CHAPTER 5

CHANGE ON THE BATTLEFIELD

When w a r had EgYP t

began a g a i n

i n Europe, the to

t h e B r i t i s h Army stationed provided this unit in the in

second The

armored

division, threat

7th, gyp t

I t a l i an

motivation f o r the l a t e

t h e B r i t i s h Army

to establish

1930s.

The s l o w p r o c e s s t o e q u i p

this divisiun

i l l u s t r a t e s the d i f f i c u l t i e s which c o n f r n n t e d the otticers who t r i e d t o organize and prepare the .armored f o r c e s
for

war.
The made their un i t s

or i g i n s w e r e
in Egypt

t h e mobi 1 e during tours the

of

f o r c e s iwh i N c h earls

appearance tank

133Us.
Egypt

Many e a r l s and

pioneers served to the as

duty

in

contributed

divisions primary

eventual staff

form.3tion. on the

Brigadier General initial

Lindsay,

the

officer

Staff

i n Egypt

f r o m 1929 t o

1932, i n t r o d u c e d t h e
training car

experiments w i t h The and force

armored v e h i c l e s d u r i n g started tanks. with

e x e r c i ses. companies became t h e

two

armored

16 medium

General

Burne t t - S t u a r t

commander

ot: t r o o p s i n E g y p t d u r i n g
P i l e t o o k command o f same member

1931, a n d
the m o b i l e
RTC
who

i n 1032 t h e t u t u r e forces

General the

He

was

ot

the

108

d e m o n s t r a t e d h i s b r i I 1 i a n c e a s an a r m o r e d commander i n t h e

1727-25
demanding which

exercises.

General

Burnett-Stuart and emphasized the

designed

t r a i n i n g exercises, and expanded

experiments of the

tested

capabilities

commander a s w e l l Prior Burnett-Stuart

as the armored f o r c e s . to his departure the War East from Egypt to in

1934,
a

convinced in the

O+f ice

establish

mobi e

force

Middle

permanently.

Increased

t e n s o n s w i t h t h e I t a l i a n s i n t h e r e g i o n made t h e n e e d + o r such a f o r c e a p p a r e n t . The m e c h a n i z e d u n i t % i n t h i s + o r c e

Were t h e 1 1 t h H u s s a r s ( A r m o r e d Cars) a n d t h e 6 t h 6 a t t . j r l i o n Royal Tank C o r p s . with Ethiopia, a In

1935 when
tank

the

I t a l i a n s w e r e a t war and
1 ight

medium

company

tank

b a t t a l i o n a r r i v e d f r o m t h e tank b r i g a d e i n England.L'l3 From t h i s n u c l e u s , a m o b i l e d i v i s i o n was f o r m e d i n t h e one f o r m e d i n G r e a t B r i t a i n

1938 a f t e r
the

the p a t t e r n o f

p r e v i o u s Year.

The M u n i c h c r i s i s p r e c i p i t a t e d t h i s H o b a r t became t h e commander a t Secretary an

of

a c t i on.

Major-General
of

the

insistence Hore-Be1 i s h a ,

the

State

for

War, armored

who

wanted

individual

with

e x p e r i e n c e t o command t h i s d i u i s i o n . C 2 3

Hobar

arrived in tank
of

S e p t e m b e r 1 9 3 9 , a n d t h e + o r c e h a d o n l y one a n d a h a l f battalions and a light armored brigade cons s t i n g

l i g h t tank b a t t a l i o n and t h e 1 1 t h Hussars.

Since p r i o r i t y

10"

for did

the n e x t year went not

i 5 i on

t o e q u i p p i n g t h e BEF, Problems
equ
I

the s i t u a t i o n for the new

improve

significantly. ou t da t ed for tank

di

'2

i nc 1 uded ; no

pme n t tanks,

p4rsonne 1 as well as

shortages, equipment

ammunition The

1 ight

shortages.

t r a c k s needed r e p l a c e m e n t , The d i u i s i o n s u p p o r t battalion, and Hobart

b u t few spare t r a c k s were a v a i l a b l e . group

did

not

have

its

infantry

formed h i s d i u i s i o n h e a d q u a r t e r s f r o m g a r r i s o n t r o o p s . [ 3 1 W h i 1e energetic man, t h e s e p r o b l e m s . may h a u e d i s c o u r a g e d a there is every indication that less

Hobart enarg.~ and in

applied himselS and z e a l . t h i s case that !war

t o h i s new command w i t h

hi's usual

H o b a r t was he

a l w a y s a demanding t r a i n e r , d u t i e s b ~ i t h the concentrated and

t a c k l e d h i s new imminent. He

assumptian training

was
on

his

eSforts

dispersion, these

flexibility he

mobility. units

To

accomplish

objectives,

taught

his

hot,<, t a

n a v i g a t e i n the d e s e r t and s t r e s s e d the maintenance.

was

importance o f crew
i t

He h a d p r o b l e m s w i t h m a i n t e n a n c e b e c a u s e s e c o n d n a t u r e for This t h e men t o c h e c k true the the

not

yet

tanks newly

at

every

halt.

was

especially

of

m e c h a n i z e d c a v a l r y un ts.C43 Apparent accustomed to a more

Y

his

officers pace,

and

men,

who

were

leisurely

ini tially

resizted

h i s t r a i n i n g program.

I n a l e t t e r t o h i s w i f e he w r o t e ;

I h a d t h e C a v a l r y C O s i n a n d l a i d m y c a r d s on t h e Thats table. They a r e such n i c e chaps, s o c i . a l l v . B u t t h e y r e so conserwaw h a t m a k e s i t so d i f f i c u l t . t i v e o f t h e i r s p J r s a n d swords a n d r e g i m e n t a l t r a d i t i o n e t c . , a n d s3 c e r t a i n t h a t t h e good o l d U m p t e e n t h w i l l b e a l l r i g h t o n t h e n i g h t , so e a s i l y s a t i s f i e d w i t h an excuE.e i f t h i n g s a r e n t r i g h t , so p r o n e t o blame the m a c h i n ? or m a c h i n e r y . And u n l e s s o l e u p s e t s a l l t h e i r p o l o e t c . - f o r w h i c h t h e y h a v e ! > a i d h e a v i l y - i t s so h a r d t o g e t a n y t h i n g m o r e i n t o them o r any m o r e w o r k o u t o f them. 3 d a y s a week t h . ? y come i n 6 m i l e s t o G e z i r a h C l u b f o r polo. A t 9 pm i t s g e t t i n g d a r k : t h e y a r e s w e a t y a n d tired. blot f i t f o r much a n d most o f them f u l l u p o f socials i n Cairo. Take t h e i r c l o t h e s a n d c h a n g e a t Club. D o n t r e t l J r n t o A b b a s s i a t i l l 2 am o r 3 am. N o n - p o l o days i t s t e n n i s o r s o m e t h i n g . Well, w e l l . B u t I am t r y i n g n o t t o be i m p a t i e n t and t o l e a d g r a d J a l l y , n o t d r i u e . The r e w l t i s I g e t d e p r e s s e d by how l i t t l e i z h a p p e n i n g : a n d i m p . a t i e n t wi t h m y s e l f .C51

...

Hobart took h i s p r o f e s s i o n s e r i o u s l y .

His e n e r g y

w a s t i r e l e s s a n d he

i n s p i r e d h i s men w i t h h i s e n t h u s i a s m . o + f i c e r s meet h i s standards and in

He demanded t h a t

hiz

t h e e n d h i s w i l l was s t r o n g e r h i s men h a d g r e a t r e s p e c t f o r him a warm

send o f f

than t h e i r s .

One y e a r l a t a r

h i m a s a commander a n d g a v e
l e f t

when

he

Egypt.

Major-General
i n Egypt

R i c h a r d OConnor,
at

who commanded t h e 8 t h D i v i s i o n that h i s d i v i s i o n was

the

time,

t o l d HDbart

the

best

t r a i n e d d i v i s i o n t h a t h e e v e r saw.C61 Hobart d e p a r t e d Egypt General i n November commander

1939 b e c a u s e

Elai t 1 and-Wi 1 s o n ,

the

new

of

troops

in

Egypt, w i t h the apparent approval of h i s s u p e r i o r ,

General

11!

Archibald

Wauell

General

Officer

Commanding-in-Chief, r e 1 ieved given

by

M i d d l e East, him i s

r e 1 ieiJed h i m .
The

lWhy Plai t l a n d - W i l s o n immediate reason

unclear.

M a i t l a n d - W i l s o n w a s a loss o f c o n f i d e n c e command, O'Connor's but the respect

of

in his ability to and General

his

soldiers

comment h a r d l y c o n f i r m t h i s . C 7 1 This narrative

of

the

7 t h Armoured but it

Diuision's prouides an

formation example o f expansion the slow

o m i t s many o f

the

details,

t h e many p r o b l e m s w h i c h during the interwar of

l i m i t e d armored force First, there because

w.as of

period.

and a u s t e r e mature

i t s formation

t h e economic Lack o f f u n d s

c o n s t r a i n t s d e s c r i b e d i n an e a r l i e r i m p o s e d s e v e r e 1 i m i t a t i o n s on number and type of tanks,

chapter.

t h e niumber o f the amount

oS

new u n i t s ,

the

t r a i n i n g ammunition, b u i l d or became tanks buy.

As

a n d r e p a i r p a r t s w h i c h t h e Army c o u l d noted i n an tank earlier chapter, did as funds prov i e

auai 1 able in the

Br i t i s h

industry
or

not

necessary q u a n t i t y

quality.

Regimental Hobart caual r y

p a r o c h i al i sm because regiments of

was
the

another recent 1y

p r o b l em

wh ich

besst

conuer t e d While

armored

in h i s diuision.

apparently

successful,

h e o n l y commanded f o r

a y e a r a n d how much he a c c o m p l i s h e d Hobart"s uncompromising

and

is

open

to

question.

strong-willed

personality helped him t r a i n

t h i s new u n i t ,

112

but

these

same

qua1 i t i e s

c o n tr i b u t e d

to

his

re1 ie f .

H o b a r t )was a z e a l o u s r e f o r m e r ,

and t h i s d i d n o t endear h i m This last pitfall

t o h i s superiors. or

their

staffs.

is

e n d e m i c t o a1 1 t r u e r e f o r m e r s .

Hobarts

i n f l u e n c e on he s e t

the the

7 t h Armoured D i v i s i o n tactical c o n c e p t s and

was s i g n i f i c a n t b e c a u s e d o c t r i n e of

armored w a r f a r e w i t h which

the d i v i s i o n f i r s t and mobi 1 i t y were the

entered b a t t l e . were

H i s c o n c e p t s on d i s p e r s i o n
important officers because

particularly the

these

c o n c e p t s Iwhich
sarlr

i n the

division that

tried

t o use units

i n the war.

D i s p e r s i o n meant

individual

traveled the

i n s e p a r a t e columns and remained d i s p e r s e d iunti 1 Dispersion air attack, was an important means no of

attack. from in

protection avai lable rapidity

particularly with idea o f

cover

the

desert.

His

mobi 1 i t y

stressed
speed.

o f commanders t o a c t , as w e l l

as physical doctrine.CS3 ual i d

S p e e d was an i m p o r t a n t p a r t o f H o b a r t s Although doctrine

if

Hobarts

concepts a r e the

tac for

ical
most

properly

executed,

problem

B r i t i s h armored u n i t s was t h a t Over r e 1 i a n c e on s p e e d f o r future battles and caused Thev

t h e y were n o t w e l l

t r a ned.

protection proved ioolhardy i n many units charged to outpace the into

support i ng anti-tank

arms.

often

directly

guns w i t h o u t s u p p o r t .

D i s p e r s i o n c . a u s e d command

I13

and

control

problems,

and

they

could

not

achieve

the

n e c e s s a r y mass a t t h e p o i n t o f a t t a c K . After Major-General officer became The became Michael the Hobart's
O'Moore

departure a

from

Egypt, cavalry division

Creagh,

former the

division

commander,

and

t h e 7 t h A r m o r e d D i v i s i o n o n F e b r u a r y 16, chart
for

1940.tYl
found in in

organization
1.

the
was

division not at full

is

Appendix

This division

strength

e i t h e r u n i t s o r e q u i p m e n t u n t i l some t i m e Thanks t o Hobart's units into the division, armored the

i n October.Cl01 i n s l u x o f new battle future

SIJCCBSS

t r a i n i n g and the i t went into in

better battles. in
the

prepared This

t h a n most to

divisions

contributed

initial

British

Western D e s e r t a g a i n s t t h e I t 3 1 i a n Army.Cl11 the Italian Tenth Army,

and

I t ,destroyed

if

British

forces war

had in

continued t h e i r

offensive,

i t may h a v e

ended t h e

t h i s t h e a t e r a n d c a u s e d an e a r l y c a p i t u l a t i o n o f the war, T h i s was r e m a r k a b l e b e c a u s e outnumbered the British the the

Italy in

I tal ian forces

start

grossly

at

of

the

campa i gn C 121 L i eutenant-General R i c h a r d O'Connor commanded t h e

W e s t e r n D e s e r t F o r c e w h i c h became t h e X I 1 1 C o r p s a f t e r t h e campaign began. C 131 General O.'Connor took command d u r i n g Henry

J u n e 1940 a n d w a s s u b o r d i n a t e t o L i e u t e n a n t - G e n e r a l

114

M a i t l and-Wi 1 s o n , The theater

Headquarters was

E r i t i sh
Sir

Troops

in

Egyp t .

commander

Gener.31

A r c h i b a l d Wave1 1 ,

Under G e n e r a l OConnors

d i r e c t command w e r e a p p r o x i m a t e l y

36,000 t r o o p s . C 141
O p p o s i n g G e n e r a l OConnors Tenth Army which consisted 150,000. in western
of
An

f o r c e cuds t h e to

I t a l i.an and
were for

10

13

divisions

numbered probably

around located

additional

90,000

Libya.ClS1

Fortunately

the B r i t i s h ,

the I t a l i a n s never concentrated t h i s f o r c e . Italians began

.a

The

l i m i t e d o4lensive

on

13

S e p t e m b e r a n d t h e y a d v a n c e d a t o t a l o i 60 m i l e s i n t o E g y p t
by

the end o f

t h e month.

At

this point

they 4topped and plans

gave t h e B r i t i s h t i m e

t o b u i l d up a n d p r e p . a r e t h e i r

f o r .a c o u n t e r a t t a c k , C 1 6 1 T h e B r i t i s h b e g a n O p e r a t i o n Compass on December 9 ,
1940 a n d p l a n n e d i t

o n l y as a the

limited attack

against

the the

l e a d i n g elements o f

I t a l i a n Army.

The s u c c e s s o f

o p e r a t i o n exceeded t h e i r tooK aduantage

greatest expectations. opportunity which the

OConnor I t a l ians

of

the

p r e s e n t e d t o him. of t e n weeks,

He c o n t i n u e d t h e a t t a c k ,

and a t t h e end

General fought

OConnor.~ f o r c e s h a d advanced f i v e f u u r m a j o r engagements and s a p t u r e d approximately

400

hundred m i l e s ,
130,1100

p r i soners, pieces.

tank and

and

YJO

arti 1lery

The

cost

to

Eri tish

Commonwealth

115

f o r c e s was a p p r o x i m a t e l y 900 k i l l e d ,
m i ss i n g . t 171

1350

wounded and 5 0

This

o p e r a t i u n was

the

first

oppurtuni t y

for

B r i t i s h armored d i v i s i o n t o f i g h t

as a u n i t ,

and t h e

7th The

A r m o u r e d D i u i s i o n p l a y e d a ma.jor p a r t divisions doctrinal success change. gave nu

i n each b a t t l e .

indication

of

need

for

B r i t i s h a r m o r e d f o r c e s a p p e a r e d c.apabl e

of c o n d u c t i n g m o b i l e w a r + a r e when p r o p e r l y t r a i n e d .
A closer

looK a t

t h e campaign f i n d s

that

t h e X I 1 1 Corps and s p e c i f i c a l l y t h e 7 t h Armoured G i u i s i o n did nut fight of a highly mobile

battle.

They in

fought which

series

limited

tactical

engagements

the

I t a l i a n s were

i n defensi ve

p o s i t i ons and s u r r e n d e r e d

the

i n i t i a t i v e t o the B r i t i s h .
I t , a I i a n s were

In the f i r s t three b a t t l e s the

Sr i t i s h

i n s t a t i c d e + e n s e s a n d a1 l o w e d t h e reconnaissance

to

make

extensive

of

these

positions. i n d i n one time to

T h e r e was a t instance

l e a s t a weeK b e t w e e n e a c h b a t t l e , a month. The British used

almost

this

d e l i b e r a t e l y p l a n t h e i r n e x t move, a n d f o r m e d s u p p l y dumps i n front each

of

the

a t t a c k i n g columns s e v e r a l The first than three from attacks

days p r i o r
made

to

attacK.

were

from
to

assembly a r e a s r a t h e r the f i r s t a battle,

the march,

and p r i o r

t h e r e was
of

a complete rehearsal
Italian position.

against last

full-scale

mocltup

the

The

engagement was a m o b i l e one,

but only a +orce of was of the remainder

several of 7th

understrength b a t t a l ions which Armoured D i v i s i o n a f t e r i n the operation.ClS1

weeks

fighting

participated

The 7 t h Armoured D i v i s i o n g e n e r a l l y a t t a c k e d a s b r gades w i t h l i t t l e or n o c o o p e r a t i o n between t h e armored

b r gades and t h e s u p p o r t g r o u p .

As

i n France,

the armored

b r i g a d e s o f t e n l a c k e d a r t i l l e r y s u p p o r t and t h e employment of a i r f o r c e s was n o t i n .a c l o s e a i r s u p p o r t r o l e . t l 7 1 description individual

From
conc 1 u s on is that

this the

o+ t h e

campaign,

the

att.3cks resembled W 1 J

b a t t 1 e s i n t h e i r p l a n n i n g and c o n d u c t .

T h i s campaign gave capabi 1 i t i e s doctrine

is
were

no

ind cation a more The

of

!what

the

B r i t i sh

against warfare.

active

enemy # w i t h a ones

for

mob l e an
he

capability of in the

enemy any

of

course

important condition success.

in

factor of the

a n a l y s i s of
Army

campaign.

Italian

was

key

to

B r i t sh

The I t a l i a n A r m y was u n p r e p a r e d f o r W o r l d War I 1 ways. and were Most units

were

many

poorly officers

equipped who The did morale

and not of

trained,

poorly

led

by

understand the most u n i t s was

nature low,

o f modern w a r f a r e .

and t h e r e w e r e

indications to fight

that many against

mass

s o l d i e r s and o f + i c e r s d i d n o t want the British. This partially

a war

accounted

for

the

117

surrender tactical

of

many

uni ts

and

there wi 1 1 ingness

to

offer

i n t e l l i g e n c e t o t h e i r captors.C201
S t i l l

the

B r i t i s h deserve c r e d i t f o r making t h e prepared to f i g h t their

was

right

decisions, and

being thoroughly executing leadership

each

battle,

capably O'Connor's

battle

plans. in

Lt.-General victory.

key

factor

He was f l e x i b l e the initiatiue to

i n h i s employment o f f o r c e s and throughout in the the campaign. battle

maintained drove his

He
when the

soldiers was

victory down,

last

equipment

breaking

suppl i e s

1 imi t e d

and

sol d i e r s n e a r i n g e x h a u s t i o n ,
The combat capabi I i t i e s of the 7th Armored

D i v i s i u n was a l s o a f a c t o r . trained together for several

The n u c l e u s o f years

this division the war and

prior

to

t h i s w a s an adUantagQ o v e r

the armored d i u i s i o n t h a t w e n t was in the division's

to

France.

second

advantage

leadership.

Many o f t h e l e a d e r s h a d t r a i n e d w i t h t h e u n i t a n d t h e y knew t h e i r s o l d i e r s a n d h a d conditions of the desert. There

f o r more t h a n a y e a r ,
a familiarity with

the

was c o h e s i o n
fighting. the

i n the the

d i v i s i o n and i t h a d s k i l l s two new tank regiments

i n desert to join

Even in

sent
of

divisiun in

August desert

1940

had

couple

months battle.

training

the

before

going

into

Subsequent armored d i v i s i u n s deplOYQd i n t o t h e t h e a t e r d i d

113

n o t have

this.

final

factor

which

added

to

the

combat morale Th e

c a p a b i l i t y of was high,

t h e u n i t was m o r a l e .
they
were

The d i v i s i o n ' s
of

and

confident

victory.

d i u i s i o n ' . s a b i l i t y t o keep f i g h t i n g o v e r a t e n week p e r i o d o f t i m e a t t e s t s t o t h e i r h i g h morale.t213 A l t h o u g h t h e armored d i v i s i o n was s u c c e s s f u l , campaign was n o t a c o m p l e t e t e s t o f doctrine and organization. d i v i s i on the Part was to this

the armored d i u i s i o n ' s of the doctrine enemy not Sor a

Br I t i sh

armored

destroy
Army

armored have
any

f u r mat i ons

Since

Italian

did

armored d i v i s i o n s in the small tank

i n t h i s campaign and d e p l o r e d i t s armor

supporting fight a its infantry fnrmations, 'during

units d i d not

division

Large

armored f o r c e

t h e c m p a i gn. Finally, c l e a r l y favored match for a comparison o f the British. cruiser The or tanks i n the two a r m i e s no One

Italian infantry was the

t a n k s cuere tanks.

the

British which

vulnerability

surfaced

mechanical I n the

u n r e l i a b i l i t y o f many B r i t i s h t a n k s i n t h e d e s e r t . campaign, ensmy

t h e B r i t i s h l o s t m o r e t a n k s t o breakdown than t o This uulnerabil i t y had serious

f i r e . C 221

imp1 i c a t i o n s f o r

the future.
t h e a r m o r e d d i u i n . i o n en.joyed un i t

D u r i n g t h i s campaign,

aduan t a g e s o v e r t h e I t a l i ans i n 1 QadQrsh i p , weapons,

training,

cohesion and morale.

The d i v i s i o n s d o c t r i n e In

and o r g a n i z a t i o n w e r e n o t f a c t o r s i n t h e b a t t l e .

f u t u r e c a m p a i g n s many o f t h e s e a d u . a n t a g e s t u r n e d i n t o

d i s a d v a n t a g e s when c o m p a r e d t o t h e Germans.
base o f combat e x p e r i e n c e ,

From t h i s

t h e 7 t h Armnured D i v i s i o n c o u l d

h a v e d e v e l o p e d i n t o a iuni t c a p a b l e o f m a t c h i n g a German panzer d i v i s i o n . T h i s d i d n o t happen. Because t h e 7 t h i t returned to

Armoured D i v i s i o n needed a c o m p l e t e r e f i t , Egypt. of

The r e f i t p r o c e s s t o o k c o n s i d e r a b l e t i m e b e c a u s e I n t h e meantime

c r i t i c a l shortages i n B r i t i s h tanks.

t h e n e e d f o r manpower a n d u n i t s i n o t h e r p a r t s o f t h e
M i d d l e East r e s u l t e d i n the dispersal o f
before

the d i v i s i o n

i t saw a c t i o n a g a i n . C 2 3 1 A t the conclusion o f t h e campaign a g a i n s t the

Italians,

t w o e v e n t s o c c u r r e d which had d i s a s t r o u s e f f e c t s

on t h e B r i t i s h i n t h e W e s t e r n D e s e r t .

The f i r s t was t h e

r e q u i r e m e n t t o send B r i t i s h f o r c e s t o t h e a i d o f Greece. The s e c o n d w a s t h e a r r i v a l o f G e n e r a l I r w i n Rommel a n d

s u b s e q u e n t German f o r c e s i n t o t h e t h e a t e r .

The f o r c e s w h i c h w e n t t o G r e e c e came f r o m G e n e r a l
Wavells M i d d l e E a s t Command. General M a i t l a n d - W i l s o n t o Greece Iwhile

t o o k command o f

the f o r c e s t h a t went OConnor

Lieutenant-General

r e l i n q u i s h e d command o f X I 1 1

C o r p s a n d t o o k o v e r as Commander o f B r i t i s h T r o o p s , E g r p t

The C r r e n a i c a Command r e p l a c e d t h e :<I11

Corps

h e a d q u a r t e r s , a n d t h e new commander was L i e u t s n a n t - G e n e r a l P. Pleame. T h e r e wa.5 n o t r a i n e d s t a f f c o r p s h e a d q u a r t e r s a n d a s h o r t a g e of c o m m u n i c a t i o n s eqquipment made i t

impossible t o control mobile forces uvsr the extended

d i s t a n c e s uf

t h e d e s e r t (241 Pleamcs ftorces d i d n o t i n c l u d e any the

Lt.-General

m a j o r u n i t s u s e d i n t h e l a s t campaign a g a i n s t Italians.

The 2 n d A r m o u r e d D i v i s i o n r e 1 i e v e d t h e ? t h O r i g i n a l l y f o r m e d i n l a t e 1939, i t

Armoured D i v i s i o n .

a r r i v e d i n t h e M i d d l e E a s t w h i l s t h e c a m p a i g n a g a i n s t ths I t a l i a n s was i n p r o g r e s s . However, o n l y p a r t o f the its

d i v i s i o n was a v a i l a b l e t r o Neame, b e c a u z s one ,sf armored b r i g a d e s and p a r t nf GreeceC251

i t s s u p p o r t g r o u p iwent t n

G e n e r a l Wauel 1 was w a r e o f t h e w e a k n e s s of h i s forces defending i n Cyrenaica. According to h i s

i n t e l l i g e n c e r e p o r t s t h e A x i s powers c o u l d on y mount a
1 imi ted attack through mid-ApriI.

T h e m o s t 1 kel y he r e c e i v e d thought

a s s e s s m e n t s t a t e d t h a t Rommel w o u l d w a i t u n t i h i s p a n z e r d i v i s i o n i n May. Personally, Wavell

t h a t Rommel m i g h t n e e d u n t i l J u n e

i n order t o acclimate B y Play

and p r e p a r e h i s f o r c e s f o r b a t t l e i n t h e d e s e r t .

:21

Wauell

e x p e c t e d s e v e r a l more i n f a n t r y d i v i s o n s t o a r r i v e defenses prepared.C261

th i

a n d Neame's

Surpr i si ngl y, German h i g h command's

d i d n o t w a n t Rommel

s a s s e s s m e n t was c o s e t o t h e
the s i t u a t ion. They

appraisal o f

to get

i n t o d i f f i c u l t i e s i n a theater

t h a t was c l e a r l y s e c o n d a r y t o t h e u p c o m i n g B a r b a r o s s a operation. Rommel's m i s s i o n w a s t o r a i s e t h e m o r a l e o f

t h e I t a l i a n s a n d k e e p t h e m i n t h e war.C271 N e i t h e r Wauel 1 n o r t h e German h i g h command knew Rommel.

He s t a r t e d h i s o f f e n s i u e a t t h e e n d o f M a r c h a n d
By

c o n t i n u e d as e a c h o p p u r t u n i t r p r e s e n t e d i t s e l f .
end of A p r i l

the

1941, he p u s h e d t h e B r i t i s h b a c k t o t h e

gyp t i a n b o r d e r , a n d e x c e p t f o r t h e u n i t s h o l d i n g T o b r u k , t h e 6 r i t s h l o s t al I Italians.C2Sl A g e n e r a l w i t h less d r i v e a n d w i 1 1 i n g n e s s t o t a k e r i s k s t h a n Rommel c o u l d n u t h a v e a c h i e v e d t h i s s u c c e s s .

I t w a s a l s o i m p o r t a n t t h a t he d i s o b e y e d h i s o r d e r s a n d

t h e i r p r e u o u s g a i n s made a g a i n s t t h e

o v e r c a m e t h e o b j e c t i o n s o f h i s I t a l i an s u p e r i o r s , Wauell

General

took a c a l c u l a t e d r i s k in t h i s p o r t i o n of h i s

t h e a t e r because he h a d major o p e r a t o n s t o c o n d u c t i n G r e e c e a n d E a s t A f r i c a a n d h a d t o p .an a g a i n s t

I r a q and Syria.C291

threats in

The 2 n d A r m o u r e d D i v i s i o n t y p i f i e d t h e p r o b l e m s f a c i n g the B r i t i s h Army i n developing the f i g h t i n g capabi 1 i t i e s o f

i t s armored f o r c e s d u r i n g t h r

f i r s t two

y e a r s o f t h e war.

I n 1P39,

t h e 2nd Armoured D i v i s i o n

e x i s t e d i n name o n l y . priority for

The 1 s t A r m o u r e d D i v i s i o n r e c e i v e d
As discussed i n

i t s deployment t o France.

the l a s t chapter,

t a n k s were n o t a v a i l a b l e t o e q u i p any
Loss o+ t a n k s i n

a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n up t o + u l l s t r e n g t h . France i ncreased t h i s shortage.

On J u n e 1 1 ,

1PJ0, W i n s t o n C h u r c h i l l

told

parliament that Britain.CBO1

were

t h e r e w e r e o n l y 100 t a n k s i n G r e a t

The o n l y o t h e r t a n k s i n t h e B r i t i s h Army

i n t h e M i d d l e E a s t where t h e 7 t h Armoured D i v i s i o n i t s r e q u i r e d s.ix t a n k r e g i m e n t s .

had o n l y f o u r o f

The f i r s t p r i o r i t y f o r B r i t a i n f r o m J u n e 1 9 4 0
until
l a t e t h a t Year w a s defens.e a g a i n s t

invasion.

Sometime d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d t h e 2 n d A r m o u r e d D i v i s i o n s t a r t e d r e c e i v i n g i t s tanks. Egypt d u r i n g e a r l y January, The d i v i s i o n a r r i v e d i n b u t t h e normal deployment f r o m The

England t o the M i d d l e East took n e a r l y t h r e e months. d i v i s i o n r e c e i v e d o n l y a short d e p l mymen t

training period prior t o

a n d some o f t h o s e sK i 1 1 s a t r o p h i e d d u r i n g t h e

l o n g deployment period.E311 that c r i t i c a l

I t

i s a reasonable assumption

t a c t i c a l s k i l l s s u c h as c o o r d i n a t i n g a t t a c k s

12 3

i n support o f

or i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h i n f a n t r y , c o m b i n i n g
t h e weapons a n d s y s t e m s o f the d i v i sion

t h e e f i e c t s o f a1 1 i n an a t t a c k ,

and t h e use o f a i r c r a i t

i n a c l o s e 'support

r o l e were n o t m a s t e r e d p r i o r t o l e a u i n g G r e a t B r i t a i n . T h i s was p a r t i c u l a r l y t r u e b e c a u s e b r a n c h p . a r o c h i a l ism during the i n t e r w a r y e a r s p r e u e n t e d most o + f i c e r s f r o m

t h i n k i n g t h r o u g h t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r employment o f a combined arms d i u i s i o n . C 3 2 1 C e r t a i n l y a u n i t o r g a n i z e d i n such h a s t e c o u l d n o t master these h i g h e r o r d e r s k i t r a i n i n g system e x i s t e d which t h i s stage of the w a r .
11.5

of

c o o r d i n a t i o n even

if

i t d e f i n i t e l r did not at

T h e Army was t o o b u s y f o r m i n g a n d

deploying u n i t s t o give t r a i n i n g a high p r i o r i t y . When t h e 2 n d A r m o u r e d D i v i s i o n a r r i v e d i n E g y p t i t

was s t i l l

incomplete.

One o f

i t s tank brigades d i d n u t This brigade

have t a n k s f o r one o f

i t s tank regiments.

r e p l a c e d t h e 7 t h Armoured D i v i s i o n

i n western Cyrenaica

and equipped i t s t h i r d tank r e g i m e n t w i t h c a p t u r e d I t a l a i n tanks. The o n l y t r a i n i n g t h i s b r i g a d e r e c e i v e d i n d e s e r t

o p e r a t i o n s w a s t h e e x p e r i e n c e i t g a i n e d on i t s moue a c r r j s s the desert to the b a t t l e area. When Rommel a t t a c k e d , he

d e f e a t e d each r e g i m e n t i n d i v i d u a l dispered conducting individual

Ir

because t h e r lwerr F i n a l l y the

unit training.

d i v i s i o n commander s t a t e d t h a t he l o s t o n e t a n k f o r e u e r y t e n m i 1 e s b e c a u s e o f mechan i c.31 f a i 1 u r e . C331 T h i s u n i t was n o t combat r e a d y . inexperienced i n d i

I

I t was

i s i o n o p e r a t i o n s .and i t s s h o r t h i s t o r y S h o r t a g e s h a n d i c a p p e d t h e un i t ,

I imi t e d un i t c o h e s i o n .
a n d most o f

t h e t a n k s on hand were m e c h a n i c a l l y unsound. i n January, t h e d i v i s i o n #commander

F i n a l l y , upon a r r i v a l

d i e d s u d d e n l y , a n d a commander i n e x p e i e n c e d i n b o t h armored and d e s e r t w a r f a r e r e p l a c e d him. April ,during the m i d d l e o f t h i s campaign, On t h e 7 t h o f t h e Germans

c a p t u r e d t h e d i v s i o n commander a n d m o s t o f h i s s t a f f . Several days before combat t h i s event occurred, the d i v i s i o n

1~3.5

i n e f f e c t i v e because i t s tank

s t r e n g t h was a r o u n d

20.t341
A g a i n t h e B r i t i s h Army d i d n o t r e c e i v e 3 c l e a r v i s i o n of i t s doctrinal deficiencies. The d e p l o y m e n t
# I f

t h i s d i v i s i o n a s a separate armored b r i g a d e w i t h rougnly

h a l f of

i t s s u p p o r t g r o u p s h o w e d a t r u e be1 i e f

i n the t o operate

a b i l i t y o f armored forces, s p e c i f i c a l l y tanks, independently.

Actual d i s p o s i t i o n s of the d i v i s i o n s

s u p p o r t group a n d t h e a r m o r e d b r i g a d e i n C y r e n a i c a f u r t h e r demonstra.ted t h e l a c k o f a combined arms c o n c e p t . The t w o

f o r m a t i o n s were unabl e t o s u p p o r t each o t h e r t h r o u g h o u t t h e c a m p a i g n . t351

115

The a l l a r m o r e d c o n c e p t w h i c h H o b a r t a n d o t h e r s i n t h e R o y a l TanK C o r p s p r e a c h e d a n d p r a c t i c e d p r i o r t o t h e s t a r t o f t h e w a r was t h e d o c t r i n e w h i c h a r m o r e d c o m m a n d e r s were a t t e m p t i n g t o e x e c u t e . impossible f o r of Even t h i s + a u l t r d o c t r i n e was

t h e 26 Armoured D i v i s i o n t o e x e c u t e because The c r u i s e r tanks which the d i v i s i o n

i t s inexperience.

possessed a t t h i s t i m e f l u r t h e r hampered t h e e x e c u t i o n o f t h i s doctrine. Their l i m i t e d m o b i l i t y due t o mQChaniCa1 impossible.

As

u n r e l i a b i l i t y made r a p i d a n d deep t h r u s t s i n d i c a t e d i n the which p r i o r i t i z e d

war h a d a s e r i o u s

l a s t chapter,

the competing d o c t r i n e

n f a n t r y tank p r o d u c t i o n p r i o r t o the m p a c t on t h e f i g h t i n g i n N o r t h A f r i c a . t h e command i n E g y p t d i s b a n d e d

A f t e r nearly
.3

When t h i s c a m p a i g n e n d e d , t h e 2nd Armoured D i U i S i o n . fighting,

:ear o f

t h e B r i t i s h A r m y was n o closer t o d e v e l o p i n g a

v i a b l e a r m o r e d f i g h t i n g f o r c e t h a n i t was a t t h e b e g i n n i n g

of the war.

The A r m y l o s t t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f

the 7th

A r m O U r Q d D i v i s i o n because

t h e y w e r e b a s i c a l l y a new u n i t

when t h e y f o u g h t

i n t h e n e x t campaign.

I n the four months t h a t wai t e d for reconsti tution, t.inKs.

t h e 7 t h Armoured D i v i s i o n

t h e u n i t s d i d n o t have any
O f

The t h e a t e r COmmander U s e d t h e s o l d i e r s a n d many

the

d i v i s i o n as replacements, non-commissioned

k e y o f f i c e r s and

officers l e f t for

Other as,signments.

126

D i v i s i o n l e a d e r s h i p was s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t . d i v i s i o n commander, h o w e v e r , r e m a i n e d t h e same.

The The t a n k

c r e w s d i d n o t t r a i n w i t h a n y t a n k s for f o u r m o n t h s a n d now one e g i m e n t r e c e i v e d a new m o d e l c r u i s e r tank.

A l l

units

find IY r e c e i v e d t h e i r t a n k s by J u n e 7 ,

1P41 a n d h a d u n l y

f i ve d a y s t o t r a i n as. a d i v i s i o n b e f o r e e n t e r i n g t h e

b a t t e.

T h i s l a c k o f t r a i n i n g t i m e was e v e n m o r e c r i t i c a l I n the

b e c a u s e t h e d i v i s i o n c o n t a i n e d s e v e r a l new u n i t s .

i n i t i a l campaign t h e d i v i s i o n h a d s i x t a n k r e g i m e n t s i n two b r i g a d e s . Now t h e d i v i s i o n h a d f a u r tank r e g i m e n t s i n

t w o b r i g a d e s a n d two r e g i m e n t ;

w e r e new t o t h e d i v i s i o n .

The t w o a r m o r e d b r i g a d e s h a d t w o d i f f e r e n t m i s s i o n s b e c a u s e t h e 4 t h A r m o u r e d B r i g a d s was e q u i p p e d i n f a n t r y support (Matilda)

lhi

th

t a n k s whi I e t h e 7 t h Armourad tanks. These c h a n g e s i n

B r i g a d e was e q u i p p e d w i t h c r u i s e r t h e d i u i s i o n m e a n t a loss o f

c o h e s i o n an i m p o r t a n t p a r t at:

combat e f f e c t i v e n e s s w a s l o s t . C 3 6 1

During t h e n e x t campaign, O p e r a t i o n B a t t l e a x e (15-17

J u n e 19411, t h e d i f f e r e n c e s between t h e t w o I n the concept o f

brigades'

m i s s i o n s were s i g n i f i c a n t .

the o p e r a t i o n the b r i g a d e w i t h i n f a n t r y tanks i n i t i a l l y

was t o s u p p o r t t h e i n . f a n t r r d i v i s i o n ,
accomplished i t s o b j e c t i v e s ,

and once

i t

t h e b r i g a d e was t o w o r k w i t h

t h e r e s t o f t h e 7 t h Armoured D i v i s i o n .

D e s t r u c t i o n of

the

127

enemy armor was t h e armured d i v i s i o n ' s

mission.

The

c o o r d i n a t i o n o+ i n f a n t r y and c r u i s e r t a n k s a t t a c k was new f o r t h e armored d i v i s i o n .

i n the same The d i f f e r e n t i a l The s p e e d u f the

i n m o b i l i t y made t h i s m i s s i o n d i f f i c u l t .

M a t i l d a tank was a b o u t t h e same speed a s m a r c h i n g i n f a n t r y w h i l e t h e speed o f the c r u i s e r tanks a v a i l a b l e f o r this

b a t t l e r a n g e d between 15 and 30 mph.C373 A n o t h e r p r o b l e m w i t h the 4 t h Armuured S r i g a d e ' s m i s s i o n was t h e

lack

0.F

t r a i n i n g w i t h the i n f a n t r y General LJaveI 1

d i v i s i u n they w e r e recognized that

t o support.C381

t h i s A r m y r e q u i r e d m o r e t r a i n i n g t o reach b u t h i s hands w e r e t i e d because o f

combat e f f e c t i u e n e s s ,

p r e s s u r e s f r u m t h e Prime M i n i s t e r t o b e g i n t h e o f f e n s i t t e
a s soon as p o s s i b l e .

He d e l a y e d the att.acK as lung as he

c o u l d under t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s . C 3 ? 1 New Corps. l e a d e r s h i p was a n o t h e r f a c t o r preparing t h i s force f o r concern. in

t h e campaign w h i c h caused Idauel 1

The t h i r d campaign began w i t h L i e u t e n a n t - G e n e r a l i n command o f X I 1 1 Corps. Rommel O'Connor

Beresford-Peirse

c a p t u r e d b o t h Lt.-General i n t h e l a s t campaign. blow f o r

Neame and L t . - G e n e r a l

The loss o f O'Connor

was a s e r

ou 5

the B r i t i s h . C 4 0 1 W i t h t h e p r o b l e m s w h i c h a g a i n p l a g u e d the XI1

Corps,

i t

i s h a r d l y s u r p r i s i n g th.at the B r i t i s h l o s t t h e

123

campaign.

W h i l e t h e campaign

l a s t e d o n l y t h r e e d a y s and one

B r i t i s h f o r c e s c o n s i s t e d of i n f a n t r y and one a r m o r e d ,

# o n l y two d i u i s i o n s ,

t h e c o n c l u s i o n s drawn f r o m t h i s

campaign w e r e e x t r e m e l y i m p o r t a n t f o r f u t u r e B r i t i s h operations, Before i t i s p o s s i b l e t o understand these conclusions, one must u n d e r s t a n d some o f

the differences
the

between B r i t i sh and German d o c t r i n e . two a r m i e s ' t a n k and a n t i - t a n k

Compar i son o f

s t r e n g t h s a t the s t a r t o f In

t h e campaign b r i n g s t h e s e d i f f e r e n c e s i n t o f o c u s . terms of

t a n k numbers b o t h a r m ) e s p o s s e s s e d a p p r o x im.atel y t h e German t a n k s had guns and t h e

200,

but only h a l f of

rest were

l i g h t t a n k s armed w i t h machineguns. The p e n e t r a t i n g power o f

All

British

t a n k s h a d guns.

t h e B r i t i s h and The number of Ther had

German t a n k guns was rough1.y e q u a l .C411 anti-tank guns s t r o n g l y f a u o r e d o f

t h e Germans.

150-175
guns.

anti-tank

guns and t h e I t a l i a n s h a d 81) a n t i - t a n k The

The I t a l i a n gun5 were g e n e r a l l y i n a d e q u a t e .

German guns were 30mm and 88mm d u a l p u r p o s e a n t i - a i r c r a f t/an t i - t a n k a p p r o x i m a t e l y 13. pounder a n t i - t a n k guns. The number o f 88's was the 2

The B r i t i s h h a d a b o u t PO o f guns.C423

The German A r m y d o c t r i n e p l a n n e d t o concen t r a t e t h e i r armored f o r c e s a t the c r i t i c a l t i m e and p l a c e .

129

Because t h e y r e c o g n i z e d t h e v u l n e r a b i l i t i e s o f a p u r e t a n k force, t h e y o r g a n i z e d a c o m b i n e d arms f o r m a t i u n w h i c h anti-tank and a n t - a i r c r a f t guns,

included a r t i l l e r y ,

i n f a n t r y and r e c o n n a i s s a n c e elements..

They d e v e l o p e d

t e c h n i q u e s a n d dr i 1 1 s t o c o o r d i n a t e t h e motuemen t a n d f u n c t i o n s of these v a r i o u s arms w i t h i n t h e f o r m a t i o n . The

German Army r e c o g n i z e d t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f

i n f a n t r y on t h e

b a t t l e f i e l d and t h e u s e o f d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n s a s linchpins for t h e i r offensive operations. I n o r d e r t o do

this,

the

i n f a n t r y iuni t s n e e d e d t h e means t o d e f e a t t a n k s . guns p r o v i ded t h i s capabi 1 i t y + o r t h e i r The i m p o r t a n c e o f the anti-tank gun c o i n c i d e d

A n t i -tank infantry.

w i t h t h e i r concept t h a t t h e purpose o f b a t t l e f i e l d was t o d e s t r o y s o f t - s k i n n e d h e a d q u a r t e r s and s u p p l y columns, tanks.

t a n k s on t h e t a r g e t s s u c h as

not t o destroy other

T h i s l e d them t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t a n t i - t a n k tanks from other tanks. This guns i n

guns a l s o p r o t e c t e d t h e i r

was t h e r e a s o n f o r

t h e l a r g e number o f a n t i - t a n k

t h e German o r g a n i z a t i o n . C 4 3 3 T h e B r i t i s h Army d o c t r i n e b e l i e v e d t h e p u r p o s e o f t h e t a n k was t o d e s t r o y enemy a r m o r . Armored d i v i s i o n s

a t t e m p t e d t o mass t h e i r t a n k s t r e n g t h t o d e z . t r o y enemy armor. The o t h e r arms i n t h e a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n p e r f o r m e d B r i t i s h armored

subsidiary r o l e s i n t h i s mission.

130

brigades u s u a l l ~ moved a s p u r e t a n k f o r m a t i o n s .

The

s u p p o r t g r o u p w h i c h c o n t a i n e d t h e Nother a r m s o+ t h e d i v i s i o n s c r e e n e d a f l a n k o r p r o t e c t e d t h e l i n e s of cnmmun i c a t i o n .

The 1 e a d e r s o f t h e a r m o r e d d i u i s i o n s
s u p p o r t +or t h e

1 a c k e d t e c h n I q u e s t o p r o v i de a d e q u a t e f i r e

armored b r i g a d e s .

T h e B r i t i s h saw t h e a n t i t a n k gun as a

d e f e n s i v e weapon a n d h a d n o t i n t e g r a t e d i t i n t o t h e armored brigade.C441 B r i t i s h i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s a l s o required tanks to p r o t e c t them f r o m enemy t a n k s . T h i s was t h e r e a s o n f o r

t h e Army Tank b r i g a d e e q u i p p e d w i t h i n + m t r y s u p p o r t tanks. Although the main purpose of the infantry t a n k was

to help the

i n f a n t r y t o b r e a k t h r o u g h t h e enemy d e f e n s e s , enemy t a n k s . clp u n t i 1

i t was also a v a i l a b l e t o w a r d o f f the Eattleaxe operation,

t h e " M a t i I d a " t n n k was r e l a t i v e l y

i n v u l n e r a b l e on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d so i t p e r f o r m e d b o t h

roles.
The Germans r e c o g n i z e d t h e n e e d t o d e v e l o p a weapon a n d t a c t i c s t o d e f e a t t h e B r i t i s h h e a v y i n f a n t r y t a n k s p a r t i c u l a r l y a f t e r t h e y examined t h e c a p t u r e d i n f a n t r y tanks i n France.
I t was f o r

t h i s reason that

t h e y a d a p t e d t h e 85mm t o p e r f o r m i t s d u a l r o l e a5 an anti-?ircraft and a n t i - t a n k gun. T h i s weapon h a d a

131

s i g n i f i c a n t i m p a c t on a l l w i t h Battleaxe.C451

campaigns i n t h e d e s e r t s t a r t i n g

W i t h o u t any t r a i n i n g between the 4 t h Armoured B r i g a d e and t h e infantry division, t h e a t t a c k on t h e A x i s The

d e f e n s e s f a i l e d because o f a l a c k o f c o o r d i n a t i o n . attack o f the supporting. anti-tank i n f a n t r y and armor were n o t m u t u a l l y

W i t h l i t t l e a r t i l l e r y s u p p o r t t o suppress the the i n f a n t r y t a n k s were d e f e a t e d .

defenses,

T h e r e was p o s s i b l y a n o t h e r r e a s o n b e s i d e s l a c k ot' t r a i n i n g

to e x p l a i n why t h e t a n k u n i t s e n t e r e d t h e b a t t l e i w i t h o u t
adequate s u p p o r t . Brigade fought I t a l i.3n.z.. from a l l Both anK r e g i m e n t s i n t h e 4 t h A r m o u r e d

i n F r a n c e a n d one f o u g h t a g a i n s t t h e

I n t h e s e campa gnr: t h e y h a d b e e n r e l . a t i v e l r sat'e t l n k and a n t i - t a n k guns. The new r o l e f o r the

88mm g u n b r o u g h t a c h a n g e t o t h e b a t t l e f i e l d . C 4 6 1

Meanwh i 1 e t h e 7 t h f i r m o u r e d B r i g a d e , cruiser
of

equ i p p e d

I*I~

th

t a n k s , m e t a s i m i l a r f a t e when

i t r a n i n t o a group on k e y

88mm a n t i - t a n k

g u n s w h i c h Rommel h a d d u g - i n

terrain.

L i k e t h e 4 t h Armoured B r i g a d e ,

the 7 t h drove

i n t o the anti-tank After

defense w i t h o u t any s u p p o r t . Rommel

t h e r e p u l s e of t h e a r m o r e d b r g a d e ,

m a s s e d h i s a r m o r e d s t r e n g t h a n d a t t e m p t e d a f 1 ank i n g movement t o c u t t h e B r i t i s h l i n e s o f commun c a t i o n . This

f o r c e d t h e B r i t i s h f o r c e s t o w i t h d r a w t o t h e E g y p t i an

132

border.

The B r i t i s h l o s t 3 1 t a n k 5 w h i l e t h e Germans l o s t

12.t.171
The + i r s t c o n c l u s i o n t h e d i v i s i o n made lwas t h a t leaders o f the armored

he m a j o r i t y o f t h e B r i t i s h t a n k s

w e r e d e s t r o y e d by enemy t a n k s . L a t e r a n . 3 l y s i . j h a s shown that anti-tanK guns d e s r o y e d m o s t E r i t i sh t a n k s . There

a r e s e v e r a l r e a s o n s why t h e E r i t i s h d i d n o t u n d e r s t a n d t h i s a t the time. The f i r s t i s t h a t t h e S8mm h a d .3 r a n g e

o f 3000 y a r d s a t w h i c h , At

i t c o u l d d e s t r o y a B r t i sh t a n k . i t was d i f C c c l t t o t h e Germsn t a n k s

t h i s r a n g e i f a crew were h i t , the tank.

de t e r m ne w h a t h t

Further,

u s e d a t a c t i c wh c h t h e y u s e d s u c c e s s f u l l y m.any t i m e s i n
flJ

ture bat t 1es

The German t a n k s l u r e d t h e un i t s # o f t h e defenses. Since

7 t h Armoured B r i g a d e i n t o t h e i r a n t i - t a n k

t h e B r i t i s h saw enemy t r n K s i n t h e a r e a ,
was t h a t t h e y d i d t h e damage.C4S1

the assumption

Since the B r i t i s h

be1 i e v e d t h a t t h e p r i m a r r p u r p o s e f o r t h e t a n k was t o k i 1 1 o t h e r tanks and they d i d n o t p e r c e i v e a r o l e f o r anti-tank the

gun s i m i l a r t o t h e Germans,

t h e i r assumption was

understandable. The r e s u l t o f t h i s c o n c l u s i o n was t h e c r e a t i o n o f

t h e m y t h o f t h e o u e r w h e l m i n g s u p e r i o r i t y o f German t a n k s . Th i s f o r c e d 6r i t i s h commanders t o c o n c e n t r a t e e v e n m o r e on the r e l a t i v e tank s t r e n g t h of t h e two a r m i e s , and t h e need

I33

f o r available reserues w i t h which t o r e c o n s t i t u t e the forces during the middle o f the b a t t l a .

tank'

This belie+ in

German t a n k s u p e r i o r t y l e d t o a m o r a l e p r o b l e m among t h e

B r i t i sh a r m o r e d s o l d e r s .
were

T h e y b e g a n t o be1 ieiue t h a t t h e y

i n c a p a b l e o f de e a t i n g German a r m o r e v e n iwhen t h e y

had overwhelming s u p e r i o r i t y . T h e s e c o n d c o n c l u s i o n was t h a t now d e f e a t t h e Germans c o u l d the infantry

t h e " F l a t i l d a " w h i c h meant t h a t

d i v i s i o n now r e q u i r e d a d d i t i o n a l p r o t e c t i o n i r o m t a n k s . T h r e e m e t h o d s o f how t h i s c o u l d b e a c c o m p l i s h e d iwere cunceiued. F i r s t the armored f o r m a t i o n c ? u l d s u p p o r t the Second t h e armored f o r m a t i o n c o u l d b e inf.antr:i

infantry directly.

e m p l o y e d t o d e f e a t t h e enemy .armor b e f o r e t h e launched i t s a t t a c k .

T h i r d the armored d i v i s i o n c o u l d infantry attack i n order idea to

c o n + o r m i t s movement t o t h e guard the

i n f a n t r y f r o m tank' a t t a c k .

The f i r s t

e l i m i n a t e d b e c a u s e t h e r e was n o p r o c e d u r e s o r

training

w o r k e d o u t w h i c h w o u l d a l l o w an a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n t o

support i n f a n t r y u n i t s .

Also a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n l e a d e r s d i d

n o t b e l i e u e t h a t t h i s w a s a p r o p e r m i s s i o n f o r an a r m o r e d diuision. Few saw t h e n e e d t o i n c r e a s e t h e f i r e s u p p o r t gun c a p a b i 1 i t y t o s o l v e t h i s p r o b l e m . C471

or a n t i -tank

These l e s s o n s l e a r n e d a f f e c t e d t h e n e x t 8 r i t i s . h o f f e n s i v e w h i c h was c a l l e d t h e C r u s a d e r

erati ti on.

IiJi t h i n

the concept o f

t h e o p e r a t i o n t h e d e c i s i on

made t h a t

t h e enemy a r m o r m u s t b e d e s t r o y e d i n t h e f i r s t p h a s e o+ t h e o p e r a t i o n a n d t h e n t h e g a r r i s o n o f T o b r u k was to bre.ak o u t t o l i n k up w i t h i n f a n t r y f o r c e s f i g h t i n g t o w a r d t h e garrison. After t h e l i n k up a n d r e l i e f o f the reconquest the g a r r i s o n , The

p h a s e t w o c o n s i s t e d of most i m p o r t a n t p a r t o f

Cyrenaica.

t h i s c o n c e p t was c l e a r l y t h e O r i g i n a l l~ the p l n ;

d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h e enemy a r m o r . cal 1 ed f o r t h e c o n c e n t r a t i on o f Norrie,

t h r e e a r m o r e d trr i g a d e s

lrnder L t . - G s n e r a l

commander oC

YX< C o r p s , t u

d e s t r o v enemy a r m o r , b u t t h e p l a n was l a t e r m o d i f i e d t o detach the 4 t h Armoured B r i g a d e t o p r a t e r - t t h e l e f t +lank

o+ X I 1 1 C o r p s .
XXX C o r p s W o u l d a t t a c k on t h e
l e f t

and

XI11 C o r p s w o u l d a t t a c k on t h e c o a s t .
conformed t o the l e s s o n s o f B a t t l e a x e . m i s s i o n !was t o d e s t r o y enemy a r m o r ,

This generall? General N o r r i e s

b u t .also t o c o n f o r m

h i s movements o f t h r u s t t o p r o t e c t t h e i n f a n t r y c o r p s
f 1 ank.

1501
Prior t o the operation,
t h e c o n t i n u i t y of

l e a d e r s h i p was a g a i n b r o k e n .

General Claude Auchinleclc

r e p l a c e d G e n e r a l W a v e l l who w a s r e l i e v e d a f t e r B a t t l e a x e .

I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o n o t e t h a t General A u c h i n l e c k s p e n t
most o f h i s t i m e

i n the s e r v i c e i n the B r i t i s h I n d i a n

Army.1511

S i n c e a r m o r e d f o r c e s w e r e s u c h an i m p o r t a n t

p a r t of w a r f a r e logical that

i n the ldestern Desert,

i t w o u l d seem

t h e S r i t i s h Army w o u l d s e l e c t a n o f f i c e r w i t h The r e a s o n t h a t one

some e x p e r i e n c e w i t h a r m o r e d f o r c e s .
was n o t g o e s back:

t o the

i n t e r w a r y e a r s i n w h i c h m o s t ot'

t h e l e . a d e r s o f t h e Royal Armoured Corps h a d been s h u n t e d i n t o other duties or r e t i r e d . G e n e r a l P i l e was t h e o n l y

p o s s i b l e Tank C o r p s o f i i c e r w i t h enough s e n i o r i t y f o r t h e position, b u t he was s e r v i n g a s t h e Commander o f Command w h i c h was s t i l l a position of high

Anti-Aircraft pr i Q r i t y

.
1Ji t h t h e a p p o i n tmen t
NO+

General Auch i n I eck t o the newly

command,

he s e l e c t e d h i s own commander f o r I n August

f o r m e d 8 t h Army.

1 9 4 1 , he s e l e c t e d

L i e u t e n a n t - G e n e r a l A l a n C u n n i n g h a m who h a d n o p r e v i o u s armored e x p e r i e n c e . Lieutenant-General Major-General

O t h e r changes saw t h e r e 1 i e f o f

Beresford-Peirse

f r o m S I I I Corps and

Creagh f r o m 7 t h Armoured D i v i s i o n . C S 2 1

A n o t h e r loss w h i c h m a y h a v e h u r t t h e d e u e l o p m e n t

o f armored f o r c e s i n the M i d d l e E a s t , was the death o f

Lt-General oificers,
Uyuyan Pope a n d t w o o f h i s p r i n c i p l e s t a f f

B r i g a d i e r s C a u n t e r and Unwin,

i n a plane crash

on t h e i r way t o t h e M i d d l e E a s t .

G e n e r a l Pope who h a d in

b e e n t h e R o y a l A r m o u r e d C o r p s o b s e r v e r on t h e BEF s t a f f

F r a n c e was on h i s w a y t o E g y p t t o command XXX C o r p s w h i c h

136

c o n t a i n e d the armored and m o b i l e f o r c e s . have s o l v e d the

Whether he c o u l d

l e a d e r s h i p p r o b l e m s i s n o t known, b u t a t

l e a s t , i t w o u l d have been b e t t e r t h a n what o c c u r r e d a f t e r h i s death. The commander o f t h e 1 s t A r m o u r e d D i v i s i o n who

was on h i s way t o t h e M i d d l e E a s t w i t h h i s d i v i s i o n w a s
e l e v a t e d t u command XXX C o r p s f o r

the Crusader

operation.CS31 Division of

N o t o n l y d i d t h i s d e p r i v e t h e 1st Armoured but

i t s commander,

i t r e q u i r e d a man, u n p r o v e n
t o serve a t the next

as a d i v i s i o n commander i n c o m b a t ,
h i g h c r 1 eve 1

.
General Auchinleck:

A s i n t h e o t h e r d e s e r t campaigns t h e armored

f o r c e s were u n d e r g o i n g changes u n t i 1 t h e l a s t m i n u t e and t h e t r a i n i n g was a g a i n c u t s h o r t .

began r e c e i v i n g p r e s s u r e t o b e g i n an o f f e n s i v e as s o o n as p o s s i b l e a l m o s t f r o m t h e d a y h e t o o k command. h i m i n a dilemma. He knew t h a t t h e l a c k o f This put

trrined units

was a c a u s e o f d e f e a t t h i s same p r o b l e m .

in Battleaxe,

a n d he w i s h e d t o . a v o i d endear h i m w i t h

T h i s d i d n o t , however,

t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r who d i d n o t a p p r e c i a t e b e i n g p u t o f f by h i s generals. I n t h e e n d A u c h i n l e c k succumbed t o t h e

p r e s s u r e a n d s e t a d a t e o f a t t a c k f o r November 18, w h i c h was e a r l i e r t h a n h e w i s h e d . C S 4 1 The 7 t h A r m o u r e d D i v i s i o n f o r consisted of t h e 7 t h Armoured B r i g a d e , this battle

1741

t h e 4 t h Armoured

!3:

E r i gade a n d t h e 2 2 n d A r m o u r e d B r i gade wh i c h was r e a l 1 y

part of t h e 1 s t Armoured D i v i s i o n , b u t the remainder of

the divison d i d not a r r i v e u n t i l a f t e r the b a t t l e s t a r t e d . The 7 t h A r m o u r e d B r i g a d e w a s an e x p e r i e n c e d u n i t by now, b u t even t h i s u n i t s t i l l h a d a s h o r t a g e o f

end of October.

tanks a t the

Meanwhile t h e 22nd Armoured B r i g a d e Crusader, d i d n o t All of

equipped w i t h

t h e newest c r u i s e r t a n k ,

s t a r t t o disembark

i n A l e x a n d r i a u n t i l O c t o b e r 4.

i t s t a n k s r e q u i r e d a m o d i f i c a t i o n w h i c h t o o k t h r e e weeks. T h i s b r i g a d e was n o t a b l e t o b e g i n i t s d e s e r t t r a i n i n g u n t i l October 2 5 . driving, Some o f the crew t r a i n i n g nc 1 u d e d

navigation,

gunnery,

i n t e r c o m m u n i c a t on 9 v e h i c l e a n d c r e w ma i n t s n a n c e they

r e c o g n i t i o n o f many t y p e s o f

T h i s o f c o u r s e d i d n o t make a u n i t c o m b a t r e a d y f o r

s t i l l r e q u i r e d t o l e a r n movement t e c h n i q u e s i n f o r m a t i o n

as well arms.

as t h e n e c e s s a r y s k i l l s t o c o o p e r a t e w i t h o t h e r By t h e t i m e t h e 2 2 n d A r m o u r e d B r i g a d e w e n t into

b a t t l e i t was f a r f r o m combat readr.CS51

T h e 4 t h A r m o u r e d B r i g a d e was e q u i p p e d w i t h t h e

f i r s t c o n t i n g e n t o f Amer i c a n tanks.
tank. gun,

T h i s was t h e S t u a r t

I t p r o v e d t o be a r e 1 a b l e t a n k m o u n t e d w i t h a 3 i m m

b u t i t o n l y h a d a r a n g e o f 70 m i l e s . he s t r o n g e s

This brigade

!was p o t e n t i a l l y

a r m o r e d f o r m a t i on b e c a u s e i t

had experienced tank u n i t s ,

a c o m m a n d i n g o f f i c e r who h a d

been i n t h e M i d d l e E a s t s i n c e t h e b e g i n n i n g o f new t a n k s w h i c h w e r e m e c h a n i c a l l y r e l i a b l e . i n i t i a l l y h e l d ou.t o f

t h e war and

T h i s u n i t was i t was an

t h e armored b a t t l e because

r e q u i r e d t o screen the l e f t f l a n k o f XI11 Corps, i n f a n t r y c o r p s . C561 The m a j o r d o c t r i n a l B r i t i s h t a n k s went i s s u e was t h e c o n c e p t

t h a t the

i n t o b a t t l e t o d e s t r o y enemy t a n k s . t a n k s on b o t h s i d e s

I t

i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o n o t e t h e number o f d u r i n g the b a t t l e .

A g a i n t h e q u a l i t y o f armor on b o t h i f crew t r a i n i n g i s n o t

s i d e s was r o u g h l y equal considered. superior

I n

total

tanks the B r i t i s h w e r e v a s t l y They had ouer o v e r 7 0 0 tankE.

Of

t o t h e Germans.

w h i l e t h e Germans and I t a l i a n s had a p p r c x i m a t e l y 3 3 0 . t h e German t o t a l

70 o f t h e t a n k s w e r e 1 i g h t t a n k s armed

o n l y w i t h machine guns and 146 o f t h e t a n k s b e l o n g e d t o the I t a l ians. The B r i t i s h t e n d e d t o i g n o r e t h e I t a l i a n t h e p o o r showing t h e

I t 3 1

a r m o r , p r o b a b l y because o f

ians

made i n t h e i n i t i a l campaign.

I f these a r e d i s c o u n t e d

t h i s b r i n g s t h e t o t a l c o u n t o f German t a n k s a v a i l a b l e f o r t h e b a t t l e down t o 175.

O n t h e B r i t i s h s i d e n o t a l l 700

t a n k s w o u l d p a r t i c i p a t e i n the g r e a t t a n k b a t t l e . Approximately were

100 tanks w e r e

i n Tobruk g a r r i s o n and 130

i n t h e 1 s t A r m y Tank B r i g a d e ( i n f a n t r y s u p p o r t and V a l e n t i n e ) . This s t i l l

l e f t the B r i t i s h w i t h

-MatiIda

470 t a n k s i n the 7 t h Armoured D i v i s i o n .

I f t h e 170 t a n k s

o f t h e 4 t h Armoured B r i g a d e s c r e e n e d the X I 1 1 Corps,

the

B r i t i s h c o u l d s t i 1 1 mass 3 0 0 t a n k s a g a i n s t German t a n k
formation. T h i s i s the type o f c a l c u l a t i o n t h a t t h e

B r i t i sh t.ank commanders wen t t h r o u g h i n d e t e r m i n i n g whether or n o t t h e y w e r e r e a d y f o r b a t t l e a g a i n s t t h e Germans.CS73 T h e p r o b l e m w i t h t h i s c a l c u l a t i o n was t h a t i r r e l e v a n t i n a c o u p l e o f ways. F i r s t t h e German

i t was

commanders d i d n o t p l a n t o t a c k l e t h e B r i t i s h a r m o r w i t h
their

tanks.

If

t h e commanders w a n t e d t o c c m p a r e w e a p o n s

t h e y s h o u l d h a v e c o u n t e d t h e t o t a l number o f a n t i - t . n n k g u n s t h . a t t h e Germans h.ad w i t h t h e i r a r m o r e d + o r m a t i o n s a s well. Th s i s w h a t d e s t r o y e d m o s t B r i t i s h t a n k s d u r i n g A German p a n z e r d i v i s i o n h a d a l m o s t as many guns a s i t d i d t r n k s , a n d i f one t a k e s i n t o

Battleaxe anti-tank

a c c o u n t t h e qu.31 i t y o f t h e s e guns t h e p i c t u r e b e g i n s t o l o o k somewhat e q u a l . A s an e x a m p l e , i n one p o s i t i o n an B o t h t h e SOmm

88mm g u n k n o c k e d o u t 11 B r i t i s h t a n k s . C S 8 1

long b a r r e l and 88mm a n t i - t a n k gun c o u l d d e s t r o y B r i t i s h

tanks o u t s i d e the e f e c t i u e range of B r i t i s h tank guns. Even t h i s i s n o t t o t a l l y r e l e v a n t because i t i g n o r e s t h e m o r e l domain o f combat. This pertains t o

t h o s e human + a c t o r s w h i c h i n f l u e n c e t h e c o m b a t p o t e n t i a l

140

of a unit.

The f a c t o r

of

t r a i n i n g h a s been d i s c u s s e d , b u t

t o further elaborate,
one
I N Q Q ~ ~

t h e 22nd Armored B r i g a d e was g i v e n t o going i n t o

to train

i n the d e s e r t p r i o r
.A1

battle. master,

Besides

the

i n d i v i d u a l c r e w c l t i 11s i t h a d t o i ts

the b r i g a d e needed u n i t t r a i n i n g h employ .a1 1

VQlY.

combat power e f f e c t

AS p r e V i O U 5 l y d e s c r i b e d ,

B r i t i s h armored d i v i s i o n s )were weak because of

i n combined arms

a t r a d i t i o n o f t r a i n i n g .as s i n g l e arms wi t h
T h i s g r e a t l y handicapped t h e B r i t i s h

separate d o c t r i n e s .

armored d i v i s i o n because t h e Germans Fought as combined arms u n i t s , and t h e German u n i t s i n t h e d e s e r t w e r e 1.ue11 drilled. In addition, t h e y h a d c o n s i d e r a b l e combat

esperience.

With t h i s Understanding o f

t h e t y p e o+ u n i t
i t was , a b s o l u t e l : /

t h a t B r i t i s h armor was t r y i n g t o d e f e a t , imperat i v e t h a t

t h e armored b r i g a d e s mass t h e i r un t s t o T h e i r capabi

It

b r i n g the most combat power t o b e a r .

i t:/
S

tu

do t h i s i n t h i s b a t t l e was e x t r e m e l y l i m i t e d . h i g h l y unl iltely that proper Y integrated weeK's time,

t h e 22nd Armoured B r i g a d e c o u l d b e n t o t h e 7 t h Armoured D i v i s i o n i n one

g i v e n a 1 t h e o t h e r s k i 1 1 s t h e b r i g a d e needed T h i s i s why i n a l l t h e campaigns i n t h e

t o learn f i r s t . d e s e r t up u n t i l

t h i s t i m e t h e .aPmoUrQd d i v i s i o n s f o u g h t Bs

separate brigades.

141

The C r u s a d e r b a t t l e was m o r e v i o l e n t a n d c o n f u s i n g than any o t h e r p r e v i o u s d e s e r t b a t t l e . This pattern of

c o n f u s i o n a n d h a r d f i g h t i n g on b o t h s i d e s became t h e n o r m
for

t h i s and a l l f u t u r e d e s e r t b a t t l e s .

When t h e B r i t i s h

1 aunched t h e i r a t t a c k

t h e y ach i eued t o t a l s u r p r i s e ouer

Rommel,

a l t h o u g h some o f h i s s t a f t : a n d s u b o r d i n a t e

commanders t r i e d t o a l e r t h i m t o t h e a t t a c k a l m o s t immediately. T h e f i r s t day t h e a r m o r e d b r i g a d e s , m o v e d The B r i t i s h commanders t o !do b e c a u s e t h e y reaction.CS3:

a b o u t 40 m i l e s a n d s t o p p e d . commanders w e r e

i n a q u a n d r r .about w h a t

p r e d i c a t e d t h e i r n e x t moue on Rommels The n e x t day, deeper

t h e a r m o r e d b r i g a d e s d e c i d e d t o moue

i n t o t h e German p o s i t i o n s a n d s e i z e a u i t a l

l o c a t i o n w h i c h w o u l d f o r c e t h e German p a n z e r d i v i s i o n s t o attack. T h i s i s w h a t G e n e r a l N o r r i e w a n t e d t o do f r o m t h e three brigades. got into

b e g i n n i n g . They d i d t h i s and a l l b a t t l e t h e n e x t day. b r i g a d e s were

The u n f o r t u n a t e p r o b l e m was t h a t , t h e

i n t h r e e s e p a r a t e l o c a t i o n s and c o u l d n o t T h e d e e p e r t h e y d r o v e i n t o German

s u p p o r t each o t h e r .

t e r r i t o r y t h e m o r e d i s p e r s e d t h e t h r e e b r i g a d e s became. The r e l a t i v e c o m b a t e x p e r i e n c e o f apparent i n the three battles.t601 The 2 2 n d A r m o u r e d B r i g a d e w h i c h !was t h e new brigade i n the theater, f o o l i s h l y d r o u e d i r e c t l y i n t o .an t h e t h r e e b r i g a d e s was

142

I t a l i a n d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n h e l d by an I t a l i a n armor dinjision. One o f t h e r e c o n n a i s s a n c e r e g i m e n t s warned the but,they f a i l e d t o

brigade not t o attack t h i s position, heed the w a r n i n g .

T h i s brigade received a severe repulse Even p r i o r t o t h i s

a n d s u f f e r e d c o n s i d e r a b l e t a n k losses. engagement,

t h e 2 2 n d a r m o u r e d B r i g a d e h a d l o s t many t a n k s and i t s support echelon The t h e new tank: c r e w s

because of m e c h a n i c a l f a i l u r e ,

which kept g e t t i n g l o s t delayed the brigade. breakdowns i n d i c a t e b o t h t h e u n r e l i a b i l i t y o f C r u s a d e r t a n k as w e l l as the i n a b i l i t y of tanKs.Cd11

:he

t o p e r f o r m m a i n t e n a n c e on t h e i r

The 4 t h A r m o u r e d B r i g a d e s u f f e r e d t h e most l o s s e iwhen a p a n z e r d i v i s i o n a t t a c k e d i t . anti-tank This

w.85

due to t h e The

guns w h i c h were wi t h t h e panzer u n i t .

Germans b r o k e o f f

t h e a t t a c k t o w a r d dusk and t h e 4 t h

A r m o u r e d B r i g a d e d e c i d e d t o p i ~ r s u et h e a t t a c k t h e n e x t d a y . T h i s a t t a c k c o n t i n u e d t h e n e x t d a y a n d 22nd A r m c l u r e d B r i g a d e was o r d e r e d t o s u p p o r t t h e 4 t h Armoured B r i g a d e .

The 2 2 n d d i d n o t a r r i v e u n t i l l a t e a n d was u n a b l e t o g e t i n t o t h e a t t a c k t h a t day. T h e t w o commanders made t h e i r

p l a n t o a t t a c k and Cight t h e d e c i s i v e armor b a t t l e t h e n e x t day. T h e Germans w i t h d r e w th.at n i g h t a n d t h e 7 t h Armoured B r i g a d e t h e n e x t

concentrated against
day.

The 4 t h A r m o u r e d B r i g a d e a t t e m p t e d t o p u r s u e i n t h e

143

. morning but
range of

c o u l d n o t c a t c h up b e c a u s e o f t h e 70 m i l e

t h e S t u a r t tank.Ce23 The 7 t h A r m o u r e d B r i g a d e , p r o b a b l y t h e m o s t

experienced u n i t o f

t h e d i v i s i o n , s i e z e d an o b . j e c t i u e
1 i n e o f c o m m t u n i c a t i o n s on t h e

w h i c h t h r e a t e n e d Rommels
17th.

T h e y c a p t u r e d an a i r f i e l d w i t h t h e . a i r c r a f t s t i l l W i t h t h i s success a t the end o f the d a r ,

on t h e g r o u n d .

t h e y s e t u p a c o m b i n e d a r m s d e f e n s e ~i t h t h e s i ~ p p o r t g r o u p o f the d i v i s i o n . The d i v i s i o n n e e d e d m o r e infantry,

a r t i 1 l e r y and a n t i - t a n k

sun< becauoe t h e r e w e r e t o o f e w

s u p p o r t a r m s i n t h e B r i t i s h a r m o r e d d t i ~si i o n m l r g a n i z a t i o n . C o n s e q u e n t l y t h e d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n was n o t v e r y s t r o n g . The d i v i s i o n c a l l e d f o r m o r e i n f a n t r v s ~ ; ~ ? g r t , b u t never arrived.Ca31 From t h i s p o i n t t h e b a t t l e lost i t s cnherencr. t h e enemy tri.3~
i t

B o t h commanders w e r e c o n f u s e d a b o u t w h e r e a n d w h a t h e was d o i n g .

S u b o r d i n a t e commanders d i s o b e y e d

o r d i s r e g a r d e d o r d e r s w h i c h a d d e d t o b o t h commanders.

confusion.

Cunningham r e c e i v e d o p t o m i s t i c r e p o r t s a b o u t He

t h e d e f e a t a n d w i t h d r a w a l o f German a r m o r . subsequent 1 y o r d e r e d t h e breaKou t o f

t h e Tobrult g a r r i son.

On t h e 7 1 s t , he r e c e i u e d a r e p o r t t h a t t h e Germ3.n armeor
was w i t h d r a w i n g a n d h e l a u n c h e d t h e

inf.antry attack w i t h

h i s XI11 C o r p s . C 6 4 1

144

T h i s w a s n o t t h e case and f o r the armored battle that the the British

the next three days had been seeking t o mass

occurred. t h e i r armor,

Although

B r i t i s h f i n a l l y managed

t h e y #were u n a b l e t o c o o r d i n a t e t h e i r : t t s c k s . hard, but for %he most part the tank of

The B r i t i s h f o u g h t brigades fought the Germans the

alone,

and the

the

combined

arms

attacKs At
Rummrl

destroyed Br t i s h

armored have
of

brigades. i f

this had
His

point,

might

retreated the take armored a

continued o.Ffensive total

his

destruction caused h i m

units. and
try

spir t

to

risk

for

victory.

H e h a d lost h e a v i l y up to t h i s p o i n t a n d

h i s t r o o p s were t i r i n g . C 6 5 1

For t h e n e x t t h r e e d a y s ,
t o the Egyptian border w h i l e attack. The

Rommel made a d a r i n g d a s h

t h e XI11 C o r p s c o n t i n u e d t h e t h e o n l y one who On t h e 2 6 t h o+ Cunn i ngham deputy chief until wi t h

of

S t h Army d i d n s t p a n i c a n d

a p p a r e n t l y l o s t h i s n e r v e was C u n n i n g h a m . November, Acting staff. end o f General Auch i n l eclc

rep1aced
his

Lieutenant-General T h i s was t o be a

Ri tchie,

temporary appointment

the to

t h e campaign. the

H i s i n s t r u c t i o n s t o R i t c h i e were B y now of the the Rommel threat

was

continue and

oifensive. because During

unsuccessful

retreated

to

his

1 ines
made

of

communication. drive

period while border, the

Rommel

hi..

for

the

Egyptian

British

armor

145

reconst i tuted

and

the

a n t i -tank

defenses

of

the

B r i t i sh

i n f a n t r y d e s t r o y e d t h e German a r m o r . C663 The B r i t i s h Army continued the offensive T o b r u K was r e 1 i e u e d . t r i e d t o p ~ r s u e a n d Rommel a n d on

December 7 t h Rommel w i t h d r e w . The

B r i t i sh armored br i gades

but t h e y were

u n a b l e t o do t h i s e f f e c t i u e l y . but t h e

Both armies

were exhausted,

" A f r i K a K o r p s " c o n t i n u e d t o mount

i t s wi t h d r a w a l

counterattacks t o cover "Crusader" was

through Cyrenaica. but the cost in

a British S t h Arm,. Giith

uictory,

a r m o r was e x c e s s i v e . tanks counting tanks,

b e g a n t h e c a m p a i g n iwi t h 950 a battle

reserves.

l o s s oC

$ o v e r 800

r e p l a c e m e n t s were p r o d u c e d many burdens.

no longer avdi l a b l e . tank casual t i e s , and

Mechanical added to the

breakdown repair

shop

Recovery

operations

swamped

r e p a i r shops w h i c h e n d . C671 During the Korps"

c o u l d o n l y r e p a i r 300

t a n k s by y e a r ' s

l a s t week o f

t h e campaign,

the

"AfriKa

received a resupply of i n Rommel's

tanks and o t h e r

e q u i pmen t .

T h i s improucment result of of

supply s i t u a t i o n was a d i r e c t allowed the release The

the w i n t e r to

i n Russia which the

aircraft

support

North African

campaign.

use o f the

these a i r c r a f t of

i n December a n d ;anu.ar:i a n d a1 l o w e d
At

neutral ized get

is1and

Plal t a

several same

cc~nuoys t o the

through

to Tripolitania.

the

time,

J.apane5.e

attack

in

the

Pacific

hurt

%he B r i t i s h s u p p l y

situation The again "Afrika

b e c a u s e i t t o o k away B r i t i s h s h i p p i n g .and a i r situation passed Kor ps rapidly the stabilized British 8th and Army the to

power.

initiative Rommel's

from
"

C 6 83
Rommel w a s t e d 1 i t t l e time i n cuunterattacking the The of the situation the time

widely

dispersed B r i t i s h paralleled the

forces. situation

for

the

S t h Army General to

previous. year. Rommel needed needed

Auchinleck his

underestimated 7th

begin

offensive.

Armoursd

Division
He

refitting,

su A u c h i n l e c k

accepted the

risk.

replaced

t h e 7 t h Armoured D i v i s i o n w i t h a p o o r l y t r a i n e d d i u i s i o n . This division was the 1st Armoured Division 2nd its

c o n d i t i o n was s i m i l a r t o t h e c o n d i t i o n o f D i v i s i o n when The

1st

t h e 2nd A r m o u r e d in 1941.

i t

r e p l a c e d 7 t h Armoured D i v i s i o n Division was the the first original armored and

Armoured and

"t-lobils diuision.

Division''

subsequently

After

the

division's i n France,

piecemeal i t was n o t

commitment

loss o f

equipment the units

t o t a l l y reorganized w i t h

that

accompanied In April,

it

to

the

Middle

East

until

F e b r u a r y 1941.

t h e new c r u i s e r

t a n k s were taken .BY

f r o m i t s tank b a t t a l i o n s and s e n t July, were when the

t o t h e Middle E a s t . the

d i v i s i o n was a g a i n r e - e q u i p p e d , one more

time

tanCs

withdrawn

to

undergo

modification.

147

Because o f decided in

the preparat ions f o r late August

"Crusader", one
of

t h e W a r O # C i ce the diwision"s t h e 2Znd, "Crusader" campaign, pursuit which

to

send

armored b r i g a d e s t o t h e 3 t h A r m y . as p r e v i o u s l r d e s c r i b e d , camplign. the

of

This brigade, poorly in in the the

fought

After

losing

i t s t.ank.5 e a r l y

b r i g a d e was r e f i t t e d a n d p a r t i c i p a t e d i n Rommel the across brunt of Crrenaica. the

the

It

was

this

brigade

bore

counterattacks

cowering

Rommel , ' s

w i thdrawal
were the

i n l a t e December. almost total

The r e s u l t s o f of the

these a c t i o n s

destruction

Z 3 d Grmoured

Brigade for

t h e s e c o n d t i m e a n d i t was w i t h d r a w n t o r e f i t . Meanwhi I s , the remainder

of

the

1st

Armoured in

D i v i s i o n l e f t Great B r i t a i n

i n l a t e September,

arrived

E g y p t i n l a t e November a n d came u n d e r at the beginning

of

1 3 t h C o r p s " command Training throughout

January

1942.

t h i s p e r i o d was d i s r u p t e d a n d c o h e s i o n iwas n e v e r d e v e l o p e d w i t h i n the d i v i s i o n . upon arrival in in

A s w i t h most p r e v i o u s a r m o r e d u n i t s ,
there was l i t t l e time
A

Egypt
a

to

learn

operations compl i c a t i o n wounded division infantry

desert when

environment.

further

developed

the

division

commander

was

n an a i r a t t a c k a n d h a d t o be r e p l a c e d . arrived
or

When t h e engineer.5, the field

at

the

front,

i t

had

no

reconnaissance

units.

Also,

a r t i l l e r r u n i t s s u p p o r t i n g t h e d i v i s i o n !were S o u t h A f r i c . a n

u n i t s w h i c h h a d c o n d u c t e d o n l y one the d i v i s i o n p r i o r Rommels i n f o r m a t i on inexperienced British that units no he

t r a i n i n g exercise w i t h

t o moving t o t h e i r posi tion.C6Yl i n t e l l igence an offic9r provided him w i t h ex i s t e d because

Th e

oppor tun i t y the

occupied Ultra told

British

front.

received because Rommels

information no one attack about

about his

Rommels plans in to the

intentions a t tack.

surprise

resulted

w i t h d r a w a l o f B r i t i s i h f o r c e s t o t h e G.azala l i n e , o i 70 t a n k s o f of 1 s t Armoured D i v i s i o n , and the

t h e loss

abandonment L u c k i l y for

e a r l y pl.ans f o r a n o t h e r B r i t i s h o f + e n s i v e .

t h e 8 t h Army, them b a c k

t h e A x i s s t r e n g t h was n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o p u s h The E r i t i s h now n e e d e d i u n t i 1 ,June t o

further.

r e s u m e t h e o i f e n s i v e . C701 Rommels l a s t counterattack during the the Crusader .and h i s the

campaign w h i c h m a u l e d
1 imi t e d

22nd Armoured B r i g a d e in
January

counteroffensive the
for

which

destroyed

remainder o f significance importantly significance B r i t i s h Army the Br i t i sh

1 s t A r m o u r e d D i i J i S i O n h a d some s t r a t e g i c
the t h i s the North African i t theater. had
By

More

for
for back access

study,

operational pushing the

next

campaign.

t o what to

twas known a s

the were

Gazala

1 inr,
to #of

a i r f i e l d s which

necessar:. the retclrn

support

Ma1t.a w e r e

denied.

Coupled w i t h

148

German winter

airpower months,

from this in

the had

Russian the

campaign
of

during

the the

effect

isolating the same

B r i t i s h bastion this Ax i
5

the Mediterranean. supply situation

At

time, more

helped

Rommels

and

allowed

.sh i pp i n g t o g e t t h r o u g h . s h i p p i n g and c o n t r o l

Converse1 Y , t h i s t h r e a t e n e d

Britains

of the Mediterranean.

This

was s i g n i f i c a n t t o C h u r c h i l l and h i s m i l i t a r y p l a n n e r s i n
London and caused the Prime M i n i s t e r to place immedkte

p r e s s u r e on A u c h i n l e c k Crrenaica level, the to help

t o b e g i n an o f f e n s i v e Malta.
At

t o t a k e back operat i onal a

S O U ~ C ~ to+

relieve effect

the

ultimate

of

this

1,ua.s

f r i c t i o n between A u c h i n l e c k : and h i s p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y superiors. moral e f f e c t 9 t h Army.

feel ing

Of

greater

oper.ational

s i g n i + i c a n c e !was

the

t h e s e t w o t a c t i c a l d e f e a t s h a d on t h e B r i t i s h these
two d e f e a t s ,

After the

there

was

a the

general German

among

British

armored

uni ts

that

panzer u n i t s were o v e r w h e l m i n g l y s u p e r i o r fighting capability.

i n equipment and

Rommel h a d m o r a l a s c e n d a n c y o u e r t h e

Br i t i sh.
This c e r t a i n l y was t h e case w i t h A u c h i n i e c k .
He

became o v e r l y c a u t i o u s a n d p e r h a p s e v e n p e s s i m i s t i c . attitude is

His his

best

summed up

in

letter

he w r o t e

to

C h i e f o f S t a f f , S i r A r t h u r S m i t h i n o n J a n u a r y 30, 1 ? 4 2 .

150

W e h a v e g o t t o f a c e t h e f a c t t h a t , u n l e s s we c a n a c h i e v e s u p e r i o r i t y on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d by b e t t e r c o - o p e r a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e army a n d more o r i g i n a l l e a d e r s h i p o f our armoured f o r c e s t h . m is. a p p a r e n t l y b e i n g e x e r c i s e d a t p r e s e n t , we may h a v e t o f o r g o a n y i d e a o f m o u n t i n g a s t r a t e g i c a l o f f e n s i u e , because our armOUrQd f o r c e s a r e t a c t i c s l 1 y i n c a p a b l e o f m e e t i n g t h e enemy i n t h e o p e n , e v e n when s u p e r i o r t o h i m i n numbers. Another very s e r i o u s a s p e c t w h i c h i s o b t r u d i n g i t s e l f m o r e a n d m o r e i s t h e g r o w t h o f an i n f e r i o r i t y complex amongst o u r .armoured f o r c e s , o w i n g t o t h e i r f a i l u r e t o c o m p e t e w i t h enemy t a n k s w h i c h t h e y C o n s i d e r ( a n d r i g h t f u l l y s o ) s u p e r i o r t o t h e i r own i n c e r t a i n aspects. T h i s i s v e r y d a n g e r o u s a n d iwi 1 1 b e most d i f f i c u l t t o e r a d i c a t e o n c e i t t a k e s r o o t , a s I am a f r a i d i t i s d o i n g now. I t becomes a l l t h e m o r e i m p o r t a n t t o w e l d t h e t h r e e arms t n g e t h e r a s c l o s e l y as p o s s i b l e . I h a v e p u t t h i s m a t t e r v e r y pl3.inl.. t o t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r , as t h e m i l i t a r y a u t h o r i t i e s a t home, i n c l u d i n g F l a r t e l , must r e a l i s e what t h e y a r e up a g a i n s t , a n d i t i s n o good J u s t c o u n t i n g t a n K s o r r e g i m e n t s and p r e t e n d i n g t h a t o u r s a r e i n d i v i d u a l l y a s E e f o r e we g o o d as t h e German b e c a u s e t h e y a r e n u t . ;an r e a l l y d o a n y t h i n g a g a i n s t t h e German on l a n d t h e y h . a v e g o t t o b e made as good a n d b e t t e r b o t h n e q u i p m e n t , o r g a n i s a t i on a n d t r a i n i n g . A s y o u Know I am n o t i n c l i n e d t o p e s s i m i s m b u I v i e w o u r p r e s e n t s i t u a t i o n w i t h m i s g i v i n g , so f a r as o u r p o w e r t o t a k e t h e o f f e n s i v e on a l a r g e scale 5 concerned. t i 1 I

In

telegram

he

sent

to

Churchill

on

the

same

day

he

stated;

o t h e r a n d a t t i m e s i r r e m e d i a b l e c a u s e s twhich I h a v e a l r e a d y m e n t i o n e d to y o u i n a l e t t e r a r e s h o r t r a n g e a n d i n f e r i o r p e r f o r m a n c e of o u r t w o - p o u n d e r g u n s c o m p a r e d w i t h t h e German g u n s a n d mechan i c a l u n r e l i a b i 1 i t y o f o u r c r u i s e r t a n k s compared w i t h German t a n k s . I n a d d i t i o n I am n o t s u r e t h a t t h e

....

151

t a c t i c a l l e a d e r s h i p o f our armoured u n i t s i s o f s u f f i c i e n t l y h i g h s t a n d a r d t o o q f s e t German m a t e r i a l advantage. T h i s i s i n hand b u t c a n n o t be improued i n a day u n f o r t u n a t e l y . I' am r e l u c t a n t l y c o m p e l l e d t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t o m e e t German a r m o u r e d f o r c e s w i t h a n y h o p e o f d e c i s i u e success, our armoured f o r c e s as a t p r e s e n t e q u i p p e d , o r g a n i s e d a n d l e d , must h a v e a t l e a s t t w o t o one s u p e r i o r i t y . Even t h e n t h e y m u s t r e l y f o r s u c c e s s on w o r k i n g i n t h e v e r y c l o s e s t c o - o p e r a t i o n w i t h i n f a n t r y and a r t i l l e r y , w h i c h e x c e p t f o r t h e i r competent t o take weakness i n a n t i - t a n k guns a r e f i ~ l l y on t h e i r German o p p o s i t e n u m b e r s . G e n e r a l R i t c h i e a n d I a r e f u l l y a l i v e t o Rommel's p r o b a b l e i n t e n t i o n s b u t w h a t e v e r t h e s e may b e h e w i l l c e r t a i n l y t r y t o e x p l o i t s u c c e s s by u s e o f elJen s m a l l e r c o l u m n s u n t i l he m e e t s r e s i s t a n c e . Plans are i n t r a i n t o c o u n t e r such a c t i o n . C 7 2 1

A l t h o u g h h i s assessment iwrong, he made Over several key

of

S t h Army was n o t in next .judgement

S a w month-,

far
and

errors of the

leadership.

the course

and

n e x t c a m p a i g n w h i c h Rommel w o u l d i n i t i a t e ,

these mistakes

had d i s a s t r o u s e f f e c t s b o t h f o r h i m s e l f and h i s Army. Auchinleck's i n which

first critical

e r r o r was t h e m a n n e r Church i I 1's through At pressure Mar both of

he r e s i s t e d P r i m e M i n i s t e r an offensiue. up From next

t o begin

February offensiue.

sides b u i l t February, his

for

the

the

end

Churchill

began t o p r e s s u r e A u c h i n l e c K Auchinleck before began his

t o begin

attack.

General weeks

"Crusader" because

campaign

several

he
those i t

was

ready

of
into

Churchill's

pressure,

and f o r
re.?.dy

u n i t s t h a t went

b a t t l e before

t h e y were

h a d been a c n t a a t r o p h e .

He w o u l d n o t

l e t

Churchill he was

coerce him to

begin h i s

next

camp.aign b e f o r e was that

of

ready.

Auchinleck's in

prrs.pecti*;e theater. a

military the other

commander hand,
1.uas

a single

Churchill, victorv.

on

i n desperate need o f Britain in the

E v e n t s were

g o i n g badly f o r

Far

East, naval being

losses h a d b e e n h i g h , German a r m i e s w a r e s t i l 1
almost everywhere, and M a 1ta was tunder

succesful

heavy p r e s s u r e . bolster morale

Most o f a1 1 C h u r c h i 1 1 n e e d e d a ~ l i c t o r yt o
and pol i t i c a l to support on the homefront. that

Auch i n l ecK

f a i 1ed

a c k n o w l edge

the

i n f luencs

p o l i t i c s n s c e s s a r i 1 y h a d on h i s t h e a t e r o f c p e r a t igns. T h i s disagreement between t h e Prime M i n i s t e r

h i s general

and At to

r e a c h e d i t s most c r i t i c a l stage February, Churchill h i s future sent

i n March.
telegram

the

end

of

Auchinleck were. ratios,

a s k i n g what

plans for

an

offensive the force on sent the his than the that the

B a s e d on w h a t he expected time

t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r knew o f the 8th Army to

go

back

o f f e n s i u e some

i n March.

When A u c h i n l e c k

estimate announcing that June

he c o u l d n o t In

begin e a r l i e r to settle

1,

Churchill

was

furious. them,

order

difference Auch i n l e c k situation. relationship

between
r eturn

Churchi 1 1 Br i t a i n the

requested to di scuss

to

Great

When A u c h i n l e c K was

refused,

damage

to their

irreparable.

This

disagreement

br

153

correspondence

continued

throuqh

the

man t b

of

May.

S e v e r a l t i m e s C h u r c h i l l was d e t e r m i n e d t o r e p l a c e h i m , b u t his C.I.G.S, General Brooke conuinced him not to change

commanders a t t h i s c r i t i c a l j u n c t u r e . C 7 3 3 Even w i t h o u t campaign Commander would have t h i s feud the r e s u l t s of

demise

the next as
the

spelled

Auchinleck's

i n Chief, M i d d l e East.

The s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h i s
A

a r g u m e n t w a s t h e e f f e c t i t must h a v e h a d on A u c h i n l e c k . commander who s e n s e s h i s s u p e r i o r ' s his abilities his were

is

lack of confidence his. of efforts

in on

unable

to

concentrate Pluch
his

commandi n g energies

o r g a n i z a t i on. directed toward

Auch i n l eck's with the

the

battle for

homefront r a t h e r battle.

than p r e p a r i n g h i s

Force

coming

The n e x t e r r o r w h i c h A u c h i n e c k c o m m i t t e d was the realm of 1eadersh ip. The tenor

of

in
Y

the to
the

p r e v i ousl which

c ited

messages spirit
to

demonstrates had the sunk.

moral

the He

dep thc, a l 1 owed

h is

fighting commander

opposing lack
of

gain

ascendancy.

This

f i g h t i n g s p i r i t e m a n a t i n g f r o m t h e commander was f a t a l the 8th Army. Auchinleck and many

to

of

the

senior

commanders o f t h e 9 t h A r m y w e r e now o v e r l y c a u t i o u s t o w a r d " A f r i K a Korps,." They l o s t f a i t h i n t h e a b i l i t y o f t h e 8 t h

Army t o b e a t t h e Germans.

154

Included

in

Auch i n I e c k s m i s g i u i n g s

about

the

qua1 i t i e s a n d c a p a b i 1 i t i e s o f confidence in 8th

Armys

h i s f o r c e s was h i s especially one o f

13ck o f of his

leadership,

armored f o r c e s . which confronted

As previously noted, the armored control forces the

the problems a n d twhich

in Africa untimely

,was b e y o n d a n y o n e s

was

loss o f k e y
i n the next Men w i t h no

armored l e a d e r s . higher position

L e a d e r s were f o r c e d t o serue in their chain of command.

e x p e r i e n c e as d i b J i s i o n commanders thrust into positions found

as

i n combat were commanders. in combat command.

suddenly new their

corps

These
w i th

commanders

,of t e n

themsc 1 81es after

u n i t s almost leaders leaders 1 imi t e d and

is

immediately the

taking

Loss of other such .and

res.ultant

demands

thi.3

p l . a c e s on howeuer,

normal

i n wartime. exper i ence

T h e r e twas, in

Br i t i sh

Army

armored

warfare

e v e n less i n d e s e r t a r m o r e d w a r f a r e , a f e w k e y men w a s .a s e r i o u s b l o w . I n hindsight, o f f i c e r s h a d been t h e manner

t h a t t h e loss o f . j u s t

i n w h i c h R o y a l Tank C o r p s

f o r c e d out

of

t h e Army

or

shunted o f f

i n t o meaningless p o s i t i o n s d u r i n g peacetime was a c r i t i c a l error. horsed Many o f t h e commanders d u r i n g t h e w a r w e r e f o r m e r o f f i cers recently converted time

caual

ry

to

armored

off icers.

L e a d e r s who s p e n t c o

1i t t l e

l e a r n i n g and

i 55

contemplating

the

unique

problems

of

mobile

armored,

w a r f a r e c o u l d n o t h o p e t o become e x p e r t s o v e r n i gh t . Regardless o f apparently t h e s e p r o b l ems, the his fact leaders General that and
i t

Auch i n l e c k
was

overloaked to develop

h i s

responsibility He was
the

their

staffs.

the u l t i m a t e a u t h o r i t y standards

i n s e t t i n g and m a i n t a i n i n g the o f f icers under his

leadershi p

of

command.

If t h e s e o f f i c e r s
to

lacked experience then them f o r job combat. then

it

i t was
If

h i s responsibil i ty were incap.able

to

prepare doing

they his

of

the them.

twas

responsibil i ty
too

r e 1 ieue

Auchinleck and
too

was
to

perhaps
forgiue

easy

on

his

subordinates

quick

t h e i r mistakes t o develop

a d i s c i p l i n e d and p r o f r s s . i o n a l

o f f i c e r c o r p s i n h i s Army.CT41 General Auch i n l e c k ' s method of hand1 i n g h i 5,

s u b o r d i n a t e s was h i s t r a j i c f l a w . obstinancr with s u b o r d i n a t e was Churchill, inexplicable.

his

l r l h i l e he t e n d e d t o w a r d leniency w i t h his chief

I t was a g r a v e m i s t a k e f o r

h i m t o keep L i e u t e n a n t - G e n e r a l Army. Auchinleck's t h e way o f loyalty

Ritchie and

i n command of 8 t h

friendship

for

Ritchie

stood i n
1 eader

h i s judgement

and r e s o n s i b i l i t y as a

.
A u c h i n l e c k p i c k e d R i t c h i e , who was ser1,ing
as h i s

Chief o f Staff

at

the

time,

t o r e p l a c e General

Cunningham

1 sa

during

the

"Crusader" at the and

campai gn. time. became He the

Ritchie
was

was an

still

.a

Major-General

made

acting Army

Li eutenant-General commander. that

temporary
+or

8th

AuchinlecK's

rationale

h i s s e l e c t i o n twas

i t w o u l d cause

t o o much t u r b u l e n c e t o e l e v a t e a n y o f
Since Ri tchie the
situation,
U J ~ S

t h e C o r p s commanders d u r i n g t h e b a t t l e . fami 1 i a r w i t h both the Middle-East and

he

was a l o g i c a l c h o i c e .

The C o r p s commanders . a c c e p t e d t h i s

e x p e d i e n c y p a r t i c u l a r l y b e c a u s e G e n e r a l A u c h i n l e c k brought h i s headquarters t o
his

t h e b a t t l e f i e l d a n d cc,n,:inued detai led instructions. than

a commander

t o giive

old

chiei

of

staff

Ri tchie
during

remained more o f the remainder of At

to Cairo.

a staff officer
the campaign.

t h e e n d #of D e c e m b e r ,

1R41, A u c h i n l e c K

returned

D u r i n g the n e x t month R i t c h i e demonstrated t h a t comm.anding 8 t h Army. Auchinleck refused

h a was

incapable o f stated,

For
to

the reasons him.

previously

re1 ieue

W hi1e

Auch i n l eck

recogn ized

General

Ri tchie's

shortcomings,

h e a p p a r e n t l y h o p e d t h a t R i t c h i e w o u l d grolrJ In the meantime, he planned to give him

into

the

job.

e n o u g h a d v i c e so t h a t h e c o u l d n o t go t o o f a r w r o n g . This system

o+

command

simply

did

not

worK.

R i t c h i e w a s n e v e r s e e n as t h e
Army.

l e g i t i m a t e commander commanders recogni:ed

of

3th that

H i s c o r p s and d i v i s i u n

157

Auchinleck Ri t c h i e

was

really

in

charge, This
were

and

any

command
led

from to
a

wa's

q u e s t i oned.

whole

process

situation

where

all

orders

discussed,

debated in

and the

often

ignored.

By f a r

t h e most

s e r i o u s weakness

8 t h Army d u r i n g

t h e n e x t campaign,

e a c h commander p l a c e d Besides destroying

h i s own i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o n e v e r y o r d e r . a1 I the

t r a c e s o f c o h e s i v e n e s s and c o o p e r a t i o n between u n i t s , decision-making i t process slowed to

snai 1's

pace. forces

T h i s made

absolutely

impossible

t o concentrate

a t the c r i t i c a l

time and place.C751 detailed discussion i t was

of

This

the

leadership critical
force..

s i t u a t i o n was p r e s e n t e d b e c a u s e factor during i.dhich

the

t h e most

affected
first
six

the

development of

of
342.

armored Even

months

wi t h
!of

techno1 o g i c a l material dedicated win, the and

improvements, time to

increas ng unit

quantities

develop

cohesion; with the was

without w i l l to

a n d we1 1 - t r a i n e d defeat of

1 eadersh i I

8th

Army

forces

probably

i nev i t a b l e . While the were not the

only

l e a d e r s h i p p r o b l e m s were s e r i o u s , problems to plague 8th Army.

they An

a s s u m p t i o n w h i c h most l e a d e r s i n t h e A r m y a n d p a r t i c u l a r l y in the armored units made

was

that

German of

tanks 8th

were

technologically

superior

to

the

tanks

Army.

153

Auchinleck alluded t o staff closer and t o Winston

this

in h i s letters to h i s chief on January

a+
F;

Churchill of the

:311, 1142.

examination

facts

s h a ~ s that

these

assump t i u n s w e r e

incorrect ,
WdYS.

T a n k s r a n b e c o m p a r e d i n many d i f f e r e n t few o f size of these ways i n c l u d e ; gun, armor armor,

r a d i u s o f . a c t i o n , speed, Capability of and the gun at

penetrating

u.ar i o u s

ranges,

ammun i t i o n

capabi 1 i t y

mechan i c a l the same

reliwbility.
O'JQr

Armor

protection

is not

uniformly

t h e C o m p l e t e t a n k so t h i s c o m p a r i s o n c o u l d b e made i n s i d e or turret.

t e r m s o+ f r o n t a l ,

Nu k a n k was s u p e r i o r
types of

in

all features.
each bank

Each s i d e having

had several arld

tanks !with !When

advantages

8disadvant.a.ges

compared w i t h t a n k s o f

the other side, uniformly

except p o s s i b l y the in

Ital ian

tanks which

were

disadvantaged to

al I

categories. specific constantly s t a t u s of faults

Additionally

modifications

correct occurred complete

or

to

make

improvements to Know the

so

it

was

impossible

t h e o p p o s i n g t a n k s a t any g i v e n t i m e . I n the

n e x t c a m p a i g n w h i c h b e g a n May,
tanks tanks, The were V.alentinec, model z types and of

1942,

the

principle infantry Grants design

British support

Matildas; Crusader,s, American

several Last The

and

Stuarts.

two

were

and m a n u f a c t u r e .

Germans h a d M a r k s

11,

111,

!5 3

a n d IU w i t h t w o t y p e s o f M a r k I 1 1 .The I t a l i a n s h a d F113 a n d
M14's.

The most armor

which

important and the

items of

c o m p a r i s o n #were t h e of
the

protection
the various

p e n e t r a t i n g power The guns,

guns tanks had

a

t a n k s mounted.

B r i t i s h made

were

still

armed w i t h

pounder

the

Stuart

37mm g u n a n d t h e G r a n t h a d a 75mm g u n . t h e German M a r k 47mm g u n ,

11's

On t h e A x i s s i d e ,

h a d no gun,

the I t a l i a n t a n k s had a

t h e Mark

III(H) h a d a s h o r t 50mm g u n , t h e M a r k
and t h e had the t h e Mark
Mark

IIICJ) h a d a l o n g 5Omm g u n ,
gun. power, The Grant's

IU h a d

.P

75mm

f5mm

gun
by

greatest

penetrating gun. The

closely

followed

III(.J)'s

p e n e t r a t i n g power o f t h e S t u a r t ' s

3 i m m was b e t t e r

than the

B r i t i s h 2 pounder guns w h i c h were s l i g h t l y b e t t e r t h a n t h e M a r k III(H)'s a low

and M a r k I V ' s .

The 75mm o f fired only

t h e Mark high

I V was

velocity

weapon

which

explosi~,e T h e German which gave

which accounted f o r Mark

it

i t s low p e n e t r a t i n g power.
type shell the

111's

f i r e d an a r m o r - p i e r c i n g p e n e t r a t i n g power than

greater

B r i t i s h 2 pounder muzzle v e l o c i t y t h e 2 pounder

but o n l y a t s h o r t e r r a n g e s . tapered o f f r a p i d l y so t h a t better.

This shell's at

1000 y a r d s ,

g u n was s t i l l number defeat of

T h e G e r m a n s . c a r r i e d o n l y .a sma!I primarily to

armor at

p i e r c i n g s h e l l s w h i c h were close range as a

tanks

self-defensr

measure.

One m u s t

remember

that

German

doctrine tanks.

at

this

time

did

nut c a l l f o r In M . 3 t i l d a were invulnerable long-barrel,

tanks t o defeat other terms of armor

protection,

t h e U a l e n t i n e and

t h e most h e a v i l y a r m o r e d a n d w e r e r e l a t i v e l y to ,311 gun Axis tanks at

1000
enough

yards. to The

The

50mm

was

powerful

penetrate G r a n t was t h e MarK German armor

p a r t s ot' t h e U a l e n t i n e t a n k a t the next best armored tank, and Crusader. and Mark The the hul 1

t h i s range.

closely The

.Followed b y

111, Mark
Mark

I'J

B r i t i s h Crusader, in

IIICH),

IV h a d r o u g h e q u i v a l e n c : t '
armor ot' but the the
Mark

protection. greater Crusader turret, than

lwas

I 1 1 a n d I V was
armor
.armor

Crusader,

turret :39mm o f

o+
in

the the

thicker.

lu'i t h

unlv

the

M a r K

IIICH)

and

Mark

IV

were

extremely training

vulnerable

i n t h i s area;

however, crews

because o f this

the

level

of

many B r i t i s h

tank

v u l n e r a b i 1 i t y Iwas 50mm g u n or the the

the

never e x p l o i t e d .

The M a r K I I I ( H ) ' s

short

MarK I V ' s
British British

75mm g u n c o u l d n o t p e n e t r a t e a n y p o r t i o n o f
Crusader tank's could at front at
1000

yards,

but

2 pounder

penetrate

the

Mark

III(H)'s

and true

Mark I V ' s

turret front

1000 yards.

( T h i s was n o t

o f t h e Mark turret).

IIICJ) w h i c h h a d m o r e a r m o r p r o t e c t i o n i n i t 5
Stuart
tank

The

was

l i g h t l y armored than the

but

s t i l l

consi derabl y

better

protected

German Mark

II

sr

the I t a l i a n tanks.

I t s 37mm g u n h a d an a r m o r e d - p i e r c i n g ,
i t the capabi 1 i t y t o p e n e t r l t e t h e

c a p p e d she1 1 w h i c h g a v e Mark

IIICJ) t u r r e t a n d h u l l a t r a n g e s o f 1'000 y a r d s . The

I t a l i a n a n d Mark I 1 t a n k s w e r e n u t a t h r e a t t o t h e B r i t i s h
o r A m e r i c a n made
tank;. the

At

ranges o f

5011 y a r d s o r

less

all

tanks,

except

Valentines

and P l a t i l d a s , the

could be Only

p e n e t r a t e d a l m o s t a n y w h e r e b r a n y ui: the the long-barrel, 50mm o f tanks t h e Marlr at this

t a n k guns.

IIIIJ)
range.

could penetrate T h i s w.as the

B r i t i s h support reason the

primary

Germans

developed

armured-p i e r c i n y

ammuni t i u n f o r c l o s e r a n g e s . If just had these

two

c r i t e r i a were

compdred,

the

Br i t i s h
over the

tanks

consi d e r a b l e
Tha G r a n t

qua1 i t a t i ive

.aduan tage

" A f r i k a Korps."

t a n k s w e r e new t o 8 t h the mix that

Army a n d c o m b i n e d w i t h of
of

t h e Crusaders and S t u a r t s ,

tanks

i n t h e B r i t i s h A r m y was c l e a r l y b e t t e r T h e Mark Grant tank

than

t h e Germans a n d I t a l i a n s . the

IIICJ)

was the u n l r

tank which c o u l d o f f s e t gun power. The

i n b o t h armor

and

Germans,

howeuer,

had only

19 o f

these

t a n k s w h i l e t h e B r i t i s h had 167 G r a n t t a n K s . E 7 6 l There B r i t i s h advantage of the British were other

factors

which

degraded

the

i n these tanKs the

two a r e a s . inferior

The u p t i c a l to those

sight?.
uf

idere

the
was.

Germans.

Also

armur

uf

many

German

tanks

s t r e n g t h e d wi t h B r i t i s h 2 pounder
to

face-hardened shell
the

p l ates.

This

caused

the

w h i c h was n o t plates without

p r o t e c t e d by penetrating.

a c.np The

shatter

against

Stuart tank's
1 irni t e d

r.ndius o f

o p e r a t i o n w3.s o n l y 70 m i l e s w h i c h although the than that of range o f the other tanks. The

i t s capability, t a n k s was b e t t e r tank

was not

3 t h Army The G r a n t

t h e German

without

some d i s a d v a n t a g e s .

75mm g u n was n o t m o u n t e d i n t h e t u r r e t b u t
the r i g h t .side o f
l e f t

i n .a s p o n s o n o n to a

the

tank.

This

l i m i t e d traverse

f e w degrees

and r i g h t .

k m o r e 5er113u5 d i s a d v a n t a g e
too low in
a

was

that

the

gun

Iwas m o u n t e d

the

tank

.and dobun the

consequently position.C773 mechanical

could Finally

not the

f i r e most the

from serious Crusader

' 5

"hull"

p r n h l e r n was tank.

unrel iabi 1 i ty o f

T h i s had

s e r i o u s r e p e r c u s s i o n s d u r i n g Romrnel January line. 1 9 4 2 when the British

counteroffensive of to the Gazala

retreated

I n the words o f Colonel Berry,

the Chief Mechanical

E n g i n e e r f o r X I 1 1 C o r p s a n d 3 t h Army;

The 1 a c k o f rnechani c a l r e 1 i a b i 1 i t y was a v e r y d i f f e r e n t m a t t e r a n d h a d a p r o f o u n d e f f e c t on t h e whole o f t h e d e s e r t f i g h t i n g i n 1741 and 1942. L i k e t h e M a t i I d a t h e e n g i n e ,of t h e C r u s a d e r t a n k I t was a 1 2 - c y l i n d e r 400 hp was n o t d e s i g n e d as s u c h . a e r o e n g i n e l e f t o v e r f r o m t h e 1'?14-1913 w a r . . U n f o r t u n a t e l y t h e c o o l i n g p r o b l e m s i n a tank .are v e r y d i f f e r e n t f r o m those i n a a e r o p l a n e , and h e r e t h e I n t h e C r u s a d e r t h e e n g i n e was t r o u b l e s began

....

..

....

163

m o d i f i e d by t h e f i t t i n g o f t w o f a n s a n d two w a t e r - p u m p s d r i v e n f r o m t h e e n g i ne c r a n k s h a f t by a long chain. T h i s was a d i s a s t e r . A s s o o n as t h e t a n k w.35 u s e d i n t h e d e s e r t s a n d g o t i n t h e c h a i n , t h e c h a i n s t r e t c h e d and s t a r t e d t o jump t h e c r a n k s h a f t I t was a t h r e e - d a y j o b t o c h a n g e d r i v i n g sprocket. the sprocke t Worse still, t h e w a t e r - p u m p w o u l d n o t s t a n d up t o t h e s a n d a n d h e a t o f t h e d e s e r t .and s o o n l e a k e d ' v e r y badly. A re-design was necessary but u n f a r t u n a t e l y the manufacturing f a c i l i t i e s did not e x i s t i n Egypt. I n J a n u a r y 1942 we h a d p u s h e d Rommel r i g h t b a c k t o E l A g h e i l a a n d he seemed t o b e n e a r l y f i n i s h e d . I t h i n k he w o u l d h a v e b e e n f i n i s h e d i f we h a d n o t t w o The r e p 1 y hundred Crusader t a n k s under r e p a i r . . came b a c k : " R e g r e t n o t a v a i l a b l e i n U K . " I f thus4 w a t e r - p u m p s h a d b e e n a v a i l a b l e Rommel ' 9 c o u n t e r - a t t a c k c o u l d n e v e r h a v e s u c c e e d e d a n d t h e r e w o u l d n o t ha1)e b e e n a b a t t l e o f A l a m e i n , f i r s t , s e c o n d or t h i r d . l ? 8 1

..

Whether

his

assessment

of

the
V I ~ S

impact

this i s not had

3

d e f i c i e n c y h a d on t h e c o u r s e o f h i s t o r y important. serious The s h o r t c o m i n g s o+ on the the

correct tank in

Crusader men the

effect

confidence

the of

had

their
54

equipment. important. confidence.

T h i s w a s why They finally

the a r r i v a l

G r a n t !was they

h a d a weapon

i n which came

had to

I t s tremendous f i r e p o w e r

a s a shock

t h e A x i s f o r c e s i n t h e n e x t campaign. offset the d e f i c i e n c i e s of the

T h i s tank c e r t a i n l y

Crusader

and b a l a n c e d t h e

s c a l e s i n t e r m s o f a r m o r on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d .

A t t h e s t a r t o f t h e n e x t campaign,
a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n s h a d 573 t a n k s ; a n d 257 C r u s a d e r s .

the

two B r i t i s h
149 S t u a r t 5

167 G r a n t s ,

T h e r e was. a n o t h e r a r m o r e d b r i g a d e 1wi t h

!5 4

7 5 G r a n t s a n d 70 S t u a r t s I w h i c h w a s n o t beginning of the battle, but the

available were

at

the
as

tanks

used

replacements during the b a t t l e . two Army tank brigades the with

T h e B r i t i s h Army a l s o h a d
166

Valentines

and

110

Matildas.

Normally

i n f a n t r y support

tanks were

not

employed a g a i n s t o t h e r t a n k s , b u t a h e a v y t o l l on A x i s t a n k s .

i n t h i s b a t t l e they took

O n the Axis side

Italian,

t h e r e were

560

t a n k s w i t h 228

50

Mark

II's,

242

Mark

111's

of

which, Mark

as

p r e v i o u s l r noted,

1Y w e r e t h e J m o d e l ,

a n d 40

1L"'s.

T h e A x i s f o r c e s h a d a p p r o x i m a t e l y 60
this battle.l791

tanks

i n r e s e r v e for

Whi I e numbers,

the

British

had a cle.ar

c.uperiori ty

in

t h e y a l s o h a d a t l e a s t p a r i t y i n qua1 i t y a s .shown above.

Why

i n the discussion the n e x t b a t t l e ? strengths of the

then d i d

the

Britiz.h

1os.e

The a n s w e r d o e s n o t 1 i e i n t h e n u m e r i c . 3 1 two armored forces. to the the Br i t i sh armored

f o r c e s be1 i e v e d t h e y w e r e and this had real

inferior

"Afrika Kurps" Gazala Battles

significance

for

w h i c h b e g a n May, b u t t h e Army be1 i e v e d i t . The

1942.

Not o n l y d i d t h e u n i t s b e l i e v e i t ,
the %op w i t h A u c h i n l e c k

leaders s t a r t i n g a t

reason they

believed

this

relates

back

to

B r i t i s h armored d o c t r i n e .

Their doctrine c a l l e d for tanks

1 ,55

to

Kill

other at

tanks.

When

so many B r i t i s h
the Crusader

t.anks w e r e campaign,

Iti l l e d

great

ranges

during

s o l d i e r s and t h e i r leaders c o n c l u d e d t h a t the superior f i r e p o w e r a n d gun r a n g e o f

i t was c . s u s e d b y t h e German tanks. guns,

was

T h e y f a i l e d t o r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h e German . a n t i - t a n k
part

of

the
for

panzer this.

division's As indicated tank

offensive

power the

the

reason offset and

prev i ousl y,

Germans numbers that

the

their

inferior in

numbers w i t h guns.
Add

superior to this

qua1 i t y

ant i-tank

German p a n z e r u n i t s w e r e we1 1 their combined arms doctrine on the

t r a i n e d and a b l e and

t o esecute had Only the

by

% h e Germans

t a c t i ca 1

aduan t a g e their

b a t t 1 e+ i e 1 d niJmberB
of

.
tnnKs

concentrating

superior

on

the

b a t t l e f i e l d c o u l d the B r i t i s h d e f e a t Another d o c t r i n a l British was their

t h e Germans.

i s s u e and a disaduantage f o r t h e in traveling iwith dispersed Time

belie+

armored f o r m a t i o n s . after time Rommel He was

T h i s c o n t i n u e d t o haunt had caught able the to British destroy

them.

forma i o n s
i n d i u dual The
the

dispersed.

often

r e g i m e n t s by a t t a c k i n g w i t h h i s e n t i r e a r m o r e d f o r c e . B r i t i s h always planned t o concentrate critical but they time were and p l a c e un.able to fight to the their armor at

b i g armored b a t t l e , doctrine.

execute

this

Th e

command s y s t e m o f

t h e B r i t i s h 8 t h Army o p e r a t e d t o o s i o w l v

to

do

anything too

but

react Under the

to

Rommel

and for

then a1 1

they

were

usually

late.

Ri tchie,

the

reasons slower. Ri t c h i e at an

previously To

identified, this keep

command s y s t e m became Auchinleck forces and gave

counteract to

problem the

i n s t r l i c t i ons the start of

B r i t i c.h campaign

concentrated them
as

the

next

employ

armored corps. consequence armor. was

R i tch ie
the

i gnorsd these i n s t r u c t i o n s and the in detail

defeat

of

most

of

his

C SO 1
F i n a l 1y, Auch i n l e c k recogn i z e d the t r a i n i ng

d e f i c i enc e s o f
to

h i s armored u n i t s . to change because arm it the

$of

These d e f i c i e n c i e s l e d organization. tradition

Army

dec s i o n that each

d i v i sion the

He of

recognized training

p e . a c e t ime the

separately

British

was arms all

h a n d i c a p p e d when tram. arms

tr e d

to

fight

as

combined

He be1 i e v e d t h a t o n l y t h e c l o s e a s s o c i a t i o n o f in
a

division in
battle.

wou d

lead

to

the

close

cooperation for this

required

AuchinlecK's

timing

d e c i s i o n was at
a

incorrect. the

T h i s c r e a t e d t o o much t u r b u l e n c e develop battle cohesion and

t i m e when de

u n i t s needed t o Results from

"esprit

corps."

the

demonstrate purpose.

t h a t h i s r e o r g a n i z a t i o n f a i l e d t o a c h i e v e it-, fairness
to

In
waz

General

Auch i n l eck

the

r e o r g a n i z a t i on

167

incomplete merit.

and

did

not

have

enough

time

to

prove

its

The

o r g a n i z a t i on he

recommended c a l 1 e d f o r

the

ar mor e d d i v i s i o n t o have o n l y one a r m o r e d b r i g a d e and two rnstorized regiment brigades,. to include Each b r i g a d e w o u l d have an a r t i l l e r y an anti-tank battery. The ar m or e d

b r i g a d e w o u l d have a m o t o r i z e d i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n and each motorized b a t t d l ions. anti-aircraft brigade Each would brigade have three have
Ha

motorized i t s own

infantry

would units.
'J

anti-tank,

and e n g i n e e r

a l s o h.ad .a s i m i h r

r e o r p a n i z a t i on f o r This d i s e r s e d th e and d i d n o t the d i u i s i o n . the division

infantry di

i s i o n s . C81 I detrimental throughout because the i t

o r g a n i z a t i o n was support arms

combat allow

diijision !within

fur

concentration of

support

O f g r e a t e r consequence was t h e
to

inabi 1 i t y of support.

mass

its

available

artillery

T h i s r e o r g a n i z . a t i on

tended

t o al 1 ow d i u i s i ong t o f i qh t as

separate'brigades but n o t as d i v i s i o n s . T h i s was specifically his greatest the state

of

the

8 t h Army

and more launched all the a

i t s a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n s b e f o r e Rommel
offensive against in
May,

1942.

Despite the battle first

forces

working

the

army, for

cias

surprisingly Individual

c1os.e

contest

the

111

dayc.

soldiers fought w e l l

i n s p i t e of

their

leaders

168

low

morale

and

lack

of

faith. leadership

Many

brave

men

iwere faulty un i t the

sacrificed doctrine, training.

because and The poor

of

deficiencies, to i nadequate however,

tactics of

due

courage

these

men,

W Q ~ Q

seeds o f f u t u r e s u c c e s s . Rommel b e g a n t h e G a z a l a c a m p a i g n on Mar 2 6 ,

1742.

He m a s s e d a l l o f h i s a r m o r e d f o r c e s t o e n c i r c l e 8 t h Army
from euen its southern flank.

HQ a c h i e v e d
reported.

initial This

s u r p r se s u r p r 'se

though

h i s movements w e r e
Y

iwas p r i m a r i 1

because

the

commanders

i n v o l v e d refus.ed t o t o iwhnt

be1 i e v e t h e

i n t e l l ignece r e p o r t s which r a n counter

A u c h i n l e c k h a d f o r e c a s t a n d d i s s e m i n a t e d t o h i s commanders as the d i r e c t i o n o f other of t h e enemy m a i n e f f o r t . Rommel on the

s de d i d n o t achieve h i s i n i t i a l
i n t e l 1 igence about 8th

9 h J e c t i # . J e S ,b e c a u s e Army dispositions.

f a u tr

B s s i des r u n n i n g i n t o u n i t s w h i c h he d i d n o t know e x i s t e d , the

m i bef i e l d s

were

much he

more managed

extensive to defeat

than

he

anticipated.
di spersed

Still,

serieral He

brigade

groups the

and

armored

br i gades.

accornpl i s h e d t h i s w i t h first tnll. On

loss o f o v e r 200 t a n K s i n t h e
The Grant tank had taken its

days

of

battle.

the t h i r d day of

b a t t l e Rommel

had t o p l ~ l l i n t h e same

h i s f o r c e s i n an a t t e m p t t o c o n s o l i d a t e a n d a t

1 ,5'?

t i m e he f o u n d h i s u n i t s p r a c t i c a l l y lack of supplies. a During this

i m m o b i l e bec3use o f

period, it might

i f

8 t h Army

had

mounted Rommel. him.

coordinated

attack,

have

destruysd

The s l o w n e s s o f

t h e B r i t i s h command s y s t e m r a v e d

Once b a t t l e became smaller armored size

Rommel

was

resupplied,
of

the

story

of

the and and arms

the

destruction

individual failure of

brigades infantry combined

units. to

Repeated launch

divisions

coordinated

a t t a c k s characteri:ed the campaign,

t h i s e n t i r e campaign. formations w*re

E7 t h ? e n d o f
the

infantry

convinced o i Flany

unrel iabi I i ty o f soldiers lost

armored u n i t s

in battle.

infantry to

their

1 i v e s because

a r m o r e d iuni t s i . a i

f o l l o w up t h e i r
BY
superior i ty in

attacks i n time.

12
t.ank

June,

the

British During

no

longer

had

a
of

numbers.

this

period

intense f i g h t i n g , continual

t h e B r i t i s h armored u n i t s h a d undergone
A

reorganization.

couple

of

descriptions

of

t h i s e f f o r t shows t h e p r o b l e m s t h i s c r e a t e d .

A t t e m p t s t o b r i n g t h e a r m o u r up t o s t r e n g t h h a d th , e been most c o m p l i c a t e d a n d n o t v e r y ~ u c c e s s f ~ u l b a s i c Cause b e i n g t h e d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n t h e t h r e e s o r t s o f c r u i s e r tanks. To g e t t h e r e q u i r e d t a n k i ~ i i t h a 5 u i t a b l e c r e w t o t h o u n i t t h a t w a n t e d i t was n o t Qa5Y. I t l e d t o s u b - u n i t s b e i n g combined, o r E l ~ e n s i n g l e tank.5 a c t sometimes l e n t t o o t h e r u n i t s .

....

170

c r e w s h a d t o be s e n t h e r e a n d t h e r e . Regiment.31 o r g a n i z a t i o n was d i s r u p t e d , a n d t h e 1 s t A r m o u r e d B r i g a d e , much t o i t s d i s g u s t , h a d b e e n u s e d a s a pool o f immediate r e q u i r e m e n t s . C321

...

and T h i s s y s t e m i n g e n i o u s l y combined t h e w o r s t a s p e c t s a n y m e t h o d o f r r p l a c e m e n t . The s u r v i v o r s ! w e r e o f t e n s u f f e r i n g f r o m b a t t l e shock, n e e d i n g r e s t and h o p i n g f o r escape f r o m a b a t t l e i n w h i c h t h e y h a d a l r e a d y e x p e r i e n c e d s e t - b a c k a n d Iwere now s e n s i n g blow t h e y w e r e t o g o b a c k i n , l e a v i n g ultimate defeat. t o the comparative s a f e t y and e l s e o f the r e a r a r e a s e n t i r e t a n k c r e w s who w e r e f r e s h a n d u n s c a t h e d . These i n t h e i r t u r n w e r e i n f u r i a t e d t o s e e t h e i r own t . a n k s upon w h i c h t h e y h a d o f t e n l a v i s h e d g r e a t c a r e b e i n g d r i v e n o f f t o b a t t l e by o t h e r s , w i t h so e u i d e n : a r e f l e c t i o n u p o n t h e i r own c o u r a g e o r t h e i r own a b i l i tr.1833
t o f

Thus armored

during

the

course

cf

this battle because

two more
the;, had in

brigades were

destroyed simply for

been u s e d a s a r e p l a c e m e n t p o o l the unit

1 ine.

t h e i ~ n i t sa l r e a d y

The

advantage of was ignored

unit

cohesion gained the use of

through such
a

training

through

system.

T h i s d e m o n s t r a t e s i n s e n s i t i v i t y t o and a l a c k of

u n d e r s t a n d i n g i n t h e m o r a l d o m a i n o f c o m b a t on t h e p a r t o+ leaders. This

is also a

r e f l e c t i o n on

the

professional

competence o f

the leaders.

O n t h e 1 4 t h o f J u n e u n t i l R i t c h i e w a s r e l i e v e d on

the

25th

of

June,

there

was

complete

I.acK

of

u n d e r s t a n d i n g between A u c h i n l e c k Ritchie failed t o

and R i t c h i e .

Primarils,

inform Auchinleck

of e i t h e r h i 5 action:

17!

or

his

intentions. 33,000 the men

On

25

June,

the

garrison

of

Tobruk

fell

with to

lost

and Y t h

Army

was
to

in put

headlong dist.rnce

retreat

Egyptian

border,

trying

between i t s e l f and " A f r i k a K o r p s . " From 25 June u n t i l the b.rttle. 8th

26 J u l y ,

Auchinleck'

directed ready to

B y 30
Army
The

June, at

Rommel's

forces were
deep

attack

forces British the

El

Alamein 150

in

Egyptian

territory.

had a r o u n d

tanks

remaining;

consol i d a t e d i n o n l y 50

7 t h Ar m our ed D i v i s i o n . but still

The A x i s h a d

tanks remaining, O n

Rommel m a i n t a i n e d h i s

offensive.

4 Julr

the of

initiative campaign

p.assed o v e r
.saw 8 t h A r m y

to

8th

Army.

The

remainder

the

which

receiued

reinforcements, forces. The

mount

continued

rttrcl.:~ to

trr

and b r e a k Rommel's the same reason.

E a c h one f r i l c d f o r and a r m o r e d

basicallr
were

infantry

forces

never a b l e t o c o o r d i n a t e t h e i r a t t a c k s . often got bogged German down in minefields

Tha a r m o r e d u n i t s and then ~ w r e

subjected t o and

counterattacks. w or n out

F i n a l I Y ,A u c h i n l e c k and could attack no

his

soldiers

were

mor e. C841 D u r i n g t h e campaign t h e B r i t i s h h a d b a s i c a l l y l o s t an entire army. was

I t

is

not

surprising

that

Gener al Gener al East

Auchinleck

relieved became

shortly Commander

thereaftsr. in Chief

H a r o l d A l exander

M i ddl e

and

Lieutenant-General i n Chief,

Sir

Bernard

L.

Montgomery

became to

t h e Commander

E i g h t h Army. 15,
1942,
but

T h i s c h a n g e was General

have o c c u r r e d on A u q u s t took over two

Montgomery cre.ated which .an he

days

early

on
by

August the

13 a n d
in

everlasting

controversy

manner

denigrated h i s predecsssor.L851 The c o n t r o v e r s y t h a t M o n t g o m e r y s t i r r e d up important changes to this study, but what

a

i s not the a

is

important Army

are into

which

transformed

defeated

v i c t o r i ou s

one.

Mon t g o m e r r ' s

cr it i c s

'jay

that

ouerwhelming numbers were t h e r e a l r e a s o n f o r h i s v i c t o r s . C e r t a i n l y when M o n t g o m e r y w e n t on t h e o f f e n s i v e d u r i n g t h e battle However of ALamein, he had an awesome enjoyed superiority.CS61 superior numbers

B r i t i sh

Armi e s

had

throughout

the p r e v i o u s campaigns

i n North A f r i c a against Rommel b e a t s u p e r i o r t h e o f f e n s i u e one m o r e that his old formula and

Rommel a n d h a d n o t b e e n v i c t o r i o u s . numbers s e v e r a l time

would

times,

a n d he

took

against

Montgomery success.

be1 i e v i n g
He

achieve

was

unsuccessful,

Montgomery w r e s t e d t h e

i n i t i a t i v e f r o m him.

M o r e t h a n m e r e s u p e r i o r i t y i n men a n d m a t e r i e l was r e q u i r e d t o d e f e a t Rommel. the pieces to success

is

M o n t g o m e r y was a b l e t o + i ! l h.ad e l u d e d that Sth Army in

in the to

that to

past.

This

not

say

~ ' ~ e r y t h i np gr i o r

Mon t g o m e r r ' s

a r r iual

was

inconsequent i a l

to

h i s success.

M o n t g o m e r y was t h e c a t a l r s t W h i ch o r g a n i r e d and enercji zed the f o r c e s o f 3 t h Army. The f i r s t c h a n g e w h i c h Mon t g o m e r y b r o u g h t

Middle

to

the

East

was

different as

leadership
I'

philosophy. and and the

the

Montgomery
wi 11

defined

1eadersh i p

the

c.apac i t y

t o r a l ly men a n d women

t o a common p u r p o s e ,

character which he added

i n s p i r e s confidence."C371 leadership He principles that

3 .

I n h i s memoirs or qualities must plan to be

several

this

definition. and not

be1 ieved

le.ader the

decisive operation,

the
the

commander staff.

must The

develop

nf

commander,

howeuer,

must
le+t

n o t become b o g g e d down

in details. the

These s h o u l d b e is free to

to

the

staff,

so

that

commander

think

t h r o u g h t h e p r o c e s s of

t h e enemy's

defeat.

The commander

must c a r r y o u t h i s d u t i e s i n a d i r e c t and p e r s o n a l manner. In this regard, his before to each his

battle

the

leader In

must to

transmit ensure intent,

intent

subordinates.'

order

that the

subordinate
Army

commanders

wi 11

understand select

the

commander

must

carefully

them. i n war

F i n a l l y he b e l i e u e d t h a t

the most individual ideas

important factor soldier. and they'

was

the

mor.ale all

of
of

the

Montgomery
were

practiced

these

the

intellectual
A r m y . C 831

force

behind

his

sweeping

chanqes

in

8th

P l o n t g o m e r y was a ' m a n o f a c t i o n a n d he p r o c e e d e d t o r u t h l e s s l y put h i s stamp on the Army. One o f of staff. and his first
Hs g a v e

a c t i o n s was t o a p p o i n t a c a p a b l e c h i e f him the power to speak

for

the

commander

complete

c o n t r o l over the staff.C393 staff

T h i s o f course +reed him from t o daal directly with The man

De

d e t a i l s and a l l o w e d h i m t i m e

s u b o r d i n a t e commanders o r o t h e r c r i t i c a l m a t t e r s . selected Guingand, for an this old position was Brigsdier and friend,

Freddie who

acquaintance

had

considerable time i n the desert. M o n t g o m e r y was f u r t u n a t e t o h a v e manv 4::per i encecl, Young staf staff .C901 officers available when he built his
Arm?

De G u i n g a n d lwas a p e r f e c t e x a m p l e .
Director
of

A~chinlecK Middle

appo n t e d h i m

Mi 1 i t a r y

I n t e l 1 igence,

E a s t and p r o m o t e d h i m f r o m L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l i n F e b r u a r y 1942.

t o Brigadier

He p r o v e d d e s e r u i n g o f r a p i d p r o m o t i o n a n d he d i d t h e same a s a c h i e f of

while i n that position, staff.

A n o t h e r way h e a s s e m b l e d h i s s t a f f w a s t h r o u g h h i s knowledge

intimate Britain. London,

of

the

officers

available he s e n t

in

Great

H i s f i r s t e v e n i n g i n command,

a b ~ i r et o

a s K i n g f o r s i x s e n i o r o f f i c e r s b y name.C911

A n o t h e r p a r t o+ M o n t g o m e r y s the process of evaluating his

s w e e p i n g c h a n g e s was
The

commanders.

first

c h a n g e was t h e a p p u i n tmen t of M a j o r - G e n e r a l t o command X I 1 1 him sent and Corps, an i n h n t r y corps.

B r i an H o r r o c k s Montgomerv h a d

out from Great to did train not

B r i t a i n because him as any a

he knew h i m we11 commander. changes; he he

helped he

divisional

Although after placed

make

other at the

immediate end o f

Rommels many

brief new men and

offensive in

August, men
a

command.

Most
Thus

were

personally

knew

trained.CW1

within
O V E . ~ hi.;

month Army. in

Montgomery had g a i n e d c o n s i d e r a b l e c o n t r o l T h e new 8 t h Army commander other ways

i n f l u e n c e d h i s Arm:* immedi.atr concern

as

well.

His

most

upon

t a k i n g command was r e s t o r i n g t h e moral e a n d c o n + i d e n c e ut t h e Army. in his He was most a p p a l l e d by t h e a t m o s p h e r e he f o u n d headquarters. With the probabi 1 i t y

,2f

Rommel

l a u n c h i n g an a t t a c k w i t h e a c h p a s s i n g d a y , h e knew h e m u s t

do

something

immediately evening

to

change

the

outlooK gave

of

his

Army.
speech himself
for

His first

i n command h e

a memorable established need

to his staff. as the man in

Montgomery

immediately

c h a r g e a n d he

emphasized t h e

a new o u t l o o k i n t h e A r m y .

A t one p u i n t h e s t a t e d ;

....o n e

of

t h e f i r s t d u t i e s of a commander

is t o

17.j

c r e a t e what I c a l l "atmosphere," and i n t h a e a t m o s p h e r e h i s s t a f f , s u b o r d i n a t e commander'z, .and t r o o p s w i 1 1 1 i u e and work and f i g h t , I do n o t 1 i k e t h e g e n e r a l a t m o s p h e r e I f i n d h e r e . I t i s an a t m o s p h e r e o f d o u b t , o f l o o k i n g b a c k t o s e l e c t t h e n e x t p l a c e t o w h i c h t o ! w i t h d r a w , o f 1o4.s o f c o n f i d e n c e i n o u r a b i I i t v t o d e f e a t Pommel, c,+ d e s p e r a t e d e f e n c e m e a s u r e s by r e s e r v e s i n p r e p a r i n g p o s i t i o n s i n C a i r o and the D e l t a . A1 1 t h a t m u s t c e a s e . L e t us h a v e a new a t m o s p h e r e . C S 3 1

I n t h i s . same immediately Rclmmel out begin to

t a l k h e a s s u r e d them t h a t t h e y w o i ~ l d plan for also the offensive i t clear to throw no

of

Africa.

He

made

that

o f f e n s i u e w o u l d b e g i n b e f o r e t h e Army was r e a d r . C ' ? 4 1 The e f f e c t s o f Ciuingand. t h i s s p e e c h was s u m m a r i s r d by De

. . T h a t a d d r e s s by M o n t g o m e r y w i 1 1 r e m a i n one o f m y most v i v i d r e c o l l e c t i o n s . . . . 1de a l l f e l t t h a t a cool a n d r e f r e s h i n g b r e e z e h a d come t o r e l i e v e t h e o p p r e s s i o n .and s t a g n a n t a t m o s p h e r e . He was g o i n g t o c r e a t e a new a t m o s p h e r e The b a d o l d d a y s w e r e o v e r , a n d n o t h i n g b u t good was i n store for us. A new e r a h a d dawned.CS53

..

....

A n o t h e r comment f r o m a s t a f f same f e e l i n g .

officer

conveys

the

T h e r e was v e r y m u c h a f e e l i n g o f " W e 1 1 w e ' l 1 g i v e I t h i n k we h a d t h i s r a t h e r a r r o g a n t v i e w i t a go."

....

t h a t we'd h a d r a t h e r a l o t o f g e n e r a l s t h r o u g h o u r hand i n o u r day. And t h i s was a new one-but he !was t a l k i n g sense,... I remember i t iwas, i t was a f e e l i n g o f g r e a t e x h i l a r a t i o n : a f e e l i n g t h . i t h e r e was somebody who was r e . a l l y g o i n g t o use h i s s t a f f . C P 6 1

A l though

these

comments w e r e made a f t e r

the e v e n

the f a c t

t h a t two p r i n c i p a l s t a f f o f f i c e r s remembered t h talk demonstrates the impression i t must

particular

have

had on t h e s t a f f . A n o t h e r d e c i s i o n w h i c h h e made on t h e day h e command was i t Known from began knew t o cancel any p l a n s + o r i w i t h d r a w a l . would fight From division going to the that defensive day
took

He made
battle he he

that

8th Army

the ir

current

position. and

forward that

conv n c i n g

corps

cummanders make

Romme " s p l a n
3

.and was

Pommel

fight he

according

h i s plan.

As he v i s i t e d

each commander

s t r e s s e d t h e s e two p o i n t s . C Y 7 1

His
brought victory. 9th

actions during back to

the

first

weeks the

nf

command
of

Army

1ife

and

sowed

seeds shook

I t was u n s e t t l i n g because

h i s manner

the

A r m y o u t o f a c o m p l a c e n t a t t i t u d e and f o r c e d commanders t o

heed h i s demands. his men recognized in

H i s manner was a l s o r e a s s u r i n g because an uncommon imposing leader his will in him. upon the
He
w .3.5

successful

rapidly

Army.

Once

in

control

the

Army

obeyed

him

and

he

made

the

changes t o win.C931 N o t a1 1 a g r e e d t h a t Montgomery was re'spclnsi b l r f o r t h e changed a t t i t u d e o f the Army. 4th T h i s 1fi~a.sb e s t e x p r e s s e d ztatrd 8th put

bv t h e
after Army's

commander the war

of

the

Indi.an DiiJi5iDn who was n o t h i n g wrong not

that which

"there its

twi t h easily

morale

regiments would

r i gh t t hemse 1 v e s , " C 991

Many a u t h o r s a t t e m p t to show that Gener.al t o go e v e n f u r t h e r en.joyed the in trying

Auchinleck

complete the Army that

c o n f i d e n c e of

h i s A r m y and t h a t

the low morale o f There

was a m y t h c r e a t e d by Montgomery.
9 t h Army

i s no doubt
time

had many c a p a b l e
these of men the would
Army.

leaders a t

this

md
was

that
the
art

many

ot'

be

loyal

to

whomever

commander example of

Brigadier

De

Uuingand w a s

such

an o f f i c e r .

I t was a k o no s e c r $ t

th,g.t

t h e i n d i v i d u a l s o l d i e r s o f 8 t h A r m y h a d f o u g h t rwell l a s t campaign.

i n the

Still
necessary.

there were

indications that

a change

was

The A r m y

fought

well

as

individual

tactical

u n i t s but were a cohesi v e

i n c a p a b l e o f c o o r d i n a t i n g i t s a c t i v i t i e s as The b i cker i ng amung

Army

Iwhul e ,

commanders
There

d u r i n g the

L a s t campaign h a d a f f e c t e d i t s uutcnme.

was c o n f u s i o n a b o u t how t h e A r m y s h o u l d . F i g h t n o t o n I Y due

to

recent

organizational methudz. o f to the

and

doctrinal had

changes, them

but

because

Rommel's

fighting

baf+led.

M o n t g o m e r y idas new

d e s e r t a n d was a b l e

t o b r i n g .a

fresh approach t o the problem.Cl001 Perhaps A u c h i n l e c k when he wrote to the Prime himself Minister had a after

sense o f
the

thiz of

+.all

Tobruk on 23 J u n e ;

The u n f a u o r a b l e c o u r s e o f t h e r e c e n t b a t t 1 I?. i m p e l s me t o ask Y O U s e r i o u s l y t o c o n s i d e r ? h e a d v i s a b i l i t y o f r e t a i n i n g me i n m y command... A ! : t h e same t h e r e i s n u d o u b t t h . a t i n .a s i t u a t i o n 1 i k e t h e p r e s e n t , f r e s h b l o o d a n d new i d e a s a t t h e t o p m a y make a l l t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n s u c c e s s and s t a l e m a t e . . A f t e r s t e e p i n g o n e s e l f f o r m o n t h s i n t h e same s u b j e c t a1 1 d a y a n d e1,ery d a y o n e i s a p t t o g e t into a Q r o o v e and t o l o s e o r i g i n a l i t r . C l 0 1 3

. ..

..

Another upon assumption

c h a n g e w h i c h M o n t g o m e r y made of command was to eliminate

immediately brigade and

o t h e r a d hoc t a c t i c a l g r o u p s and t o r e t u r n t o t h e d i v i s i o n a s t h e b a s i c Army f i g h t i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n .

He w a n t e d u n i t s

t o t r a i n and f i g h t as d i v i s i o n s t o d e v e l o p a h i g h e r d e g r e e
of the cohesion need among to the various as arms.
He

necessarily

saw

fight

combined

arms

organizations.

4 u c h i n l e c K a l s o w a n t e d h i % u n i t s t o f i g h t as c o m b i n e d arm's units; however, his division reorganization made the

brigade the basic f i g h t i n g organi:ation.

T h e new d i v i s i o n

organization

!which Montgomery with

developed the

had

one and

armored combat

and one m o t o r i z e d b r i g a d e support appendix that What the arms one). armored consol i d a t e d The

artillery

under froma

divis.ion previous

c~ztntr~~ (s lee

problem

battles

1w.1~

b r i g a d e s had was now

always

fought was

srparatr!~.
a

Montgomery

proposing

radical

ch.ange.Cl021 the 8th

T h i s c o n c e p t d i d n o t t a k e r o o t o v e r n i g h t and divisions were but Montgomery them next

far

Arrny.'s armored

from

perfect their had to

fighting

instruments, and

under.5tood He

1 imitations
drfext

employed in his

accordingly. offencive and

Rornmel

allow

hi%

d i v i s i o n s time

t o t r a i n be.Fore u s i n g them
battle

i n an o f f e n 31 -' ve put
his

role.
armored

In

the

of

&lam H a l f . n ,

Montgomerr to make

units

in

defensive

positions

Rommel

destroy h i s u n i t s against u n i t s t o charge

h i s guns r a t h e r anti-tank

than

allow h i s

i n t o Rommel's

guns.Cld31

Montgomery saw t r a i n i n g as t h e k e y t o i ~ j c t o r ~ He . r e q u i r e d a l l u n i t s t o r e h e a r s e t h e r e a c t i o n s and movements before rehearse command. the the his battle. battle
He

had

an a

exercise

designed of

to

plan the

within

few
his

days

taking to

I n designing

exercise an

instructions picture

umpires

were

to

portr.3y

accurate

o+

Rommel 's a t t a c k and t o p r o d u c e a r e . 4 1 i st i c e x r r c i s e . C 1 OJ!

After same. ready. He

t h e b a t t l e o f Alam H a l f . r , to go into battle period acted as

i t wa% m o r e o f until the

Army

the

refused the

was Alam

During

intervening batt es he

between his own own

the

H a l f a and Alamein

training training

off i c e r

and

personal y

pub1 i s h e d

his

i n s t r u c t i o n s . C 1051

Of

course

vital

part

of

the

training

r e q u i r e m e n t s w h i c h Montgomery directed doctrine. at practicing and

demanded 04 learning
a

h i s u n i t s was new tactical

What

he demanded of

a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n s !was t o armorecf and infantry armored

caonduct c o o r d i n a t e d a t t a c k s units. The o r i g i n a l

between

B r i t i s h doctrine called for t o conduct separate,

br i gades and d i v i s i i o n s att.acks. were

i nclependen t

When t h a t d o c t r i n e was w r i t t e n , organizations

and

armored b r i g a d e s initial idea. armored Also the conduct

l a r g e l y pure

the

d i v i s i o n o r g a n i z a t i o n r e f l e c t e d t h i s same doctrine called

for

Army

tank

brigades

to

coordinated attacks w i t h i n f a n t r y . Conditions on the b a t t l e f i e l d h a d changed to

inual idate t h i s doctrine. been evolving

T h e n e e d f o r a new d o c t r i n e h a d since
.a

on

the in

battlefield desert were

the

Battleaxe

campaign. achieved, situation;

First, mobile and t h e

the

once

b r e a k t h r o u g h was to exploit the Army the tank

forces

required

i n f a n t r y support

tank of

brigades were tank had

too slow become

t o be

of

use

in

this role. as

This the

also

increasingly more

vulnerable snd better changed the

battlefield guns.
A

pro1 iCerated w i t h second in factor

anti-tank was the

which

had

imprnuement and

inCantr? mobil i t ? . infantry to

were

C ' . ~ i n c e. a l l

Bri tlsh they

Commonweal t h tank

now exploit

m o t o r i zed, their

required The

support

fully

mobi 1 i t y . o i

final

factor armor now

which

ended wa5

all
the

possibility anti-tank

independent Minefields battle for

operations for

mines. in

stretched 3th

mi les, now

particularly preparing. units, guns.

ths

which of

Army

was and

Besides

coordination required the

infantry support of

armored

both arti

now
ler'v,

anti-tank:

anti-aircrait successful fought in

guns, any

engineer.; attack.

and a i r s u p p o r t Rommel's panzer

t o be f u l l y div sions

t h i s way f r o m t h e b e g i n n i n g . General Auch i n 1 eck armor r e c o g n i z e d the need f o r and inCantry campaign. hoped to as c l oser as the

cooperation other his

between the

well

arms a f t e r

"Crusader" groups he

By deueloping
gain
a

mobile

brigade

greater

degree o f c o o r d i n a t i o n between t h e v a r i o u s arms. pub1 i shed i n London lessons very

A 1 though

a .report after the desert

t h a t campai gn based Ion had ' s t a t e d t h a t

learned from

theater

idea.

The armoured d i v i s i o n ( o p e r a t e s ) o r g a n i s e d i n b r i g a d e s o f a l l arms i n c l u d i n g a p r o p o r t i o n o f i n f an t r y . and M o b i l e d e s e r t w a r f a r e appe.ars t o be l a r g e l y a m a t t e r o f columns ol: a l l arms iwhich may work ,suer 1 ong d i S t a n c e s w i d e l y s e p a r a t e d . C 10dl

T h i s i d e a was i m p o s s i b l e f o r to
QXeCUtQ.

the B r i t i s h d i l J i s i U n S

The G a z a l a b a t t l e s w e r e r e p l e t e w i t h a t t a c k s because
of

that

failed

inability

of

uarious

armored,

i n f a n t r y and . a r t i l l e r y u n i t s t o c o o p e r a t e . An n i g h t of
5~

example

of

two .such a t t a c k ? . o c c u r r e d on

the

21/22 . J u l y .
Armoured

The f i r s t a t t a c k was t o be c o n d u c t e d m d
a

22nd

8riga.de

brigade

from

the

NQW

Z e a 1 and

D i u i s i on.

The commander o f t h e 22nd Armoured B r i g a d e h a d r e f u s e d t o move b e f o r e dawn on t h e g r o u n d s t h a t t a n k s c o u l d n o t moue b y n i g h t , and Corps H e a d q u a r t e r s h a d not overruled t h i s extrordinary assertion. The German t a n k s , u n f o r t u n a t e l y d i d moue a t n i g h t , and t h e A f r i c a Corps was i n a p o s i t i o n t o p u t i n a dawn The i n f a n t r y u n i t s were o v e r r u n by t h e assault.... German p a n z e r d i u i 3 i on. C 1 0 7 1

The

Second

failure

occurred the The

at

dawn.

231-d
a

Arrnoured B r i g a d e iwas t o p a s s t h r o u g h gap in the m i n e f i e l d was cleared.

infrntry after armored

brigade

184

crossed

its

departure infantry.

1 ins

on

schedule no

and

ran

into the

withdrawing

There

was

word

whether

m i n e f i e l d was c l e a r e d , anyway and, tanK.s.

"

b u t t h e commander d e c i d e d t o a t t a c k ' of

in

the

a r m ou r e d equ i u a l en t straight armored 'onto the

a " f1 at-ou t
lost

g a l 1 op twentr

running
"

minefield,

The

brigade

all

by

itself

on

the

m i n e f i e l d was f i r e d on by German a n t i - t a n k from with failed three 11 of sides. The

guns and t a n k s only had

brigade had to withdraw but Obuiously Auchinleck

104

tanks.Cl081.

i n h i s attempt

t o g a i n g r e a t e r c o o p e r a t i o n between

t h e d i f f e r e n t arms. Montgomery doctrine

.as

did

not had

try

to
to

imitate with

the hia

German mobile

kuchinleck

tried

brigade groups.
a radical

He b e l i e v e d t h a t

these m o b i l e g r o u p s were B r i t i s h doctrine to execute and

a

dep.arture from commanders

traditional were unable

that

British

such

mobile doctrine.

He w a s p r o b a b l r c o r r e c t b e c a u s e 8 r i t i s h

d o c t r i n e i n p a r t was s t i l l c l o s e l y l i n k e d t o t h e W o r l d War

I d o c t r i n e w h i c h had s t r e s s e d h e a v y use o f f i r e p o w e r .
is not

I t
its

surprising

that

British

doctrine was

tied

to

past.

T h e same was t r u e o f t h e Germans.

T h e i r World War

I 1 d o c t r i n e h a d e v o l v e d d i r e c t l y f r o m t h e d o c t r i n e ot' t h e
l a t t e r y e a r s o f W o r l d 1Jar I .

The develop making. in his

doctrine armored

iwnich units

Montgomery !was not

in

WAS

trying his

to
own

solely

The

RoYa.1

Armoured

Corps

Great

Britain

had new i t

pub1 i s h e d a R o y a l doctrine clearly. from his

Armoured Creed w h i c h Montgomery, as Chief

d e s c r i b e d the in

h o i ~ i e v e r , had a hand Umpire during of

position

training Both this

e x e r c i s e s i n Great B r i t a i n d u r i n g the f a l l he and General Brooke shaped the final

1941.
of

wording

creed. C 1091
One o n l y n e e d s t o c o m p a r e
3 few

of of

the statements Montgomery~ The

on

the

Royal

Armoured

Creed

with

some

i d e a s w r i t t e n b e f o r e A l a m e i n t o see t h e s i m i l a r i t i e s . new c r e e d s t a t e d :

1. An a r m o u r e d d i v i s i o n i s a f o r m a t i o n o f a l l arms. E a c h a r m o r b r a n c h o f t h e S e r v i c e i.5 .a member i l part to play. Success o f t h e team, a n d h a s i t s ~t a i s d e p e n d e n t on m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h i n t h e t e a m , w h i c h m u s t be b a s e d on e x p e r i e n c e g a i n e d d u r i n g training. 2. I f a commander c a n s u c c e e d i n d e s t r o y i n g t h e g r e a t e r p a r t o f t h e enemy a r m o u r e d d i u i s i o n s , w h i l e r e t a i n i n g h i s own f i t f o r a c t i o n , he w i l l b e a b l e t o operate f r e e l y and b o l d l y t o achieve h i s purpose.....This f i g h t f o r armoured supremacy w i l l n o r m a l l y s t a r t w i t h a manoeuvre f o r p o s i t i o n between Forw.ard t h e a r m o u r a d f o r m a t i o n s of t h e two s i d e s . p i v o t s may be s e i z e d b y m o t o r b a t t a l i o n s f r o m w h i c h I n t h i s manoeuvre armoured a c t i o n can be 1 aunched.. f o r p o s i t i o n , t h e r e i s 3 g r e . a t AdoVanhge t o t h e s i d e t h a t c a n f o r c e t h e enemy t o . a t t a c k h i m c N n #ground o f h i s own c h o o s i n g . T h i s can sometimes b e a c h i e v e d b r s e i z i n g g r o u n d w h i c h i s v i t a l t o t h e enemy.

....

..

The c l a s h b e t w e e n t h e a r m o u r e d d i v i s i o n s o f p r e l u d e t o many t h e two s i d e s w h i c h seems a l i k e l : ~ o p e r a t i o n s , h a s o f t e n b e e n i n t e r p r e t e d t o m e l n .a # c l a s h b e t w e e n t h e .armour o f t h e t w o s i d e s . T h i s may h a p p e n a t t i m e s , b u t i t i s g e n e r a l l y sound t o use t a n k s t o a t t a c k t h e u n a r m o u r e d p o r t i o n s o f t h e enemy .armmured d i v i s i o n s a n d w a r d o++ t h e enemy t a n k s w i t h a n t i - t a n K guns w h i l e d o i n g s o . C l 1 0 1

3.

Montgomery w r o t e t h e f o l o w i n g ;

3. The a r m o u r m u s t b e k e p t c o n c e n t r a t e d . I t must be so p o s i t i o n e d on i m p o r t a n t g r o u n d t h a t t h e e n e m y will be f o r c e d t o a t t a c k i t , i . e . he w i l l h a v e t o a t t a c k ,our a r m o u r on g r o u n d o f i t s own c h o o s i n g . I n f a n t r y ' p i u o t s ' ( p a r a 2 ) m u s t be so s t r o n g Infantry t h a t t h e y w i l l h o l d o u t a g a i n s t any a t t a c k . gar r s o n s m u s t n o t r e l y on a r m o u r e d u n i t s t o h e l p them beat o f f attacks. The a r m o u r w i l l t h e n b e + r e e t o #choose i t s own b a t t e f i e l d a n d w i 1 1 be a b l e t o b a s e i t s m a n o e u v r e o n s e c u r e 1 y he 1 d p i Q t s , I1 1 1 3 21....b) The o f f e n s i u e u s e o f a n t i - t . a n k a r t i l l e r y i n c l o s e c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h armoured r e g i m e n t s i n the a t t a c K o n enemy a r m o u r e d f o r m a t i o n s . Particular c o n s i d e r a t i o n w i l l be g i v e n t o the employment o f a n t i - t a n K g u n s on t h e f l a n k s o f he a r m o u r . C l 1 2 1

8.1

C l e a r l y these were with him the

i d e a s wh c h M o n t g o m e r y b r o u g h t whic there. these had The been deueloped

from

Great

Britain

during

training exercises

d i f f i c u l t y he

had i n g a i n i n g accept.mce f o r to him before Romme1,'s

i d e a s became a p p a r e n t at
Alam

att.ack

Halfa.

In

e x p l a i n i n g h i s concept he was a s k e d ;

t o t h e a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n commander,

.armour a g a i n s t Rommel? He s h o u l d g i v e t h e w o r d for t h a t t o happen. I r e p l i e d t h a t n o one w o u l d l o o s e t h e armour; i t w o u l d n o t be 100s.ed and w e w o u l d l e t Eommel T h i s was a new i d e a m to him bump i n t o i t f o r a change. and he a r g u e d .about i t a good d e a l . t 1 1 3 1

.... who w o u l d l o o s e t h e t h o u g h t t h a t he h i m s e l f

H i s p l a n was armored b r i g a d e d i d n o t battle began he had

obeyed

during

the

battle.

The

l a u n c h an a s s a u l taken precautions

t , b u t b e f o r e the
and placed the

armored b r i g a d e d i r e c t l y u n d e r certain this didn't

After

the c o r p s comrrlander

t o make

happen.Cl141 # v i c t o r y a.t k l a m H a l i a ,

his

the

Sth

/;?my

commander concen t r a t e d h i s t r a i n i n g e f f o r t s i n p r e p a r a t i o n
$or

t a k i n g the

offensive.

A vital
"

part o i
L ' J ~ St

t h i s pl-an w a s

%he use o f where he

a " C o r p s de Chasse. had concentrated the

This bulk

he

10th Corps armor in

o+

his

armored d i v i s i o n s and a m o t o r i z e d d i v i s i o n .
to

I n addition doctrine, he

training

the

armored d i v i s i o n s

in

a new

had t o p r e p a r e an a r m o r e d c o r p s f o r o f f e n s i n > e . a c t i o n .

Th is c o n c e p t

of

g r o u p i n g armored un i t s

together

and have them f i g h t as a c o r p s h a d bean t r i e d i n p r e v i o u s

c amp a i gn s

In

the

"Crusader"

campaign,

three

armored

b r i g a d e s and t h e S o u t h A f r i c a n m o b i l e d i v i s i o n w e r e p l a c e d
in

one

Corps,

but

# d u r i n g the

battle

theie

iunit;

became During to fipht

s e p a r a t e d and b a s i c . a l l r f o u g h t the Gazala b a t t l e s A u c h i n l e c K

separ.ate b a t t l e s . had told Pitchie

t h e t w o a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n s .as .a c o r p s , in execution because the units

but

t h i s b r o k e #down concentrate

coi~ld not

b e f o r e Rclmmel

defeated the armored b r i g a d e s i n d e t a i 1 , d o c t r i n e h a d been establ ished

I n b o t h c a s e s no

b e f o r e t h e campaign.

T h e r e was n o c o n c e p t o n h m a r m o r e d A t the time articulated

corps headquarters should control operations.

oi

these

campaigns,

the

highest

level

of

a r m o r e d d o c t r i n e was t h e b r i g a d e . each commander from corps

to

Dur i n g t h e s e campaigns brigade had a different

c o n c e p t on how

to fight

the b a t t l e .
be

For

any d o c t r i n e

to
the

be w . 1 i d a t e d t h e r e must concept which is

a common u n d e r s t i n d i n g o f achieved through

only

training.

T r l i n i n g f o r a c o r p s l e v e l O p e r a t i o n must n o t o n l y i n c l u d e developing the technical skills of the units,

to+

but

more
to
dn

importantly deueloping the control this. and c o o r d i n a t e .

capabilities

the

staffs
to

Plo a t t e m p t

h a d b e e n made

M o n t g o m e r y t r i e d t c r e c t i + y t h i s p a s t p r o b l e m when

he

created h i s how

" C o r p s de to fight.

Chasse" He made

by

giving

the

uni t s f i t

c o n c e p t on concept f o r
for

the

doctrine

his

the next

campaign. and

Seven w e e k s w e r e the

allowed
The

the

units to was

train

learn

new d o c t r i n e . 8th
Army

doctrine

disseminated

through

Training and

Memorandum No 1 .

T h i s memorandum iwas t o

be s t u d i e d

18?

r e a d once

a week

by

all

commanders.

portion

#of t h e

d o c t r i n e s e t down i n t h e memorandum s t a t e d ;

2. 1 0 C o r p s w i l l be an a r m o u r e d C o r p s . Its o p e r a t i o n s w i l be m o b i l e and e s s e n t i a l l y o f f e n s i v e e v e n when 8 t h Army i s f i g h t i n g a d e f e n s i v e b a t t l e . M o b i l i t y means s p e e d i n a c t i o n , a n d h a s l i t t l e t o d o Speed i n w i t h m.p.h. and h a s l e s s t o do w i t h h a s t e . a c t i o n i s a c h i e v e d by: a ) I m m e d i a t e d e c i s i o n by commanders a t e a c h level b ) R a p i d i s s u e o f o r d e r s and i v s t r u c t i o n s c ) I n s t a n t a n d i n t e l l i g e n t o b e d i e n c e on t h e part o f subordinates. Immediate d e c i s i o n s a r e o n l y p o s s i b l e i f commander"s minds x r e c o n t i n u a l l y a p p r e c i a t i n g the. s i t i ~ a t i n n . . . . c1151

This

i 1 l u s t r a t e r M o n t g o m e r r ' . s command a n d ccmtrcNl

portion of h i s doctrine. discussed commanders, combined arms, and

T h e r e iwere o t h e r s e c t i o n s w h i c h
f l e x i b i l i ty unit and organization, and battle

formation

headquarters,

d r i l l as w e l l

as a s e c t i o n f o r e a c h o f t h e c o m b a t a r m s .
expected his un i t s to
1earn

Montgomery doctrine through

this

a rigorous
1

training both

program. what and

Training how the

Memorandum

No.

established

t r a i n i n g was t o be a c c o m p l i s h e d . general of t r a i n i ng p o l i c y and

A

One s e c t i o n cover'ed to

outlined a the be sequence prepared

another

training.

weekly

training

program

down t o p l a t o o n or t r o o p

l e v e l was r e q u i r e d .

As the Army

1 PCI

Commander,

he c o n d u c t e d s t a f f

exercises f o r the

d i u i s i o n and In his

brigade headquarters throughout t r a i n i n g memorandum he s t . a t e d ;

period.ClIA1

i t i s a w a s t e o f t i m e and t r a i n i n g mile.sge t o t r a i n w i t h v e h i c l e s u n t i l a l l ranks understand ex.actly T h i s i s t a u g h t on TEWTz & what i s b e i n g done. d e m o n s t r a t e d on c l o t h m o d e l s . C l 1 7 1

....

The l e v e l o f d e t a i 1

t o whi8:h level That

Montgomery p r e s c r i b e d of p r o f e s s i o n a l i5m h e completely

h i s concepts demonstrates the h a d .achieved i n successful however employ several h i s career.

he was n o t

i n p r o p a g a t i n g t h i s doc: tr i ne m u s t be a c c e p t e d ;

b e c a u s e h i s . a r m o r e d c o r p s was n e v e r a b l e t o f u l I:/ in battle for his as he had envisioned. the too There of were what to be

it

reasons asked

th is. Army to

First
do

nature

Montgomerr

was

complex

m a s t e r e d i n such a s h o r t t i m e .

E i g h t h Army h a d n e v e r b e e n

e x p o s e d t o s u c h a s y s t e m o f command a n d d i s c i p l i n e a t a n y p r e u i ous time.

Me

was

Unable

to

overcome

all

the

r e s i s t a n c e t o Change found i n t h e A r m y . I n p r e v i o u s campaigns, had failed, in part, when t h e u s e o f an a r m o r e d c o r p s the corps commander had

d i s a g r e e d w i t h t h e &rmy commanders the corps.

p l r n f o r e m p l o y m e n t fn+ lack

T h i s was a s e c o n d r e a s o n f o r M o n t g o m e r r s

191

o f cumplete success. the b a t t l e p!.m f o r disagreeing armor. commander

1 0 t h C o r p s commander d i s a g r e e d ! w i t h the of+ensive. This

as t a n t a m o u n t

to

with
i t

Montgomerr'.s

doctrine a

for
of

the the

use

of

While

was

never

question he

corps
the

disobeying

Montgomery,

clearlr

lacked

e n t h u s i a s m and d e d i c a t i o n needed t o e x e c u t e t h e p l a n . C l 1 3 1

A
execute had this

t h i r d r e a s o n why doctrine

the

armored u n i t s c o u l d n o t t h e many changes w h i c h prior to

was due

to
their

completely

destroyed

cohesion

Montgomery's

arrival.

U n i t s h a d been c u n s . t a n t l r changed u n i t s iwere n e u e r the same

between d i v i s i o n s , f r o m one b a t t l e on a new tanK a l l leads

to

groupings o f next,

t o the

a n d crews h a d t o be

trained

too f r e q u e n t l y .
that

The p i c t u r e th1.s p . a i n t s there was too l i t t l e

the

conclusion

c o n t i n u t i r on w h i c h t o b u i l d . Even d u r i n g corps commander's One this p e r i o d ot' t r . a i n i n g , the changes divisions from the

p e r s p e c t i ve

appeared had been

insurmountable.

of

the

armored

d i s b a n d e d and t h e o t h e r t w o a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n s i n h i s c o r p s h a d t o a b s o r b t h e two b r i g a d e s .
One b r i g a d e ,

an

infantry

b r i g a d e , was s t i l l a d a p t i n g t o i t s r e c e n t l y c o n v e r t e d r o l e
as

lorried

infantry, attached.

a n d now After

it

was

required

to

opebate Cherm.an

w i t h armor

Alam

H a l + a new

1J.S.

t a n k s a s we1 1 a s C r u s a d e r s w i t h 6 p o u n d e r g u n s a r r i u e d .

C r e w s h a d t o l e a r n t h e c a p a b i l i t i e s o f t h e s e new t a n k s , and t h e r e f i e l d i n g r e q u i r e d c o n t i n u a l t r a n s f e r s o f t . a n k s the and crews f r o m o n r squadron t o a n o t h e r . Soria O C Sherman t a n k s w e r e d e l i v e r e d t o c r e w s on t h e d a y o f t h e b a t t l e . C 1191 Even f o r PlOn t g o m e r y ' s s t r o n g u i 1 1 these problems w e r e t o o much t o o v e r c o m e . Tu h i s c r e d i t he recognized t h e l i m i t a t i o n s i n t h e c a p a c i t y o f 9 t h A r m y t o ch.ange. I n h i s P l e m o i r s he w r o t e ;

i t was b e c o m i n g a p p a r e n t t o me t h a t t h e E i g h t h Army was ' v e r y u n t r a i n e d . The n e e d f o r t r a i n i n g h a d n e v e r been s t r e s s e d . M o s t commanders h a d c o m e t o t h e f o r e b r s k i l l i n f i g h t i n g and because n o b e t t e r w e r e a v a i l a b l e ; many w e r e a b o v e t h e i r c e i 1 i n g , a n d f e w w e r e good t r a i n e r s . By t h e e n d o f September t h e r e idere s e r i o u s d o u b t s i n m y m i n d w h e t h e r t h e t r o o p s . W O U I ~ be . a b l e t o d o wh.at was b e i n g demanded; t h e p l a n iwas s i m p l e b u t i t was t o o a m b i t i o u s . I f I was n o t c a r e f u l , d i v i s i o n s a n d u n i t s w o u l d be g i v e n t a s k 5 w h i c h m i g h t e n d i n f a i l u r e becaus.e o f an i n a d e q u a t e standard o f training. T h e E i g h t h Army h a d s i ~ f f e r , d some 3 0 , 0 0 0 c a s u a l t i e s s i n c e i t was f o r m e d , a n d 1 i t t l e t i m e h a d been s p e n t i n t r a i n i n g t h e r e p l a c e m e n t ; . C 1 2 0 1

....

With his plan and plan

these f a c t o r s take a mare 10th

i n mind,

he d e c i d e d t o m o d i ' y approach. through

The

conservative Corps 30th to

original

required

pass

30th

Corps a f t e r enemy's

the

i n f a n t r y of

Corps had bre.ached t h e t o establish the enemy the enemy .armor itself in

defenses.

1 0 t h Corps was across would

defensive

positions This
by

1 ines
armor in

uf
to

communication. destroy itself

force the

attacking

British

their

p o s i t i o n s . C 121 I

The destroy battle enemy

intent armor

of

t h e changed p l a n was no l o n g e r

to the

but

to

hold

the

armor

out

of

w h i l e athe

forward

enemy

inf.mtry that rear

defenses

were

destroyed piecemeal. have to thrust

T h i s meant enemys

1 0 t h Corps d i d n o t and closer contact

i n t o the

c o l i l d be m a i n t a i n e d b e t w e e n t h e t w o c o r p s . C ! 2 2 1 Flontgomerr w a s v i c t o r i o u s , c r i t i c i s m of h i s g e n e r a l s h i p abound. a l t h o u g h q u e s t i o n s and H i s changed p l a n f o r attrition. in

the

Alamein f o r c e d h i s u n i t s t o f i g h t The u s e o f classic demanded. armor in

a battle of

t h i s b a t t l e was c e r t a i n l y n o t supporters
of

style

that

of

mobile point

iwarfare out that

had he his They

Suppoerters

Montgomery of

recognized the armored forces

1 imitations

h i s Army, his plan

particularlr

and a d j u s t e d

accordingly.

a l s o p o i n t o u t t h a t Rommel was n e v e r a b l e t o d e f e a t h i m . Not a l l study. What and is

of

these

issues are i s to

important

to

this

important other

i d e n t i f r why f a i led. posi t i u e

P!ontgomerr First, factors the

succeeded external

commanders p r o v i d e d many

environment

for

Montgomery w h i c h were n e g a t i v e f o r A u c h i n l e c k Montgomerys

r e 1 a t i onsh i p
w i th

and W a v e l l . p r o v i ded
a

his

super i o r s

p o s i t i u e c l imate f o r change. confidence of both Alexander

Montgomery h a d the t r u s t and .and B r o o k e who g a v e him thc

L a t i t u d e t o command h i s A r m y a s h e saw f i t .

He b e n e f i t e d

!94

from

h i s wartime experience

i n Great

E r t i a t i n b e c a u s e he

h a d a f i r s t h a n d know1 edge the Army. General

Brooke,

ol: t h e 1 e . n d e r s h i p a u a i 1 a b l e i n
as,
C.I.G.S.,

all~:~wedhim

to

choose the aggress i ve admiration

e a d e r s he n e e d e d for h i s A r m y . eadership of Winston

H i s brash and respect he he nnd

style soon
Churchill.

h~i m t h e

Although early,

received did not and

Snme p r e s s u r e
experience the

to begin
constant

h i s offensiue

badgering which

b o t h Wauell

Auch n l e c k r e c e i v e d f r o m C h u r c h i l l . abi 1
ty

T o h i s c r e d i t wa.5 h i s
Neither

t o communicate w i t h

the

Prime M i n i s t e r .

w av e

1 n o r A u c h i n l e c K !were a b l e t o h e l p t h e m s e l v e s i n t h i . 5

regard.

M o n t g o m e r y was . a b l e t o f o c u s !on d e f e a t i n g Rommel

whereas. A u c h i n l e c k a n d p a r t i c u l a r l y I J a v e I 1 h a d t h e a t e r w i d e responsibilities. This often diverted their attention

is

well a s r e s o u r c e s .
Montgomery had t i m e t o p r e p a r e h i s A r m y f o r b a t t l e which neither Wauell nor AuchinlecK had. This allowed them he

h i m t i m e n o t o n l y t o make c h a n g e s , through training. In the final

but

to legitimize

analysis,

howruer,

s t i l l r e q u i r e d more t i m e t o c o m p l e t e these changes. A * n u i ronmen t second important point in

is

the
Army

internal when
he

wh i c h

Montgomery

l:ound

the

t o o k command.

He h a d t h e 3 o o d f o r t u n e t o t a k e command m a +
war f i g h t i n g experiences.

an a r m y w h i c h h a d 15 m o n t h s o f

He

had

the

benefi t had

of

commanding endure

many the

combat

skilled of
the

s o l d i e r s who ldesert.

learned t o t h e s e many

hardships

Besides

experienced veterans,

there

w e r e many s m a l l

u n i t s which w e r e w e l l

l e d and c o u l d s e r v e

as t h e f o u n d a t i o n a r o u n d w h i c h t o d e v e l o p l a r g e r c o h e s i v e
un i t s . Another aduan t a g e wh i c h Mon t g o m e r y h a d was

the

many c a p a b l e a n d e x p e r i e n c e d t o d e v e l o p an e f f e c t i u e s t a f f Their control professional ism of the Army and

staff

o f f i c e r s around which time. gain have

i n .a s h o r t p e r i o d o f helped he him to not

loyal ty which

without

could

c a r r i e d o u t t h e sweeping changes. Even w i t h t h e s e a d v a n t a g e s M o n t g c m s r r s t i l l h a d t o p r o v i de t h e d r i v e , staff

Army

f o c u s a n d d i r e c t i on w h i c h s n e r g i :sd cohesive some combat force. and

the Ths had and

and c r e a t e d a s t r o n g , had just gone through

trying

times

s u f f e r e d many c a s u a l t i e s . several

He

h a d many new

soldiers

new a r m o r e d u n i t s t o

i n t e g r a t e i n t o the Army.

To

d e v e l o p t h e c o o r d i n a t i o n between h i s i n f a n t r y and armored u n i t s , he h a d t o r e s t o r e t h e infantry units' confidence i n

the f i g h t i n g c a p a b i l i t i e s o f the armored f o r c e s . A n o t h e r f a c t o r w i t h w h i c h E r i t i s h commanders h a d t o c o n t e n d was t h e qua1 i tr a n d q u a n t i t y o f a r m o r e d + o r c e . z .

BY
deal

the

time a

Montgomery shortage

took of

command

he

did not

ha')@ t o and

with

materiel.

Both

American

B r i t i s h war

p r o d u c t i o n was

p r o 0 i d i n g e q u i pmen t
5

and

the i r

c o m b i n e d c a p a c i t y 5 . u r p a s s e d t h r ::xi The guns

powers

capabi 1 i t i e s . a n t i -tank

B r i t i s h )were al so p r o d u c i n g 1 a r g e r
in greater quantities !which

c.al i b e r helped

close

the The

qua! i t a t i u e gap b e t w e e n t h e A x i s a n d B r i t i s h f o r c e s . B r i t i sh C r u s a d e r gun, new but t a n k w a s a1 so p r o u i ded w i t h

a 6-pounder improved. quantity t.anK in tank

A

i t s mechanical tank, the

re1 i a b i l i t r h a d n o t
Sherman, arrived in

American

in

September. any which

T h i s was a b e t t e r a n d m o r e p o w e r f u l the B r i tis.h In turn armored forces

had

than the had tank

iwas

seen

Middle East.

.a m o r e

powerful

M.ark

IV

o f f s r t a n y t e c h n o 1 o g i cal
may

aduan t a g e s t h a t The

t h e Sherman
Mark

have

gi urn

the

Br i t i s h .

German

!I

prouided w i t h a long-barreled c o u l d match r e s u l t of to parity

its

75 mm g u n , a n d n u o t h e r tanK
penetrating the power. The net

range

and

these

c h a n g e s was t h a t guns b u t

eritish were

c!oser

i n anti-tank tanks. The

h a d lost

ground ~ l i p h t l r between the

i n terms o f

relative correlation

f o r c e s had n o t changed d r a m a t i c a l l r .
The British forces had not been at

a serious

qua1 i t a t i u e d i s a d u a n t a g e s i n c e t h e B a t t l e a x e c a m p a i p n when General

ldauell

was

i n command.

The:.,

had c l o s e d the
and by

g3.p

s i g n i + i c a n t l r by t h e Crusader c 3 m p . i i p n , b a t t l e s they had achieued a t

the G.axala

least parity.

1 ?7

I n terms of quantity,

B r t i t i s h f o r c e s h a d en.joyed
the

an a d v a n t a g e i n numbers o u e r Pommel s i n c e t h e s t a r t of Crusader superiority of campai q n , pion t q o m e r v ' . s ' r a t i o guns b e f o r e

of

t'orce

i n tanKs and a n t i - t a n k

the b a t t l e beflore the Montgornerr anti-tank commander

Alam Hal a w a s n o t a$. g r e a t BY the in any

as A u c h : n l e c K ' s
time of Alamein, tanks,

G a z a l a B a t t es.CI231 had a g r e a t e r guns,

superiority than

materiel, preu i ous

and a r t i 1 1 e r y

B r i t i sh

h a d e x p e r i e n c e d d u r i n q t h e N o r t h A f r i c.an carnpai g n s . While quantity following of i t is difficult meant t o a s s e s s idhat q u a l i t : ? and in the desert battles, was not the
a

equipment

obseruations factor to the in

seem
the

ual i d . outcc!me

Qua1 i t y

significlnt since prior

of

battles However,

at

l r a ~ t

Crusader

campai g n .

B r i Ii sh

a r m o r e d f o r c e s w e r e n e u e r a b l e t o ach i elus t h e combat p u w e r

of

the

German p a n z e r superiori ty The and in reason

uni ts, in

therefore order to the

the

B r i t i s h needed the German tactical unit.

numerical

defeat

forces.
doctrine

for

this of

was

superior

training

the

German

panzer the

Superiority British

numbers d i d n o t During armored the

quarantee

s u c c e s s uf the British to

forces.

Gazala b a t t l e s , and w e r e

had consi derabl e

super i o r i t v

unabl e

w i n euen w h i l e ,on t h e d e f e n s i u e .

.
not p~ictur,~.

C1 e a r I Y
he These and

t h e n Pion t g o m e r r i s had to make other

s u p e r i o r numbers changes in to

ere

enough,

achieve division armored unit the

other

changes

i,uere

the new

o r g a n i z a t i on division division.
a r r i Val

d o c tr i ne made

.
the

Montgomerr's basic

structure

fighting

T h i s was a s i g n i f i c a n t c h a n g e b e c a u s e u n t i l h i s the armored brigade forces groups. had fought p r imar i 1 y as to

brigades

or

He was
in detail

determined not a s he h a d t h e

a l l o w Rommel

t o defeat him

other

B r i t i s h commanders.

U1 t i m a t e 1 y ,
to complement never his

t h i s d i v i s i on o r g a n i z a t i on was medn t new doctrine. assimi 1 n t r d The the British armored which this to

forces

completely

doctrine

Plontgomeri' b r o u g h t t o t h e M i d d l e E a s t . doctrine needed more time, but his

Acceptance o f training

program

a c h i e v e i t w a s sound. F i n a l 1y , c r i t c i z e d for his overall Mon t g o m e r r ' s general ship but has been

h i s use o f

armored f o r c e s ,
as

this

ignores

contribution that

a
the

leader. greatest The

It

was

his

l e a d e r s h i p qua1 i t i e s

made

contribution had

t o t h e change

i n armored f o r c e s .

a r m o r e d luni t s

n o t b e e n s u b j e c t e d t o h i s s t y l e o+ d i s c i p l i n e a n d t r a i n i n g since the days of Hobart's prewar the Egyptian command.

of

During the

intervening period,

tactical

doctrine

1 ?9

armored

forces

had

been

allowed the

to type

develop of

without

.a

professional requi r e d to

understrndi ng of fight.

war
the

they were n a t u r e iof the

Plon t g o m e r y

recogn i zed fight

the

b a t t l e which

armored f o r c e s must

a n d made which

appropriate forces
were

adjustments then

to

the

doctrine Existing

armored was

practicing. Other change

doctrine

difficult had seen

to a

change. need for

commanders, in to doctrine do having the

1 ilce

Auchinleclc lacked about the

it.

but

strong,

forceful

character

anything the w i l l

Montgomery d e s e r v e s c r e d i t of personal i t ? to bring

for

and f o r c e changes to

about

necessarr

achieve f i n a l

v i c t o r y i n the desert.

ENDNOTES

1. B r i a n Bond, B r i t i s h M i l i t a r v P o l i c y Between t h e Two l d o r l d ldsrs < O x f o r d : C l a r e n d o n , 1?80), p p . 181-182.

7. B. H . L i d d e l l H a r t , T h e i V e m o i r s o f Liddel! ( L o n d o n : C a s s e l l , l965), 1 1 , 193-134. The M u n i c h c r i s i s o c c u r r e d i n S e p t e m b e r 1935 when H i t l e r demanded t h e
C.a~,tsin Hart

r e t u r n of the Sudetenland, a p a r t o f C z e c h o s l o v a k i a a t the t i m e , t o Germany. W a r was a u o i d e d when G r e a t B r i t a i n a n d F r a n c e f o r c e d C:echosl ouak i a t o a c q u i e s c e , a n d t h e t e r r i t o r y was c e d e d t o G e r m a n y ,

1941 ( L o n d o n :
Hart,

3.

B a r r i e P i t t , The C r u c i b l e N n f I,d%r: l d e s t c r n D e . s e r t J o n a t h a n Cape, 1'?:30), I , 13-21. L i d d r l I I ! , 194.

4. K e n n e t h J. M a c k s e y , A r m o u r e d C r u s a d e r : k B i o a r z p h v o f M a j o r - G e n e r a l S i r P e r c y H o b a r t ( L o n d o n : H i ~ t ~sh on i, l?.S?i, p p . 157-160.

5.
6.

As q u o t e d f r o m MackseyI Armoured Crusader, p .

157.

Macksey, Armoured C r u s a d e r , p p , Pitt,

1511-173. Pi t t , I ,

41.
7.
8.

I , 40-41,
pp.
100-102,

Macksey, Armoured C r u s a d e r , Pitt,

160-161

9.

I , 42.

10. P i t t , I , 86. A c o n v o y s e t s a i l i n A u g u s t a n d On t h i s c o n v o y w e r e a r r i v e d i n t h e Suez on 24 S e p t e m b e r . 3 t a n k r e g i m e n t s o r b a t t a l i o n s ; one b a t t a l i o n each o f l i g h t , medium a n d h e a v y t a n k s . The h e a v y o r i n f a n t r y t a n k s d i d n o t become a p a r t o f t h e d i u i s i o n , b u t t h e a d d i t i o n o f t h e o t h e r t w o r e g i m e n t s gaue t h e 7 t h A r m o u r r d The D i v i s i o n i t s c o m p l e t e complement o f 6 tank r e g i m e n t s . t o t a l t a n k s t r e n g t h when t h e y w e n t i n t o b a t t l e w a s .about 200 l i g h t t a n k s a n d 75 c r u i s e r s . S e e I . 5 . 0. P l a r S a i r s t a1 The Medi t e r r a n e . a n a n d M i d d l e E a s t , Oolume I : T h e E a r l y S u c c e s s e s A a a i n s t I t a l y ( t o Flay 1941). H i s t o r y o f

.,

20 1

t h e S e c o n d W o r l d War. O f f i c e ) , I , 190-172.

(London:

H i s Majesty's

Stationery

11. The t e r m W e s t e r n D e s e r t i s a t e r m ~ ~ s e by d Br i t ish The g e n e r a l a n d Commonwealth s o l d i e r s who f o u g h t t h e r e . g e o y r a p h i c b o u n d a r i 8s b e g a n j u s t w e s t oC A l e x a n d r i 3 a n d extended west t o Gazala. T h i s .area i s a band w h i c h e x t e n d s a b o u t 150 m i l e s a t i t s w i d e s t p a r t s o u t h o+ t h e Pledi t e r r a n e a n . A t t h e t i m e L i b y a c o n s i s t e d o f two p a r t s ; the e a s t e r n p a r t , C y r e n a i c a and t h e w e s t e r n p a r t , Tripolitania. S e e P l a y f a i r , I , 115.

1 2 . C o r r e l l i B a r n e t t , The D e s e r t G e n e r a l s ( B l o o m i n g t o n , I N , I n d a n a U n i v e r s i t y , 1932), p p .

63-64.

13.
14.

Playfair,

I , 230.
Barnett, p.
21.

P i t % , I , 36- 2 9 .

15.
16.

P l a y + a i r , I , 92-9:3. Pitt,

I , 50-54.

Playfair,

I , 209-211.

17. P l a y f a i r , I , 362. G i f r a r d Lea. M a r t e l , & Armoured F o r c e s ( L o n d o n : F a b e r , l?45), p p . 91-72. P i t t , I , 190. F o r a c o m p l e t e a c c o u n t o f t h e c a m p a i g n s e a P l a y f a i r , I , 265-293; 351-366 o r P i t t , I , 85-193.

18. B r i g a d i e r C. N. B a r c l a y , A a a i n s t G r e a t Odds ( L o n d o n : S i f t o n P r a e d , 1 9 5 5 ) , p p . 21-27. R o b e r t H. L a r s o n , The B r i t i s h A r m y and t h e T h e o r y o f A r m o r e d W a r f a r e . 1918-1940 ( N e w a r k , NJ: U n i u . o f D e l a w a r e , 1 ? 8 4 i , p p . 237-238. P l a y f a i r , I , 355-360. 19. 20.
Larson, pp. Pitt, Pitt,

237-238.
Playfair,

I , 21-26. I , 52-54.

I , 363-364.

21.

22. C o l o n e l H. C. 8. R o g e r s , TanKs i n B a t t l e ( L o n d o n : S e e l e y , 1 9 6 5 1 , p p . 121-122. P l a y f a i r , I , 364.

23. I . S. 0. P l a y f a i r e t al., The M e d i t e r r ~ n e a na n d M i d d l e E a s t , Yolume 11: The Germans C 8 m :e t o the H e 1 ~ of t h e i r A l l y (1941j. H i s t o r y o f t h e S e c o n d Ihlorld War. ( L o n d o n : H i s M a j e s t y ' s S t a t i o n e r ? O f f i c e , 1'?56), 1 1 , 164. P i t t , I , 190.

24.

Barnett, Plxyf3ir,

p.

65.

Playfqir,

11, 3 .

25.

11, 2.

26. D a v i d F r a s e r , And W e S h a l l Shock Them. The B r i t i s h A r m y i n t h e S e c o n d W o r l d 1d.w ( L o n d o n : H o d d e r a n d Stoughton, 1953), p148. P l a y f a i r , 1 1 , 2 , 11-17. Pitt, I, 251 -252.

27. B. H. L i d d e l l H a r t ( E d ) , The Rommel P a p e r s (New Y o r k : H a r c o u r t . B r a c e . 1953). Pitt. I. 2 5 1 . , D D . 105-106. The B a r b a r o s s a o p e r a t i o n was t h e p l a n f o r t h e IGerman a t t a c k o f the S o v i e t Union. Rommel was n o t t o l d a n y t h i n g about t h i s operation a t the time.

..

28. S e e L i d d e l l H a r t , The Rammel P a p e r s p p . 106-134 f o r a c o m p l e t e a c c o u n t o f t h i s c a m p a i g n f r o m Rommels perspect iue.

2P.

Pitt,

I , 248-252.

30. M. M. P o s t a n , D . Hay a n d J. D . S c o t t , D e s i o n .and D e v e l o p m e n t o f Weapons, S t u d i e s i n G o v e r n m e n t a n d I n d u s t r i a l O r o a n i s a t i o n (London: Her M a j e s t y s S t a t i o n e r y O f f i c e , 1 9 6 4 ) , p . 338.

31.
~~~

Playfair,

I,

194;

291.
(London: B.T. Batsford,

32. Michael Carver, Tobruk 1 9 6 4 ) , p . 255.

33. Them p .

P l a r f a r , 11, 3; 20. F r a s e r , A n d Me S h a l l Shock 151. P t t , I , 249-256.

34. F r a s e r And W e S h a l l Shock Them p p . P l a y f a i r , 11, 2 -24.

145-152.

35.

Playfair,

11,

19-24.

36. P i t t , I , p p . 295-296. P l a y f a i r , 1 1 , 164. G i f f a r d L e q . M a r t e l , An O u t s p o k e n S o l d i e r : H i s V i e w s a n d M e m o i r s ( L o n d o n : S i f t o n P r a e d , 19491, p . 158.

37. 296.

F r a s e r , And W e S h a l l Shock Them p . Playfair, 11,

159.

Pitt.

I,

39.

172-173.

20 3

39. 413.

Fraser

A n d We S h a l l S h o c k Them p .

155.

P l a y + 5 r , 1 1 , 29. H a r t , T h e Rummel P a p e r s p p . 1 4 1 ; 1 4 7 . F r a s e r , A n d !We S h a l l S h o c k Them p . 1 5 8 .

41. Liddel Rogers, p. 123.

42. U . S . War D e p a r t m e n t , G e n r e r a l S t a f f , M i 1 i t i r y I n t e l l i g e n c e D i v i s i o n , S p e c i a l B u l l e t i n No, 3 6 : T h e B a t t l e 1?41), p . 11. S a l u m , .June 1 5 - 1 7 . 1 9 4 1 ( W a s h i n g t o n D . C . , F r a s e r , A n d We S h a l l S h o c k T h e m p . 1 5 6 . Carver, p . 29.

43. S h e l C o r d a i d w e l l and D o m i n i c k G r a h a m , F i r e - P o w e r : B r i t i s h A r m y W e a p o n s and T h e o r i e s o+ War. 1 9 0 4 - 1 9 4 5 (London: A l l e n and W n w i n , 1 ? 8 2 ) , p p . 235-237. F r a s e r , A 3 We S h a l l S h o c k Them p p . 1 5 9 - 1 5 9 . P i t t , I , 302.
44. E. K . G. S i x s m i t h , B r i t i s h G e n e r a l s h i p i n t h e T w e n t i e t h C e n t u r y ( L o n d o n : A r m s and A r m o u r , 1?7c)), p . 2 1 9 . F r a s e r , A n d We S h a l 1 S h o c k T h e m p . 1 5 9 .

45. G e n e r a l m a j o r H a n s - H e n n i n g u o n Hol t z e n d o r f + , R e a s o n s F o r R o m m e l s S u c c e s s I n A f r i K a 1341.,1942 E n g l i s h Copy, H i s t o r i c a l D i v i s i o n , H e a d q u a r t e r s U n i t e d S t a t e s Army, Europe, F o r e i g n M i l i t . a r y S t u d i e s Branch, I G a r m i s c h , C a r v e r , p p . 29-29; 35-3d. G e r m a n y , 17 M a r c h 1 3 4 7 ) , p . 1 3 .

46.

M ar t e l , An OutspaKen S o l d i e r , p .

158.
the b a t t l e

4f. R o g e r s , p. 130. s e e P i t t , I, 294-3113.

For a d e s c r i p t i o n o f Carver, pp.

43.
49.

Playfair, Carver,

11,

172-173. 35-36.

29-30.

pp.

29-29;

SO. F r a s e r , A n d We S h a l l S h o c k T h e m p p . B a r n e t t , p p . 88-89.
51. F r a s e r , A n d We S h a l l S h o c k T h e m B i d w e l l .and G r a h a m , Caruer, pp.
35-37.

164-165.
60.

p.

52.

p.

242.

53.
pp.

54. John C o n n e l l , A u c h i n l e c k 250-269.

(London:

Cassell,

1?5?>,

55. I . S . 0. P l a y f a i r e t .PI The P l e d i t e r r a n e m a n d M i d d l e E a s t Volume II I : B r i t i s.h For t u n e s R r i c h T h e i r L u w e s t Ebb H i s t o r y o f t h e S e c o n d l d o r l d Mar, ( L o n d o n : H e r P1.3.jesty's S t a t i o n e r y O f f i c e , 1 9 6 0 ) , 1 1 1 , 5 .

.,

56.
142.

PLnyfair,

1 1 1 , 23-27.

Pitt,

I , 346.

Rogers, p .

57.

B i d w e l l a n d Gr,aham, p .

227.

Play+air,

111,

28-30.
58.
59.

Pitt, Pitt,

I, 301.

I , 357-357.
pp.

60.

F r a s e r , And We S h i l l S h o c k Them,

1.56-167.

61.

C a r v e r , p p . 51-53.
Playfair. 167-168. Playfair, Playfair,
Pitt,

Them p p .
63.

62.

111 ., 40-43. 111, 40.

F r a s e r , And G I s Shall arver, p . 62.

Shock

64.
65.

111, 4 2 .
P ayfair, 1 1 1 , 49-52.

I , 3'71-394.

66. C a r v e r , p p . 171-172. C o n n e l 1 , pp 370-372.

I

P l a y f a i r , 111,

52-61.

67.

Playfair,

111, 30-31;

99-100.
P.aperz, pp.

69. L i d d e l l H a r t , The Rnmmel P i t t , I , 466-467.

176-130.

P l a y f a i r , 1 1 1 , 136-137. N e i l O r p a n , War i n t h e D e s e r t S o u t h A f r i c a n F o r c e s W o r l d War I 1 V o l u m e I 1 1 ( C a p e t o w n : P u r n e l l , 1 9 7 1 ) , p p . 154-158.

69.

70. P l a y f a i r , 1 1 1 , 153-154. O r p e n , p . 156. Phiiip W a r n e r , A u c h i n l e c K : The L o n e l v S o l d i e r ( L o n d o n : Suchan .and E n r i g h t , 1 7 3 1 ) , p . 120.

71, Message f r o m A u c h i n l e c K t o h i s C h i e f o f q u o t e d i n W a r n e r , p p . 122-!23.

S h f f PS

72. Message f r o m A u c h i n l e c k t o P r i m e M i n i s t e r l,Jin-.ton C h u r c h i l l as q u o t e d i n ILJarner, p p . 123-124.

73. Warner, pp, 125-141. Athenelurn,

74.

1752), p . 2 7 4 .

D a v i d F r i s e r , Alanbronke l:ble~Y o r K : W a r n e r , p p . 173-174.

3 . P l a y f a i r , 1 1 1 , 285. B . i r n e t t , p p . 125; !35. B a r r i e P i t t , The C r u c i b l e o f M a r , The Y e a r ot: A l a m e i n 1 3 4 2 ( L o n d o n : & J o n a t h a n Cape, 1 ' ? 8 2 ) , 1 1 , 36. F r a s e r , And W e S h a l l Shock Them p . 2 2 5 . S i x s m i t h , p . 228.

76. L i e u t . - C o l o n e l R . M. P. C a r v e r , " D e s e r t Dilemmas., P a r t IIJ. The G a z a l a L i n e , " T h e Ror3.1 A r m o u r e d C o r p s J o u r n a l , J : 2 l A p r 1951), 95-97". P l a y f a i r , 1 1 1 , 27-28. Rogers, pp. 148-147. B a r n e t t , p . 144. J. A . I . A g a r - H a m i l t o n a n d L. C . F . T u r n e r , C r i s i . z . i n t h e D e s e r t . F ! A Y - & J ~ ' Y !'?42. I J n i o n I J a r H i s t o r i e s S e r i e s . !Cape Town, S u u t h A + r i c a : O x f o r d l i n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 7 5 2 j , p p . 9-!1.
7-

.r.

P a r t I'J,"

L i e u t . - C o l o n e l R . PI. P . C a r u e r , " D e s e r t Di!emma-,, pp. 75-97. P l a y f a i r , 111, 5 7 - 2 5 ,

78. C o l o n e l Norman B e r r y , C h i e t : M e c h a n i c a l E n g i n e e r f o r X I 1 1 C o r p s and EiNShth A r m y i n 1941 as q u o t e d i n I d a r n e r , p p . 116-117.

79. L i e u t . - C o l o n e l R . M . P. C a r l > e r , " D e s e r t D i l e m m a s , I ' d , " p p . 95-37. P l a y f a i r , 1 1 1 , 27-28. Part

YO. F r a s e r , A n d We S h a l l 'Shock Them, B a r n e t t , p p . 141-142.

51. Agar-Hamilton and T u r n e r , 39-40. P l a y f a i r , 111, 213-214.

p.

225.
Pitt,

pp.12-13.

11,

32.
83.

Playfair, Pitt,

1 1 1 , 235-239.

11, 72.
t h i s campaign see

84. For a complete d e s c r i p t i o n o f P i t t , I ! , 42-170.

85. For accounts of t h i s c o n t r o v e r s y from d i f f e r e n t p . 158-174. F i e l d Flarsh.31 8 . L . p e r s p e c t i v e s s e e Warner,. p . . Montgomery, The Memoirs o f F i e l d M a r s h a l Montqnmerv ( L o n d o n : Col 1 i n s , 1958) p p . 91-106. b l i g e l Hami 1 t o n , M o n t y : The M a k i n q o f A G e n e r a l , 1887-1942 (New Y o r K : McGraw-Hill, 1981), pp. 588-520. B a r n e t t , pp. 231-243.

86. Montgomery had a p p r o x i m a t e l y 1 0 0 0 t a n k s , 900 a r t i l l e r y p i e c e s , 1400 a n t i - t a n k guns and 530 a i r c r a f t v e r s u Rommel.s a p p r o x i m a t e 550 t a n k s , 550 a r t i l l e r y p i e c e s , 1050 a n t i - t a n k guns and 350 a i r c r . i f t . See I . S . 0. P l a y f a i r e t a l . , The M e d i t e r r a n e a n and M i d d l e E a s t . Uo1. I L J : The D e s t r u c t i o n o f t h e A x i s F o r c e s i n A f r i c a . H i s t o r y o f t h e Second W o r l d War. ( L o n d o n : Her F l a j e s t y ~ Orpen, p . 4 8 4 . S t a t i o n e r y O f f i c e , 1 9 6 4 ) , p p . 8-13. 37. Montgomery, p. Montgomery,
Pitt,

30.

58.

p p . 21-90.

89.
90.
91.

11, 211.

H a m i l t o n , p . 526. H a m i l t o n , p . 598.
Hamilton,

Warner,

p.

125.

92.

p.

717.

93. A d d r e s s t o O f f i c e r s o f HQ E i g h t h A r m y b y 6 n e a l Montgomery a s q u o t e d i n H a m i l t o n , p . 623. 94. H a m i l t o n , pp. 623-624.

95. RemarKs by M a j o r - G e n e r a l S i r F r a n c i s De Guinguands O D e r a t i o n V i c t o r y a s q u o t e d i n P i t t , 1 1 , 2 0 9 .

96. From an i n t e r v i e w w i t h S i r Edgar W i l l a i m s f o r m e r 8 t h Army 6-2 a s q u o t e d i n H a m i l t o n , p . 6 2 6 . 97. F r a s e r , And We Shal 1 Shock Them,
p.

p p . 234-237.

98. B i d w e l l and Graham, Barnett, pp. 267-268. 99. 391. Major-General F.

245.

Pi t t ,

I I ! 21,5-.217.

.J. S . T u k e r

3 . 5

q u o t e d i n IJrpen,

p.

100. 241 -245.

101.

Sixsmith,

p p . 235-237.

B i d w e l l and Graham p p .

General A u c h i n l e c k

.as q u o t e d i n B . a r n e t t , p .

180.

102. S e e B i d w e l l and Graham, p . 2 2 4 . They make t h e p o i n t " E i g h t h A r m y had been C i g h t i n g i n b a t t l e g r o u p s a l l t h e t i me "

103.

Hami I t o n ,

pp.

643-646.

104. 105.

H a m i l t o n , pp. Hamilton, p.

663-464.
713.

106. C u r r e n t R e p o r t s f r o m O v e r s e a s N o t e s No. q u o t e d i n B i d w e l l and Graham, p p . 233-234.

107.

1 as

Rogers, p . Rogers, p .

166.

103.

163.

107.

Hami 1 t o n , p p . 473-4P5.
n Martel

110. Royal Armoured C o r p s C r e e d z s q u o t e d Our Armoured F o r c e s p p . 156-157.

1 1 1 . Montgomery d i a r y e n t r y , 7 September, f r o m Alam H a l f 3 a s q u o t e d i n H a m i l t o n , p . 712.

essons

112. 9 t h A r m y T r a i n i n g Memorandum Plo. H a m i l t o n , p . 726.

1 .as q u o t e d i n

113. Montgomery, p .
114. Hamilton, p.

104.

647.
1 as q u o t e d i n

119. 8 t h A r m y T r a i n i n g Memorandum No. H a m i l t o n , p . 722.

116.

Hami 1 t o n , p p . 721-727.

Ham i

17. 9 t h A r m y T r a i n i n g Memorandum N o . 1 .as q u o t e d i n ton, p. 7 2 5 . 13. Pitt,

1 1 , 273-276. 1 1 , 275.

Playfair,

I V , 34-35.

19.

Pitt,

20 8

120.

Montgomerr, Plav+air,

p.

!l?.

l?!.
122.

IV, 5.
pp.

Montgomerr,

119-120.

Plar+air,
p.

10, 34.
712.

123. Fraser, A n d IMe S h a l l H a m i l t o n , p p . 661-663.

Shock Them,