the survey indicate that far from being simply rational actors who attempt to maximise their utility, EU citizens must balance aspirations for career advancement with the uncertainty of moving, and the potential loss of systems of support. For the EU27 as a whole, the key factor that deters people from moving is the fear of losing ones social network: 44% give losing direct contact with family or friends as a reason for not wishing to move region or country, while 27% cite missing support from family and friends. Such social network factors are much more of a disincentive to moving than the challenge of learning a new language. This is usually considered a key factor in limiting geographical mobility between EU countries. However, only 19% cited this as a reason for not moving. Housing conditions and healthcare were cited as less important concerns. When country groupings are compared, concerns over loss of ones social networks is still the primary deterrent. However, in the highmobility NMS, this is much less of an impediment then for the other country groupings: 10 percentage points less than in the low mobility NMS, and 20 percentage points less than in the high mobility EU15. If Europeans are to move more from one job to another, labour markets will need to become more flexible, economic growth will need to become more employment intensive and the isks of job transitions will have to be minimised. Currently, Member
32 |

States differ in the institutional arrangements that they have implemented to promote this sort of labour market flexibility. To understand present levels of job mobility, it must first be measured. Job mobility can be assessed by counting the number of times people have changed employer, and measuring the average duration of each job they have held. The survey looked at the relative proportions of people who had never changed employer after the age of 35 years (this age was chosen to balance the fact that younger people may never have had the opportunity to change jobs). Across the EU27, 23% of respondents had never changed employer. Furthermore, substantial differences are found between Member States in terms of mobility: only 6% of Danish respondents had never changed employer, compared to 42% in Malta. Corporatist welfare states, where reasonably generous provision benefit systems are largely funded by citizens own contributions during their working lives (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg). It is the social-democratic, and the liberal, welfare states that facilitate the highest levels of market flexibility. More liberal employment protection legislation in these countries means that jobs are less protected, and hence workers are forced to be more flexible. However, greater security in the form of active labour market policies, low exit rates and high re-entry rates encourages and enables citizens to make job changes and hence participate in greater job mobility. With their much higher levels of job protection, corporatist welfare states have less flexibility, and therefore have less mobility. Southern European countries, while not forming as coherent a group as the other three, also show lower levels of flexibility and hence mobility. (The picture for the NMS is more mixed, with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania having relatively high mobility.) Job mobility, as indicated above, can also be measured by job duration. Shorter job durations indicate greater mobility: those countries with the lowest proportion of
33 |

citizens who had never changed jobs also have the shortest job durations (the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands, Ireland, the UK and Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania). Denmark has the shortest job duration, at just under five years, while Portugal has the longest, at 11 years. The average job duration increases sharply with age. This indicates that people change jobs more frequently early in their careers. It may be that older workers are more satisfied with the position that they have found; alternatively, they may be less confident about their chances of finding an acceptable alternative job at their later stage in life. It is noteworthy that the average number of jobs does not increase for people aged 35 years and over: this indicates that, in the past, people stayed longer with the same employer than they do now. In terms of other demographic characteristics, people with children are among the most mobile; parents have the most pressing financial needs and are likely to search actively for better paying jobs. This is particularly the case for single parents. When sectoral and job differences are examined, very different levels of job mobility become apparent. 1. Not surprisingly, workers in the more protected public sector display the least mobility: in public administration and defence, average job duration is almost 12 years. By contrast, workers in the hotels and restaurants sector have average durations of just over six years. Low-skilled manual workers also have shorter job durations. 2. Managers have somewhat longer job durations than other employees. 3. As would be expected, employees on permanent contracts have longer job durations more than twice as long as those on other types of contract. 4. A spell of unemployment also appears to predispose a person towards higher mobility: once a respondent had been unemployed for three months or more, at least once, their average job duration fell by half.

34 |

3.5.7.Forced and voluntary mobility Job mobility is assumed to be generally desirable: however, an important distinction to make is to determine whether a job change was taken voluntarily or was forced on the worker. Demographic, sectoral and occupational differences emerge when this distinction is drawn. Across Europe, 65% of the working age population voluntarily changed employer in the previous five years, while 38% were forced to do so. Age and education Age differences are noteworthy: younger people aged between 15 and 24 years experience more forced mobility (46% being forced to leave their job); those aged between 25 to 34 years are more likely to leave their employer voluntarily (only 34 % being forced to leave). However, the proportions of older people being forced to leave their employer rises to 56% for those aged 55 64. These older respondents are both more likely to be made redundant or to have to leave for health reasons; the youngest age group is more likely to have had their contract expire. Lower levels of educational attainment are also associated with a greater likelihood of forced mobility. Respondents who finished their formal education between ages of 16 and 19 are made redundant much more often than those in other categories. By contrast, those with the highest level of education have the lowest proportion of forced mobility. Sectoral differences When sectoral differences are examined, it becomes apparent that heavy industrial sectors (manufacturing, mining and quarrying) have a high proportion of redundancies, and hence of forced mobility. Again, as might be expected, those working in the public sector on permanent contracts are unlikely to have been forced to leave their employer. As the skills level of a job increases, so too does the ratio of voluntary to forced mobility. Workers in the service sector have the highest proportion of voluntary transitions (75%) and the lowest proportion of forced transitions (27%). This contrasts
35 |

with unskilled manual workers, who have slightly more forced transitions (55%) than voluntary transitions (53%). Furthermore, health-related transitions are more prevalent among manual than white-collar workers. Unemployment A spell of unemployment earlier in the career increases a respondents chances of being forced to leave their employer: the ratio of voluntary to forced transitions increases. When there are two or more spells of unemployment, the ratio then switches entirely: such workers more often eport having been forced to leave than having done so voluntarily. Dual labour market Job mobility can have positive outcomes in terms of skills acquisition and the employability of people. However, the picture that emerges is of a dual labour market, with more vulnerable workers more likely to be mobile than betterprotected or hierarchically higher employees. These more vulnerable workers lone parents, blue-collar workers, those who have experienced unemployment, or who are on temporary contracts are likely to change jobs more often and change to jobs that do not have longer job durations. Moreover, they are more likely to have been forced to leave their last employer than having done so voluntarily.

36 |

4.The Future of Job Mobility

At the macroeconomic level, greater job mobility is associated with higher rates of GDP growth, higher employment rates and lower rates of long-term unemployment. While it is not possible to establish a causal relationship on the basis of this, it is highly significant that job mobility is not associated with lower GDP or rates of employment. Of those respondents who were currently working at the time of the survey, 43% said that they expected to change their current job in the next five years. As might be expected from the findings discussed above, expectations of future mobility are highest in the liberal and socialdemocratic welfare states, and in the Baltic countries. Citizens in corporatist welfare states and southern European countries have fewer intentions of changing employer. Respondents who had changed jobs before were more likely to report that they expected to change in the future. Those who had never changed jobs were especially reluctant to change. However, it should be noted that expectations of job mobility are higher than actual job mobility. While 43% of respondents said they expect to change jobs in the next five years, only 32% had actually done so in the preceding fiveyear period. Some caution when making projections about job mobility is therefore required. Geographical and job mobility are clearly related: as already stated, a majority of moves across regions or borders are made for jobrelated reasons. The findings on geographical and job mobility can thus be combined to form a composite picture of European mobility. Across Europe, it would seem that levels of geographical and of job mobility coincide: in countries that have high levels of geographical mobility, people tend to change jobs more often.

37 |

The countries can be grouped into five mobility clusters. The Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Finland and Sweden) and the UK combine The highest levels of geographical and job mobility. Three Mediterranean countries (Malta, Italy and Portugal) and four

central/eastern European countries (Austria, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia): these countries have a generally low mobility profile, both in terms of geographical and job mobility. Three eastern European Member States (Czech Republic, Hungary and Latvia): have high levels of job mobility but the lowest levels of geographical mobility. Two country groupings have medium scores on one dimension but higher scores on the other. France, Ireland and Luxembourg have a high level of geographical mobility combined with medium levels of job mobility, whereas Estonia, Latvia and the Netherlands have the highest levels of job mobility but only medium levels of geographical mobility. Four countries (Belgium, Cyprus, Germany and Spain) have average levels of both forms of mobility. This pattern recalls the typology of welfare states discussed earlier: higher levels of both types of mobility are found in the social-democratic and liberal states. Such countries may have a wider application of social insurance, which encourages their citizens to consider both residential and job mobility as feasible options. This may be particularly relevant for those with lower levels of educational attainment, who may otherwise be more restricted in their overall mobility. Moreover, because most job transitions result in upward occupational mobility, this suggests that these states perform quite well in ensuring career advancement and social mobility for their citizens. While the survey findings paint a complex picture of geographical and job mobility, it is clear that at the national level greater levels of both are associated with higher rates of GDP growth, better rates of employment and lower rates of long-term
38 |

unemployment. Together with the greater opportunities for upward mobility available to those who undertake more job changes, it would seem that the focus on mobility in the European Employment Strategy is justified. However, a reliance upon greater geographical mobility to resolve Europes labour market issues could be misguided. The survey found that, in the event of unemployment, only 31% of respondents said they would move region or country to find a job. This indicates that only a small proportion of the European workforce would be prepared to cross national borders in the event of unemployment. While migration may be a solution to unemployment and labour market imbalances, it is likely to be so for a relatively restricted number of persons or households. Moreover, encouraging greater mobility will be a challenge: despite its perceived and actual benefits, geographical and job mobility in the EU is likely to remain at a low level. Only 4% of EU citizens have ever moved to another country in the Union, and fewer than 3% have moved to a non-EU country. When asked about their future intentions to move country, only 3% indicated that they might move in the next five years. Even when interregional mobility is considered, 21% have lived outside their region of birth. In terms of job mobility, a similar preference emerges for stability: 68% of working Europeans still have the same employer as they had five years ago, while 57% see themselves being with the same employer in five years time. Only around one in three job transitions is voluntary, with a view to improving labour market position; the rest of the time, job changes are either forced upon the worker or are the result of an attempt to reconcile working and personal life. While mobility is seen as a desirable goal of European social policy, it is important to recognise that too much mobility, or mobility of the wrong sort, could create as many problems as it might be expected to solve. Geographical mobility has the potential to erode communities and lead to a loss of social cohesion; it can also result in a brain drain for countries or regions facing substantial emigration of young, welleducated workers (witness recently expressed concerns in Poland about the movement of many
39 |

of its young people to the EU15). Job mobility can also represent a downward spiral for disadvantaged workers, who may be forced into an ongoing situation of precarious employment. Moreover, less mobile workers the lower educated, those aged 45 years and over may be in greater need of the protection against social exclusion provided by the social support of family and networks. Long-distance mobility could weaken this support. High levels of voluntary mobility can also create problems for employers, as it means higher recruitment and training costs (Employers may aim to reduce these costs by minimising staff turnover through a policy of raising levels of job satisfaction.) A policy goal for mobility then, is that it should be optimised, rather than maximised.

4.1. EU policies While mobility is an important goal of EU policy, it must be recognised that it exists in a policy context with other, established structural and regional policy directions. Throughout the EUs history, regional development support has played an important role in protecting the human, social and economic capital of marginalised areas. This support, implementing capital mobility or foreign direct investments in these areas regions, has enabled less developed regions to compete with more industrialised regions of the Union. If mobility policy was implemented in such a way as to facilitate the permanent mass migration of better educated citizens from these regions, it would undermine policies of regional support. Instead, mobility policy and structural and regional policy should be designed and implemented in the context of an integrated EU employment, regional and social policy. In recognition of the impact of demographic ageing on the economy, the European Commission has highlighted the need to review immigration policies in the longer term: more sustained flows could help contribute to the needs of the EU labour market. For this to work, a strategic pan-European initiative is required.

40 |

In its absence, migration flows are more likely to be able to bypass current national legislation; Part of such a strategic approach should be a system of recognition of the qualifications of workers from third countries; such recognition can give migrant workers better access to the labour market and hence facilitate integration. This would also entail wider recognition of the qualifications gained from initial induction and training courses. Vulnerable workers the previously unemployed, manual or unskilled workers, the poorer educated, and those on temporary contracts make more job changes and are more likely to have been forced to leave their last employer. Such workers may require targeted intervention to ensure that they do not become discouraged and withdraw from the labour market. Those countries with the highest levels of mobility also have the best institutional arrangements balancing flexibility and security for instance, the flexicurity ethos prevalent in Denmark. If institutional arrangements are such that security and flexibility go hand in hand, it is likely that both the individual worker and the broader economy will benefit. Such welfare systems minimise the risk of moving; the cost of changing jobs, or residence, is equalled, or more than recompensed by, greater profits in terms of income, skills, or job satisfaction. Where such a favourable outcome is not guaranteed, however, people are more likely to remain in the situation that they are at least familiar with, retaining access to social support networks How to ensure that mobile citizens can be rewarded for mobility, and their risks minimised, is a challenge for policymakers. Employment protection legislation results, clearly, in better job protection for workers. This has the advantage of reducing workers expectations of being forced to leave their jobs; it also results in less downward occupational mobility. However, it would appear that more restrictive legislation reduces overall expectations of mobility both voluntary and forced, and reduces the level of upward occupational mobility. Hence,

41 |

while and important feature of labour market regulation, the implications of using strict EPL should be considered before making legislative changes. The complementarity observed between geographical and job mobility suggests a mutually reinforcing effect. This benefits those who are already advantaged, but it could also mean that individuals who do not have the skills or resources to be more mobile (including languages), would become progressively disadvantaged over the life course. Mobility of all types is easier for the young, the better off and the well educated. Other groups however, require assistance if they are to become more mobile. One way to progress this would be to expand and upgrade the EURES job information network, so that it is readily available in each Member State.

4.2 Migration Trends in an Enlarging European Union

How is the potential to migrate defined and measured? The study measures the attitudes towards migration into the EU on two different levels: (1) general intention to migrate and (2) firm intention to migrate. (1) The general intention to migrate reflects a basic attitude towards migration to the EU. The questionnaire includes a direct question: Do you intend to go to live and workfor a few months or for several yearsin a current European Union country in the next five years? In order to control the validity of the answers to this question and to construct the indicator on the general intention to migrate, positive answers to this question are combined with the results of questions which measure the intention of regional mobility in the next fiveyears by moving to any place outside the same city, town or village. In this respect, one filter question and one follow-up question were asked: Do you intend to move in the next five years? and if the answer was positive the follow-up question: In the next five years, do you intend to move to another city,

42 |

town or village within the same region; to another region within the same country; to another country in Europe and to live in a country outside Europe? Not only for logical reasons, but also from a common-sense point of view, it has to be assumed that anybody who intends to migrate into the EU also has a basic intention of regional mobility in the next five years.2 Respondents answering positively to the combined indicator can be regarded as having overcome their natural inertia against migration and have a general intention to migrate into the EU. (2) The firm intention to migrate to the EU provides a second measurement within the present study, which should provide the highest degree of probability to predict actual migration behavior by capturing, at least partly, the intensity of the intention to migrate. It has been measured with the help of four variables two of which have already been used to measure the general intention. In addition, these answers are controlled by a third indicator of target regional mobility into the EU15 and by a fourth indicator, which measures the willingness to live in a country with a foreign language. The question was How willing would you be to live in another European country, where the language is different from your mother tongue? To accept explicitly the challenges that come with migrating to a country with another language provides an indicator of medium level strength of the seriousness to migrate. The response categories vary from very much, to some extent, not much and not at all. The indicator of a firm intention to migrate includes only those respondents who answered very much to this question. Similar to approaches by other scholars, the present study aims to capture the strength of the intention to migrate by using a four-dimensional scale. The last part of the empirical analysis in this section compares the estimates of the potential to migrate based on the Eurobarometer survey from 2002 with the results of an econometric study of the European Commission on The Impact of Eastern Enlargement on Employment and Labour Markets in the EU and Member States, which was conducted at nearly the same time. Comparability is not easy as the studies use different
43 |

methodologies. The present study is based on individual survey data, with all its advantages and disadvantages, to predict actual migration behavior. It predicts the possible increase in migration stock in the old EU member states within the next five years, i.e. by the end of 2006. Its key dependent variables arevarious estimated migration rates in the country of origin as a percentage of the population 15 years and older. The European Commission study uses a macroeconomic approach in order to estimate annual migration flows between 2002 and 2030. Unlike the present study, the Commission only includes eight new member states (NEW8) and two accession countries (AC2), leaving out the three southern Mediterranean countries Malta, Cyprus and Turkey. The coefficients for the estimation of the migration potential are based on time series data of the migration flows to Germany in the period 1967 to 1998. Its key dependent variable is the annual change in the ratio of the stock of migrants to the population in the receiving country. The theoretical assumptions are based on the human capital paradigm of migration. As independent variables the model uses the following sets of indicators: the difference of per capita purchasing power parity, the employment rate in the home and host countries, a lagged ratio of the stock of migrants to the home population and other institutional variables. In addition, the model is estimated with the help of country-specific effects to control for culture, policy, language, distance, etc. For the dynamic analysis two additional basic assumptions are made as far as the baseline projection is concerned: that the GDP gap between old and new member states converges by two percentage points per year; and that the unemployment rates are stable. Based on these assumptions the study estimates an increase of the stock of migrants from 1.16 million in 2002 to 3.9 million in 2030. The annual flow figures decrease from 340,000 in 2002 to below 3,000 in 2030. Due to the different methodologies the two studies can only be compared on the basis of estimated changes in the stock figures in ten countries between 2002 and 2006. For
44 |

this comparison the following calculations have to be made for the Commission study: the stock of migrants is predicted to be 1.16 million in 2002 and 2.25 million in 2006.13 This results in a predicted increase of 1.1 million migrants in the time span 2002 to 2006 for the ten countries. In order to make the present study comparable it has to provide results for the two dependent variables for the ten countries included in the Commissions study. The results are as follows: General inclination NEW8 and AC2: 3.7 percent Firm intention NEW8 and AC2: 1.2 percent In the next step it has to calculate the population in the NEW8/AC2 for the age groups 15 years and older. The total population of the ten countries on January 1, 2001 was 102 million.14 Subtracting the population under 15 years of age of around 19.5 million provides a total number of 82.5 million inhabitants in the ten countries of 15 years of age and older. Multiplying this basic figure with the three coefficients provides the following band of a predicted increase in the migration stock up to the end 2006 in absolute numbers: General inclination: 3.05 million Firm intention: 1 million (precisely 990,000) The result of the comparison is that both methods lead to similar results predicting an increase in the total number of migrants from the ten Eastern European Countries of between 1 and 1.1 million people for the narrow band in the years up to the end of 2006 in the old member states of the EU. Four main basic arguments are usually developed, which may explain the low probability of a significant inflow of migrants from the three country groupings into the EU:

45 |

 Firstly it is argued that a significant proportion of the overall potential of migrants from these countries has already arrived in the existing EU member states in recent years, i.e. before 2002. The available figures show that this had led to only a small increase in the population of the older member states. In 1998, the 15 EU member states hosted less than 900,000 citizens of the Central and Eastern European countries. Secondly, the demographic situation in the 13 countries is similar to the demographic situation in the EU. Fertility in most of these countries is even lower than in the EU (with the exception of Turkey) and mortality has dramatically increased, with the consequence of a decreasing population trend in the next 30 to 40 years. Consequently, everything being equal, the employment chances for younger and better educated people will increase in the NEW10 and AC2. Based on this trend Fassmann and Muenz predict a decrease of the potential for migration. Thirdly, transfer of resources for economic development, increased internationaltrade and massive inward investment will accompany the accession process of the new and the future member states. This will accelerate the economic development process and will give the new member states a positive growth differential in relation to the old member states. In addition, contrary to the predictions of economic theory, European employees have taken only little advantage of the free movement within a common labor market. Straubhaar provides an explanation and notes: To an important degree, trade has replaced the economic demand for migration in the EU. Launched in December 2005, LABREF is an on-line database providing information on enacted policy measures which are intended to have an impact on labour market performance in the EU. The database provides information on the design of reforms, their scope and durability. LABREF is organised around nine policy fields, one of which is immigration policies. Under this heading, the database covers the following types of policy measures:

46 |

 Border controls, encompassing measures related to the entry, stay and access to the labour market; Selective immigration policies, including quota systems aimed at the recruitment of foreign workers, the easing of recruitment policies for highly skilled or for specific occupations as well as bilateral labour agreements on seasonal or temporary workers; Measures to facilitate the labour market integration of immigrants, ranging from ALMPs to the recognition of formal education attainments and the entitlement to benefits/social assistance programmes targeted at immigrant workers The structure of the database enables the user to analyse policy measures by areas of intervention and specific design characteristics. LABREF will be updated annually and there are also plans to backdate the information. So far, the database contains a summary overview of reforms enacted by EU Member States in 2004. The following brief illustrates how LABREF can be used as an instrument for tracking trends in EU Member States' migration policies.

4.3. Migration flows As a response to increasing migration pressure, many EU Member States have set migration control high on their political agenda, both at national and European level. Combating illegal immigration is seen as a priority. Spain, a country currently having one of the highest migration rates in Europe, established an extraordinary process of legalisation in 2005. Registered immigrant workers holding a work contract with a minimum duration of 6 months could obtain residence permits. In Greece, immigrants with an expired temporary permit were allowed to submit their renewal request. In both cases, the objective of the intervention was to combat undeclared work, gain better control over the immigrant population and facilitate their social and economic development.

47 |

The UK opened its labour market from 1 May 2004 and introduced a Worker Registration Scheme (WRS). Under the scheme, citizens from EU-8 who took up work in the UK needed to register with the authorities. The purpose of the scheme was to allow the Government to monitor the participation of workers from EU-8 in the UK labour market. While toughening controls over migration flows, EU Member States also show increasing interest in developing policies to promote selective immigration policies. Several Member States have eased their legislation to facilitate the entry of highly skilled workers. Special programmes, simplified administrative procedures and bilateral agreements are used to further this aim. Facing a shortage of graduates in the fields of physical science, engineering and mathematics, the UK has introduced a Science and Engineering Graduates Scheme (SEGS) which authorises foreign graduates in the relevant disciplines to remain in the country for 12 months to pursue their careers. A similar measure has been enacted in Germany, where students who complete their studies may remain in Germany for one year after graduation to seek employment. Moreover, Germany welcomes selfemployed foreigners provided they are anticipated to have an impact on the economy and employment. The Netherlands also seek to attract skilled workers. According to a new regulation, workers with a labour contract and an annual gross salary of at least 45.000 now only need a residence permit and no longer a separate work permit. In Spain, new measures aim at linking legal immigration flows to the dynamics of the labour market. A new system of entry for immigrants should make more room for individual recruitment of high-skilled workers and for programmed recruitment of 'quota' workers required in specific sectors.

48 |

4.4 Integration of the labour market As regards measures to facilitate the integration of immigrants, reforms were focused on efforts to curb discrimination and promoting integration of immigrants in the labour market. With the aim of promoting equality in the workplace, Ireland introduced new employment rights which should prevent indirect discrimination and broaden the scope for positive action. Similarly, Finland has reinforced legal protection against discrimination based, among others, on ethnic origins. The legislation covers in particular access to social services and requires each authority to draw up a plan to foster ethnic equality. To facilitate the participation of immigrants into the national labour market, some Member States have formulated active labour policies aimed specifically at this group. Denmark introduced special coaching schemes and entrepreneurial centres in neighbourhoods where the majority of the population is of foreign background. In France, the use of 'reception and integration contracts' has been extended to all of the country. The contracts provide newly arrived immigrants with language classes and social assistance in order to assure a successful integration process.

49 |

5. Study Case: Romania ns Migration within the European Union framework

There are different factors and motivations which explain the movement of people from a state to another. The motivation for migration is different in different moments of migration. Many studies about migration and migrants take into account that economic aspects have importance in a sustainable motivation for emigration. First of all the motivation for emigration for Romanian people was to earn money, because in their country the conditions of work were inappropriate, the distribution of plus value between managers and workers was unfair, the corruption and bureaucracy exist at all levels. The low level of living standards determined by the salaries of people is another factor which is important for the migration process. But why did they choose mostly latin countries? Language and culture similarities, rather friendly attitude from Spanish people, networking, job opportunities, etc. are very important for the Romanian people in regards to their decision to emigrate in Spain. The migration movement of the Romanian people developed in 3 main stages: A. Stage 1: between 1990 and 1995: 3 migration rate, with the following profile of the Romanian migrant: young, man, from the urban area, with general education, leaving from Moldavia, Muntenia and Transylvania to work in countries like Israel, Turkey, Italy, Hungary and Germany; B. Stage 2: between 1996 and 2001: 7 migration rate, with the following features of migration: men and women equally represented, urban and rural areas equally represented. The migrants leave mainly from Moldavia to work in countries like: Spain, USA and Canada.

50 |

Between 1990 and 2002, since the Romanian border was closed, the legislation allowed Romanian people to enter the European Union countries only with a visa. The strategies of emigration in this period were: illegal border crossing, buying a Shengen visa from the black market, using friends or kin relations from Germany (especially people from Transylvania), using the right for asylum. Before 2002, only the people with a very good financial condition were engaged in migration abroad. Even if after 2002 Romanian migrants still had to present some guarantees for their trip abroad (booking of accommodation in the destination country, 500 Euros in cash or an invitation to prove inancial support in the country of destination), the migration became more accessible for people. So, we can say that the composition of migration has changed after 2002. C. Stage 3: between 2002 and 2006, when Romanians were allowed free access to the Schengen area, is characterized by a substantial increase of the migration rate up to 28, preserving the migration features of stage 2, except for the changes in terms of host countries: Italy, Spain, Germany, Israel and Hungary. In this period, migration flows were largely directed towards two main destination countries: Italy (50% of Romanian labour migrants) and Spain (24%). Spain has become a preferred destination since 1996, especially for Romanians leaving the rural areas of Romania (Muntenia, Moldavia and Oltenia). In the same year a bilateral agreement between Romania and Spain was signed (29th of April, 1996). In 2007, Romanians who intended to migrate for work abroad were predominantly young, with a good level of education and with relatively high incomes (with an average of 570 Euros per month, i.e. double the net average wage in Romanian economy). The main destinations of migrants were Italy (23%), Spain (20%) and Great Britain (18%). The free movement of persons within the EU did not come along with the right to work in most EU member states and led to a very peculiar configuration of European citizenship without European employment rights. The accession of Romania to the EU
51 |

in 2007 determined an explosion of circular movements. Romanian migrants were able to leave and return to their home country without restrictions. Even after 2007, in many EU countries Romanian migrants have had the right only to free travel (for periods of three months) but not to freely access the national labour market of the destination country. The 2005 Act of Accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the EU allows the EU-25 Member States to temporarily restrict free access of Bulgarian and Romanian workers to their labour markets in countries providing these restrictions in their legislation. Despite restrictions imposed by the transitional arrangements, a Member State must always give priority to Romanian and Bulgarian workers in front of workers from non-EU countries, in the priority of access to employment. No restrictions apply to workers from EU-2 (Romania and Bulgaria) in the Member States of the EU-2. The seven years transitional period is separated into three distinct stages (2+3+2). During each of the three stages different conditions apply, thus: National legislation of other Member States regulated access of workers from Bulgaria and Romania to the labour markets of these countries during the first two years. Member States had the option to extend their national measures for the second stage for another three years, subject to notification to the Commission before the end of the first stage, otherwise applying the EU legislation ensuring the free movement of workers. A Member State maintaining national measures at the end of the second phase had the option, in case of serious disturbances of the labour market or risk of such disturbances and after notification of the Commission, to continue to apply measures until the end of seven years following the date of accession. Also, there is a safeguard clause allowing Member States who stopped using national measures and apply EU law on free movement of workers before the end of the global transition to reintroduce restrictions if there are serious labour market disturbances or the risk of such disturbances.
52 |

The transitional measures will be irrevocably removed December 31, 2013, and apply only to get access to the labour market under EU law on free movement of workers. Since the EU-2 workers are admitted to the labour market of a Member State, they benefit fully from all other rights under EU law on free movement of workers. The transitional measures influence in any way the fundamental right of EU citizens to move and reside freely within the EU under Article 21 from the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU). There are transitional arrangements for implementation of EU legislation on coordination of social security programs. (The Treaty of Functioning of the European Union, 2010) For Romania the possibility of imposing transitional arrangements on free movement of workers was established by the EU accession treaty in April 2005. Transitional measures govern the right of each Member State to determine the policy of access to employment for workers of the Member States of the European Union according to local labour market situation so as not to prejudice the economic and social security system. In the case of EU states who do not apply to Romania the free movement transitional measures for workers, Community legislation (Regulation 492/2011 on free movement of workers within the Union) is applied, so that Romanian citizens become employed in the same terms as citizens of the State. The European Commission announced that starting January 1st, 2012, nine states had decided to maintain restrictions for the next two years for workers from Romania and Bulgaria. The only country that has lifted the restrictions imposed on Romanian workers in the labour market from January 1st, 2012, was Italy. Out of these, the first to have notified the Commission of their decision to maintain labour market restrictions were Britain, Germany and Ireland. Romanian and Bulgarian nationals intending to work in the UK will have to obtain a work permit in advance from the United Kingdom Border Agency. This decision is part of the British governments strategy to reduce dependence on foreign workers to employers, especially in sectors where unskilled labour is required, the main aim being
53 |

to help the unemployed to find a job. Germany has not fully opened its labour market to Romanian and Bulgarian workers. In December 2011, the government in Berlin decided that the disciples, seasonal workersand persons with qualified advocates in Romania and Bulgaria have no need of work permits to be employed in Germany. Decision came into force on January 1st, 2012. Spain invoked the safeguard clause and the Commission accepted, on August 11th 2011, the request of that country to reintroduce restrictions to Romanian workers until December 31st, 2012. The reason was that unemployment in Spain has increased dramatically. Belgium refused to open its labour market to Romanians and Bulgarians, extending restrictions up to the end of 2013. The reason is that citizens of the two Eastern European countries who are already working in this country refuse to pay social contributions, thus deceiving the state. The Netherlands has also decided to extend the restrictions for Bulgarian and Romanian citizens by 2013. Luxembourg, France and Austria announced the European Commission in December 2011 that they will keep restrictions for of the EU-2 workers by 2013. The cause is the growth of unemployment in these countries and the negative effects of the global crisis. Thus, Romanian workers now have free access to the labour market in 16 of the 25 EU Member States, 9 maintaining restrictions until 2013 (UK, Germany, Ireland, Spain, Luxembourg, Belgium, Netherlands, France and Austria). Each year, Member States that have not opened their labour market for Romanian citizens publish a list of occupations and sectors/industries open to citizens of the new EU member states and those for which the release of a work permit is not subject to the national labour market situation. Romania did not impose transitional measures for Member States concerning free movement of workers.
54 |

Romanias integration in the EU in 2007 was the major step taken by our country for its both economic and social development. Starting 2007 Romanian citizens can freely circulate within the Union or they can change their permanent domicile, becoming permanent citizens of another member country. On our countrys level we can see, especially in the last ten years, a permanent or temporary movement of the citizens towards more developed countries of the Union, the choice of the destination being made depending on the salary level obtained for a potential job in the host country. If until 2001 the migrants were mostly men, from 2002 to 2006 the number of migrant women increased a lot, the gap between genders decreasing from 76% to 12% (Table 1).

Table 1. The evolution of persons who left to work abroad from 1990 to 2009 Stages 1996-2001 2002-2006 15 44 85 56 48 49 52 51 89 94 10 4 1 2 76 60 19 31 6 10 Total 2007-2009 40 73 47 58 99 11 2 82 35 9 111 302 185 220 374 33 5 306 92 30

Female Male Location Rural Urban Romanians Nationality Hungarians Others Married Marital Single status Others (widowers, divorced) Primary Education Gymnsium Vocational and high school University

Gender

1990-1995 12 88 41 59 92 8 88 7 5

3 2 78

3 8 79

1 16 77

3 12 82

10 38 316

17

32

65

Source: OECD Economic Surveys, 2009

55 |

If we take into account the other variables too, we may say that in the first stages left to work married men, from urban areas, with high school or vocational school studies. In time, the number of persons from rural areas, unmarried and with a lower education level has increased, so there was a diversification of the temporary emigration abroad. The migration of Romanian workers abroad, confirming a imension of the neo-classic economic theory, was firstly towards countries more economically developed where there was a possibility to obtain higher wages compared to the one obtainable in Romania. However, the economic dimension must be associated with the political one. The limited legal possibilities for Romanians to go to work in the West have caused the destinations for the temporary economic migration in the first 10 years after the 1989 events to be very scattered, the main targets being Israel and Italy with 17% followed by Hungary, Turkey and Spain with lower percentages. After 2001 the situation changed dramatically, Italy and Spain being by far the most wanted destinations for Romanian workers. The possible explanations for the fact that almost three quarters of the Romanian migrants go to these countries are the cultural resemblances (including the ease to learn the two Latin languages), the local authorities flexibility in accepting foreign immigrants and the existence, at least in Italy, of Romanians who have facilitated the migration of other Romanians through the migrant networks. Linguistic and geographical distances, migrant networks, as well as scale seem to have played an important role in the allocation of migrants across destination countries. The high number of migrants to Italy in the studied interval can also be explained by the fact that the economy in this country is more developed and offers higher wages than in Spain. If we consider the historical regions too, we can emphasize the role of the networks and of certain migration traditions in the increase of the migration flow. Workers from Moldavia prefer Italy, those from Muntenia prefer Spain. Many inhabitants of Banat go to Germany and those from Ardeal to Hungary. The importance of the migrant networks results clearly from the next table, where we can see an increase in the number of those who were offered support when leaving the
56 |

country in finding a house and a job abroad. In the last stage compared to the first one, the number of those who were helped when leaving has tripled and the number of those supported to find a job and a house has doubled, help being offered primarily by relatives and friends. The fact that fewer and fewer left with contracts intermediated by the Employment Agency or through specialized companies from Romania is positively correlated with the decrease of those who said they worked legally abroad. One can also notice that the number of persons who worked in house-work and agriculture has increased, decreasing the number of those who worked in constructions, which is explicable by the increase of the number of women migrants.

Table 2. Main destinations of temporary emigration by historical regions, 2001 2009 Moldova 76 14 1 3 1 6 2 100 Muntenia 21 54 8 1 1 14 3 100 Oltenia 62 21 3 6 6 100 Dobrogea 75 13 13 100 Transilvania 42 17 3 17 3 13 4 100 Crisana 41 29 3 6 3 12 6 100 Banat 43 4 29 13 7 100 Bucharest 75 18 13 100

Italy Spain Germany Hungary Greece France Others No response Total

Source: OECD Economic Surveys, 2009

The high number of Romanians who left to work abroad could not remain without effects on the Romanian labour market. From October 20th to October 30th 2007, a national representative study was conducted at the request of the Soros Foundation which targeted the identification of the issues that three economic areas were confronted with (textile, constructions, hotels and restoration industries) due to the lack of workforce.

57 |

Table 3. Migrants that go abroad

1990 - 1995 Helped by anyone on departure Yes No No answer Native relative Native friend Native acquaintance Others Not the case No answer Contacts intermediated by the Employment Agency Through intermediation companies in Romania Through relatives from abroad Through friends from abroad Left directly to the employer Others No answer 22 69 8 8 5 7 3 15 69 0

Who helped them leave

Stages 1996 2002 - 2006 2001 40 60 56 38 4 2 4 2 16 23 6 16 3 5 20 18 56 38 0 1

2007 - 2009 50 15 3 3 19 12 4 12 0

How were they able to find a job abroad

22

21

11

25

7 25 17 12 7

13 24 13 10 10

27 27 15 12 7

22 26 15 12 7

Source: OECD Economic Surveys, 2009

The result was that in the textile industry 30% of the companies had available unoccupied jobs for more than two months. The two other economic areas faced the same issue although at a lower level. The positive side of the matter is that these companies, in order to face the penury of workforce, have invested in most of the cases in refurbishment (76%) and in work productivity increase. Bringing workforce from abroad, which is a possible future solution, was done by only 3% of the companies. This means that, at least for the time being, the compensation of the lost workforce due to the Romanians emigration by bringing foreign workers is not a solution.
58 |

Table 4. Situation of the way the migrant work abroad Stage

Agriculture Constructions House-work Others No answer Legal Clandestine Legal and clandestine No answer No, they havent even tried No, although they tried Yes No answer 1990 - 1995 14 41 0 44 2 53 34 8 5 68 1996 - 2001 16 41 7 32 5 57 31 7 6 58 2002 - 2006 16 28 28 26 3 31 53 9 7 53 2007 - 2009 20 31 32 29 3 39 46 8 6 55

Areas of activity

Legal worker/ Clandestine worker Migrations who have legalized their situation

0 12 20

10 28 5

28 13 6

23 15 7

Source: OECD Economic Surveys, 2009

The workforce market is in crisis, the number of persons with a new job is decreasing, the workforce market crisis affects men more than women, but the womens salaries are still lower than those of mens at the same level of work. A significant percentage of the full-time employees have had a salary decrease in the last year and those who have earned more money during the last year have been judges, high public officials and managers.

59 |

Conclusions
European Union needs to make full use of its labour potential to face the challenges of an ageing population and rising global competition. Policies to promote gender equality will be needed to increase labour force participation thus adding to growth and social cohesion. "An agenda for new skills and jobs" has like goal the modernization of labour markets and to empower people by developing their skills throughout the lifecycle with a view to increase labour participation and better match labour - supply and demand, including through labour mobility. The European Commission have to facilitate and promote intra-EU labour mobility and better match labour supply with demand with appropriate financial support from the structural funds, notably the European Social Fund (ESF), and to promote a forwardlooking and comprehensive labour migration policy which would respond in a flexible way to the priorities and needs of the labour markets. The free movement of workers is not only a fundamental principle of the European Union, but also a key precondition to reap the benefits from the opportunities offered in the labour market, to ensure sustainability of member states welfare systems and to strengthen the EUs global competitiveness.

60 |

References
[1]

WCSDG (2004), A fair globalization: Creating opportunities for all. World Commission on

the Social Dimension of Globalization and International Labour Office, Geneva, February 2004. http://www.ilo.org/public/english/wcsdg/docs/report.pdf
[2]

Ibid; ILO 2004. Report VI Towards a fair deal for migrant workers in the global economy

International Labour Conference, 92nd Session 2004, ILO Geneva. http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc92/pdf/rep-vi.pdf

[3]

"Dealing with the Global Jobs Crisis", Opinion piece by Juan Somavia (Director-General

of the International Labour Office) at the World Economic Forum, Davos (25 January 2006) http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/dgo/speeches/somavia/2006/davos.pdf
[4]

United Nations (2006). International migration and development: Report of the Secretary-

General. New York, A/60/871, United Nations, June 2006. http://www.un.org/esa/population/migration/hld/Text/Report%20of%20the%20SG%28J une%2006%29_English.pdf
[5]

Towards a fair deal for migrant workers in the global economy, op. cit.

[6]

Piayasiri Wickramasekara, Theme paper on Globalization, International labour Migration

and Protection of Migrant Workers, ILO, Geneva. http://www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/migrant/download/pws_new_paper.pdf

[7]

United Nations Population Division (2006), Trends in Total Migrant Stock: The 2005

Revision, New York, 2006

[8]

Koser, K. and J. Salt (1997) The geography of highly skilled international

migration,International Journal of Population Geography 3: 285-303

[9]

Kofman, E. (2000) The invisibility of skilled female migrants and gender relations in studies

of skilled migration in Europe, International Journal of Population Geography 6: 45-59

[10]

Findlay, A.M. (1990) A migration channels approach to the study of high level manpower

movements: A theoretical perspective International Migration 28: 15-23

[11]

Iredale, R. (2001) The migration of professionals: Theories and typologies, International

Migration 39: 7-24

61 |

[12]

Meyer, J-B. (2001) Network approach versus brain drain: Lessons from the diaspora,

International Migration 39: 91-108

[13]

Aneesh, A. (2001) Rethinking migration: On-line labour flows from India to the United

States, in the International Migration of the Highly Skilled, W.A. Cornelius, T.J. Espenshade and I. Salehyan, La Jolla: Centre for Comparative Immigration Studies, University of California, San Diego, pp. 351-70
[14]

Xiang Biao (2001) Structuration of Indian information technology professionals migration

toAustralia: An ethnographic study, International Migration 39: 73-88

[15]

R. Atkins and C. Giles (5 May 2009) Brussels sees end to European recession,

Financial Times, Economic Recovery, p 7, Inventories p 13.

[16]

J. Souter (2011) A Culture of Disbelief or Denial? Critiquing Refugee Status Determination

in the United Kingdom, Oxford Monitor of Forced Migration.vol-1-no-1.pdf; and J. Brachet (2011) The Blind Spot of Repression:Migration Policies and Human Survival in the Central Sahara, in T.-D. Truong and D. Gasper, Transnational Migration and Human Security: The Migration-Development-Security Nexus, Berlin-New York: Springer, pp. 5766.
[17]

S. Saggar (2003) Immigration and the Politics of Public Opinion, in S. Spencer (ed), The

Politics of Migration: Managing Opportunity, Conflict and Change, London: Blackwell Publishing; and Ellerman (2006) Street-level democracy: How immigration bureaucrats manage public opposition, West European Politics 29(2):293.
[18]

http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/publications/htmlfiles/ef0659.htm http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/publications/htmlfiles/ef0712.htm Migration Trends in an Enlarging European Union, Hubert Krieger and Bertrand

[19]

[20]

Maitre, European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin, Ireland
[21]

http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/indicators/labref_en.htm Brsan, M., Cucuruzan, R.: The Eastern migration and the labour markets in EU. The case

[22]

of Romanian workers in Spain on Journal of Identity and Migration Studies (JIMS)-Volume 1, no.1, 2007 http://www.emigration.ro/jims/Vol1_no1/Birsan_Cucuruzan.pdf
[23]

Ciobanu, O., Elrick T.: Politici de migratie si strategii ale migrantilor transnationali intre

Romania si Spania, in R. Anghel and I. Horvath (eds.) Sociologia Migratiei. Teorii si Studii de Caz Romanesti, Bucharest, Polirom, 2009, pp. 195-214
62 |

[24]

Cucuruzan, R.E.: Migraia i mobilitatea forei de munc din Romnia n contextul

integrrii europene, Editura Fundaiei pentru Studii Europene, Cluj-Napoca, 2009

[25]

Garson, J.P., Loizillon, A., OECD: Changes and Challenges: Europe andMigration

from 1950 to the Present, Conference on The Economic and Social Aspects of Migration jointly organised by the European Commission and the OECD, Brussels, 2003
[26]

Hartman, Tod: Moral Vectors, Transitional Time and A Utopian Object of Impossible

Fullness, Social Anthropology, 15, 2, 2007, pp.187-203

[27]

Hille, H. and Straubhaar, T.,: The impact of EU enlargement on migration movements and

economic integration: results of recent studies, in OECD Migration policies and EU enlargement. The case of central and eastern Europe, Paris, OECD, 2001
[28]

Kahanec M., Zimmermann, K.F., Migration in an enlarged EU: A challenging olution?,

in European Commission, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs Publications, Belgium, 2009
[29]

Massey, D.S., Arango, J., Hugo, G., Kouaouci, A., Pellegrino, A., Taylor, J.E.: Theories

of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal, presentation of IUSSP Committee on South-North Migration
[30]

Morakvasic, M.,: Post communist migration in Europe and gender, in Journal of Gender

Studies 5, 2002
[31]

Nicolae Mariana, Radu Brndua Mihaela: Socio-Economic Effects Of The Labour Force

Migration in an Enlarged Europe, Romanian Journal of Economic Forecasting, Isuue 2/2007, pp. 44-56
[32]

Nitulescu Dana, Oancea Alina, and Tanase Ioan: Cu bine, din Europa! Studiu despre

migratia fortei de munca romanesti in Uniunea Europeana. Bucharest: Asociatia Nationala a Birourilor de Consiliere pentru Cetateni, 2007
[33]

Sandu D. (coordinator): Comuniti romneti n Spania, Soros Foundation,

www.osf.ro\
[34]

Stan Sabina: Romanian Migration to Spain and Its Impact on the Romanian Labour Market,

Working Paper N 14, 2009

[35]

Zaiceva, A. and K. F. Zimmermann: Scale, Diversity, and Determinants of Labour

Migration in Europe, IZA Discussion Paper No. 3595, 2008

[36]

OECD Economic Surveys, 2009

63 |

[37]

www.europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/fundamri/movement/studies:

Migration in Europe: Lessons from the Past, 2002

[38]

http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/pubdocs/2003/109/en/1/ef03109en.pdf, The way

forward Migration trends in an enlarged Europe

[39]

http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/pubdocs/2007/03/en/1/ef0703en.pdf, Mobility in

Europe

64 |