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What is at stake if justice authorities decide to hack a computer system that is physically located on a server outside the territory of the state they represent for instance, because a malicious attack was operated from foreign territory, causing serious harm to a variety of computing systems? The article explores potential answers to this question, starting with a discussion of the makings of territorial jurisdiction. My starting point is an inquiry into the territorial spatiality of modern jurisdiction that traces the history of the idea of mutually exclusive jurisdiction that informs international law. I will argue that such territorial spatiality has been generated by the technologies of cartography and discuss how this connects with the notion of terror, with Bodins absolute sovereignty, and with Schmitts understanding of occupatio as central to territorial sovereign jurisdiction. Next, I investigate the powers of extraterritorial jurisdiction in the light of Grotiuss Mare Liberum. His natural law theory entails that the high seas be seen as a passage and a global commons that enable free trade and the common good of mutual collaboration between independent states. The eschatological overtones of Grotiuss belief in the moral and economic benets of free trade have been coined economic theology by Agamben, paraphrasing Schmitts political theology. We can detect a similar economic theology in early descriptions of the benets of cyberspace. This, nally, raises the question of the feasibility and the desirability of a cyberspace liberum, taking into account various attempts to gain control over parts of cyberspace for instance, by means of a so-called indirect extraterritorial effect. I conclude with the question of whether we can sustain cyberspace as a passage and as a global commons, considering its non-modern spatiality and keeping in mind how it engages with the landscape of territorial jurisdiction while often evading that jurisdictions core of mutually exclusive boundaries. Keywords: extraterritorial jurisdiction to enforce, cyberspace, Bodin, Schmitt, Grotius, Mare Liberum, cyber security, cybercrime

* Institute of Computing and Information Sciences (iCIS), Radboud University Nijmegen; Erasmus School of Law, Rotterdam; Centre for Law, Science, Technology & Society, Vrije Universiteit Brussel. An earlier version of this article was discussed at the workshop on Jurisdiction: Comparison, History, Theory, at the University of Toronto, June 2012. My thanks to Guyora Binder, Markus Dubber, Lindsay Farmer, Karen Knop, and Simon Stern for their comments. (2013) 63 UTLJ UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS
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What is at stake if our justice authorities decide to hack a computer system that is physically located on a server outside the territory of the state they represent for instance, because a Web bot was operated from that location,1 causing serious harm to a variety of computing systems in our own jurisdiction that renders the perpetrator criminally liable under our own criminal law? How would we respond to Ukrainian, Chinese, Iranian, British, or Argentinian justice authorities that hack a computer system that is located within our own jurisdiction? Does it make a difference whether the hack by law enforcement authorities targets a dissident whose right to free speech is denied or a network disseminating child pornography? Should we evaluate such groping for extraordinary jurisdiction in terms of just versus unjust causes (a bellum iustum privatum) or is this about the Westphalian interplay of internal and external sovereignty? Might the attempt to extend or initiate extraterritorial jurisdiction to enforce be understood as an occupatio, grounded in what some have termed a-legality,2 or should we follow the principles of Grotiuss Mare Liberum and consider cyberspace to be a common good that requires us to reinvent natural law theory? In the following, I start with a brief introduction on the move from computer crime to cybercrime, explaining how this connects to the notions of cyberspace and cybernetics (Part II). Next, I discuss sovereignty and the makings of territorial jurisdiction. This is achieved by eshing out the territorial spatiality of modern jurisdiction by tracing the history of mutually exclusive jurisdictions generated by the technologies of cartography; by tracking down the connection between terror and Bodins absolute sovereignty;3 and nally, by inquiring into the notion of

1 A bot is an automated software program that can execute certain commands when it receives a specic input (a ro-bot); see, sub verbo bot, online: <>. It can be used to search or crawl the Web to retrieve information. In the case of cybercrime, [a] zombie (also known as a bot) is a computer that a remote attacker has accessed and set up to forward transmissions (including spam and viruses) to other computers on the Internet. The purpose is usually either nancial gain or malice. Attackers typically exploit multiple computers to create a botnet, also known as a zombie army; bot, online: <http://searchsoa.>; see also, SearchSOA, sub verbo botnet, ibid; SearchMidMarketSecurity, sub verbo zombie, online: <>. 2 E.g. (based on Carl Schmitt) Hans Lindahl, A-Legality: Postnationalism and the Question of Legal Boundaries (2010) 73 Mod L Rev 30 [Lindahl]; Markus D Dubber, Common Civility: The Culture of Alegality in International Criminal Law (2011) 24 Leiden J Intl L 923 [Dubber]. 3 Jean Bodin, in Julian H Franklin, ed, Bodin: On Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) [rst published 1576] [Bodin]. (2013) 63 UTLJ UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS
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198 UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAW JOURNAL occupation as central to territorial sovereign jurisdiction (Part III). This prepares an inquiry into the powers of extraterritorial jurisdiction in the light of Grotiuss Mare Liberum, interpreting the freedom of the seas as an economic theology4 in the sense of Agamben and as a solution based on natural law theory (Part IV). Finally, I discuss the idea of a cyberspace liberum, beginning with the question of the experiential unregulability of cyberspace, following up with an account of various attempts to gain control over parts of cyberspace for instance, by means of the so-called indirect extraterritorial effect. I conclude with a question. Studying the implications of the use of extraterritorial search and seizures in cyberspace confronts us with the issue of spatiality. Cyberspaces demand a reconceptualization of jurisdiction in terms of novel spatialities. This means a critical stance toward cyberspace as a mere utopia and a rejection of cyberspace in the sense of a mere isotopia whose regulation can be framed on the regulation of territorial sovereignty and the freedom of the sea. The question is whether we can sustain cyberspace as a passage and a global commons even though cyberspace is a heterotopia,5 crossing over into the landscape of territorial jurisdiction while also evading its mutually exclusive boundaries. It would be preposterous to pretend that I can do more in this article than spell out the pertinence of this question (Part V). From computer crime to cybercrime


In the old days, one could speak of computer crime, conveniently discriminating between criminal offences against computers (hacking), offences with computers (a distributed denial of service attack DDOS), or offences whereby computers played an incidental role (for instance, storing the evidence).6 The exponential growth of the Internet, the World Wide Web, search engines, online gaming, and social networking sites and a host of applications for mobile devices has resulted in the integration of ofine and online life worlds, creating a continuity of cyberspaces that interconnect, transform, and redirect spaces, events, and time lines. This has not only changed our sense of place and duration; it has also altered

4 Giorgio Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of Economy and Government, translated by Lorenzo Chiesa & Matteo Mandarini (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011) [Agamben]. 5 On these terms, building on Foucault, see Julie E Cohen, Cyberspace as/and Space (2007) 107 Colum L Rev 210 at 213 [Cohen]. 6 Patricia L Bellia, Chasing Bits across Borders (2001) U Chicago Legal F 35 at 378, n 11. (2013) 63 UTLJ UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS
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the unity of time, place, and action that informed the notion of actus reus in the criminal law. Physical actions behind a computer screen can easily trigger devastating consequences in other time zones, on other continents, stretching the scope of what qualies as an action. Understanding an action in terms of its effects, even if they occur at a distance from the original physical motion, is not a new thing. People can act through various types of instruments and even use other people to commit fraud, murder, or criminal damage. In fact, this has led to the effects doctrine in the case of transnational crime: if criminal harm has been caused in the territory of a state, that state can punish the perpetrator even if she was outside the territory when committing the crime. For a long time, however, the default has been that the criminal law applies only to those within the territory of the state; extraterritorial jurisdiction has been the exception. This is even more clearly the case for jurisdiction to enforce. In the famous Lotus case, the Permanent Court of International Justice decided that extraterritorial jurisdiction to prescribe is allowed in the case of an effect within the territory or to a national of the state, whereas extraterritorial jurisdiction to enforce is, in principle, not allowed unless the other state agrees (by treaty or in the course of judicial or police cooperation).7 This prohibition is challenged by the emergent transnational cyberspace to the extent that the investigation of crimes committed with or against computing systems cannot restrict itself to local computing systems. The gradual shift towards cloud computing amplies this challenge.8 Meanwhile, the distinction between crimes with or against computers seems to miss the point, since the most salient factor in cybercrime is not a stand-alone computer but a networked computing system that is interconnected with other computing systems, RFID-tagged commodities,9 human implants, smart mobile devices, and smart homes. Attacks against these systems proliferate, vulnerabilities abound, malware is rened, reinvented, copied, and commodied and the number, the effects, and the gravity of cybercrime offences increase by the minute. The combination of

7 SS Lotus (France v Turkey Case) (1927), PCIJ (Ser A) No 10. 8 In that respect, the jurisdictional vacuum of cyberspace may resemble that of the high seas; cf. Steven R Swanson, Google Sets Sail: Ocean-Based Server Farms and International Law (2009) 43 Conn L Rev 709. 9 RFID tags are intelligent bar codes that can talk to a networked system to track every product that you put in your shopping cart . . . RFID tags, a technology once limited to tracking cattle, are tracking consumer products worldwide. Many manufacturers use the tags to track the location of each product they make from the time its made until its pulled off the shelf and tossed in a shopping cart. Outside the realm of retail merchandise, RFID tags are tracking vehicles, airline passengers, Alzheimers patients and pets; How RFID Works, online: HowStuffWorks <>. (2013) 63 UTLJ UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS
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200 UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAW JOURNAL simultaneity, speed, and automation of machine-to-machine communication in cyberspace produces the famous network effect that constitutes potentially critical threats to identity management systems (IDMs), personal data, trade secrets, and public infrastructure.10 One of the major software security companies, Symantec, reported more than 403 million unique variants of malware over 2011; worldwide around 1.1 million identities were exposed per data breach, amounting to a total of 232.4 million breaches. Vulnerabilities in mobile computers (smartphones) increased by 42% in 2011, while, in total, 4 989 new vulnerabilities were detected. Rustock, the largest botnet of 2010 had well over 1 million bots under its control; it was shut down in 2011 causing spam rates to plummet (from 88.5% of all e-mail in 2010 to 75.1% in 2011). In 2010, in an underground economy advertisement, 10 thousand bots (often used for DDOS attacks) were promoted for $15, whereas the price range for a stolen credit card number was between $0.07 and $100.11 Most of these types of attacks can be made from outside the territory of the targeted state, and even if an attack is initiated within the same state there is a high probability that computing systems outside that state will be somehow involved for instance, but not only, in the case of cloud computing. Instead of speaking of computer crime, it makes sense to use the term cybercrime, highlighting the fact that many of the relevant crimes take place in the realm of interconnected computing systems and are somehow related to both cyberspace and cybernetics.12 To understand the challenges to extraterritorial jurisdiction in the age of interconnected digital infrastructures, we need to explore, at least briey, the notions of cyberspace and cybernetics.
10 E.g. on the network effect for cybersecurity issues, Konstantin Beznosov and Olga Beznosova, On the Imbalance of the Security Problem Space and Its Expected Consequences (2007) 15 Information Management & Computer Security 420 at 429, doi:10.1108/09685220710831152. On network effects and its relevance for law, see e. g. Katherine J Strandburg et al., Law and the Science of Networks: An Overview and an Application to the Patent Explosion (2006) 21 Berkeley Tech LJ 1294. 11 Symantec Enterprise Security, Trends for 2012 (2011) 16 Internet Security Threat Report, online: Symantec < 21182883_GA_REPORT_ISTR_Main-Report_04-11_HI-RES.pdf>; Symantec Enterprise Security, 2011 Trends (2012) 17 Internet Security Threat Report, online: Symantec <>. 12 In principle, the present article restricts itself to criminal jurisdiction to enforce, though we must admit that the distinction between crime and war will require hard work in cyberspace. On espionage and foreign intelligence, see e.g. David E Sanger, Obama Ordered Wave of Cyberattacks against Iran The New York Times (1 June 2012), online: NYTimes < obama-ordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html>. On cyberterrorism, see Kelly Gable, Cyber-Apocalypse Now: Securing the Internet against Cyberterrorism and Using Universal Jurisdiction as a Deterrent (2009) SSRN Working Papers Series, online: SSRN <>. (2013) 63 UTLJ UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS
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The term cyperspace was coined by science ction author William Gibson, in 1984, in his novel Neuromancer. He describes it as
[a] consensual hallucination experienced daily by billions of legitimate operators, in every nation, by children being taught mathematical concepts . . . A graphical representation of data abstracted from the banks of every computer in the human system. Unthinkable complexity. Lines of light ranged in the nonspace of the mind, clusters and constellations of data.13

We should note that Gibson coined the term before anything like what we now call cyberspace existed. In fact, the Internet, the interconnection between different computing systems on the basis of the TCP/IP protocol, was still under construction when he published his novel. The World Wide Web originated even later, in the early nineties, on the basis of the http and html protocols that enable hyperlinking, thus creating what is often called a virtual space in which humans and machines from anywhere can communicate, exchange information, and present themselves any time anywhere to anyone. The unprecedented collapse of geographical and temporal distance that was generated by the Internet and Web created the euphoria of cyber-utopianism and cyber-exceptionalism. The idea was that cyberspace allowed for a new type of direct democracy, outside the reach of territorial governments or commercial enterprise. In 1996, John Perry Barlow published his cyberspace manifesto,14 claiming that cyberspace was inherently unregulable that its technological foundations resisted territorial boundaries and thus disabled law enforcement based on a physical monopoly of violence. In the wake of such optimism, Castells announced the demise of the nation state, still based on mutually exclusive jurisdictions, suggesting that territorial states are like dinosaurs in the evolving network society.15 Legal scholarship developed along similar lines: also in 1996, David R Johnson and David B Post wrote their famous Law and Borders The Rise of Law in Cyberspace,16 arguing that Cyberspace is a distinct, separate space where geographical borders and territorial jurisdiction make no sense. They explain that cyberspace is not a physical space and therefore does not fall under the powers of sovereigns whose control is limited to
13 William Gibson, Neuromancer (New York: Ace, 1984) at 51. 14 John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace (Davos, Switzerland: 1996), online: < barlow_0296.declaration>. 15 Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996); Jan Van Dijk, The Network Society: Social Aspects of New Media, 2d ed (London: Sage, 2006). 16 David R Johnson & David B Post, Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in Cyberspace (1996) 48 Stan L Rev 1367. (2013) 63 UTLJ UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS
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202 UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAW JOURNAL whoever and whatever stays within their territory; they go on to point out that, in cyberspace, the assumption that the effects of any particular behaviour are restricted by physical proximity does not hold. They suggest that such proximity informed the legitimacy of territorial government, notably because these physical constraints allow governments to give notice of a change in the law. They proclaim,
Because events on the Net occur everywhere but nowhere in particular, are engaged in by online personae who are both real (possessing reputations, able to perform services, and deploy intellectual assets) and intangible (not necessarily or traceably tied to any particular person in the physical sense), and concern things (messages, database, standing relationships) that are not necessarily separated from one another by any physical boundaries, no physical jurisdiction has a more compelling claim than any other to subject these events exclusively to its laws.17

In Cyberspace as/and Space, Julie Cohen traces the various positions on what she calls the cyberspace metaphor.18 She discusses Johnson and Posts cyber-exceptionalism, various types of traditionalism that view cyberspace as just another communications network, postmodernist cultural studies that claim to uncover undesirable political and ideological implications, and nally she considers the cognitive theory that proclaims the inevitability of place- and space-based metaphors, as dictated by our cognitive make-up. Cohen, however, rejects the easy dichotomies between cyber- and physical space that inform much of the debate. She notes that
To say that humans reason spatially is not to say that we are place-bound, or property-bound, but simply to say that we are embodied, situated beings, who comprehend even disembodied communications through the lter of embodied, situated experience.19

Her point is that understanding cyberspace as either a separate space (often a utopia) or a space that continues existing space (an isotopia) are two easy ways out of a far more complex challenge. Referring to Foucaults term heterotopia, she denotes cyberspaces as real spaces in which ordinary rules of behaviour may be suspended or transformed as compared to ordinary spaces, thus highlighting the relation between cyber- and ordinary spaces as well as the embodied spatiality of cyberspace users, who are situated in both spaces at once.20 She concludes

17 18 19 20

Ibid at 1376. Cohen, supra note 5. Ibid at 213. Ibid at 2145, referring to Michel Foucault, Of Other Spaces (1986) 16 Diacritics 22 at 22; Kevin Hetherrington, The Badlands of Modernity: Heteropia and Social Ordering (London: Routledge, 1997) 2038.
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that utopian theories of cyberspace as an entirely separated space fail not because of their unregulability but because of the untenable presumption of experiential separateness. In this way, she goes one radical step further than Lessig and Reidenberg, who, according to Cohen, demonstrated that the unregulability of cyberspace was neither a permanent nor a technologically necessary feature.21 In opting for a heterotopian conception of cyberspace, Cohen acknowledges both the malleability of cyberspace and the fact that such malleability can be made to serve the economic and political goals of businesses as well as governments.22 In foregrounding the embodied spatiality of cyberspace users, she can, moreover, come to terms with the fact that cyberspace is not a unitary phenomenon but a rich variety of entanglements between virtual and physical spaces that are real to the extent that they generate real consequences. Cybercrime, from this point of view, is a unitary concept for a diversity of criminal offences that play out on the nexus of the Internet, the Web, and a plethora of applications that generate real consequences for legal subjects across a multiplicity of national jurisdictions. Geography and territory seem to loose their hold on the effects of malicious attacks due to the unprecedented possibilities for the invisible remote control of computing systems.

This explains the relevance of the notion of cybernetics, which derives from the same Greek root as governing, both meaning to steer, rule, guide.23 Cybernetics refers to the study of control at a distance and was coined as such by Norbert Wiener in 1948.24 It concerns the use of technologies to affect the behaviours of remote systems and is closely related to the development of articial intelligence. It is important to observe that cyberspaces situated at the nexus of online and ofine life-worlds are built on a computational layer that produces sophisticated articial intelligence for business enterprises and governmental agencies. In both cases, algorithms are used to mine so-called big data to predict
21 Ibid at 217, referring to Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (New York: Basic, 1999); Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules through Technology (1998) 76 Tex L Rev 553. 22 Ibid at 222. 23 Online Etymology Dictionary, sub verbo cybernetics, online: <http://www.etymonline. com/index.php?term=cybernetics>[OnlineEtymology]. 24 Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics: Or the Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine, 2d ed (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1965). For an interesting overview of cybernetics and articial intelligence, see N Katherine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1999). (2013) 63 UTLJ UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS
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204 UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAW JOURNAL consumer or criminal behaviours, aiming to pre-empt human intention on the basis of proling technologies such as machine learning, articial neural networks, and the more.25 Cyberspace is not merely a place where registration is becoming paramount, pervasive, and highly protable. Increasingly, it is becoming a space rooted in a layer of automated decision-making systems. These computational layers enable and inform all kinds of remote control, which are not only used to create added value for the industry or to uncover criminal networks; they also underpin malicious attacks against both individual netizens and private and public organizations. The increasing use of tracking technologies to enable data analytics produces a host of novel vulnerabilities that enable misuse, abuse, and attacks against individuals, systems, and infrastructure. The fact that the Internet facilitates remote control across national borders at low costs basically means that the fundamental assumptions of territorial criminal jurisdiction will increasingly fail to describe accurately what is at stake. This presents an intriguing challenge to the territorial basis of internal and external sovereignty as we know it. Sovereignty and the makings of territorial jurisdiction


At this point, we need to be reminded that the interplay of internal and external sovereignty that denes the modern state is not only constitutive for the power to enact, to enforce, and to speak the law within a specic territory. It is also a condition of possibility for the protection of human rights and for the internal division of sovereignty that denes the rule of law. Such protection depends on the monopoly of violence within a specic jurisdiction that enables enforcing the law as determined by the courts. Though Montesquieu is rightly applauded for having argued for the internal division of sovereignty,26 it is imperative that we acknowledge that, without such sovereignty, there is nothing to divide. Without some form of sovereignty as we know it, there is no actor that can be addressed as the subject of the negative and positive obligations that

25 Andrew McStay, The Mood of Information: A Critique of Online Behavioural Advertising (New York: Continuum, 2011) at 3. McStay indicates how proactive computing allows for the pre-empt of users intention by always remaining one step ahead of them on the bases of machine learning techniques. This is how behavioural advertising works today. For a critique of such predictive analytics in the sphere of the criminal law see Bernard E Harcourt, Against Prediction: Proling, Policing, and Punishing in an Actuarial Age (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2007). 26 See, for an unconventional but convincing interpretation of his maxim on the judge as a bouche de la loi, KM Schoenfeld, Rex, Lex et Judex: Montesquieu and la Bouche de la Loi Revisited (2008) 4 European Constitutional Law Review 274. (2013) 63 UTLJ UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS
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constitute human rights law. If territory loses its dening role in constituting jurisdiction we cannot take for granted that such historical artefacts as human rights and the rule of law will be sustainable. We should admit that even the enforcement of international human rights law depends on national courts and national enforcement.27 To come to terms with the consequences of a post-territorial spatiality, we need to inquire into the specic makings of jurisdiction in the era of territory. To this end, I will investigate the rise of territorial jurisdiction and its relation to modern cartography and then analyse terror, territory, and occupation as the foundations of modern sovereignty.

Jurisdiction is a term rst encountered in the early fourteenth century, initially referring to the administration of justice and soon meaning extent or range of administrative power.28 The term territory rst appeared in the early fteenth century, then meaning land under the jurisdiction of a town, state, etc.29 Thus jurisdiction is the older term and territory was initially dened in terms of jurisdiction. This suggests that jurisdiction need not be based on territorial rule and that the concepts of sovereignty and of territory, dening characteristics of jurisdiction, emerged simultaneously in modern history. In Laws Territory (A History of Jurisdiction), Richard Ford develops two theses on the history and scope of territorial jurisdiction.30 One thesis is that territorial jurisdictions, the rigidly mapped territories within which formally dened legal powers are exercised by formally organized governmental institutions,31 are a recent invention, even though we tend to take them for granted and have problems imagining jurisdiction that is not dened by territory. The second thesis is that territorial jurisdiction is an affordance of modern cartography,32 in the sense that it could not have developed

27 This is why the study of international relations cannot assume the balance of power that inheres in the rule of law, frequently taking refuge in a social scientic often called realist understanding of international law. A refreshing alternative can be found in Claude Lefort, Writing: The Political Test, translated by David Ames Curtis (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000). 28 Online Etymology, supra note 23, sub verbo jurisdiction, quoting OED Online. 29 Ibid, sub verbo territory. 30 Richard T Ford, A History of Jurisdiction (1999) 97 Mich L Rev 843 [Ford]. 31 Ibid at 843. 32 On the role of cartography in the formation of the modern state, see also Michael Biggs, Putting the State on the Map: Cartography, Territory, and European State Formation (1999) 41 Comparative Studies in Society and History 374. Mark Neocleous, Off the Map on Violence and Cartography (2003) 6 European Journal of Social Theory 409. (2013) 63 UTLJ UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS
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206 UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAW JOURNAL without the modern, scientic demarcation of distinct territories that depends on cartography as its enabling technology.33 This observation is of great import for our investigation because, if correct, it raises the question of whether cyberspace will overrule the specic production of space that is inherent in cartographic mappings and its affordances in terms of territorial jurisdiction. Ford highlights four prototypical characteristics of modern, territorial jurisdiction: rst, he conrms that, if jurisdiction is territorially dened, this means that authority is to be exercised primarily by area, instead of status or family; second, he notes that territorial jurisdiction is denitely bounded and that these boundaries are not ambiguous or contested (except in times of crisis or transition); third, he notes that territory is abstractly and homogeneously conceived, meaning that jurisdiction refers to an abstract space in the sense that the authority does not depend on the concrete characteristics of the territory it concerns. Ford points out that such abstract and homogeneous mapping implies authority over an empty space, dened by latitude and longitude, not by its contingent contents. As a result such mapping eliminates the need for the specic enumeration and classication of whatever resides in the territory, at least for the constitution of authority.34 A related implication is that actual social relations and the distribution of resources are invisible from the perspective of the abstract map; the abstraction of modern jurisdiction presents social and political relationships as impersonal. One could sum this up as the proposition that modern jurisdictional space is conceptually empty: jurisdiction reduces space to an empty vessel for government power.35 His fourth point is that cartographic mapping produces a gapless map of contiguous political territories,36 thus grounding the Westphalian system of

33 The concept of an affordance was coined by psychologist James J Gibson. See James G Greeno, Gibsons Affordances (1994) 101 Psychological Review 336 at 338: The term affordance refers to whatever it is about the environment that contributes to the kind of interaction that occurs. It thus indicates what a specic technology makes possible for a specic organism or type of person, entailing a non-deterministic and relational understanding of both technology and the human subject. This implies that technologies have normative implications; see Mireille Hildebrandt, Legal and Technological Normativity: More (and Less) Than Twin Sisters (2008) 12:3 Techn 169. 34 Ford, supra note 30 at 854 [emphasis in the original]. 35 Ibid at 854. The notion of mutually exclusive territorial jurisdictions as the enabling metaphor for the Westphalian system describes a way of looking at jurisdiction. It creates the institutional fact of internal and external sovereignty. Compare Friedrich Kratochwil, Of Maps, Law, and Politics: An Inquiry into the Changing Meaning of Territoriality (2011) [Danish Institute for International Studies Working Paper]. Kratochwil notes the fuzzy reality and the many countervailing claims made against the unitary and monopolistic tendencies of the Westphalian system, already from its inception. 36 Ford, supra note 30 at 854. (2013) 63 UTLJ UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS
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mutually exclusive territorial jurisdictions. Ford goes on to explain that territorial jurisdictions are inherently synthetic (articial) to the extent that they do not depend on an organically grown Gemeinschaft; they stipulate who falls within the scope of the jurisdiction irrespective of social status or family relationship. In this way, the individual becomes the primary agent, instead of the religious, ethnic, or other group she may belong to. This allows governments to base their rule on a strange combination of articial administrative units and an appeal to the loyalties of a thicker community, which is not given and must be constructed. In short, Fords history of modern jurisdiction demonstrates that [t]he abstract space created by modern cartography, what we will call territorial jurisdiction, was the midwife of the administrative state.37

In The Ethos of Pluralization,38 William E Connolly discusses the notion of territory in a way that seems remarkably relevant for our purpose. The following passage is worth quoting at length:
Territory, the Oxford English Dictionary says, is presumed by most moderns to derive from terra. Terra means land, earth, soil, nourishment, sustenance; it conveys the sense of a sustaining medium that fades off into indeniteness. People, you might say, feel the claim the land they belong to makes upon them. This experience of belonging to a place, as long as it does not exclude other identications, and as long as it incorporates the disruptive experiences of earthquakes, tornadoes, oods, and restorms into the experience itself (this essay is being written during a year in California), can play a positive role in the cultivation of care and critical responsiveness. But the form of the word territory, the OED says, suggests something different from the sustenance of terra. Territory derives from terrere, meaning to frighten, to terrorize, to exclude. And territorium is a place from which people are warned. Territorium seems to repress the sustaining relation to land that it presupposes. Perhaps a modern territory, then, is land organized and bounded by technical juridical, and military means. Perhaps the experience of land as sustenance is both presupposed and repressed by the modern organization of territory. To occupy territory, then, is both to receive sustenance and to exercise violence. To become territorialized is to be occupied by a particular identity.39

37 Ibid at 870. 38 William E Connolly, Introduction The Ethos of Pluralization (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995) xi at xxii; citing OED, sub verbo territory [emphasis in the original] [Connolly]. 39 Ibid at xxii. (2013) 63 UTLJ UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS
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208 UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAW JOURNAL We could summarize Connolly as proposing that territory is sustaining land occupied and bounded by violence.40 I would like to suggest that this links territorial jurisdiction to the monopoly of violence and claim that the territorial monopoly of violence is the foundation of the modern state. It provides a gapless map of mutually exclusive sovereign entities that denes and determines their internal and external sovereignty since the peace of Westphalia. This gapless map also underlies Bodins triple denition of absolute power that still informs our understanding of sovereignty, even when we confront its limits.41 The impact of Bodins On Sovereignty (1576) warrants a brief discussion here, linking notions of territory with those of occupation and a-legality. As Goyard-Fabre has argued,42 Bodin should not be understood as an advocate of corrupt absolutism. His main concern was the protection of the res publica, which he thought could only be safeguarded if the sovereign could not be corrupted by other powers within his realm. The sovereign should not be seen as the most powerful person, but as the highest ofce, tasked with the safety and the well-being of his subjects. Bodin articulated three constitutive conditions for such sovereignty: the puissance publique de commandement, the continuit de la puissance publique, and the puissance absolue. The rst marks the transition from suzereignty feudal lordship based on a complex asymmetrical reciprocity to sovereignty. The public power to command implies a unilateral public competence to enact laws that bind the subjects; the validity of the law does not depend on the consent of those to whom it applies. This entails a transition from jurisdiction that is mainly based on adjudication to one rmly grounded in legislation.43 The second marks the transition from rule by man to rule by law, from the military or economic power of a person to the institutional authority of an abstract sovereign. The continuity of the public power is thereby constituted, generating a type of legal certainty that transcends the arbitrary power of the king as a person. This conforms the position taken by Kantorowicz in his The Kings Two Bodies44 that explain sovereignty as an abstract institution that is capable of surviving the death of whoever happens to full the role of the king. The fact that sovereign power does not depend on the person of the king, nor on the contingent
40 Ibid at xxii. 41 Bodin, supra note 3, bk 1, ch 10 (On the True Marks). 42 Simone Goyard-Fabre, Jean Bodin et le droit de la Rpublique (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1989) [Goyard-Fabre]. 43 On the shift from adjudication to legislation as the core of jurisdiction, see Harold Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), e.g. at 4045. 44 Ernst H Kantorowicz, The Kings Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957). (2013) 63 UTLJ UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS
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consent of his subjects is seen here as a protection against arbitrary rule and as a particular type of legal certainty that is not available in the negotiations that nourish feudal suzereignty. Finally, the third condition marks the transition from a system of interdependent lords and overlords that requires permanent military and economic struggle, to a centralized hierarchical distribution of authority that guarantees the independence of the sovereign from his subjects and towards his fellow sovereigns. Absolute power denes the independence of the sovereign, but for Bodin, it did not imply that the sovereign can rule according to le bon plaisir du prince. He is still bound by les lois divines et naturelles; les lois fundamentales du royaume et le respect du droit de proprit.45 This entails that the sovereign has absolute power but is still bound by laws; for Bodin, this tension within his concept of sovereignty was not a problem. The king had to give an account of his actions to God, which was a much more powerful constraint than the contingent opinion of his subjects. It seems that the role of territory in jurisdiction emerged from the simultaneous appearance of a particular technology and the birth of the abstract sovereign state, based on an effective territorial monopoly of violence. As explained above, Connolly proposes that territory is sustaining land occupied and bounded by violence.46 To the extent that jurisdiction is territorial, the making of jurisdiction would be a matter of occupation: the taking of land is part of establishing sovereign jurisdiction. Occupation in this particular case must be understood as the process of terrorizing both the inhabitants (internal sovereignty) and the rulers of other lands (external sovereignty). Terrorizing then has the double meaning of ruling by means of the threat of terror and protecting those within the territory against threats of terror by their fellows (criminal law) or by the rulers of other lands (law of war). Terror refers to the monopolies of violence that prevail within mutually exclusive territories.

In his Political Theology, Carl Schmitt argues that sovereign is he who decides on the exception.47 He nds that the precondition as well as the content of jurisdictional competence in such a case [of extreme emergency] must necessarily be unlimited.48 Schmitt refers to Bodins understanding of sovereignty as indivisible, thus according to Schmitt nally settling the question of power in the state. This relates to Bodins
45 Goyard-Fabre, supra note 42 at 1623. 46 Connolly, supra note 38 at xxii. 47 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2005) [Schmitt, Political Theology]. 48 Ibid at 7. (2013) 63 UTLJ UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS
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210 UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAW JOURNAL answer to the question of whether the sovereign is bound by natural or divine laws in a case of emergency.49 Bodin nds that, in cases of urgent necessity, the sovereign must take the law into his own hands instead of becoming dependent upon whatever other powers within the state think. In the end, sovereignty resides in the authority to suspend valid law. Such authority is deemed even more fundamental than (and as a precondition for) the authority to command new laws. The decision on the exception is, in fact, an occupatio that reduces the territory to a res nullius that is taken by the sovereign on the basis of his factual dominion. Schmitt explains the emergence of a new political order at the end of the middle ages, created by the constitution of the territorial state:
First, it created clear internal jurisdictions by placing feudal, territorial, estate, and church rights under the centralized legislation, administration, and judiciary of a territorial ruler. Second it ended the European civil war of churches and religious parties, and thereby neutralized creedal conicts within the state through a centralized political unity . . . Third, on the basis of the internal political unity the state achieved vis--vis other political unities, it constituted within and of itself a closed area with xed borders, allowing a specic type of foreign relations with other similarly organized territorial orders.50

This new territorial legal order derives from the initial a-legal occupation that precedes the institution of legality. In his discussion of nomos (Greek for law), Schmitt reminds the reader of its rst meaning, that he asserts to be to take or to appropriate, whereas the second would be to divide or distribute: the division and distribution, i.e., the suum cuique, presuppose the appropriation of what is to be distributed, i.e. and occupatio or appropriatio primaeva.51 To give, to enact the law, the competence to make jurisdiction must rst be occupied, conquered, and according to Schmitt even Kant admitted that acquisition of land precedes rule by law.52 By implication, such occupation must be a-legal, since it precedes as well as constitutes a legal order.53

Extraterritorial jurisdiction in the light of Grotiuss Mare Liberum

At one point during his discussions on the primacy of occupatio, Schmitt arrives at the distinction between the surfaces of rm land and free sea,
49 Ibid at 8, referring to Bodin, supra note 3, bk 1, ch 10 (On the True Marks). 50 Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum (New York: Telos Press, 2006) at 1289 [Schmitt, Nomos]. 51 Ibid at 326, note 6. 52 Ibid at 328. 53 On a-legality, see Dubber, supra note 2; Lindahl, supra note 2. (2013) 63 UTLJ UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS
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which was important for the distinction between land war and sea war. Each had its own concepts of enemy, war, and plunder.54 This refers to the different jurisdiction that applies to the free sea as compared to that of occupied territories. Schmitt explains that the legal regime that rules the mare liberum has major consequences for the relationships between territorial states that meet outside their territories on the high seas; the abstract cartographic order that determines sovereignty in the spatial order of rm land is absent at sea. Noting Julie Cohens depiction of cyberspace as/and space, it may be of interest to look more closely into the non-territorial jurisdiction of the high sea. Julie Cohen proposes that [t]o understand cyberspaces spatiality, one must disentangle the concept of experienced spatiality from abstract, conceptual models of space, and also from the related but distinct concepts of place and property.55 In this section, I will tease out the manner in which the humanist legal scholar Grotius disentangled the spatiality of the high seas from the concepts of place and property. He said that the sea, as a res communis, is distinct from both private and public property. Basically he claimed that the sea may be a res nullius, but not one that due to its experiential unruliness lends itself to any kind of occupation. Grotius depicted the high seas as a passage, instead of a place, and a common good instead of a private or public property. In his Mare Liberum (1608) Grotius contested the monopolist claims of Spain and Portugal on parts of the high seas,56 which they aimed to appropriate as part of their trade route to South and South-East Asia. Grotius, who was asked to defend free trade on the high seas in order to safeguard the interests of the Dutch Republic, argued that the high seas cannot be appropriated. While land was occupied, divided and distributed, the sea remained open to all. Whereas lands turned into territory, the sea remained outside the grasp of territorial sovereignty. It was considered as part of a different spatiality, not portioned into mutually exclusive jurisdictions but left to the rights and obligations of Grotiuss natural law, the same natural law that obligated people before they concluded the social contract that constituted their territorial sovereign.57
54 Schmitt, Nomos, supra note 50 at 184. 55 Cohen, supra note 5 at 227. 56 Hugo Grotius, The Freedom of the Sea, translated and revised by Ralph Van Deman Magofn (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Oxford University Press, 1960) [rst published 1688] [Grotius], online: (2008) The Marsi and Clefrin Frelock Book Series < Grotius_Hugo_The_Freedom_of_the_Sea_%28v1.0%29.pdf>. 57 Natural law is an essentially contested concept that might mean anything to anyone. For a view on Grotiuss engagement with natural law, see Jon Miller, Hugo Grotius in Edward N Zalta, ed, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, online: (Fall 2011) Stanford (2013) 63 UTLJ UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS
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212 UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAW JOURNAL Remaining outside the realm of sovereignty, his law of the sea must also be distinguished from his other radical invention: the laws of war that constitute the rules for a ius ad bellum (the rules for determining what makes for a just cause) and the ius in bello (the rules for the conduct of warring states irrespective of whether their cause is just or not).

In the introductory note to the English translation of Mare Liberum, James Brown Scott refers to the famous Latin tractate of Grotius as proclaiming, explaining, and in no small measure making the freedom of the seas.58 This highlights the constructive as well as performative nature of jurisdiction at sea. According to Johannes Thumfart, Grotius uses the text to put forward his normative ideals of global free trade, including those of equality, reciprocity and private responsibility, thus, for instance, inuencing the father of the idea of the invisible hand of political economy, Adam Smith.59 Thumfart detects a theological undercurrent in Grotiuss treatise that he shares with and took from the Spanish Dominican, Francisco de Vitoria, who defended free trade as implicit in the Christian mission. Thumfart suggests that both assume a historicoteleological tendency inherent in global free trade, such that the purpose of free trade is to unite the world in peace.60 He nds that this eschatological understanding of global free trade ts what Agamben calls an economic theology and, mutatis mutandis, Schmitts political theology.61 It entails that theological notions such as salvation be transformed so as to survive in the secular era, while still producing expectations and legitimizations that derive from their discarded theological roots. In the case of the freedom of the seas, this eschatological notion of salvation by means of global free trade provided legitimacy for the Dutch trading company, the Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie to secure its trading expeditions by military means, which also included preemptive strikes.62 We may notice that, in the struggle for a free Internet, various stakeholders come up with very similar arguments, based on the idea that a free Internet will automatically bring salvation for

58 59 60 61 62

Encyclopedia of Philosophy < grotius/>. James Brown Scott, Introductory Note, in Grotius, supra note 56, v at v. Johannes Thumfart, On Grotiuss Mare Liberum and Vitorias De Indis, Following Agamben and Schmitt (2009) 30 Grotiana 65 at 68 [Thumfart]. Ibid at 69. Agamben, supra note 4; Schmitt, Political Theology, supra note 47. Thumfart, supra note 59 at 70.
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oppressed people outside the West.63 We will return to this point later. For now, it seems interesting to trace Grotiuss argument for the freedom of the sea, since it legitimizes what he termed a bellum iustum privatum, paraphrasing what the VOC had called coophandel met force (trade supported by the force of arms).64 If cyberspace, like the high seas, is structured as a spatiality different from that of the territorial state, some of Grotiuss arguments may be relevant for the extraterritorial jurisdiction to enforce in cyberspace.

Apart from making the freedom of the seas, Grotius was one of the founding fathers of natural law theory, opening his tractate with a dedication that posits a fundamental difference between things that are to be enjoyed in common with all men and things that belong distinctly and exclusively to one individual. This difference is based on the nature of things as created by God and inscribed in the minds of men and this rules out the possibility that this could be a matter of convention or opinion. In the rst chapter, Grotius claims that
every nation is free to travel to every other nation, and to trade with it . . . So by the decree of divine justice it was brought about that one people should supply the needs of another, in order, as Pliny the Roman writer says, that in this way, whatever has been produced anywhere should seem to have been destined for all.65

From this, Grotius concludes that trading routes especially those over seas should be free for all to use. In the fth chapter, Grotius argues that sovereign nations cannot gain property or sovereignty over parts of the high sea by means of occupation. He explains that the sea is often framed as having the legal status of a res nullius, a res communis, or a res publica. His point, however, is that the high seas fall within the scope of natural law, and he claims that nature of itself knows no exclusive rights such as sovereignty or private property. The emergence of private property originates in an act of occupation, mostly of things formerly held in common. On the one hand, this act of occupation was initiated
63 Compare Evgeny Morozov, The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom (New York: Public Affairs, 2011); Jack Goldsmith & Tim Wu, Who Controls the Internet? Illusions of a Borderless World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) [Goldsmith & Wu]; Milton Mueller, The New Cyber-Conservatism: Goldsmith/Wu and the Premature Triumphalism of the Territorial Nation-State A Review of Goldsmith and Wus Who Controls the Internet? Illusions of a Borderless World (2006) Internet Governance Project (Paper IGP06-003) [Mueller, Review], online: IGP < pdf/MM-goldsmithWu.pdf>. 64 Thumfart, supra note 59 at 76. 65 Grotius, supra note 56 at 7, ch 8. (2013) 63 UTLJ UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS
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214 UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAW JOURNAL by individuals and resulted in private property; on the other hand, states began to occupy certain territories and that resulted in public property. He concludes that all property has arisen from occupation and that nonrivalrous goods cannot and should not be occupied, since nature has clearly meant to exclude exclusive rights to such goods.66 He refers to sun, air, and waves as incapable of becoming private property and calls them public gifts. This means that the seas are common to all men, rst because they cannot be occupied and second because they have been marked out for common use. He continues to argue that, whatever cannot become individual private property also cannot become the public property of a state, since this would exclude parts of what he calls the human race from enjoying the common use of these goods. It seems that Grotiuss hidden assumption is that the experiential spatiality of land though originally used as a common good lends itself to occupation, division, and distribution as private or public property, whereas the experiential spatiality of the outer sea does not lend itself to such compartmentalization. This claim was countered in 1652 by John Selden in his Mare Clausum,67 who advocated the British claims to jurisdiction over the high seas surrounding the isles. Lets note that Grotius views the spatiality of the outer sea as a passage, a route to conduct trade and to travel between different nations. He argues that even over land which had been converted into private property either by states or individuals, unarmed and innocent passage is not justly to be denied to persons of any country, exactly as the right to drink from a river is not to be denied.68 Grotius thus claims that even territorialized lands retain the spatiality of a passage. The difference with the high seas seems to be that its spatiality is exhausted by the metaphor of the passage, as, according to Grotius, they are not conducive to occupation and distribution. His freedom of the sea is grounded in the sea as an in-between, a connection, a passage from one nation to another, the precondition for the global free trade that will achieve global peace and well-being according to the economic theology of the laws of nature. The fact that Grotiuss vision won out over Seldens attempted refutation was not obvious; it is a
66 Ibid at 27. Grotius often mingles is and ought, one of analytical philosophys mortal sins. If the sea cannot be appropriated, it makes no sense to discuss whether it should be so. If it should not be appropriated, we assume that it can be so. There is logic in this, but perhaps reality is more fuzzy and more complex. In some ways, you probably could not occupy the seas at that point in time, while in other ways you could (the Spanish and the Portuguese did, in their way). In that sense can and should are interdependent when making an institutional fact like jurisdiction. 67 John Selden & Marchamont Nedham, Of the Dominion, Or, Ownership of the Sea, reprint of 1st ed in English (New Jersey: The Lawbook Exchange, 2004). 68 Grotius, supra note 56 at 434. (2013) 63 UTLJ UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS
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prime example of the making of a special type of jurisdiction that seems to defy the logic of occupation. Attempts to achieve some form of command over the commons of the high seas are not uncommon69 and the distributed jurisdiction over the high seas that was consolidated in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) cannot be taken for granted.70 What does this imply for extraterritorial jurisdiction to enforce? For a start, lets acknowledge that Grotius admits of no monopoly of violence on the high seas; the freedom of the seas signies the absence of sovereign claims that exclude other nations. This implies that natural law applies; there is no social contract that stipulates the establishment of a human-made jurisdiction. For Grotius, natural law rules in three types of situations: rst, it rules the interactions of people that have not established a state on the basis of a social contract; second, it rules the interactions between states in times of war and peace; third, it rules the interactions of both state and private actors on the high seas. Grotiuss natural law starts from the notion of individual rights that derive from the need for self-preservation and the need for society. Before the social contract is concluded, these individual rights pertain to individual persons; after the social contract, these rights are also attributed to sovereign states, while the subjects of the state will lose some of their rights and rights will be attributed to them on the basis of sovereign legislation. Mare Liberum argues that, at sea, both sovereign states and private parties under the ag of a sovereign state have the natural right to defend themselves and the duty to respect the communal character of the sea as a route for free trade. Pirates can be caught and punished by all parties since they beset and infest our trade routes;71 nations can agree to bring pirates under a specic jurisdiction when caught in this or that part of the sea, but such agreements have no binding force on those not
69 Craig H Allen, Command of the Commons Boasts: An Invitation to Lawfare? in Michael D Carsten, ed, Global Legal Challenges: Command of the Commons, Strategic Communications and Natural Disasters (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2007) 21 [Allen]. 70 See Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3, pt VII, arts 86 120 (entered into force 16 November 1994) [UNCLOS], on the legal regime of the High Seas. For an interesting attempt to compose a clone of the convention regarding the legal regime of cyberspace, see Raymond K Joe, Cyberspace and the Seas: Lessons to be Learned (Masters Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1998), online: < sequence=1>. 71 Grotius, supra note 56 at 10. See UNCLOS, supra note 70, art 100: All States shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State. For the denition of piracy, see ibid, art 101. (2013) 63 UTLJ UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS
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216 UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAW JOURNAL party to the agreement.72 If a party attempts to monopolize a trade route by prohibiting passage, natural law allows others to take up arms:
If many writers, Augustine himself among them, believed it was right to take up arms because innocent passage was refused across foreign territory, how much more justly will arms be taken up against those from whom the demand is made of the common and innocent use of the sea, which by the law of nature is common to all?73

In fact, he suggests that whoever hinders free trade by obstructing the use of roads or the export of merchandise must be prevented from doing so via facti even without waiting for any public authority.74 This natural right against whatever hinders free trade constitutes a cause for a just war, even if it is a private party that retaliates. In that case, Grotius speaks of a bellum iustum privatum a private just war. In what sense could cyberspace be equivalent to Grotiuss high seas? It may be interesting to compare the relationship between territorial sovereignty and the freedom of the sea with the relationship between territorial jurisdiction and the often claimed unregulability of the Internet. Taking it from there, we can investigate how the notion of extraterritoriality depends on a particular spatial mapping that may not apply in the case of either Grotiuss sea or our own cyberspace.

Cyberspace liberum?

Julie Cohen suggested that [t]o understand cyberspaces spatiality, one must disentangle the concept of experienced spatiality from abstract, conceptual models of space, and also from the related but distinct concepts of place and property.75 Grotius, who lived on the verge of a new area, in which abstract spatiality was the new kid on the block in the arts, politics, and the law, reinvented the abstractions of natural law theory and developed a law of nations that matched an abstract spatial understanding of the surface of the earth.76 The exception he argued for

72 Grotius, supra note 56 at 35. UNCLOS, ibid, art 92(1), stipulates in that ships shall sail under the ag of one State only and, subject to minor exceptions, shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas. Ibid, art 97(3) stipulates that the ag state shall have exclusive penal jurisdiction to enforce. 73 Grotius, ibid at 74. Note that the rhetorical strategy of quoting the ancients was a canonical method to convince ones audience in Grotiuss time. 74 Ibid at 75. 75 Cohen, supra note 5. 76 Earlier natural-law theory developed within the realm of scholasticism; notably, in Aquinass Summa Theologiae. At that point, natural law theory was still a branch of (2013) 63 UTLJ UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS
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jurisdiction at sea partly rests on the experiential unregulability of the high seas at that point in time. For another part, the natural law that he proposes depends on an abstract conception of individual actors with individual rights; Grotius was indeed one of the rst authors to develop the abstract notion of subjective rights that do not depend on privilege and exist as legal rights beyond moral entitlement.77

In the rst decade of its existence, cyberspace seems to have evoked an experiential unregulability similar to that of Grotiuss high seas. Even the eschatological undertones detected in Grotiuss expectations of world peace based on free trade returned with the birth of cyberspace. In the preface to their Who Controls the Internet, Goldsmith and Wu cite the following passage:
The new technologies will bring every individual . . . into immediate and effortless communication with every other, practically obliterate political geography, and make free trade universal. Thanks to technological advance, there [are] no longer any foreigners, and we can look forward to the gradual adoption of a common language.78

These words were actually inspired by the telegraph, one century before the emergence of cyberspace. Yet, they resonate with numerous writings on the challenges posed to the rule of nation states in the last decade of the twentieth century, reiterating the eschatological expectations unmasked by Schmitts notion of a political theology and Agambens economic theology.79 Some would say that eschatological expectations must be hardwired into our cognitive make-up. Though the idea of a political theology referred to the notion of territorial sovereignty as a road to salvation for a divided humanity, cyber-utopianism seeks salvation in an undivided global cyberspace under the banner of Internet freedom. Goldsmith and Wu summarize the dreams of cyberutopianism as those of self-governing cyber-communities that would escape geography forever.80 But, in their history of the (partial)
moral philosophy that determined the validity of positive law. With Grotius, natural law theory begins the process of disentanglement from theology. William A Edmundson, An Introduction to Rights (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004) at 1722 [Edmundson]. Goldsmith & Wu, supra note 63 at vii, quoting Julian Hawthorne, June 1993, The Cosmopolitan (February 1893) 450 at 4567, as discussed and quoted by Carolyn Marvin, When Old Technologies Were New: Thinking About Electric Communications in the Late Nineteenth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988) at 2012. Agamben, supra note 4; Schmitt, Political Theology, supra note 47. Preface, Goldsmith & Wu, supra note 63 at vii.
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77 78

79 80


218 UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAW JOURNAL territorialization of cyberspace, they argue that, even if geography no longer rules, national states still manage to pulls the strings or, rather, the wires. It has required hard work by legislators and especially courts to come to terms with the unprecedented extraterritorial effects of action in cyberspace. Goldsmith and Wu describe the Yahoo case,81 in which a French court decided that the US First Amendment does not have force of law in a French jurisdiction. The case concerned the sale of Nazi paraphernalia on an Internet auction site that could be accessed in France, where the sale of Nazi relics is a criminal offence. Yahoo claimed that it could only comply with French law if it blocked access to the site for all its users which would practically enforce French law in the United States. Once it became clear that it was technically possible to discriminate between users based on their geo-location, the court ordered the US-based provider Yahoo to block access to certain Web sites for French users. Reidenberg has described this decision under the heading of the international democratization of the Internet, arguing that it demonstrates respect for local, that is national, democratic constituencies.82 This may be a relevant argument for territorial demarcations in the case of democracies, but as Goldsmith and Wu discuss at some length, such demarcations are also used by non-democratic states like China to prevent their subjects from gaining unrestricted access to the global public sphere. Milton Mueller goes even further, raising the difcult question of the relationship between human rights and democracy:
They [Goldsmith and Wu] criticize the global extension of the First Amendment and its implied universalism. But why not extend it globally? If you believe that individuals have rights that are over and above those of states, how does the fact that a (possibly temporary) majority happened to seize political control in one territory for a few years alter the basis of the claim? And if you believe that it is illegitimate to apply the First Amendment standard globally, why is it legitimate to apply Goldsmith and Wus amoral utilitarian standard? Some standard has to be applied.83

Mueller agrees that the cyber-utopianism of early adopters of the Internet has turned out to be not only nave but dangerous because it turns a blind eye to the sophisticated methods used by nation states to regain (remote) control over whatever affects their jurisdiction. However, he

81 Trib gr inst Paris, Ordonnance de rfr du 20 novembre 2000, online: Legalisnet <>. Unofcial English translation at <>. 82 Joel R Reidenberg, Yahoo and Democracy on the Internet (2001/2) 42 Jurimetrics 261 at 261. 83 Mueller, Review, supra note 63. (2013) 63 UTLJ UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS
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warns against what he calls the new cyber-conservatism that assumes that cyberspace does not pose critical threats to the system of nation states. Apart from this contestable assumption, such cyber-conservatism often involves a normative position, claiming that only the combined internal and external sovereignty of nation states can provide adequate solutions for the governance of cyberspace. Goldsmith and Wu justify this normative position by means of mainstream utilitarian arguments,84 even though they recognize the fact that oppressive governments can use the Internet to achieve an unparalleled granular control over their subjects. Mueller warns, however, that cyberspace does pose unique challenges and at the same time generates novel opportunities to counter some of the drawbacks of the rule of mutually exclusive territorial monopolies of force.85 He nds that intellectual property, cyber-security, content regulation, and the control of critical Internet resources (domain names and IP addresses that are the condition of possibility of any cyberspace) require transnational governance at a level and in a manner that cannot be provided by any nation state in itself, for itself.


In 2001, before the United States ratied the Cybercrime Convention (in 2007), Jack Goldsmith wrote a paper on the legitimacy of remote cross-border searches.86 He describes one of the rst known cases of remote cross-border searches and seizures in the context of cyberspace. After tracing the source of malicious hackings into computing systems of banks, Internet service providers (ISPs), and other US rms to data servers in Russia, the FBI tried to get Russian assistance in monitoring and redressing these criminal activities. When the Russian authorities turned out to have other priorities, the FBI decided to act unilaterally.87 They obtained a search warrant in the United States, gured out the hackers user names and passwords via a keystroke sniffer, and thus gained access to the servers in Russia, downloading the information necessary to charge them and to prevent further attacks. Goldsmith recalls that the normal way to proceed in the case of extraterritorial jurisdiction to enforce is judicial or police cooperation, but he explains,

84 E.g. Goldsmith & Wu, supra note 63 at 153. 85 Milton L Mueller, Networks and States: The Global Politics of Internet Governance (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2010) [Mueller, Networks]. 86 Jack Goldsmith, The Internet and the Legitimacy of Remote Cross-Border Searches (2001) U Chicago Legal F 103. 87 Ibid at 103. (2013) 63 UTLJ UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS
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The problem is that such cooperation is often difcult. Sometimes the sourcecountry government lacks legal authority to seize and freeze computer information within its borders. Sometimes it lacks the technological capacity. Sometimes the enforcement machinery in the source country will simply take too long, because evidence of the crime can quickly be destroyed or anonymized. And sometimes, as in the opening example, the source country government simply fails to cooperate.88

He notes that for these and other reasons, ofcials in the target country might take matters into their own hands.89 Goldsmith then refers to international law, observing that many authors would nd this a violation of the territorial sovereignty of the source country.90 His essay, however, is meant to argue that remote searches are, indeed, restricted by international principles of enforcement jurisdiction but that such restrictions cannot be deduced from norms of territorialism. He adds that, though he does not see jurisdictional grounds to prohibit unilateral extraterritorial searches, there may be other grounds to restrict or prohibit these searches, notably potential violations of privacy or free speech rights. The main reason why Goldsmith contends that, under certain conditions, states are free to engage in remote searches is necessity. He observes that the Cybercrime Convention prohibits unilateral exterritorial enforcement, but considers that the Convention will have little inuence on crimes committed from safe-haven nations that do not ratify it.91 Necessity will require ofcials to take the law in their own hands, and for Goldsmith this entails another necessity: the need to reinterpret the prohibition on extraterritorial jurisdiction. In short, Goldsmith proposes that remote searches do not violate this prohibition because the ofcials doing the search do not leave the territory of the United States. The argument which returns in Who Controls the Internet is that states will nd ways to achieve indirect extraterritorial effect; they will use local infrastructure, local ISPs, and local divisions of foreign companies to target the source of the harm they wish to redress. Just as cyberspace destroys the unity of time, place, and action of the actus reus of a cyber criminal, it does the same for the enforcement

88 Ibid at 104. 89 Ibid at 104. 90 Ibid. Goldsmith refers to the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States 432, comment b (1987). Note that he does not refer to international law but to the US restatement of its position on obligations under international law. 91 Ibid at 106; at 106, note 14, Goldsmith refers to arts 19, 20, 23(a), and 32 of the Convention on Cybercrime, 23 November 2001, ETS No 185 that restrict cross-border searches to publicly available data or consent in the case of private data. (2013) 63 UTLJ UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS
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action of national authorities; the scope of the extraterritorial effect of territorial action is transformed by cyberspace. Goldsmith actually links this effect to cross-border surveillance on the high seas and international air space and concludes that [n]orms of territorial sovereignty have never precluded such offshore espionage.92 Goldsmiths argument oscillates between pragmatic arguments entailing that, because judicial cooperation does not always work, unilateral action is needed and a curious understanding of international law entailing that states can always act in their own best interest. To the extent that this violates international law, he asserts, the law will simply have to be changed: There is little doubt that if such searches prove necessary to redress cross-border internet attacks, international law will adapt to permit them in some circumstances.93 There is no doubt that, for Goldsmith, the sovereign is he who decides on the exception. Norms are nice, but in cases of necessity, we are better off with decisions.94 He acknowledges potential abuse for instance, if ofcials resort to cross-border searchers even if alternative means of investigation are available and warns against the threat of reciprocity and retaliation so that, for example, Russia might decide to engage in crossborder enforcement in cyberspace on the territory of the United States. But ultimately, the claim stands that unilateral actions are inevitable and require an adjustment of international law. Interestingly, after his paper was published, the United States ratied the Cybercrime Convention, which forbids these searches without express permission of the source country.95 What does this mean for the competence of US ofcials to engage in unilateral cross-border searches? Are they bound by their agreement to the Convention, or is there space for an a-legal decision in the case of necessity? In their book on control over the Internet, Goldsmith and Wu argue that territorial sovereignty will hold in cyberspace, whereas Goldsmiths earlier position suggests that territorial sovereignty will be redened to allow extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction in cyberspace. It seems that Schmittian decisionism will rule cyberspace when things get nasty, leaving international law and respect for the internal sovereignty of other states for times of relative peace.

92 Ibid at 114. It is not clear what is the relevance of this observation, since espionage is not the same as extraterritorial enforcement of the criminal law. 93 Ibid at 116. 94 On Schmitts view of legal order in terms of legal norms and a-legal decisions, see Mireille Hildebrandt, The Indeterminacy of an Emergency: Challenges to Criminal Jurisdiction in Constitutional Democracy (2010) 4 Criminal Law and Philosophy 161. 95 See articles listed supra note 91. (2013) 63 UTLJ UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS
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Conclusions: Novel spatialities cyberspace as passage and common good?

Let us now return to Grotiuss Mare Liberum. I briey recall the dimensions of territorial jurisdiction distinguished above: territorial demarcation that overrules personal status and the creation of abstract boundaries that dene an empty space, capable I might add in a simple way, of producing an inside and an outside and, in turn, a gapless map of contiguous jurisdictional territories.96 The high seas escaped this totalitarian scheme due to their value as a common good, their status as a passage, and the vigilance of different players who have resisted occupation. Cyberspace can be territorialized, but only by redening territory in a way that dees the original connection of the notion of territory to the land, to the earth. As mentioned here, this connection constructs territorial jurisdiction as exclusive and gapless; there is no outside that is not an inside and a subject or an object cannot be inside two different territories. The novel connection to territory, however, would have to be inclusive and overlapping; as soon as there is an inside, there are numerous ways to extend the inside for instance, by means of what Goldsmith calls indirect extraterritorial effect. This marks the difference between cyberspace and Grotiuss high seas: the high seas unlike cyberspaces were not everywhere or anywhere.97 This difference implies that the metaphor of Mare Liberum has its limits because unlike cyberspace it depends on the territoriality of the land it surrounds. This is precisely why cyberspaces require novel negotiations between jurisdiction and spatiality. The boundaries of the high seas were determined by those of the land; there was no overlap. The boundaries of territory in the era of cyberspace are, however, liquid.98 Cyberspace does not stop where ordinary space begins. This means that territorialization of cyberspaces easily generates cross-border communication, commerce, and crime, situating the same action seamlessly in different territories (both online and ofine). On the side of cybersecurity, this will trigger universal extraterritorial jurisdiction to enforce. As we have seen above, as long as the ofcial conducting a remote extraterritorial search is physically located in the territory of the investigating state, some will dene her action as an intraterritorial search with indirect extraterritorial effects. It may be the case that the legal requirement that
96 See text accompanying notes 312. 97 Thanks to Markus Dubber for pointing this out during the workshop in Toronto, June 2012. 98 Cf. Julie JCH Ryan, Daniel Ryan, and Eneken Tikk, Cybersecurity Regulation: Using Analogies to Develop Frameworks for Regulation in Eneken Tikk & Anna-Maria Talihrm, eds, International Cyber Security Legal & Policy Proceedings, 2010 (Tallinn, Estonia: CCD COE, 2010). They distinguish among the natural commons; notably, the sea, the air, the Antarctic, outer space, and cyberspace. (2013) 63 UTLJ UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS
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the other state must agree to such a search is contingent upon an earlier spatiality, on articial demarcations that have run out of steam. A redenition of the scope of territorial jurisdiction that justies indirect extraterritorial effects will, nevertheless, run into problems. It builds on an a-legal occupatio because it claims and seizes access to computing systems located in the realm of another state that may decide to exercise its monopoly on violence. Retaliation and reciprocity may turn cyberspace into a platform for cyber war; to the extent that our critical infrastructure is increasingly rooted in cyberspace, such a-legality is not something to look forward to. The recent history of the malware program Olympic Games is a primary example of such a-legal occupation. The program, developed by the National Security Agency of the United States and Israels secret services with the aim to disturb the nuclear plant at Natanz (Iran), sets an example that will be and undoubtedly has been followed.99 We thus have to face the question of whether cyberspace liberum grounds a-legal occupatio or requires grounding in a novel version of natural law that attributes subjective natural rights based on a distributed control over cyberspace infrastructure.100 Part of Grotiuss scheme may work; namely, where we view cyberspace in analogy to the high seas as a passage that affords international trade, communication at a distance, and the proliferation of information and of the techniques to transform information into knowledge. This would entail that we see cyberspace as a global commons. But even if we manage to escape the temptations of an economic theology that takes the benets of cyberspace as a global commons for granted, we still need to nd ways to ensure that cyberspace as a passage, a conduit is instituted and maintained as a res communis that cannot be appropriated, may not come under exclusive sovereign control, and requires a vigilant international community to safeguard the distributed control that is needed to prevent violent, exclusionary monopolies.101

99 See supra note 13. Note that the example does not refer to criminal jurisdiction to enforce but to something more like cyber war. Obviously, the distinction may not hold in cyberspace, unless we nd a way to construct an effective legal demarcation that reinvents the distinction between internal sovereignty (criminal law) and external sovereignty (war) for the era of cyberspace. 100 Though the idea of natural rights seems to defy the idea of attribution, this is precisely the point of natural law: it attributes rights it claims to be inherent in the nature of human beings. This rhetorical strategy is based on the performative nature of the construction of reality and some relate it to the so-called endowment effect of our cognitive make-up; cf. Edmundson, supra note 77 at 13. 101 On potential threats to the distributed control over the root structure of cyberspace (the Internet), see one of the founding fathers of the Internet, Vinton Cerf, Keep the (2013) 63 UTLJ UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS
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224 UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAW JOURNAL This seems to be the challenging alternative to accepting that the power will be with those who take control, thus imposing their sovereignty in cyberspace to the extent that others let them.102 However, to face this challenge, we still need to gure out what it means to take care of a common good that cannot be separated from the territorial landscape it pervades. Cyberspace is everyware.103 If we want to save ourselves from an a-legal cyberspace, we need to build a new heterotopian spatiality, taking into account the novel mappings that cyberspace affords. We must remember that sovereign jurisdiction entails unilateral enforcement of the criminal law but, so far, is also the precondition of the unilateral enforcement of human rights, such as a fair trial, privacy, and non-discrimination. The challenge will be to sustain a measure of safety, freedom, and respect for human rights in cyberspace, based on a legality that cannot however be grounded in the monopolistic spatiality of territorial sovereignty.

Internet Open, The New York Times (24 May 2012), online: NYTimes <>. Also Mueller, Networks, supra note 85. 102 Cf. Allen, supra note 69. 103 Adam Greeneld, Everyware: The Dawning Age of Ubiquitous Computing (Berkeley, CA: New Riders, 2006). (2013) 63 UTLJ UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS
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