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STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF IRANIAN MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE IRAN-IRAQ W A R

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. A r m y


Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER O F MILITARY A R T AND SCIENCE

R.S.,

DONALD H. ZACHERL, MAJ, USA United States M i l i t a r y Academy, 1974 M . A . , Hofstra University, 1980

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


1986

86-3483

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

MASTER O F M I L I T A R Y ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of C a n d i d a t e :
T i t l e of T h e s i s :

Donald 11:

Zacherl

S t r a t c g i c and O p e r a t i n a l Implications o f ; Iraniiin N i l i t a r y O p e r a t i o n s i n the I r a n - I r a q iJar

Approved b y :

T h e s i s Committee Chiiirmdn

Bobby L d C h i l d r e s s , Ph.D.

Member, G r a d u a t e F a c u l t y

Accepced t h i s 6 t h d a y o f < J u n e 1986 b y :

D i r e c t o r , G r a d u d t e Degree

Programs

'The o p i n i o n s a n d c o n c l u s i o n s e x p r e s s e d h e r e i n a r e t h o s e o f : t h e s t u d e n t a u t h o r and do n o t n e c e s s a r i l y r e p r e s e n t t h e v i e w s of t h e U.S. Army Command a n d G e n e r a l S t a f f r C o l l e g e o r a n y o t h e r g o v e r n m e n t agency. (References to t h i s study should include the foregoing stacement.

APSTRACT

F I R A N I A N MILITARY STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS O OPERATIONS IN THE IkAN-IRAQ WAR: An a n a l y s i s of the nlodern I r a n i a n Army from Reza S h a h t o the I r a n - I r a q War. FOCUS i s on the e f f e c t o f the r e v o l u t i o n on t h e I r a n i a n A r m y s f i g h t i n g p o w e r , by D o n a l d H. Z a c h e r l , USA, 106 p a g e s .

T h e p r o g e s s o f the I r a n - I r a q War has s u r p r i s e d a n a l y s t s . I n o r d e r of g a i n i n s i g h t i n t o e v e n t s i n the r e g i o n a n d t h e i r i m p l i c a t i o n s , I p r o p o s e a n a n a l y t i c a l franleworl. u s i n g C a r l Von C l a i . i s e w i t z a n d M a r t i n Van C r e v e l d , which is u s e d to a n a l y z e the m i l i t a r y worth o f the I s l a m i c I r a n i a n
Army.

The t h e s i s ha!j three l o g i c a l s t e p s l e a d i n g t o t:he eventual conclusion. F i r s t , the I m p e r i a l I r a n i a n Armed F o r c e s were f u n d a a c ? n t a l l y f l a w e d . From i t s i n c e p t i o n undf2r Reza Shah, the p e o i a l e , army, g o v e r n m e n t t r i n i t y had f a t a l attempting to cracks throughout. Muhamnled Reza P a h l a v i b u i l d on the s a n e ! 3 t r ~ 1 c t ~ i rie n, c r e a s e d the p r e s s u r e o n the p e o p l e , army, government t r i n i t y , r e s c i l t i n g i n a collapse. T h e w e a k n e s s e s o f t h i s t r i n i t y was d e m o n s t r a t e d by the p a t e n t i n a b i l i t y o f the army t o d e f e a t the r e v o l u t i o n i n s p i t e , o r e v m b e c ~ u s eo f , the l a v i s h a u g m e n t a t i o n o f

equ 1 pnien t

S e c o n d , the I i j l a m i c I r a n i a n a r m y p r o v e d t o h a v e r e m a r k a b l e power a n d r e s i l i e n c e i n the I r a n - I r a q War. S u r p r i s e d by a p o w e r f u l i n v a d e r , h a n l p e r e d by d e s e r t i o n , e r o d i n g e q u i p m e n t , a n d u n r e l i a b l e l o g i s t i c s , the I r a n i a n Armed F o r c e s r e s i s t e d the a t t a c k a n d w e n t o n the o f f e n s i v e . A c t i o n s were c h a r a c t e r i z e d by c o u r a g e a n d f i g h t i n g p o w e r , e x c e l l e n t s t a f f work, a n d o p e r a t i o n a l l e v e l p l a n n i n g . T h i r d , the ch.ange i n the Armed F o r c e s was c a ~ i s a l l y l i n k e d t o the impact o f the 15lamic R e v o l u t i o n on the p e o p l e , army, government t r i n i t y . T h e s t r o n g bond between K h o n l e i n i a n d the p e o p l e , a n d the new army l e g i t i m a c y a n d e t h i c , h a d a m u l t i p l i c a t i v e e f f e c t o n the m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y o f the <3rmy. T h e r e s u l t w a s a n arm9 w i t h resilience, f l e x i b i l i t y , a n d p o t e n t i a l f o r real growth i n m i l i t a r y power. T h e war, p a r a d o : : i c a l l y , h a s h a d a s t a b i l i z i n g e f f e c t o n the P e r s i a n Gulf Region. T h e r e g i o n now ha5 a v i a b l e c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t r r o r g a n i z a t i o n , le55 v u l n e r a b l e o i l l i n e s o f c o m m ~ u n i c a t i o n s , a n d i s c a r e f u l l y w a t c h e d a n d g u a r d e d by the U.S. H o w e v e r , the w a r , w h e n i t e n d s , i s l i k e l y t o h a v e a d e s t a h i l i i i n g e f f e c t on I r a n s n e i g h b o r s . I r a n has t h e m i l i t a r y g r o w t h p o t e n t i a l t o b e c o m e the d o m i n a n t r e g i o n a l power w i t h a c a p a b i l i t y t o c h a l l e n g e the S u p e r p o w e r s f o r c o n t r o l o f the P e r s i a n G u l f .

iii

ACKNOWLECGMEN'TCi

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and
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I mw a
I115titLlte,

i n time, r e s o ~ r c e 5 a ~ n d by simple common s e n s e . great deal to Dr.

GL+wrych, o f the Cornbat S t u d i e s

w h o c o n e t a n t l y e n c u i . i r 7 e d me, p a t i e n t l r corrected my r e p e . i t o d

e r r o r s , .ind h e l p e d r r i e nlainta
debt o f g r a t i t u d e
ti7

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my p e r s p e c t i v e .

I also

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Dr.

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the Departtnlent o f

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rnethodr:ilc~~~~i err(.:)rs, cal and p r e s s e d m e t o d e f e n d each l o ~ ~ j . c : ~ i l
step.

Without t h e i r e f f o r t s a n d e n coi.iraqenlmit:, the t h e s i r


and f a r poorer, product.
tlim

woi.itd h a v e b e e n a d i f f e r e n t ,

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5c:holars:

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C a r l ('on C l a u s e w i t z a n d M a r t i n Van Cre3.,,F?ldr I-Iy


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t h e n re-read, t h e i r u j r i t i n g s . ack?qi.iately a p p l i e d C l a u s e w i t :

until

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T o the e::tent: I h a v e

a n d a d a p t e d Van C r c v e l d ,

more comp 1 e t E? [..in der s t d n d i 11 '3 n f c o n t:e r np o r a r y e v e n t 5 i n I r a n

is p o s s i b l e .
Finallu, b u t most i m p o r t a n t l y l
IIIY

I owe a g r e a t a n d

continuing debt to

w i f e , M a r i a n n e , who made i t p o s s i b l e

fnr m e to h a v e the time t o w o r k .

Any e r r o r s i n the thesis a r e e n t i r e l y my own.

iY

TABLE O F CONTENTS

Thesis A b s t r a c t

......................................
' I

iii

C & y i

t v r 0 ne

T h e5 i 5 I Ii t: t?n f: , A n d 19 t i c a 1 F r meidor I:.


a n d j' irlit i f i c a n c ~ :

C h r7 p t e r
1

O r (3 an i 2 a t i o n ,

.......................

Ckk-5!pter ' T b s g

T h e P o % t - r e v o l u t i o n a r y Army a n d

t h e I r a n - - I r a q War..

...................................

33

Ch<dpter F'~LII- T h e E f f e c t : of the I s l a n ~ i cR e v n l u t i c m


on t h e I r a n i a n A r m q

.................................. ...........

$,5

CtJ+p&!r

F i v e C o n c 11.1s i c i n s a n d A n d 1 !ds i 5 .

Ah

Maps....................

.............................

I,

- !;

Selected B i b l i o g r a p h y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.................

t 0O

Distribu~ion......

...................................

105

STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS


O F I R A N I A N MIL I TARY,APLRAT IONS

-IN

THE IRAN-IRAQ

WAR.

By D o n a l d H.

Zacherl,

MAJ,

USA

Ctlapter O n e

T h e s i s I n t e n t , A n a l r t i ca 1 F r a m e w o r k , C h a p t e r Organ i - a t i o n , and Significance

"War i s more t h a n c7 true c h a m e l e o n t h a t s l i g h t l y a d a p t s

i t 5 c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s t o the g i v e n c a s e . As a t o t a l p h e n o m e n o n

i t s d o m i n a n t t e n d e n c i e s a l w a y s make war a p a r a d o x i c a l
tr i n i ty--conposed
o f pr i m o o r d i a1 v i o l e n c e , h a t r e d a n d enm i t y , t h e play

w h i c h a r e t o be r e g a r d e d a 5 b l i n d n a t u r a l f o r c e ; of

o f chance and p r o b a b i l i t y w i t h i n which t h e c r e a t i v e s p i r i t

is f r e e t o roam; a n d of

i t s element of subordination,

a5 a n

instrument

gf

policy,

which m a k e s i t subject t o r e a s o n

alone.

C a r l Von C l a u s e w i t z

I.

Thesis Intent.

I i n t e n d t o shoirr t h a t I r a n i a n armys M i l i t a r y Worth was s i s n i f i c a n t l y c h a n g e d by the I s l a m i c r e v o l u t i o n . of this change,


The nature

I s u g g e s t , was a f u n d a m e n t a l r e a l i g n m e n t nf
the p e o p l e , the army, a n d the

the three elements o f war: gnvernment.

A s a r e s u l t , the m i l i t a r y b a l a n c e o f power h a s

r a d i c a l l y a l t e r e d w i t h s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t on the s t r a t e g i c s i t u a t i o n i n the P e r s i a n G u l f r e g i o n .
T h e thesis h a s f o u r s t e p s .

T h e f i r s t s t e p w i l 1 show

t h a t the M i l i t a r y Worth, of

a 5 d e f i n e d by Mal-tin V a n C r e v e l d ,

the p r e - r e v o l u t i o n a r y

army war, weaker t h a n i t a p p e a r e d

b e c a u s e of the weak l i n k a g e b e t w e e n the three f u n d a r r l e n t a l

elenlent5.

T h e s e c o n d s t e p a n a l y z e s the p e r f o r m a n c e o f the
War, d e m o n s t r a t i n g i t s h i g h
T h e t h i r d s t e p i d e n t i f i e s the

I r a n i a n army i n the I r a n - I r a q l e v e l of m i l i t a r y p e r f o r m a n c e .

I s l a m i c r e v o l u t i o n a 5 the proximate c a u s e o f the s t r e n g t h e n e d p e o p l e - a r m ~ - g o v e r n m e n t 1i n k a g e . T h e f o u r t h step inr.rlicdtions

w i l l s p e c u l a t e o n the s t r a t e g i c a n d o p e r a t i o n a l

f o r the use o f

l a n d p o w e r i n the r e g i o n .

11. A n a l y t i c a l Framework.

I t was n e c e s s a r y t o a d o p t a new a n a l y t i c a l framework


for. t w o r e a s o n s .

F i r s t , m i l i t a r y e v e n t s i n I r a n were, a n d
A t the time o f the R e v o l u t i o n ,

arc, unpredictable.

for

example, the I m p e r i a l I r a n i a n Armed F o r c e s w e r e f i f t h

l a r g e s t i n t h e w o r l d a n d l a r g e s t i n the r e g i o n .

A military

m o d e r n i z a t i o n program c o n t i n u e d

LIP

t o the Shahs d e p a r t u r e ,

a n d i n c l u d e d 12 b i l l i o n d o l l a r s i n p u r c h a s e s f r o m the U n i t e d S t a t e s alone. N e i t h e r was the S h a h s army i n e x p e r i e n c e d i n In f a c t ,

internal control operations.


use.4

i t was i t s p r i m a r y

Yet,

outside observers,

c o u n t i n g the s i z e a n d q u a l i t y

of. the m i l i t a r y eqi.iippnlent

i n the I r a n i a n army, were

s u r p r i z e d by i t s f a i l u r e t o s u c c e s s f u l l y oppose the revolution.


T h e p e r s c v e r e n c c o f the I r a n i a n armed f o r c e s i n the

I r a n - I r a q War was e q u a l l y u n e x p e c t e d . o u t s i d e the r e g i o n ,

Analysts,

in and

i n c l u d i n g Saddaa H u s s e i n , were

u n p l e a s a n t l y s c i r p r i z e d by I r a n s r e s i s t a n c e t o the i n v a s i o n a n d i t s s u b s e q u e n t s u c c e 5 s e s o n the b a t t l e f i e l d . c o n f i d e n t w a s Saddam H u s s e i n ,


So

i n f a c t , t h a t he was o n the

v e r g e o f a n n o u n c i n g the a n n e x a t i o n o f K h u z e s t a n s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e i n v a s i o n began.5
The shock o f
the s u c c e s s f u l

I r a n i a n c o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e i n 1982 c a u s e d a major s t r a t e g i c s h i f t by t h e G u l f Cooperation C o u n c i l from s u p p o r t i n g I r a q

to p r e s s i n g for a

easef fire.^

Most r e c e n t l y , the r e n e w e d

I r a n i a n o f f e n s i v e once a g a i n c a u g h t the w o r l d by s u r p r i i l e .
Up u n t i l

the r e c e n t l a r g e s c a l e a t t a c k s , i t was a s s u m e d t h a t

I r a n was t o o e x h a ~ i s t e dt o c a r r y o n the war. 7 S e c o n d l y , the I s l a m i c R e v o l u t i o n i n I r a n wa5 a p r o f o u n d and genuinelv unique political, social, and r e l i g i o u s event
w h i c h may p r o v e
ti2

he o n the same s c a l e a n d i m p o r t a n c e a 5

Previous analytical t h e French and Russian R e v o l u t i ~ n s . ~ f r a m e w o r k s h a v e n o t a d d r e s s e d the c o m b i n e d e f f e c t o n t h e


people,

a r m y , g o v e r n m e n t 1i n k a g e .

T h e a n a l y t i c a l framework a d o p t e d i s a c o m b i n a t i o n o f

two related,

and simple, paradigms:

Carl Von C l a u s e w i t z ' s

model o f t h e n a t u r e of war a n d Martin Van C r e v e l d ' s

f o r m u l a t i o n o f M i l i t a r y Worth.

A l t h o u g h e a c h f r a m e w o r k is

s i m p l e , sometimes " t h e s i m p l e t h i n g s are d i f f i c u l t " . 9


A c l e a r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the l i n k a g e b e t w e e n them is

vital.

I w i l l c l a r i f y the r e l a t i o n s h i p by f i r s t e x p l a i n i n g
t h e n Von C l a u s e w i t z ' s model, a n d

Van C r e v e l d ' 5 f o r m u l a t i o n ,

f i n a l l y t h e way I h a v e l i n k e d t h e m i n t h e thesis. Van C r e v e l d d e f i n e s the M i l i t a r y W o r t h ( W m ) o f a n army


a 5 equal t o t h e Q u a l i t y ( Q 1 ) a n d Q u a n t i t s r ( Q 2 ) o f

is

e q u i p m e n t m u l i t p l i e d by i t s F i g h t i n g Power ( P f ) . e x p r e s s e d t h i s a s fOllOW5:

I have

T h e Q u a l i t y a n d Q u a n i t r o f e q u i p m e n t are a d d i t i v e :

both t h e

numbe r o f t a n k s a n d t h e i r e x c e l l e n c e a s t a n k s a r e v i t a l . P u t a n o t h e r w a y , a 5IT1aller number o f excel l e n t American t a n k s a r e o f t e n e q u a t e d t o larger n u m b e r s o f poorer q u a l i t y Soviet tanks. T h e s e two f a c t o r s a r e m e a s u r a b l e , a n d armies

s p e n d e n o r m o ~ i s resource^, a n d e f f o r t f r ~ e a s u r i n gthe s i z e a n d q u a l i t y o f opposing f o r c e s m i l i t a r y equipment.


4

. .

F i g h t i n g Power is d e f i n e d a s " t h e s u m t o t a l o f the

mental s ~ i a l i t i e s t h a t make a n a r m f i g h t " . 1 '


self in discipline,

I t manifests it

c o h e s i o n , morale,

i n i t i a t i v e , courage, Fighting

t o ~ i g h n e 5 sa ~n d the w i l l i n g n e s s t o f i g h t a n d d i e .

P o w e r is m u l t i p l i c a t i v e a n d h a s g r e a t e r immediate e f f e c t
t h a n t h e Q u a l i t y a n d Q u a n t i t y of equipment. However, a v e r y

h i g h l e v e l o f F i g h t i n g Power can n o t overcome v e r y low


.. ..

l e v e l s o f poor e q u i p m e n t . reduced t o near z e r o ,

I f e i t h e r set o f c o m p o n e n t s are

the M i l i t a r y Worth i s n e a r zero,

r e g a r d l e s s o f the e l e m e n t s when s e p a r a t e l y v a l u e d .

F i g h t i n g power is more d i f f i c u l t t o m e a s u r e t h a n t h e
Q u a l i t y a n d Q u a n t i t y of equipment.

Detailed objective data c o h e s i o n , a n d morale, is

on the I r a n i a n a r m y ' s d i s c i p l i n e ,

virtually i~~possitil te o o b t a i n a n d w h a t l i t t l e e x i s t s is o f l i m i t e d v a l u e i n a n y case.

However, Van C r e v e l d p r o v i d e s a n
T h e secret o f

i n s i y h t i n t o the niecret o f F i g h t i n g Power.

F i g h t i n g Power lie5 i n t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n the a r m e d f o r c e s a n d society, ideological beliefs,

the p o w e r f u l i n f l u e n c e o f r e l i g i o u s a n d
a n d p r i m a r y g r o u p cohesion. 1 1 1 ~ Von

C l a u s e w i t z ' s mode'l o f the n a t u r e o f war w i l l p r o v i d e the

tool t o u n l o c k t h t s s e c r e t .
C l a u s e w i t z r e d u c e s the n a t u r e of war t o " a r e m a r k a b l e t r i n i t r " : a n i m u s , estimates, a n d p o l i t i c a l o b j e c t i v e s . Animus, which m a i n l y c o n c e r n s the people, hatred a5 a natural force. is b l i n d , v i o l e n t

E s t i m a t e s , w h i c h a r e the p r o v i n c e
is the p l a y of c h a n c e a n d
5

o f the commander a n d h i s a r m y ,

probability.

P o l i t i c a l o b j e c t i v e s , which is the concern o f

the government a l o n e , is t h e realm o f reason a n d p o l i c y . W a r

e x i s t s i n a b a l a n c e b e t w e e n these t h r e e t e n d e n c i e s ,
o b j e c t s u s p e n d e d b e w t e e n three magnets". 14

" l i k e an

" T h e s e t h r e e t e n d e n c i e s are l i k e three d i f f e r e n t c o d e s o f

law,

d e e p r o o t e d i n their s u b j e c t a n d y e t v a r i a b l e i n their
m

r e l a t i o n s h i p t o one another.

15

Van C r e v e l d ' s s e c r e t o f F i g h t i n g P o w e r ; r e s t i n g on the


r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n the a r m e d f o r c e s ,

society, a n d personal

b e l i e f s , echoes the r e l a t i o n s h i p i n Von C l a u s e w i t z ' s remarkable t r i n i t y . a n d Government,


By e x a m i n i n g the I r a n i a n p e o p l e ,

army

( t h e C l a ~ i s e w i t z e a ne l e m e n t s ) , I c a n

determine t h e n a t u r e of Creveld's formulation).

I r a n i a n F i g h t i n g P o w e r , ( i n Van
A p p l y i n g F i g h t i n g Power t o t h e

Q u a l i t y a n d Q u a n t i t y of equiprrlent,

I can t h e n estimate the

I r a n i a n army's M i l i t a r y Horth.

An a c c u r a t e e s t i m a t e o f the

I r a n i a n arm~y's M i l i t a r y Worth a l l o w s more a c c u r a t e a n a l y s i s of

t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the r e g i o n .

I I I.

Orsan i z a t i o n . C h a p t e r o n e , which is the c u r r e n t c h a p t e r , a d d r e s s e s

the t hes i 5 i n t e n t , ana 1y t i c a l f ranlework , o r g a n i z a t i o n , a n d

significance.

T h e p u r p o s e o f C h a p t e r two is t o exarrline the

P r e - r e v o l u t i o n a r y I r a n i a n army u s i n g t tie m e t h o d o l o g y
outlined. C h a p t e r two 5 e t s t h e h i s t o r i c a l b a c k g r o u n d of the

Pre-revolutionary

army b e g i n n i n g w i t h i t s b i r t h u n d e r Re-a

S h a h a n d i t s d e v e l o p m e n t u n d e r h i s s o n , Mohhanmed Reza S h a h . I t c o n c l u d e s w i t h a n a n a l y s i s of t h e pre-revolutionary

a r m y s M i l i t a r y W o r t h ; the q u a l i t y a n d q u a n i t i t y o f
eqi..iipment a n d a n

e s t i m a t e o f i t s f i g n t i n g power b a s e d o n a n
arrrly, government r e l a t i o n s h i p .

a n a l y s i s of

the p e o p l e ,

C h a p t e r t h r e e e x a m i n e s the m i l i t a r y p e r f o r m a n c : e I r a n i a n army d u r i n g the I r a n - I r a q

of

the

war.

C h a p t e r three shows

t h a t t h e Iranian armys M i l i t a r y Worth s i g n i f i c a n t l y i m p r o v e d d e s p i t e a s t e a d y d e t e r i o r a t i o n i n the Q u a l i t y a n d Q u a n t i t y of e q u i p m e n t ; t h e inescapable conclusion

is t h e

F i g h t i n g Power has s i s n i f i c a n t l ~ i~ nlpruved. If t h e I r a n i a n armys M i l i t a r y W o r t h h a s i m p r o v e d a5 a w h a t was

result o f a s i g n i f i c a n t l y i m p r o v e d F i g h t i n g Power,
t h e cause?

ChaptEvr f o u r e : : a m ~ i n e s the army from the time of


LIP

t h e Revolution

t o t h e I r a q i i n v a s i o n t o d e t e r m i n e i f the
t h e army, a n d the S t a t e , c h a n s e d i n

b o n d b e t w e e n t h e people,

such a way t h a t F i g h t i n g P o w e r was e n h a n c e d .


C h a p t e r f i v e s u r r ~ a r i z e sthe thesis c o n c l u s i o n s a n d

s p e c u l a t e s o n t h e s t r a t e g i c use o f

laridpower

i n the r e g i o n .

IV.

Significance.

There are f o u r p r i n s a r y r e a s o n s f o r the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f


t h e r e g i o n a n d h e n c e the thesis: o i l , g e o p o l i t i c a l p o s i t i o n , s u p e r p o w e r i n t e r e s t , a n d the war i t s e l f ( b o t h i n respect t o

the other three f a c t o r s a n d f o r p u r e l y p r o f e s s i o n a l a n d


i n t e l l e c t ~ i a lr e a s o n s ) . T h e importance of o i l a n d the P e r s i a n G u l f does n o t appeal- t o r e q u i r e s t r e n o u s j u s t i f i c a t i o n .
T h e majority o f

the r e g i o n s p e t r o l e u m e x p o r t s s t i l l e x i t t h r o u g h the G u l f
a]. t h o u g h

t h i s has d i m i n i s h e d a 5 a r e s u l t o f the war.


58:; o f

Never-

the-less,

the w o r l d s known o i l r e s e r v e s a r e i n the


16% a r e i n I r a n , a s well as 20% n f

Gulf Region.

Of that:,

the

w o r l d s known n a t i . . i r a l g a s r e s e r v e s .
of

Approximately onp t h i r d

the w o r l d s F e t r o l e u r n p r o d u c t i o n a n d 30Z o f

t h e US

p e t r o l e u m s i m p o r t s a r e from the G u l f r e g i o n .

Europe and Japan

import 70% o f t h e i r p e t r o l e u n i p r o d u c t s f r o m the G u l f . l h


A l t h o u y h c o n s i d e r a b l e e f f o r t by p e t r o l e u m importers h a s y o n e

i n t o r e d u c i n g their d e p e n d e n c e o n t h e r e g i o n ,
i m p o r t a n c e n f the r e q i o n i s c l e a r .

the 1011s term

Oil i s e v e n msore i m p o r t a n t t o the G u l f e x p o r t e r s .

G r e a t e r t h a t 82% o f the GNP o f the G u l f s t a t e s i s made u p o f o i l revenues., a l t h o u g h o i l r e v e n ~ i e sm a d e


As result,
LIP

o n l g 22% of

I r a n s GNP b e f o r e the war.

I r a n may t:re 1R55

concerned over o i l r e v e n u e and, t h a n tier n e i gh boi.irs

t h e r e f o r e , Gulf s t a b i l i t y

I r a n ' s geopolitical p o s i t i o n j u s t i f i e s it5


s i s n i f i c a n c e , e v e n w i t h o u t the importance o f o i l . I r a n sits

a t the c o n j u n c t i o n o f the A s i a n a n d A r a b w o r l d a n d is a t h w a r t v i t a l petroleum t r a d e r o u t e s .


A 500 mile r a d i u s of

her b o r d e r s , r e a c h a b l e by m o d e r n c o m b a t a i r c r a f t ,

includes

v i r t u a l l y a l l o f the C a s p i a n Sea, the P e r s i a n g u l f , Onlan,

Kt.wait, the s n l a l l e r G u l f s t a t e s , a n d S a u d i A r a b i a ' s o i l


f i e l d s a n d p o r t s . l8

In addition,

I r a n b o r d e r s on I r a q ,

T u r k e y , Rus!si a , Rf c3 h a n i s t a n , a n d Pal: i 5 a n a n d c o n t r o l s the

Persian Gulf
tankers. motive,

i s l a n d s a s t r i d e the t r a f f c l a n e s f o r o i l

S h o u l d I r a n a c h i e v e sciff i c i e n t m i 1 i t a r y poiuer a n d

i t impact w o u l d b e e n o r ~ o ~ i s .

T e r r a i n a n d t h e presence of r e s o ~ i r c e sa r e n o t r e l e v a n t

u n l e s s the p 0 1 i c i ~ ' sof the powers i n the r e g i o n a r e t a k e n


i n t o acount. T h e r e g i o n is o f p a r t i c u l a r a n d a c u t e i n t e r e s t

t o b o % h the s u p e r ~ o w e r s . I r a n i n h i g h among S o v i e t
e x t r a n a t i o n a l p r i c i r i t i e s a n d is a n a r e a o f h i s t o r i c a l

Russian s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t . l9

P r e m i e r B r e z h n e v l i s t e d the

P e r s i a n G u l f a 5 among the S o v i e t U n i o n a two h i g h e s t


ex t r a n a t i ona 1 p r i cir i

t ies. " T h e S o v i e t U n i o n has h a d , s i n c e

1921n1 a " t r e a t y o f

f r i e n d s h i p " which r e q u i r e s I r a n t o

prevent "anti-soviet"

a c t i v i t i e s i n I r a n i n exchange for a
T h e USSR has s u p p o r t e d

p r o m i se o f n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n . 2 1

s e p a r a t s t movements i n I r a n , is i n v o l v e d i n the T u d e h
(Masses
party.

Additionally,

the S o v i e t U n i o n r e c e n t l y

b e g a n a p r o g r a m d e s i g n e d t o i n c r e s e her power p r o j e c t i o n i n t o t h e region.

22
I r a n is s p e c i f i c a l l y c o v e r e d tw the

Additionally,

Carter d o c t r i n e , which e s t a b l i s h e d the r e g i o n a5 a n a r e a of


v i t a l US i n t e r e s t s .

I t i 5 a n area of s p e c i f i c c:ontingency

o p e r a t i o n s by USCENTCOM US C e n t r a l Command) a n d USREDCOM (1)s


R c a d i n e s s Command). T h e US has r e s p o n d e d t o t h r e a t s t n Close

the G u l f by m i l i t a r y r e i n f o r c e m e n t a n d a promise t o k e e p the


Gulf open and f r e e t o t r a f f i c .

Finally,

the c u r r e n t government i n I r a n

i5 largely

u n a f f e c t e d by a t t e n ~ p t st o m o d i f y i t s f o r e i g n p n l i c y .

Its

open t i o s t i 1 i . t ~t o the " G r e a t S a t a n " ( t h e U S ) ,

a n d the

"L.esser S a t a n " ( t h e USSR), has m e a n t t h a t i t owes no


a l l e g i a n c e to e i t h e r S u p e r p o w e r . F u r t h e r ,

i t s p o s i t i o n a 5 an

e n e r g y s u p p l i e r g i v e s i t more e c o n o m i c f l e a i b i l i t q than i t 5 neighboiirs a n d a l l o w s i t r e l a t i v e economic independenc:e.


5~1pport of

It

terrorism a n d r e f u s a l t o a c t i n c o n c e r t : w i t h

o t h e r r e g i o n a l n a t i o n s has f u r t h e r i s o l a t e d i t p o l i t i c a l l q . In s ~ m , its f o r e i g n policy, r e g i o n a l l y and sloballsj,

is

r e l a t i v e l y encumbered and u n p r e d i c t a b l e .

T h e d a n g e r i s t h a t t h e P e r s i a n Gulf R e g i o n , w h i c h is
v i t a l t o b o t h the S u p e r p o w e r s ,

is i n d a n g e r o f

d o m i n a t i o n by

a h o s t i l e n a t i o n t h a t is l a r g e l y b e y o n d t h e i r i n f l u e n c e .

T h e war i t s e l f i s s i g n i f i c a n t f o r p o l i c y a n d
professional reasons. First,

the s t r o n g I r a n i a n r e s i s t e n c e

a n d s u b s e q u e n t s t u n n i n g s ~ i c c e s s e swere c o m p l e t e l y 10

unexpected, a5 wa5 earlier related.

Additionally, the

tactical, operational, and strategic aspects are not: well known or understood. Until Iranian military power and the

Iran-Iraq war i s more adequately understood, re1 iable estimates are unachievable.
As a re5ult. policy regarding

Iran is likely to be ineffective. Second, the war is, or ought to be, of intense prof 85s onal interest.

I t is a major, modern, sustained mid

to high intensity conflict which has included repetitive,


sequent all multi-division operations, and tactical i-nnovation.

It included the heavy

use

of chemical weapons

and strategic rockets, and conventional strikes on nuclear targets. Further, the lessons o f the war are untainted by

Superpower 1ogis.t i cal sponsersh i p, un 1 i k e the Arab- Israel i Wars, and is a better harbinger of future conflicts of this
type.

Additionally,

it

allows an insight into the Iranian

and Islamic military tradition, the Islamic revolution and the I rani an mi 1 i tary leader. Given Irans potential a5 an aggressive, militant, and we 1 resourced force, a real understanding o f the war i s

essential.

A new army, and a new leadership, born in

revolution, fired by religious zeal, and tempered by war, i s arising. The forces that have shaped and are shaping this

potential militar!j power in one of the most volatile and vital area5 of Superpower interest are of global significance.
11

ENDNOTES CHAPTER ONE


1.

R o b e r t G. Ncurnarin, F o r e w a r d t o I r a n - I r a q War.:. S t e p h e n R. Grummon, ( W a s h i n g t o n , D . C . : 1982), p. v i i i .

2. N a d e r E n t e s s a r , " M i l i t a r r a n d P o l i t i c s i n the I s l a m i c R e p u b l i c o f I r a n , " ( S p r i n g H i l l C o l l e g e , Department of P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e , M o b i l e , A l a b a m a , 1985). p. 2 . ( P a p e r p r e p a r e d f o r 1 9 t h A n n u a l M e e t i n q of the M i d d l e E a s t S t u d i e s A s s o c i a t i o n , N o v e m b e r , 1985. )

3. J o h n M. S m i t h , "Where w a s the S h a h ' s A r m y ? , " ( F t . L e a v e n w o r t h , K a n s a s , 1980), p. 2 . (Master o f M i l i t a r y A r t a n d S c i e n c e T h e s i s , PO R e y i s t r N19052.421-31) R i c h a r d F. N y i - o ~ , e d . , ( W a s h i n g t o n , D . C . : U.S. O f f i c e r 1978), p. 399. 4.
Parn 550-68,

Lran: R Cot!n_t:rcl S t u d v , Government: P r i n t i n g

DA

A n t h u n y H. C o r d e s n ~ a n , The G u l f a n d the Search fcly the M i l i t a r r B a l a n c e i n the G u l f , a n d T r e n d s i n the A r a b - I s r a e l i M i l i t a r r r E a l a n c c , ( P a u l d e r , C o l o r a d o : W e e t v i e w P r e s s , 1 9 8 4 ) - p. 648.

5.

Stratesic S t a b i l i t y : Saudi Arabia,

6.

Ibid.,

p.

679.

7. R a r r y R u b i n , " M i d d l e E a s t : Search f o r P e a c e , " F o r e i g n A f f a i r s : America a n d the W o r l d , ( L o c a t i o n : P ~ i b l i s h w , 1 9 8 6 ) ~P. 599.


8. George W. G a w r y c h , " T h e I r a n i a n R e v o l u t i o n " , Lecture P r e s e n t e d t o US Army Command a n d G e n e r a l S t a f f College as p a r t o f I n d i v i d u a l D e v e l o p m e n t C o u r s e M i 1 i tarr. HJstorr o f the M i d d l e E a s t , F e b r u a r y , 1986.
9. C a r l Von C l a u s e w i t z , On War, t r a n s . a n d e d . Michael Howard a n d P e t e r P a r e t , ( P r i n c e t o n , N e w Jersey: P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s r 1984), p. 119.

by

10. M a r t i n Van C r e v e l d . F i y h t i n g P o w e r : G e r m a n Militarr P e r f o r m a n c e , 1914-1945, ( C a r l i s l e B a r r a c k s , P e n n s g l v a n n i a : A r t of War C o l l o q i u n l P u b l i c a t i o n , 19133)~ P P .

1-2.

11.
12.

Ibid. Ibid. Ibid..


PP.

13.

l-'' L.
12

14.

Clausewitz., Ibid.

On War, p.

89.

15. 16. 1 9 8 6 , P . 66.

"Jeers f o r C h e a p Oil," T h e Econom~ist,, March,


Cordcsnlan,' 42.

17. A n t h o n y H. for S t r a t e g i c Stab-,

T h e G u l f a n d the Search

p.

18. CIA Map 503828 12-78, Aqencg, D e c e m b e r , 1978. East,

Iran, C e n t r a l

Intelligence

"

19. J o h n C. Campbell. " S o v i e t S t r a t e g y i n the M i d d l e American-Ar-ffairs, S p r i n g , 1984, PP. 74-82.

20. J o i n t S p e c i a l O p e r a t i o n s Agencg l e c t u r e Y i v e n a t US Comlmland a n d General S t a f f College, f e b u r a r y , 1 9 8 6 .

21.

R i c h a r d F.

Nyrop,

ed.,

I r a n : A S t u d L k p . 52.

22. A n t h o n y H. C o r d e s m a n , " The G u l f a n d the Search f o r S t r a t e g i c S t a b i l i t u , P . 58.

13

C h a Pt : er Two

T h e E v o l u t i o n o f t h e M o d e r n I r a n i a n Army f r o m R e z a S h a h t o the I s l a m i c R e v o l u t i o n

"The f i r s t of people;

t h e s e t h r e e a s p e c t s m a i n l y c o n c e r n the

t h e s e c o n d the commander a n d his a r m y ;

the t h i r d the

g o v e r n m e n t . . .These three t e n d e n c i e s a r e l i k e t h r e e d i f f e r e n t

c o d e s of

l a w , d e e p r o o t e d i n t h e i r s u b j e c t a n d yet v a r i a b l e
A theory t h a t

i n their r e l a t i o n s h i p t o o n e a n o t h e r .

ignores

a n y o n e o f t h e m or s e e k s t o f i x a n a r b i t r a r y r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e m would c o n f l i c t w i t h r e a l i t y

t o such a n e x t e n t

t h a t f o r t h i 5 r e a s o n a l o n e i t would b e t o t a l l y u s e l e s s . "

Carl Von C l a u s e w i t z .

14

T h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n the p e o p l e ,

the army a n d the

g o v e r n m e n t , is coniple:.: a n d c h a n g e a b l e .

To g a i n i n s i g h t

into

the e v o l u t i o n o f the modurn I r a n i a n a r m y a n d i t s F i g h t i n g Power,

I w i l l t r a c e the three C l a u s e w i t z e a n e l e m e n t s from


t h r o u g h h i s son Reza Muhanmed P a h l a v i , LIP t o the T h i s is d o n e by d i v i d i n g the p r e -

Reza K h a n ,

Islamic r e v o l u t i o n .

r e v o l u t i o n a r y p e r i o d i n t o two p a r t s c o r r e s p o n d i n g t o the P a h 1 a v i Shat15 .

F o ~ i n d a t i n n so f the I m p e r i a l I r a n i a n Army.

Reza Khan, l a t e r R e z a Shah, was a s e m i l i t e r a t e s o l d i e r


who came t o power throi.igh the army. H i 5 a c c o m p l i s h m ~ e n t swere

considerable.

H e b u i l t a n a t i o n a l s t a n d i n g army v i r t u a l l y
i n t r o d u c e d s o c i a l c h a n g e , e x p a n d e d c i v i l law, industrialization,
wd5

from s c r a t c h ,

and promoted education, T h e army w h i c h he b u i l t

and nationalism. It

the m a i n s t a y o f h i s p o w e r .

b e c a m e his p e r s o n a l i n s t r ~ i n i e n t a n d was u s e d a g a i n s t his opponents, i n c l u d i n g the I s l a m i c c l e r g y a n d the p e o p l e when

recal c i t r a n t

.
i n $.pi te o f r e m a r k a b l e i m p r o v e m e n t s i n the

However,

army's s i z e a n d o r g a n i z a t i o n ,

i t c o l l a p s e d i n 1941 when

f i r s t s e r i o u s l y c h a l l e n g e d by a c o m p a r a t i v e f o r c e . So r a p i d a n d complete wa5 i t s c a p i t u l a t i o n t h a t F i e l d Marshall S i r


William Slim L i e s c r i b e d i t a5 " o p e r a b o u f f e " . 1

15

E e f o r e W o r l d War I ,

I r a n h a d n o n a t i o n a l s t a n d i n g army.

T h r e e n a t i v e armies, o f f i c e r e d by f o r e i g n e r s , p o l i c e d the
c o u n t r y a n d a c t e d i n d e f e n s e o f the f o r e i g n i n t e r e s t s i n Iran.

These were the Cossack b r i g a d e ,

l e a d by C z a r i s t l e a d by R r i t i s h l e a d by

R ~ i s s i a nO f f i c e r s ,
officers,

the S o u t h Persia r i f l e s ,

a n d the G e n d a r m e r i e , a n a t i o n a l p o l i c e ,

Swedish o f f i c e r s .

T h e Pbol s h e v i k r e v o l i . i t i o n u p s e t the R u s s i a n - R r i t ish


balance i n Iran, Russian officers.
a s w e l l a s c a u s e d the w i t h d r a w 1 of

the

T h i s d e p a r t u r e g a v e R e z a Khan, w h o w a s a n
the

o f f iccr. i n the C o 5 s a c k P , r i g a d e , to ass1.1ne Command o f

h r j . g a d e which was g a r r i s o n e d a r o u n d T e h e r a n .

The Persian

Q a j a r reqime, i n a n atterr1p.t b a l a n c e the u n m a t c h c d P r i t s h


power,

a p p e a l e d to the n e w S o v i e t U n i o n f o r s i . i p p o r t .
i n the m i d s t o f n e g o t i a t i o n o v e r the " T r e a t 2 o f

In

19'21,

Fri.endship", a revolution, Cossack B r i g a d e ,

s u p p o r t e d by H e z a titoan a n d the

s e i z e d power.

( T h e 1921 T r e a t y o f

F r i e n d s h i p i s o f t e n c i t e d by the S o v i e t U n i o n a 5 l e g i t m i z i n q

i t s i n t e r e s t i n the i n t e r n a l e v e n t s i n I r a n .

No modern

I r a n i a n government r e c o g n i z e s i t , w h i c h is n a t u r a l c o n s i d e r i n g the c i r c u m s t a n c e s d e s c r i b e d ) . Reza Khan,

w h o was made m i n i s t e r o f war, p r o v e d H e moved tn f o r m a s i n g l e


i t was the

r e s o u r c e f u l and e f f e c t i v e . national

army by u n i f y i n g t h e s e p a r a t e f o r c e s ;

f i r s t s i n g l e army i n I r a n ' s

long history.

tie p u r g e d

f o r e i g n e r s a n d r e d u c e d f o r e i g n i n f l u e n c e i n army
16

o r g a n i z a t i o n , c u l t u r e and language w i t h an uncompromising zeal. However,


i n s p i t e o f his promotion o f n a t i o n a l i s t he v a l u e d the

cat..15es i n e v e r y a s p e c t o f I r a n i a n l i f e ,

k n o w l e d g e o f the west a n d e d u c a t e d his s o n a n d h i s b e s t o f f i c e r s abroad. I n 1925, h e p e r s u a d e d the M a j l i s , the


The

I r a n a i n p a r l i a m e n t , to i n t r o d u c e u n i v e r s a l c o n s c r i p t i o n . Same y e a r he was proclairrled Shah.


Over the n e : : t f i f t e e n y e a r s ,

o f f i c e r s l o y a l t o h i m were

p l a c e d in i n f l n e n t i a l g o v e r n m e n t p o s i t i o n s .

D u r i n g the same 2 p e r i o d the ,army w a s e x p a n d e d f r o m 4 0 , 0 0 0 t o 1 2 5 , 0 0 0 . It b e c a m e h i g h l y c e n t r a l i z e d u n d e r the d i r e c t c o n t r o l o f t h e S h a h a s the Commander i n C h i e f . Promotion, e d u c a t i o n , and

p e r q u i s i t e s were b a s e d o n the S h a h s e v a l u a t i o n o f the o f f i c e r s personal pun i s h e d 3 I n i t i a l l y , c o n s e r v a t i v e e l e m e n t s o f the M e j l i s a n d r e l i g i o u s l e a d e r 5 were a l l i e d w i t h h s programs, which t h e y


c o r r e c t l y i n t e r p r e t e d as n a t i o n a l i s t c a n d o p p o s e d t o
loyalty.

Disloyalty w a s harshly

foreign influence.

H o w e v e r , n o t a l l of the regimes reforms


Many o f Reid S h a h s n a t i o n a l i s t g o a l s

were w e l l r e c e i v e d .

were a t o d d s w i t h the I s l a m i c c l e r g y .

W i t h the i n t r o d u c t i o n

of a c o d i f i e d j u d . i c i a l system,

the c l e r g y l o s t i t s a u t h o r i t y
Marriage a n d

o v e r c i v i l law a n d r e l i g i o u s t r u s t f u n d s . 4

d i v o r c e c i v i l codis+ r e p r e s e n t e d a t t e m p t s t o r e d u c e c l e r i c a l
power,

a 5 d i d a c t i v e programs t o promote western d r e s s a n d


17

restrictions on wearing clerical garb.

R e l i g i o u s instruc:tion

was p l a c e d u n d e r c o n t r o l o f the g o v e r n m e n t : e d c i c a t i u n s y s t e m .
W e a r i n g o f a v e i l by women was f o r b i d d e n .

P.oth the Reza Shah a n d the I s l a m i c c l e r g y i n t e n d e d t o


i n f l u e n c e the b e h a v i o r o f the people.

T h e c l e r g y , however,

had a d i s t i n c t a d v a n t a g e i n their access t o the p e o p l e .


F r e q u e n t a t t e n d a n c e a t s e r v i c e s a s s u r e d t h a t the f a i t h f u l h e a r d the c l e r i c a l v i e w p o i n t f a r more o f t e n t h a n the governments. P k l i e v i n g i n the K o r a n i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a n d l a w by I s l a m i c c l e r g y ,

aclnlinistration of c i v i l

ttle

g o v e r n n 1 e n t 5 c r e d i b i l i t y i n the e y e 5 o f g r a d u a l l y weakened,
as was

the p e o p l e w a s

the p e o p l e - g o v e r n m e n t

r e l a t i o n s h i P.

C o r r e s p o n d i n g 1y

the 1 i n k a g e b e t w e e n the

c l e r g y a n d the p e o p l e g r e w 5 t r o n g e r . O p p o s i t i o n t o the S h a h w a s r e p r e s s e d r e g a r d l e s s of the source. I n c r e a s i n g l y a l a r m e d by the S o v i e t I J n i o n s he e v e n t u a l l y o u t l a w e d the

revolutionary influence, comn~unist p a r t g .

Rebellion,

whether t r i b a l ,

political,

or

re1igious, w a 5 harshly repressed.

T h e army, o s t e n s i b l y
w a 5 primarily used in

d e s i g n e d t o d e f e a t f o r e i g n aggression, an i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y role, 1i n k a g e .

f u r t h e r w e a k i n g the p e o p l e - a r m y

T h e a r m y t h a t R e z a Shah d e v e l o p e d wa5 p u t t o the test


i n 1741 w h e n I r a n was i n v a d e d by B r i t a i n a n d the S o v i e t Union. P u r s ~ i i n gn e u t r a l l i t y a5 the s a f e s t c o ~ i r s e , b u t

a c c e p t i n g German t e c h n i c a l a d v i s e r s , Rc:a
18

Shah w o ~ i l d n o t

a l l o w the t r a n s p o r t o f a l l i e d m a t e r i a l t o the S o v i e t U n i o n

t o cro5s I r a n .
event,

As C h u r c h i l l n o t e d i n d e s c r i p t i o n o f

this

" I n t e r Arnla,

s i l e n t leges. " - - ( b e t w e e n

Armies, law5

a r e s i l e n t )5

T h e B r i t i s h a t t a c k e d o n the 25th o f Augr.ist i n the s o u t h


f r o m the I r a q i c i t y o f B a s r a w i t h one d i v i s i o n t o c a p t u r e Abadan a n d Khorran~shahr, a n d i n the w e s t w i t h o n e d i v i s i o n

from G!asr-e-Shirin

t o w a r d Kermanshah.

A l t h o ~ i g ho n e b r i g a d e

a n d o n e r e g i m e n t waz a r m o r e d ,

the9 may h a v e b e e n less


s i n c e t h e y were

e f f e c t i v e t h a n t h e other a t t a c k i n g u n i t s , r o a d bound.

T h e o b j e c t i v e was t o c a p t u r e the Abadan o i l f i e l d s ,

c o n t r o l c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , a n d secure a r o u t e t o the C a s p i a n
5ea.

T h i s p l a n w t % s r e p e a t e d v i r t u a l l y w i t h o u t c h a i i y e by the
The Soviets, fighting
d i d n o t p u t their N e v e r the less,

I r a q i ' s almost 40 y e a r s l a t e r .

d e s p e r a t e l y w i t h t h e N a z i ' s on their w e s t ,
best t r o o p s i n t h i ? s o u t h t o i n v a d e I r a n .
they entered Azerbaijan,

i n t e n d i n g t o push t o Teheran.

The

t o t a l i n v a d i n g f o r c e , B r i t i s h a n d S o v i e t , was n o t more than


s e v e n d i v i s i o n e q u i v a l e n t s ; f i v e R u s s i a n a n d two Anglo-Indian. I r a n was d e f e n d e d by f i v e d i v i s i o n s .

R e z a Shah was c l e a r l y d e p e n d i n g on the M i l i t a r y Worth

of

h i s army t o r e s i s t t h e A n g l o - R u s s i a n

invasion.

In a

speech t o the M a j l i s c o n c e r n i n g p o s s i b l e i n v a s i o n by R u s s i a n
a n d B r i t i s h f o r c e s , he s t a t e d " C e r t a i n l y w e c a n c o u n t o n o u r disciplined forces.

..".

In addition,
19

he o r d e r e d the p r e s s

arid t h e Government:

propaganda a ~ p a r a t ~ t io s c o n c e n t r a t e on

i n f o r m i n g t h e p e o p l e o n the w o r l d s i t u a t i o n a n d the n e e d f o p s t r e n g t h and r e s i s t a n c e . Additionally,


b

tie r e f u s e d ample o p p o r t u n i t y t o comply

w i t h a l l i e d demtands a n d r e m a i n e d i n c a l c i t r a n t l p r e f e r r i n g t o
o f f e r b a t t l e inctead. Defending with f i v e I r a n i a n d i v i s i o n s

a g a i n s t a c o a l i t i o n of seven Russian and Anglo-Indian


d i v i s i o n s is p e r f e c t l y r e a s o n a b l e , c o m p a r a b l e M i l i t a r i j Wortrh. if

the d i v i s i o n s a r e of

Reza S h a h c l e a r l y t h o u g h t so,

s i n c e h e h a d c o n f i d e n c e i n h i s arfrty, w h i c h he h a d e x p a n d e d

f r o m 4 0 , 0 0 B t o 1ZOrQQ0, a n d h a d u s e d i t s ~ ~ c c e s s f t . ~ a ls l ! his ~

personal

instr~iment

.
G i v e n the e v i d e n t B r i t i s h a n d

T h e r e is n o e v i d e n c e t o s u q r e s t t h a t R e z a Shah t h o c i q t l t Churchill was b l u f f i n g . '

Russian need,

contmitment a n d c a p a b i l i t r l

i t w o u l d have b e e n
u l t i m a t u m was a

u n r e a s o n a b l e t o t h i n k the A n g l o - R u s s i a n

ruse.

Howeverl e v e n i f t h e Reza S h a h h a d t h o u y h t so1 i t

c o u l d n o t have b e e n h i s i n t e n t t o o f f e r n o r e s i s t a n c e s h o u l d a n i n v a s i o n occur. enemy,

H i s army c o l l a p s e d on c o n t a c t w i t h i t s

d e s p i t e Rera S h a h ' s t w e n t y year e f f o r t t o s t r e n g t h e n

it.
No s e r i o u s r e s i s t a n c e wa5 e n c o u n t e r e d a n d c o n r j c r i p t s

d e s e r t e d i n the t h o u s a n d s .

I n ttte s o c i t t t ,

one infantry

b r i g a d e c a p t u r e d Abadanl w h i l e " t h e m a j o r i t y o f P e r s i a n

forces e s c a p e d i n lorries"
Kermanshahl

I n ttte c e n t r a l s e c t o r new

the d e f e n d e r s " a b a n d o n e d t h e i r p o s i t i o n s
20

hastily".

On t h e 28thr J u s t a5 a c o n t i n u e d a t t a c k was a b o u t

t o b e l a u n c h e d , the I r a n i a n commander s u r r e n d e r e d . T h e t o t a l
n u m b e r o f R r i t i s h c a s u a l t i e s f o r the whole o p e r a t i o n was 22
k i 1 l e d a n d 4 2 wounded.
1Gl

There was n o p o p u l a r r e s i s t a n c e ,

i n s p i t e of a year

l o n g p r o g r a m by Rera S h a h t o impress the people w i t h the


n e e d t o resist a p o s s i b l e i n v a s i o n . l 1

F a c e d w i t h the a n d the

c o l l a p s e o f t h e army, the c o i n p l a c e n c y of the p e o p l e , l a c k of qovernacnt r e s o l v e ,

Reza Shah o r d e r e d a c e a s e f i r e o n

the 2 5 t h r three d a y s a f t e r the i n v a s i o n a n d b e f o r e a n y major b a t t l e w a s f o u g h t or o f f e r e d by the I r a n i a n s . Mohammed Reia Shah, R e z a S h a h ' s s o n , p r o v i d e s the f i n a l e v i d e n c e r e g a r d i n c r the poor M i l i t a r y Worth of
Army.

1941 I r a n i a n

'...except

for a f e w i s o l a t e d e n g a g e m e n t s , the

r e s i s t a n c e o f the I r a n i a n a r m e d f o r c e s was c o m p l e t e l y
i n e f f e c t i v e . "1' because of
The I r a n i a n army w a s o v e r w h e l m e d ,

not

i n f e r i c i r nnmbers, but b e c a u s e of

i t chose n o t t o

r e s i s t . Even i f t r i t a l l y o v e r m a t c h e d , a cohesive, d i s c p l i n e d
army w i l l r e s i s t v i o l e n t l y , a n d many t i n e s s c i c c e s s f ~ i l Y . I r a n i a n army,

The

was i n ,spite of it5 numerical i ~ ~ p r o v e n ~ e n t s , of

lower M i l i t a r y Worth t h a n i t s s i z e w o u l d i n d i c a t e . U s i n g Van


C r e v e l d ' s f o r n l u l a , t h i s c a n o n l y o c c u r i f the F i g h t i n g Power
is low.

R e z a Shah's army was o f low M i l t a r y Worth b e c a u s e o f

i t s low F i g h t i n g P o w e r , a n d h a d low F i g h t i n g Power because


o f an i n t b a l a n c e

n the r e l a t i o n s h i p s among the e l e m e n t s of


21

Von C l a ~ i s e w i t z ' s " r e m a r k a b l e t r i n i t y " .

T h e arrrly h a d a w e a k

r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the I r a n i a n p e o p l e a n d r i g i d r e l a t i o n s h i p
w i t h the g o v e r n m e n t ,

i n the f o r m o f the Reza S h a h a s h e a d o f


g o v e r n m e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p was a already described

state and despot.

T h e people,

r e f l e c t i o n the p e o p l e ,

army r e l a t i o n s h i p ,

a5 weak.
r e s u l t of trinity.

T h e F i g h t i n g P o w e r o f the a r m y was l o w a 5 a d i r e c t

the p o o r l y b a l a n c e d people, a r m y , g o v e r n m e n t

B r i t i s h f o r c e s w i t h d r e w o n the 1 9 t h o f O c t o b e r ,
a l t h o u g h S o v i e t f o r c e s r e m a i n e d p a s t the e n d of
RE!::a

t h e war.

Shah d i d n o t resist B r i t i s h demands f n r his a b d i c a t i o n ,

a n d i n f a c t p r e f e r r e d i t t o " t a k i n g o r d e r s from some Rritish Captain". Pahlavi,

T h e MaJl i s a p p o i n t e d h i s s o n , Reza Muhammed

the n e w Shah. R e z a Shah w e n t i n t o e x i l e , i.iltirrmt:el!d


T h e n e w Shah v e r y y o u n g , u n p r e p a r e d t o

i n South Africa. rule,

a n d d e p e n d e n t u p o n h i 5 a d v i s o r s . 13

Reia Shah h a d r e a s s e r t e d I r a n ' s

intent to control

it5

own d e s t i n y .

A u t h o r i t a r i a n and n a t i o n a l i s t i c ,

he e x p a n d e d

the a r m y a n d e l e v a t e d the a r m y ' s i n f l u e n c e t o the p o i n t t h a t

i t was the s i n g l e most i m p o r t a n t g o v e r n m e n t b o d y . H e u n i f i e d


a n d e x p a n d e d the a r m y , u s e d i t e x t e n s i v e l y f o r e n f o r c i n g

s o c i a l c h a n g e , a n d e l e v a t e d the w e a l t h a n d s o c i a l s t a t : u s of
l o y a l mgilitary o f f i c e r s . However,

he n e g l e c t e d the p r i m a r y i t 5 army, a n d i t s
low F i g h t i n g P o w e r ,

r e l a t i o n s h i p s between I r a n ' s government.

people,

T h e r e s u l t wa5 a n army o f

a n d q u e s t i o n a b l e M i l i t a r y Worth.

How the new Shah w o u l d

.-,.-,

LL

h a n d l e t h e i m b a l a n c e s w o u l d d e t e r m i n e the f u t u r e o f

Iranian

a r ~ r ~ y 'M s i l i t a r y W o r t h , a n d u l t i m a t e l y the f u t u r e o f I r a n .

A blew Shah, A n O l d P a t t e r n .

Reza Motlaanled P t i a l a v i

the ShahanShah, s u d d e n l y a n d

u n e x p e c t e d l g o c c u p i e d the P e a c o c k T h r o n e a t the age of

twenty two.

H i s military e d u c a t i o n i n I r a n and S w i t z e r l a n d

was t h a t o f a n i m p e r i a l o f f i c e r c a d e t , a n d h a s f a t h e r h a d

t a k e n w e a t c a r e t o i n s t i l l the m o n a r c h y i n r o y a l p r i n c e .
H i s f a t h e r , i n e x i l e i n S o u t h A f r i c a , d i e d three y e a r s
a f t e r his abdication. Muhaninied R e z a P a h l a v i h a d t o d e p e n d o n
a l l i e s and s e n i o r military and

the a d v i c e o f r e l a t i v e s ,
sovernment o f f i c i a l s .

P o w e r b e c a m e more d e f u s e d a n d there

was conipetion f o r g r e a t e r shares o f the I m p e r i a l power.


T h e M a j l i s , f e a r i n g t h a t the n e w Shah w o u l d use the Armed f o r c e s t o e n f o r c e a father's,
despot sin^

similiar t o h i s

i n i t i a l l y g a i n e d more a u t h o r i t y o v e r the Armed


A general

f o r c e s throush i t s c o n t r o l o f the m i l i t a r y b u d g e t .

r o l l b a c k o f Reza S h a h ' s r e f o r m 1 5 o c c u r r e d i n other a r e a s .


r e l i g i o u s a n d t r i b a l l e a d e r s r e a s s e r t e d c o n t r o l , more t r a d i t i o n a l d r e s 5 and

anguage r e a p p e a r e d ,

a s well a5

f a s c i s t , commcinis-t, re i g i o u s a n d n a t i o n a l i s t p o l i t i c a l

~ a r t i e 5 . lHowevei-, ~
d e s p o t t h a t was
ti2

i t wa5 the c h a l l e n g e o f a n o t h e r w o u l d be
s h a p e S h a h P a h l a v i ' s a t t i t u d e a5 r u l e r ;

the P r i m e M i n i s t e r , Mohammed M o s s a d e q . 15

23

M o s s a d e q h a d f o r m e d a coal i t o n o f n a t i o n a l i s t i c

p a r t i e s o f e v e r y s t r i p e , f o c u s i n g o n the c o n t r o l o f

Iran's

o i l . He was i n i t i a l l y w i d e l y

POPLI

a r a n d was a p p o i n t e d P r i m e
i n 1951.
As the o i l

Minsterl a t the demand o f the M a j l i s ,

c r i s i s l w h i c h he h a d h e l p e d t o p r e c i p i t a t e , M o s s a d e q d e m a n d e d more a n d more c o n t r o l .

worsened,

H e eventual lyl

c n n s o l i d a t e d h i s c o n t r o l by a s s u m i n g the r o l e o f m i n i s t e r of

war, a n d t h o u g h c h a l l e n g e d by the Shah, was s u p p o r t e d i n the


s t i - e e t : s by r a d i c a l religio1.15 c l e r g y . M o s s a d e q a t t e m p t e d t o t u r n the a r m y i n t o h i s p o l i t i c a l i n E t r u n i e n t , a5 h a d R e z a Shah. H e p u r g e d the a r w o f o f f i c e r s loyal t o the Shah a n d p r o m o t e d those l o y a l t o h i m . however,

The

d e p e n d a b i l i t y o f these o f f i c e r s ,

proved u n r e l i a b l e .

T h e p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s w o r s e n e d as M o s s a d e q lost s u p p o r t
a n d more d i r e c t l y c h a l l e n s e d the Shah, e v e n t u a l l y d e p o s i n g
him.

I n 19531 i n a s h o r t f o u r d a y p e r i o d d u r i n g w h i c h the

S h a h l e f t the c o u n t r y , M o s s a d e q was o v e r t h r o w n i n a c o u p by army o f f i c e r s he h a d p u r g e d . T h e c h a l l e n g e p o s e d by M o s s a d e q was a f o r m a t i v e o n e f o r

the S h a h .

Where the Shah h a d r e i g n e d b e f o r e , now he w o u l d

rule."

T h i s was e + p e c i a l l r t r u e i n the armyl which M o s s a d e ?

h a d t r i e d t o use a g a i n s t : the Shah, b u t h a d u l t i m a t e l y p r o v e d

the S h a h ' s b a s i s o f power.


mainst:ay. However,

Clearly,

the army was t o b e h i s

t h i s v i e w p o i n t was s h o r t s i g h t e d , a n d the

shism b e t w e e n the p e o p l e l

the a r m y , a n d the g o v e r n m e n t l

24

e v i d e n t d u r i n g the r u l e o f h i s f a t h e r , a l t h o u g h i n i t i a l l y abatedm, would soon r e 5 ~ 1 ~ i1 ts e growth. T h e S h a h b e e a n by p u r g i n g o f f i c e r s a f f i l i a t e d w i t h the c o m n ~ n n i s t Tudeh (Masses) p a r t y a n d o u t l a w e d +:he p a r t y i t s e l f , as h a d his f a t h e r .
of

He tool:: s t e p s t o r e d u c e the p o w e r

the M a j l i s by c . L . i p e r v i s i n g the n o m i n a t i o n o f c a n d i d a t e E
He c r e a t e d s e v e r a l

and e l e c t i o n s .

internal securitg

organizations, (Saznlan-i

the most n o t : o r i o u s o f w h i c h was SAVAb:

I t t i l a a t va Amniyat--i t i e s h v a r ; Nat-ional

I n t e 1 1 i g e n c e a n d Cwcur i t y ( h g a n i z a t ion ) 17
SAVAK was c l o s e l r a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the mi1 t a r y a n d was

r u n ti9 h i g h r a n k i n g m i l i t a r y o f f i c c r s . wm-e a r r a n g e d i n
EI

These o r g a n i - a t i o n s
50

bewildering system
AS

that

e v e r y b o d y was

w a t c h i n g somebodr e l s e .

a n example, a s u p e r s e c r e t

o r g a n i z a t i o n e n t i t l e d the S p e c i a l I n t e l l i g e n c e P u r e a u o p e r a t e d out o f the S h a h s p a l a c e with w o r k i n g i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f SAVAh,

the 50le aim o f

p r e s ~ i r r ~ a b lt yo a c t a 5 t h e
A comlprehensive s t u d y o f

S h a h s w a t c h d o g of SAVAK i t s e l f . l9

these o r g a n i z a t i o n s is w o r t h y of a thesis i n i t s e l f . S u f f i c e

i t t o s a y , t h a t t h e y were a n outgrowth o f the S h a h s c o n c e r n f o r i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y a n d l a c k of t r u s t . A n o t h e r f e a t u r e of


the S h a h s l a c k o f

t r u s t was the

c o n t r o l o f h i s mi1,itary o r g a n i z a t i o n s .

The General S t a f f

a c t e d a5 a p l a n n i n g a n d c o o r d i n a t i n g a g e n c y , b u t n o t a s a command b o d y . S e r v i c e C h i e f s o f S t a f f , major s u b o r d i n a t e

25

c o r n n ~ a n d e r s a n d s e c u r i t y o r e a n i - a t i o n s were e n c o u r i i q e d t o r e p o r t : d i r e c t l y t o the Shah. ZP)

T h e r e s ~ i l t , i n terms o f the C l a u s e w i t z e a n t r i n i t y ,
potent:ially i:atastrophic.
A v i c i o u s cycle of b r u t a l

were

r e p r e s s i o n a n d r e s i s t a n c e f u r t h e r s e p a r a t e d the g o v e r n m e n t ,
i n the p e r s o n of the Shah, f r o m the p e o p l e , a n d the p e o p l e

from the army a s the t o o l of his o p p r e s s i o n .


c o n s i d e r a b l e s t r a i n o n the p e o p l e ,

T h e Shah p u t a

army, government

r e 1a t i o n 5 h i p t 1 1 a t e v e n t u a I 1 y p r o d u c e d a r n a jo r r e v o 11.it i on
However,

these t r e n d s a r e n o t a complete a n a l ! ~ s i s a n d

F i g h t i n g Power o f the I r a n i a n army a n d i t s M i l i t a i - y Worth r e q u i r e s a more d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s .

1075 was a w a t e r s h e d y e a r f o r the I r a n i a n army.


N a t i o n a l wealth s u d d e n l y i n c r e a s e d a 5 r e s u l t o f

a sustained

o i l r e v e n u e w i n d f a l l s , a n d the m i l i t a r y b u d g e t d r a m a t i c a l l y
increased correspondingly.

T h e r a p i d i n c r e a s e i n the Wual i t y

a n d Q u a n t i t r o f e q u i p m e n t p r o v i d e s an e x c e l l e n t o p p o r t u n i t y

t o e v a l u a t e the I r a n i a n a r m y i n Van C r e v e l d s t e r n ~ s , a n d
w i l l p r o v i d e g r e a t e r i n s i g h t i n t o the a r m y s F i g h t i n g P o w e r .

From 1973 t o 1075 I r a n i a n Gross N a t i o n a l P r o d u c t more


t h a n d o u b l e d a 5 a r e s u l t o f i n c r e a s e d o i l reveni.ies.
Defense

e x p e n d i t u r e s i n c r e a s e d more t h a n f i v e f o l d a n d d o u b l e d as a p e r c e n t a g e o f the GNP i n the same p e r i o d .


Most o f

the

e x p e n d i t u r e s were o n e q u i p m e n t a n d m m d e r n i z a t i o n , manpower r e m a i n e d aln105t c o n s t a n t . 2 1

since

T h e sudden influ:: of

e q u i p m e n t was i m p o s s i b l e t o a b s o r b w i t h o u t waste a n d
ti.irmoi 1 .

In a d d i t i o n ,

the r a p i d m o d e r n i z a t i o n b r o u g h t w i t h i t a

g r o w i n g d e p e n d e n c e o n f o r e i g n s o u r c e s f o r war m a t e r i e l , a

c r i t i c a l w e a k n e s s i n a p r o t r a c t e d war.

A l t h o ~ i g hp r o d u c t i o n

of small arnls h a d b e r u n a n d p l a n s f o r p r o d u c t i o n o f other

t ~ w 5 o f e q u i p m e n t were l a i d o u t , a t the time o f the


revolution, I r a n was s t i l l a l n l o s t c o m p l e t e l y d e p e n d e n t on

o u t s i d e 5 0 u r c e s f o r major items a n d t e c h n i c a l e x p e r t i s e .
T h i s w a s f u r t h e r c o n ~ p l i c a t e dby a d e l i b e r a t e g o v e r n m e n t

d e c i s i o n t o p u r c h a s e equipment from d i f f e r e n t c o u n t r i e s .
some c a s e s ,

In

the t a n k of o n e c o u n t r y w a 5 mlatched w i t h the

m a i n g u n of a n o t h e r . T h e r e 5 i . i l t i n g mi:.: o f weapons, c a l i b e r s ,
a n d r e p a i r items t o s u p p o r t them was a l o g i s t i c a l n i g h t m a r e .

T h e re5ponser a computerized l o g i s t i c a l system,


e x a c e r b a t e d the p r o b l e m by i n c r e a s i n g the f o r e i g n dependence. I n a d d i t i o n , the s o p h i s t i c a t e d e l e c t r o n i c s were

even more l i k e l y t o f a i l a n d 1135.5 l i k e l y t o b e i m m e d i a t e l y


or locally repairable.

In addition,

the c r i t i c a l s h o r t a g e o f t r a i n e d p e r s o n n e l

t h r o u g h o u t the c o u n t r y was e r o d i n g a r m y morale a n d c o h e s i o n , v i t a l e l e m e n t s o f F i g h t i n g Power.

T h e e x p l o d i n g economy h a d

c r e a t e d a w i d e s p r e a d demand f o r a l l t e c h n i c a l S k i l l s . As the g r o w i n g demand f o r c e d the C i v i l i a n wage s c a l e s u p , o f f i c e r s

e i t h e r l e f t the s e r v i c e , o r b e g a n t o c h a f e u n d e r the
r e l a t i v e l y low m i l i t a r y s a l a r i e s .
12

--

27

I n a n e f f o r t t o meet the s h o r t a g e , a new m i l i t a r y C l a s s


uias r a p i d l y e x p a n d e d ; W a r r a n t O f f i c e r s .

C r i t i c a l l y important

t o the m o d e r n i z i n g a r m y , t h e y were p r o m o t e d on the b a s i s o f


their b a d l y n e e d e d s k i 1 1 5 a n d t h e r e f o r e n o t n e c e s s a r i l y
l o y a l t o the S h a h .
As the army came t o d e p e n d more a n d more

on these t e c h n i c i a n s ,

they began t o g a r n e r an i m p o r t a n c e f a r

beyond their r a n k i n c r i t i c a l t e c h n i c a l a r e a s ; n m i n t e n a n c e , c o m p u t e r i z a t o n , conmi.incations, weaponry a n d i n t c l l i g c n c e . T h i s cr t i c a l g r o u p was n o t p r o m o t e d o n the b a s i s o f


loyalty.

T h e Shahr w h o r e v i e i o e d a l l promotions. t o Major, d i d i n s p i t e o f their c r i t i c a l

3 a v e them no s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n , i m p o r t a n c e t o the

T h e y were a d i s t i n c t l r n e w f e a t u r e

i n the I r a n i a n army a n d a f u r t h e r p o t e n t i a l f r a g m e n t a t i o n ; o f f i c e r s i n c o n t r o l of c r i t c a l n o d e s w i t h no s p e c i f i c l o y a l t y t o ttie ~ t l a t s . ~ ~


T h e l o y a l t y a n d c o h e s i o n o f the b u l k of
the e n l i s t e

f o r c e was e r o d i n g a 1 5 0 .

L a r g e l y s h o r t term c o n s c r i p t s ,

e n l i s t e d s o l d i e r s h a d s c a n t a f f e c t i o n f o r the regime t o beqin w i t h .

''

Poorly t r e a t e d a n d p o o r l y p a i d , e v e n b e f o r e
their m o r a l e ,

the s u d d e n i n c r e a s e c i v i l i a n w a g e s ,

cohesion

a n d l o y a l t y s u f f e r e d e v e n more t h a n the o f f i c e r C o r p s .
As a n i r o n i c twist,

e f f o r t s t o make them more r e l i a b l e

i n an i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y r o l e h a d the o p p o s i t e e f f e c t .
C c m s c r i p t s were r o u t i n e l y s t a t i o n e d i n a r e a s o u t s i d e t h e i r na.tive region.
T h i s was t h o u g h t t o assure t h e i r l o y a l t y i n

the e v e n t o f a l o c a l i n s u r r e c t i o n .
ZH

However,

the y o u n g

soldier,

l o n e l y a n d s e p a r a . t e d f r o n t his f a m i l y ,

friends,

and

coroaunity,

t u r n e d t o the l o c a l n105que a s the o n l y a r e a he However,


yoLiiiy

r e c o s n i z e d iand f e l t c o n l f o r t a b l e in." i n c r e a s i n g l y o p p o s e d the Shahr the

a s the c l e r g y

conscripted soldier

h e a r d an e v e r l o u d e r a n d more i n s i s t e n t b e a t o f c r i t c i s m a n d c o n d e m n a t i o n o f the S h a h ' s regime. When the R e v o l u t i o n came,


many e n l i s t e d j o i n e d

i n the r e v o l t , some t u r n i n g o n t h e i r

o f f i c e r s a n d k i 1 1 i n g them. - '

, 7
these p r o b l e m s g r e w

B e t w e e n 1975 a n d the r e v o l u t i o n ,
moi-e p r o n o u n c e d .

I n s p i t e o f e n o r m o u s i m p r o v e m e n t i n the

Q u a l i t y a n d Ijluantity of eqciipnlent, r e v o l u t i o n when i t came.

i t c o u l d n o t r e s i s t the

When the S h a h ' s a r m y is e v a l u a t e d ,

i t b e c o m e s c l e a r t h a t i t s M i l i t a r y Worth was l o w e r than i t


appeared.

I n Van C r e v e l d ' s f o r n u l a t i o n , t h i s c a n o n l y o c c u r

when the F i g h t i n g Power is v e r y low.

T h e p e o p l e , a r m y , govcrnmtent l i n k a g e was so w e a k a n d so
imbalanced that v i o l e n t ,

total revolution occurred.

T o the

e x t e n t t h a t w e can g a i n i n s i g h t

i n t o the F i g h t i n g Power o f

a n army by a n a l y z i n g the r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n the p e o p l e ,

the a r m y , a n d the y o v e r n m e n t , the F i g h t i n g Power was a l s o


v e r y low. I n the f i n a l a n a l y s i s ,

the arrrty d i d n o t o n l y n o t
The final

o v e r c o m e the r e v o l u t i o n ,

but participated i n it. "non-interference"

military d e c l a r a t i o n of

m a r k e d the e n d o f

the P a h l a v i r e i g n a n d b e g i n i n g of

the I s l a m i c R e p u b l i c .

28

U n d e r d i f f e r e n t c i r c u m s t a n c e s , c o u l d the I r r i p e r i a l I r a n i a n Grnirnd F o r c e s h a v e e x h i b i t e d greater M i l i t a r y W o r t h ?

29

S i n c e I i n t e n d t o c o m p a r e the M i l i t a r y Worth o f the S h a h ' s a r m y t o the army o f

the I s l a r n i c R e p u b l i c ,

ttle

qnestiori i s a n

important one.

If

I r a q h a d i n v a d e d b e f o r e the v e v o l u t i o n ,

w o u l d the I r a n i a n army s t i l l h a v e b e e n so w e a k ?

T h e q u e s t i o n is u n a n s w e r a b l e i n a n y m e a n i n g f u l way.
real external threats d i d n o t h a v e t h i s e f f e c t .
materialized,

The

I f o n e had

the s i h i s n ~ b e t w e e n the p e n p l e ,

the army, a n d

the q o v e r n m e n t w o u l d b e a s s e r i o u s a n d the w e a k n e s s e s i n
military cohesion,

morale,

and l o y a l t y would h a v e also

remained.

I t w o u l d b e n e c e s 5 a r - y t o as51..1rr1e awakj the

r e v o l u t i o n a n d i t s c a ~ i s e sb e f o r e we a g a i n h a v e a n I r a n i a n a r m y o f r e s p e c t a b l e F i g h t i n g Power a n d M i l i t a r y Worth.

This

a s s u m p t i o n i s s u c h a d e p a r t u r e from r e a l i t y t h a t a n a l y s i s b e c o m e s s p e c : ~ i l a t i v egnessbiork w i t h o u t u t i l i t y . A d d i t i o n a l l y , s u c h a p r o p o s a l b e g s the q u e s t i o n . f i n a l a n a l y s i s the M i l i t a r y Worth o f the a r m y was


50

I n the

low
low

t h a t i t c o u l d n o t r e s i s t the r e v o l u t i o n .
M i l i t a r y Worth i n s p i t e o f r e c e n t

I t was of

l a v i s h augmwntations i n

Q u a l i t y a n d ( 3 u a n t i t y o f e q u i p n l e n t a n d b e c a u s e o f poor
F i g h t i n g Power. I t w a s of
poor F i g h t i n g P o w e r a s a r e s u l t of
arnly,

b a s i c weaknesses i n t h e p e o p l e ,

government l o y a l t y and

r e l a t i o n s h i p and e r o s i o n i n m i 1 i t a r y cohesion,

morale.

T h e e f f e c t o f the r e v o l u t i o n o n the M i l i t a r y Worth of


t h e I r a n i a n a r m y i s r e v e a l e d i n the f o l l o w i n g c h a p t e r o n i t s

p e r f o r m a n c e i n the I r a n - I r a q

war.
36

ENDNOTES
CHAPTER TWO 1. S i r W i l l i a m S l i m , D e f e a t I n t o Victorcr, D a v i d McKay, I n c . , 19-51), p. 3.

(New York:
p.

2.
39m.
3.

R i c h a r d F. N y r o p , Ibid., Ibid. 54.

ed.,

I r a n : A Countrcr S t u d q ,

P.

4.
Vol

5. W i r i s t i m S p e n c e r C h u r c h i l l I T h e S e c o n d W o r l d War, 1 1 1 , 1);~ G r a n d A l l i a n c e , (Rostori: H o u q h t o n M i f f l i n Co., 1 9 5 0 ) , pp. 482-483.

6. Georgi: L.enczo1~151:i, e d . , k a n u n d e r the P a h l a v i $ . , ( S t a n f o r d , C a l i f o r n i a : Hoover I n s t i t u t i o n P r e s s . , 1 9 7 8 ) , p. 49.

7.
400.

W i n s t o n S . C h i . i r c h i 1 1 , Ihe S e c o g d W o r l d War,
R i c h a r d F. N y r o p , W i n s t n n S. I b i d , , , p. ed., I r a n : A Studcr,
p.

P.

8.
9.
481.

391

C t w r c h i l l , T h e S e c o n d W o r l d War, P. 483.

10.
11. 49. Countrcr,

Georqe L e n c z o w s k i ,

p a n Under. t h e P a t l l a v i 5 r P .

Mohartmed Reia Shah P a h l a v i , 12. ( N e w Y o r k : : Mcgraw h i l l . , 1 9 6 2 ) , p.

p m i i for Mu.
70.
P.

13.

R i c h a r d F. N y r o p . , Ibid., Ibid. Ibid.,


p.

ed.,

Iran:

A Countrcr Studcr,

55.
14. 15. 16.
P.

60.

62.

1 7 . ErvancJ A b r a h a m i a n , I r a n : Petioeen TWO R e v o I i . i t i o ~ , ( P r i n c e t o n , N e w J e r s e y : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1 9 8 2 ) - PP. 4 19-420. 18. Theconomlist, 1 1 November, 1978.9
P.

13.

31

19.

R i c h a r d F. N y r o p , Ibid.,
401.

ed.,

Iran: A

Count:rli S t u d l i ,

P.

373.
20.
P.

21. A n t h o n y H. for St-rategic S t a b i l i t q , 22.


410. 23.

C o r d e a r n a n , " T h e Gcilfnd p . 726.


Flyrop, 401.

the S e a r c h
P.

R i c h a r d F. Ibid.,
p.

ed.,

Iran: A C O L I I S ~ tctdg,

N i k k i R. K e d d i e , R o o t s o f R e v o l u t i o r p n n . H i s t o r i d o f Modern I r a n , (New H a v e n , C o n i i e c t i c : t . i t : Yale U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s ) , p . 6.

InterprAive
25.
73.

24.

J o h n M. N i k k i R.

Smith,

"Where was the S h a h ' s A r m y ? " , p .

26.
83-84.
29.

Keddie,

Roots o f R e v n l u t i a n , p .

7.
PP.

27. J o h n .

M.

Smith,
p.

"Where was the S h a h ' s Arnl!j?",

Ibid.,

90.

32

Chapter T h r e e

T h e P o s t - r e v n l u t i o n a r y Army i n the I r a n - I r a q

War

" I f y o u w a n t t o o v e r c o m e your enemy y o u m u s t match y o u r e f f o r t a g a i n s t h i 5 p o w e r o f r e s i s t a n c e , w h i c h can b e e x p r e s s e d a5 the p r o d u c t : o f two i n s e p a r a b l e f a c t o r s , v i z ,


t h e t o t a l m e a n s a t his d i s p o s a l ,

a n d the s t r e n g t h of h i s

will.
tt1oLigt.l

T h e e x t e n t of

the means a t h i 5 d i s p o s a l is a rrlatter,

n o t e x c l ~ ~ ~ - i ~ vof ely f, i g u r e s , and s h o ~ ~ l bd e


P . u t the s t r e n g t h of h i s w i l l is much less easg

measurable.

t o d e t e r m i n e a n d c43n o n l y b e g a u g e d a p p r o x i m a t e l y by the
s t r e n g t h o f the m o . t i v e a n i m a t i n g i t . "

C a r l Von C l a u s e w i t -

33

C h a p t e r three is s u b d i v i d e d i n t o t h r e e s u b s e c t i o n s ; a

strategic overview of t h e c o n f l i c t , events, and f a c t o r s


l e a d i n g c i p t o t h e war, a n o p e r a t i o n a l level analrsis of

selected Iranian military actions,

and a n o v e r v i e w a n d

a n a l y s i s o f t h e I r a n i a n army5 p e r f o r m a n c e . I t i s t h e i n t e n t o f C h a p t e r t h r e e t o s h o w t h a t the p e r f o r m a n c e of the I r a n i a n a r m y i n the I r a n - I r a q

war

i n d i c a t e s t h a t i t i s a n arrrly o f c o n s i d e r a b l e M i l i t a r y Worth
inspite of

low l e v e l s o f

t h e Q u a l i t y arid h a n k i t 3 of c o n s i d e r a b l e F i g h t i n g Power. If

e q c i i p f r l e n t b u t b e c a u s e of

t h i s is s o ,

i t s t r o n g l y i m p l i e s t h a t the Revoli.i+:ion

was +:he

p r o x i m a t e cacise f o r the c h a n g e i n F i s h t i n s P o w e r .

I t then

b e c o m e s t h e p u r p o s e of

Chapter f o u r t o a n a l y z e the

R e v o l u t i o n a n d t o d e t e r m i n e the e f f e c t on the a r m y . T h e I r a q i d e c i s i o n t o go t o war was b a s e d o n the i n t e n t : t o t a k e a d v a n t a g e of governnent


way

t h e apparently unsteady

i n I r a n , g a i n c o n t r o l o f t h e S h a t t a1 A r a b water
a n d I r a q s s t r a t e g i c l i n k t o the and

( c o n t r o l l e d by I r a n ,

P e r s i a n G u l f ) , assert i t 5 d o m i n a n c e i n the r e g i o n ,

p e r h a p s a n n e x t h e e t h n i c s 1 i y Arab; o i l r i c h K h u z e s t a n province. She d l 5 0 e x p e c t e d t h a t t h e o p e r a t i o n w o u l d

d e s t a b i l i z e the r e a c t i o n a r y I s l a m i c r e p u b l i c a n d p u t a n
early e n d to t h e threat of

I s l a m i c fi.indanientali5t r e v o l u t i o n
To h e l p c a r r y out

t h r o u g h o u t : the Mos1er11w o r l d .

its i n i t i a l

military o p e r a t i o n s ,

I r a q elicited c o n s i d e r a b l e d i r e c t and

34

m o n e t a r y s 1 . 1 ~ ~f 0 ro rm t the P e r s i a n G ~ i l f a n d other A r a b n a t i o n s because,


she p o i n t e d o u t w i t h r e g u l a r i t y ,

she f o u g h t

a n enemy t h a t t h r e a t e n e d thern a l l .

A l t h o u q h no d i r e c t

e v i d e n c e e x i s t s t h a t Iraq was e n c o u r a g e d i n i t s a d v e n t u r i s m

or s o ~ i g h t a d v i c e i n this r e g a r d ,
condoned thc? action.

i t is c l e a r t h a t t h e y

Iraq h s d a n o t h e r c l e a r i n t e n t w h i c h can o n l y b e t e r m e d
an o v e r d e v e l o p m e n t o f

i t s sense o f

its rightful

d e s t i n r as

l e a d e r o f the A r a b w o r l d .
Egypt,

A f t e r the Camp D a v i d a c c o r d s ,

the p r e v i o i . . i s l e a d e r o f the A r a b s t a t e s , was r e j e c t e d

w i t h o u t a c l e a r s~icc:essor. Here w a s a n o p p o r t u n i t y f o r Saddam H u s s e i n , p r e s i d e n t o f Iraq, t h a t s e e m e d t o h i m t o be b e l l i g e r e n t , a n d thoroLigh1y


a l o n g term a n d a r g u a b l y

too g o o d t o miss: a w e a k ,

d i s l i k e d non--Arab n a t i o n ;

J u s t i f i a b l e g r u d g e ; the p r o m i s e o f a p e r m a n e n t r e g i o n a l
power r e a l i g n m e n t

i n I r a q s a d v a n t a g e ; a n d the g l i t t e r i n g

p o s s i b i l i t y of stage.

l e a d e r s h i p o f the Arab n a t i o n s on the w o r l d

Additionally,

the a r e a o f p l a n n e d i n v a s i o n l o o k e d
K h u z e s t a n , a l s o known
d5

especially vulnerable.
wa5 a t

Arabistan,

l e a s t 4Wi A r a b , a n d i t s o i l workers h a d r e c e n t l y

r e a c t e d v i o l e n t l y i n o p p o s i t i o n t o the I s l a m i c g a v e r n m e n t s a t t e m p t s t o i n f l u e n c e o p e r a t i o n s i n the o i l f i e l d s a n d refineries. Hi.issi?in made much o f

the r a c i a l f a c t o r i n

p u b l i c s t a t e m e n t s a n d m a y h a v e o v e r e s t i m a t e d i t 5 impact o n i d e o l i J g i c a 1 ground!;.

T h a t K h u z e s t a n w a s a l E o almost
35

e x c l u s i v e l y S h i i t r . was d i s c o u n t e d , e t h n i c l o y a l t r w o u l d provf? d o m i n a n t .

s i n c e i t wa5 f e l t the T h e r e was r,owe reason I r a q was

to b e l i e v e t h i s .

The c o r r e s p o n d i n g b o r d e r area o f

a l s o S h i i t e a s was the I r a q i e n l i s t e d f o r c e .

If racial

l o r a l t y was the don1inan.t f a c t o r i n I r a q ,

then,

the i d e o l o g y

suggested i t would b e dominant i n Khi.iiestan. In t h e f i n a l a n a l y s i s , Husseinr, reach exceeded h i 5


grasp.

L i k e manq o t h e r d i c t a t o r s uihose sense o f

destiny
1:uril

d r o v e thew t o m i 1 i t a r y a d v e n t u r i 5 ~ 1 ,he c o u l d n o t seeming gnl den o p p o r t u n i t y .

dOwn a

I r a n w a 5 r e g j o n a l l r i s o l a t e d e v e n b e f o r c t:he revolution. I t s c l ~ i m s y a n d i n e f f e c t i v e use of

power a g a i n s t

t h e D h o f a r r e b e l s i n On~ari a n d s u p p o r t of against Iraq,

t h e K u r d i s h rebel

its heavy handed n e g o t i a t i o n w i t h Iraq o v e r


and it5 p a t e r n a l i s t i c a t t i t u d e

t h e S h a t t e l A r a b i n 1975,

toward t h e G u l f v i r t u a l l y g u a r a n t e e d s u f f i c i e n t a n i n ~ o a i t y i n
the r e g i o n .
S i n c e the I s l a m i c r e v o l u t i o n t h i n g s h a d g o t t e n d e c i d e d l y worse. I r a n held, w i t h m a l i c i o u s i n t e n t , American f o r ransom;

Embassy a n d m i l i t a r y p e r s o n n e l

the I r a n i a n

Revolutionary Party

( I R F ) was e r r a t i c a l l g a n d b r u t a l l y

r o o t i n g out o p p o s i t i o n w h i l e competitors f o r f o r I K P l e a d e r s h i p f o u g h t a m o n g 5 t them~selves. T h e I R P o p e n l y i n c i t e d I s l a m i c peoples e v e r y w h e r e ,


especially I r a q i s ,

to revolt

a g a i n s t t h e i r c o r r u p t 1 e ~ i d e i - s . ~ T o m a k e matters wor~c?, its announced i n t e n t i o n to u s e oil to g a i n concessions and as a

36

tool o f i n f l r m c e i n i t s f o r e i g n p o l i c y a r s e n a l , a s s u r e d

r e g i o n a l and g l o b a l e n m i t y .

However,

i t r e m a i n e d i n OPEC,

a n d j o i n e d w i t h S y r i a , S o u t h Yemen, "Steadfastness front",


5 t ates.

and Libga in t h e

a group of

l i k e minded r a d i c a l

Post-revolutionary d i f f i c u l t to f a t h o m .

I r a n i a n i n t e n t t o w a r d I r a q i s more

A l t h o u g h a low i n t e n s i t y b o r d e r war h a d t t l e r c ? was n o

been i n p r o g r e s s througtl t h e previous year,

t r o o p r e d e p l o y m e n t other t h a t f o r i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t r .
Khomeini's strategic p e r s p e c t i v e appears to have an Hominem q u a l i t y .

H e made a n u m b e r o f

theatening statements

d i r e c t e d a t the p e r s o n o f S a d d a m H ~ t s s e i n , c a l l i n y h i m a t o n e point

the " d w a r f p h a r o a t t " . 6

H e also d i r e c t e d personal
both

a t t a c i : : s a t other leaders whom h e t h o u g h t o p p o s e d h i m ,


e x t e r n a l l y and internally,

i n c l u d i n g the S a u d i l e a d e r s a f t e r

1982.

'

K h o m e i n i ' s Ad Hornginem f o r e i g n p o l i c y a p p r o a c h was

l a t e r i l l u s t r a t e d d u r i n g t h e attempt t o n e g o t i a t e a t r u c e
betmeen I r a n and Iraq: h e i n s i s t e d that H u s s e i n b e put on The key

t r i a l a n d b e h e a d e d b e f o r e an armistice b e c o n c l u d e d .

to t h e i n f l u e n c e of

I r a n may be t h r o u g h a p e r s o n a l

r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the A y a t o l ah.

Geography of

t h e Battle area b o r d e r s t r e t c h e s r o u g h l y 1500 tii lometers

The Iraq-Iran

f r o n t the P e r s i a n G u l f border.

i n t h e S o u t h t o the common T u r k i s h
plains, d e s e r t and mountain

I t t r a n s i t s swamplands,
37

wasteland.

I n t h e s o u t h e r n b o r d e r r e g i o n t h a t has s e e n t h e

g r e a t e s t f i g h t i n g , the t e m p e r a t u r e r a n g e s f r o m j ~ ~ below s t
f r e e z i n g i n J a n u a r y i n the a i d - n i n e t i e s i n July. Winter

r a i n f a l l s are quite s e v e r e , w i t h a n a n n u a l r a i n f a l l of a b o u t

20 i n c h e s .

S i n c e the T i g r i s a n d E u p h r a t e s , w h i c h d r a i n t h e
a n d the K a r u n r i v e r ,
o u t of

c e n t r a l Iraqi b a s i n ,

the I r a n i a n

Zaqros m o u n t a i n . . ,
roi..itinel!j f l o o d s , swamplands.

d r a i n s i n t o the S h a t t a1 A r a b , covering a broad expanse of


~ILIC~I

the r i v e r

low lying

S e a s o n a l r a i n s can v a r y a5

a s 40%, tlc.weverr

a n d d u r i n g the f a l l o f

1980 r a i n s were u n u s u a l l y h e a v y .

The

I r a n i a n o i l f i e l d s a r e f i f t y t o 200 miles e a s t of the b o r d e r i n the south of t<hu::e=tan p r o v i n c e ;


the b o r d e r

the I r a q i f i e l d 5 a r e 100

t o 2012 miles w e s t o f

i n the N o r t h a t t i i r k u k .

I n t h e N o r t h e r n a n d c e n t r a l s e c t o r s l t h e Zagros r u n s a l o n g the I r a n i a n s i d e of

the b o r d e r c r e a t i n g a f o r m i d a b l e

obstacle.

T h e I r a q i t e r r a i n i n t h e c e n t r a l s e c t o r i s rrlcich a l t h o u g h i t is more
These a r e a s

f l a t t e r a l l the way t o B a g h d a d ,

m o u n t a i n o u s i n t c ~ i r d i s t a n a5 closer t o Turkey.

a r e r e l a t i v e l y a r i d , a l t h o u g h there a r e w o o d l a n d 5 i n the
hisher a l t i t u d e v a l l e y s a n d l a r g e c u l t i v a t e d a n d i r r g a t e d
a r e a s f r o m K i r k u i r to the S y r i a n b o r d e r

i n the west. 8

T h e S h a t t a 1 A r a b l or the Shore o f the A r a b s , c e n t r a l r o l e i n the e v e n t s l e a d i n g


LIP

~ l a r j 5a
T h e Shatt:

to t:he w a r .

is a m e a n d e r i n g c h a n n e l ,
Karun r i v e r s , and makes

combining t h e T i g r i s , Euphrates and


LIP

the lower b o r d e r b e t w e e n I r a n a n d

Iraq.

I t i s f r o m o n q u a r t e r t o three q u a r t e r s o f a m i l e w i d e
LIP

and silt5

rapidly if

i t is n o t k e p t c l e a r .

P o s s e s s i o n a n d c o n t r o l o f the S h a t t h a s r e m a i n e d a b o n e

of c o n t e n t i m i s i n c e i t wa5 u s e d a s a d e m a r c a t i o n ,

; ! i

lowever,

the c u r r e n t d e b a t e b e g a n i n 1 9 1 4 . T h e 1 9 1 4 t r e a t y , c l a r i f i e d

i n 1 9 3 7 , g a v e the b u l k o f the S h a t t t o I r a q , t h e n u n d e r
B r i t i s h control.
T h i s g a v e the I r a q i s the p o t e n t i a l o f

s e v e r e l y restrictins I r a n i a n passage from i t 5 major o i l r e f i n e r y i n Abadan t o t h e P e r s i a n G u l f .


~ise the

Iran continued to

Shatt without change, but a l s o planned and b u i l t

s e v e r a l p i p e l i n e s t o p o i n t s lower on the G L I I ~ .I n 1 9 6 9 , I r a q t o l d I r a n i t might c l o s e the S h a t t t o I r a n i a n s h i p p i n g . 1 9 7 1 , d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s were s e v e r e d a n d a p e r i o d of In

r i .ii n g t e n s i o n e n s u e d .
W i t h the e x c e p t i o n of a t e m p o r a r y r a p p r o a c h m e n t d u r i n g

the 1 9 7 3 A r a b - I s r a e l i

war, f o r c e s a n d a c t i o n s o n the b o r d e r

c o n t i n u e d t o b u i lcl,

culmiinationg i n s e v e r a l border c l a s h e s

i n 1 9 7 4 a n d o v e r t 5 u p p o r t o f the K u r d i s h r e b e l s i n I r a q by Iran. I n 1 9 7 5 , a t r e a t y was w o r k e d out u n d e r A l g e r i a n

a u s p i c e s d i v i d i n g the S h a t t a t the m i d p o i n t o f the d e e p e s t c h a n n e l , ( t h e thaluieg l i n e ) , a n d e n d i n g I r a n i a n s u p p o r t f o r the

T h e l r a q i n e g o t i a t o r was S a d d a a H ~ i s s e i n , l a t e r

t o become the f i v - s t I r a q i c i v i l i a n h e a d o f s t a t e , a n d
i n i t i a t o r o f the I r a n - I r a q Following
thEs

war.

a c c o r d i n 1975, both Iraq and I r a n


Iraq l a r g e l y

c o n t i n u e d t o imprcrve their m i l i t a r y f o r c e s ;
39

becaucc i t s poor p e r f o r m a n c e i n the 1973 A r a b - I s r a e l i

warl

a n d I r a n as p a r t o f Gulf r e g i o n .

i t s e m e r g i n g a g e n d a of s e c u r i t y f o r the

A more d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s o f the f o r c e

c o n ~ p a r i s o n b e t w e e n the two p o w e r s b e f o r e the war f o l l o w s .


B e f o r e the war corrmencedl I r a q a p p e a r e d o n the v e r g e o f a s c e n d a n c y i n the P e r s i a n G u l f r e g i o n . e q u i p p e d armq a n d A i r F o r c e , I t had a w e l l and a

powerful a l l i e s ,

c e n t r a l i z e d government i n f i r m c o n t r n l .

T h e I r a q i armg was c o n s i d e r e d t o h a v e a g o o d
capabi l i t y l havinq undergone i n t e n s e s c r u t i n y , reorganization, and t r a i n i n g following its l a c l r l ~ i s t e r

p e r f o r m a n c e i n the 1 9 7 3 A r a b - I s r a e l i h a d more t h a n d o u b l e d i n s i z e .

War.

By

1 9 8 0 +:he army
IUAC

S p e c i a l emphasis

given to

armored and armored i n f a n t r y f o r c e s ,

air defensel anti-tankl


Saddanl H u s s e i n , a

A i r Forces and t r a n s p o r t a t i o n u n i t s .

c i v i l i a n w h o had come t o power i n 1 9 7 9 t h r o u y h a p r o t r a c t e d i n t e r n a l s t r u g g l e w i t h powerful r e v o l u t i o n a r y m i l i t a r y leaders, f orces. h a d c o n s o l i d a t e d his c o n t r o l o v e r the m i l i t a r y

T h e s e c u l a r R a a t h p a r t y h a d made u s e o f the i n c r e a s e d
p r o f i t a v a i l a b l e t h r o u g h o i l r e v e n u e s a n d the s t a n d a r d o f l i v i n g had improved. military a l l y of Additionallyl

the S o v i e t U n i o n was a

l o n g s t a n d i n g l h a v i n g s u p p l i e d the I r a q i

arrny s i n c e the a s s a s s i n a t i o n o f the Hashemite K i n g i n 1958.


I t h a d f u l l y s u p p o r t e d I r a q s i n v o l v e m e n t i n the 1 9 6 7 a n d 1 9 7 3 wars w i t h I s r a e l a n d w a s c l o s e l y a l l i e d p o l i t i c a l l y

40

w i t h t h e Pei'ath

p a r t r a n d its g e n e r a l goals: pan-arabism,

s o c i a l ism, ; ~ n t i - c o l o i i i a l i s r r ~ , a n d t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f

I s r a e l . 10
A c c u r a t e f o r c e c o m p a r i s o n s are a l w a y s d i f f i c u l t .

This

was p a r t i c u l a r l y true i n I r a n i n 1980 w h i c h wa5 i n a s t a t e


of
chaos a n d u n r e c e p t i v e t o i n q u i r i e s o f

any kind.

The

f i q u r e s ~ i s e i jhere come f r o m the I n s t i t u t e f o r I n t e r n a t i o n a l a n d S t r a t e q i c S t u d i e s i n L o n d o n a n d a r e t h e rr~ost r e l i a b l e ,

a l t h o u g h d i f f i c u l t o f v e r i f y o u t s i d e of c l a s s i f i e d
Ac, i l a u s e w i t z s t a t e s i n

SOC~~CFS.

the i n t r o d u c t o r y q u o t a t i o n , means

a r e l a r g e l y a matter o f f i g u r e s a n d e a s i l y m e a s u r e d ; the
s tr en gth of Iran's w i l l , ( i n Van C r e v e l d ' s

terms, " F i g h t i n s

P o w e r " ) i s . t h e b a s i c thesis q u e s t i o n .

T a b l e 3.1 shows s e l e c t e d e l e m e n t s f o r c o r n s p a r i s o n i n

1900, 1981, a n d 1982.

T h e s e f i g u r e s c o v e r the p e r i o d I

w i l l f o c u s o n i n tmy a n a l y s i s o f

the w a r .

41

T a b l e 3.1

80-81

8 1 -82

82--83
Unk

D e f e n s e Spending,

t$

Ril)

4.2 240

4.2

Manpower ( 0 0 0 s ) Tanks Armored f i g h t i n g V e h i c l e s Art: i 1 1 e r y


H i s h Performlance A i r c r a f t

195
1410

235

1735

1770
700 1300
67

1 075
1100

Un Ir
1100
665

725
7

Naval S e a g o i n g Warships

80-81

81-82 Un k 252
2600
2100
860

82-83
U n Ir
342 2300 3000 9013

D e f e n s e Spending,

(B R i l )

3.0 242 2600

Manpower ( 0 0 0 s Tank5 Armored f i q h t i n g V e h i c l e s


Ar% i 1 lery
A i 1-craf t

2500
1040 332 0

335
0

335
0

Naval S e a g o i n g W a r s h i p s

What c a n be y a t h e r e d f r o m t h e T a b l e 3. 1 i 5 t h a t r o u g h p a r i t y e x i s t e d i n q u a n t i t y o f e q u i p m e n t a t t h e b e g i n n i n g of

the war, a l t h o u g h

I r a n q u a n t i t y of e q ~ ~ i p m e n wt a 5 e r o d e d , I n two c r i t i c a l a r e a s , t a n k s a n d I r a q kept a c o n s i d e r a b l e edge.

especiallr i n A i r c r a f t .
armored f i g h t i n g vizhicles,

I n Naval S e a g o i n g W a r s h i p s ( F r i g a t e s a n d D e s t r o y e r s ) , I r a n s
edge a1 lowecl a n i n l i r l c d i a t e a n d p e r m a n e n t b l o c l . : a d e o f

Iraqi

o i l sea l i n c ! o f coirlrrlcinication.

T h e Q u a l i t y corr~parisori i s more d i f f i c u l t .
generall Iraq spent

Sincel

in

less o n m i l i t a r y h a r d w a r e a n d sot more,

the q u a l i t y of
however,

the c ? q u i p i r l e n t p u r c h a s e d nlay h a v e b e e n lower;


w e r e o f f s e t by t h e

t h e defensct! e : : p e n d i t u r e s

~ o ~ i r c( et . he Soviet U n i o n ) a n d l o a n s r e c e i v e d f r o m other
n a t i o n s ( n o t a b l y S a u d i A r a b i a d u r i n g the W a r ) . a f t e r t h e war c o m m e n c e d ,

The Iraqis,

c o m p l a i n e d a b o u t the q u a 1 i t y o f the however, e v i d e n c e suggests t t l a l

Soviet a i r c r a f t o r d n a n c e ;
t h e q u a l i t y of Additionally,

t h e I r a q i p i l o t s w a s more t o b l a m e .

the q u a l i t y o f the I r a n i a n e q u i p m e n t Wac


proqrani

d r a s t i c a l l y r e d u c e d by the poor l o g i s t i c a l

p r e v i o u s l y n o t e d a n d t h e s i m p l e n e g l e c t a f t e r the Revolution.
A 5 a n example, almost 60X o f

the army h a d

d e s e r t e d s i n c e t h e r e v o l u t i o n a n d o n l y 50%- 80% o f a i r c r a f t were c o n s i d e r i n o p e r a b l e a t the s t a r t o f

Irans

the war

for m a i n t e n a n c e .

As I r a n s t i l l h e l d t h e A m e r i c a n e m b a s s y

personnel,

i t was i ~ i n l i k e l y t h a t i t w o u l d receive l a r g e s c a l e

43

l o q i s t i c a l s u p p o r t f r o m the west: f o r i t 5 h i g h e r q u a l i t y

western

esi.ii

pnien t

.
T h e E:quipment

I t is aszurr~edt h a t n o g r e a t d i f f e r e n c e e x i s t e d b e t w e e n

I r a q a n d I r a n i n the q u a l i t y o f the e q u i p m e n t .

I r a n p u r c h a 5 e d may h a v e b e e n o f s l i g h t l y h i g h e r q u a l i t y , b e i n g o f western m a n u f a c t u r e a n d more e x p e n s i v e , b u t i t was v e r y p o o r 1 3 m a i n t a i n e d a n d was w i t h o u t a 1 o g i s t i c : a l 5 u s t a i n i n y base.


(Ari; a n a s i d e ,

a n i n d i c a t i o n of I r a n s problem, Israel.
i t wirc:haced

d e s p e r a t i o n t o s o l v e the l o g i s t i c a l

r e p a i r p a r t s f r o m i t 5 5worn e n e m y ;
limited,

T h i s s n i . i r c e was

however, a n d w a s e n d e d when the war f r o n t

s t a b i 1i zed.

What i s n o t s t a t e d i n T a b l e 3.1
t w o s t r a t e g i c a r e a 5 of

i s major i n e q u i t e c i n
t o t a l ~ o p u l a t .o n 7

a long c o n f l i c t ;

GNF, a n d r e s e r v e m a n p o w e r .

44

79.--80
T o t a l population
(Mi I
)

80-01
38. 5

81-82 39.57

82-83 39.1

393

GNF

Ril)

84.7
30c1

Un k
4Gl0

112.1

IJn I r

Reserve Manpower

400

440

(0Q0s)

79-80
T o t a l popcilat ion

80-01 13.11

e 1-82
13.84

92-83 13.5

12.73

(Mil)
GNP
($

Bil)

21.4

39.0

Unk
250

Un k
75

Reserve Manpower

330

33Q

(000s)

45

What

is i r n n l e d i a t e l g n o t e d i s t h a t :

I r a n s popu1at:ion

is

o v e r three times Irac15; i n s i g n i f i c a n t i s a s h o r t war but d e c i s i v e i n a long one. Not u n e x p e c t e d l y , Irans reserve

m a n p o w e r g r o w s o v e r t i n e , while I r a q s s h r i n k s .
GNP a n d o i l o u t p u t g r e w d u r i n g the War.

Also,

Irans

Followiny a

p o ~ t - - r e v o l u t i o n a r yr e d i . . i c t i o n , the I r a n s o i l exports r o s e t o t h e OPEC c e i l i n g by p r o d u c t i o n has g o t r e c e i v e d almost $9U d u r i n g the war.

1980.

Contrastinsly,

Iraq..

oil
l ~ ~

t o a c h i w / e rre-war

levels.

I r a q has a

P I 1 l i o n i n loan a n d l o a n s qi.i,.rrantees

T W D i m p o r t a n t f a c t s a r e e v i d e n t from a n a l y z i n g the
Oilualitr~ a n d Q i . i a n t i t y o f e q u i p m e n t a n d the s t a r t o f

the war.

First, Second,

t h e r e was rough p a r i t y b e t w e e n t h e l a n d f o r c e s . I r a q wa5 p o t e n t i a l l y v u l n e r a b l e i n a p r o t r a c t e d i t 5 r e l a t i v e l y small p o p u l a t i o n , and

c o n f l i c t b e c a u s e of

d e p e n d e n c e on o i l r e v e n u e . f a c t o r i s snia11 i n i t : i a l l y ,

T h e s i g n i f i c a n c e of this second
but grows e x p o n e n t i a l l y a s t h e

war c o n t i n u e s .

RE!leVant

Denlographg.

I r a n is e t h n i c a l l y a n d r a c i a l l y d i v e r s e .

Primarily
(

P e r s i a n ( 6 3 % ) , I r a n also i n c l u d e s T u r k ( 1 0 % ) , A r a b K u r d ( X ) , a n d P a l u c h i a n d other m i n o r i t i e 5 . minority

lX!),

T h e Arab

is c o n c e n t r a t e d i n K h u z e s t a n ,

a5 p r e v i o u s l y n o t e d .

46

K h u z s t a n was a semi-,-antononlocis Arab s t a t e u n t i 1 the r e i g n of


Reza S h a h ,

when i t

U J ~ Sf

o r c i b l y absorbed.

Conversely1 of

I r a q is e t h n i c a l l y A r a b w i t h the e x c e p t i o n However,

Turk a n d Kurd m i n o r i t i e s .

its p o p u l a t i o n is

s p l i t b e t w e e n t h e S u n n i i n t h e n o r t h a n d west a n d the

s h i i t e i n t h e e a s t a l o n q the I r a n - I r a q
LIF

border.

S u n n i s make

t h e ma,iority of o f f i c e r s i n t h e I r a q i a r m y , w h i l e
LIP

S h i i t e s make

the b u l k o f the e n l i s t e d f o r c e .

In s h o r t l t h e e t h n i c a l l y Arab, r e l i q i o u s l y S h i i t e
p o p u l a t i o n of S o u t h e a s t e r n

Iraq a b u t s on t h e d e m m y r a p h i c a l l y
i n Khuze5tan. It

similiar I r a n i a n Population

is worth n o t i n g

t h a t the ap1wa15 t o A r a b b r o t h e r h o o d by I r a q a n d S h i i t e

l o y a l t i e s b!j
I

I r a n were b o t h s i n g u l a r l y u n s u c c e s s f u l . 13

T w o p e r i o d s i n t h e war a r e a n a l y s e d i n g r e a t e r d e t a i l ;
f i r s t b e c a u s e the outcome o f e a c h was u n e x p e c t e d , and second

b e c a u s e the u n e x p e c t e d o u t c o m e may h e l p d e t e r m i n e I r a n i a n

i \,,. \, -

! \,

F i g h t i n g Power. Iraqi

T h e f i r s t i 5 the I r a n i a n r e a c t i o n t o the

i n v a s i o n a n d the s e c o n d is the I r a n i a n

coun t e r o f f e n s i v e c a m ~ p a i g n

.
T h e N o r t h e r n a r e a wa5 a t t a c k e d

Iraq c r o s s e d t h e b o r d e r w i t h a t least: six d i v i s i o n s a t

t w o w i d e l y separated p o i n t s .

w i t h one d i v i s i o n a l o n g a b r o a d f r o n t n e a r W a s r - e - S h i r i n
,

a l o n q the t r a d i t i o n a l B a g h d a d -- T e h e r a n i n v a s i o n r o u t e .

It

was a p p a r e n t l y a d e f e n s i v e m o v e t o s e i i e d e f e n d a b l e t e r r a i n
t h a t w o u l d b l o c k access t o the f l a t t e r , rolling terrain

b e t w e e n t h e I r a n i a n b o r d e r a n d B a g h d a d . 14

~t was s u c c e s s f u l

47

as f a r s o u t h as M e h r a n , roi.igh1y 30 miles, b u t o n l y 3 t o Ei
miles d e e p .
Importantly,

i t was an a r e a p r o n l i 5 e d t:o I r a q by
but not

the Shah a 5 p a r t of

the 1975 A l g i e r F : t r e a t y ,

surrendeed.

No f u r t h e r a d v a n c e wa5 m a d e i n the a r e a .

T h e r e m a i n i n g f i v e a r m o r e d a n d m o t o r i z e d d i v i s i o n s made

the ma.jor a t t a c k i n the 5 0 ~ 1 t h .T h e m a i n e l e m e n t was a two


d i v i s i o n f o r c e w h i c h c r o s s e d the S h a t t - a l - - A r a b

t o seize

Khorramshar a n d A b a d a n .

Three d i v i s o n s c r o s s e d the b o r d e r

f u r t h e r n o r t h a n d b e y a i j t o d r i v e a l o n g two axes t o w a r d A h v a z

( t h e c a p i t a l o f tit1ur:estan p r o v i n c e ) a n d D e z f u l .

The primary

o b j e c t i v e w a s a p p a r e n t l y t o i s o l a t e the two o i l r e f i n i n g p o r t 5 i n the d e l t a o f the E ~ i p h a r a t e s (t<horawshahr a n d


\

A b a d a n ) a n d cut the c r i t i c a l o i l p i p e l i n e b e t w e e n them a n d Ahvaz, t h e r e b y d e n y i n g Teheran o i l f o r b o t h i n t e r n a l

c o n s u m p t i o n a n d export.

T h e o p e r a t i o n c l o s e l r r e s e m b l e d the

the s u c c e s s f u l B r i t i s h I n v a s i o n i n 1941 i n s e v e r a l p e c t i
area,. f o r c e s i z e , and i n i t i a l o b j e c t i v e s . Initial I r a q i r e p o r t s were e c s t a t i c .

W i t h i n the f i r s t

d a y , H u s s e i n was o n the v e r g e of a n n o c i n c i n s the a n n e x a t i o n


o f a l l o f K h ~ i i e s t a na n d s t a t e d , ' " a s s e r t e d i t s own c l a i m s " . l 5 than expected. in fact, t h a t the w a r h a d

However,

p r o g r e s s was slower

I r a q i f o r c e s s t o p p e d short o f

the Karrin r i v e r

i n the South, a n d f a i l e d t o reach e i t h e r D e z f c i l a n d Ahvaz, a l t h o u q h I r a q c l a i m e d t o s u r r o u n d them " o n three s i d e s " . In

part,

this was a result o f a p o l i t i c a l r e l u c t a n c e t o i n c u r

48

l a r g e c a s u a l t ies. U r i q ~ p s i t o n a b 1y

however,

the v i r u 1c n c e of

t h e I r a n i an r e 5 i s t a n ce was con1p 1e t e 1y un e >: p e c t e d 16


P,y the e n d o f S e p t e m b e r ,

I r a q was f o r c e d o n the

defensive; tactically,

o p e r a t i o n a l l y , and strategically.
LIP d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n s ,

Armor was d1.w i n , i n f a n t r y b u i l t

and

a t t a c k s c o n s i s t e d o f h e a v r a r t i 1l e r y bombardment.

A number

o f a n a l y s t s h a v e c o m m e n t e d o n the " W o r l d War I " f l a v o r of


this s t a g e o f

the war, c o n ~ p l e t ew i t h e n t r e n c h m e n t s ,
eventually,

a r t i l l e r g d u e l s and,

cherriical w e a p o n s .
w h o felt

Operationally,
,\
,

a c t i v i t i e s s e e m e d t o cease. H u s s e i n , and

h i s s u p p o r t w o u l d e r o d e i f c a s u a l t i e s were h i g h ,
by the I r a n i a n r e s i s t a n c e ,

\y/ surprized . .
i

abandoned any

operational initiative.

S t r a t e g i c a l l y too,

Iraq proclaimed

t!;s d e f e n s i v e .

H u s s e i n m a d e his f i r s t o f f e r o f a c e a s e f i r e

a t the e n d of S e p t e m b e r a n d r e p e a t e d his o f f e r s e v e r a l times d u r i n g the n e x t six m o n t h s . i n i t i a t ive.

I r a q n e v e r r e g a i n e d the

T h e I r a q i a i c ; a s s e s s m e n t was made by e v e r y o n e e l s e w h o
h a d e v a l u a t e d the c o m p a r a t i v e s t r e n g t h . others,

What I r a q , a n d

h a d m i s s e d w a s the s u r p r i s i n g I r a n i a n F i g h t i n g

Power.

T h e Q u a l i t g a n d Q u a n t i t y o f e q u i p m e n t was more e a s i l y
a n d I r a q w a s g i v e n a n e d g e , or a t l e a s t p a r i t y .

mieastrred,

However, F i g h t i n g Power, d i f f i c u l t to
nieastlre

the more n e b u l o u s r a n d more

e l e m e n t o f M i l i t a r y Worth, n u 1 i t p l i e d

the I r a n ' s
r e a c t i o n . 17

c a p a b i l i t y out o f

p r o p o r t i o n t o the a n t i c i p a t e d

49

I t a p p e a r s tt1a.t I r a n was s u r p r i ; : e d by +:he i n v a s i o n .


the severi a c t i v e d i v i s i o n s , none were o n the I r a q i b o r d e r ,
a l t h o u q h a n a r m o r e d d i v i s o n wa5 i n g a r r i s o n n e a r Ahva-. However,
r o ~ i g h l y240 m i l i t a r g i n c i d e n t s h a d t a k e n p l e ~ c e

Of

b e t w e e n I r a n a n d Iraq, mang i n v o l v i n g the P a s d r a r i ,

or the

Islamic R e v o l u t i o n a r y Guard Corps ( J R G C ) .

T h e Fasdran
infantrr

niirnbered a b o u t 30,0!20 a t t : t ~ i stime a n d w a s a l i q h t

force.

I t was p r i m a r i l i j i n Teheran a n d
t h e IRP.

U J ~ S

the o v e r t

c o e r c i v e e l e m e n t of a n d the R e q u l a r

T h e i n t e y r a t i o n of the Pacrlr.an

I r a n i a n a r m y !was e v e n t u a l 1 3 a f f e c t e d o u t o f

m i 1i t a r q n e c e s s i t y a n d i s s e p a r a t e l v a d d r e s s e d .
Achieving s t r a t e g i c : and t a c t i c a l s u r p r i z c ,
the I r a q i

n o r t h e r n o b j e c t i v e s were s e i z e d e a s i l y a n d n o o p p o s i t i o n was
i n i t i a l l y e n c o u n t e r e d i n the c o u n t r y s i d e i n the s o u t t l .

However,

the I r a n i a n s t r a t e g i c r e a c t i o n w a s s w i f t =ind
A i r strikes b e g a n a l n ~ o s tL

a p p a r e n t l y well planned.

immediately on I r a q i s t r a t e g i c targets ( o i l f i e l d s , bases, etc.


),

air

the I r a n i a n Navy c l o s e d the S h a t t t o I r a q a n d


ports, a c t i v e Army f o r c e s where d e p l o y e d , and

a t t a c k e d Iraq

r e s e r v e s mobi i z e d , Such a r a p i d ,

a l t h o u y h the A r m y s r e a c t e d irlorc? s l o w l y . & d , c o o r d i n a t e d r e s p o n s e can n o t b e m a d e t

H S L .

T h e Shahs army h a d d o n e e x t e n s i v e p l a n n i n g
everit;

or

.j~ist

~ L I C ~a In

i t i s 1 i k e l : J t h a t the c o n t i n g e n c y p a n 5

p r e v i o u s l ! ~d e v e l o p e d were d u r j t e d o f f a n d n s e d . What i 5 wo5t s i g n i f i c a n t , however,

w a s the s p e e d ,:And
What c a n b e

e f f i c i e n c q i n t h e e x e c u t i o n o f these p l a n s .

50

c o n c l u d e d is t h a t t h e I r a n i a n a r m e d f o r c e s a c t e d w i t h e n e r g y a n d d i s p a t c h t o a t~olt--otit--of-..the--blue attack.

I t was n o t

the r e a c t i o n a n a r m e d f o r c e f r a c t u r e d by i n d i s c i p l i n e or
indecision;

it

was the r e a c t i o n o f

a n army w i t h a c l e a r g o a l then, the Islamic

and single i n t e nt .

F r o m the f i r s t m o m e n t ,

army was v a s t l y d i f f e r e n t t h a n the Reza S h a h s a r m y , or the


army that r e b e l l e d a g a i n s t

i t 5 o f f i c e r s d u r i n g the

r e v o 1CI t i o n .

T a c t i c a l l q , t h E ! r e s i s t a n c e wa5 a l s o n o t e d f o r i t v i y o r .
Khoram~shar, the I r a n i a n c i t y c : I o s e e t t o the b o r d e r ,
d e f e n d e d s u c c e s f u l l y f o r o v e r a nioritti, a n d local m i l i t i a ,
was

i n i t i a l l y by p o l i c e

l a t e r by r e g u l a r army a n d P a s d r a i ~ f o r c e s .
s t u b b o r n t h a t i t wa5 r e n a m e d t u n i n s h a h

The defense was


C i t y o f P.lood.

50

ia
p r e p a r a t i o n for urban warfare d i d n o t

Iraqs lack o f
5top

i t f o r m l a u n c h i n g h e a v y p e r s i s t e n t a t t a c l . - s . Nor d o e s i t
l o n g a f t e r the

e x p l a i n t h e t e n a c i t y of the c i t y s d e f e n d e r s , c i t y had b e e n i s o l a t d , n e i g h b o u r i n g Abadan,

or the e s u a l l y s t u b b o r n d e f e n s e of
16

w h i c h was n o t c l a i m e d by I r a q u n t i l However,

November a n d was c o n t e s t e d c o n t i n u a l l y .

i t can be

! ; a m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f a n e n e r g i z e d people, army, explained a


government 1inlrage.

T h e r e m a i n d e r o f t h e f r o n t wa5 l a r g e l y s t a b i l i z e d

w h i l e f i g h t i n g f o r the c i t i e s o f A b a d a n a n d t \ h o r a n 1 5 h a r w e n t
on i n t o O c t o b e r a n d November. r e d e p l o y m e n t s a n d preparation

BY J a n u a r g 1901 I r a n i a n
for the initial
51

counteroffensives

were i n p r o g r e s s .
i : + r m ! j l

Thrr. P a s c l r a n ,

s t i 11

separate f r o m t h e

was c o n c l u c t i n g n i y h t t i m w c r o s s

b o r d e r s a b o t a g e r a i ds.

T h e f i r s t major c o u n t e r - a t t a c l : :

at

S c i c a n g e r d was t o b e a w a t e r s h e d f o r the a r m y , a n d l a150 f o r

Ir a n ian

Po 1 i t i c s

.
the B a t t l e o f Susarigerd.

T h e f a l s e start:;
Thf
II

I r a n i a n c o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e a t S u s a n g ~ i - dW Z ~ S

1 t i mate 1 y u n s u c c e s s f CI1, a 1 t houg tl i t: h a d a prorrl 1 5; i rig

beqinning.

I t resi..iltcd i n a s h a k e

LIP o f

army corrlnlani-1 a n d
It: was a l s o the

c o n t r o l l a n d t h r i n t e g r a t i o n of

the P a s d r a n .

cause f o r t h e e v e n t u a l

d o w n f a l l o f B a n i Sack.
P.ani Sadr,

F o r a number o f m o n t h s , Minister,

t h e n t t r r Prirrte

had p l a n n e d f o r a l a r y e s c a l e o f f e n s i v e t:o d r i v e
I t was h i s i n t e n t t o d e v e l o p t h e a r m y a 5 h i s and

the I r a q i 5 o u t . power b a s e ,

a p a t t e r n noted earlier in Iranian History,


A

t o c e m e n t his p o s i t i o n a s
Ktlonleini.

l e a d e r w i t h the p e o p l e a n d i.kq<.\inst t h e

He was a1s;o a n : : i o u s t o f o r t i f y h i m s e l f

a t t a c k s o f his p r i n c : i p a l r i v a l s i n the r a d i c a l c l r r y y , wh o r s e
m i l i t a r y power b a s e was i n the P a s d r a n . The b a t t l e p l a n w a 5 a m b i t i o u s , c o n c e n t r a t i n g armor i n a inkcr I r a q .

p e n e t r a t i o n t o breal:: the f r o n t a n d c a r r y t h e w a r Significantly,

the a t t a c k was m a d e w i t h o u t t h e P a s d r a n l a
P . a n i S a d r d i d n o t want: t o share his
c l e r g y w h o o p p u s e d him.

largely i n f a n t r y f n r c e .

v i c t n r r w i t h t h e the? r a d i c a l

me
tanks

a t t a c k matk! i n i t i a l g a i n s , but the p e n e t r a t i o n


a n d a l a r g e number o f

c o u l d not b e s u s t a i n e d or d e f e n d e d ,
illere

l o s t or a b a n d o n e d . 20

A nurnber of

c r i t i c a l d e c s i o n s were m a d e a 5 as a r e s ~ i l t

of

the d e f e a t o f t h e b a t t l e o f S ~ i s a n g e r d .

F i r s t was

K h o n l e i n i ' s p r o c l a a a t i o n s t o " l e a v e the w a r t o the s o l d i e r s a n d G e n e r a l s " a n d h i s a t t a c k s u p o n the c l e r g y f o r interference in e l r a e n t s of


thi?

war.

T h i s was a p p a r e n t l y d i r e c t e d a t a l l
i n c l u d i n g B a n i S a d r a n d the

the qovm-nrrlent,

radical clerqy, Pasdran.

a l t t i o i . i g h the c l e r g y

s t i l l c h a m p i o n e d the
the

T h e u l t i m a t e r e s u l t was the c 5 t . a b l i s h m e n t of

S t r a t e g i c D~!fen5e Council,

which i n c : l u d e d B a n i S a d r ,

IRP

representat i v e s ,

t h e Army a n d P a s d r a n Coninianders.

S e c o n d , w a s K h c : ) m e i n i ' s conlnlitment t o c o n t i n u e the war u n t i l H u s s e i n was overthrown.

T h i s was c l e a r a t the I s l a m i c

peace c o n f e r e n c e i n M a r c h ,

where he i n s i s t e d t h a t I r a q
and e f f e c t i v e l y s c u t t l e d

withdraw b e f o r e n e g o t i a t i o n s began,

the c o n f e r e n c e by i n s i s t i n g t h a t H u s s e i n ' s K o r a n i c a l l y

c o r r e c t p n n i s h e e n t was b e h e a d i n g .

T h e r e s u l t we5 the most s i g n i f i c a n t c h a n g e i n the


I r a n i a n army t h u s f a r ; i n t e g r a t i o n of the c o o r d i n a t i o n a n d e v e n t u a l

the P a s d r a n a n d the r e g u l a r a r m y .
i n May,

When t h e

coi..interoffensive campaign kicked o f f

the P a s d r a n w a s
.-..-

a v i t a l p a r t o f the a t t a c k a n d b a t t l e f i e l d command a n d
control, a l t t l o u q t s s t i l l a t t h i s time a s s e p a r a t e u n i t s . "

53

T h r e e l f ~ s s o n sc a n b e d r a w n f r o m the I r a n i a n c:ounter o f f e n s i v e campaign. Second,

First, i t w a s a s t u n n i n g

IjLICceSs.

i t was c o o r d i n a t p d b e t w e e n the! R e g u l a r s a n d P a s d r a n ,

as u e l l a s other Naval a n d A i r f o r c e s . T h i r d ,
from an o p e r a t i o n a l p e r s p e c t i v e .

i t was p l a n n e d
be one of

I t may,

i n fact:,

the more a d r o i t e x a m p l e s o f o p e r a t i o n a l a r t i n the o f f e n s e s i n c e the W o r l d Wasr 1 1 . Finallq,

the c a m p a i g n e s t a b l i s h e d
considerable Military

the I r a n i a n a r m y a s an i n s t r u m e n t of

Worth i n s p i t e o f c o i i s i d e r a b l e d i f f i c i . . i l t i e S i n I I ! ~ i i . i 1 i t f j a n d
L!LI<.Int i t y o f

e q u i pme n t

.
attacl.,s f r o m the

The i n t e n t o f
out of

the c a m p a i g n was t o f o r c r e the 1r;idii a r ~ r ~ q

I r a n by c o o r d i n a t e d m u l t i - d i v i s i o n a l

unexpected fronts.

l'he c a m p a i g n h a d three major b a t : t . l e s :

b a t t l e f o r A b a d a n i n September 1981, o p e r a t i o n U n d e n i a b l e

V i c t o r r i n Plarch 1902, a n d o p e r a t i o n H o l y C i t y i n Mar 198:::.


When v i e w e d as a c a m p a i g n ,
they r e s e m b l e a b o x e r ' s

l e f t-r igtr t - 1e f t c o m b i n a t i o n . T h e b a t t l e f o r Abadan b e g a n w i t h a s e r i e e o f d i v e r s i o n a r y a t t a c k s f a r n o r t h o f the c i t y w h i c h r e s u l t e d 1.n a n I r a q i r e d e p l o y m e n t away f r o m A b a d a n . m a i n xktacl: began with a s n c c e s s f n l n i g h t

T h e two d i v i s i o n
i n f i l t r a t i o n bg

l i g h t i n f a n t r y t o i u e n t i f y weal: s p o t s .

I t was f o l l o w e d u p b y

i n f a n t r y e n g a g e m e n t o f s t r o n g p o i n t s t o f i x them i n p o s i t i o n a n d c o m b i n e d arms ( i n f a n t r y , armor, a r t i l l e r y , a i r ) a t t a c k s

a t i d e n t i f i e d weak p o i n t s . Iraq
bia5

A 5 a r e s c i l t , Abadan

E rec:overd,

f o r c e d t o wit:hdraw

t o more d e f e n s i b l e t e r r a i n

54

be?yond t h e K a r u n River, Khi..iiestan.

a n d I r a n i a n LOCs were r e s t o r e d i n

S h o r t l r a f t e r the b a t t l e ,

t h e t o p Regular a n d P a s d r a n A l t h o u g h the loss

c o n m a n d e r s were k i l l e d i n a p l a n e c r a s h . of

the t o p r e g u l a r a n d P a s d r a n conlmandcrs must h a v e s e t b a c k

the a r m y t o a n e x t e n t , i t d i d n o t l o s e i t s c o n f i d e n c ~or i t s
initiative; i n nther words,

its f i g h t i n g s p i r i t .

T h a t theq

were a l l k i l l e d t o s e t h c r d r a m a t i c a l l y i n d i c a t e s how mc:c:h


c o i : i r d i r i a t i o r i b e t w e e n the two f o r c e s h a d i m p r o v e d i n verg

s h u r t time.

R e f e r e n c e s i n the thesis t o t h e I r a n i a n a r m y

a f t e r this t l a t t l e i n c l u d e b a t h the o l d R e g u l a r a r m y a n d the Pacdran, unless ott~r~wis se pecified.

O p e r a t i o n I l n d e n i a b l e V i c t o r y , w h i c h tool: p l a c e i n t h e n o r t h i n the v i c i n i t y o f D e - f u l , b e g a n i n the t h i r d weel: o f

March w i t h

13

force of roughly four divisions;

100,00@
I r a q had

r e g u l a r s a n d 30,O0G1 P a s d r a n l i g h t i n f a n t r y .

l a u n c h e d a number nf s p o i l i n s a t t a c k s w h i c h r e s u l t e d i n a h i g h number of casi.ialties a n d a d e c i s i o n t o d i g i n e v e n deeper.

The I r a n i a n attack began w i t h a n i g h t i n s e r t i n n of


f o l l o w e d by a n i g h t

corrmando f o r c e s b e h i n d I r a q i l i n e s ,

a t t a c k on two s e p a r a t e axis by combined Armor a n d 1 n f a n t : r y


units. of

T h e I r a q i s , s ~ i r p r i s e d by b o t h the l o c a t i o n a n d s i z e

l a t e r c l a i m e d o v e r w h e l m i n g o d d s a n d human -, -, i s wave i n f a n t r y a s s a u l t s by f r e n - i e d r e l i g i o u s f a n a t i c s .
the a t t a c k ,
T h i s is almost c e r t a i n l y f a l s e .
W h i l e i n f a n t r y was

55

Linc:ioubtedly u s e d c c i u r a g o u s l ! d a n d a g y r e s i v e l q , I.l5E?d w i t h great s k i 1 1 e n d e f f e c t i v c n e e s .

it W a c also

I n o r d e r t o apw-eciate t h e s k i 11 a n d e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f

the I r a n i a n f i g h t i n g f o r c e i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o fi::plain i t i n

greater detail.

Night attacks,

which are a l w a y s the

Rl05t

d i f f i c u l t a n d r e q u i r e the rmst d e t a i l e d p l a n n i n g ,

staff

worC:r

I-ehearsal,

t r a i n i n g a n d l e a d e r s h i p , were r c u t i n e

t h r o u g h o u t t: h i 5 cam p a i g n
of

Un i t 5 , w h i c h wer e f r c??cien t 1Y
Fur e : : a m p l u ,

m i t:

contact, a c t e d w i t h i n t i a t i v e a n d e l a n .

snia11 d e t a c h m e n t : s o f

i n f a n t r g uere t r a i n e d t o a t t a c l s~~ppres the s s t r o n g point:

s p e c i f i c I r a q i posit:ions,

t o mask

th~? a r m o r e d p c m e t r a t : i o n r a n d as~ji.ire d h r F i a k t h r o o u q h .
N o t u n l r is thts t.f f e c t i v e n e s s ,

. . ~ g g r e s s i , F n r 5 = a n d s1:i I 1

of

the a r m y d e m o n s t r a t e d b y i t s v i c t o r y i n t h e s f ? d i f f i c u l t
b u t also i n the h i g h r a t i o s of
the I r a n i a n
about

a n d complex n i g h t o p e r a t i o n s , enemy t o f r i e n d l y d e a d .

D u r i n g this carripalgn,

s o l d i e r s k i l l e d ttwir o p p o n e n t s a t a r a t i o o f one, without A i r


~ L I F . W ~ ~ I ~ against C Y ,

,two t o

a prepared and we1 1

e q u i p p e d enemy i n s t r o n g e c h e l o n e d d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n s , n i g h t . 24

at

I t was a

COuragous,

effectivr.

and l e t h a l

performance t h a t : a n 9 army w o u l d b e p r o u d o f .

I t wa5

c e r t a i n l y n o t a s e r i e s o f s u i c i d a l a s s a u l t s by c r a z e d f a n a t i c s s e e k i n g m m r t y r d o m . 25
The b a t t l e d e s t r o y e d a n I r a q i a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n ,

r e c o v e r e d 90vJ s q u a r e miles of t e r r i t o r y , f r o n t b a c k t o the I r a q i b o r d e r ,

a n d f o r c e d the

b u t was not w h o l l y

56

sncces;sfi..il.

T h c u1t:irrlat:e y o a l o f the two arms o f

the d o u b l e

e n v l o p m e n t w a s deer! i n s i d e Iraq a n d , a n d M I A s t o t a l e d 40,000,

while I r a q i c a s i . i a 1 t i e s

I r a n i a n c a s u a l t i e s a n d M I A s were

26 c l o s e t o 10IOQO.
I n these b a t t l . e s ,

the I r a n i a n f o r c e s s e l d o m a c h i e v e d

the three t o o n e f o r c e r a t i o t h o u g h t n e c e s s a r y f o r
succcssful attack,
h.it were s ~ ~ c c e s s f u al nyway.

li/

--

G i v e n the

g r o w i n g d s a d ~ / a n t a ? i c + zi n the Q u a l i t y a n d c h i a n t i t y of e q u ip in e n t:

the m u l t i p l i c a t i v e a s p e c t of F i g h t i n g Power i s
the I r a n i a n l a n d f o r c e s p m i E r f u 1

i n d i c a t e d as +tic: 5m.irce of

c a p a b i 1 . t ~a n d M i l i , t c l r y Worth ( S e e T a b l e 3 . 1 a n d 3 . 2 ) . O p e r a t i o n Hol!j C i t y b e g a n i n Mayi heels of t h e , I l a r c h t i a t t l e .


lS82,

Close o n t h e

Three d i v i s i o n s u s e d i n the
D e z f c i l t o the s o u t h e r n

p r e v i o u s b a t t l e werc r e d e p l o y e d f r o m f r o n t n e a r tihoranlshahr.

Three s e p a r a t e d i v i s i o n s i z e

a s s a u l t 5 t o w a r d s e p a r a t e t a r g e t s p u s h e d a c r o s s the Kariin

r i v e r t o rec:aptcire tihoranist'iahr a n d f o r c e the f r o n t back t o


the I r a q i b o r d e r .
A s i n p r e v i o u s attacks,

i t w a s p r e c e d e d by

n i q h t i n f a n t r y a t t a c k s f o l l o w e d by r a p i d l y c o n c e n t r a t e d
armored attacks.

T h i s time, h o w e v e r ,

h e 1 i c o p t e r s were the

pri.mary a i r s u p p o r t weapons.
Rg 24 IMay,

1982, the I r a q i d e f e n s e w a 5 c r w n b l i n y a l l

a l o n g the f r o n t , Khui.estan,

I r a n i a n f o r c e s had v i r t u a l 1 . ~ cleared

a n d a d v a n c e d t o w i t h i n 15 miles o f the I r a q i c i t y

o f Basra.

Khoran~shahr~ which t i u s s e i n h a d v o w e d n e v e r t o

57

5 ~ 1 r r e n d e rf~e l l ,

a n d I r a q h a d l o s t almost 20.000 k i l l e d a n d

a l m o s t a 5 marig p r i s o n o - s t o I r a n .
I t war; a n i n d i c a t i o n o f the d e s p e r a t i o n o f the I r a q i
f o r c e s , t h a t n e w l y f o r r n e d " t r i p l e d i g i t " r e s e r v e u n i t s had
b e e n c a l l e d t o the f r o n t ,
a 5 w e l l as f o r e i g n w o r k e r s .

V o l u n t e e r s f o r other n a t i o n s ,

notably Jordan and Egypt had

alreadir h e e n u s e d i n t h e f i g h t i n g .
F o l l o i ~ i i n q the f i r s t : two y e a r 5 o f
t h p w a r l major
th e

a c t i v i t i e5

1oilrc!d c o n s i d e r ; . I b 1y

I r a ? c o c i 1 d n o t b r val:
E e a

I r a n i a n h o l d o n thr? P e r s i a n G u l f

l i n e s o f r:ornmiiriicatiol.i, albeit

a 1 t hoLlg tl i t c a r r i e d o u t a n i n c r e a s i n g l r a m b i t i o u s ,
1 a r g e 1y

n e f f e c t i v e a i r war a g a i n s t t h e I r a n i a n o i l p o r t s a t I r a n a n o i l e::port.s c o n t i n u e d

K h a r i I5 and.

t o r i s e aiid h i t :
Iraq's
More r e c e n t l q ,

the ClPEC i m p o s e d c e l i n q i n 1903, i n 5 p i t e o f


in l p or t e d t e c h n o 1og CJ a n d c o i i t i n o ~ i r j a t t a c k 5 . 29

o i 1 e x p o r t s werf? more e f f e c t e d by f l u c t u a t i o n s i n the o i l


market d e m a n d s a n d s ~ i p p l y t h a n I r a q i u d r a c t i o n .
J0

I r a n con i n u e d o f f e n s i v e s on l a n d ~ i t h decreasiny effectivences I r d q i r e5 i 5 t a n c e


5% i

f f enc:d

c o n 9i d t ? r a b 1y w h 6.m

the W a r moved i n t o I r a q .

A d d i t i o n a l l y , r e d u c t i o n i n the

h i a l i t g a n d Q u a n t i t y o f equipment had f i n a l l y begun t o

t e l l . 31

F o r e::ample, A r m ~ o r e d F i q h t i n g V e h i c l e s ( A F V ) had Aircraft

d r o p p e d f r o m r o c i q h l r 1 1 0 0 i n 1980 to 700 i n 1982. h a d d r o p p e d f r o m 725 t o 67 i n the


5dIrlE

period.

T h e Khonleini g o v e r n m e n t ,

5 e t t i n g political ob.ject.ivss,
p a ~ i s e , alt:hoi.ic)h

i n s i s t e d t h a t t h c war c o n t i n u e u,ithoi.it

the

5s

m i l i t a r r l t ? a d e r s h i i > , e s t i m a t i n g j , t s lou, p r o b a b i l i t i e s o f
5 ~ 1 c c e 5 5 ,s t r i m s l y i::oi..inselled a p a ~ i s et o r e b u i l d .

Additionallr,

t h e r e ? was no s h o r t a g e o f v o l u n t e e r s f r o m the
T h e r e s u l t wa5 i n a d e q u a t e l y
During this p e r i o d ,

p e o p l e f o r the war e f f o r t .

s u p p o r t e d a t t a c k s ,and higher c a s u a l t i e s . Fall,


1982 to S p r i n g ,

1984, the P a s d r a n was h e e d l e s s l y

e x p a n d e d to a l R 1 0 5 t 1Gl0,000 a n d was n o t a l w a y s a d e q u a t e l y 32 J r lead. T h e massed i n f a n t r y a t t a c k s t:rainc?d, e q u i p p e d T

n e v e r f a i l e d f o r lac:): o f c o u r a g e ,
of

b u t d i d r e d u c e the r a n k s

the P a s d r a n t h r o u g h a t t r i t i o n .
A f t e r si:: y e a r s of s t r u g g l e ,

the w a r c o n t i n u e s w i t h o u t

s i q n of a compromise.

Recpnt e v e n t s h a v e s u q q e s t e d t h a t the

1985 I r a n i a n p a u s e w a s a d e l i b e r a t e b u i l d u p . :33 I r a n ' s r e c e n t

t w o f r o n t o f f e n s i v e was a p p a r e n t l y s u c c e s s f u l , a l t h o u g h i t
i s s t i l l tni:) e a r l y to e x a l t l a t e the t r u t h u f

the m a t t e r .

In

any e v e n t ,

i t i s clg!ar

e v i d e n c e t h a t the war g o e s o n a n d

I r a n c o n t i n u e s t o press i n t o Iraq.

I r a q w i l l not s u r r e n d e r ,

I r a n is u n w i l l i n g t o s t o p , and

n e i t h e r 5 i d e has tho' s t r e n g t h t o f o r c e a sudden d e c i s i o n


t h ~ i sf a r i n war.

I n 5 h o r t r I r a q c a n not: w i n a n d c a n n o t
Barring

quit;

I r a n c a n n o t he d e f e a t e d a n d w i l l n o t s t o p .
(SLIC~I

unforeseen circumstances,

a 5 r e v o l u t i o n or l a r g e s c a l e

i n t e r v e n t i o n ) , t h r ? war w i l l e n d i n either a m u t u a l ei:haustion,


a c o n t i n o i l s s t a t e o f war,

(such a 5 b e t w e e n

I s r a e l a n S y r i a ) , o r i n the g r a d u a l d e s t r u c t i o n o f I r a q .

59

Overview and a n a l y s i s . The performance of t h e I r a n i a n armed f o r c e s ,

p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e c o m b i n a t i o n o f the Army a r i d the P a s d r a n ,


c l e a r l y d e r m n s t r a t e s . a n a b u n d a n c e o f F i g h t i n g Power.
During

the f i r s t two y e a r 5 of w a r ,

the army was r e s i l i e n t i n the


C a m p a i g n p l a n n i n g uia5 d e c e p t i v e p l a n n i n g were

d e t e n s e a n d p o w e r f u l i n the o f f e n s e . s k i l l f u l and v i o l e n t . High l e v e l s of

e v i d e n t i n the three c a m p a i g n s e : : a m i n e d a 5 w e l l a 5 o p e r a t i o n a l a n d t a c t i c a l a q i 1 i t g i n the m o v e r r l m t and concentratioii of forces at all

lcvo15. Depth

Wac

evident

in

the a i r d e e p a t t a c k s a n d e f f e c t i v e ~ { s o ef {jeep i n s e r t i o n o f
conmando forces. tactical
level,

T h e b a t + : l e s where ~ y ~ i c h r . o n i ; : e c a lt
carefully

t i m i n g the use of

i n f a n t r y and

armor 5 ~ 1 c c e s s f ~ 11 y 1a t n i g h t .

The c o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e campaign,

p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e March a n d May, genuine operational

198:;'

offensives,

were

a r t ; a c o m b i n a t i o n o f o f f e n s i v e s purichec.

i n a s i n g l e c a m p a i g n w i t h the same f o r c e s t h a t d r o v e the Iraqi's, reeling,

i n t o t h e i r own t e r r i t o r y .
i t rests
and

A m e r i c a n d o c t r i n e is v e r y s i m i l i a r i n t h a t

also rest u p o n a y i l i t y ,

initiative,

synchronization, However,

d e p t h , a5 w e l l a5 on v i o l e n t e x e c u t i o n .

American

d o c t r i n e d o e 5 n o t s u g g c s t a w i l l i n g n e s s t o a c c e p t the h i s h casualties implicit

i n the I r a n i a n t a c t i c a l d o c t r i n e , i u i t h
of IJS e l i t e f o r c e s .
However, the

the p o s s i b l e e x c e p t : i o n

I r a n i a n s c 1 c c e 5 s s u g g e s t s an u n e x p e c t e d l y o f f e n s i v e r o l e f o r
light i n f a n t r y f o r c e s .

G i v e n s u f f i c : i e n t F i g h t i n g P o w e r , and

60

adcqi.iater

c o o r d i n a t e d A i r a n d A r t i l l e r y s u p p o r t r there i s n o
50

redson t h a t c a s u a l t jes n c x d be

high,

a n d o v r r y reason t o

b e l i e v e t h a t such f o r c e s w o u l d b e s u c c e s s f i i l
rrmst d e t e ? r r a i n e d def c!nse.

a g a i n s t thc

T h e I r a n i a n s r by a g g r e s s i v e use of
assault force,

l i g h t i n f a n t r y a5 a n

s u p p o r t e d by a r t i l l e r y a n d f o l l o w e d by armor,

arc! r r i p e a t e d l r s n c c : e s s F u l

a g a i n s t a S o v i e t stvle e c h e l o n e d

d e t e n s e i n d e p t h r .<lthocigh t h e y a r e t h u s f a r u n a b l e t o e : : p l o i t these O t f e n E i v o s t n o p e r a t i o n a l d e p t h . VictnrieE are

p u ~ s i b l eu s i n g o f f r ? n 5 i v e l a g g r e s i v e o p o r a t i o n E r i f

the

ccimnlander is w i l l i n g t o a c c e p t the r i s k nf h i g h c a s u a l t i e s .

W i t h i n t h e 1 i n t i t : a t i r i n s of the t e r r a i n r a n d I r a q i a p p l i c a t i o n
of S o v i e t Doi:trine,

t h i s may b e a n i m p o r t a n t 1 r . s s o n .

AE

ntinimi.imr

i t deservt.!c, g r e a t e r s t u d y .

T h e c o n t i n u e d o f f e n s i v e s by I r a n t e s t i f y t o i t s
c n n t i n u e d abundarici: of F i g h t i n g Power, althoLiqh i t s 1 0 s ~ 111~

the Q u a l i t y a n d t > u d i i t i t y of e q u i p m e n t r e d u c e d i t s M i l i t a i - y

Worth.

However,

i t c o n t i n u e d t o p r o s e c u t e the w a r

s u c c e s s f u l l y r a5 rsc.:ent e v e n t s t e s t i f y .

I t is c l e a r t h a t s o n ~ e t h i n gh a p p e n e d w h i c h r a d i c a l l y a n d
p e r h a p s p e r m a n e n t l y c h a n g e d the F i g h t i n g P o w e r o f

the

I r a n i a n a r m y . T h i s c h a n g e h a d a m u l t i p l i c a t i v e e f f e c t o n the a r m y s M i l i i a r y W o r t h which a l l o w e d i t t o r e s i s t a d e t e r m i n e d a n d well a r m e d a t t a c k r h a l t i t , o v e r c o m e i t r a n d t a k e the o f f e n s i v e .

T h i s o c c u r r e d w h e n the O u a l i t y a n d

Q u a n t i t y o f e q u i p a c n t was e r o d i n g .
61

I t i 5 l o g i c a l t o s u g g e s t t h a t t h e r e v o l u t i o i i iuas tlte
prc?::irrtate c a i 1 5 ~ of

t h i s r a d i c a l change.

The pcnpls,

t h e arrrty

a n d the g n v e r n r r t e n t ,

which were a t war w i t h o n e a n o t h e r uncler

the Shah, were h r o u q h t much c l o s e r t o u n i t y u n d e r t h e


Islamic Iranian republic. four to
sttohi

I t i s the p ~ i r p o s eo f

the C h a p t e r

how that occurred.

ENDNOTES CHAPTER THREE


1.

Enlbat.tled,

Strsphr?ri R . Grirnmon, T h e I r a n - I r a q War: Islam ( W a s h i n q t o n D. C. : P r a e g e r P u b 1 i 5 h t ~ 5 , ICrEIZ), p . Cordesmanr The Gulf 545, 6 4 8 , 579.
650. 549.

15.

2. A n t t t o n g H. S t r a t e g i c S t e b i l i t y , p.
3.
4.

a n d the Search f o r ,

Ibid.? Ibid.,. Stept1c.n

p.

p.

5.
5.

R.
p. p.

Grunimon.

Ttie I r a n - I r a q

War, p.

15.

A n t t i o i i j H. Ibid.,,

S i r a t e q i c S t : a b i l it!i,
7.

Cordesnlan, T h e G u l f h4D.

a n d the S e a r c h f o i -

545.

R i c h a r d F . N r r o p a n d Harvey H e n r y Srrlith, e d L ; . , S t t i ( N , DA parri 55G)--311 ( W a s h i n g t o n r D. C . : IJ.S. G o v e r n n l e n t P r i n t - i n q O f f i c e , 1 9 7 9 ) , p. 155.

8.

Iraq: A-c,r~lrfi.!:rr

9.

Richatd F.

Flyrop,

ed.,

Iran:

A Ccriuritrcl

Study,

p.

36.

_ Iraq: _

10. R i c h a r d F. N y r n F a n d H a r v e y H e n r y S n l i t h , e d E . , A C o u n t r u S t ~ ! j h , pp. 251-252.

il.Data i i i T a b l e 3.1, 3 . 2 , a n d 4 . 1 a r e t a l : e n f r o n t XI:. @.ilf a n d t h e Searcti f o r S t r a t e g i c S t a b i l i t c l by A n t h o n y H. C o r d e s m a n , pp. 756, 7 4 3 . Source o f S t a t i s t i c s i 5 T h e Pli1tars.i. R a l . a n c e a n d s t r a t e g i c S u r v e c l , I n t e r n a t i o n a l Institute o f S t r a t e g i c S t u d i e s , (Carribridye, England: H e f f e r s P r i n t e r s L t d . , various years).
12. A n t h o n q H. C o r d e s m a n , T h e G u l f a n d the S e a r c h f o r %.r&r?gic S t a b i l i t x , pp. 7 2 8 , 7 3 2 . A 1 5 0 see Hickman, Havayed a n d Reborn., p. 1 .

13. A n t h o n y H. S t r a t e g i c S t a b i l i t y , p.
Iran-Ii-aq
14. W?E,

C o r d e s n ~ a n , T h e G u l f ari d the Search foi: 649.

I b i d . . , p. p. 25.

651; A l c l : ~S t e p h e n R.
Cord1?5niai1, 640.
h63.
63

G r u ~ r l n ~ o n 1-h~. ,

15. A n t h o n y H. SStrategic, S t . : i h i l i t y , p.

Ttie G u l f a n d t h E ! . ~ e a r c I lfor-

16.

I b i d . , p.

17.

Ibid. Ibid. Ibid.


9

18.

19.

F ' . 6761.

26. l d i l l i a w F . H i c k m a n , F!avase!.!d and f < e t ~ > r nT : t~e, ( W a 5 h i n g t o r 1 , D. i. : T h e R r o o I ; . i n g s I r a n i a n Army, 19R':, I n s t i t u t i o n , 19S.2) P. 25.
21. E c o n o m i s t , F r b r u a r g 21, 1901. T h i s c h a n s e f o r I*:horneini, hut the e v e n t s u n d e r s c o r e d i t .

not a

Anthnn!.j H . S t r a t e g i c S+:i.ibilit~-i,p .
22.

__

C n r d e s m a n , T h e G u l f a n d t h r ? Sr?ar.ch f r r .
670.

'23" ::it.
3.

Ibid., Itiid. Ibid. Ibid. Ihid. Ibid. Ibid.

p.

673.

2b.

p.

674.

27.
28.

p.
p.
p.

673.
677.

3.

549.

39. C e p a r t m e n t o f S t a t e Fi.11 l&.i~c., V o l 85, Flunlber 2 1 8 5 , Dec::ember, 1 9 8 5 p . 68. and Earry Rubin, "Pliddle East: Search f o r P e a c e " , F o r e i s r i Affa-, F e t w u a r y , 1 9 0 5 , p . .50Cio

31. 32.

Ibid., Ibitl.,

12.

727.

p.

68;'.

33. G.H. J a n s e n , "Dawn E i q h t S h a k e s t h e G ~ i l f , " M i d d l e E a s t I n t e r n a t i o n a l , 21 F e t i r ~ i a r q , 1986, P P . 3-5.

64

C h a p t e r Four

T h e E f f e c t o f the I s l a m i c R e v o l u t i o n on t h e I r a n i a n Army

" H i s t o r y p r o v i d e s the s t r o n i e s t p r o o f o f the i m p o r t a n c e


of

moral

f a c t o r s arid t h e i r of t e n i n c r e d i b l e e f f e c t ;

this is

t h e n o b l e s t a n d most z o l i d n o u r i s h m e n t t h a t the m i n d o f a

g e n e r a l may d r a w from

5ti.1dy o f

the p a s t : . . .

One nlicqht 5ay

t h a t the p h ! ~ s i c a l IjPem15 l i t t l e more t h a t the w o o d e n h i l t ,


w h i l e the rrloral f a c t o r s a r e the p r e c i o u s metal, the r e a l weepon,
the f incly--honed b l a d e .
"

C a r l Von Clausewitz

65

I n the C h a p t e r

one?

I o u t l i n e d the r e l a t i o n c h i r > betiut.en


PeOFle,

F i , . ~ h t i n g Powk?r a n d t:hE!

army, a n d g o v e r n m e n t

trinitg.

I n C h a p t e r two I d e m o n s t r a t e d the w e a C n e s 5 e r i n t h a t t r i n i t q u n d e r the P a h l a v i S h a h s ; a n d t h a t the m i l i t a r y Worth o f


a r m y was p r o b a b l y F i 13 tit i n g P o w e r .
N I L I C ~l e s s

the

t h a n i t a p p e a r e d due t o i t s weal:.

C h a p t e r t hrae d e m o n s t r a t e d ,khe scirpr I 5 i rig


War.

F i q h t i n g Pourer o f t h e I r a n i a n a r m y i n t h e I r a n - I r d q Chdpter four, which follow=,

In

I w i l l p r u p o s e tlidt t h e 1 5 1 a m i c :
t t j e

r E ? v o l u t i o n wa5 t h e c a u s e O F
arrriy5 F i g h t i n g

signif icunt

increase

in the

Power, a n d e : : p l o r e the i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h a t
i.15e

c h d n g e o n the mi 1 i t a r q
The revolution

of

l a n d p o w e r i n thr. r e y i u n . indirect? dcliberdto


A 5 noted i n

h a d bottl d i r P c t ,

arid u n i n t e n t i o n a l e f f v c t s o n the I r a n i a n avmy.

C h a p t e r two,

a revolution of

the sc ope a n d t o t a l i t y o f the!

Islarnic revolution,
o f a 5ocietr.

has a s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t on a l l azpects the I r a n i a n a r m y ,

I n the ca5e o f

i t was t i e d

c l o s e r t o the c o l l e c t i v e i n t e n t o f the p e o p l e % t i r o u g h t h e
n a t u r e of

t h e p o p u l a r r e v o l u t i o n a n d the a c t i o n s a r i d
Through d i r e c t

a t t i t u d e s of the s o l . d i w - s t h e m s e l v e = .

p r e s s u r e by the r e v o l u t i o n a r y g o v e r n m e n t ,

i t uras c t i a n q e d i n
The

5 p i r i t a n d i n t e n t t o f i t the g o v e r n m e n t 5 airas.

r e l a t i u n s h i p between the p e o p l e a n d the y o v e r n n i e n t


the f e r v o r o f t h e p o p u l a r I s l a m i c r e v o l t ,
etengthencd.
idas

through

5 i s n i Ficantly

The? r c l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e m the three e l e m e n t s o f

the Clauseirritzean t r i n i t y were r a d i c a l 1 9 r e d e f i n e d and

st w i g t hened

.
the i - e v o l u t i o n was n o t a n u n a l l o y e d b l e s 5 i n g

However,

f o r the m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h of
a n d t h e I r a q i inva!;ion,

Iran.

Eetween t h e r e v o l u t i o n

almost 613% o f the army d e s e r t e d . 1

Those r e m a i n i n g ,

who h a d s e e n t h e i r f e l l o w s o l d i e r s t u r n o n unreliable, and r e s t i v e .

t h e i r o f f i c e r s , were u n d i s c i p l i n e d ,
T o mal::e r n a t t : e r s worse,

two p u r g e s r e m o v e d almost a 1 1 ttle


Logisticirl

s e n i o r . army I e a d w L j t I i F , a n d 513% of a l l o f f 1 c e r s . support^

already ricldled w i t h problems,

g r e w r a p i d 1 2 worse

as w e s t e r n s o ~ i r c e 5c3f
eqi I

s u p p l y were c u t o f f .

Technoloqical
E tj o r

i 1:men t d n t er i 0.r t e d f o r 1a c k of ma i n t eri a n ce a n d


s k i l l e d personnel.

t age

of

T o e x p l a i n how the r e v o l u t i o n e n a b l e d t h a t a r m y , w h i c h
had 5 e r i o u s f l a w s equipment, .ind
,kc3

start: w i t h ,

rapidly deterioratinq

rebellious personnel,

to s t o p a n d defeat a
i s the i n t e n t o f
this

larqer a n d b e t t e r e q u i p p e d i n v a d e r , chapter.

E f f e c t on the P e o p l e ,

Army,

Government R e l a t i o n s h i p .

A y a t o l l a h tihonleinis i n f l u e n c e on p u b l i c opiiiion i n I r a n d u r i n g t h e revr::rlt:

is h a r d t o o v e r e s t i m a t e .

ti.honieini

was

a p o p u l a r a n d a c c l a i m e d f g u r e a n d the revoli.i+:ion
nothing i f not
d

was

~10p~ilis rt evolt.

In Ira?,

and during hi5

e : : il e i n F r a n c e , b ; t m m i e i n i s s p e e c h e s a n d p h i l o s o p h y were broadcast:

from moEiqi..ies t h r o u g h o u t

Iran.

In f a c t ,

his exile

57

by S a d d a m H ~ i s s e i i i i n c i . e a s e d h i s a b i l i t r t o i n f li..ience t h e

I r a n i a n Fw!oF:)1e, a n d se!,.cur~?dh i s p o s i t i o n as s o l e l e a d e r of t h c I5larrlic r e v o l u t i o n .

'

so m a n i f e a t was tiis p o F i L i I a r i t y l

ac.:claim a n d P o w e r l
and a

that h i s r e t u r n t o I r a n was a c e l e b r a t i o n
e v e n b e f o r e the post-Shah
t.13
foi-in

Within a few days,

y o v e r n m e n t f e l l l he a p p o i n t e d a new P r i m e M i n i s t e r

new yovernnlent. 5
ti o t orw i n i ' 5 p r i ma r 'J

t ti erne was a I. r ea c l ~ j ~

Ep R 1!-J

i n y r a i ri e cl

in

ttle

I r a n i a n S h i ' i.tes; t h a t I s l a m i c law o r d a i r i e c l the ri.ile:s

o f a r i g h t i c ~ t 5 l i f e ; a n d . t h a t d i s o b e d i e n c e t o them was an
act aqjainst Allah and

the tioran.

C o u p l e d w i t h ttle real a n d l i f e s t y l e and

pc!rceivecl

in justices;

the S h a h ' s o p t i l e n t

l i b e r a l westrcrn n o t i o n s ,

a n d the d e l i b e r a t e t e r r u r s k r r a t l by

his s e c r e t o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,

i t is s m a l l

iuoi1dt.r

t h a t t\'horneini

founded an entrhusiastic audience.


A s this cmthusiam t u r n e d i n t o r e v o l u t i o n ,

then t o a

r e v o 11 1 . t i o n a r q 51 o vet- 1'1 men t g 1.1 i de d by I 5 1am i c pr i n c I p 1 E s , a n d f i n a l l y t u a n I s l a m i c R e p u b l i c a t war w i t h a n i n v a d e r ,


p e o p l e a n d the g o v e r n m e n t ,

the

w h i c h were n a t u r a l l y a l l i e d by

common i n t e n t l

became f u r t h e r c e m e n t e d a5 chal l e n g e a f t c r

c h a l l e n g e l b o t h i n t e r n a l a n d e x t e r n a l , were s u c c e s s i 1 . ~l1 y
met. As w o u l d tie e x p e c t e d l

the f e e l i n g of the p e o p l e f o r t h e

a r m y was s t r o n y l q e f f e c t e d by Khomeini's a t t i t u d e a n d

w - o n o u n c e m e n ts.

K t l o n l e i n i f o l l f l w r d t w o t r a c k s i n h i s a t t i t u d e t o w a r d the S h a h ' s army.

H e urged the n~err~bers o f the Arm!d F c i r c ~ ? st o

d n s e r t : a n d j o i n the r e v o l u t i o n ,
At

w i t h con5iderable effect. b

the s m e time, he u r g e d h i s f o l l o w e r s not:


but to recoyiii:e

t o r e s i s t the

army,

the s o l d i e r s a5 b r o t h e r s .

"YCJLI

R I L I ~a ~p p e a l

ti3

t h e s o l d i e r ' s h e a r t s even i f

the3 f i r e

on a n d k i l l you.

ILet them k i l l f i v e t h o u s a n d ,

ten t h o ~ ~ s a n d ~

t w e n t y thCiLlCiarid--thEy
WE'

=ire our b r o t h e r s a n d we welcome them.


7

w i l l p r o v e t h a t tJ1c:iod i s more p o w e r f c l l t h a n the s w o r d " '

A l + : h o u ~ ha d d r e s . i e d to the r e v o l u t i o n d r i e s , i n t e n d e d for. the c o i i s c r ~ i p t s . T h e s o l d i e r s , K h i : m e i n i , were the p e o p l e a l s o .

this was a l s o
i n the o p i n i o n o f

T h i s a i y h t also have

b e e n a s h r e w d t r i c k by a s k i l l f u l r e v o l u t i o n a r y who i n t e n d e d

t o s i . { b v e r t the m i 1 i t : a r g .
Khomeini's

However,

a5 w e s h a l l see,
He w a s

l a t e r a c t i c i n s bore out t h i s a t t i t u d e .

sui. te s u p p o r t i v e o f s o l d i e r s a n d o f f i c e r s o f good I s l a m i c

c r e d e n t i a l s a n d had n o i n t e n t i o n of r e p l a c i n g t h e fact,

~I-IIIY.

In

he i n t e n d e d t o m a i n t a i n the a r m y , q u i t e u n l i k e the

c o n l m u n i s t l o a d e r s of the T u d e h r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s c o m m i t t e e s .

H e w a s s ~ i p p o r t i v eo f the a r m y ' s n e e d f o r d i s c i p l i n e arid g o o d

o r d e r , a n d f a i r tcr those pi.irqed f r o m m i l i t a r y s e r v i c e ,


a l l o w i n g them i o r e t i r e a n d s p e c i f i c a l l y a c c o r d i n g them " t h e

rights a n d respects o f a l l c i t i z e n s " .

Shortly a f t e r t h e Shah l e f t t h e country,


of o f t i c e r s of

a l a r y e number
There

a l l grader; f l e d w i t h t h e i r

was a p p a r e n t l q n o w h o l e s a l e " r e i q n o f

terror" , w h i c h

threatened officers generally,

however a n o f f i m ' r p u r g e was

made a t o p p r i o r i t y t o a 5 s u r e the s e c u r i t y o f t h e new


regime. 9
T h e i n i t i a l p u r g e i n the a r m y was l i m i t e d t:o G e n e r a l

o f f i c e r s a n d those i.icci.ised o f a t t r n c i t i e s . e : : e c L i t i o n s di.trins


this period,
for

<:If the 404 t o t a l

o n l y Z b were Gerlcral a r t , of t h e S h a h ' s

O f F i c ~ r s , wtiu were,
5eixritg a p p a r a t u s .

the

R I C J S ~p

T h e remiaindc-r,

alnlwst 310,

were a l l o w e d

t o r e t i r e c i n d e r the p r o v i s i o n r of the law.


other officers were forcibly retired, evidence of

A l t h o u y h mr:lny

there i r l i t t l e
In f a c t , +:his

an indi5criminatt= housecleaning.

w a s r e s i s t e d b y the r e v o l u t i o n a r y g o v e r n m e n t .
K h o m e i n i r e c o g n i z e d the n e e d f o r a s t r o n g m i l i t a r y a n d intended t o m a i n t a i v one. derrionstrations, ~onseqi.iently, pressure,

a n d d e m a n d s b y l e f t i s t e l e m e n t s to

c o m p l e t e l y d i s b a n d the a r m y were s t r o n g l y o v e r r u l e d . K h o m e i n i saw these q r o ~ i p s , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e T u d e h p a r t y !

a5

a g r e a t e r d a n g e r t o the r e v o l u t i o n i f the a r m y w a s
disbanded. S a i d a n o t h e r way,
he f e l t a g r e a t e r s e c u r i t y

t h r e a t f r o m the r i v a l r e v o l u t i o n a r y f a c t i o n s t h a n f r o m the

counter r e v o l u t i o n a r y t h r e a t o f t h e army.

12

T h e r e w a s a l s o e v i d e n t n e e d t o k e e p the army i n t a c t : , a s i d e f r o m t h e n e e d t o b a l a n c e other r a d i c a l p o l i t i c a l


70

movements.

As w i t h t h e S h a h b e f o r e h i m l

Khoaeini w a 5

r e q u i r e d t o 1.ise t h t ? arrrly i n a n i n t e r n a l c o n t r o l r o l e t o p u t down r e v o l t s i n thc t r a d i t i o n a l t r o u b l e s p o t s : K c i r d e s t a n a n d Khuzestan. However, t h e army w a s d e p l o y e d w i t h a n e w l y

d e v e l o p i n g f o r c e ; the P a s d a r a n or t h e I s l a m i c R e v o l u t i o n a r r G u a r d Corps. K h o m c i n i o r d e r e d the c r e a t i o n of

the P a s d r a n at: a b o u t

the same time


t a k i n g place.

AT-

the i n i t i a l

p u r g e i n the m i 1 i t a r c J was

I t wa5 a p p a r e n t l y i n t e n d e d as the c o e r c i v e

w i n g o f the I r a n i a n R e v o l u t i o n a r y P a r t y a n d a n a d d i t i o n a l
s a f e g u a r d i n the e v c n t o f

the C o ~ i p by r o y a l i s t o f f i c e r s , a s

had o c c u r r e d iuher1 M o s s a d e q h a d a t t e m p t e d t o o v e r t h r o w t h e

S h a h i n 1953. l 3

I t e v e n t u a l l y reached a s t r e n g t h of a b o u t
the

30,000 a n d remained i n i t s i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y r o l e u n t i l
Iraqi invasion. I n a n e f f o r t t o s u p p o r t the army a s a n i n s t i t u t i o n ,

K h o n ~ c i n i i s s u e d a nwrlber o f u n e q u i v o c a l j u d g e m e n t s b e t w e e n F e b 28, 1979 a n d Dec:ember 3 1 ,

1979 r e q u i r i n g s ~ i p p o r t f o r the

a r m y by the peoplE,, the army a5 the d e f e n d e r of r e p u b l i c and its s e r v a n t ,

the I s l a m i c

a n d the requirement o f d i s c i p l i n e 14 issued a general and even

a n d rood o r d e r i n the army. Finally,

i n % l u l y , 1979, K h o n e i n i

a n m e s t y f o r a l l i n d i v i d u a l s e r v i c e m e n l pol i c e m e n , m e m b e r s o f t h e S h a h s s e c ~ i r i t ya p p a r a t u s .

H i s amnesty

s t a t e n l e n . t , w h i c h f o l l o w s , l i n k 5 the three e1enlerit:s o f the


Clausewi.tzean t r i n i t y ,

i n d i c a t e s h i 5 i n t e n t t o keep those
71

t h r e e elen1ent.5; t h e I r a n i a n arrny,

" t h e noble people", a n d

the g o v e r n m e n t (t\'honleini 1 ,

s t r o n g l y bonded.

"The t h r e e brancheE of pardoned,

the Armed f o r c e s a r e thius b e i n g


t,

a n d I and t h e n o b l e p e o p l e f o r g i v e t h e m .

15

However,
b~.!3 i 11.

the s e c o n d a n d more thorough p u r g e was a b o u t t o

Khomeini

U J ~ Sc

onvinced of

the n e c ~ s 5 i t yo f a rr~ore
Mi.ictafa

thorcxtgh p u r g e my h i 5 new m i n i s t e r of D e f e n s e ,

C ti amran

C h a m r ~ nh a d c o n s i d e r a b l e m i 1 i tai-y r e v o 1 u t : i o n a r y
the AMAL t c + r r o r i s t s

e x p e r i e n c e i n L e b a n o n a5 o r g a n i z e r of

a n d a5 head o f Kfromeini's Conmittee o n Revoli.itiunary Affairs. L o o k i n g on the army a s the p r m d u c t of

the " 5 a t : a n i c "

regime a n d i n n e e d o f t o t a l r e v i s i o n ,

he began a thorough

r e v i e w o f a l l o f f i c e r s a t the g r a d e of Major a n d a b o v e ; those who the Shah h a d p e r 5 o n a l l y s e l e c t e d .


T h e p u r g e was t h O r o L t g h , invasion, c o n t i n u i n g p a s t the I r d q i Hickman estimates

a n d i t s e f f e c t was w i d e s p r e a d .

t h a t o v e r o n e t h i r d o f the f i e l d g r a d e o f f i c e r s were r e m o v e d
f r o m s e r v i c e , or roi..ighly 9000 a r m y o f f i c e r s . O f f i c e r s who

had a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h the ( J n i t e d States, p a r t i c u l a r l y a f t e r

t h e a b o r t i v e h o s t a g e r e s c ~ i ea t t e m p t , were e s p e c i a l l ! ~
5juspect.

Not o n l y were one t h i r d o f the f i e l d g r a d e o f f i c e r ' s


removed,

those renlnved were the b e s t t r a i n e d .

-IL

T h e S h a h had

sent the b e s t of h i v o f f i c e r s t o b e e d u c a t e d a b r o a d ,
t h e U n i t e d States.

many to

S i n c e a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h U n i t e d S t a t e s uia5

e v i d e n c e o f q~iestic31lable l o y a l t y , most o f

these o f f i c e r s i n

the a r m y were r e m o v e d .

However,

i t a l s o m e a n t t h a t those

0 f . f i c e r s r e m a i n i n g were l o y a l

t o the r e v n l u t i n n , a n d more

importantly,

1 s l . a m i c a l l y p u r i f i e d a n d c o m m i t t e d t o carry out agenda. Z h a n w a n i n t e n d e d t o r e d u c e the army t o D e s e r t i o n h a d by a n d l a r g e

the g o v e r n m e n t ' s

In addition, half

it5 prerevolutionary s i z e .
thE!

h a d this a f f e c t on

c o n c r i p t e d e n l i s t e d f o r c e , arid t h 0 5 ~

r e m a i n i n g were, by d e f a u l t , more c o n t m i t t e d t o m i l i t a r y s e r v i c e u n d e r the r e v o l u t i o n a r y g o v e r n m e n t

T h e e n d r e w l t wa5 n o t a s h o r t a g e o f t r a i n e d o f f i c e r 5 ,
s i n c e t h e s i z e o f both the e n l i s t e d f o r c e a n d the o f f i c e r

c o r p s w a 5 c u t almost i n h a l f ,

but a d e f i n i t e change i n t h e Loyalty

c h a r a c t e r o f the o f f i c e r s a n d s o l d i e r s r e m a i n i n g .
was n o l o n g e r t o t h e S h a h

( p e r s o n a l pledg1?5

of

l o y a l t y were

r e m o v e d e v e n b e f o r e he l e f t ) , b u t t o t h e I s l a n ~ l cr e v o l u t i o n

and t h e military idi?als of


ua5 c h a n g i n g

Islam.

I n s h o r t the army e t h i c

from 5elf--serving allegiance to a despot,

"the

web 5 y s t e n i "

t o an e t h c o f mi i t a r y s e r v i c e t o the
thE1

r e v o l u t i o n and

n a t: on.
v a c i e 5 wa5
dl50

T h i s c h a n g e CI constitution.

r e f l e c t e d e d i n t h e new

C h a m r a n g a v e the a r m y two s p e c i f i c m i s s i o n s .

T h e f i r s t was straisht f o r w a r d ;

to guard Iran's
as

independence,

( N o t to t h e S h a h or a n y other i n d i v i d u a l ,

73

u n d e r the P a h l a v i ' s ) .
revolution.

The S e c o n d , was t o " s a f c q n a r d " the

S i i i c e .I:hc! I s l a m i c r e v o l u t i o n w a s e x p l i c i t l y
a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n scope, dimensions. this

d e f i n e d a5 p a n - i s l a m i c :

mission had i n t e r n a t i o n a l

"Our d e f e n s i v e f o r c e s r t h e r e f o r e , s h o u l d be i n t r u s t e d n o t
o n l y w i t h the d u t i e s o f s a f e g u a r d i n g o u r c o u n t r y ' s

f r o n t i c r s ; t h e y s h o ~ i l da l s o be c a p a b l e o f w a g i n g d o c t r i n L 3 1
j i h a d i n the n a m e o f A l l a h a n d the e x t e n s i o n o f His d o m a i n . " --.The I r a n i a n Corist i t u t i o r i , The army, s u p p o r t of

19R3. 17
n e e d e d the

h a v i r i g a c c e p t e d the d u a l m i s s i o n s ,

the g o v e r n m e n t ,

a n d Chamran s t r e s s e d thc.

r e q u i r e m e n t : f o r o b E ? d i e n c e t o the c : h a i n o f

command,

i r r e s p e c t i v e of r e v c ) l i . i t i o n a r r coi..inri 1% or z e a l o u s c 1 e r g l - l . T h e c o u n c i l s were f r e e t o express t h e i r a d v i c e ,


"the b u s i n e s s of

but

conmiand b e l o n g s t o the c o m ~ m a i i d w a n d the


to i n t e r f e r e i n t h e a f f a i r s

councils w i l l not have t h e right


nf

the command" 18

A l t l i o u g h this r e d u c e d the d i s c i p l i n e problem, o t h e r factions, n o t a b l y t h e Tudeh part:y, c o n t i n u e d .to c n c o u r a y e

the r e v o l u t i o n a r y c o u n c i 1s.

rlost i m p o r t a n t ,

however,

f o r the people, a r m y ,

g o v e r n m e n t r e 1 a t : i o n s h i p wa5 C h a m r a n " 5 v i s i o n o f the o r q a n i z a t i o n of

the I r a n i a n I s l a m i c a r m y .

First,

the

b a r r i e r s b e t w e e n t h e army a n d p e o p l e were t o be redi..iced by

el i m i n a t i n g c l a s s b a r r : i e r s a n d p r o g a n d i z i n g thc a r m y
nation's d e f e n d e r and protector o f

clr,

the
part

the r e v o l u t i o n .

111

74

this was i n t e i i d e d to p r o v i d e grea.ter s e c u r i t y f o r the


government,
~ ~ i h i c tfie l t : more c o n f i d e n c e i n t h e s u p p o r t o f

the

p e o p l e t h e n the get u n t e s t e d arnii]; but: i t was alsm the o b s e r v a t i o n by Khoiriein i ' 5 d e f e n s e a d v i s e r s t h a t the r i g i d i t y " of
"

c 1a s s

the Shah's army was a r e f l e c t i o n nf


I r a n and w o u l d n o t s t a n d
LIP

pre-revolutionary

i n the

p i - o t r a c t e d warfare a n t i c i p a t e d . Second,
the,

e n t i r e n a t i o n was t o b e c o m e a n a r m y , w i t h

the' m i l i t a r y p r o f e s s i o n a l s p r o v i d i n q the e x p e r t i s e . 2 0

"We b e l i e v e t h a t the e n t i r e I r a n i a n n a t i o n s h o u l d
bei:oae

the s o l d i o r s o f

the r e v o l u t i o n . . . . T h e

army shni.ild

a l s o be t u r n e d i n t o a s p e c i a l i z e d a n d m o d e r n t c c t l n i c a l

cadre. "--Chamran,

O c t o b e r 9,

1979. 21
professionals with a

T h e arm3 w o u l d b e a 5IIid11 c a d r e o f v e r y larye t r a i n e d r e s e r v e ;


were i n t e n d e d

i n f a c t the a r m y a n d t h e p e o p l e

t o have the same m i l i t a r y p u r p o s e a n d r e a l l y

b e separate componerits of announcement:,

the same s y s t e m .

Ktionieini's

s h r ~ rl ty a f t e r C h a n t r a n ' s s t a t e m e n t o n Q c t u h e r
began
d

9 t h , o f the f o r r r i a t i n n o f the "Army of 20 M i l l i o n "

c o m p r e h e n s i v e proqram of m i l i t a r y t r a i n i n g i n f a c t o r i e s , s c h o t ~ l . ' i , a n d on t e l e v i s i o n , general mobilizatinri. complete w i t h s t a f f p l a n n i n g f o r


wd5

T h e "Army o f 33 M i l l i o n "

sonietinies

r e f f e r r e d t o as the P a s s e j v o l u n t e e r s . Third,
out of

the a r m y a n d a r m y O f f i c e r s were to s t a y s t r i c t l y
T h i s l a s t was a l s o i n t e n d e d t o e n h a n c e ttle

politics.

s e c u r i t y of

the g o v e r n m e n t ;

however,

i t h a d the i n d i r e c t

75

e f f e c t of

c l a r i f y i n s the army, y o v e r n m o n t r e 1 a t : i o n s h i p a n d
As e t a t c d tiy

e n h a n c i n g the a r m y ' s ~ ) i ^ n f e 5 s i o n a le t h i c .

C ~ ~ L I ~ E ? " IP Uo 1 ~ i~ tic Z: a ~ l . a i m s a r e the b u s i n e s s o f g o v e r n m e n t


alone.
I'

T h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y g o v e r n m e n t took d e l i b e r a t e s t e p s t o t r a n s f o r i n the a r m y l e a d e r s h i p a n d o r g a n i z a t i o n s o t h a t : the


people1

the rwmu, a n d the r o v e r n r r i e n t h a d a common g o a l a n d


ft.inctions.

clear, separate

T h e y rerjtorecl d i E c i p l i n e l
and

e n h a n c e d c o h e 5 i c i n r a n d d p f ' i n e d the n a t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e : :

mi 1 i t a i - y m i s s i o n s .

T h i s was d r i v e n i n p a r t by the r i a t u r e o f t h e p o ~ ? u l i s t
Islamic revolutirin. i n p a r t by o t h f ? r t h r e a t s t o the a n d i n p a r t bu n t i z t r i i s t

f l e d 4 1 i n s r e v o l i . i t i o n a r y government:,
of

the o l d m i l i t a r y h c i r a r c h y .

A l t h o u q h t h i s wa5 n o t s o l e l y

m o t i v a t e d by a d e l i b e r a t e e f f o r t t o e n t r a n c e the m i l i t a r y
power o f

r e v o l u t i o n a r y I r a n l i t had the c ? f f e c t o f

s i s n i f i c a n t l y s t r e n g t h e n i n g the b o n d s b e t w e e n the c+lerrientrs


of

the C 1 a i . i s e w i t z e a r . i t r i n i t g , a n d t h e r e b y ,

the armq's

F i (3 h t i n g Fower.

Effects of

the R e v o l u t i o n the Q u a l i t y a n d c j l u a n t i y o f

E q u i pmen t
I n this s e c t i o n I w i l l e x p l o r e the e f f e c t o n the Q u a 1 i t y a n d Q u a n t i t r y a n d e q u i p m e n t a n d o n the F i g h t i n g P o w e r of

the p r e - i n v a s i o n

I r a n i a n army.

76

As was n o t e d i n e a r l i e r c h a p t e r s ,

the Q u a l i t y a n d

O u a n t i t y o f the I r c r n i a n a r m y s e q u i p m e n t was a r e f l e c t i o n Of

t ti t? S h a ti r,
e?i.iipnient

1t1

i 1 i t arv nloderri i i a t ion program

A 1 t hous, h t : toe

was p l c i n t i f c i l

a n d the b e s t a v a i l a b l e ,

i t came f r o m

w i d e s p r e a d s o u r c e s o u t s i d e t h e coi.intry a n d t e c h n i c a l n l a i n t e n c e p e r s o n n e l were i n s h o r t s u p p l y . circ~i~r~~tanc lo eg s, i s t i c a l p r o b l e m s werp a F o l l o w i n g the r e v o l u t i o n ,

I n the b e c t o f

--

I . .

t h i n g s b e c a m e d e c i d e d l y worse.

As n o t e d i n T a b l e 4 . 1 ,

the e q u i p m e n t w a s s t i l l there,
Defpnse

b u t i t s combat r e a d i n e s s was r a p i d l y e r o d i n g .

e x p e n d i t u r e s were c:i.it o v e r 60% a n d d i d s t a y e d r e l a t i v i e l g c o n s t a n t u n t l t h t ? gE!ar f o l l o w i n g the i n . / a s i o n . ma.jur Of


the! three

p o r t i o n s of t h e d e f e n s e e x p e n d i t u r e s ( P e r s o n l i e 1 and Ciirjtainment) p e r s o n n e l r e m a i n e d about the

Acquistions,

same the f i r s t y e a r .

A c q u i s t i o n p a y m e n t s c o n t i n u e d i n rnany

cases u n t i l t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y g o v e r n m e n t c o u l d take over,


a n d i n a n y case, t h i r d element
wd5

w w e d r o p p i n g b e f o r e the r e v o l u t i o n .
s~istainrrlentand maintenance,

The

a n d i t was

t h i s a r e a b o r e the b r u n t o f t h e 60% budget r e d u c t i o n .


Additionally, warrant officers,

the t r a i n e d t e c h n i c a l p e r s o n n e l ,

largely

w w e a n t i . - r h a t I a n d made n o g r e a t e f f o r t t o
In

k e e p the f o r c e i n peal: c o n d i t i o n d u r i n g the r e v o l u t i o n .

a n y c:aser d u r i n g ; i n d a f t e r the r e v o l u t i o n ,

there were a f a r

more p r e s s i n g issues i n the rni 1 i t a r y t h a n the s u s t a i n m e r i t


a n d r e p a i r of e q u i p m e n t .

77

T a b l e 4.1

77-78

78-79 9.9 413

77-80 3.8 415 300

D c f e n s e S p u n d i n s ($F,i 1
ManpouJar

7.9 342

(0005)

Reserves ( 0 0 0 s )
Tank5

300
16::o

300
1735

1735
103

A r r r m r P d F i 3 t~ ?: i 11y ?.r? t~ i c: 1 e5
A r t i 1lery

2250
714
40 1

1075

782

78;:
715
7

Hi 3 h P e r f o r miin c u A i i -c r A f t
Naval Seagoing W a r s h i p s

669
7

78

A f t e r 1900, r e g u l a r manpower d r o p p e d t o a b o u t 60% of

the 1 9 7 9 l e v e l .

However,

the r e s e r v e rrsanpower a n d the

m i l i t i a b e g a n t o g r ( 3 w c o n s i d e r d b l y , w h i l e the d e f e n s e budget:
rerrla i n e d r e 1 a t i v e 1i j 5t a b 1F! 3

~t ttse

5dlllE

time,

combat Therefore,

1 0 5 5 e 5 f o r c e d the a c q u i s i t i o n o f new e q u i p m e n t .

once a g a i n ,
m ain tenance.

l i t t l e money wa5 a v a i l a b l e f o r s u s t a i n m e n t a n d

E s t i m a t e s o f t h e o p e r a t i o n a l c a p a b i l i t y of
e=!i.iipmwnt

the m i l i t a r y

a f t e r t w o y e a r s of r e v o l u t i o n a r y g o v e r n m e n t v a r y T h e r t e f o r e ? , e v e n t.hough

by tqpc? a n d r a n g e f r o m 40% t o 7 0 Z . 24

the q u a n t i t y o f eqi..iipnlent s t a y e d the same i i n t i l the 5 t a r t o f


the w a r ,
the q u a l i t y of the e q u i p m e n t was r e d u c e d by a b o u t

509%. 5

( I t i s a l s o w o r t t s n o t i n g t h a t : a f t e r the i n v a s i o n , the
Iranian t:echnicians and maintenance personnel t o
especially aircraft, w a s

a b i l i t y of

repair and r e b u i l d equipment,


miraci.ilons.

T h i s c a n b e a t t r i h u t e d t o the conlnlitnlent of

the s u p p o r t f o r c e , a1t:hough

i t may d l 5 0 b e a t e s t a m e n t t o
111 a n y

the courage of
case,

the p i l o t s w h o f l e w the a i r c r a f t .

the i t is a r e f l e c t i o n o f the c o h e s i o n r m o r a l e ,
i n ~ i t s c i r t , the F i g h t i n g Power of the Armed

dedication, forces,

t h a t : allowed i t t o o c c u r . )

T h e e r o s i a n of materiel r e a d i n e s s a f t e r the r e v o l u t i o n

has a p p l i c a b i l i t g t:o Van C r e v e l d s f o r m u l a t i o n .

If Fiqhting

Power. r e m a i n e d c o n s t a n t , t h e n the M i l i t a r y Worth of the


I r a n i a n army would h a v e e r o d e d p r o p o r t i o n a l l y . However,
a5

w e 5aw i n C h a p t e r T h r e e , the I r a n i a n Armed f o r c e s were a b l e

79

t o meet a n d d e f e a t the I r a q i s , e v e n t h o u y h I r a n s o v e r a l l
Q ~ i a I i t ya n d Q u a n t i t r o f e q u i p m e n t c o n t i n u e d t o e r o d e v i s a v i s the I r a q i s .
up

Clearly,

the i n c r e a s e i n F i g h t i n y P o w e r rrlade

the d i f f e r e n c e .
A 5 w i t h Re-a Shat.15 army, Muhammed R e z a F a h l a v i army,

a n d the w a r t i m e I a l a n l i c r e v o l u t i o n a r r a r m y ,
the c o m b a t p e r f o r m a n c e of

I have r e l i e d u n

the armty t o be the f i n a l i n d i c a t o r


I n this; p e r i o d ,
+:he

of

i t 5 M i l i t a r y Worth ::lnd F i g h t i n g P o w e r .
However,

t h e e::anwles a r e l i m i t e d .
arrrly

the p e r f o r m a n c e rJf

in t h i s period i5 indicative of

its changed charact:w,

ef f e c t i v e n r s s ,

a n d i t s new r e l a t i o n s h i f i . t o t h e people a n d

the g o v e r n m e n t : .

During this p e r i o d ,

the arm19 wa5 u s e l l i n a n i n t e r n a l

s e c u r i t g r n l e a g a i n s t s t r i k e r s a n d armed arab r e s i s i t a n c e i n tihcrietan, a g a i n s t t ( ~ i r d i 5 ha n d A i e r b a i j a n r e b e l l i o n s i n the The Pasdran also

n o r t h east, and in t r i b a l r e b e l l i o n s . participated

i n these operations,

a5 w e l l a5 again5t s e v e r a l

attempted m i 1 i t a r r cocips.

I t is d i f f i c u l t t o i m a g i n e
d i f f i c u l t circrinlstancus:

ti

h a r d e r a i ~ j s i n n i n more

the s u p p r e s s i o n o f r e b e l l i o n w i t h a

r e b e l l i o u s army i n the m i d s t o f a t h o r o u g h p u r g e w i t h

d e t e r i o r a t i n g equipment,

i n c o m p e t i t i o n w i t h a watr:tid~g

para-mi 1 i t a r r f o r c e .

However, i n s p i t e , o r p e r h a p s b e c a u s e o f the
conditions,

the m i s s i o n was c a r r i e d out s u c c e s s f u l l y ;

in

f a c t more s u c c e s s f u l l y t h a n the S h a h s army h a d h a n d l e d the

80

r e b e l l i o n s i n the g e a r s b e f o r e the r e v o l u t i o n :
n.l. r e b e l l i o n c e a s e d a n d d i d n o t
->

the r e p o r t s

T h e New M i 1i t a r y Leader
Among the most i m p o r t a n t r e s u l t s o f d e m o n s t r a t e d i n the I r a n - I r a q

the R e v o l u t i a n ,

as

war i s the n e w I r a n i a n

m i 1 i tar9 l e a d e r .
corpE,

l i e p e a t e d pi-irges h a v e p u r i f i e d t he o f f i cer

a s s u r i n s i:oinmittrrlent,

largelcJ a p o l i t i c a l ,

t o the

I r a n i a n Islamic r e v u b l i c .

O f f i c e r s i n key p o s i t i o n s i n the

m i l i t a r y h a v e repe8:+t:eclly p r o v e n t h e i r l o y a l t y by I s l a ~ n i c

c r e d e n t i a l s a n d t h e i r s e r v i c e t o the g o v e r i i m e n t . addition,

In

the cri.icit)le o f the r e v o l u t i o n a n d the war h a v e the s u c c e s s f ~ i lc o r n m d n d e r s w h o p a s s e d the a c i d


The

a s s u r e d that:

test5 o f

i d e o l o g y a n d l o y a l t y h a v e been advanc:ed.

prmces5 i s s t i l l o n g o i n g .

These o f f i c e r s a r e u n h e s i t a n t ,
powerful courage and

c l e a r h e a d e d combat: c o n m a n d e r s of
commitment.

T h e 9 dre a l s o a r r ~ b i t i o u s i a n d t h e i r f u t u r e is

t i e d t o the f u t u r e rjf t h e r e v o l u t i o n . "

Two s p e c i f i c e x a m p l e 5 a r e i n o r d e r .

T h e f i r s t i s the

Chairman of the $ J o i n t C h i e f s o f S t a f f , C o l o n e l I s a n ~ e l
Sohrabi,

( t h e r e a p p e a r t o b e n o more promotions t o G e n e r a l

i n the I r a n i a n a r n l y ) .
" B u t c h e r of t i u r d s i t a n "

C o l o n e l S o h r a b i b e c a m e known a s the
d u r i n g the u p r i s i n g i n 1979-80 f o r

his b r u t a l s u p p r e s s i o n ; he a l s o p r o v e d c a p a b l e o f d o i n g
q u i c k l q a n d e f f e c t i v e l y w h a t e v e r the g o v e r n m e n t asl:.ed h i m t o do.
T h e s e c o n d i s C o l o n e l S a y y a d S h i r a z i , Commander o f
81

Ground Forc:es,
army C a p t a i n ,

who i s now r u n n i n g the war w i t h I r a q .

As an

tie was; r e c o g n i z e d as a part c u l a r l v b l o o d y

minded a n d r u t h l e s s a r t i l l e r y commander. prnmotion, a n d the O F e r a t i o n a l p e r f n r m a n c

His rapid
of the Iranian

a r m y is a t e s t a m e n t t o h i s s k i l l as a m i l i t a r y p r o f e s s i o n a l ,

the r e v o l u t i o n t h a t g a v e h i m the o p p o r t u n i t y , a n d t h e
r e v o l u t i o n i z e d I r a n i a n a r m y . 29 In t h e f i n a l analysis,

the rrlajor i m p a c t o f +:he


ttle

r t . v o l i . I t i o n was the c h a n g e .is and Pasdaran, fi.indamental

I r i i n i a n s n l d i ~ l r ?reqiiliir Staff. I t was

Easerj v o 1 1 . 1 n t e e r t o C h i e f o f

and enduring, r e g a r d l e s s of grinding,

f u t t i r e w/eiit:s. A f t e r

si:: y e a r s o f the rrlosjt b r u t a l ,


W o r l d War I ,
ttlere

c u r s b a t s i n c e the
q~ie5tii~ii

i.5 n o 5hortiiqe o f

v o l ~ i n t e e r s , nu

of retreat, n o loss of

i n i t i a t i v e , no drop i n conmittnlent,

no search f o r c o m p r o m i ~ eor n e g o t i a t i o n . T h e r e i s i n s t : e a d a n
e a g e r n e s s to d e s t r o y the e n e m y a n d a d v a n c e the r e v o l u t i o n u n d i m m e d a f t e r si:: y e a r s o f the h a r d e s t f i g h t i n g i m a s i n a b l e .

I n the w o r d s o f a n A m e r i c a n a n a l y s t i n the DeFiai-t:ment o f


Defense,

" A l l the F 1 4 ' s a n d the M-60'5

p u r c h a s e d by the Shah tlave n o t

h a d o n e t e n t h t h e i m p a c t o n t h e war t h a t the t e n s o f thousands of

illiterate young I r a n i a n p e a s a n t s have.


f o c u s of
50

S p e n d i n g m o n e y o n the m a c h i n e r y o f w a r - - - t h e e f f o r t a n d d e b a t e i n the W e s t - - r e m a i n s c e n t r a l issue is t h e w i l l i n g n e s s o f

rrluch

s e c o n d a r y ; the

t h e troops t o F i g h t ,

82

T h e i r be1 ief officers.


.5C)
'I-

i n thl:?i.r caulje, a n d t h E ? i r c o n f i d o n c e i n t h e i r

T h e I r a n i a n arrw i s now a n i n 5 t r ~ i n 1 ~ m of t enorri~oue


military potential. T h e c h a n g e s e f f e c t e d by the r e v o l u t i o n a n d r e i n f o r c e d by the extreme

were p r o f o u n d ,

fundamental,

pre5s~ires, n o t e r o d e d .

G i v e n a c o h e s i v e l o g i s t i c a l system,
i t s r e g i o n a l p o w e r w o u l d b e i..inrnaf:ched

o r a r e l i a b l e bacl:c?r,

a n d i t 5 g l o b d l s i g n i f i c a n c e c h a l l e n g e the 5uperpowers.

93

ENDNOTES CHAPTER FOUR

1.

William F. H i c k n i a n ,
Ibid.,
p.

R a v a g e d a n d Re-tx~:.~., P.

1.

2.

16.

3. S h a u l P.aI::tiash, T h e R e i g n o f the Acratol lS3iis: I r a n a n d the I s l a m i c R e v n l u t i o n , P. 49.


4.

Ibid.r Ibid.,

p.

50.

5.

p.

51.
a n d RctmrXr P .

5.
York:

W i l l i a m F. Hicl:.manr R a . ; a s e d

7.

Motianimt!d t i e i i : a l , I r a n : t h e UnkcAd--5&.rl, 7. P a n t h e o n Rooks. 198;:. ) , pp. 145.-146.

(b1tl.1~~

8 . I n . k e r v i e w ivit:h M A J M a r k P a y e r , 1LI.S. t%rrrlkj. Cited O f f i c e r p r o v i d e d s e c u r i t y f o r T e h e r a n A i r p o r t t h e d a y +:he Shah l e f t a n d f o r 5 e v ~ r a l .d a y s thert=after.

9.

William F. H i c k m a n ,
Ibid., p. 9.

Ravayed a n d

Rehorn,

P.

El.

10.

11. Nader E n t e s s a r , I ~ j l a m i cR e p u b l i c o f I r a n . " P.


12.
13. 14.

"Military a n d P o l i t i c s i n t h e 9.
a n d Hickman,
P.

Ibid.,

p.

10.,

11.

Nader E n t e s s a r ,
P.

" P l i l i t a r y a n d P o l i t i c s i n the

I s l a r r ~ i cR e p u b l i c o f I r a n . "

in.
R a v a g e d c?nd Reborn.,
p.

W i l l i a m F. H i c k m a r i ,

11.

15.
16.

Ibid., Ibid.

p.

12.

17. E x t r a c t o f the C o n s t i t ~ r t i o no f the I s l a m i c F 'E x iLb L l i c o f I r a n , a s p ~ i b l i ~ h ei d n Nader E n t e s s a r , " M i l i t a r y


and P o l i t i c s i n the Islantic R e p u b l i c of 18. Iran,"
p.

15.
p.

William F. H i c k n i a n ,

Ravaged a n d RebEn.,

12.

19. Nader E n t e s s a r , I s i l a n i i c R e p u b l i c o f I r a n , " P.

" M i l i t a r g a n d P o l i t i c s i n the 14.


R a v a g e d and R e t m r n ,
p.

20.

William F. H i c k m a n ,

14.

84

21. F e d e r a l Proadcast Informatiori S e r v i c e , Daily Report: Mirjcll.c! E a s t Area, O c t o b e r 9 , 1979, P . R13. a 5 p u b l i s h e d i n Hickniaii, 6 7 . 13. Dona1 ( I L ' o u q h t , " I r a n ? " F i g h t i n g A r m i e s : , ~~-tayoiiiFj i~ n.~ +:he Middle E a s t L A Combat Assessment, Ric:hartJ G a b r i e l , e d . , ( W e s t . p o r t , C o n n e c t i c u t : Greenwood P r e s s , 1 9 8 2 . 1 , N o P a g e Number.
LIZ.

-.

23.

See T a b l e 3 . 1 ,

3.2.

24.

See T a t i l e 3 . 1, 3 . 2 .

2 5 . Anthony H. C o r d e s m a n , T I I F G u l f a n d the Seni-ch f o r . S!:j,:.,3L.c%i c S t a b i 1 i t *-I, P P 73.2,734

27Dona1,cl VoLiqht, " I r a n " , No pa3c rlunlber, S ~ c t i i 2 n r+nl:itled ' S c e n a r i o s o f D e p l o y m e n t ' .

blader E n t a s s c i r , " M i l i t a r r J a n d P o l i t i c s i n t h e I s l a n ~ i cR e r w b l i c o f I r a n , " P. 17.

18.
29.

Ibid.,

F'. 15.

85

I n t r o du c: t i o r i

.
the t h e s i s is i n t e n d e d t o r e v i e w

T h i s f i n a l seckii::)n o f

t h e ma.jor c o n c l i . i s i i m s o f the f i r s t f o u r c h a p t e r s , resional

their

i m ~ , l i c a ? i o n s , a n d t h e i r l o n q term e f f e c t s .

II

Major Conclr.isi.i:~ns.. T h e thesis haas t h r e e l o g i c a l


5 t ~

1 ~ . e5 a d i n g t:n t t , e

e v ~ ? n k ~ . i ac l onclrrsion.
F o r c e s were fi.indamt:!iit.:ll

First,

the I m p e r i a l Ir;+n i,.ari A r i i l c d

1 y f 1diiJed.

F r o m i t s i n c i z p t i o n iindeit r i n i t . 9 tlad fat:,Al

Re;:a

Shah,

t h e peoF:rle, arnl!ir

yovw-nnlent

ci-ticks.

ll~ihairimied f?t.;:a

Pahlavi,

a t t e n ~ p + : i n t o b u i l d un ttle
army,

same f o i . i n d a t : i o n r

i n c r e a s e d t h e pi-ess~ire o n t h e p e a p l c i ,

gcivernment t r i n i t y j , r c ? s u l t i n g i n a c o l l a p s e .
of

T h e weaI;.nesses

tt1i.s t r i n i t y ~liacj d e m o n s t r a t e d by the p a t e n t i n a t 3 i l i t y o f


t h c rev.oli.itiori i n s p i t e , iir e v e n tiecaiusie

t h e a r m y t:o d e f e a t

of, the l a v i s h auyrrlc+nt:ation o f e q u i p m e n t .

S u o o n d , the I s 1 ~ 3 m i c I r a n i d n a r m y ,

p r o v e d t o ha\:u

c o n s i d e r a b l e power a n d r e s i l i e n c e i n the I r a n - I r a q & r .


5 i r pi^ i s

e d by a p o w e v f 1.1 1 i n v a d e r , h am p e r e d by dec t?r t 1 on


t:!qLiiwrwnt,

eroding

a n d u n i - e l i a b l e l o s i s t i c s , the I r a n i a n

Armed F o r c r i s r e s i s t e d

the attack a n d went o n t h e o f f e n s i v e .


by ~ i n ~ i s ~ co ~uar a l ge an0 f iqhtiny ancl o p e r a t i o n a l l e v e l plarininq.

A c t i o n s w e r e charac:t.ori;lcd
power, e : : c e l l e n t st::aff

work,

Third,

the c:tlangc+! i n the Armed F o r c e s was c a ~ i s e d t 3 9 a

07

qovernmen t

.
1

T h e I r a n i a n armq i s n o t n n l q s t i - o n q f : ! r a n d move resi i r n t : t h a n


than

vr e t:.lt?cc?s5nr s , i t

i s a r g ~ ib d14 iimr P F w w r f I.I1

it5 Persian Gulf neishbors.

I t has b e a t e n b a c l

d e t e r m i n e d a n d we1 1 e q u i p p e d i n v a d e r a n d h a s h a s since

c a i - r i e d t h e war i n t u I r a q i t e r r i t o r y o v e r s t r o n g enEmy
opposition, without

a r e l i a b l i - . a l l y or l o g i s t i c a l s u p p o r t ,
as5~t5.

a n d w i t h v e r s l i m i t e d a i r potuer or h i g h - t c c h n o l o s y

T h i s o c c u r r e d while the r i t u a l i t y arid q i . i a n t 1 t y o f est.tipnlent

Irans

was e r o d i n g .

Iran did 88

50

wheri

Iraq h a d bolt1

m o r i e . t a r y ancl maripoiwr : ; u p p c n t o v w w h r 1in i n q a i I51.1 r . ; w

f r o m the other A r a b n a t i n n s ,
1 w 3 i~i k i c v 71
wafr

i cir i +:!j a n d re I i d t s 16:'

LIPP POI^.

Iran w a s a b l e t o d o so b e c a ~ 1 5 et:he arnlg


5 t r ell q

f LI ndarrlen t a 1 1g

b e I 5 1din i c r e v o 1LIt 1 i:m t. t~ en d b y t !

A F t e r s i x y e a r c o f the most b r u t a l w a r f a r e s i n c e W o r l d
' W a r I,
I r a n shows n o ssign o f flagging in its resolve, and
i~

c o n t i n u e r , +cj p r c s e c x t a the w a r .

I r a n g a i n e d the i n i t i a t i

a n d h a s not re1 i n i i . . i i s h e d i t s i n c e the khc f i r s t m o n t h s o f


t h e war.

I t has,

iii

fact,

j u s t recentlg r e n e w e d +.tie
19S6,
Ii-dii

ofFensi:/e.
att:ac:I:.ed i n

I n the e a r l y ~ l o n t h scrf
ti012

EiiccFc;fiilly

art?.s5; t h e s t r a t e y i c a l l : ~.,'it.\i

A 1 raw

p F ? n i n s u l a , a n d i n t~:i.iri::Ie5tan. A t : the time cif ( A p r i l , 19336), the f r u n t . ha= a g a i i i s t a b i l i : e d , Ir.rn's choice,

ttli.5 w r i l.in'd
arparently at

s i n c e I r a q a p p e a r s i i n a b l e t u make a n y i n +:he I r a n i a n g a i n s - .

substantial reduction

11%.

Reqiorial

I m p ~ i ~ of t

the War.

The? war hds h a d a l o n g term s t a b l i i z i n g e f f e c t o n the

reqion.

As a d i r e c t r e s c i l t : of

the I 5 l a 1 1 1 i c r e v o l i t t i n n and the

I r a n - I r a q War, the P e r a i a n G u l f was moved t o the f o r e f r o n t


o f U.S.

str*:rteric i n t w - e s t s .

I t has g e n e r a t e d t h e Cart.ei-

doc:trine, interests,

w t l i c h i c l c ? n t i f i e s the a r e a a5 a v i t a l to (J.5. a n d t ~ u oq J o i n t C o a m a n d s t o r e s p o n d t o c r i s e s ; US
T h e U.S.

C e n t r a l Command a n d IJS R e a d i n e s s Command. interest.

strateqic

cotrmitwewt: c\nd c a p a h i l i t g ,

maI:.es a l l n a t i o n s

c o i i c ~ r I ~ ew di t h t:he r e g i o n more c a ~ i t i o u s , t h e r e b y c t a b i l i ; : i r i q the resion. Additionally, development of s t a b i l i z i n g the


the war harj a l s o a c c e l e r a t e d +.he

regii:)na1 c o l l e c t i v e sen..irit:!d1 t h e r e b y
hi].

F internally.

Throi.igh

the G u l f

C o o p e r a t i m C o u n c i l ( b e g u n i n r e s p c m 5 e t o the war a n d t o f e d r s of

the d c s t a b i 1 i : i n g

e f f e c t c3f

the I s l a m i c

r F . ? v o l u t i o n ) , the n i l t i c i n s o f the G u l f h a v e now (.:oiich..ict,o.J j o i n t defisnse e::err:isEs a n d o t h F r c o l l r i c t i v e actions.


T h e y h a w ? the appcirent. i n t e n t of
5F?ci..iri b5.j

C , ~ L I I I ~ F ?~ I- n q lr

r3n,

a n d k e e p i n g t h e C u ~ ~ c ? r ~ i ~ i out u e r s uf

t h e Ck11r:.

1-tI

t> = _ F .,

d ~ ? ~ , ~ e l o p r n ew n tosu l d i i o t hdve m c c u r r c d w i t h o u t t:hc Ir,in - . I ~ a u


war
~5

a i.inI f y i n q

Focu~:j.

F i n a l . 1 ~i~ t ha:

also c a u s e d

el

d i f f u 5 i o n of

the: u i l

oi..ikle+:!j i n t h e r . e g . i o n , r e d i . . i c i n q the v u 1 n e r a b l i t : r 0 . F t h e G u l f s o i l LClCc t.13 i n t e r d i c t i o n . Iran, S a u d i A r a b i a ? a ri d T u r k e y l


The' uiar ha= c;iusvd 11-a+,

t o b u i l d new o i l p i r ; e l i n e C
khe f2cd

f r o m the o i l f i e l d s t o p o r t s on .the M e d i t w - a n e a n ,
Sea,

a n d b e l o w t h e S t r d i t s o f Horniu::;

a l l outcidc2 t h e G u l f .

I t has a l s o m a d e d e f e n s e o f the o i l p o r t 5 i n s i d c ? h e G u l f o f vital i m p o r t a n c e i n t h e p l a n n i n g neiu f a c i l i t i e s a n d the


T h i s consti-i.ict~r.in i ! s

d e f e n s e a n d r e 5 t r u r : t ~ i r i n y o l d one*>.

d i f f i c u l t a n d e x p e n s i v e a t a t i n e wh en o i l r e v e n i . t e s a r e f a l l i n g , a n d w o u l d n o t : have t a k e n p1ac:e w i t:hou.t: the m a n i f e s t

threat: o f war.

T t l i s i s 1 , i k ~ l yto h a v e a l o n s term

s t a b i l i z i n s P f f e c t mi the export o f o i l f r m k h e r e g i o n ;

.far.

niore t h a n w o u l d h a v e occ:i.irrcd w i . t h o u t +:he war.


On the other tjancl,

t h e e n d o f +:he war w i l l l i k e l y
the? I r a n i a n Aving,

d e s t a b i l i z e the r e q i o n . blhen the war e n d s , which


i s conimitted

t o the ex t en .: i o n

of the r e v o l u t i o n ,
d

t r a i n e d i n b a t t lev a n d s u p p o r t e d by
p m l i c y o f s t a t e terrorism,

l a r g e l y unencunibered

w i l l b e f r e e t o meddle w h e r e v e r

i t chooses.

A 5

WAS

noted,

Khomeini c a n c a r r y

el

grcidse

10119

ti,rrler a n d is ~ . i n l i l : i ? l g t o f o r q e t t h a t the F e r r i i a n G u l f

n a 1: i t i n s , w i t h o u t e': c : e vt i o n , s u p p o r t e id I r ~
erid w i t h o u t :
Fr.)rces,
r7

( 4

C jtiou

1 d the war

ct1aii*3ei n I r a n i a n p o l i c i o c ,

thcr

I r a i i i c i i i Armed

i d e o l o s i c a l l y c o n m i t t e d a n d h a r d e n e d to war, c o i u l d
i m

have a d + ~ . s t a b i l i z i n a effect

t h e P e r s i a n Gcilt, Lcbanon,

a n d i n other a r e a s o f

Iranian interest. Iranian t.hreats

To t h i 5 n i ~ i s tb e d d d e d the i n f l u e n c e o f
a n d the p e r c e p t i o n of

power c x i t s i d e o f d i r e c t m i l i t a r y

action.

Ttle G u l f nc:tt:ions h a v e l e a r n e d I r a n is a n i m p l a c a b l e ,

d e . t a r n i i n e d enemy.

P o c t war I r a n i a n t h r e a t s w i l 1 ha~:e
a n d r e s ~ i l t a n t i n f l u e n c e o n tlle G u 1 F

t r e n i o n d o ~ i 5c r e d i b i l i t y ,

s t a 1: e s

.
IS

10.

P o s t War I r a n i a n Army
The p r e s e n t I r a n i a n militarg c a p a b i l i t y m a t c h e d by

i t s p o t e n t i a l f o r m i l i t a r y p o w e r growt:ti.

I t has t h e n a t i o n a l

will,

the m o t i v e , the o p p o r t u n i t y , a n d the c a p a b i l i t y , t o


power

become the doniinanl': r m g i o n a l

i n a qlob,illy

vital

=ires.

91

I r i i n i a n n a t i o n a l wi 1 1 , d e r n i o n s t r a t c + d b r i t 5 i n . t r a n s i i s c ? n c e arid .j.i-on r e s o l v e i n the f a c e o f eni3rnic)i.is d i t f ic:ull:ies,

is d o c x r r i e n t e d t.iy i t s war.t:into

p m - f o r m c ~ n i : , k ? CJVEI-

t h e l a s t si:: y e a r 5 .

I t has qeni.iine,

c r c d i t i l e r r m t i v e s to for s~ip~oo rf t Iraq

e : : e r c i s e its m i l i t a r y p o w e r :

retribution

d u r i n g the war a n d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 1~ rrtandated d o c t r i n a l j i h a d t o e x t e n d ttti:? I s l a m i c r e v o l u t i o n . e v i d e n t : i n I r a n s r:wG::imit!A g o v e r n m e n t s n f t h e hl.f .


Cippor.ti.ini

t g is

t o the r r t n n a r c h 1 a I a n d auti:)crert:ic

Tho5e g n v o r n r r ~ e n t s iirv vi.iliii?rdbl~:~t c )


s s s A c 5 i n a t. i t::n
I

i n sur q e n 1: *y an d t el- r or i sm , pa r t i c:1.1 1 r7 r 141

I r a n s p o t e n t i a l m i l i t a r y capability has thr.It.!


eltmentsi
F i , 3 j h t i n g poiour,

rc?vc!nue bast!, ,arid r n i l i k a r i l y

s i c i n i f i c a n t d e n o q r c i ~ h i c 5 . T h e f i q h t i n s r:iower

nf +:ti+!

Iranian

A r m y i s well d o c u n l e n t c d a n d the p o t e n t i a l
g r o w t h is e v i d e n t .

for. m i l i t a r y power

I f i t d e v e l o p e d a s o i r n d l . o s i s . t i ~ . : a l bast:?.
support,

or was c o n f i d e n t o f r e l i a b l e l o q i s t i c a l
have i.inparallt:led

i t cortlrl

poww i n the re3ion.

I r a n a1512 h a 5 a r e l i a b l e r e v e n u e bast2 i n i t s peti-olc~lrlri


prnrj;c.tion.
As w a s n o t e d ,

i t wa5 a b l e t o i n c : r e a s e ! Its
in spite of

wartime o i l p r o d u c t i o n t o the OPEC c e i l t n g ,


Iraqi actions.

F r e e d from wartirite c o s t s a n c l interruptions,

I r a n s r e v e n u e b a s e , ~ ~ u r c h a s i r ia gb i l i t y a n d l e g i t i n i , 3 t e f i n a n c i a l power w i l l incrcaEt?.

I t a l s o has a l a r g e a n d g r o w i n g m i l i t a r y malt? a(>e


population. of
As notc:.d i n e a r l i e r

tables,

i t has a ~ m F x i l a t i o n

app:)ro::imatel!j 45 n i l l i o n ,

o f which ro1.Iqhly TI1 r r i j l l i n n a r c


9;:

males b e t w e e n 15 a n d 25.

I r a n s p o p ~ i l a t i c i n groiuci a t a b o u t 3%
m i l i t a r y a g e males a r e

a n n ~ i a I 1 1 4 . Pi-it a n o k h c r
aclikd e v e r y y e a r .
combat e::per i e n c c

U I ~ L I b00,L100 ~

Plore t h a n 2 m i l l i o n nla1i.s

had railitary

tw the e n d o f 1984. T h i s w a s almost three


put

times a l l the o t h e r G u l f n a t i o n s
of

toget:hcr.

i i n l y 5oJ01000

these h a d c o m b a t e x p e r i e n c e l m~ostly I r a q i s .

In addition,

I r a n s l i t e r a c y r a t e o f 50:! i s t h e h i g h e s t i n t h e G u l t ,

next

to h u w a i t .

(Figi.irt:!E

riot l i s t e d i n T a b l e s 3.1,5., d n s 4 . 1
LC.

a r e f r o m T h e IntE?ri.i,:it i . o n a 1 I n c t i t u t e f o r S t r a t w
1959-1984 1
V.

Studies,

1J.S.
IJ. S.

Lonq T e r m S t r a t e g i e s .
lon5j term i n t e r e s t s drc s t i - a l q h t . f o r w a r d : re-establish

s t a b i l i z e the u i l F.rodi.tction, c ~ : ~ r i t a i n a e no tf Hriiuever,

the c o n t i n e n t a l
s k t e
t~rri3ri~ir1.

F h e S o v i e t Un on a n d c o i i n t e r

s t r a t e g i c , q O a l s r n o matter how s i i n p l g s t a t e d , do
up

n u t make

a strat.c.Jqcj.

The 1J.S.

can t a k e four steps t o

a c : h i c v e these l o n g term s t r a e q i c ~0.115. T h e i i i i t i a l s t e p w o u l d b e t o s u p p o r t the Gcil f C n o p e r a t i o n Coi..iiicil ( G C C ) . orvani::aton rt;!surgent T h i s c o l l e c t i v c securitq

has t h e p n t e n t i a l o f b a l a n c i r i q the p o w w o f a
a 5 we1 1 a s S o v i e t r e g i o n a l

Iran,

advt.?nt:i.irism.

S i n c e o n e of

the m o t i v a t i o n s f o r the d e v e l o p m e n t o t the! G C C


out of the G u l f l t h i s p o l i c y m u s t
p r e s e n c e i n the G u l f .

i s t o k e e p the SuFe!rpowers

n o t appear t o f o r j t e r greater U.S.

Mitt1 t h i s i n m i n d w e s h n u l d e n c o u r a q e the G C C s
eventual expansion to include Pakistan and Iraq.
A t soire

9K

fi.iti.irc time

i t w i l l a l s o be i n I r a n ' s i n t c r c ! s t

t:o

join,

in

or:) pi35 i t i o n

t 13 9ov i $2 t

6:'

: . : pan 5 i mi j

SRI

.
)

iT h i s i E n o t. w i t: t Imit
= I

p r e c e d e n t i rr~i.it:i.id e n e r r l i e s have o f t e n j o i n e d i n
i n d e f e n s i ? a s a i n s t a c.:omrr~on t h r e a t .

ccalition

Next s t e p is t o enr.:ourage
5t:rong

the GCC t o a d o p t

C o u n t e r - t a r r ~ o r i s t policy and c a p a b i l t y .
illel

This i s
coiintw-.;

c e r t a i n l y i n their b e s t i n t e r e s t a s
the p r i m a r y

1 aL;

OLII-L~,

Iranian poteiikial

t h r e a t , a n d w c u l d c.:ntlance G!'C

an i:J A r A b c:r e d i ti i 1 i t 'J a n d I e g i t I rr a c 9


Third* Iran's
1% tii

.
fiuusia i %
Ira11 m e t 1

mairitain c?nt.:!my,

=I

nun-a1 i g n r d IrL3n.
30

t:raditional

dnd

loris a=

ntLi1ns

AII

indepk!ndent
5c)i.i 1: h w r i r

f o r e i g n p o l ichj, she r7ct.s ds a b n l i o a r b t o !?r.Wiet


A I co ,
5 hoi.t 1 d

d e:: F a n 5 i on .

t hD

61.1 1f

pr CWF

r F! 1 I : i vc' 1,J

rc!sistant

t o 1 1 - a r i i ~ ~ ri. i i f l w n c e ,

I r a n mag t u r n i t v ; mil l t a r g
lran;

c a p a b i l i t y t o w a r d t h e i i m r c ' o b v i o u s danger t o I s l a i r , .\rid


r ess i on o f A f g h ~n t h e S o v i r? t o c TCI pa t i o n ~n t> c1 o p p
i 5 t L3 n

Finally,

i t i s a d v i s a b l e t o c o n c l u d e a defe!nse ti-c.a{:'j
she i s a t t : a c k e d by

w i t h I r a n i n the evt'nt: Such a t:reat:y


impose,
50

t h e S o v i e t Union.

c o r i l d c r m t a i n a n y r e s t r i c t i o n s I r a n i:hooses t o

l o n g a5 she w o u l d a c c e p t IJ.2.

l o g i s t i c a l suppnrt:

i n the e v e n t o f a g g r e s . ; i o n

by the S o v i e t : U n i o n . I r a n i a n rnilitary pottmtial

T h i s wo1.11d e x p l o i t the r e a l

t o our m11.1t~ia1 a d v a n t a g e w i t h o u t e n d a n g e r i n g the r w i o n .

It

w o u l d d l 5 0 b u t t r e s s the r e s i o n a s a i n s t S o v i e t e x ~ : a r 1 5 i o r i ~ p r o v i d e the US w i t h a s m a l l d@grc?e o f i n f 1Lierice


OL'G!I'

Iranian

p o l . i c 9 , a n d a 1 l c . 1 1 more ~ n o r m a l r e l a t i o n s a t a l a t e r tlatc?.

94

T h i s is a l s o n o t w i t h o u t p r e c e d e n t , a l t h o i r g h g i v e n t h e
a i i i n i o s i i t ? l of +:he pec:)pl.e o f aqreerrlent
IIIC!I.I~~

I r a n t o the U.S.,

~ L . I C : ~ Ia

tia\.r.! t o tie c o v e r t : .

However, 3 i v e n that: I r a r i

b o u g h t a r m from I s r a e l ,

i t s s w o r n enemyy Irari w i l l l i k e l y

a c l o p t a n1or? p r a g m w t i c : a p p r o a c h t o

i t s d e f e n s e when f a c e d

w i t h a S o v i e t tt1rea.l:.
I t i 5 a l s o worth n o t i n g t h a t I r a n s p o t e n t i a l
e a s i l y b e t u r n e d t r ) the S o v i e t V n i o n s a d v a n t c i y e ,

cncild a5
d5

t n the

acbantaqc nf

the U.S.

I t is i n o u r i n t e r e s t t o coopt I r a n ,
if

or k e e p i t n e u k r a l ,

on19 to p r e v e n t

ttle r e q i o n

truiri

f a J 1 i n y u n d e r Sovirit. i n f l u e n c e .

VI

Surriniarg

.
the

T h e I r a n i a n ar.w is a p n t e n t m i l i t a r y f o r c e u i t h p o t e n t i a l f o r c o n s i d c r a b l e growth i n r e a l power.


fornie?d i n a r e v o l u I i o n iutlich h a s
=I

I t . waE
WE

5ignific:ance

are

J L I E ~

beginins to understand.

T h e army h a s d i r e c t l y a n d i n d i r e c t l y

a l t e r e d the r e q i o n , + l a n d ~ t r a t e q i cb a l a n c e c f r)ower i n t h r P e r s i a n G u l f a n d h a s the p o t e n t i a l influence. f o r e v e n greater vital natural

T h e war. tdkes place i n a n area o f

r e s n ~ r c e sv~ nlatility, a n d the S o v i e t J n i o n .

a n d s t r a t e g i c i m p o r t a n c e t o the 1,J.S.

T h e war, the I r a n i a n arniy,

a n d the

revolut ion,

d e s e r v e greater s t ~ i d y

95

Sudan

PO.,

E " 0 . "

'.

Yemen
*S.M

97

9n

1 om

Slim,

S i r William. Irefeat McIracJ, In(:. l.%J

i n t o Victnrcr.

N e w Yorl:: D a v i d

V a n Crcve?1d , IYav t i n F i 83 ti k i r i g P o w e r : Germ.in M i 1 1 t: 3i-y P w r f o r m n n c e . I ~ l a s h i n q t o n . D. C . : O f f i c e o f N e w A c s e s s e m e n t , I k p a r t r r i e n t o f D e f e r i s ( ? , 1980.


VoIi

Clausewit-, Carl. (11. War. T r a n s l a t e d a n d e d i + e d by Michacl Howarlj a n d Peter P a r e t , P r i n c e t o n , New J e r c e y : P r i 11 c e t o n Un i v w 9 i t L I P r e55, 1984.

ZoIra, Yahya.

T h e Irrti..erial I r a n i a n Arnicl from C q r ~ 1 5toPahlavi, T c h r a n , I r a n : M i n i s t r y of Ci.iltcire a n d A r t s F r % e s s r 1971.

ART1 CLES

103

104

I FI IT I AL D IS~T'RIPIJTIClbl 1. IS'T
1.

2.

D w f e n s e Tw:tiiiical I n s t i t u t e I n f o r m a t i o n Center Cameron S t a t i o n A 1c? ::a n d r i a , L' i I- q i n i a 2 2 3 14

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.