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    From Platonism to Neoplatonism by Philip Merlan, a classic work on the shift from the original Platonism to the form that emerged after Plotinus.

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    From Platonism to Neoplatonism by Philip Merlan, a classic work on the shift from the original Platonism to the form that emerged after Plotinus.

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    640 Ansichten122 Seiten

    From Platonism To Neoplatonism by Philip Merlan

    Hochgeladen von

    Sam Webster
    From Platonism to Neoplatonism by Philip Merlan, a classic work on the shift from the original Platonism to the form that emerged after Plotinus.

    Copyright:

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    1988) p. 48 PHILIP MERLAN De.tun,, De. Pt, (ViExwa) PaovEstor oF Panwosoniiy ScxtPrs COLLEGE AND CLARm ONT GRapvaTE SCHOOL FROM PLATONISM TO NEOPLATONISM Second edition, revised THE HAGUE MARTINUS NIJHOFF 1960 TABLE OF CONTENTS mopUcTION » + The present tendency to bridge the gap between putosism and Neoplatonism and the main fectors of fiat tendency (1-3). — The purpose of the present vig: to strengthen this tendency. ‘The way of achiev- wiithat purpose (3). — The intention of interpreting eT \ristotle’s metaphysies as essentially neoplatonic 3) The importance of Tamblichvs, De commons Sihlematica scientia for the present investigaticn (4-5), ‘note on excessive realism (4). — A note on the use Gf later philosophic and scientific theories in interpreting Greets philosophy (5-6). — Appendix (6-8). — Bibtio- friphical note (8-10). —- Appendix (10). Sovr AND MATHEMATICALS ©... ss ‘The excessively realistic, anti-abstractionist _(in- ‘witionist) interpretation of mathematicals in Iam- blichus and Proclas and the intermediacy of mathema- ticals (the mathematical sphere of being) between in- {eligibles and physicals (11-13). — How ie this :nterme- diacy of the mathematicals related to the intermediacy ‘of the soul between ideas and physicals according to Plato's Timaone (13.16)? The problem of the mo tive" character of mathematicals in De communt ma- ‘iematica scientia ch. TIT and its solution ibid. ch. TV: ‘mathematicals not “motive” and. therefore different from the sonl (15-17). — Resumption of the sroblem concerning the identity of mathematicals with the sout in Ds communt mathematica scientia ch. IX; this time the solution favors such an identification, stressing Particularly the necessity of identifying the soul with all branches of mathematicals, viz, arithmeticals, geo- metricals, and harmonicals, the mathematicak, thus, sumed to be tripartite (17-19). — This. octrine ilustrated also from Iamblichus, On éhe Sout (19-21) ind from Proclus, ia whom, however, the identification '5 with quadripartite mathomaticals, including. astro- homicals, ie. “motive” mathomaticals (21-24). — Further discussion of the identification of the soul with {ripartite) mathematicals in De communi matnematica Scientia ch. X (24-25). — This identifieation incom: patible with the zesults of De communi mathematica Scientia ches HIT and TV, this incompatibility revealing che presenee of different Sourees from which De coununs ‘mathematica setentia derived (25-25), Analysis of eh. X resumed; the identification of the soul with mathematicals explained by Tamblichas (26). 11-33 xu IL TABLE OF CONTENTS Explanation of the inconsistency of De communi mathematica sciontia by its peculiar literary character neither a original, aor plagiarism, nor a flosiegium (2-21). ‘Discusion concerning the difference between trie partite and quadripartite mathematicals and the im= portance of this differeace for the problem of the ide tiffeation of the soul and mathematicals: omly if the soul is identified with quadriparted mathematicals (including astronomicals, is. “motive” mathematical), the “motive” character of the soul (fundamental tenet of Plato) can be maintained (27-30) Concluding proofs of the plurality and inconsistency fof the sources of De communi mathematica scientia 30-22). Appendix (92-33), Postpoxivs axp NEOPLATONISM 6s ee ‘The problem concerning the identification of the soul ‘with mathematicals traced to Speusippus, Xenocrates, and, particularly, Posidonius, who seems to have com: ined the tripartition of being into ideas, mathema- ticals, and sensibles, ascribed to Plato by Aristotle, with the tripartion of being into ideas, soul, and sensi bles, as found in Plato's Timacus (34-39); this identi- fication, as found in Tamblichus and Procius, ultimately derived from Posidonius (39-40). Poleiic with Cherniss concerning the boginnings of this identification in Speusippus; Tamblichus’ report on this identification defended, despite its apparent dis- crepancy with Aristotle (4044). — Polemic with Cher- hiss concerning the beginnings of this identification by ‘Xenocrates; the assumption that Xenocrates assigned ‘to mathematicals an intermediate position not incom= patible with his denial of ideas (44-45; 42 note). Comparison of Cherise’ own interpretation of Plato with the interpretation by Aristotle: the two differ essentially in Choris’ unwillingness to identify soul land mathematicals mainly bectuse of the “motive character of the former (48-46). — The similarity of Cherise’ position to that of the source of Tamblichus, De commini mathematica scientia ch. TIL (46). “The Platonic character of the thesis of the “motive! character of mathematicals (46-47). ‘hus, the reports concerning Speusippus’ identiti- cation of the soul with a mathematical (ie. a geome trical) and Xenocrates’ identifieation of the soul with A mathematical (Le, an arithmetical) reliable and these {dentifications, including the assumption of the “motive” character of some or all mathematicals, not entirely un- Platonic; the two identitications of ‘Spousippus and Xenocrates closely related to each othor (47-48), ‘TABLE OF CONTENTS raves of (indentation in Ants pasty ra giving up of the doctrine of the subsistence of tha the Ses by. Arstle closely connected with his heat eee a the tuontann of ao Ean OP sy oot on the yroblem a dee {arses oe unten od cep 0 psdeas (49-98). FE ee amples of the Wentfcation of the soul ce natal 59) 8 math fae seuettin of a th neta a Sn gS an Bibliographical note (57-58). ‘tar SuBpIvistons oF TuroRwTIcaL PutLo- sorny Aristotle's tripartition of theoretical knowledge into metaphysics (theology, first philosophy), mathematics, nd physics rooted n'what he reported to have been Piate's division of being into ideas, mathematical, and Seusibies (with ideas and mathematicals interpreted as Shinistent). The incompatibility of Aristotle’: tripar- Chon of knowledge with his rejection of the subsis- tence of mathematicals (59-62). Discussion of the two main passages exhibiting this inconsistency. First passage (in A¥ef, b): the tripartition ot knowiedge faulty, because based on two different principles, viz. raiio essendi and ratio. copnoscendi; Physicals erroneowsly designated as dyépvoea (62-63). Detense of the asvertion that Aristotle's tripartition of knowledge Platonic in its origin (63-64). Attempts to defend Aristotle's tripartition as con sistent, particularly by interpreting it as based on Aegrees of knowledge (instead of degrees of being), refuted. [a connection with the problem of abstraction, the problem of a melaphysica geveratis in Aristotle e- merges (64-71). ‘Attempt to defend the designation of physieals as Aeiqurea refuted (71-72) Stcond passage (et. K) briefly discussed from the point of view of its inconsistency (72-73) Summary: only to the extent to which Aristotle ever accepted the excessively realistic interpretation of ideas (or whatover takes their place in his own philosophy) and mathematicals, could his tripartition of theoretical Knowledge be justified. (73-74). Historical survey of difficulties resulting whenever a. writer who did not accept excessive realism and the attendant tripartition of being, nevertheless professed the tripartition of theoretical knowledge (71-52). xu 59-87 amtvscenees | xiv WV. y. TABLE OF CONTENTS The appearance of another tripartiion of theoretical knowledge, into. theology (metaphysics, frst philoso- phy), psverology, and physies and its roots im theidenti- Trenton of the sol with mathematical (82-83). Conelu= sion (04). Appendix: (84-87) ‘Tue ORIGIN OF THE QuapRIVIUM . . Survey of the history of the quadrivium (ie. the quadriparted mathematics); ambiguity of the term mathematics in this context (does mathematics mean philosophy of mathematics, deserving an intermediate place between metaphysics and physics, in connection with a tripartition of being and an excessively realistic interpretation of mathematicals, or does it mean ele mentary grammar schoo! disciplines?) and the treat ‘ment of the quadrivium in some representative authors, revealing that ambiguity. Speusiprus IN TaMBLicHus . . Introduction. Chs IX and X of De cammnuni mathe smatica scientia contain references to doctrines of Spen- Sippus. Are there any other traces of him in the same ‘work (96)? ‘A comparison of the system of Speusippus as present- fd by Aristotle (96-94) with the content of De copimuni ‘mathematica scientia ch. IV (98-90) proves that the latter indeed presents ideas of Speusippus (100). — But the chapter is not derived from Aristotle (109), nor ean the difference between the two presentations be ex plained by the assumption that Iannblicbus ‘plotinized”” Speusippus or read his own neaplatonic doctrines into hhim (100). ‘These points proved (100-101). ‘After having im this way established that Spensippus pprofeased the doctrine of the One which is above being [indeterminate being) as one of his supreme principles, ‘the concept of indeterminate being (and indeterminate non-being) traced to Plato's Soplis (101-102). Summary: ch. IV of De commun mathematica scien- tia is an independent source of our lenowiledze about Speusippus (102). Additional arguments, regarding _Tamblichus! lmowleage of other early philosophers and of Speusi: pus in particular (103), Detailed comparison of Speusippus’ supreme formal principle as presented in ch: IV of De communi mathe- ‘matica scientia with the presentation by Aristotle (103-104), expecially the concept of the One-above-being (104), — Probably even Aristotle himself ascribed this doctrine to Spessippus, although he expressed himself TABLE OF CONTENTS saiviguowly, yedhape ev. 6H puipowa\ i ofat to be ebiguons 2 s doctrne beer by relating i 9 his i of taecanen sng Deck th. ieee own fret (104105). — How to interpret the tert dare “applied by Aristotle to the One of Speusippus 1-108) 5100 ality of formal peincipln in Speesppia 106-107 fc aietrine that the supreme formal principle (the «A indeterminate being) ‘a not only above being ue shove the goed and the Donut and that the a erg last in the mphere of niathanationls; Dante gee of the doctrine Ghat there i bowty fn i imately professed also by Aristotle, not only im = Mfraphysce, but also in a passage in Procis; and ae macedge in Proclas derived from a writing afferent BA Peel's Metaphysics, perhaps trom his. Pro- treplons (107-105) tie sdetiaa that the supreme principle act good ssl lathough the source of goods) riticeed by ‘Satole (109110); perhaps also by ‘Theophirast (110- 1 Discussion of the other supreme principle in Speu sippan the material priniple, which fe neither gly nor SUP nor even cause of evi. (1I-LI4);,Spewippus Sheory of ev! (evil not subeitent) compared with that ot Reade (U18-118). ihe interstion of the supreme formal and she om preme material peincipis (115-116) Spesippas no olution, (116-118) Was Speusippus a “isjointer” of being (11-119)? The principle of analogy in Speusippus and Alistote Some’ lingustic observations on De communi mathe: snatcnscienia ch. IV (119-122), ‘Conparizon of Speusippus with Potaus establishing sitrences and resemblances within a fundamental sit larity caused by the neoplatonie quality ofthe dectrines at Speusippuy (122-127) Did Speusippus desc hls supreme material pring vie as above non-being? Genoral characteristic of the System of Speusippuss the originality of bie doctrine thatthe two supreme pritipies are (worally and cathe- scaly} neutral (127-128); Appendix (128-40) A New FRaGMENT oF ARISTOTLE Four reasons for deriving De commun’ mathematica scientia ch, XXIII from Avistotle, particularly from is Provepticus (141-144), The yeneral content of this chapter: mathematics Praised by Aristotle as a branch of theoretical knowledge xv 141-189 XVI vu, TALE OF CONTENTS land eminently appropriate for a life of contemplation (144.145), — Mathematics, in this context, interpreted by Aristotle as knowledge of something subsistent (145). ‘Wiiy is uot only mathematics but also. psychology according to one passage in De aniwa characterized by Aristotle by the quality of dxo(Bua? Possibility that even in De anima Aristotle is still thinking of the soul fas a mathematical entity (145-148). ‘A detailed analysis of De communi mathematica scien- ia ch. XXIEL. The doctrine that mathematics has the ‘advantage of making ie possible 10 initiate evea a young person t0 the life of contemplation (148-150). ‘Some linguistic observations on De communi mathe ‘matica scientia ch, XXII (150-151). ‘A comparison of Iaocrates' and Aristotle's attitudes toward mathematics (161-182). Conclusion: the newly discovered fragment consider ably elucidates Aristotle's tripartition of theoretical philosophy and illustrates a phase of his philosophy in ‘which he (obviously in connection with an excessively realistic interpretation of mathematicals) interpreted ‘mathematics as a strictly philosophic discipline (i philosophy of mathematics rather than what we should fall mathematies), in complete agreement with the ‘Academy (152) Note on the educational ideas of Montaigne and Isocrates (153) “Appendix (164-169) METAPHYSICA GENERALIS IN ARISTOTLE? « ‘The problem; Does the term being-as-such, when nsed by Aristotle to designate the subject matter of metaphysics (theology, first philosophy) mean that Which is most abstract, making, thus, Aristotle’s meta physics a metaphysice genevalis? If this question is answered in the affirmative, how ean we explain that ‘Aristotle described his metaphysics as knowledge of just one (the uppermost) sphere of being and, thus, as Imetapivsica specialis? In other words: is the entity escribed by the term being-assuch comparable to & Imathematieal interpreted non-realistically (a mere, not Subsistent abstraction) or rather to a mathematical interpreted realistically (as subsistent) and not merely ‘an object of abstraction (160-161)? “Analysis of the pertinent passages in Met. I. Tt be- ‘comes obvious that in all relevant passages the com plete equivalence of the terms “‘being-as-such” and Feapreme sphere of being’” is assumed by Aristotle; it becomes, further, obvious that metaphysics is for Aristotle an inquiry into the opposite elements, ulti nately being and non-being, of which the supreme TABLE OF CONTENTS sphere primarily and everything else derivatively con- Eats (161-166). Tn Met. 'the principle of contradiction is treated not ‘asa formal principle but as a metaphysical priciple: it Spplies fully only to the supreme sphere of being (145-168). Analysis of Met, E 1: again the equivalencs of the terms being-as-such and supreme sphere of boing assumed (168-169). ‘Solution of the apparent contradiction in the defi nition of metaphysics and explanation why Aristotle speaks of metaphysics in terms of a {wo-cpposite- principles doctrine: Being-as-sueh, in this context, foes not mean an abstract object (the most abstract at that) in our sense of the word; it means fullest, ic. fully indeterminate being; it ‘is therefore together ‘with its opposite, non-being-assuch, equivalent to the concept of the supreme sphere of being (163). ‘The Academic (and, in this sense of the word, neo- platonic) character of the concept of beingas-such [169-172) and of the doctrine that all beings are ulti mately redueible to two opposite principles (172-173). Further clarification of the formula describing metaphysics as xalddou dre agdien: xodiu in this context ‘does not mean “universal” in our sense of the word; st'means rather “omnipresent” (173-174). Analysis of Met, 3-7, particularly with regard to the concepts of digaigrme and mqiatlens. In this contest, dgadgears does not designate the pracess of abstraction in our sense of the word by ‘waich we ascend from the individual (concrete) to the universal (abstract); it is rather a concept peculiar to the ex- cessively’ realistic way of thinking, in which, by xodo- rag, the individual (concrete, real in the’ ordinary sense of the word) is derived from the universal (some: ‘times called deal), in a manner usually termed neo- platonic (174-178) Further elarifietion of the Academic charseter of Anstotle's metaphysies (178-184). The neoplatonie character of the (equivalent) con cepts of being-as-eueh and indeterminate being and the attendant gnoseologie problems, The peculiar evaracter of indeterminate being demands a peculiar type of knowledge, different from ordinary predicative know- ledge. Interpretation of Met. © 10, particularly of the ‘concept of davidicra (184-189). Survey of passages in which Aristo, ina diferent phase of his philosophy, erticized the two-cpposite- Principles doctrine and ‘the system of derivation of Particulars from universal; the defense of that system for the purpose of elucidation (189-194) Did Plato himself profess a system of derivation ? xvit xvur TABLE OF CONTENTS Impossibility of answering in the affirmative with certainty; but diffienlies arising from an answer in the negative (194-197). Sarvey of passages implying that according to Aris- toile the Pythagoreans, Plato, and other Academics tied to derive the sensible (individual, eonerete) from the non-sensible (197-100). ‘A particular aspect of the problem of derivation sausality of ideas in Plato (200-202) Sarvival of the idea of derivation in a text of Sextus Empiriens (202-204), Simmary: Aristaile's metaphysics as defined in Met, TE 1, and K 3-7 is a two opposite-principles ‘metaphysics, with the supreme sphere of being desig- nated a8 being-as-such or indeterminate being, and in this sense of the word, most universal (204-206). ‘Objections to a separation of Met. P, E 1, and K 3-7 from ‘the rest of the metaphysical treatises refuted (205-206) ‘Note on the different attempts to explain (a) the efinition of metaphysics as a knowledge of the two supreme, opposite principles so contradictory to all the criticism leveled otherwise by Aristotle at the two ‘opposite-prineiples doctrine (b) tho apparent contra Giction in the definition of metaphysics as metaphysica eneratis and metaphysica specials at the same time (205-209) ‘Concluding remaris. Four possibilitioe of explaining the obvious rift between Met. I, Ft, and K 3-7, in which being-as-such is interpreted as indeterminate nd therefore fullest and prime being and the two- ‘opposite-principles doctrine is accepted, and other ‘writings by Aristotle in which the concept of being-as- such indicates what i most abstract (a strictly logical Universal, arrived at by abstraction in our sense of the word) and. the tvo-opposite-principles doctrine is completely rejected (209-212). Appendix (212-220). CONCLUSION. . 6. 6 ke Divisions of being from Plato, as interpreted by Aristotle, to Posidomius and hence to Yamblichus and Proclus, ‘with mathematicals interpreted realistically, as 4 spliere of being intermediate betseeen metaphysic~ dls and physicals; survival of this tripartition 10 the eth century. ‘The problem concerning the identifi- cation of (intermediate) mathematicals with the (in vermedinte) soul and of the causality of mathematical. The difficulties resulting from detaching certain doe- ‘vines (tripartition of theoretical knowledge; the 21-231 TABLE OF CONTENTS scot ep rat “ea apathy rine content (at S) Sra davai of Ue mio it Big ou, aot oe ots a asc being (228-229). el hari act) Papp vin cekoie a mtapysta sprit @25 20) es Juvex or NAMES Jyprx oF PassaGes IN GREEK aND LaTIN AUTHORS xix 232-237 238-250 INTRODUCTION How close are Platonism and Neoplatonism? * There had ages when the two were considered virtually identical. he 19th century saw the victory of the opposite point of view. ‘Fhe claim of Plotinus to be nothing else but an interpreter of ‘Plato vas rejected and the complete difference between the ‘gwo systems stressed. The last decades have again seen a change {aking place, This change is characterized by four main factors. First, se concentrate our attention on what Aristotle presented ‘and criticized as Plato's philosophic system. This leads to three ‘min problems. The first is to ascertain with precision the ‘meaning of this presentation of Plato; the second to determine the sources from which Aristotle derived his knowledge of that system; the third to evaluate the correctness and faimess of “Aristotle's report and critique. Only the first of these three problems is relevant to the present investigation, because what- 7 sve flowing assumptions eaem to be among those characteratc of what is Bobs Nelsons 1h plurality of apres of being stietysubortinated to one anoter, s that, Satcasre the sgl ers of whieh represent highs al fover dope eg Boris sont, mont ene pce of hang cospbig Wt tua caled pot ie being bag inne and epace WP ean ato feck ink pee of bung trom sop, tis deivation Bt ing process n time space and thereoreconparsia tient! ogi Motions ater than to cata Gato tempera) ration, ths te easel fa errs with regard to cach vier ot ain of the type et ecent cooly . The derivation of te supreme sphere of bg fom prciple tic ar the GG of a tring cannot be deeb ss beng —"ie shove being and theta Hilly indatcrminate, this indeterminateness belng net the inde-rminateness of 8 Bee miverel concept, but an atic indeterminatenes, Le full “being” pecelsly Beso so ned (obi thio hat f. The deseription ofthis onic indctecilnatenes also by saying that the supeeme Bf iol One, this onenes expresting not only is uniqueness bet also its compe Phir, fo. the lark of any deteetaation, “One designating not some Kind of Bp dccpon ut Sg rater tomers ae apron oe Bre hain wither os Breen map nach eqn op ing rater Bg nissing at nyt rene camber onli aa tes os Imran determin ttn) feck iy ea oe eo #9: ‘cmpual detrmfsatin snd therfore tthe ston sone Bae, 1h Seite aprost to temp pipes blg ly erent, Bact cart te serene pict pede Mews Hes vii torn as alg wa eee Boe ica narra sieaty canton oct ee ek fa Dino ad nientn af ie thy to ter Se nan ee sd, with the pea pag ae apenas 2 INTRODUCTION ever the sources and whatever the correctness or faimess Aristotle, the system of Plato as set forth by him, exhibit | unmistakable similarities to a neoplatonic system. Seconcl, we prefer to compare Neoplatonism to the syste of Plato's first generation pupils, Xenocrates, Speusippus Heracleides, Hermodorus, rather than to Plato himself. Ay ‘the thoughts of these members of the Old Academy resemble { neoplatonic doctrines, To deseribe ths similarity, many scho ) speak of the Prthagorsm of the Old Academy (or even of late Plato), admitting at the same time that what is called Neopys | thagorism is obviously a forerunner of Neoplatonism, And ey " the specifically magico-religious coloring of Neoplatonism seer to have originated in the Old Academy, including a demonolo and an interest in occult phenomena. Thitdly, the study of some lesser writers Tike Agatharchid Moderatus, Eudorus reveals in their doctrines some element anticipating Neoplatonism. But none of these writers gives impression of originality; each seems to transmit ideas which! could stem from the Old Academy. Here again the term Ne pythagorism is applied to them and again we are reminded that Neopythagorism might very well be Pythagorisut us assimilates by the Old Academy. In addition to these lesser men one mot can be claimed as a link between the Old Academy and Ne platonism. It is Posidonius. Few would deny that in some s of the word he prepared the way for Neoplatonism, yet the fa that he commented on Plato's Timaews proves that he him: ‘was inspired by the Old Academy. Fourthly, Plotinus, once considered to be the founder Neoplatonism, is now being interpreted as its greatest member | important but not all important in the history of Neoplatonist The soil out of which he grew, sometimes referred to a5 PR ‘Neoplatonism, sometimes as Middle Platonism, exhibits qualities precisely mediating between the Academy and Neoplatoniss Many Neoplatonists, either Plotinus’ contemporaries or belongit to a later period, are not exactly Plotinists, This can particularly be said of Iamblichus, at least of some of his writings. And if would not be surprising to discover that the connection bet hhese un-Plotinian Neoplatonists and the Old Academy is 0 = % | chvious than the one between Plotinus and Plato INTRODUCTION 3 fo these four factors, characteristic mainly of moder scholar- vie should add another. Of all dialogues by Plato none BP, more obstinate obstacle to all denials of essential sity between Platonism and Neoplatonism than did the qenites. Time and again the “neoplatonic” interpretation Phat dialogue found its champions, regardless of the general rend of viewing all such attempts with suspi Sfp short, the present tendency is towards bridging rather than jdening the gap separating Platonism from Necplatonism, his book wants to contribute to this tendency by strengthen- some of the factors indicated above. It will pay very little sition to the problem of Aristotle's fairness or correctness in Ps Plato's system or to the sources from which Aristotle drew; and the knowledge of that presentation in its main, hrardly controversial features it will take for granted *. It will evote mach more space to Speusippus and Temblichus than | {to Plato and Plotinus and it will elucidate Posidonius’ inter-| ation of Plato as mediating between the Academy and platonism. But it will also add another factor to those men- tioned above, It will do so by establishing the neoplaton “dhiaractor of some fundamental doctrines of Aristotle. ‘There should not be anything particularly suprising about this. “The presence of strictly Platonic elements in some of Aristotle's Waitings has been proved beyond any reasonable doubt by Tetent scholarship, whatever the explanation of this presence. ‘Now, if itis true that Plato's philosophy as presented by Aristotle WBsimilar to Neoplatonism, it would only be natural to expect | MEioile's Platonism to be Neoplatonism at the same time Gubiotle’s presentation of Plato can be assumed to be correct frroneous; his sources can be considered to be either ‘Alusively Plato's published writings, or exclusively Plato's "unbets to ideas and of the very concept of Ideal numbers (or perhaps rather TRODUCTION 4 1 oral doctrines, or a combination of both. Whichever we accept ~ if Aristotle ever was a Platonist, it is unlikely that he never professed some of the “neoplatonic’ doctrines which he imputed | to Plato. The notion of a_platonizing Aristotle implies a neo platonizing Aristotle, if Plato, the way Aristotle understoad — or misunderstood. — him, was a neoplatonizing Plato himself, ‘There is nothing new about 2 neoplatonizing Aristotle either. The Arabic commentators interpreted him in this manner. To the extent to which their interpretation was based on neoplatonie writings erroneously ascribed to Aristotle, such as the Theologia Aristotelica or the Liber de causis, they were mistaken. But it, is not unreasonable to hold that this mistake should not have been the only basis of their construction. Without explicitly investigating the relation of the present interpretation of Aristoth to that of the Arabs, the present book reopens the case for Aristoteles Arabus i Much of the material of this book is well known, But some of it is not so. This is mainly the result of utilizing a work which hardly received full attention from scholars of Greek philosophy. lt is Tamblichus’ little book De communi mathematica scienliay 1c is part of his larger work on Pythagorism, portions of whi (De vita Pythagorica, Protrepticus, In Nicomachi arithmeticam introductionem, Theologoumena arithmeticae) are preserved, while others are lost. The most obvious justification for the interest paid to it in the present book lies precisely in the fact of its boing neglected, in strong contrast to his Pythagorasvita for example, on which an ample literature exists. But the results seem to justify it even more. Among its sources we shall find | Aristotle, represented by a new fragment, Posidonius, and most gratifying of all, Speusippus. The latter find will make | possible a re-evaluation of his system, At the same time, this work of Iamblichus will provide us with a new perspective in which to sce two old problems, that | of the classification of sciences and the idea of the quadrivium. Finally, his treatise will remind us of the importance of a way of thinking often designated as that of exeessive or conceptual realism * and permit us to uncover some of its more obliterated + Exeanive sealism or, to use N, Hartman's tom, Unoeratenraliomas, 16 not very fashionable among contemporary Bsterans of phifosphy.. Moderate INTRODUCTION 5 etches, connecting classical antiquity with the middle ages, Sh even with modern times *, “comin als empiits of al! denominations sein ary a rater hypenniagol concen Andon Mton of bron Sey ieee om tate We stl remember the controversies garding Plato, Phi “St jitteutioe defending thr lerpetaton of Fate a exon in seoy) agit fhe oolaghte of paints who ll hat they LS" Dto tom bang “sand” of somcptal tans A grat io “iv cult have profesed a dotinesopipably wre. The palsogt, ro mad aie 09 proving ensure Unk the ing ans et Sarl rn dr) apr go “ao whee onsets abo: Bay sr mand, they were not pertacyitreted fm proving tat exctive od pice te ccciee linden wet fol sympethy fr, though witost spol exon Tenpan iis yp, te flming tan cold buat Te ul i said mace uotertmd se lcd intestine eatin ft Bat heh Nichola of Com to the artery Aenea explanetion en rane ingen another inspace and tine ian expinaton alan imp at To rvs ever ermal capaci a sorsmieln fet oy Hen singly to sing up of een surh an stomp fry ae thng Bs cate be Sepces by hapten and eguseaten (ogee dade Bes Seivasoe, ditcnng) or Poty os foaktycamot be Seplned by ricuon and Cleon, tty cannot unferstond ts Exctnve rel, Be: tan ots characterbedy hypontssingconcnpa sald be rare t= | Ee scine waning only “ae ronnae” (itd ph) ws bree Undesianding Borst) oct Ske coy Sr of tigniGoat etal navy of mon We ma Boy coetig cotta, ry bela aman otis an wa our now? Bi sny mood is some kde mental engagrnent. Tet nove of tose settee Sb spc mich nc n the sornialighs corso tee tora ba Bp: cxrianatom of rsity, bt specs cara mode f tag But ay BE fet irae tat ts he exchane bonnes of pilinpby fo aped Exensve rene He inobtnce that piosphy about either bean sped ns srenr is ets Hp ondcrand to ontive selec, which roles tot te uadentandy tha mite stip to posophy to andertand aad that oy wnt can ptf eto Beil” impiction an exyleaton understood. Ot cowse wen we speak ftp! eplcntin and explain or dsivaton, we Ge oe neo oe sxdanety fn tational Slope pe fa éven es er formal fog) Hegel fale te mot cuttentig esate of Bean, nn ora ogi Another wens to be te daens method othe (Aes. general every plsophy which stam hat realy canbe andesioed, Bf se asime tht theca of aly nnd Ue hat parte prs ets Be edie eaernces and whatever Mogi oe, tr vaiy ee the ried by he fact that eb ths eben Mayo Sout be devoted tote fact ha the sent work refers sometimes ik plenty and pioopay of wien, Many haste af ilesophy find in Aristotle’s Speusippus and Xenocrates identified the soul with a mathe- ila matical (whether they did it interpreting the Timaeus ot pro- Far ctor snse ofthe ord eta dosh But hat mates ijt {essing their own doctrine is immaterial in the present context), onc ord nutter the ea on nr (rele is unobjectionable. And there is nothing in the Timaews to rule Soni het te a he tea on el phaea ange hy out this identification as completely un-Platonie * i ee tah coo alli toting each to baa ae } Gierent fom the determination ofa genus bya spect etterene. And its precisely j Be. Pes, 7551-97 Atle rays: Among te eases why one tGeeee ere We can now return to the problem of how the mathematical fact than another js ako this that ono is €8 Ekarsdwow he olber, les exact, Be character of the sonl (in other words, the soul being an idea BH Sac tote mira Uae ea as mathematical form) is related to the Aristotelian soul as Freier, took Cnerechungen | EPL ¥ ides of a living body. Pethaps the following interpretation may. Beivinstiinng in mattenatce, Kw tinal be suggested. For Aristotle the soul becomes a form of the scl Ri om ec th tt determi body (i.e, no longer a subsistent entity) within the same train versned than the eoneret nvidal in space sd Haue ete vere To unde i Alani the mathod of dxitensaitung, however, we have to look af it from a Simple diffrent point of view. The more determined a things, the less eal ity the les determined, the more real. And ifthe point tress determined thas the Hine of thought which led him to give up excessive realism in mathematics **, Mathematicals for Aristotle no longer subsist dai fin this sense ofthe word more univer obviows tha iver, when wed ee 4 context, cantot mean what we ter the wolveealty of genes ind specie. the sot should be compatible witb the ones inthe Phaedra, than todo co ith Biosinus, Ban, V1 2,9, 17-18 Brébie; 1, 1523 Bhier; SA” Beier; yaa reeard to the structure of the universe and its history au presented inthe imac Beier howd topes had dt Pic om the ober Fron an abstraction point of view all hk mikes no seme, The geomet ‘Onelc of Mato's reataent of mathematics ("eitnzatende Mathemait") Beis Sabntraced’” not from the poeta! lin, ut fom 8 phy “poin Pipl rretlgrctys neg erry perenne OPP lve snot derived fromm the poy fi abstracted rom # pays "Tine, And, Method’, Quon und Stadion sur Getcic der griecischon Mathemait Abt. B Pelcoure, ts psi points and lines reves ea, the mathematica pats Scudlen 1 (991) 99-107; ee on th problem also idem, Die EnieNung de ari £2 les are stuply the resale of sbsttacton, This absttatioustpolnt of lew tt Stason 1198) 49-407 oe ile prion a em 0 or aa Broxwiedly tha of smother Avett; but inthe pasage quoted sbove, Arbtotle {7} sot Solncen’ssterpctaion,pareulriy his analyse ofthe Analiza Prior Bias #130 Academic woud and durves the Une fom th part cy bya prosss nd Postriva bas realy boon caiceed by W. D. Ross (Arieiés Prior nd sea rom the proce by white ginta “becom” apoies aa Foca hebeel Posterior Avaiyis (043) 14-0), To the extent to which Rost riticiem refers BE Sco" desigoates the monad and te pont as oat On vending Rs” commentary {he problem of the chroncoglal det within Asstt Anais ft docs not cone i. soa asthe etn that Rowse somonbateobaraved by it fs eaplana, fiver It what i of terest in the present contexts Ress assertion that "the ot why Arietoue here wes the term obit cestaily weak enh Aoetrine of tho Posarior nay te not the stupid doctrine which treats numbers, whole problem of "derivation" wil Beette cleats in eh VIl For the time goad ten veces Zeaieee (eee eae eee es Ta, lit ours to the assertion that Arssotes Analy contain rlles of {he relation of point to line, te aa be stated preisly im term of fenus an specks "ratieal realism, Just as Soman had nested, 50 POSIDONIUS AND NEOPLATONISN psychology to the formula: from the soul as el8és 7 to the soul fs elbog twig (Aristoteles® [1955] 44). The same formula can be ‘ised to describe the change in the status of mathematicals — 7 from realism to moderate realism. Objecting to Jaeger, Cherniss (op. eit 508) turned attention to the fact that even in Met. M2, 1077a32-33 the soul still is considered to be eliog and weph ‘ne, However, first of all Cherniss overlooks that this assertion may be hypothetical (olov et dpa 4 dugh rowdroy) *; but let it be supposed that Cherniss is right. This would only prove that ‘Aristotle was somewhat dubious as to the relation between his former and his more recent conception of the soul — just as in” ‘Met. E 1, 1026a15 he is still somewhat dubious as to the entire status of mathematicals. All this, including the passage just {quoted by Cherniss, once more proves how orthodox-Academie: the equation soul — mathematicals is. Aristotle says in Met. M2: Lines cannot subsist (or: be olaia:) as forms, the way soul does (or, according to the above interpretation: the way the soul is supposed to do). The very fact of comparing lines with forms and souls shows how easily Aristotle switches in his: ‘thoughts from mathematicals to the soul. What we see happening in the Metaphysics, we soe even better in De antma: in 113414628 sve find a detailed (and puzzling) comparison of the problems: involved in the definition of the soul and in that of a geometrical figure. We could perhaps say: without this equation soul = mathematicals as a background, it would be hardly comprehensi- ble why Aristotle elaborates the comparison between soul and geometrical figure in such detail | ‘A comparison of two Simplicius passages is also instructive, He says on Xenocrates (In And he says on “Aristotle's Arist. De an, 404b27, p.30,4 Eudemus (In Arist. De ar) Hayduck and 408632, p. 62,2 429a10, p. 221,25 Hayduck, fr. 46 Rose, fr. 8 Walzer): By his definition of the soul as _[Stressing] the intermediney of selfmoved number Xenocrates the soul between the undivided Continued on faze st 7 In F. Nuyens, £'Bvoluion dele PaycolagedArisite (1948) we find curiously setl-contranictory interpretation of this phrase. On p, 173 n. 76 ke approves (quite etvcty) of the translations of Treat (comme Mame, ef bien me ext bien tell el {ile a0 Reso (asthe soul pordape 12). But is own translation (173): com ‘Pest sae doute Bion le eas pour Pe. UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY POSIDONIUS AND NEOPLATONISH 51 jatended to point out its inter- and the divided and the fact, ‘Mediacy between ideas and the that the soul siows characters Malm shaped by ideas (and its of both the shape and the thoy) shaped [gos and dpoue- vor]... Aristotle defined the soul as @ form (e863 %). In other words, in his Eudemus Aristotle was according to simplicius very close to the mathematical interpretation of the soul After the identification of the soul with the, or with a, mathe- matical was once made, there was no limit to combinations, some ‘of which could become extremely fanciful. Of course, it was not easy to surpass the fancifulness of Plato's Timacus and its strange mixture of poetic metaphors and mathematical formulas, ‘culminating in a concept which cannot be grasped either by imagination or by thought — a soul which is a circular strip consisting of a mixture of being (essence), identity, and diversity, this mixture being “marked” (whatever thismay mean) according to some ratios or intervals. But it was always possible to simplify Plato's fancies, still preserving the main idea, viz. the identifi- cation of the soul with some specific geometrical *, or number, or ratios. One such combination has been preserved in Sextus Empiricus and Anatolius-Iamblichus. ydtletie, gh Bnddve p92 Sextus Empirious, Ado. leiberg ~ Tamblichns, Theolo- mati. IV S-8 ~ VII 95-100 goumena arithmeticae 23-24 ed. V. de Faleo (1922), p. 30, 2-15 O8 pivoy BE aay 208 exierog ¢ Gore by 16 ‘rerdory” destin Riya diyov senple, QM val vty re0 oGueme mepiyeadat Srtyes ntyoy serpy abd val atv voi aduareg, nepttyeoae Bir ss Wore: Gs v9 abv Shor Doyo eal why eal sly Te Suny ack xark dgyovlay Buot- —duyier be tap “av Bhov xéouow Sas nw v8 Gin dra Spun Noe Bod Lorin. Bonet vat sla etre zal 32 Toy Yoon By spat coupovinis Boxet BE 4 whens dpporia bv shat... fie. the fourth, peel avupaoviais Raver chy Continued on pase 52 ids, De messidws 119: the salts a rectangle, a clrl, a sphere. 37664 82 POSIDONIUS AND NEOPLATONISM. q aw... 220d yap Tobtar the fifth, and the octave] ... tm taco BE dpiOuy reaaipen zi obras bzbycev, wal wack shy rpdirty «= $v robteg val 4 vis Apyibev SrsBeow renadgon troy | poe Bix mepidyesan wack chy deidudiv «.. br ole DEyoyer wal Brapuinn Miya «.. a B8 ev thy we oxic (kav weptbyeotan Y dpules vo nv vateat bx juris wack civ bvapuhuoy Moyo 1 al atiyartos, afc ipa xa, 2. ah copponias naam ae absiy eho. ‘Both passages try to explain why the number four ‘corresponds to” or “contains the formula of” both the body and the soul ‘As far as the body is concerned, the reason is obvious: the 4 pyramid is the first body and the pyramid corresponds to the: number four, because four points are necessary and sufficient to form this kind of solid (ef. Iamblichus, ibid., 18, p. 22, 10 7) Falco; 62, p. 84, 11 Faleo; Sextus, ibid), Somewhat more com- plicated is the proof that the four corresponds also to the soul. First, Sextus and Tamblichus equate the harmony which govern the universe with the soul of the living being — in other words, they assert that the sou! is essentially harmony. Secondly, they. explam that perfect harmony contains three intervals, the fourth, the fifth, and the octave. But these three intervals aré |) based on the ratios 8/4, %/s, and 4, ic., on ratios formed by mumbers all of which ate contained in the number four. Thus” the four contains the fundamental intervals and is in this sense iq of the word perfect harmony; but the sume, i.e. being perfect harmony, is true of the soul too. Therefore, the four “corresponds. 10” both body and soul. [All this can be expressed in the condensed form: the four 7 “ig” pyramid in the realm of the extended, it “is” soul in the | realm of the non-extended. Still simpler: 4 = pyramid = soul | Tf we read this equation backwards, we sce immediately thit it amounts to the identification of the soul with an arithmetical (the four), a geometrical (the pyramid), and at the same time js based on the assumption that it is “composed” of three 7 specific harmonies (intervals). 3 What is the source of Sextus and Anatolius-Iamblichus? In his investigations concerning mainly Tamblichus V. de Faleo (Sui Theologoumena Arithmeticae”, and “Sui trattati anit 7 POSIDONIUS AND NEOPLATONISN 83 pologiet di Nicomaco ed Anatolio”, Rivista Indo-Greca-Itaica 6 {922} St-60 and 49-61) suggested that this source might have een among others Pesidonius who in his commentary on Piato’s Titacus commented on the number four. Now, whether je was in a formal commentary or simply in some comments Jin Plato's Timacus, de Falco seems to have ‘well established his thesis that Posidonius commented on the four in such a way as to make it correspond to a pyramid and the soul at the sume fine; this would jibe perfectly with his definition of the soul us quoted by Plutarch (above p.36). But perhaps it is again possible to go one more step back *. In the well known quotation from Speusippus (Theologoumena arithmeticae 61-63, p. 82, 10-85, 23 Falco) Iamblichus reports that in his little book on Pythagorean numbers Speusippus in the first half of it devoted some space to a consideration of the five regular solids. It is almest impossible to imagine that in this consideration the equation four = pyramid did not occur, just as it occurs in the second half of his book (p. 84, 11 Falco). Perhaps it is not too risky to assume that it also contained the equation pyramid soul or at least some words making it easy for an imitator to proceed to this equation Pethaps it containeé the definition (fr. 40 Lang) soul = “idea” of the allextended, quoted by Tamblichus. It could very well have been among the sources of Posidonius or at least have inspired him and others to identify the soul with some mathematical. The equation soul = pyramid Sounds very crude, but so does the whole discussion concerning the number ten, preserved for us by Iamblichus in the form 2 literal quotation from Speusippus (fr. 4 Lang’. In any case and whatever the ultimate soures, th ion fo foun in Sextus Empitieus an Anatotin-Lamblichus, i ‘nother characteristic example of the attempts to identify the Bou! with thor ranches of aathensta SN fo steps, if we ascept the shooy of Es Robbin, “Posies = ct Psthagoresn Ari Patines 920) 209-208 nd = Phase Artholgy hare Pe 1970) 39-302 and “The Fal ek Artlogy's tidy 16 C921) 99-138 xp. 12 (eh ALS Di aaenmyat t Pon on nena 193) aca oe nd Posdons soe aitndogiea! eat omapoved in the 2nd centary. 3 POSIDONIUS AND NEOPLATONISM For modern thinking, the identification of soul and mathe~ maticals probably sounds somewhat fantastic *. But pethaps it can be explained in rather simple terms. When we speak of soul (or intelligence, voie, etc.), semiconsciously we take the ‘word to designate something subjective — consciousness, ete. — ‘as opposed to the objects of consciousness. But this is not the only possible point of view **. Reasonableness and reason may. very well be interpreted as two aspects of one and the same reality (whether or not we are going to use the term Absolute, Absolute Identity, ete. for it) — reasonableness as reason in its self-alienation and reason as reason having become conscious of itself, Indeed, can it be denied that in some sense of the word, reason is what it thinks, or that the objects are what they are thought to be? If we assume that the universe has a reasonable structure, we can express this conviction by saying that it has ‘a soul, intelligence, ete. Now, the best proof that the universe hhas a reasonable structure is that it is amenable to mathematical calculation ***. In other words, it seems to be helpful to approach Greek philosophy by way of Schelling, or even, to a certain extent, Kant. The latter turned ou: attention to the problem of appli- cability of mathematics to reality ****. To be sure, he explained itin terms of his theory of the a prior? and formal element of our knowledge and of his Copernican turn, certainly a most un-Greek explanation. But this is precisely the point where Schelling (and, in his Schellingian phase, Hegel) stepped in: reason is applicable to the universe because the universe is (objectively) reasonable, When Plato says that the world-soul causes by her thinking the reasonable motions of the universe, this is tanta- Gh alo A. Delato, Etudes sur de Kitéature pythagorisienne (1918), xp. 205-208 amd Slam" doctrings pytnagoricennes des Hvres de Numa", Bull de I Académie R de ‘Beghque (etre) 22 (086) 19-40, tracing back the revival of Pythagoiam t0 the beginning of the 2nd century B.C fe tg, W. D. Rows Plato's Theory of Has (1951) 213. 1 Ch i Helmet, Die secs graven Themen der abendlendischon Mtetaphysi8 (4980) 90-130, exp. 92; 118 E. Bickel, “Inoealitas FFeaachrift ser sevion.Tohrhanderierseines Geburstags. He Unieestel in Koenigsberg Pr (1928). chee, The History of Nature (1949) 2 “Tne exten o which this peoblem tle with us ean be scent. in Vs Keaft ik, Logik und Ch also 0. Becker, “"Mathematiehe " Tainbuck fuer Phlomphis ond Phacnomenotopsche Forschung 8 (1927) Carex Gea Mt, Stock Grandpeite der Mathematih (1946) 78-95. POSIDONIUS AND NEOPLATONISM 55 sount to the assertion that there are reasonable motions in the tiniverse, which can be known *, Thus, it may be appropriate to conclude this chapter by a quotation from Schelling’s Ueber das Verhaeltnis der bildenden ‘Keuenste zur Natur (1807): For intelligence (Verstand) could not make its object what contains no intelligence. What is bare of knowledge could not be known either. To be sure, the system of knowledge (Wissenschaft) by virtue of which nature works, is unlike that of man, which is conscious of itself (mit der Reflexion ihrer selbst verknuepfi. In the former thought (Begriff) does not differ from action, nor intent from exe- cution (Saemlliche Werke, 1. Abt., v. VIE [1860] 299). Appendix 1. The most recent presentation of Posidonias is that of K. Reinhardt in RE XXIT/1 (1953). Here on the passage in question (Posidonius in Plutarch) see p. 791 (cf. M. Pohlenz, Die Stoa, vol. II (2nd ed., 1955), p. 215). To reconcile this passage with their interpretation of Posidonius both Pohlenz. and Reinhardt must assume that the passage is strictly interpretative and does not Foply that Poxidonios shared he views which credited Plato will 2. For accepting the testimony of Iamblichus in preference eilitipn tenn techn od Mita eta Ps ig Ra tl eal ee re eh ee canine asus mares (peta opt

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