GT Neg

GDI 04 Greece/Turkey Neg
1 Nielson/Hahn
Greece/Turkey Negative
Greek Nationalism 1NC Shell (1) .............. 2 Cyprus Impact Module (1)......................... 4 2NC/1NR UQ Block.................................. 6 Anti-Americanism Up................................ 7 Cyprus = Priority for Greece...................... 8 No Major Policy Changes .......................... 9 Sex Trafficking/Human Rights Link ........ 10 US Military Presence Link....................... 11 Minority Rights/Immigration Unpop........ 12 Bad Economy Unpopular......................... 13 Spending Unpopular ................................ 14 Womens Rights Popular ......................... 15 Democracy Popular ................................. 16 Public Support Internal ............................ 17 Karamanlis/Greece Key to Reunify.......... 18 Cyprus Impact ......................................... 19 Terrorism Impact ..................................... 20 Greece/Turkish Coop Impact ................... 21 TURKISH POLITICS DA SHELL .......... 22 US/TURKEY COOP MODULE.............. 24 Uniqueness: Aegean ................................ 25 UNIQUENESS: Relations ....................... 26 UNIQUENESS: Hardliners...................... 27 LINK EXTENSIONS .............................. 28 NEW 2NC LINK..................................... 30 INTERNAL LINK EXTENSION ............ 31 IMPACT EXTENSIONS......................... 32 Turkey-EU Relations DA Shell................ 40 UNIQUENESS EXTENSIONS ............... 42 LINK EXTENSIONS .............................. 43 IMPACT EXTENSIONS......................... 44 STATE DEPARTMENT DA 1NC Shell.. 45 Impacts: US Leadership........................... 47 UQ extensions ......................................... 48 Link extensions........................................ 49 US-Greek Relations DA Shell.................. 51 Uniqueness Extensions............................. 52 Link Extensions ....................................... 54 2NC/1NR Link Wall ................................ 55 2NC/1NR: Aid Links ............................... 57 Link Extensions: Media Spin ................... 58 Impacts: Demo Promo ............................. 62 POLITICS LINKS TURKEY................... 64 BAN ARMS SALES TO TURKEY CP ... 67 BAN ARMS SALES EXTENSIONS....... 68 Consult Turkey 1NC ................................ 72 Turkey = yes / Genuine partnership key ... 73 Turkey = yes security issues.................. 74 Middle East policy / peace process link.... 75 Binding consult key to relations ............... 76 Binding consult key to base access........... 77 A2: consultation not needed ..................... 78 SHUNNING LINKS................................ 79 NGO CP Shell 1/2.................................... 80 Diversion NB Link Extensions................. 82 The 2NC Hammer.................................... 87 Aid Diversion Link Greece ................... 88 Trafficking K 1NC (1) .......................... 89 Sex Trafficking Discourse (1)............... 92 Sex Work Language (1)........................ 94 Stories of Violence................................... 96 Claims of Innocent Victims (1)............. 97 Anti-Trafficking (1) ................................. 99 Focus on Poverty ................................... 101 NO ESCALATION (Cyprus/Aegean) .... 102 NO ESCALATION: CYPRUS............... 103 NO ESCLATION: AEGEAN................. 104 NO ESCALATION: AIRSPACE T/O.... 109 SQO SOLVES: CBMS INCREASING .. 110 SQO SOLVES: CYPRUS ...................... 112 SQO SOLVES CYPRUS: Partition OK . 114 SQO SOLVES: G/T RELATIONS UP... 115
2 Nielson/Hahn
Greek Nationalism 1NC Shell (1)

A. Uniqueness 1. In the recent Greek elections, Papandreou lost because he failed to take sufficient control of his own party Karamanlis has a margin of maneuverability within his own party for the time being. Financial Times (London, England), Greece reaps the harvest of a shift to normality, 03/09/2004 But Mr Simitis largely failed to reform the state, a Leviathan with feet of clay, as it has aptly been described and a Leviathan that is fairly corrupt. He also failed to take sufficient control of his own party and to reform it. The new leader, George Papandreou, son of Pasok's founder, had little time to make his own mark; and the message he gave to the electorate lacked focus. Costas Karamanlis, New Democracy's leader, won a personal victory in the election. He shifted the party towards the middle ground. Some of the old guard often gave the impression that they were being dragged kicking and screaming to the centre but Mr Karamanlis appeared consensual and moderate in his policies. The electorate rewarded him with a comfortable majority, which should give him a wide margin of manoeuvre in his own party and beyond - at least for a while. 2. Conservative victory has strengthened nationalist elements in Greece Karamanlis has them in check now. Agence France Presse, Greeks Turn Right, But No Great Policy Changes Expected, 03/08/2004 The defeated socialists fear the resounding victory by the conservatives could provide a springboard to far-right circles. "ND's victory shows a conservative turn out of step with modern ideas," Tilemachos Chytiris, spokesman to outgoing Prime Minister Costas Simitis, said. "Karamanlis will have to show he can check far-right elements within his party," said Pantelis Kapsis, news editor at Greece's biggest, pro-socialist daily Ta Nea. Many ND supporters flirt with the Greek orthodox, radical Christian right. ND-renegade Yiorgos Karatzaferis founded LAOS, a far-right, xenophobic party, which fell short of a three-percent threshold to enter parliament, but hopes to do better in European Parliament elections in a few months. "Then, we will claim much more," Karatzaferis said. "Forty percent of ND supporters agree with Karatzaferis' ideas," political analyst Ilias Nikolakopoulos told AFP.
3 Nielson/Hahn
Greek Nationalism 1NC Shell (2)

B. The Link -
US presence and assistance to Greece will enflame Greek nationalism and anti-American sentiment.
AIM Athens, The Greeks Persistent Anti-Americanism, 2/12/1999, www.aimpress.ch/dyn/trae/archive/data/199912/91205-017-trae-ath.htm
Under such circumstances, "the rapid development of a diffused anti-Americanism that is not based on specific issues nor does it have specific demands, and that leads to all kinds of reactions is a negative symptom" wrote Christina Poulidou in "Avghi" (14/11). How
widespread is that phenomenon? Former conservative New Democracy (ND) minister and now independent deputy Vasilis Kontogiannopoulos wrote that "the outdated ideological reflexes of the Left meet with the nationalist reflexes of the populist Right in an extremist and leveling anti-Americanism which keeps Greece hostage" ("Ta Nea" 13/11). Prime Minister Costas Simitis even said: "I am sorry that ( ) ND is an antiAmerican, anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist party or movement" ("Avghi" 12/11). Indeed, the largest pro-ND newspaper "Eleftheros Typos," in an editorial (14/11), accused the Greek government of "submissiveness" and the US of engaging in the "national humiliation" of Greece. THis debate took place as US President Bill Clinton was to visit Greece: a trip initially sched led for 13-15 November, postponed for a week and shortened to 24 hours (19-20/11), partly because of an avalanche of negative reactions and planned demonstrations. "Demonstrations for the people to express their displeasure with the New World Order, and with the subservience that plagues not only the Greek but all European governments; ( ) displeasure with government policy and, especially, with some subservient journalists, from both Greece and the West, who are ruthless murderers of human dignity." These harsh words were written by George Stamatopoulos, a
journalist in "Eleftherotypia" (19/11), who thus showed little respect even for his colleagues with views different than his. Leading PASOK politicians also voiced or made known strong reactions. Former Minister Stelios Papathemelis considered Clinton's visit "a useless trip [that] now becomes dangerous" ("Eleftheros Typos" 14/11). PASOK's youth, along with those of the communist KKE, the leftist Coalition, and the socialist splinter DIKKI, declared "the representative of American imperialist policy persona non grata in our country" ("To Vima" 15/11). Eleven personalities -including two former leading PASOK politicians (Manolis Glezos and Manolis Drettakis) and former Minister and current PASOK deputy Professor George Mangakis- issued a very strong statement ("Eleftheriotypia" 15/11). "We are exasperated even by the thought that the US President's presence will contaminate the sanctified -
with the blood of sacrifice- soil of our motherland. We forbid him to set foot on Pnyka Hill -the temple of Democracy- and Parthenon - the temple of ineffable beauty. We regret that the Greek government ignores the feelings of the Greek people towards a murderer of people, ideals, values, beauty and life. We are happy to feel proud that once again the Greek people resists and fights against the charge of barbarism and will therefore be present in his mobilization against the visit of the lord of the planet."
4 Nielson/Hahn
Cyprus Impact Module (1)

C. The Impact 1. Greek cooperation is key to Cyprus reunification. Agence France Presse, Cyprus top priority for new Greek foreign minister, 3/10/2004 Solving the Cyprus problem will be the new Greek government's top foreign policy priority, Foreign Minister Petros Molyviatis, a tough-minded negotiator and veteran diplomat, said Wednesday. "Our immediate priority is to solve the Cyprus problem. We'll work on the basis of the agreement reached in New York, which allowed the resumption of negotiations... to reach a settlement by May 1," said Molyviatis at a ceremony marking the handover from his predecessor Tassos Yiannitsis. The president of the internationally-recognized Greek-controlled south, Tassos Papadopoulos, and Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash agreed in New York in February to resume talks aimed at reunifying the island on the basis of the UN blueprint before it joins the European Union on May 1. If they fail by March 22, Greece and Turkey will step in to try to push them forward.
Cyprus has been divided along ethnic lines since 1974 when Turkey invaded it and occupied its northern third in response to an Athensengineered Greek Cypriot coup aimed at uniting it with Greece.
Molyviatis is reputed to be a hardliner when it comes to dealing with Ankara but he is expected to adopt a constructive and firm attitude during the talks, according to analysts and diplomats. They said Molyviatis will likely pursue the policy of his Socialist predecessors in seeking a settlement for the divided Mediterranean island as well as a deeper rapprochement with NATO partner and arch-rival Turkey. 2. Enflamed Greek nationalism will prevent a resolution to the Cyprus issue. Financial Times (London, England), Greece reaps the harvest of a shift to normality, 03/09/2004 The new government will not have an easy task. It will immediately need to tackle the Cyprus issue, as the deadline for negotiations for a political settlement is getting very close. Mr Karamanlis may have to rein in some of the nationalist elements in his party. The process that began in New York almost three weeks ago, on the basis of the plan submitted by the UN secretary-general, already looks difficult to reverse. Mr Karamanlis is unlikely to try to do so. He is also expected to continue with the policy initiated by the previous government towards Turkey, which favours rapprochement, on the crucial assumption that Turkey becomes more European and grows closer to the EU. 3. Without a resolution of the Cyprus question, Turkey will not be accepted into the EU. Civilitas Research, Turkey: Cyprus Issue Threatens European Union Membership Hopes, 03/15/2003,
www.civilitasresearch.com/resources/view_article.cfm?artile_id=33
The failure to reach a settlement now means that the island of Cyprus will now enter the European Union divided in May 2004; a situation that will pose very real problems for Turkey. For a start Turkey will now face a direct danger of having any application for the start of membership talks vetoed by the Greek Cypriots. At the most recent European Council meeting in Copenhagen, in December 2002, Turkey's application for the start of formal membership discussions was effectively delayed until after another review in December 2004. However, assuming all goes well in terms of the EU enlargement process in the coming months, the review will now come at a time when Cyprus will be a full member of the European Union. As a full member it will have a right to block any decision concerning Turkey's application for membership. However, it is questionable whether the Greek Cypriots would even need to do this. Instead, by failing to persuade Mr Denktash to reach a settlement, Turkey will be caught in the anomalous situation of wanting to join the European Union and yet not recognising one of the European Union's member states. While the Republic of Cyprus is recognised internationally as the sole legitimate government of the whole of the island of Cyprus, Ankara only recognises the breakaway 'Turkish Republic of !!!!!!!
5 Nielson/Hahn
Cyprus Impact Module (2)

Civilitas Research continued Northern Cyprus'. Accession to the European Union requires a full and complete acceptance and implementation of the acquis communautaire, the EU's body of laws. Failure to accept a member would be in direct contravention of these terms. Turkey will therefore need to accept Cyprus. This means accepting the Greek Cypriot controlled Republic of Cyprus or else work to find a solution that would unite the two parts of the island. Just how serious this situation is for Turkey has been highlighted by the European Commission. Gunter Verheugen, the Commissioner for Enlargement, in a speech made to British parliamentarians at the start of March, stated that, 'Turkey is also well advised to reflect on the consequences of a non-settlement for its EU aspirations...It is difficult to see how it would be possible to start accession negotiations under such circumstances.' Such a view was restated after the breakdown of the discussions by Jean-Christophe Filori, the European Commission Spokesman, who also noted that with the accession of Cyprus Turkey would be in occupation of an EU member state. 4. EU rejection of Turkey makes wars in Europe inevitable Turkish Daily News, 03/04/2002
www.turkishdailynews.com/old_editions/03_04_02/for.htm
Motherland Party (ANAP) Deputy Chairman Bulent Akarcali cautioned that if Turkey's membership to the European Union is hindered, a fascist structure would take over in Turkey and a war would break out between Turkey and the EU. Akarcali said that if southern Cyprus was admitted to the EU, or if Europe turns its back on Turkey using the excuse of the death penalty, emotional Turkish people would be dragged into dangerous tendencies. 5. European wars spark nuclear wars Duffield, Political Science Quarterly, 1994 In all these ways, NATO clearly serves the interests of its European members. But even the United States has a significant stake in preserving a peaceful and prosperous Europe. In addition to strong transatlantic historical and cultural ties, American economic interests in Europe--as a leading market for U.S. products, as a source of valuable imports, and as the host for considerable direct foreign investment by American companies--remain substantial. If history is any guide, moreover, the United States could easily be drawn into a future major war in Europe, the consequences of which would likely be even more devastating than those of the past, given the existence of nuclear weapons.(11)
6 Nielson/Hahn
2NC/1NR UQ Block
The newly elected government provides uniqueness for our scenario Extend the Financial Times evidence it indicates that the previous Socialist Greek Premier Papandreou lost the election because he and his predecessor had failed to take sufficient control of the party. This evidence says that the new Premier of Greece, Karamanlis of the New Democratic Party, had to drag the opposition kicking and screaming to the center and that for the time being he has political maneuverability. The Agence France Presse evidence indicates that due to the ideological shift in the election outcome, Karamanlis victory has strengthened the far-right, nationalist elements of his party, which he has a tenuous check on in the status quo. And, Karamanlis has popular support now. Sydney Morning Herald, Spotlight OnThe Greek Elections, 03/11/2004 The election of the conservative Karamanlis Government in Greece, after 11 years of the socialist PASOK party, is being viewed by many as a positive victory. The Kathimerini newspaper editorialised: "[The party's] emphasis on the need for a state that can guarantee equal opportunity and equality before the law, a state that is not held ransom to conflicting interests, coupled with a carefully built-up image of modesty, as opposed to the unabashed arrogance of PASOK cadres, allowed New Democracy to send a reassuring, if not attractive, message even among voters with deep anti-right-wing reflexes." However, Papandreou downplayed nationalist elements of his party No evidence that Karamanlis can easily check enflamed nationalism. The Daily Telegraph (London), Papandreou tries on his father's shoes After the controversy of a decade ago Greece's most famous political dynasty is back in business, reports Kate Connolly in Athens, 01/10/2004 Possibly as a consequence of being shunned by his father, but more likely because of his own convictions and education, Mr Papandreou has developed very differently from his father. He has, in short, spent his whole political life trying to undo the damage wrought by him. "He has ditched the intransigent Greek nationalism, the anti-Americanism and the macho posturing of his father, and has faced down areas of institutional conservatism and genuinely embraced the European Union," said Misha Glenny, a Balkans expert.
7 Nielson/Hahn
Anti-Americanism Up
Anti-US sentiment up in Greece due to US assistance against terrorism during the Olympics. The Toronto Star, Overseas Force Bolsters 1,500 Greek Officials Two-week Drill Preparation for Games in Athens, 03/11/2004 Protests against the cameras and tight security have been staged in Athens and the northern city of Thessaloniki, which will host soccer preliminaries. Groups opposing the presence of foreign troops in the country plan to stage an "anti-Olympic and anti-American" rally today. Demonstrators are expected to march to the U.S. embassy. In Greece, hatred of the United States is now a definition feature of political life. Fouad Ajami, Majid Khadduri prof. at Johns Hopkins U.s School of Advanced International Studies, The American Enterprise, Europes anti-American obsession, December 1, 2003 A culture that casts so long a shadow is fated to be emulated and resented at the same time. The United States is destined to be fixed in the politics--and imaginations--of strangers even when the country accurately believes it is not implicated in the affairs of other lands. People cannot be talked out of this kind of anti-Americanism. Though Jordan is the recipient of a U.S. free-trade agreement, a privilege the United States shares only with a handful of nations, 71 percent of Jordanians believe the United States is more dangerous to the world than al-Qaeda. A sense of disinheritance has always hung over Jordan, and anti-Americanism emanates from it. In Greece, hatred of the United States is now a defining feature of political life. The United States offended Greece by rescuing Bosnians and Kosovars. The same Greeks who hailed the Serbian conquest of Srebrenica in 1995 and the mass slaughter of the Muslims there were quick to summon up outrage over the U.S. military campaign in Iraq. Greece is part of NATO and of the European Union, but the ethno-nationalism of Greece spins a narrative of Hellenic persecution at the hands of the United States. The aggrieved glide over the role the U.S. played in the defense and rehabilitation of Greece after World War II. They overlook the lifeline that migration to the U.S. offered untold numbers of Greeks, where they now prosper. The malady here is a Greek variant of what plays out in the world of islam: a belligerent political culture that, in an abdication of political responsibility from one's own world, searches for foreign "devils"
Athens is the most anti-American European capital.

AIM Athens, The Greeks Persistent Anti-Americanism, 2/12/1999, www.aimpress.ch/dyn/trae/archive/data/199912/91205-017-trae-ath.htm "Criminal, pervert, murderer, imposter, blood-thirsty, gangster, slayer, naive, criminal, butcher, stupid, killer, foolish, unscrupulous, disgraceful, dishonest, rascal. These are some of the adjectives I found in the Greek media of the last few days about the US President," wrote writer Nikos Dimou in his weekly column in "Ethnos" (14/11/1999). He had not seen the following quote of another columnist, Nikos Vardiambasis ("Eleftherotypia" 13/11): "Clinton is a miserable little Hitler that Adolph himself would not have made him even deputy commander of an army camp, because [Clinton] is stupid." No wonder then foreign diplomats and correspondents in Athens were saying that "Athens is the most anti-American European capital" ("Ta Nea" 20/11).
8 Nielson/Hahn
Cyprus = Priority for Greece

Greek PM Karamanlis has put Molyviatis in charge of the Cyprus issue. Agence France Presse, Cyprus top priority for new Greek foreign minister, 3/10/2004 He added that the resolution of the Cypriot issue was the incoming conservative government's top foreign priority. "Molyviatis is very experienced, he won't make any mistakes, he knows the issues and he will negotiate with the Turks as a good diplomat," a Greek analyst said. "It's because of his know-how that (new Greek Prime Minister) Costas Karamanlis put him in charge, to prevent mistakes from happening," he added.
9 Nielson/Hahn
No Major Policy Changes

Despite power shift in recent elections, there wont be any major Greek policy changes. Agence France Presse, Greeks Turn Right, But No Great Policy Changes Expected, 03/08/2004 Greece's conservatives, who scored a resounding victory in Sunday's election to sweep back to power after more than ten years in opposition, are not expected to radically depart from the policies of their predecessors, analysts said. "A new team takes the reins of the state apparatus after a socialist lock on all positions for 20 years," said Dinos Mitsis, news editor of Greece's English-language daily Athens News after early results showed the conservative New Democracy (ND) party had scored a strong victory. The socialist PASOK party held power for 19 out of the last 22 years, giving rise to widespread perception of cronyism. But he quickly added: "I don't expect any essential changes in foreign or economic policy." New Greek government wont change any policies from the old Greek government. The National Business (New Zealand), Greece moves to the centre-right after long socialist rule, 03/12/2004 One of the curiosities about the election in Greece last weekend, in which the conservative New Democracy party (ND) unseated the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (Pasok), was not the change of government itself but that the main issues immediately facing Greece were not discussed much during the election campaign. Indeed, the outgoing prime minister, George Papandreou, in his concession speech, delivered incidentally well before all the votes were counted, offered help to the man who will succeed him, Costas Karamanlis, in the negotiations on Cyprus and in the preparations for the Olympic Games in Athens in August this year and for which building of the stadiums is running well behind schedule. Perhaps it was not having much to disagree on that stopped them airing those and other issues. Greek government isnt expected by its people to make any dramatic changes in economic or foreign policy. Financial Times (London, England), Greece reaps the harvest of a shift to normality, 03/09/2004 Greece has become a normal European country, where new governments are no longer expected to bring about dramatic changes in economic or foreign policy. A small or medium-sized country has more limited room for manoeuvre in these areas, because the external environment has to be taken more or less as a given. Normality is closely linked to membership of the EU, which for Greece worked as a catalyst for modernisation and the opening of what used to be an inward-looking country, lacking in self-confidence. One indication of how much Greece has changed is the way it has absorbed, without much political or social upheaval, a large wave of immigrants following the fall of communist regimes in the Balkans and beyond.
10 Nielson/Hahn
Sex Trafficking/Human Rights Link

Empirically, Greeks hate US pressure on human rights issues the see it as another attempt at imperialist control of the planet.
AIM Athens, The Greeks Persistent Anti-Americanism, 2/12/1999, www.aimpress.ch/dyn/trae/archive/data/199912/91205-017-trae-ath.htm Sadly for him, but not so surprising for Greek observers, Turkish minority deputy of the Coalition party Mustafa Mustafa voiced an equally primitive anti-Americanism. He allied himself with mainstream Greek politicians notorious for their hostility towards the Turkish minority and towards the US Department of State for reporting annually, among other things, on that minority's human rights problems. "Peoples have visions, hopes and values and do not need the values and the visions of the lord of the planet [common attribute of Clinton in the Greek debate]. The problem lies not with the person of the lord of the planet; but with the values and the visions that the US wants to impose on humanity" Mustafa said while marching to protest Clinton's visit ("Paratiritis" 22/11).
11 Nielson/Hahn
US Military Presence Link

Greeks hate US troop and military presence in their country. The Toronto Star, Overseas Force Bolsters 1,500 Greek Officials Two-week Drill Preparation for Games in Athens, 03/11/2004 Protests against the cameras and tight security have been staged in Athens and the northern city of Thessaloniki, which will host soccer preliminaries. Groups opposing the presence of foreign troops in the country plan to stage an "anti-Olympic and anti-American" rally today. Demonstrators are expected to march to the U.S. embassy.
12 Nielson/Hahn
Minority Rights/Immigration Unpop.

Papandreou lost the recent election because he stressed minority rights and pro-immigration policies. New Statesman, When defeat is a new beginning; Observations on Greek socialists by Helena Smith, 03/15/2004 This helps to account for the socialists' stunning defeat. Since taking over Pasok, just four weeks ago, the mildmannered Papandreou has harped on about civil society and minority rights. He has taken the once-unthinkable step of embracing neoliberals. He uses slogans such as 'participative democracy', 'transparency' and 'society of knowledge'. Often, his own party cadres hardly understand such concepts - let alone the suggestion that they look 'beyond their own fears'. Successive surveys show that the Greek nation is one of the most xenophobic, anti-immigrant in the EU. 'Minority' is still a dirty word in a country that resolutely refuses to recognise any non-Orthodox-Christian Hellene other than the Muslim Turks of Thrace. It is testimony to Papandreou's tenacity - and determination to upgrade the quality of Greek democracy - that he chose throughout the election campaign to address such issues. The son of the American feminist Margaret Chant, his approach has what some call emotional intelligence.
13 Nielson/Hahn
Bad Economy Unpopular

Economic concerns resulted in Karamanlis victory in the recent Greek elections. The National Business (New Zealand), Greece moves to the centre-right after long socialist rule, 03/12/2004 Greece has been underachieving compared with other members of the European Union. After it joined the eurozone its inflation fell and it has recently had a growth-rate of about 4% but its unemployment is high, 8.8% overall, and much higher among younger workers. Part of the blame for the under-achievement has been the entrenched position of the unions and it is believed that Mr Karamanlis will be much better placed to bring about changes than Pasok, whatever Mr Papandreou's intentions. Economic factors are an important concern of the Greek people. Sydney Morning Herald, Spotlight OnThe Greek Elections, 03/11/2004 The Arab News, of Saudi Arabia, saw the promise of changes in the state sector of the Greek economy: "Private banks and big businesses are hoping their views will now count in Athens. Government employees in the bloated and over-manned state sectors . . . will be worried about their jobs."
14 Nielson/Hahn
Spending Unpopular
New Greek government must constrain spending to maintain public support. Financial Times (London, England), Greece reaps the harvest of a shift to normality, 03/09/2004 Having inherited one of the biggest public debts in the EU, together with a growing public deficit and a large current account deficit, the new government can ill afford a spending spree to keep its voters happy. The Olympics present a formidable organisational and security challenge. Meanwhile, several internal reforms - most notably of pensions are long overdue. The reforms are prompting much resistance - mainly because the potential losers are easily identified and well organised.
15 Nielson/Hahn
Womens Rights Popular

Womens rights are important to the Greek people. The Guardian (London), International roundup: Europe: New era for Greek politics, 03/11/2004 Heralding a new era in Greek politics, a determinedly youthful conservative government assumed office in Athens yesterday, five months ahead of the Olympic games. The 47-member cabinet was sworn in, in a ceremony that saw the New Democracy party replace the socialist movement, Pasok, for the first time in 11 years after its surprise, landslide victory in general elections last weekend. "The new government will act with modesty, humbleness, courage, decisiveness, vision and optimism," said the prime minister, Costas Karamanlis. He put his personal stamp on the government by giving portfolios to younger, western-trained politicians. The elections saw more women being elected to parliament than at any other time. Many new MPs won seats from senior members of Greece's two main parties. Womens rights are important to the new Greek government. Hamilton Spectator (Ontario, Canada), Authority figure; Greek premier-elect takes personal responsibility for Athens' Olympic readiness, 03/11/2004 Caramanlis also proposed a woman for the post of parliament speaker. If approved by the 300-member body, Anna Psarouda-Benaki would become the first woman to ever hold that post in Greece. Caramanlis created one new cabinet post -- tourism minister -- and abolished the press ministry. A number of ministries were renamed.
16 Nielson/Hahn
Democracy Popular
Recent Greek elections prove democracy is clearly more popular than socialism in Europe. Sydney Morning Herald, Spotlight OnThe Greek Elections, 03/11/2004 In France's Le Figaro, columnist Pierre Rousselin examined the fall of Europe's last socialist government. "Throughout Europe, the ability of the welfare state to offset the effects of globalisation are being assessed. "And when the left began shifting toward more right-wing policies, voters preferred the original to the copy. In Greece, as in other countries that have long known socialist reign, the left was handicapped by the resistance of an old guard that sought to shackle those with more modernist tendencies." Oslo's Aftenpost wrote: "Pensions reform and deregulation of the labour market have repeatedly been delayed because the socialists shied away from a confrontation with trade unions."
17 Nielson/Hahn
Public Support Internal

Greek government follows the desires of the Greek people, who are critical towards the US.
Agence France Presse, Greeks Turn Right, But No Great Policy Changes Expected, 03/08/2004 Conservative leader and prime minister-elect Costas Karamanlis, 47, is a dedicated European, in the tradition of his uncle Constantine Karamanlis, who led Greece into the then European Community in 1979. "I would say he (Karamanlis) will be more European than Atlanticist. He will attach great importance to relations with the United States but it is evident that he will be definitely more European-minded," Yiannis Loulis, a Karamanlis advisor, told AFP. "I think he will go along with those backing a speedier integration of Europe, like France or Germany," he added. "In foreign policy, every Greek government will have to take the people's feelings into account, and these are very critical towards the US," Mitsis said. Greek government will have to mobilize the silent majority toward reforms. Financial Times (London, England), Greece reaps the harvest of a shift to normality, 03/09/2004 The price for being a normal country is that Greece must operate under certain constraints, including those imposed by EU membership. Luckily, normality also brings tangible benefits, appreciated by most Greeks. The success of the new government will depend on its ability to mobilise the silent majority of potential winners in favour of muchneeded reforms.
18 Nielson/Hahn
Karamanlis/Greece Key to Reunify Cyprus

Karamanlis is working with Turkey to reunify Cyprus. The National Business (New Zealand), Greece moves to the centre-right after long socialist rule, 03/12/2004 Just as immediately, he will be faced with negotiations over Cyprus. On May 1 the Greek part of Cyprus will join the European Union (EU), together with nine other countries. There is a concerted international effort, involving the UN, for Cyprus to be reunited. The Turkish military occupied the northern part of Cyprus in 1974 and there have effectively been two republics since then. There are about 200,000 people living in the Turkish part of Cyprus out of a total population of about 750,000. The decision to admit the Greek part of Cyprus to the EU has created pressures for the two parts of the island to come together again. Because Turkey wants to join the EU and the settlement of the Cypriot question might be considered a mark in its favour, Turkey is disposed to see the issue settled. The commission president, Romano Prodi, says Turkey's efforts to see the Cypriot problem fixed and its admission to the EU are inextricably mixed, though it is not a firm position with a great many of the present EU members. Kofi Annan, the secretary-general of the UN, has set a number of dates for agreement. One of them, for a referendum within Cyprus was April 21. Greece did not like the date because it was the anniversary of the setting up of a military dictatorship in 1967 in Greece. Mr Annan then set the date for April 20. Mr Karamanlis, like Mr Papandreou, takes a conciliatory attitude toward Turkey. Rauf Dentash, the Turkish Cypriot leader, said there was no chance of an agreement between the two communities by May 1. Nevertheless, as soon as he takes office, Mr Karamanlis will be faced with a very tight timetable on Cyprus as well as on the stadiums for the Olympic Games and will probably accept such help as he can get, including from Mr Papandreou.
Greece concessions are key to Cyprus resolution.

Times Newspapers Limited, The New Athenians, 03/09/2004 But he leaves to Mr Karamanlis the basis for a breakthrough on Cyprus and a solid Greek relationship with Europe and America. Cyprus will be the first big test. Under the tight United Nations timetable, the two Cypriot sides have until March 22 to negotiate on the UN peace plan. So far, neither side seems ready to rise above the deadlock which, this time, has arisen largely from the reluctance of the Greek Cypriot side to made further concessions. Greece and Turkey will have to intervene, and Mr Karamanlis will lead his country in crucial negotiations with Turkey this month.
19 Nielson/Hahn
Cyprus Impact
Greek nationalism prevents a resolution to the Cyprus problem. Turkish Daily News, Us and Them, 02/25/2003 Our intelligentsia perceives EU membership perhaps as the sole identity asset to hold on to. And it believes Ataturk, or state nationalism, as he described, prevents a solution to the Cyprus problem, an obstacle for EU membership. Together with certain religious circles, who deem themselves to have been oppressed by the state, these intellectuals can call for a solution that is not in line with national interests. Both of them are so preoccupied with their own problems that they are not aware even of Greek Cypriots' nationalism which has not secularized and whose strength stems from its primitiveness. They are enchanted by the Hellenistic propaganda which shows what is nonexistent as existing and what is existing as nonexistent.
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Terrorism Impact
Enflamed Greek nationalism as a result of anti-Americanism causes terrorism. Irish News, Terrorists Face Life for a Generation of Murders, December 9, 2003 IN an avalanche of verdicts against terrorists who once taunted authorities, a Greek court yesterday convicted the mastermind, chief gunman and 13 other members of the November 17 cell for killings and attacks spanning a generation.
The terror gang's last victim was British military attache Brigadier Stephen Saunders who was gunned down as he drove to work in Athens in June 2000. His widow Heather, who was born n Co Fermanagh, brought pressure on Greek authorities with tearful appeals following the assassination. "They killed 23 people, but it is 23 widows, there's goodness knows how many children, how many parents. They will all carry this scar for the rest of their lives, " she said after the verdicts. The rulings - following a nine month trial in a bunker-like Athens prison courtroom - cap one of the last major prosecutions against European militants inspired by 1970's visions of Marxism and social revolution. "Democracy has defeated terrorism, " government spokesman Christos Protopapas said. The trial also was seen as a boost for Greece's terrorist-fighting image before it hosts next year's Olympics. "Terrorism received a decisive blow and, of course, Greece is now viewed throughout the world as one of the safest countries, something very significant especially in light of the Olympic Games, " Mr Protopapas said. In the past, Greece was accused of lacking the political will to attack domestic terror groups led by November 17 - named for a day in 1973 when Greece's then military rulers crushed a studentled protest. "Greek justice spoke today, " Athens Mayor Dora Bakoyianni said.
Pavlos, a spokesman for the conservative New Democracy party, was killed by the group in 1989. He was among 23 people killed by November 17 since the ambush of a CIA station chief returning home from a Christmas party in 1975. From there, the group's death toll grew to include three more American envoys, two Turkish diplomats and prominent Greek political and business figures.
Her husband But Greece's statue of limitations meant the trial of the 19 defendants could only cover acts during the past 20 years. The three-judge panel - working under Greece's new anti-terrorism laws - issued blanket convictions against Alexandros Giotopoulos (59), as the leader of the group. Among the other 14 men convicted were several key figures including the main assassin, 45-year-old Dimitris Koufodinas, who is linked to most of the group's slayings and was known by the code name Poison Hand. Four defendants were acquitted because of lack of evidence, including the lone woman suspect, who is also Koufodinas' wife. The entire group sat stone faced as the head judge took more than 90 minutes to read the verdicts from the hundreds of charges that included bank robberies and bombings. Sentencing is expected tomorrow. Many of those found guilty face multiple life sentences. Greece does not have the death penalty. "The decision was expected. I was condemned from the start, " the silver-haired Giotopoulos, a French-born academic who lived under an alias in Greece for decades, said. Giotopoulos steadfastly denied any links to the group. But others freely admitted their roles. Koufodinas told the court he took "political responsibility" for all the group's actions and was defiant to the end. "We don't care about the court's judgment, " he said. "We care about the judgment of the Greek people."
November 17's proclamations professed a mix of hardline Marxism, Greek nationalism and opposition to the power of America and its main allies. They also mocked authorities by evading arrests for decades and building a reputation as the untouchable cousins of other European guerrilla groups:
21 Nielson/Hahn
Greece/Turkish Coop Impact

Greek nationalism will destroy Greek cooperation with Turkey. Turkish Daily News, Us and Them, 02/25/2003 Greek nationalism was born and developed within Orthodox religion during the Ottoman Empire. Religion shaped the nationalism. Volunteers coming from Europe to help Greeks in the Patrar revolt of 1820 were disappointed when they saw the revolting Greeks had nothing to do with Hellenes. And Greeks came to realize that they would not receive backing from Europe if they were not perceived as Hellenes. In the end, an identity mixture with a superficial, even fake, Hellenism and a strong but deep-felt Orthodoxism emerged. The Greeks learned not to appear as they were while wearing the Hellenic guise. Their ability to carry out propaganda to promote their interests improved when they were trying to appear like a Hellene. Then, in order to look like Hellenes despite not being Hellenes, the Greeks presented the Ottoman-Turkish identity as something different from them; barbarian, backward and the source of all evil. This is how their anti-Turkish propaganda, meant to make them look civilized and Western, developed. But the Greek largely remained an Orthodox Byzantine Greek, its true identity. This Orthodox-Hellenist identity is very strong because it intermingles religion and nationalism. In this identity, religion cannot be an autonomous mental and conscience authority supervising the sins committed in the name of nationalism. The Turk, an enemy in the political field, is attributed as an inhumane character as it is perceived as the enemy of both the religion and the nation. In this way, the Greek perceives the Turk as an evil force because it sees the Turk an enemy not only on the mundane but also on the divine axes. And this fight against the enemy does not only become political but also has certain metaphysical and cosmic ideals, such as saving the Orthodoxism, Hellenism and the "humanity". In this sense, an autobiography by Kazancakis, called "Letters to Greko" is an interesting document.
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TURKISH POLITICS DA SHELL

Turkish nationalism is in check now
Financial Times (London, England) - 7/19/04 HEADLINE: Anniversary calls for change of heart Kerin Hope and Metin Munir say prospects for a settlement are dim even though both sides need a deal In the north, the political landscape has changed beyond recognition since the sidelining of Rauf Denktash, the veteran Turkish Cypriot president. Mr Denktash, who turns 80 next year, is unlikely to stand for re-election in April 2005. For three decades, Mr Denktash, had set a hardline Cyprus policy agenda both in northern Cyprus and in Ankara. In December, however, his National Unity Party (UBP) was trounced in parliamentary elections. His support in Turkey has also been on the wane since the Justice and Development party won a large majority in Turkey's general elections of November 2002. His stance has been successfully challenged by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the new Turkish prime minister, who has been keen to remove the Cyprus problem as an obstacle to his own country's EU accession. The EU and the US have also bypassed Mr Denktash, preferring to deal with Mehmet Ali Talat, the new Turkish Cypriot prime minister who is refreshingly soft-spoken and straightforward. B. CONCESSIONS ON CYPRUS ISSUE GALVANIZES TURKISH HARDLINERS GORDON AND BARKEY 2K2 The National Interest
The military does not worry for nothing. After years of stability the electorate-having historically opted for moderate center-right formations-is showing signs of desperation. In 1995, an anti-Western Islamist party (Welfare), won a plurality with 21 percent of the vote. In 1999, two nationalist parties-the current prime minister Bulent Ecevit's center-left Democratic Left Party and his deputy Devlet Bahc eli's far-right Nationalist Action Party, garnered 20 and 19 percent of the votes, respectively. These strange bedfellows then teamed up with Mesut Yilmaz's center-right Motherland Party to form the ruling coalition. The current instability of the Turkish electorate is further demonstrated by recent polls showing that under today's electoral system, the coalition's three constituent parties would fail to garner the requisite 10 percent of the vote to remain in parliament. This kind of uncertainty is not conducive to new thinking, least of all about Cyprus, and could easily ! activate the existing nationalist impulses of the current coalition government. Ecevit is on record as having said that the present division of Cyprus is the most desirable solution. His poor health and the possibility that his party may disintegrate should he have to leave office might also make the search for a solution more difficult. Bahc eli, as head of a future coalition led by his ultra-nationalist Nationalist Action Party, might use Cyprus as a means to establish his nationalist credentials. Rightly or wrongly, the Turkish political-military elite will approach the Cyprus accession issue as one no less existential in nature than the Kurdish and Islamist problems of the past decade. There has been little debate on the merits of the Turkish position and tactics; support for Denktash has been solid irrespective of events in northern Cyprus. Dissent on Cyprus, as the Turkish ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
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TURKISH POLITICS DA SHELL

LINK CARD CONTINUED .. columnist Ferai Tinc points out, is often branded as treasonous by Denktash and the hardliners. Challenges to the Turkish military by opposition figures in northern Cyprus have also strengthened the military's determination not to concede. More importantly, the Cyprus issue will invariably be seen as part and parcel of a European attempt to deny Turkey what is rightfully its due. Cyprus could thus emerge-and very soon-as the issue that decides Turkey's long-term future with Europe. Any concessions Turkish Cypriots might be required to make can galvanize not only the nationalistic elements in Turkey, but also those who have been opposed to European membership because of the domestic economic and political changes it would entail. Such a coalition could include established parties like the Nationalist Action Party, the nationalist Left, elements of the military worried about European demands for greater cultural autonomy for Kurds, and inward-looking business elites. Even Islamist groups that have become increasingly pro-European may switch sides if the global anti-terrorism campaign increasingly assumes a West-versus-Islam character, despite Washington's best efforts to prevent that from happening. For some, the temptation might be to replace Europe with a special security relationship with the United States, while maintaining the customs union with the EU.
And, hardline political resurgence crushes Turkey-Israel alliance

Israeli, Professor of Islamic, Middle Eastern, and Chinese Affairs at Hebrew Univeristy. January 2001. Orbis While the blunt intervention of the army calls into question Turkey's maturity as a modern liberal state, there is no doubt that it also reflects Turkey's determination to continue to align itself solidly with the West, including Israel. It is equally evident, however, that Islam has insinuated itself into the heart of Turkey's outwardly secular political system. It is reasonable to assume that should Islam reemerge as a strong political force, the question of Turkish identity will again come to the fore and militate against the present rapprochement with Israel.
C. The Impact Israel/Turkey alliance key to preventing war in the ME National Review 3/8/99
Here, then, are two wars that did not take place. That is good news. But there is no shortage of issues in the Middle East that at any moment can erupt into local or regional war. On the whole, the Turkish-Israeli axis seems likely to provide a more lasting impetus to peace than any other conceivable combination of states, but of course it might oblige Greeks and Arabs and Iranians to form a contrary bloc. Such is the fluid aftermath of the Cold War. This is best expressed in a less complacent way: If great powers will not impose peace in circumstances of unavoidable conflict, lesser powers must do it for themselves.
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US/TURKEY COOP MODULE

NATIONALISM THREATENS COOPERATION WITH WEST LESSER-SENIOR ANALYST RAND-2001 TURKEY, GREECE, AND THE U.S. IN A CHANGING STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT As a result of internal disputes and legal restrictions, Turkey's Islamists have become a less potent force on the political scene, although some, including former Istanbul Mayor Recep Tayip Erdogan, remain highly popular. Overall, the confrontation between the Islamists and the secularists is less clear-cut now than a decade ago. The more significant force on the Turkish scene today is arguably Turkish nationalism -- and the behavior of Turkey's nationalist party, the MHP, is one of the large open questions for the future. It could also have important implications for Turkish policy on key issues such as Cyprus and U.S. access to Turkish facilities, already constrained by Turkish sovereignty concerns and the lack of a shared regional strategy. The strong reaction to Congressional debate over a non-binding Armenian genocide resolution, and the threat of Turkish retaliation on defense cooperation and trade, points to the continued potential for national sensitivities to impede predictable cooperation. THE IMPACT-- US/Turkey
cooperation is key to prevent war in the Middle East
Bagci, Turkeys Neighbourhood Part II, June 15 2003

www.foreignpolicy.org.tr/eng/articles/middleeast2_190603.htm
To find an answer to this is difficult. Turkey at the moment, at least, seems to be an external factor that is trying to bring the Arab nations and other countries in the region together while keeping very close relations with Israel. It is trying to introduce a new atmosphere into the political development of the Middle East. I think for the first time since the 90s there is no strong negative reaction from the rest of the region to Turkeys relations with Israel. This is a positive development. Due to Turkeys decision not to allow American troops to pass through its territory it is currently receiving a lot of sympathy from Arab as well as European countries. On the other hand, this decision, of course, caused great anger for the American government because they realized that Turkey is no longer acting along the same lines. I think the Turkish parliaments decision not to bring the motion was an ethically right but strategically wrong decision for Turkeys overall foreign policy. My expectation is that the Ak Party governments policies will be important from now on. They will help decide whether Turkey can be a real player in the shaping of developments in the Middle East. Turkey may have better cards in its hand than in previous experience, however there lies the danger that Turkey is excluded from this process altogether. There are some signs to this respect because the American government will put much stronger pressure on the regional countries to take part in the process of transforming the Middle East. Thus, Turkish-American relations will determine how much Turkey can get involved in the affairs of the Middle East and be a part of it. The more Turkey works together with the United States of America then the better chance it will be part of the Middle East transformation process; the more Turkey is confrontational with the United States of America then most probably it will be kicked out of Middle Eastern developments.
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Uniqueness: Aegean
The US wont push Turkey on Aegean issue anytime soon Ambassador R. Nicholas Burns 10-29-98 http://www.ahiworld.com/103098.html
Turkey: on the issue of Turkey's territorial claims in the Aegean, the U.S. does not regard itself as able to arbitrate on a legal issue. This does not mean that the U.S. does not take a position or is neutral. It does this in private. But the U.S. has good experience of the International Court of Justice in The Hague and feels that disputes of the kind between Greece and Turkey should be referred there. The U.S. does not see any advantage to be gained from seeking to apply public pressure to Turkey. Its objective was to use its influence to persuade Turkey to "take the right steps."
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UNIQUENESS: Relations
Greek and Turkish leaders maintain a fragile dtente---the are able to foster relations without upsetting nationalist concerns at home Wilkinson, 1999 (M. James, Moving Beyond Conflict Prevention, A Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, June) http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/wilk/wilk.htm
By Western calculations, this political and economic progress should translate into strong incentives for resolving old differences and forging new cross-Aegean partnerships. A number of areas virtually cry out for action. For two neighboring economies, bilateral trade of around $300 million a year is minuscule; transportation and energy infrastructure is not coordinated on a bilateral, much less regional basis; and environmental cooperation is in its infancy, despite rising Aegean pollution. At a more basic level, there is relatively little tourist trade between the two countries; the media of each have almost no representation in the other; and cultural and educational exchanges are minimal. The two prime ministers made openings that could have presaged a warming of relations. In March 1996 Prime Minister Yilmaz put a more flexible approach on the table with his Aegean "peace initiative," which for the first time incorporated Turkish willingness to consider third-party mediation for Aegean disputes.18 Under what conditions or at what price, however, remains to be determined. Turkey is said to have backed out at the last minute when American diplomats on the margins of the UN General Assembly in September 1997 thought they had brokered a trade-off involving Greek release of EU funds for Turkey and Turkish acceptance of third-party mediation on Imia/Kardak. On the Greek side, Prime Minister Simitis spoke in favor of better relations with Turkey and articulated a "step-by-step" formulation less confrontational than his predecessor's. In mid-1997, Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos's forthright expression of Greek support for Turkey's future EU membership seemed to confirm a sea change in Athens, but harsh rhetoric soon spoiled improvements in the atmosphere. In Turkish eyes, any substantive shift in Greek policy was belied at the December 1997 Luxembourg EU summit, when Greece openly supported a hard line against Turkey. Two recent concrete bilateral initiatives, promoted by Western diplomats, briefly flowered in 1997 only to wilt in the heat of Aegean cross fire. The Dutch EU presidency in the first half of 1997 persuaded the two countries to establish a "wise men's group," hoping to promote at least a minimal dialogue. Athens and Ankara each appointed two representatives, but reports submitted to the EU by the two sides in 1997 produced no basis for progress. The Greek side insisted on a severely circumscribed agenda with exchanges in writing only, and, after the Luxembourg summit, the Turkish side in any case refused to work through the EU on political issues. At the NATO summit in Madrid in July 1997, Greek Prime Minister Simitis and Turkish President Demirel issued a communiqu confirming six points agreed on by their foreign ministers to advance peaceful relations.19 The points included such language as respect "for each other's legitimate vital interests and concerns in the Aegean," "commitment to refrain from unilateral acts. .. to avoid conflicts," and "commitment to settle disputes by peaceful means. .. without use of force or threat of force." The development was hailed at the time as a potentially significant substantive advance and a logical first step in a confidencebuilding process. There was no visible follow-up, however, and, by October, both Greece and Turkey were again trading rhetorical blows while accusing each other of reneging on promises made in Madrid. To sum up, the two prime ministers can justifiably claim to have made an effort with new initiatives. Neither succeeded in any significant way. Why? At the risk of being unfair, the answer seems to be primarily the stultifying effect of domestic pressures. The prime ministers have not been strong enough to flout nationalists, within or outside their own parties. Public proposals therefore have necessarily been mini-steps, shaped to look statesmanlike at home by garnering support from Western governments while giving away nothing. They may not be a dialogue of the deaf, but they do approach a zero-sum debating game, with neither side able to risk allowing the other to score a point.
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UNIQUENESS: Hardliners
TURKISH MODERATES ARE IN CONTROL NOW NATIONALISTS ARE WATCHING FOR ANY WEAKNESS ON CYPRUS ISSUE HOTTELET-long-time correspondent for CBS-12/17/02 The Christian Science Monitor It should have been quite clear in Copenhagen that Turkey is engaged in what could be a historic transition holding enormous stakes for Europe as well. This fall, the Turkish people swept away the political parties whose incompetence and corruption stood in the way of economic revival and social stability. A free election gave the moderate Islamist AKP - the Justice and Development Party - a huge parliamentary majority and a mandate, the first to a religion-based group, to govern the country. The AKP's victory is, however, somewhat conditional. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey, decreed it be a secular state. The Army, a dominant power in the land, sees its duty as preserving this legacy, and has over the years removed a number of governments that aroused its disapproval. Together, with those who suspect the AKP of having a hidden activist Islamist agenda, it is watching the new government very closely. Nationalist elements, including hard-liners who, among other things, want no relaxation of Turkey's hold on northern Cyprus, have mounted vociferous opposition.
Turkish nationalists are dormant now but waiting to pounce

Global News Wire - Asia Africa Intelligence Wire - 6/18/04 HEADLINE: EU LEADERS HAVE A DUTY Let's start talking very openly and bluntly, because it seems some EU leaders still do not fully appreciate the huge risks that the Erdogan government is taking in pushing for reforms and deep-rooted change in Turkey. Let us be frank. There was a strong lobby against most of the reforms the government has undertaken in the past year, and the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) had to brave the strong conservative establishment that had managed to move political mountains in the past in order to secure the changes. Let no one make any mistake that the conservative establishment has been tamed. On the contrary they are lying low and waiting in anticipation of the day when the EU leaders elbow Erdogan aside and they can rise to the occasion to restore their repressive trends in Turkey. Do the EU leaders think that former Kurdish deputies Leyla Zana, Hatip Dicle and the two others were released from jail simply because the judicial system in Turkey suddenly decided to comply with the Copenhagen criteria? Is anyone in EU power circles so naive as to believe that this is true? Don't they know that the government worked with great sensitivity and determination to secure the release of these former deputies despite strong objections and resistance from the judicial extensions of the conservative lobby? Yet the government did twist some arms and did get this decision through. Do the EU leaders think that getting Kurdish language broadcasts on Turkish radio and television was done with ease? Of course not. Again, the government had to overcome opposition and resistance to impose its will on the conservative establishment. But we see with sadness that some leaders still do not appreciate how hard it was to get all this accomplished as they toy around with words in their communique in order to remain vague about Turkey's prospects of getting a date to start accession talks. These people should realize that even now the hard-liners of the conservative establishment will be preparing to "get" the Erdogan government. The leaders should be defending Erdogan and his Cabinet through their actions, but it seems they are bent on doing just the opposite. The EU leaders should not be preparing to feed Erdogan and his colleagues to the lions.
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LINK EXTENSIONS
TURKISH SOFTLINE ENFLAMES NATIONALISTS GIANNAKAKI-LUDWIG BOLTZMANN INSTITUT OF HUMAN RIGHTS UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA-2K3 http://www.univie.ac.at/bim/download/THESIS_Angeliki_Giannakaki.pdf
The new AKP government in Turkey, which came into power on 3 November 2002 elections, had the intention to put pressure for the Cyprus agenda to go forward. The AKP, with its Islamic roots coming into power is willing to differentiate itself from the Islamic forces and claim to be a centre-right party. Its main goal is the European Union accession process. Selfpreservation is its main strategic policy making, even though the state prohibited from its leader and founder of the AKP, Recep Tayyip Erdogan from running the elections in 2003. However, the EU accession process is offering Turkey the conditions on democracy in order to set the Copenhagen criteria. The EU accession is not depending only in the democratisation of Turkey but also in the solution to the Cyprus problem. Even though Erdogan is not tied to Denktash vision of Cyprus, he is willing to make a compromise over Cyprus.226 He faced, though, many protests and had to confront the military and civil forces in Turkey, who were in favour of Denktash policy over Cyprus. The Turkish Parliament showed his position when it voted against the US troops to land in the Turkish territory, when the Iraq war broke out in March 2003. In The Hague talks, Erdogan denounced the UN General Secretary as having deceived him on the Cyprus question and therefore he closed the chapter on the negotiations.227 By not allowing the US forces to be based in Turkey, the government lost the US, one of its allies and showed its inability to turn the matter to the parliament. No one knows what will happen next, since Denktash seems to reject any plan that is offered to both sides and the outlines of a solution would be beyond the limits of accessibility. Turkey has to push harder on Denktash to compromise because the more isolated Turkey becomes, the less likely it will become to join the EU and to find a solution on the island. Cyprus accession now is unstoppable (at least the Greek part) and most of the observers blame the Turkish side for its intransigence.
CONCESSIONS ON CYPRUS ARE POLITICALLY UNPOPULAR -GIANNAKAKI-LUDWIG BOLTZMANN INSTITUT OF HUMAN RIGHTS UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA2K3 http://www.univie.ac.at/bim/download/THESIS_Angeliki_Giannakaki.pdf As Seymen,228 is pointing out the main points that Turkeys government party, opposition party in parliament and the majority of the people desire. Firstly, Turkey should continue to defend and support Northern Cyprus, otherwise it looks like it abandons Turkeys historical and legal rights and national interests. Secondly, Cyprus is strategically important for the national security of Tukey and it is important for its access to energy transport lines and water resources. Thirdly, if Cyprus comes under control of a rival force, Turkey would be encircled in Anatolia. Turkey finds it irrelevant Cyprus and Turkeys accession to the EU even though it finds the latter doubtful to happen. It believes that the TRNC should become internationally recognised as an independent state. Finally, it accepts only reasonable territorial concessions to the Greek side.
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LINK EXTENSIONS
US attempts at political settlements are perceived by Turkey as an attempt at fragmenting the nation
Kemal Kirisci, Professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Bogazici University, 1998. Middle East Review of International Affairs. TURKEY AND THE UNITED STATES: AMBIVALENT ALLIES. http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1998/issue4/jv2n4a3.html#author Thirdly, given Turkish leader's reluctance to consider any solution other than a military one to the Kurdish question--which they define as a problem of terrorism--U.S. support for political solutions such as official recognition of the Kurds' ethnic, cultural and linguistic identity is considered blatant interference in Turkey's internal affairs and an attempt to undermine the Turkish state's unity. These aspects of Turkish perceptions of U.S. policy aggravate the "Sevres phobia" and produces public statements at the highest level of a U.S. intention to weaken and cause the dismemberment of Turkey.
Efforts at dtente are political suicide extremists would use these actions as a springboard to power Wilkinson, 1999 (M. James, Moving Beyond Conflict Prevention, A Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, June) http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/wilk/wilk.htm Yet Greek, Turkish, and Cypriot political leaders often appear to be waiting for reconciliation rather than pursuing it. Peacemaking is a slippery political slope in all three countries, since public opinion as reflected in the media is prone to rapid swings when the media or politicians appeal to nationalist sentiment. There are always opponents who pounce on any suggestion of concession as a sign of weakness or sacrificing of principle. Governments therefore tend to preempt opposition by staking out tough lines and invoking national unity. It is an atmosphere seemingly calculated to discourage dtente efforts. Public opinion drives Greek and Turkish policy--moves toward reconciliation will meet with massive opposition Clapsis, 2000 (Antonios, The Aegean Sea Conflict: A Recent Perspective, Spring, Brownstone Journal)
http://people.bu.edu/bjournal/archive/spring2000/aegean.htm
The public opinion of both countries profoundly affected the policies of Greece and Turkey. Underlying those opinions is the classical hatred that has marked Greco-Turkish relations. As Greek Premier George Papendrou would admit, "I may not believe in a Turkish threat, you may not believe in a Turkish threat, but the Greek public believes in it, and that makes it Greek reality and you have to deal with it in those terms."38 This helped explain Papandreou's call as a member of the opposition in 1976 for the Greek government of Constantine Karamanlis to sink the Sizmik.39 As Tozun Bahcheli argues, "The greatest setback to the prospect of a Greek-Turkish settlement was dealt by Andreas Papandreou's PASOK government when it came to power in 1981. In opposition, Papandreou had made firmness in dealing with the Turkish threat a major element of his party's appeal."40 One of the most basic centripetal forces for any country consists in uniting against a common enemy. This force has kept countless states, otherwise torn by social or ethnic divisions, united to reach a common purpose. The opposition parties in both Greece and Turkey expropriated this right from the ruling party to serve their own self-interest. Papandreou's call to sink the Sizmik in 1976 would have driven Greece and Turkey to catastrophic war. His militant and jingoistic appeals to the Greek national identity made forging eventual peace when he succeeded Karamanlis much harder to achieve. Opposition leaders gained strength in a hard-line approach to the other country, but when they came to power they found that they were constrained by their own propaganda. The hard-line approach was used in both Greece and Turkey to undermine the ruling government so that the opposition could gain power. But the militancy has lasting effects on the national psyche. As Papandreou pointed out, when the Greek public believes that the Turks are a threat, it is a reality to be dealt with. When Papandreou bombarded the Greeks with negative images about the Turks, their belief in the Turks as the "root of all things evil" became stronger. Even if it was not a reality, Papandreou's militant nationalism made it Greek reality, and as Premier he had to deal with it in those terms. The centripetal nature of uniting against the common foe has damning repercussions when used by the opposition party. Even when conciliation serves the national self-interest, it cannot always be pursued because the nation itself has lost sight of where its real interests lie in the vision of hate with which they have been inculcated.
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NEW 2NC LINK

US assistance to Turkey undermines Turkish-Israeli alliance Waxman Winter 1999, The Washington Quarterly. Vol. 22, No. 1; Pg. 25 Turkey and Israel: A New Balance of Power in the Middle East The remaining question in all this is what the United States should do to ensure that two of its most important allies and the only two secular and democratic countries in the region continue their blossoming friendship. The answer, for once, is simple and straightforward: nothing. Israel and Turkey have come together so far out of an awareness of their mutual interests, and their interests in a stronger relationship do not look likely to disappear. If anything, they will deepen. Not only is American assistance in this relationship unnecessary, it may even be counterproductive: Public opinion in Turkey may come to see the relationship as simply an American ploy to divide the country from the Muslim world, aggravating latent anti-American sentiments. A stronger U.S. role would also bolster suspicions in the Arab world that the Turkish-Israeli connection is part of an American scheme to encircle them. The United States can therefore happily sit back on the side-lines and watch its regional allies develop an alliance that may at last ensure some peace in that most troubled region in the world.
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INTERNAL LINK EXTENSION

Islamic coup would crush Israeli-Turkish alliance
Israeli, Professor of Islamic, Middle Eastern, and Chinese Affairs at Hebrew Univeristy. January 2001. Orbis There is no doubt, however, that the most menacing issue in the Turkish-Israeli partnership in the long term is the prospect that ultra-nationalist or ultra-religious factions in Turkey may agitate to return their country to its Anatolian-Asian or even Islamic roots, undoing the Kemalist heritage so jealously guarded by the military. An insoluble dilemma would then confront Israel and the West. Is the partnership with Turkey so important that it is worth maintaining even under the bayonets of the Turkish military? Or is it preferable to allow "democracy" to triumph even at the cost of Turkey's slipping--as Iran did two decades ago and Algeria almost did less than a decade ago--into the anti-Western Islamic camp? The stepped-up activity of the Turkish Hizbullah in the eastern confines of the country at the beginning of 2000, which generated killings and arrests on a massive scale, and the gains of the Hizbullah in Lebanon against Israel in summer 2000 do not augur well. For if the strategic partnership betwee n Israel and Turkey is perceived as resting on the coercive power of their arms rather than on the democratic principles they claim to uphold, its longevity will be anyone's guess.
Turkish Democracy vulnerable to coups National Review 3/8/99

In the post-Soviet world, the first priority of successive Turkish governments was to join as early as possible the emerging European federal union. Genuine obstacles exist. Frail at the best of times, Turkish democracy goes hand in hand with military coups. As much as a quarter of the electorate votes for the rather ominously named Virtue Party, in reality the Muslim fundamentalists. Although they present themselves as tolerant, their democratic credentials are hardly convincing. And down in the southeast, close to Syria, are the Kurds, some of whom were once backed by Moscow. Turkish governments have long denied them their legitimate human rights, and as a result some Kurds now resort to terrorism with the aim of establishing a separate state of their own. Without any finesse, the Turkish response is to crack down hard on all Kurds irrespective.
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IMPACT EXTENSIONS
Israel-Turkish alliance key to sustained ME peace
Waxman Winter 1999, The Washington Quarterly. Vol. 22, No. 1; Pg. 25 Turkey and Israel: A New Balance of Power in the Middle East The United States has good reason to be supportive. Although the burgeoning Turkish-Israeli relationship has received remarkably little attention except among a few seasoned Middle East observers, it holds the possibility of creating a powerful alliance between two of America's foremost allies in the region. Turkey has the largest military force in the area and the second largest in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; Israel's is technologically the most advanced and skilled. Their combined deterrent effect presents a tangible hope for that most elusive of goals in the region: peace. This peace, moreover, would not be a mere replica of the so-called Pax Americana or Pax Britannia that preceded it. As long as peace is upheld only by the whim of a distant power, it is a shaky and fragile peace, relying on the cooperation -- often coerced or bribed -- of insecure local rulers. The United States's hope of reducing its involvement in this volatile region while still ensuring peace and stability has always remained a distant, even fantastic dream. But for the first time, perhaps, it may be a reality. A Turkish-Israeli alliance would decisively shift the regional balance of power in favor of the two most democratic, market-oriented, and pro-Western countries in the area.
A/T: ARAB COUNTERBALANCES TURKISH/GREECE ALLIANCE There is no risk of an Arab alliance forming in response to Turkish/Israeli alliance
Waxman Winter 1999, The Washington Quarterly. Vol. 22, No. 1; Pg. 25 Turkey and Israel: A New Balance of Power in the Middle East
Some have expressed concern that, as the perception of threat from Turkish-Israeli cooperation grows in the Arab world, it will spark a countervailing alliance. Syria and Iran have already made tentative moves toward improving their relations. Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad, for instance, visited Tehran in the summer of 1997, only the second such visit since the 1979 Islamic revolution. n2 Syria has also begun to develop better relations with Iraq, another state threatened by the Turkish-Israeli axis. In May 1997 a Syrian delegation led by Ratib al-Shallah, the influential head of the Damascus Chamber of Commerce, traveled to Baghdad; the following month three border posts between the two countries were reopened after 15 years. Iran's recent successful testing of a medium-range ballistic missile that could reach targets in both Israel and Turkey is also probably intended to send a strong message to both countries. Even Egypt has been caught up in this evolving balance-of-power game, moving closer to Syria and Saudi Arabia. Yet this risk should not be exaggerated. The Arab states have been notoriously unsuccessful in the past in their various attempts to form an alliance, generally against Israel, and there is little reason to expect them to be any more successful in the future. They have as many difficulties and problems between them as they do with Israel and Turkey, and the chances that they will overcome all these to form an effective coalition against Israel and Turkey appear slim. Both states seem to be well aware of this. Turkey, in particular, having witnessed the disarray and division of the Arab world in the wake of Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, appears to have largely discounted the threat from an "Arab bloc."
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Israeli-Turkish alliance ensures Turkish economic prosperity Waxman Winter 1999, The Washington Quarterly. Vol. 22, No. 1; Pg. 25 Turkey and Israel: A New Balance of Power in the Middle East
In the long term, moreover, this free trade agreement offers the possibility for many more people to have a material stake in the Turkish-Israeli relationship. Annual trade between the two countries is expected to quadruple in just a few years, from $ 450 million to $ 2 billion, with much of the increase in Turkey's favor. In 1997 alone, for example, Turkey's exports to Israel increased by 54 percent over the previous year, whereas its imports increased 19 percent for the same period. More impressive still is the fact that some 300,000 to 400,000 Israeli tourists visit Turkey each year (8 percent of the total population), spending nearly $ 3 billion. As more and more Turks reap the economic benefits from close ties to Israel, powerful interest groups, especially in business, are likely to form to protect those benefits. It is not just in the Israeli market that Turks have gained greater access thanks to the free trade accord. Since Israel has a free trade agreement with the United States, Turkish businessmen also see Israel as a "backdoor" into the American market (and thanks to the North American Free Trade Agreement, the Canadian and Mexican markets as well) and a hopping ground to the Palestinian and Jordanian markets. For its part, Israel hopes to launch Turkish-Israeli joint ventures in the newly independent Transcaucasian and Central Asian republics, making use of Turkey's cultural and historical ties there. Expanding economic ties between Turkey and Israel may also have the beneficial side effect of fostering further understanding and friendship between the two peoples as their interaction increases.
Turkish-Israeli alliance increases chances of Turkish EU accession

Waxman Winter 1999, The Washington Quarterly. Vol. 22, No. 1; Pg. 25 Turkey and Israel: A New Balance of Power in the Middle East Turkey and Israel are not only outsiders in the Arab Middle East, they are also outsiders in the European state system to which they have both aspired to join. Although both are heavily integrated into the European economic order through their respective free trade agreements with the European Union (EU), neither has been integrated into the political order. This has been most frustrating for Turkey, which has long pursued full membership of the EU as one of its foremost foreign policy goals. As the EU continues to take in new members from eastern Europe, the prospects for Turkish membership now appear increasingly remote. Their advances consistently spurned by the Europeans, the Turks are now perhaps eager to save face by shifting their focus toward the Middle East. Turkey's relationship with Israel therefore provides a means to boost its regional standing and, in turn, its national pride. It also serves to reinforce Turkey's secular credentials in European minds and to dispel fears that Turkish foreign policy is being "Islamized." This may ultimately strengthen Turkey's application for EU membership. But even if Turkey remains outside the EU, its relationship with Israel reduces its sense of regional isolation and increases its prominence and status in both regional and international affairs. Such issues of status and prestige clearly cannot be ignored in foreign policy choices, and Turkish-Israeli cooperation is no exception. For both Turkey and Israel, not only does friendship mean they are no longer alone in a hostile region, but it also bolsters both their international profiles and national self-esteem.
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Turkish-Israeli relations key to successful democracy building in the Middle East Daniel Pipes, Winter 1998. National Interest. "A New Axis: The Emerging Turkish-Israeli Entente
http://www.danielpipes.org/article/293
The Turkish-Israeli partnership offers many advantages to the United States. Most ambitiously, it could provide the nucleus of an American-oriented regional partnership made up of democratic allies -- as opposed to the authoritarian rulers upon which Washington has relied for five decades. Eisenhower's Baghdad Pact, Nixon's "twin pillars," and Reagan's "strategic consensus" depended mostly on dubious monarchs (Iraq's weak Hashemites, Iran's bombastic shah, the egregious Saudis) and ugly authoritarians (such as the Mubarak regime in Egypt today). But the Turkish-Israeli alignment creates, for the first time, the possibility of developing an alliance of pro-American democracies, such as exists in Europe. If cultivated carefully, Jordan might join in, with more states (perhaps Kuwait) adhering later. The final result could be that most elusive of all goals: a more peaceable Middle East.
FLIP SHEILD: TURKISH-ISRAELI ALLIANCE PROVIDES A CREDIBLE DETERRENT AND GUARENTEES REGIONAL STABILITY -- SOLVES ALL YOUR TURNS Daniel Pipes, Winter 1998. National Interest. "A New Axis: The Emerging Turkish-Israeli Entente
http://www.danielpipes.org/article/293
In the longer term, however, strong Turkish-Israeli ties will enhance the region's stability by serving as a powerful military deterrent against would-be enemies. Aggressive states must watch their step in the face of a formidable combination of the Middle East's largest military force and its most advanced, and this diminishes the likelihood of war. It may already be working: An Arab newspaper reports that Damascus has decided against a strategic alliance with Iran, fearing that this might "lead to increased coordination between Ankara and Tel Aviv against Damascus" and to its further isolation.
ISRAEL-TURKEY RELATIONS KEY TO TURKISH ECONOMIC HEALTH Makovsky, Senior Fellow at the Washington Institute 1999 The New Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy. SAIS Review. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/amakovsky/alansais.htm The economic component of Israeli-Turkish relations has also achieved considerable importance for Ankara. Turkish exports to Israel have increased thirteen-fold since 1989, from $30 million that year to $390 million in 1997. Overall trade volume has grown seven-fold during this period, from $90 million to $620 million. In 1989, Israel was merely Turkey's thirteenth largest market in the Middle East and North Africa. By 1997, it was second largest, and, in the first six months of 1998, Israel ($220 million) had virtually pulled even with Saudi Arabia ($230 million) as Turkey's leading Middle East/North Africa market.22 Good relations with Israel deters Turkish-Syrian war Makovsky, Senior Fellow at the Washington Institute 1999 The New Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy. SAIS Review. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/amakovsky/alansais.htm Strategic considerations dominated Turkey's thinking in building ties to Israel. The primary objective was to put pressure on Syria for its support of anti-Turkish terrorist groups, primarily the PKK. That strategy appeared to have paid off for Turkey during its recent crisis with Syria, when Damascus was doubtlessly preoccupied with the possibility that a clash with Turkey would quickly develop into a two-front war (despite Israel's public effort to distance itself from the conflict).
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Israeli-Turkish relations encourages GT cooperation Jerusalem Post 10-13-99 Similarly, Greece's overtures to Israel did not come out of a vacuum, but are closely related to the very strong strategic partnership Israel has forged with Greece's traditional rival, Turkey, over the past decade. That alliance grew out of many mutual interests between the two nations, such as a shared need to fight terrorism, and the fact that both countries have tense border relations with Syria. But as Tsohatzopulos himself stated, nations do not necessarily need to be extremely "selective" in the countries with which they form partnerships or alliances. Greece and Turkey have been partners in NATO for decades; they can also share alliances with Israel, with each party trying to get the best out of the respective friendships, and three-way ties are also possible.
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Turkish economic health key to regional cooperative initiative Ciller 1996 Turkish Foreign Policy in its Dynamic Tradition. Perceptions Journal of International Affairs. Sept/Nov. vol. 1 no. 3 http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/percept/i3/l3-1.htm In this context, Turkey has followed an active policy in promoting co-operation in the Black Sea region. It initiated the Black Sea Economic Co-operation (BSEC) with the aim of uniting the economic and trade potentials of the region. The BSEC, covering a vast economic space from the Adriatic to the Pacific with a total population of 325 million people, has a tremendous potential to bring prosperity to its 11 member states. It is a complementary bid for peace and stability at this end of Europe. Its role and institutions have been consciously designed to link the member states to the wider European market. The Economic Co-operation Organisation (ECO) is yet another illustration of Turkeys purposeful efforts for regional co-operation. Together with Iran and Pakistan, Turkey was a founding member of this organisation which was revitalised in the early 1980s. A decade later, Turkey spearheaded the initiative to enlarge the ECO to embrace a vast area and a population of 300 million with membership extended to the Central Asian republics, Azerbaijan and Afghanistan, to comprise ten countries in all. We are committed to sharing our experience in democracy and free market economy with Azerbaijan and the Central Asian republics in their endeavours to successfully realise their reforms. Turkeys close affinity with these countries, based on historical, cultural and linguistic ties, provides a solid foundation for co-operation. Such cooperation can consolidate their independence and help their integration with the international community. Turkey has extended loans and aid exceeding US$1.56 billion to Azerbaijan and the Central Asian republics. Our volume of trade has surpassed US$600 million. Furthermore, several projects worth over US$5 billion have been undertaken by Turkish companies operating in this region and some 8,000 students from these countries have been awarded scholarships in Turkey. Once a recipient country, Turkey currently provides economic, financial, commercial, technical and humanitarian aid to some 50 countries on three continents Turkish-Israeli deterrent checks regional aggression-Alan Makovsky January 6, 1998 ISRAELI-TURKISH COOPERATION: FULL STEAM A. HEAD.
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/watch/Policywatch/policywatch1998/292.htm
Impact on strategic environment. The impact on the regional environment of Israeli-Turkish cooperation is potentially substantial. It is far from clear, indeed probably unlikely for now, that Turkey would allow Israel to stage attacks from its territory, that Israel and Turkey would plan a joint operation, or that Israel or Turkey, lacking a direct interest, would join a war involving the other. Nevertheless, neighboring Iran, Syria, and Iraq must consider and plan for these possibilities-as well as the likelihood of less overt forms of Israeli-Turkish cooperation during hostilities. That, in itself, can be a powerful deterrent to aggressive action.
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Israeli-Turkish relations provide a model for regional cooperation and spurs peace initiatives Alan Makovsky January 6, 1998 ISRAELI-TURKISH COOPERATION: FULL STEAM A. HEAD.
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/watch/Policywatch/policywatch1998/292.htm
The U.S. approach. Washington has rightly taken a supportive position toward ties between two key allies, underscored by its participation in the trilateral exercise, while letting Ankara and Jerusalem direct the pace. The United States can more easily reap benefits if the Israeli-Turkish relationship does not carry a "made in the U.S.A." label. To U.S. advantage, Israeli-Turkish cooperation serves as a model of regional normalization in a period when the multilateral peace process is moribund; a potential nucleus (and cover) for pulling other pro-U.S. states, such as Jordan, into a wider regional security regime; an opportunity for deeper trilateral cooperation enhancing Israeli and Turkish security and increasing weapons inter-operability for U.S. forces at times of regional crisis; a source of pressure on Syrian president Hafiz al-Asad's hard-line peace process policies; and a means for the executive branch to bypass Congress in supporting Turkey (through Presidential waivers on Israeli sales of arms that include U.S.origin technology). Israel-Turkey relations key to peace in the Middle East Cakar Senior Advisor to the President of Turkey. 1998 June-Aug. Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs: A Strategic Overview of Turkey. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/percept/lll-2/cakar.htm The world is undergoing rapid and tremendous changes in the post-Cold War era. Its unique location, vigorous market economy, well-established tradition of co-operating with the West and large armed forces, second in size after the US in NATO, makes Turkey a geo-strategic player in world affairs. The geopolitically important area called the heartland of Eurasia, located on the periphery of Turkey, has always been a centre of world politics. Turkeys unique location provides certain leverages for international influence. Turkey is centrally situated between Europe, where much of the worlds political and economic power is concentrated, and Asia, which has lately become a vital centre of economic growth and rising political influence. Turkey fully supports the Middle East Peace Process by maintaining a balanced position that considers the legal rights and interests of all parties. Steadily increasing relations between two democratic countries of the region, Turkey and Israel, are expected to give momentum to the peace and stability efforts in the area.
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Strong Turkish-Israeli relations checks conflict escalation Sasley, November 1998 Conference on Defense Associations Initiatives Burgeoning Military Co-operation between Turkey and Israel: Together in otherness
Middle Eastern politics and security studies is made up of several sub-components, including, but not limited, to the Arab-Israeli conflict, inter-Muslim and territorial disputes, and Persian Gulf tensions, so it is difficult to say precisely what will happen in the next few decades as a resuk of the Turkish-Israeli military collaboration. As a preliminary conclusion, however, it can be said that relations between the two look strong, supported as they are by many different legs but primarily because both face security threats from several common sources. Each has a particular security requirement that needs to be met, and it seems that by cooperating with the other these necessities can be fulfilled. As for the claims by certain Muslim states that this relationship enhances regional instability, this author believes the evidence, both historical and contemporary, proves otherwise. Turkey and Israel provide each other with a stronger form of deterrent capability, and this forces any country that might be thinking about taking military action against one of them to take this into consideration.
Turkish-Israeli alliance increases instability

Kemal Kirisci, Professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Bogazici University, 1998. Middle East Review of International Affairs. TURKEY AND THE UNITED STATES: AMBIVALENT ALLIES. http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1998/issue4/jv2n4a3.html#author
Turkey has also supported the peace process and sees its success as the best guarantee against a resurgence of any form of radicalism that could damage Turkey. U.S.-Turkish interests also coincide in Turkey's effort to strengthen relations with Jordan and other moderate Arab states. At the same time, Turkey's closer relations with Israel are developing counter-alliances against Turkey involving Iran, Syria, Greece and Armenia, a situation which could itself endanger stability. Further, the emphasis put on the military aspect of Israeli-Turkish relations has caused some discomfort in Turkish domestic circles especially when the peace process is stalled.
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Stable Turkey key to regional stability and peace Lessor 2000 NATO Looks South: New Challenges and New Strategies in the Mediterranean
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1126/MR1126.chap4.pdf
The future direction of Turkish external policy, and the future of Turkey as a security partner for the West will be driven to a great extent by internal developments Even if the overall direction of Turkish policy remains steady and pro-Western, Turkeys ability to play an active role in adjoining regions and in NATO affairs (including the peaceful resolution of disputes with Greece) will depend on political stability in Ankara. The outlook is uncertain and is characterized by flux on three broad fronts: secularism versus Islam, the state versus its opponents, and the future of Turkish nationalism.2
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Turkey-EU Relations DA Shell

A. THE ACCESSION ISSUE HAS BROUGHT TURKEY TO THE TABLE ON SECURITY ISSUES. THE NEXT FEW MONTHS WILL BE KEY. World News Connection 9/2/03
According to diplomatic sources in the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministries, the negotiations "are going very well". However, they are not willing to reveal their cards and details. Furthermore, the Turkish Foreign Ministry is waiting from the Greek side to set the date for the visit of the Turkish Foreign Minister, Abdullah Gul, to Athens. According to sources, the two sides are looking for a compromise between Greece's stance that the issue of the Aegean continental shelf must be referred to the International Court in The Hague and Turkey's stance for a settlement of the issue through bilateral negotiations. The wish of the Greek side is that the compromise must provide for a period of bilateral negotiation and afterwards the issue will be referred to The Hague. Ankara claims that Athens believes that if the issue must be referred to the International Court, then it does not have to take the negotiations seriously. On the other hand, Athens does not want to discuss the issues about the Aegean continental shelf before referring the issue to The Hague, similar to the issue regarding territorial waters. Nevertheless, one of the trump cards of Greece is the 2004 time limit that was provided for in the resolutions of the EU summit meeting in Helsinki. By 2004, Turkey must either resolve all its differences with its neighbors, or refer the issue to international organizations. And it is up to Greece to decide what must take place, because it is considered to be the victim. This, along with the fact that in December 2004 the decision will be made regarding the start of the accession negotiations of Turkey with the European Union, makes all those in the Greek Foreign Ministry believe that the next few months are crucial.
B. US INVOLVEMENT DOOMS TURKEY-EU RELATIONS BAGCI AND KARDAS-MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY-5/12/03
http://www.eusec.org/bagci.htm#ftnref112
Without discussing all these issues in detail, at the risk of simplification, we would suggest that there are some fundamental challenges to Turkey's arguments, which would limit a sudden breakthrough in Turkish-EU relations. The main weakness of the Turkish discourse could be identified as follows. The initial rhetoric seemed to have perceived the West as a monolithic bloc.[93] Although this seemed to be true at the immediate aftermath of the September 11 terror attacks and all European powers expressed that they were united with the U.S. against the dangers of terrorism, after the novelty of the slogans of solidarity with the U.S. faded away, the underlying divergences in the transatlantic relations over a wide range of issues resurfaced. This was exacerbated by another feature of the approach taken by Turkey, which was to rely on U.S. pressure in its dealings with the EU. Those developments slowly put Turkey in an awkward position. First, because EU-U.S. relations were increasingly characterized by disagreements over several issues, and, transatlantic relations were more occupied with how to find a solution to those problems than with Turkey, in fact the urgency of Turkey's problems in the eyes of the U.S. was far away from meeting the Turks' expectations.[94] Even if one assumes that the U.S. would be inclined to support Turkey, it would approach Turkish-EU relations from a strategic perspective, and that may not be compatible with the actual realities of Turkey-EU relations and the expectations of the EU from Turkey. This reasoning applies largely to democratization and human rights priorities of the EU vis--vis Turkey, the famous analogy of "democratic and stable Turkey versus stable and democratic Turkey." That could in turn lead to the next problem. Perhaps, this 'tactic' of using the relations with the U.S. as a leverage vis-vis the EU is likely to cultivate a mood of distrust between Turkey and the EU, as well as a friction between the EU and the U.S. Instead of creating a healthy dialogue with the EU, Turkey's use of its strategic ties with the United States and the U.S. lobbying as a stick against the EU was increasingly perceived as "a kind of low-intensity threat" against Brussels. In the long run, Ankara therefore hinders the creation of a strong channel of trust with the EU, and thus isolates itself. Against such a picture, it was no surprise that soon Turkish elite started to question Turkey's membership process into the EU. This was paralleled by another debate on whether Turkey should make a choice between the EU membership and strategic partnership with the US.[95]
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C. TURNS THE CASE The Dallas Morning News 12/14/02
The desirability of inviting Turkey is perhaps best appreciated by imagining the fallout of rejecting it: a Turkey that rejects secularism and embraces Islamic politics, a fracturing of NATO and a permanent division of Cyprus. It is vastly in the United States' interest that the European Union should invite Turkey. A marginalized Turkey could generate instability in the Balkans and the Middle East. But a democratic and prosperous Turkey would be a bulwark against the clash of Western and Islamic civilizations that the United States is trying so hard to prevent.
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UNIQUENESS EXTENSIONS
Despite Bushs efforts, the EU is not excited about admitting Turkey
The Times Union (Albany, NY) - 7/11/04 HEADLINE: Bush cools the chances of Europe helping U.S. The dynamic was similar in the reaction to Bush's call during the trip for Turkey's admission to the European Union. Speaking in Istanbul, Bush said that a decision fulfilling Turkey's long-standing quest to join the EU would show that the West is open to cooperation with the Muslim world and would reward Turkey for its steps toward greater liberty, thus demonstrating that Islam and democracy are compatible. The EU's decision is due in December. Considering that Turkey last year denied the United States permission to use the country as a base for invading Iraq, Bush's remarks were magnanimous and far-sighted. But his comments drew immediate contempt from French President Jacques Chirac. Roughly translated from the French, Chirac's message was concise: Butt out. Other European diplomats echoed the sentiment in comments to reporters.
Europe is working to block Turkeys EU bid

The New York Sun - 6/24/04 HEADLINE: Turkey's Accession The closer Turkey has come to fulfilling the requirements for E.U. membership, however, the harder France and Germany work to slam the door. In December 2002, Turkey was snubbed and refused a date for entry. Valery Giscard d'Estaing, who is a current drafter of a constitution for Europe, said that Turkey could "never" be part of Europe because it was a Muslim state. In April, Premier Barnier said Turkey's membership was "not under consideration."
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LINK EXTENSIONS
MORE LINK EVIDENCE--TURKISH RELATIONS ARE ZERO SUM--INCREASED RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. TRADE OFF WITH EU RELATIONS BAGCI AND KARDAS-MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY-5/12/03
Last but not least, one should also bear in mind that Turkeys willingness to engage in active policies on several fronts simultaneously is likely to confront it with the problem of having the necessary capabilities and setting the priorities. Particularly, the wish to enhance the relations with Europe, while at the same time moving towards a deepened strategic partnership with the U.S. and engaging in a proactive policy in Eurasia, would be increasingly difficult to reconcile. Perhaps, as was discussed in the previous section, the debate over whether to choose between membership into the EU and strategic partnership with the U.S. was just an early indicator of the dilemmas of a multi-dimensional assertive foreign policy. Heres the bomb ass killer link card---strenghening the strategic relationship with the US trades off with the European track-International Journal September, 2002
Third, if reliance on the strategic relationship with the United States is at the expense of the 'Europeanization' of Turkey, Turkey's march to a 'more pluralistic-less authoritarian' democracy and 'more liberal-less statist' economic order would certainly be delayed.(f.#56) Even though it is not my intention to portray the accession/integration process with the European Union as the best possible alternative to Turkey's strategic-security dominated relationship with the United States, one needs to be cognisant of the fact that Turkey's interests in gaining EU membership are far more important than a continued strategic-security relationship with the United States. More than half of Turkey's trade is with EU countries, and traditionally Turkey's Western identity lies in Europe, not across the Atlantic. Even though the majority of the Turkish elite does not fall into the trap of either the United States or the EU and seems to recognise the different dynamics of EU-Turkey and United States-Turkey relations, the danger is that further 'Americanization' of Turkish foreign and security policy orientation might risk derailing Turkey from the EU track. This danger will be more acute if the West becomes more divisive.
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IMPACT EXTENSIONS
Turkey-EU relations key to preventing conflict and maintaining regional stability

International Journal September, 2002
Even though it would be legitimate for the EU to ask Turkey to adapt its security conceptualization to that of the EU before the merits of its membership could be debated, EU members should do all they can to encouraged Turkey in that direction. Therefore, the EU should take note of the latest positive developments mentioned above and offer Turkey a clear date for the start of accession negotiations. Indeed, if the EU does not start accession talks, and particularly if they use the pretext of no resolution to the Cyprus dispute because of Turkey's intransigent and unco-operative stance, then one might expect a gradual deterioration in Turkey-EU security relations. The EU and Turkey might face each other as strategic rivals in the eastern Mediterranean, which includes Greece and Cyprus as represented by the Greek Cypriot Administration, both of which could well become members of the EU, leaving Turkey out in the cold. As long as the accession process drags on, and as long as the process is built on vague promises to Turkey, the probability that Turkey and the EU will come to see one another as 'security threats' will increase. From Turkey's perspective, 'exclusion' from the EU would accentuate 'difference' from the EU, and 'difference' from the EU would increase the probability of 'conflict' with the EU.
MORE EVIDENCE THAT EUROPE SOLVES THE CASE AND THEN SOME
LESSER-SENIOR ANALYST RAND-2001 TURKEY, GREECE, AND THE U.S. IN A CHANGING STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT Let Europe take the lead. This approach would acknowledge Europes increasingly central place in the outlook of both countries. The United States has been a beneficiary of this trend, and may wish to support it. Moreover, the Helsinki summit has made the EU role a permanently operating factor in relation to Turkey, the future of Cyprus, and the Aegean dispute. Improved relations with Brussels provide an incentive for all sides and will be critical to the deepening of GreekTurkish dtente. The United States should welcome an opportunity for some of the diplomatic and burden to shift to Europe, especially with other claims on U.S. attention. In the context of relations with Turkey, a more balanced transAtlantic approach can take pressure off of otherwise contentious issues between Ankara and Washington. The United States has pressed for a greater Turkish role in Europe, and it should now take the next steps to encourage it. In the case of Greece, as recent experience suggests, the less bilateralism, the better.
EU involvement key to solving conflict in and bring peace to the region

Dyer 1998 British American Security Information Council. OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY. AUGUST 1998 NUMBER 29 http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/BP29.htm. Diplomacy and Arms: West Sends Mixed Messages to Aegean Adversaries As the brinkmanship continues, there is an obvious need for the international community, particularly NATO, to develop a comprehensive risk reduction strategy aimed at decreasing the threat of war in south-eastern Europe. In recent years, numerous international organisations have made efforts to improve relations between Greece and Turkey. To date, the European Union, NATO and the United Nations have failed to achieve any breakthroughs in Cyprus. In February 1996, Washington intervened to prevent the outbreak of hostilities in a dispute over the ownership of uninhabited islets in the Aegean. Although ad hoc diplomatic initiatives may avert war in the eleventh hour, the international community cannot rely on such limited crisis management tactics. Only a comprehensive set of confidence- and security-building measures developed co-operatively by all European security organisations can provide the level of conflict prevention and resolution necessary to bring peace to the region.
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STATE DEPARTMENT DA 1NC Shell

A. The state department budget is set--there is no room for administrative flexibility
Hyde FDCH 9-4-03 On the discretionary side, function 150 funds the operations of the State Department and USAID both domestically and at the overseas posts, U.S. international broadcasting, U.S. foreign assistance, U.S. security assistance programs, the Peace Corps, and U.S. participation in International Organizations. The President's FY '04 request for foreign affairs spending is $28.5 billion. This Committee reviewed this budget request at a hearing with Secretary Powell in February of this year. In large part, the budget is authorized at or above the President's request in H.R. 1950, which incorporates the Millennium Challenge Account, the Peace Corps, Security Assistance, and State Department Operations. The House passed the bill and it is now pending in the Senate. B. Links New projects crush state dept. flexibility--force staff reshuffling Washington Times 8-4-03 The State Department's personnel system needs to become much more flexible than it is. .Currently, the system is built around putting people into positions that have defined tasks [e.g., Nigeria desk officer]. When new priorities emerge, it takes time for new positions to be created and new people to be put in them. How effective would our armed forces be if soldiers were tied to defined "positions" rather than ready to execute missions as needs arise? Like the military, the State Department needs a large group of officers [as much as 20 percent of its entire corps] standing ready to work on the nation's highest priorities.The State Department would then be in the position to deploy - within a matter of days - a hundred people to work on, say, Iraq reconstruction or the AIDS crisis in Africa. These diplomatic missions would have clearly defined objectives, allowing Congress and the public to measure State's effectiveness. I have no doubt that the State Department's officers, unshackled from the bureaucracy, will excel in these high-priority tasks.
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STATE DEPARTMENT DA 1NC Shell

C. New projects force adminstrative trade offs -- leads to overstretch Gardner 2k Foreign Affairs July/August The State Department recently set forth seven fundamental national interests in its foreign affairs strategic plan: national security; economic prosperity and freer trade; protection of U.S. citizens abroad and safeguarding of U.S. borders; the fight against international terrorism, crime, and drug trafficking; the establishment and consolidation of democracies and the upholding of human rights; the provision of humanitarian assistance to victims of crisis and disaster; and finally, the improvement of the global environment, stabilization of world population growth, and protection of human health. This is a sensible list, but in the political climate of today's Washington, few in the executive branch or Congress dare ask how much money will really be required to support it. Rather, the question usually asked is how much the political traffic will bear. Going on this way will force unacceptable foreign policy choices -- either adequate funding for secure embassies and modern communications systems for diplomats or adequate funding for U.N. peacekeeping in Kosovo, East Timor, and Africa; either adequate funding for the Middle East peace process or adequate funding to safeguard nuclear weapons and materials in Russia; either adequate funding for family planning to control world population growth or adequate funding to save refugees and displaced persons. The world's greatest power need not and should not accept a situation in which it has to make these kinds of choices. D. The Impact State Dept. overstretch undermines solutions to WMD, Prolif, Global Warming, and terrorism Gardner 2k Foreign Affairs July/August A dangerous game is being played in Washington with America's national security. Call it the "one percent solution"-the fallacy that a successful U. S. foreign policy can be carried out with barely one percent of the federal budget. Unless the next president moves urgently to end this charade, he will find himself in a financial straitjacket that frustrates his ability to promote American interests and values in an increasingly uncertain world. Ultimately, the only way to end the dangerous one percent solution game is to develop a new national consensus that sees the international affairs budget as part of the national security budget-because the failure to build solid international partnerships to treat the causes of conflict today will mean costly military responses tomorrow. Those who play the one percent solution game do not understand a postCold War world in which a host of international problems now affects Americans' domestic welfare, from financial crises and the closing of markets to global warming, AIDS, terrorism, drug trafficking, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Solving these problems will require leadership, and that will cost
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Impacts: US Leadership
Collapses US leadership
Albright December 1998 Foreign Affairs The Testing of American Foreign Policy ASSUME THAT we have the vision to know when to act, the pragmatism to know how to act, and the spine to take on hard but necessary tasks. This is still not sufficient. We also need the resources -- the people, expertise, equipment, and money -- to get the job done. Unfortunately, today our foreign policy is living hand-to-mouth. We allocate only about one-fourteenth of the portion of our wealth that we did in Secretary of State Marshall's time to support democracy and growth overseas. Among industrialized countries, we rank dead last in such contributions relative to the size of our economy. We are the number one debtor to the United Nations and the multilateral development banks. For the past decade, we have been cutting foreign policy positions, closing diplomatic posts, and shutting U.S. Agency for International Development and U.S. Information Agency missions. We lack the funds to provide full security for our people overseas. And under the current budget agreement, we face a further reduction in buying power of at least 12 percent over the next 5 years. All this has consequences. It reduces our influence as a force for peace in the world. It detracts from our leadership on global economic issues at a time when American workers, farmers, business-people, and investors have an enormous stake in the health of economies overseas. It makes it harder for us to exert leverage on the contributions of others. And it requires that we walk away from problems that could be solved. This is not a test the administration can pass on its own. The executive, Congress, and the public must agree that, in striving to shape world affairs, America must be more than a status quo country. For whether the challenge is building a security fence, easing a financial crisis, or preventing a regional rivalry from erupting into violence, America cannot lead without resources, and we cannot be secure unless we lead. Key to laundry list of missions: terrorism, global drug trade, environmental destruction, WMD proliferation, sex trafficking, and humanitarian crisis Grossman 10-1-2002
We promote peace and stability in regions of vital interest. Through diplomatic intervention, your State Department prevents local conflicts from becoming wider wars that could threaten allies, embroil American troops, and create instability. We respond to humanitarian crises to help save lives. And your State Department brings nations together to address global challenges. We fight terrorism, international crime and narcotics. We prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the spread of communicable diseases, nuclear smuggling, humanitarian crises, trafficking in women and girls, and environmental degradation.
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UQ extensions
Powell standing up to cuts now--prevents mission corruption
BFR 7-3-03 At times, Powell has lost bitter fights to hardliners on whether to negotiate or threaten force. In North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and the Middle East. Most recently, the President put national security advisor Condoleezza Rice in charge of the Middle East instead of Powell. But to many diplomats, Powell is a hero for defending diplomacy and restoring deep budget cuts." Former State Department official Richard Holbrooke: "The question is, how can the White House permit this? Accusing Colin Powell of insubordination is a disservice to a man who has served presidents of both parties with distinction for many years." Mitchell: "Gingrich was told to cool it by the White House last spring, but then was given the green light to resume his criticism. Still, Powell has many strong supporters, most importantly the President's father.
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Link extensions
New projects force staff trade offs The Washington Times 8-4-2003 I want to make clear that my criticism is directed at the State Department as an organization and not against its employees, whether foreign service or civil service.In fact, the State Department has some of the most talented, dedicated and patriotic employees inside or outside government.The problem is that the department squanders this talent. Where the U.S. military uses force multipliers like technology to enhance the effectiveness of its troops, the State Department's organizational structure acts as a force divider, limiting the effectiveness of the department's workforce.The State Department's flawed structure forces highly capable individuals to spend their days navigating the department's bureaucracy and producing little of value to the American people.At the State Department, the whole is far less than the sum of the parts.
New projects trade off
Adair 3-1-2001 FDCH. HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Committee Testimony

We know that the funding requests the State Department has made to successive administrations have been cut, and the amounts the Administrations have requested from the Congress critically underfunded the foreign affairs agencies and their programs. The functional budget figures for FY2002, released by the Administration yesterday, indicate an increase in the Administration's request. We are appreciative of this and hope the Congress will appropriate to this level, if not more, with sufficient support for the operating accounts to accommodate the reforms that need to be made. In talking to various offices on the Hill, we have often been told that if the Administration will not ask, and it will not fight for additional funding of the State Department, then the Congress will not provide it. However, there have been times when the Congress, in exercising its oversight responsibilities, funded more than the Administration's request. In FY 2000 appropriations, for instance, even after the bombings in East Africa and the Accountability Review Boards recommendations to increase funding $1.4 billion a year for 1 0 years to improve embassy security, the Administration requested an irresponsible $50 million to improve security in our buildings and a total of $300 million including manpower needs. It was only after the Congress demanded a realistic request that the Administration revised its numbers and increased the amount for embassy security by an additional $250 million for construction. For this we wish to express our deep gratitude to both your committee that provided the necessary authorization levels, and to the appropriations committees that demanded a resubmittal. In the FY 2001 appropriations, while the total 150 account went down again, funding for the Administration for Foreign Affairs Account, the State Department's operating account, was actually greater than requested. Mr. Chairman, we all know that increased funding is not the total answer, but it is certainly part of the answer. Without additional funds, we cannot increase our staffing to meet real needs, and our workforce will continue to be over-extended. We will not be able to provide adequate training without sufficient staffing levels to allow training or the necessary resources at the National Foreign Affairs Training Center; and we will not be able to provide adequate security at our posts and missions abroad without more funds.
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Link extensions
State Department handles negotiations--you link South China Morning Post 10-15-02
A spokesman from the US State Department, which handles the negotiations for the US government, said it aimed to reach a more liberal agreement that would enhance competition, expand cargo and passenger services and benefit businesses and customers in Hong Kong and the US. The plan puts stress on diplomats which means you link Albright 1998 Foreign Affairs Nov/Dec
All this argues for flexibility. There has long been tension between the executive branch and Congress over mandated sanctions, prohibitions, restrictions, earmarks, and other restraints on foreign policy. Having worked in both branches, I know that this tension is inevitable and, at times, constructive. When I meet with foreign officials, referring to pressure from Congress can help to spur action. What is not helpful is the growing tendency to view entire relationships through the prism of a single issue or to enact laws that deprive the executive of the leverage needed to bargain effectively. The true challenge of diplomacy does not reside in the beauty of our goals. Foreign policy is practical, not aesthetic. It requires persuading others to agree to new policies and actions based on new understandings. That may entail simple logic, economic incentives, technical assistance, new commitments, information-sharing, coercion, the threat of coercion, sanctions, the threat of sanctions, or any combination of the above -- and it may require a different mix of those elements tomorrow than it does today. To do his job well, the president must be able to pick and choose. You would not ask a carpenter to build a house with only a hammer. We should not expect our chief executive to construct a successful foreign policy without a full box of tools.
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US-Greek Relations DA Shell

A. Uniqueness---US Greek relationship strong now Greece's prime minister the relationship between Europe and the United States is intact. "I want to stress, because many people said that there was a serious period of strain, that the trans-Atlantic relationship does work, it produces results, and it is important for both of us," Simitis said. B. Greece views US actions on Aegean as tilted towards Turkey--this bias pisses them off Copley News Service 2-26-99 Ambassador Burns describes Greek-Turkish enmity as NATO's most serious internal problem. And he recites the official U.S. position of neutrality and, when feasible, mediation between the two NATO allies. That proclaimed neutrality strikes many Greeks as a de facto tilt toward the larger, more powerful Turkey and its greater strategic importance as NATO's southern anchor. ''The neutral policy of the United States is not just, not right in this situation because we don't threaten anyone. It's Turkey that doesn't accept the legal status quo in the Aegean,'' argues Greece's undersecretary of defense, Dimitris Apostolakis. A. US Greek relations key to combating terrorism CIA World Fact Book 2K2 http://www.geographyiq.com/countries/gr/Greece_us_relations_summary.htm The U.S. and Greece have longstanding historical, political, and cultural ties based on a common heritage, shared democratic values, and participation as Allies during World War II, the Korean conflict, and the Cold War. The Greek Government responded to the September 11, 2001 attacks with strong political support for the United States, unimpeded use of Greek airspace, and the offer of some Greek military assets in support of the counterterrorism campaign. In the summer of 2002, the Greek authorities captured several suspected members of the terrorist group '17 November,' the first significant breakin the investigation of the group, which has killed five U.S. mission employees since 1975. Currently there is smooth cooperation between U.S. and Greek counter-terrorism officials. INSERT TERMINAL IMPACT
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Uniqueness Extensions
Greek-US relations strong now
Kiesling 8-17-03 World News Connection 8-17 In 2003 neither Greece nor any other country enjoys a special position in the daily political calculations in Washington. The Greeks can feel comfortable with the idea that Greece and the United States are two sovereign states, united at a safe distance with family ties, with a big of common history, and with regional interests that usually concur. We sometimes had a cavalier attitude in Greece, usually unsuccessful. We were scapegoats in Greece's domestic conflicts, sometimes rightfully. We have disagreements--like, for example, Greece's reaction to the Iraq war. However, our relations are healthier than the demagogies. Washington tilts toward Greece over Turkey in sqo Baltimore Sun 1-20-02 Greece and Turkey are old, old enemies. Their Aegean rivalry always has unsettled NATO, particularly the United States, where the enormous influence of the Greek-American lobby places Washington on the side of Athens even though Turkey has been the more strategically important of the two. This was so in most of the Cold War while the United States maintained bases in the country neighboring the Soviet Union. It is true today in the U.S. dependence on Turkey for bases near Iraq. The Turkish problem is that it has never had a very good public relations apparatus to counter the Greeks, who are about as adept at getting what they want from Washington as the Israelis are.
Relations are strong now
The Boston Globe, April 27, 2003
Even so, the practical relationship between Greece and the United States is often excellent. Leaving aside admiration for the United States as a land of opportunity, residual gratitude for the Marshall Plan, and ties to the Greek-American community, there are geostrategic reasons for keeping the United States engaged as partner and ally in a troubled region. Moreover, Greece is a country where personal relations trump ideology most of the time. The Greeks I gravitated toward had sufficient intellectual independence to dismiss unreflecting criticisms of the United States. These journalists, diplomats, academics, and politicians were fair-minded enough to be persuadable regarding American policy and would speak out in our defense on many issues where the broad Greek public had reflexively maligned us.
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Uniqueness Extensions
US-Greek Coop increasing in the sqo
Federal News Service October 28, 2003 Ambassador Cofer Black, the U.S. coordinator for counterterrorism, visited Greece in September to discuss ways to enhance Olympic security. The United States is providing equipment, policy workshops and security training to that end. Our two governments frequently discuss Olympic security cooperation, including when the secretary met with Foreign Minister Papandreou on September 17th.
Cooping on law enforcement initiatives

FDCH Political Transcripts October 30, 2003 The Balkan organized crime initiative, which consists of addressing organized criminal activity emanating from the following nations, Slovenia, Croatia, Serbo-Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania, autonomous Republic of Kosovo, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Greece is a relatively new program, but a very high profile endeavor on part of the FBI and our partners.
Greece--US cooperation now

The Times 10-23-03
"Taking into consideration the international co-operation we have established, and the training that is taking place, we are absolutely sure that we will have a secure environment," Floridis said. "If a security plan working in co operation with Britain, the United States, Israel, Spain, Germany, Australia and France was to fail, what more can be done?
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Link Extensions
US displays gross favoritism toward Turkey---our foreign policy is rigged to treat Greece like a red headed step child
Speros Vryonis, Director of the Speros Basil Vryonis Center for the Study of Hellenism, Jr. Summer 1997 UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs. 2 UCLA J. Int'l L. & For. Aff. 69
These outdated policies of the State Department, in encouraging the Turkish military caste, threaten to extend Turkish instability into Greece, a faithful American ally. Although through successive administrations the U.S. government has announced a policy of "equal treatment" of the two countries, this promise has proven to be hollow. In fact, the State Department and the Pentagon, as well as NATO, have sided with Turkey in most phases of the Greco-Turkish crises and have been willing to overlook Turkey's threatening behavior. Recent examples of responses favoring Turkey illustrate this point. First, the State Department refused to formally acknowledge repeated Turkish violations of Greek airspace in November 1995, even though such violations had been occurring since the middle of the 1980s. Briefings from the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs and from the Greek Chief of Staff in 1995 indicate that, although the overflights were regularly reported to the American military attache in Athens, no official U.S. response was forthcoming. When it was no longer formal State Department policy to deny or ignore these violations of Greek airspace, U.S. Ambassador Thomas Niles declared that the Turks were aggressively violating Greek national airspace. n24 The State Department also quietly informed the Turkish government that these actions were not advisable and should be stopped. However this had no effect on the violations, which continue to the present day. n25 [*79] Another example of Turkish favoritism is demonstrated by a report by the Greek general staff that the U.S. rented two refueling air tankers to the Turkish Air Force and accepted orders for the purchase of six refueling tankers. Yet when the Greek Air Force petitioned for the same equipment, the U.S. refused. n26 This increased the substantial advantage the Turkish Air Force enjoys in the clash over the Aegean and its violations of Greek airspace. Turkish planes can take off from Diyarbekir in eastern Turkey, airbases the Greeks cannot reach, and they can fly over the Aegean for longer distances than Greek military jets. Finally, in the past year the Greek Cypriot government negotiated with a Russian company to purchase a substantial number of Russian ground-to-air anti-aircraft missiles for $ 660 million. n27 The government took this action for defense against the strong military concentration of Turkish troops and heavy tanks, and the Turkish air and sea base in northern Cyprus. The Greek Cypriot government negotiated a mutual defense pact with Greece and has allowed Greek military jets to come to southern Cyprus. Official American policy has allowed the Turks to establish a massive military build-up in northern Cyprus which serves to intimidate the south. Turkish jets fly over southern Cyprus at their discretion, and U.S. policy has accepted this without question. In the face of the substantial superiority of the Turkish military, the Greek Cypriots, having endured this intimidation for twenty-three years, have finally developed a means to protect themselves against this threat. Although the Turkish military has attempted to make the actions of the Greek Cypriots appear aggresive, in fact they must be understood in this defensive context.
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2NC/1NR Link Wall

Bias Link: US negotiations over the Aegean are perceived as biased toward Turkey--
Copley News Service 2-26-99

It also spells another round of diplomatic trouble for the United States. Greece and Turkey are both NATO members and U.S. allies. Whenever their chronic disputes escalate, the United States is caught in the middle. Ambassador Burns describes Greek-Turkish enmity as NATO's most serious internal problem. And he recites the official U.S. position of neutrality and, when feasible, mediation between the two NATO allies. That proclaimed neutrality strikes many Greeks as a de facto tilt toward the larger, more powerful Turkey and its greater strategic importance as NATO's southern anchor. ''The neutral policy of the United States is not just, not right in this situation because we don't threaten anyone. It's Turkey that doesn't accept the legal status quo in the Aegean,'' argues Greece's undersecretary of defense, Dimitris Apostolakis.
Tilt Link: Tilt undermines US Greek relations
Rossides 1996 FNS

The State and Defense Department's continuing pro-Turkey, anti-Greece bias-- the "tilt towards Turkey"-has been and is harmful to the interests of the United States and raises serious questions of (1) competence and (2) the undue influence of Turkey's several U.S. "agents of influence" registered with the Justice Department. The number of U.S. persons involved is over a dozen. Laurence Stern, a former Washington Post diplomatic correspondent and foreign news editor, stated in his book The Wrong Horse (1977): " One of the most important keys to an understanding of the Cyprus muddle is the realization that the United States, far from being a disinterested broker to the disputes of the past, was a deeply involved participant. "(page 7) The United States pro-Turkey, anti-Greek bias, the appeasement of Turkey's numerous violations of law and the double standard on the rule of law as applied to Turkey: have harmed and continue to harm U.S. interests in the Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean; and - have put Greece, an important and loyal ally, at increased security risk, particularly from Turkey.
Misperception link: Greece is very sensitive -- will misperceive
WILKINSON 1999 MOVING BEYOND CONFLICT PREVENTION TO RECONCILIATION Tackling Greek-Turkish Hostility A Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict http://www.wilsoncenter.org/subsites/ccpdc/frsear.htm
Notwithstanding its superpower status and good relations with the two countries, however, the United States always has had to strike a delicate balance in the Aegean. Pushing too hard, especially with Turkey, puts other vital U.S. interests at risk. Greeks, attributing much of their troubles with Turkey over the last three or four decades to American meddling, remain suspicious of U.S. intentions. In Washington itself, the influential Greek-American lobby periodically persuades Congress to push the administration in Hellenic directions. Turks resent the burdens imposed on bilateral relations in the past by Congress, and Ankara lacks confidence in any administration's ability to prevail over Congress in a confrontation over Greek-Turkish relations.
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2NC/1NR Link Wall

Paranoia Link: Greek FP dominated by threat of Turkey
Moustakis and Sheenan Winter 20002 Mediterranean Quarterly. Democratic Peace and European Security Community: The Paradox of Greece and Turkey. For most European countries, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union triggered a proufound Change in their security policies. Greece has been the exception to this pattern, because for decades Greek Security considerations have been dominated by the threat from Ankara, not that posed by Moscow.
The Media Link: Greek media spin Turkish demands as unreasonable--this will fuel pro war sentiment in Greece which turns the case
Nikos Panagiotou 2003 Aristoteleio University of Thessaloniki 1st LSE PhD Symposium on Modern Greece: "Current Social Science Research on Greece" http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/hellenicObservatory/pdf/symposiumPapersonline/ N.Panagiotou%20LSE%20PAPER.pdf Another characteristic that is attributed to Turkey is that of a continuous demand that is not easily satisfied. (Turkey is pushing to the limits E.T.13/02) Desite the gains that it got over the latest incident, Turkey is presented as still demanding and pushing the Greek patience to the limit. The only appropriate response is a military one, since appeasement fails to respond to the continuation of provocations. Representations of this kind lead to the creation of a more pro-war prone public opinion, since it moves from the scene any other response. The Greek public is led to believe in the need for a continuous rearment to counteract the direct threat of Turkeys permanent and repetitive claims against the Greek sovereignty.
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2NC/1NR: Aid Links

Greece opposes aid to Turkey
European Report 5/16/96 On May 13, Greece took a small step towards approving the MEDA financial Regulation for Mediterranean third countries, with its ECU 3.245 billion budget for 1995-1999. Athens is continuing to block financial assistance to Mediterranean third countries because of its dispute with Ankara over the sovereignty of the Imia/Kardak islands in the Aegean Sea. Speaking on the fringes of the Council meeting, Theodore Pangalos, the Greek Foreign Minister, dismissed all possibility of financial assistance to Turkey "until Turkey abandons its territorial claims". However, the Greeks abstained on a vote to return the text of the proposed MEDA Regulation to the European Parliament. More evidence Irish Times 3-1-96 GREECE will block EU funds for Turkey "as long as Turkish aggressiveness persists", the Greek Prime Minister, Mr Costas Simitis, said yesterday. "It would be foolish for Greece to go along as if nothing were happening while Turkey threatens war," he said in Athens. Turkey and Greece were entangled in a dispute in January over small, uninhabited islands in the Aegean, and Greek and Turkish warships were deployed in the area until the US negotiated a compromise. Greece has already blocked a 375 million ecu (Pounds 325 million) aid package to help Turkey adjust to a customs union with the EU that came into effect in January. Mr Simitis said yesterday Greece would oppose its implementation and the accompanying aid packages, saying Turkey has broken a clause committing it to amicable relations with its neighbours. Mr Simitis and the Foreign Minister, Mr Theodoros Pangalos, visited several EU capitals last week to press their case for greater solidarity against Turkey. In Ankara, Turkey's caretaker Prime Minister, Ms Tansu Ciller, urged Greece to talk to Turkey about bilateral problems and not use its EU membership as a weapon. "Our ties are between Greece and ourselves. If we are going to solve these issues we are going to solve them through dialogue," she said.
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Link Extensions: Media Spin

The Greek press is the major influence on Greek foreign policy making--it shapes the public agenda
Nikos Panagiotou 2003 Aristoteleio University of Thessaloniki 1st LSE PhD Symposium on Modern Greece: "Current Social Science Research on Greece" http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/hellenicObservatory/pdf/symposiumPapersonline/ N.Panagiotou%20LSE%20PAPER.pdf
My analysis of the role of the Greek press is founded on the premise that its own role and significance in the Greek foreign policy is important. It is through the press that the interaction of different agendas (public, policy, press) take place and shape the outcome of the foreign policy. Its role is significant in the construction and distribution of the dominant discourse in foreign policy. The construction of the dominant discourse comes as a result both from the public opinion and the political elites agendas. The press does not seek exclusively a mediation role between those two poles but it equally preserves an autonomous role, contributing to the process of the construction of the dominant discourse. As Thompson points out, mass media should not be regarded simply as channels for the circulation and diffusion of symbolic forms, but also as mechanism which creates new kinds of actions and interactions, and contributes to the establishment of new kinds of social relations1. Mass media affect the ways that we participate in the political sphere, since they do not only provide cognitive knowledge informing us about what is happening but also order and structure political reality.
The Greek media fuels nationalism
Negative stereotypes of the Turks seem to overwhelm the positive ones. This coverage works towards the continuation of the dispute, since it constructs a negative image of the Other, drawing upon nationalistic stereotypes. This hypothesis aims to discover the role of the press in the construction of the GreekTurkish disputes, and to highlight its importance in the diffusion of it.
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Greek media will kill public support for dialogue over crisis
The perpetuation of the conflict is reflected in headlines that are calling to reorganize our capabilities. (It's time to rally to reorganize our capabilities (Kath 04/02). There is a call to the nation to be prepared for a second round in the near future while it presents hostility in the relations between the two nations as something normal. War preparations are to be considered normal, and the right reaction to be followed by the political leadership. Dialogue and a policy to diffuse the conflict are pushed out from the dominant discourse as not the appropriate approach towards an unreliable, expansionist, brutal Other. Implicit is the message that only military preparations, and even the will to use military force will provide Greece with the necessary security, and will not allow the repetition of the Cyprus tragedy.
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The Greek media will destroy support for any US involvement--the plan will be spun as imperialistic and tilted towards Turkey --the EU is viewed as an honest broker
The disappointment over failure to deal with the last incident leaves a feeling of Greece having being betrayed by its allies, and most notably the USA (Now we are looking for allies. Eleft 17/03) The image of the USA, as in the previous crisis, is of a country that favours Turkish expansionism against Greece This representation does not allow the USA to be seen as a honest broker while it serves the emotional reporting that masks the complexities of international relations. USA according to this representations adopts a double standard policy, pressuring Greece to accept a settlement, while recommending that Turkey accept the committing of the dispute to the Hague (Clinton to Demirel: Promoted Turkey but recommended to go to Hague. Eleft. 22/02). Washington is trying to restore, Kath22/02). Only the newspaper Vima is more keen towards American intervention for a compromise between the two countries (Clinton intervenes in order to succeed a compromise in the ongoing disputes. Dayton for the Aegean Sea. Rizo.18/02). The Greek government is presented as obeying to the Americans and abolishing Greek rights (They have given away the 12 miles in the night of the big treason. A cynical intervention by the Americans: Orders in the style of Piourifoy8, The country has been left at the mercy of the Americans and the Turks. Bargaining between Clinton and Demirel for our islands, E.T. 14/02) Humiliation and submission to American imperialism Rizo 17/02). The stance of the Greek press is more favourable towards Europe, although that the USA was the one that intervened to ensure the de-escalation of the crisis. Imia/Kardak crisis symbolized a political turn towards Europe and its institutions in order to secure Greeces rights. This turn in the political level was reflected in the headlines as well, which in general welcomed it. In contrast to the USAs image the EUs is by far better. (Help from Europe,Eleft23/02), Solidarity to Greece by the European Union, Kath 24/02). Europe is our shield in Aegean. "New Democracy" achievements overcome governments failures. A Foreign Policy success by Evert in Strasburg. E.T. 26/02). The appealing to others represents a common way of reinforcing the sense of justification of Greek claims. It is contradictory though, since in decisions favouring Turkey the same newspapers accuse the EU or its meber of favouritism. This manner of reporting fails to reflect the complexities of international relations in order to facilitate the exploitation of public opinion. For Rizospastis, pursuing a policy of divide and rule by imperialist America is the major explanation of this crisis, as well as the previous one. American imperialism that favours the military expansionism of Turkey should be the target of both countries policy rather than working against each other. (NATOI (in Greeks means they referring to NATO) the enemies of peace in the Aegean. The Division and ruling is the enemy. A continuous threat the politics of subordination. (Rizo31/02) The Greek government is being accused of following a policy of subordination. (A new thank you this time to Brussels28/02). Rizospastis, in contrast, favours through its headlines, the friendship between the two nations on the pretext that they would be liberated from imperialistic interventions.
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Nikos Panagiotou 2003 Aristoteleio University of Thessaloniki 1st LSE PhD Symposium on Modern Greece: "Current Social Science Research on Greece" http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/hellenicObservatory/pdf/symposiumPapersonline/ N.Panagiotou%20LSE%20PAPER.pdf The Greek press plays a significant role in the construction and distribution of the dominant discourse in foreign policy. The construction of the dominant discourse comes as a result of both the public opinion and from the political elites. The role of the press is not just that of mediation between these two poles but it preserves an autonomous role, contributing to the process of the construction of the dominant discourse. The stance of the Greek press cannot be attributed only to the national identity. In the construction of these images other factors of equal importance contribute as well. In the case of the Greek press much of its representations influenced by the newspapers political affiliation. Also bearing in mind the promotional role that the headlines play in the Greek press, some of the representations or more accurately, the dramatization of the events, can be attributed to their aim to increase their circulation. The Greek press does not usually determine the foreign policy agenda, but it clearly wields a large amount of influence, as it has been shown through the cases that I studied. The press plays a crucial role in defining success and failure insofar as the public is concerned. It provides meaning and mediates the meaning of the action in foreign policy. Its influence is greater in foreign policy issues because of the lack of personal experience, and consequently, the publics reliance upon the information that receives from the mass media in general. A very important survey conducted in both countries underlies the importance of the above. Ninety-five(95) percent of Turkish people feel that the Greeks are not to be trusted, although ninety-three (93) percent have never met a Greek; at the same time seventy three(73) percent of Greek people feel that Turks are not to be trusted although seventy (70) percent of the Greeks have never actually met a Turk.9 The role of the press is important in any case and especially if we want to move forward and break this cycle of confrontation. It is important because the press can possibly provide a critical stance that would break the dominant national stereotypes and move to the construction of a collective identity based on a future of regional peace and mutual trust and respect, rather than on the divisions of the past.
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Impacts: Demo Promo

US Greek relations key to demo promo in the Balkans
Bugajski 10-13-2002, Senior Analyst at CSIS. Conference: "Greece-U.S. Relations, the Generation Ahead," in Athens www.westernpolicy.org/Conferences/20001013/panel2.asp We have witnessed momentous events in the Balkans during the past two weeks with the evident fall of Slobodan Milosevic and the Serbian velvet revolution that gives new hope to the region. However, we must look beyond the initial euphoria and gear ourselves for the prolonged and still very difficult struggle ahead for both Serbia and its neighbors. Two questions confront us over the next few years. First, how can we consolidate recent developments and help ensure security and prosperity throughout southeastern Europe? Second, how can the U.S. and Greece cooperate productively in this process? This is not a 100-meter dash or sprint; this is a marathon. While Russia always seems to steal the credit for the final push, both in the Belgrade surrender during the war over Kosovo in 1999, and even in the departure of Milosevic this year, Greece undoubtedly played a much more important and positive role in recent events in Belgrade, primarily by respecting the will of the Serbian people right from the beginning. Moreover, Greek interests in the region, unlike those of Russia, do coincide with those of the United States. Three areas of cooperation that will be important over the coming years are security, democratic consolidation, and economic development. First, security. It is clear that, without democracy, economies stagnate or become dysfunctional; without a functioning and developing economy, democracy is threatened; and without security, neither a functioning democracy nor a functioning economy can be guaranteed. How do we make these three elements reinforce rather than undermine each other in the Balkans? Broadly defined, I would divide security into three components, and all three need to be safeguarded if a country and the region are to be stable. First, individual security from governmental repression, persecution, and lawlessness. Second, group or sub-state security for both minorities and majorities, whether ethnic, religious, or regional. And, third, state security whereby a democratic country feels safe from foreign invasion, subversion, terrorism, or other forms of assault on its sovereignty. In all these areas, Greece can intensify its work with its NATO and EU partners in the Balkans and, in particular, can develop contacts between Serb and NATO militaries to help Serbia move toward Partnership for Peace status in the coming year. In addition to the Stability Pact for Balkan Reconstruction, perhaps the region needs some kind of security pact under an overall NATO umbrella, with a strong multi-national commitment within the region involving both confidence-building measures and concrete problem-solving activities in which America and Greece can collaborate. There are several areas where the two countries can play a very constructive role. For example, not only in combating terrorism but also in combating all forms of international organized crime, which cuts across the Balkans and serves the interests of extremists, nationalists, and criminals, undermines state institutions, and prevents economic development. The second area, which is key, is democratic consolidation. Greece can play a very important role in institution-building and in political-party development in several neighboring states, particularly Serbia, where it is especially well received. It may be beneficial to coordinate some of its initiatives with U.S. institutions. The United States, on the other hand, being perceived as a neutral country in the region can also act as a facilitator and confidence-builder between Greece and other central Balkan states. Indeed, both sides should favor such a role, as it could help dispel any latent misunderstandings and fears in the region.
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Impact: Demo Promo

Successful Demo promo in the Balkans key to exporting model globally
Current Digest of Post Soviet Press 9-1-99 Yesterday Russian Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin took part in a summit in Sarajevo of the countries participating in the Southeast Europe Stability Pact. Officially, the topic was the rebuilding of Yugoslavia. But for all intents and purposes the summit was a new Potsdam Conference on the structure of postwar Europe. This time Russia was on the West's side -- a result of a radical turnaround in its foreign policy. The idea of the pact is simple: The West is tired of being a fire brigade that keeps having to extinguish armed conflicts. Now it hopes to avert them -with the help of big money. Money will go to everyone who accepts the proposed rules of play, chief of which are to deal with all disputes peacefully and to carry out democratic reforms. For now this model will be tested in the Balkans, which do not subscribe to the norms by which the rest of Europe lives. If the test is a success, the same plan can certainly be applied in other regions of the world. "The stability pact is a turning point for Europe," Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, chairman of the European Union, the pact's main sponsor, stated yesterday.
Democratization key to prevent nuclear war
Muravchik, Democracy and Nuclear Peace, June 7, 2000 www.npecweb.org/syllabi/muravchik.htm This progress offers a source of hope for enduring nuclear peace. The danger of nuclear war was radically reduced almost overnight when Russia abandoned Communism and turned to democracy. For other ominous corners of the world, we may be in a kind of race between the emergence or growth of nuclear arsenals and the advent of democratization. If this is so, the greatest cause for worry may rest with the Moslem Middle East where nuclear arsenals do not yet exist but where the prospects for democracy may be still more remote.
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POLITICS LINKS TURKEY

THE JEWISH LOBBY IS A CLOSE ALLY OF TURKEY
Turkish Daily News January 30, 2003
A powerful Jewish lobby in the United States is also a key factor that is likely to keep Turkey's relations on track with Israel for the foreseeable future. Turkey, in the past, has resorted to this influential lobby and sought its help in resolution of different troubles, such as when it was bothered by Armenian efforts to get allegations of genocide recognized in the United States. AND, THE US WOULD PUSH FOR NEGOTIATIONS UNFAVORABLE TO TURKISH
INTERESTS U.S. Arms Clients Profiles January 2002 http://www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/greece.htm Cyprus is another major source of conflict between Greece and Turkey. In response to a potential Greek invasion, Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974 and set up a new government in the northeast part of the island. Since then, Cyprus has become one of the most heavily armed islands in the world with 30,000 Turkish troops facing Greek-Cypriot forces across a UN-patrolled border. Click here for U.S. intelligence testimony on the situation in Cyprus. The United Nations and the United States both support the withdrawal of Turkish troops from the island.
JEWISH LOBBY WILL SUCCESSFULLY PROTECT TURKISH INTERESTS IN WASHINGTON

Turkish Probe November 10, 2002
Emphasizing that there are three axes in Turkish foreign policy; relations with the EU, relations with U.S. and relations with Israel, Erhan said, "Military and economic relations with Israel are crucial for Turkey. Jewish lobbies are not only supporting Turkey in Washington, but also in the EU lobbies are not only supporting Turkey in Washington, but also in the EU membership process and they are doing this very effectively and without taking money. " Strong opposition in Congress against Turkey BAGCI AND KARDAS-MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY-5/12/03
Therefore, in assessing Turkish-American relations, one has to bear in mind the fact that U.S. policies can shift easily because of different factors affecting U.S. policy making, such as lobbying, Congress and internal American debates on how to conduct U.S. foreign policy. At the moment, there are many supporters of Turkey in the Bush administration but this cannot be taken for granted forever, and there is still strong opposition within Congress against Turkey.[107] The expectation of full, unqualified U.S. support for all the issues mentioned above is therefore overly optimistic, and the developments so far prove this observation.
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The powerful Israeli lobby defends Turkish interests in Congress Washburn, Senior Researcher at the World Policy Institute 98 The Progressive, December. P. 20 In Washington, the pro-Turkey and pro-Israel lobbies are working together to pursue their common interests. The Congressional Research Service notes that Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai has confirmed that Israel is assisting Turkey on the American political scene and encouraging Jewish organizations to follow this example. Earlier this year, according to the Economist of London, Turkey was pleased to have the support of the powerful Jewish lobby in Washington, which helped to get Congress to unfreeze the sale of two frigates to Ankara. The WSJ notes that Turkish interests are now on the agenda of groups like the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, a Washington based think tank, and the America Israel Public Action Committee, and influential pro Israel Lobby. More evidence. Washburn 1998 For Turkey, this is a dream come true. The new alliance gives Ankara something theyve never had before, notes John Tirman. An ethnic constituency in the U.S. that can strengthen Turkeys lobbying presence in Washington. The Jewish lobby is the single most effective foreign affairs interest group--they are way stronger than the Greek lobby Dallas Morning New 10-29-98 His organization has opposed U.S. aid and arms sales to Turkey since Turkish troops invaded the predominantly Greek island nation of Cyprus in 1974. The institute is part of a "Greek lobby" that lobbyists and politicians have long rated as Washington's second-most influential foreign affairs interest group. But most such specialists - including Mr. Rossides - also say the Greek lobby has far less clout with Congress and the executive branch than the Jewish organizations that make up the pro-Israel lobby. "No one can come close to them," Mr. Rossides said. "It's not a question of number 1 and number 2, like McGwire and Sosa. We're so far below their effectiveness."
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The Jewish lobby will protect Turkeys interest in Congress--this ensures political battles with Greek and Armenian lobbies
The Dallas Morning News November 2, 1998
Just as the Turkish-Israeli relationship has set off alarms in Arab capitals, visions of the powerful Jewish lobby taking Turkey's side on Capitol Hill are giving heartburn to Ankara's foes in Washington. "We would not be happy with any effort by Jewish-American organizations for Turkey," said Eugene Rossides, founding director of the American Hellenic Institute, the major Greek-American lobby. "I'm hopeful they won't mount any serious effort." The Jewish groups have been drawn to longtime U.S. ally Turkey by the Muslim nation's decision in the early 1990s to foster tourism, trade and military cooperation with Israel. Alan Makovsky, an analyst at the pro-Israel Washington Institute for Near East Policy, traces the effort's beginnings to the Oslo Agreement of 1993, which created a wobbly peace between Israel and the Palestinians. "For years, it was widely believed there was a behind-the-scenes relationship between Turkey and Israel," Makovsky said, based on a mutual understanding between the two non-Arab democracies, both allies of the United States, who shared Syria, Iraq and Iran as antagonists. Jewish Lobby has Turkeys back Waxman Winter 1999, The Washington Quarterly. Vol. 22, No. 1; Pg. 25 Turkey and Israel: A New Balance of Power in the Middle East The Turks are optimistic that while their relationship with Brussels may be deteriorating, their relationship with Washington is improving as a result of their friendship with Israel. This appears to be the case. A State Department spokesman declared in May 1997, "It has been a strategic objective of the United States that Turkey and Israel ought to enhance their military cooperation and their political relations." He then went on to describe the entente as "useful to both countries and to the United States." But perhaps more important for the Turks than gaining the State Department's approval is winning friends in Congress, a place where they have always suffered at the hands of the Greek and Armenian lobbies. For this they are relying on the power and influence of the American Jewish lobby. Already this lobby has helped Turkey to obtain American arms that had been blocked by Congress for human rights reasons. There are, of course, limits to what American Jews can do for Turkey; however, the Turks are now more likely to receive a favorable hearing in Congress -something for which they previously they had little hope.
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BAN ARMS SALES TO TURKEY CP

Text: The United states should end all transfers of all types of weapons systems to Greece and Turkey. Observation I: The CP Competes--it avoids the DAs and solves all the case. Observation II: The CP solves the entirety of the affirmative--Ending arms transfers to normalizes Greece/Turkey relations and ensures regional peace and stability
Greece is the sole remaining politically and economically stable country in the Balkans, and its stability is vital to the interests of the U.S. and other countries in the region. The most obvious solution to preserve Greek stability is the cessation of the heavy arming of Turkey. Turkey is already overarmed far beyond its defensive needs. Greece, which desperately desires peace, has expressed no territorial designs upon its neighbors. Ending the flow of arms to Turkey will help restore normal relations between the two countries, and could help lead to the stabilization of Turkish economic, social, and political life. The immense funds presently spent on military spending could be redirected into the Turkish economy to serve the Turkish people. The reorientation of the Turkish economy from its present military focus to one of internal development will redress the internal political balance, allay the rising threat of the Refah party, and curb the rapid Islamization of Turkish political life. In addition, the end of Turkish heavy military spending may lessen fears of an increasingly large arms stockpile falling into the hands of an Islamic fundamentalist government. n46 [*89] More evidence--US policy is the root cause of destabilization in the region--we should end arms sales to Turkey
U.S. foreign policy has contributed heavily to the destabilization of Turkey, and has also sacrificed a stable democratic ally in Greece. A policy which has resulted only in placating the Turkish military caste is a short-sighted foreign policy. The military caste will not "save" Turkey from the growing internal tensions within Turkish society. When one nation in a conflict is given preferential treatment over another with respect to the acquisition of weapons, that nation will build up its military. The nation which establishes such military superiority will use its advantage to settle the conflict in its favor, often violating the sovereignty of the weaker nation in the process. One wonders how this simple proposition has "escaped" the notice of all those who formulate and enforce American policy in Greco-Turkish affairs. When the U.S. places no restraints on the use of Turkey's military weaponry, it rewards Turkey for its aggression. It becomes an inescapable conclusion that the present arms imbalance and the threats created by the Turkish military will result in war. This would be an unqualified disaster for the region and, ultimately, for U.S. national security. The crises which have been initiated by the stronger party, Turkey, should be settled in favor of the security interests of the U.S. and, more generally, the interest of the Balkan region. There are two parts to the solution to this impending crisis: ending the flow of arms to Turkey; and halting Turkey's expansionist aggression. Peace is an admirable goal. However, when a foreign policy favors one side of a conflict, a lopsided result is inevitable. Turkey should not be allowed to use its U.S.-supplied weapons to attack an American ally and member of NATO. The executive branch of the U.S. should act responsibly to prevent adding fuel to the tinderbox which characterizes the current Greco-Turkish state of affairs.
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BAN ARMS SALES EXTENSIONS

US arms buildups makes Greece-Turkey war inevitable
Speros Vryonis, Director of the Speros Basil Vryonis Center for the Study of Hellenism, Jr. Summer 1997 UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs. 2 UCLA J. Int'l L. & For. Aff. 69 There is no longer a doubt as to the inevitability of the outbreak of a Greco-Turkish war. Faced with an arms race between Greece and Turkey, the U.S. government has favored one side in the conflict, ignoring the axiom that superior military power will tend to violate the weaker side. The impartial arguments which President Clinton and members of his administration have put forth in the past appear to be purely political rhetoric. n44 The administration has not treated Turkey and Greece impartially. The U.S. has supported Turkey's vast military superiority by supplying it with weapons. The administration has not only excused blatant Turkish aggression, but also rewarded it with continued arms sales.
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US arms sales to Greece and Turkey fuel arms race and tensions in the Aegean Tomas Valasek, Research Analyst, December 3, 1998 Adding Fuel to the Fire: US Arms Sales to Greece and Turkey. Weekly Defense Monitor. Center for Defense Information. http://www.cdi.org/weekly/1998/issue47/#3
U.S. weapons are fueling an arms race in the Aegean even as U.S. diplomats try to stop Greek-Turkish tensions from escalating into war. This week, the U.S. Department of Defense announced plans to sell to Greece four guided missile destroyers, armed with HARPOON surface-to-surface missiles. Last month, the Department of Defense notified Congress of its plans to sell to Turkey eleven frigates and ammunition. At the same time, U.S. and European diplomats are trying to diffuse tensions over a planned deployment of S-300 surface-to-air missiles in Cyprus. Turkey threatened a military strike to prevent the delivery of the Russian-made missiles to the Cypriot government. US negotiator Richard Holbrooke is due in the region soon and will seek to persuade the Greek Cypriots to cancel the S-300 delivery and the Turks to stop military flights over Cyprus. Cyprus has been divided into a Greek and a Turkish part since 1974. The Greek government in Nicosia rules the internationallyrecognized Republic of Cyprus, while the Turkish Cypriot republic has been recognized only by Turkey. For decades, the international community left Cyprus to its fate, preferring the status quo to seeking solutions to the island's division. The UN mission guarding the inter-communal line in Cyprus, originally launched in 1964, is the third longest running UN operation. However, a series of recent events have set Greece and Turkey on a collision course over Cyprus. In December 1997, the European Union (EU) refused to extend membership to Turkey due to concerns about the nation's economy, democracy and human rights. At the same time, it named Cyprus among the first-tier candidates. The invitation for Cyprus was intended to foster reintegration of the island -- the EU hoped that the promise of membership will inspire the Turkish community to improve its relations with the Republic of Cyprus. By all counts, the effort backfired. Turkey responded by taking steps towards annexing Turkish-controlled territories of Cyprus into the mainland. The divisions between the island's communities hardened. Seeking to break the stalemate, the Greek Cypriot ordered Russian-made S-300 surface-to-air missiles. The missiles were certain to be viewed as provocation by Turkey as they threatened Ankara's dominance over the island's airspace. Cyprus hoped to use the missiles as a bargaining chip with Turkey. "We don't want to deploy the system, even if we accept the delivery. This entire effort is a way to pressure Turkey to resolve the Cyprus issue. But so far that's not happening," a Greek official told "Defense News." Cypriot President Glafcos Clerides offered to cancel the purchase if Turkey withdraws its troops from the island and stops military aircraft overflights. But instead of starting a dialogue between the Greeks and the Turks, this effort only brought both nations closer to war. Turkey warned that it would use military force to prevent the S-300 deployment. The U.S. and the European Union asked Cyprus to cancel the contract. Greece sought to diffuse tensions by offering to deploy the missiles on its island of Crete instead of Cyprus, but was rebuffed by President Clerides of Cyprus. In the meantime, the missiles are sitting in a warehouse in Russia after their delivery was postponed twice, and Cyprus is facing stiff financial penalties for reneging on its contract with Russia. The latest crisis comes among indications that the Greeks and Turks on Cyprus are preparing for a possible war. The government of the Republic of Cyprus opened a new airbase at Paphos. The country's parliament passed a 1 percent defense tax hike in August to pay for new weapons buys. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) built an airfield at Lefkoniko and upgraded its ports for possible military use. Both the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus maintain close military ties with Greece and Turkey respectively. Greece and the Republic of Cyprus have a common defense doctrine. Turkey and the TRNC signed an agreement in January 1998 which would incorporate the TRNC into Turkey proper. Any conflict on Cyprus would thus inevitably drew in Greece and Turkey. Both countries demonstrated their commitment to fight for Cyprus earlier this year when each deployed fighter aircraft to bases on the island. Defying the post-Cold War trend in Europe, both Turkey and Greece have embarked on ambitious military modernization programs. Greece plans to spend $16 billion modernizing its army while Turkey intends to buy $12 billion worth of tanks, vessels, helicopters and aircraft over the next 10 years. Many of these purchases were made with an eye on Cyprus. The U.S. embassy in Cyprus is investigating alleged transfers of US weapons from Turkey to the TRNC, which would violate a 1988 law prohibiting US weapons to be used in activities furthering the division of Cyprus. Greek sources say hundreds of tanks, armored personnel carriers and self-propelled artillery were shipped to TRNC from Turkey.
U.S. weapons -- including the 15 vessels offered to Turkey and Greece this year -- could become the instruments of war between these two NATO allies. In the light of these tensions, the obligatory phrase "this proposed sale will contribute to the foreign policy and national security objectives of the United States," which accompanies all notifications of US arms sales abroad, has an increasingly false ring in the Aegean.
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US arms transfers to Greece and Turkey are massive--these hamper any chance for peace in the Agean
U.S. Arms Clients Profiles January 2002 http://www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/greece.htm
Beginning in July 2000, encouraging reports have been emerging periodically from Cyprus. Informal talks between Greek and Turkish residents periodically help to reinvigorate peace initiatives. However, in late 2001, amidst intensified efforts to end Turkish occupation in northern Cyprus, the Cypriot government reported an increased frequency in the violations of the repubic's airspace by Turkish military aircraft. The U.S. has asked Cyprus to surrender weapons obtained by the Cypriot National Guard in order to difuse tensions and yet it remains an arms supplier to both Greece and Turkey who install these weapons on the island. Any prospect for lasting peace in the Aegean would seem to be complicated by the U.S. arms export policy to Greece and Turkey. The U.S. government has engaged in an action-reaction of arms sales to Greece and Turkey. Until 1997, the U.S. government sought to manage the Greek-Turkish arms race by providing aid and arms on a 7:10 basis. That is, for every $7 million of arms sold or given to Greece, Turkey received $10 million. But beyond balancing the financial aid, the U.S. government sells or gives the same weapons systems to both sides to maintain the balance. Some examples just from 1996 are: In December 1995, the United States sold Turkey 120 Army tactical missiles (ATACMS). (The missile has a range of 30-165 km and can be upgraded to travel a greater distance. It carriers an anti-personnel/anti-material cluster munitions warhead that spews shrapnel over a 150 square meter area.) This was a controversial sale, since the ATACMS had only entered the U.S. Army's arsenal a few years before. The following summer, the United States sold 40 ATACMS to Greece; In April 1996, the U.S. government gave both Greece and Turkey 523 BLU-107 Durandal anti-runway munitions; In April 1996, the U.S. government sold improved radar systems to Greece for its F-16 fighter jets and made the same deal with Turkey two months later. During a further wave of increased tensions in the winter of 1998-99, Greece reacted to perceived threats from Turkey and deployed a missile system on Crete. This action led to mounting tensions and triggered a further flow of similar weapons transfers from the U.S. to both Greece and Turkey. In late 1998 the U.S. government sold the Turkish Navy Knox and Perry Class frigates. A year later, a smaller number of Knox Class frigates were freely given to Greece as excess defense articles. In September 2001, a $212 million contract to Raytheon for Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles once again names both Greece and Turkey as recipients of this naval weapon. A further, more detailed comparison of sales to both countries can be found in the February 1999 issue of the Arms Sales Monitor . Greece considers Turkey its principal military adversary. Greece's armed forces number 168,000 while Turkey has 693,000 soldiers. To counter this numerical disadvantage, the government of Greece recently embarked on a ten-year, $17 billion modernization program. Their shopping list includes 60 jet fighter aircraft, six new warships, an AWACS plane, two new submarines, new tanks, four Apache attack helicopters, and seven transport helicopters. Plans also include the overall restructuring of the military and the local defense industry, modernizing existing F-4 Phantom warplanes and buying missiles, anti-aircraft systems and trainer aircraft. U.S. Foreign Military Financing to Greece and Turkey was cut in 1998, but the U.S. still plays an active role in selling U.S. weapons to each country. The Greek publication Elevtherotipia reported that former Ambassador Nicholas Burns had taken part in attempting to dissuade Greek officials from purchasing the Eurofighter in favor of a U.S. military aircraft. Since the military junta was overthrown in 1974, democracy has been re-established. The country has an overall good human rights record, with some exceptions in its treatment of non-Greek minorities. For more information, refer to the latest State Department human rights reports and Human Rights Watch reports below.
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US should halt weapons transfers to Greece and Turkey--this will spur cooperation and resolution of conflicts
Tasos Kokkinides August 1998 http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/BP29.htm Diplomacy and Arms: West Sends Mixed Messages to Aegean Adversaries
These procurement programmes are aimed at power projection beyond the Aegean. Both countries are developing the necessary capabilities to fight a war in Cyprus. For example, planned military procurement in Greece would result in the deployment of a credible deterrent posture in Cyprus and would also allow the Greek air force to operate effectively deep inside Turkish territory. Both countries have requested the US-made F-15E fighter aircraft, an addition that would double the reach of their respective air forces. Turkey has asked for 40 F-15s and Greece plans to add 30-40 new fighter aircraft to its fleet, possibly F15s. Turkey has also acquired seven refuelling tanker aircraft, substantially increasing the operational capability of its fighter aircraft fleet. Greece plans to acquire four similar tanker aircraft. Recommendations Arms Control Halt weapons transfers to Greece and Turkey. Both countries have more weapons than their legitimate security needs require (see Table 1.1). The United States and other NATO countries should introduce a moratorium on weapons transfers and upgrades until the two sides adopt a comprehensive set of CSBMs and agree on measures to resolve their differences. Arms procurements increase risk of accidental and preemptive war
Dyer 1998 British American Security Information Council. OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY. AUGUST 1998 NUMBER 29 http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/BP29.htm. Diplomacy and Arms: West Sends Mixed Messages to Aegean Adversaries The Greek and Turkish arsenals have been increasing in qualitative and quantitative terms, with no end in sight (see Tables 2.1 and 2.2). New procurement plans emphasising the introduction of a dangerous new level of air and naval power in the region and the stockpiling of sophisticated offensive weaponry will increase the likelihood of accidental war and makes the option of a surprise or pre-emptive attack more attractive. After the Cold War ended, NATO allies sent thousands of offensive military weapons to Greece and Turkey, including main battle tanks, attack helicopters, armoured personnel vehicles, artillery and combat aircraft. Under NATOs "cascade" programme, the Alliance withdrew this equipment from its central front and transferred it to the two Aegean powers. Adding fuel to the fire, both have announced massive procurement programmes for their armed forces. Greece plans to spend $24 billion over the next eight years (see Table 2.3). Turkey has committed to a programme costing $31 billion over the next decade in the first stage of a massive programme expected to reach almost $150 billion over the next 25 to 30 years (see Table 2.4). The United States and other NATO allies appear to welcome the opportunity to increase their own weapons exports. Despite the inherent risk of war, they are continuing to supply Greece and Turkey with advanced weaponry. If a war were to occur between the two adversaries, the bulk of weaponry would be of US origin or from European NATO countries. For example, the fiscal year 1999 Defence Appropriations Act would authorise the US Secretary of the Navy to transfer 14 vessels to Turkey and 11 to Greece. This surplus equipment includes Knox- and Perry- class frigates, and Adams- and KIDD- class guided missile destroyers. These procurement programmes are aimed at power projection beyond the Aegean. Both countries are developing the necessary capabilities to fight a war in Cyprus. For example, planned military procurement in Greece would result in the deployment of a credible deterrent posture in Cyprus and would also allow the Greek air force to operate effectively deep inside Turkish territory. Both countries have requested the US-made F-15E fighter aircraft, an addition that would double the reach of their respective air forces. Turkey has asked for 40 F-15s and Greece plans to add 30-40 new fighter aircraft to its fleet, possibly F-15s. Turkey has also acquired seven refuelling tanker aircraft, substantially increasing the operational capability of its fighter aircraft fleet. Greece plans to acquire four similar tanker aircraft.
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Consult Turkey 1NC

Text: The United States federal government should engage in binding prior consultation with Turkey over the mandates of the affirmative plan.
[Throughout the consultation process, the United States federal government will advocate passage of the affirmative plan, and Turkey will retain the ability to veto to prevent the United States from enacting the plan.]]
Net benefit is Turkish relations: Turkey is a vital for military power projection, but Turkish cooperation is not guaranteed Ian O. Lesser, 2000, The Future of Turkish-Western Relations: Toward a Strategic Plan,
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1241/ Chapter 4 Only the narrowest (homeland defense) approach to U.S. interests places Turkey outside the definition of an important ally. As a contributor to European, Middle Eastern, and Eurasian futures, Turkey is arguably unique. An emphasis on the transregional challenges noted above underscores this point. The phrase location, location, location has considerable relevance in the Turkish case. But this geographic approach is only a starting point, albeit an important one, especially in relation to the projection of military power, lines of communication for resources, and trade. Location implies a potential for regional influence; it does not ensure it (as the relatively limited nature of Turkeys external policy from the formation of the Republic through the 1980s demonstrates). In the absence of agreement on the Turkish side, it also does not ensure that Turkeys allies will be able to derive any advantage from Turkeys valuable position.
Joint policy planning that includes Turkish interests is necessary to solidify US relations with Turkey and US hegemony F. Stephen Larrabee, and Ian O. Lesser, policy analysts at RAND, Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty, 2003, http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1612/MR1612.ch6.pdf
Turkeys role in energy security could become more central to Turkish-Western, and especially Turkish-U.S., relations. Turkey figures prominently in the American debate with regard to power projection in the Caspian and the Gulf (Baghdad is closer to Southeastern Turkey than it is to the lower Persian Gulf), although the record regarding Turkish-U.S. cooperation in Gulf security since the early 1990s is quite mixed. The use of Incirlik air base has been essential to the maintenance of the no-fly zone in Northern Iraq. But Ankara has been very unwilling to facilitate strikes against Iraq proper since the Gulf War. On Iran, as noted above, the Turkish position parallels that of Europe and stresses economic and political engagement. So despite the fact that Turkeys geographic position makes it a potentially important partner for Gulf securityespecially if U.S. strategy is realigned to reduce military presence in the Gulf itselfa good deal more, and more effective, joint discussion and policy planning would be necessary for Ankara to accept such a role. [insert Khalilzad]
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Turkey will say yes / Genuine partnership key

The best way to ensure Turkish cooperation with the US is by cultivating a genuine partnership Alan Makovsky, senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, specialist in Turkish and Middle Eastern affairs, former State Department official, 2000, Turkeys Transformation and American Policy, ed. Morton
Abramowitz ed. As a result of its strong support for Turkey, the United States can usually count on Ankaras taking into account crucial U.S. interests. But Turkey is unlikely to compromise on its own perceived areas of fundamental national interest simply to show itself responsive to U.S. desires. Rather than leverage, the best assurance of Turkish support for U.S. policy initiativesparticularly in an era of growing Turkish power and prosperityresides in Washingtons persistent cultivation of a climate of genuine partnership, mutual interest, and respect. That will continue to be so, barring some dramatic shift in Turkeys fortunes or in the regional or international landscape.
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Turkey will say yes security issues

Turkey wants the US as a security broker in volatile regions, even if interests do not always coincide F. Stephen Larrabee, and Ian O. Lesser, policy analysts at RAND, Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty, 2003, http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1612/MR1612.ch7.pdf
A second Turkish stake in the bilateral relationship turns on the pivotal role of the United States as a security arbiter in adjacent regions, that is, beyond the containment of Russian power. Turks often refer to their existence in a dangerous neighborhood, with chronic instability on their borders. The containment of diverse security risks, from the Balkans to the Middle East, benefits considerably from cooperation with the United States, as in relations with Russia. Europe, even a Europe with growing ambitions in the foreign and security policy spheres, is unlikely to exert the same weight in regional affairs. To be sure, the American involvement in such areas as the Gulf can pose dilemmas for Ankara, and policy interests and approaches do not always coincide. On balance, however, Turkey benefits from the continued American military presence in adjacent regions.
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Middle East policy / peace process link

Turkey wants a US presence in the Mideast, even if it disapproves of aspects of US policy F. Stephen Larrabee, and Ian O. Lesser, policy analysts at RAND, Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty, 2003, http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1612/MR1612.ch7.pdf
Stability and reconstruction in the Balkans will, of course, be strongly affected by EU policies, but Washington still has enormous influence and has been a consistent advocate for a Turkish role in the region. In the Middle East, U.S. involvement provides a measure of reassurance against the worst outcomes in Turkeys relations with its neighbors, even if Ankara disapproves of the economic and political aspects of containment policies in the Gulf. Turkish views on the constructive engagement of Iran are far closer to those prevailing in Europe. In the event of a future Syrian-Israeli peace settlement, the United States would almost certainly play a key role in making sure Turkeys interests are protected, whether on water supply or in restrictions on Syrian military redeployments along the border with Turkey. Under conditions of crisis between Israel and the Palestinians, Ankara favors an active role for the United States in the Middle East peace process.
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2NC: A2: Perm / binding consult key to relations

A new agenda of shared interests is critical to relations with Turkey Zalmay Khalilzad, Ian O. Lesser, and F. Stephen Larrabee, 2000, The Future of Turkish-Western
Relations: Toward a Strategic Plan, http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1241/, Chapter 1 As Turkey has become more capableand assertivein diplomatic, economic, and military terms, Ankara has emerged as a more significant strategic partner for the West in troubled parts of the world, from the Balkans to Central Asia and the Middle East. The postCold War tendency toward a multilateral approach in U.S. foreign policy reinforces this point. Turkey is in the unusual position of being both a contributor to European security in a formal, Alliance context, and a partner in addressing wider problems influencing European, Middle Eastern, and Eurasian security, most of which lie outside the NATO area. As maintaining European security at its core becomes less challenging, and as Allies focus more heavily on security challenges on the periphery, Turkey will be a more important part of this equation. Moreover, many of the direct risks facing NATO today are actually on Turkeys borders. Yet recognition of Turkeys strategic importance on both sides of the Atlantic is not synonymous with a new and stronger strategic relationship between Ankara and the West. Security debates in the United States and Europe acknowledge Turkeys geopolitical significance and the need to reinvigorate relations with Turkey. But there has been relatively little progress in defining what a new agenda for strategic cooperation between Turkey and the West should include. As Ankara has become more active on the regional scene, and more sovereignty conscious, it has become evident that a perception of shared interest and purpose is critical to a predictable, cooperative relationship. Turkeys location adjacent to areas of critical interest for the West is just the starting point for a strategic relationship. It is not sufficient in its own right. The West must understand Turkeys strategic perspective, and Turks must want to be engaged in U.S. and European policies toward the region. Absent a catalyzing and common threat (as in the Cold War), a concerted strategic approach can only be developed through a deeper strategic dialogueand, more significantly, a new, relevant agenda.
Only through joint formation of an agenda can US-Turkish relations be strengthened and diversified Ian O. Lesser, 2000, The Future of Turkish-Western Relations: Toward a Strategic Plan,
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1241/ Chapter 4 Turkey can be a significant contributor to U.S. freedom of action in critical regions, but a business-as-usual approach to bilateral defense cooperation faces clear challenges in a climate of rising nationalism and wariness about unilateral U.S. intervention. Expeditionary requirements are making Turkey more important, but changes in Turkey and adjacent regions are increasing Ankaras own exposure and making cooperation less predictable. This dilemma may be eased through the development of a more diverse relationship in which defense cooperation is part of a broader web of interests and initiatives, and through more serious, joint consideration of an agenda for cooperation in the new strategic environment. In the absence of new rationales and relevant issues for cooperation, an enhanced strategic relationshipthe stated preference of leaderships in both countries over the past decadewill remain elusive.
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2NC: Binding consult key to base access / hegemony

US treatment of Turkey as more than just a conduit for hegemony is key to relations and base access F. Stephen Larrabee, and Ian O. Lesser, policy analysts at RAND, Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty, 2003, http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1612/MR1612.ch6.pdf
Fifth, Turkish military restructuring and modernization plans will make Ankara an increasingly important regional security actor in its own right. This suggests that Turkeys future role, coupled with a more assertive approach to diplomacy and the use of force, will go well beyond its traditional one as a facilitator of Western access and power projection. Indeed, in the absence of a more concerted U.S. approach to Turkey on strategic planning for contingencies in the Gulf and elsewhere in the region, access to Turkish facilities cannot be taken for granted. Finally, and over the longer term, these observations suggest that Turkey will be neither a bridge nor a barrier in relation to the Middle East but rather an increasingly capable and independent actor a more significant and possibly more difficult regional ally.
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2NC A2: Turkey likes plan / consultation not needed

A new generation of Turkish leaders makes rapid change in policy possiblethe US must being developing close ties with these leaders to secure relations in the future F. Stephen Larrabee, and Ian O. Lesser, policy analysts at RAND, Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty, 2003, http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1612/MR1612.ch8.pdf
Moreover, the Turkish political establishment faces a major generational turnover. Many of the dominant political figures of the last several decadesEcevit, Demirel, Erbakanare in their 70s and will soon depart from the political scene. They will be replaced by a new generation of Turkish leaders who may adopt quite different approaches to many problems than the older generation of leaders. As this transition unfoldsand this is likely to happen rather rapidly Turkey may go through a difficult period of change. Thus, the West should begin now to establish close contacts with the new generation of leaders who will shape Turkeys future.
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SHUNNING LINKS
Turkey is a major violator of human rights including forced relocation, torture, murder, and rape Dhooge 1999 (16 Ariz. J. Intl & Comp. Law 577)
The U.S. State Department has concluded that Turkish security forces have committed numerous serious human rights abuses in their suppression of the Kurdish insurgency. n565 Although unable to verify the number of victims, the State Department has characterized the reports of extrajudicial killings by government authorities as "credible." n566 Included among these victims are members of the pro-Kurdish Peoples' Democracy Party who have also been the target of government harassment and arbitrary arrest. n567 The Turkish government has waged a campaign of harassment and intimidation directed at human rights monitors, journalists, and others who have publicized these practices or criticized the government. n568 The Turkish government has taken few steps to resolve outstanding extrajudical killing cases and to discourage the practice in the future. n569 Turkish security forces have also engaged in a widespread campaign of forced evacuation and destruction of villages in southeastern Turkey. n570 The declaration of emergency in southeastern Turkey authorizes security forces "to [*647] resettle villagers for their own protection." n571 However, the strategic objective of this campaign is clearly to deny the PKK a primary source of logistical support and recruits. n572 Although exact figures are not available, various human rights groups have placed the number of villages subjected to forced evacuation and destruction in southeastern Turkey between 2,200 and 3,000. n573 The State Department places this estimate between 2,600 and 3,000 villages, which have affected approximately 560,000 people. n574 In any event, these confiscations by Turkish security forces are sudden, permanent, not subject to judicial review, and without compensation. n575 Turkish security forces have also been accused of utilizing arbitrary detention and mass arrests to suppress pro-Kurdish actions and expressions of support. n576 Turkey adopted the so-called "Anti-Terror Law" in 1991 which contains a broad and ambiguous definition of terrorism, thereby justifying the arrest and detention of "both alleged terrorists and others [whose] acts, words or ideas" advocate separatism including support of Kurdish autonomy. n577 Turkey has continued to use the Anti-Terror Law to detain thousands of persons over the course of the last eight years including 3,000 members of the Peoples' Democracy Party detained by government authorities in December 1998. n578 Many of these detainees have been subjected to torture, which the State Department has characterized as "widespread." n579 Despite the constitutional ban upon the use of torture for the purpose of coercing confessions, human rights groups and the United Nations have concluded that most detainees suffer some form of torture. n580 [*648] Common practices include beatings, electric shocks, suspension, sleep, food and clothing deprivation, and rape. n581 Torture continues to be utilized by Turkish authorities as evidenced by the filing of eighty-six claims of alleged torture in August 1998 alone. N
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NGO CP Shell 1/2

Insert Text
OBS I: The CP competes-- the CP isnt government to government, its government to NGO. It solves all the case and avoids
the net benefits. Any permutation would sever the portion of the plan that gives the assistance directly to the government. Sever permutations deprive the negative of all DA or CP ground. Its a voting issue. If the affirmative claims they dont give the money directly to the government then they arent topical and they should lose.
OBS 2: The CP Solves: USAID can channel funds through anti trafficking NGOs in Greece --weve got empirical evidence that this solves
Kent R. Hill, 10-29-03 Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Europe and Asia, United States Agency for International Development http://www.libertadlatina.org/US_USAID_Congressional_Update_On_Trafficking_10292003.htm
In Ukraine, USAID's "Trafficking Prevention Project" addresses two key factors that contribute to the vulnerability of Ukrainian women to trafficking: lack of economic opportunity and violence against women. This project began in 1998 and will continue through April 2004. In it, USAID and its partner, Winrock International, pioneered the strategy of increasing women's income-earning options as a way to prevent trafficking. Project activities are grounded on the assumption that in order to improve trafficking prevention efforts in Ukraine: 1) women in the at-risk group need to be trained in recognizing and creating viable economic opportunities for themselves; and 2) improved crisis prevention services for at-risk women and returned trafficking victims need to be enhanced. Through nine trafficking prevention centers run by Ukrainian non-governmental organizations, this activity offers both job skills training and resources for women including support groups, free legal consultations, and referrals to physicians and psychologists. Children from marginalized populations in Albania, particularly ethnic minorities, are unusually vulnerable to being sold by their relatives, manipulated by traffickers, and ignored by law enforcement. Albania's proximity to developed countries in the European Union (notably Greece and Italy), combined with porous borders, has made it a prime illegal market for trade in human beings, especially children. A new USAID-sponsored activity, "Transnational Action Against Child Trafficking," links Albanian non-governmental organizations and public officials with their counterparts in Greece and Italy to identify trafficking routes, cooperate on voluntary and legal repatriation of trafficked children, and to improve care for trafficking victims both before and after repatriation. The activity includes prevention efforts such as information dissemination and assistance for at-risk children and their families. Terre des Hommes, an international non-governmental organization, is leading implementation of this activity, and other contributors joining USAID in supporting it include the Swedish International Development Agency, UNICEF, the Oak Foundation, and the National Albanian American Council.
More evidence the CP solves

Kent R. Hill, 10-29-03 Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Europe and Asia, United States Agency for International Development http://www.libertadlatina.org/US_USAID_Congressional_Update_On_Trafficking_10292003.htm
The anti-trafficking approach of the USAID Mission in Bangladesh includes targeted research, strengthening Bangladesh's anti-trafficking networks, supporting NGO capacity building, prosecution of traffickers, protection of victims, and targeted prevention efforts. The Mission provides support and funding to the Action Against Trafficking and Sexual Exploitation of Children (ATSEC), a regional anti-trafficking network of NGOs. ATSEC builds anti-trafficking alliances, disseminates information, and promotes awareness-raising activities, particularly among vulnerable populations such as rural populations and border region communities. USAID also supports the Bangladesh National Women Lawyers' Association (BNWLA) in its efforts to combat trafficking. BNWLA focuses on the protection of trafficking victims and the prosecution of trafficking perpetrators. The BNWLA provides legal aid, rehabilitation, and repatriation support services to trafficking survivors, and manages Proshanti, a shelter home for trafficking victims and abused women and children. BNWLA has provided shelter and services to nearly 1,000 women and children over several years. It also works in co-operation with the Government of Bangladesh to promote the prosecution of traffickers.
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NGO CP Shell 2/2

OBS 3: The Net Benefit Government to government assistance gets diverted for military procurements Michelle Ciarrocca 5-10-02 http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/commentary/2002/0205armsspend_body.html
The supplemental funding gives another $420 million to the Department of Defense to be used "for payments to Pakistan, Jordan, and other key cooperating nations for logistical and military support provided" in the war on terrorism, and $525 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF). The Federation of American Scientists points out that the ESF allocations are provided on a grant basis and are available for a variety of economic purposes, like infrastructure and development projects. And, although not intended for military expenditure, these grants allow the recipient government to free up its own money for military programs. Other troubling components of President Bush's request include the lifting of prohibitions on the use of U.S. aid for counterterrorism in Colombia, and $8 million to vet, train, and equip an Indonesian police counterterrorism unit.
The impact is ethnic cleansing--diverted aid contributes to ethnic cleansing--this turns back the case since exploitations, rape, murder, and slavery are hallmarks of ethnic cleansing campaigns Plain Dealer, 5-21-94
One way we participate in this ethnic cleansing is through the $100 million in cash the United States gives each year to the government of Turkey for "economic aid." However, these funds are fungible and, coincidentally, equal the cost of maintaining the Turkish military units on Cyprus. Additionally, the nearly half-billion dollars of military equipment the United States gives to Turkey in foreign aid each year replaces on mainland Turkey the massive amount of arms that Turkey deploys on Cyprus to block the ethnically cleansed.
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Diversion NB Link Extensions

Foreign aid is fungible
Shantayanan Devarajan, January 1999 Development Research Group The World Bank http://www.worldbank.org/html/dec/Publications/Workpapers/wps2000series/wps2092/wps2092.pdf
That foreign aid is in this sense fungible has been recognized for a long time. In 1947, Paul Rosenstein-Rodin, then Deputy Director of the World Banks Economics Department, noted: When the World Bank thinks it is financing an electric power station, it is really financing a brothel. In the mid-1950s, some of the Banks member countries asked for a revision of its policy of lending only for infrastructure because they wanted to borrow for health and education projects. The World Banks president responded that they could finance their health and education projects with the funds that were released by the Banks financing of infrastructure.
Foreign aid can be diverted for military purposes

Shanta Devarajan and Vinaya Swaroop Development Research Group,October 1998 http://www.worldbank.org/html/dec/Publications/Workpapers/wps2000series/wps2022 /wps2022.pdf
Since 1960 nearly $1.7 trillion (measured in 1995 dollars) has flown from rich to poor countries as foreign aid.1 In the 1990s, however, aid fatigue has been setting in. With the end of the Cold War and many rich countries facing their own fiscal problems, foreign-aid budgets are being squeezed. Donor governments and aid agencies are asking new questions about whether the assistance they provide is as effective as possible in promoting economic growth and reducing poverty, two oft-stated development policy objectives. Much of this attention is focused on the impact of foreign aid on public expenditures in recipient countries. Public expenditures have long been considered one of the main channels through which foreign aid influences development outcomes. The donor community has been increasingly concerned that aid development assistance earmarked for critical social and economic sectors is being used directly or indirectly to fund unproductive expenditures including those on defense.2
Aid is fungible and its impossible to check abuses and diversion

Shanta Devarajan and Vinaya Swaroop Development Research Group,October 1998 http://www.worldbank.org/html/dec/Publications/Workpapers/wps2000series/wps2022 /wps2022.pdf
Precluding aid fungibility appears to be simple, at least on paper. All that is needed is conditionality on incremental spending. In practice, however, it is difficult to figure out what the recipient government would have done in the absence of that donor financing. Estimating the counterfactual is problematic. In most cases when they target aid to particular sectors, donor agencies use a proxy (e.g., the previous years spending) of what the recipient government would have spent in the absence of aid. Treating past years= composition of spending as the pre-aid composition may not be very meaningful if the change in domestic resources is large relative to foreign aid. Moreover, the multiplicity of donors further complicates the analysis. The bottom line is that in most cases it is difficult to preclude switching of donor funds at the margin. Even if nonfungibility can be established, the recipient may not feel Aownership@ for the project if it was not planning to include in its expenditure program. The win-win situation results only if there is preference matching between the donor and the recipient and they both want to undertake the project which would not have been feasible in the absence of donor financing.
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Foreign aid targeted for special sectors is highly fungible
Sajal Lahiri University of Essex, July 10, 2000 Special Interest Politics and Aid Fungibility http://www.econ.ku.dk/epru/Seminars/files/raimondos.011200.pdf More often than not foreign aid is given for the benefit of special target groups in recipient countries. However, several studies have shown that it is very dicult for the donor countries to enforce such conditionalities, and foreign aid is, to all intents and purposes, highly fungible (see Pack and Pack, 1993, Khilji and Zampelli, 1994, Boone, 1996, and Feyzioglu et.al., 1998). This fungibility is often blamed for the high degree of aid fatigue in donor countries
More evidence the plan links to aid diversion

Sajal Lahiri University of Essex, July 10, 2000 Special Interest Politics and Aid Fungibility http://www.econ.ku.dk/epru/Seminars/files/raimondos.011200.pdf
The fungibility of foreign aid, viz. that a part of aid is diverted away from its intended use, is a major source of concern among people associated with development assistance in the donor countries. It undermines the eectiveness of foreign aid, and the knowledge of its presence leads to increased aid fatigue among the population in the donor countries. In this paper we explain the diversion in terms of a domestic political process in the recipient country in which non-targeted groups manage to divert away aid by lobbying the government. Foreign aid is fungible and easily diverted to military expenditures
Sajal Lahiri University of Essex, July 10, 2000 Special Interest Politics and Aid Fungibility http://www.econ.ku.dk/epru/Seminars/files/raimondos.011200.pdf A difficulty in analysing the leakage from of foreign aid from civilian to military is that even a targeted aid or non-fungible aid can increase defence spending. Resources that would have to go to civilian programmes are freed and hence can be diverted to military spending. This leakage produces a situation in which it may be necessary to reduce total aid while increasing sector specific aid.
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US assistance to Turkey is used to fund military campaigns including suppression of the Kurds
EUGENE T. ROSSIDES April 25 1994 AMERICAN HELLENIC INSTITUTE HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS/FOREIGN OPERATION, EXPORT FINANCING AND RELATED PROGRAMS FY 95 FOREIGN OPERATIONS APPROPRIATIONS. FDCH Documents
Money is fungible. Our military and economic aid to Turkey subsidizes Turkeys costs of its occupation of Cyprus, the $4 million Turkey paid in 1993 to its several U.S. "agents of influence" registered as foreign agents with the Justice Department and part of the costs of its 125,000 man Army of the Aegean aimed at Greece's Aegean islands and the 130,000 Turkish soldiers involved in armed suppression of the Kurds.
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The US should not send assistance to Turkey--its used to funds massive human rights abuses including murder, torture, and systematic elimination of Kurds
EUGENE T. ROSSIDES April 25 1994 AMERICAN HELLENIC INSTITUTE HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS/FOREIGN OPERATION, EXPORT FINANCING AND RELATED PROGRAMS FY 95 FOREIGN OPERATIONS APPROPRIATIONS. FDCH Documents
The first $4 million of economic aid appropriated by this Committee will, in effect, since money is fungible, go to Turkey's U.S. "agents of influence." It does not matter which theory of diplomacy one follows- realism, pragmatism, expediency, or morality- it is still not in the interests of the U.S. to give any aid to Turkey. The following twenty-three reasons why it is not in the interests of the United States to give military and economic aid to Turkey include the facts and reasons why Greece is important to the national security interests of the United States and why Turkey is of questionable value to those interests and an unreliable ally. Turkey's human rights violations in Turkey against its own citizens generally and in particular against its 12 million Kurdish citizens who constitute a 20% minority (See the 78 page Helsinki Watch report, Broken Promises Torture and Killings Continue in Turkey, released on Dec. 29, 1992, the Freedom House Annual Survey for 1991, the Human Rights Watch Report released in January, 1992, the Humanitarian Law Project Report, "The Current Conflict Between Turkish Armed Forces and the Kurds of Southeast Anatolia," July 17, 1991, the Helsinki Watch report, "Denying Human Rights and Ethnic Identity The Greeks in Turkey," March 1992, the Report of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York on "Torture in Turkey: The Legal System's Response," 45 Record 6-131, 1990, the several Amnesty International reports on Turkey, and the op.-ed. page article by Jack Healy, executive director, and Maryam Elahi, program officer, Amnesty International, in the Wash. Post, Jan. 5, 1993, A15. Also see Rossides, "Cyprus and the Rule of Law," 17 Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce 2 1, at footnote 122, page 62 Helsinki Watch "recommends that the United States end all military and security assistance to Turkey until" Turkey stops its "consistent pattern of gross human rights abuses." (See Helsinki Watch report Broken Promises: Torture and Killings Continue in Turkey , Dec. 29, 1992) Turkey seeks an undemocratic 50% voting status and a rotating presidency for the 18% Turkish Cypriot minority while denying basic human rights to its 20% Kurdish minority. Turkey is not willing to offer its Kurdish minority what it seeks for the Turkish Cypriot minority. Germany recently halted for the second time military aid to Turkey because of Turkish armed attacks including air strikes on the Kurds in Turkey and in Iraq utilizing in part German military equipment. (See Reuters, April 7, 1994) The United States, on the other hand supports Turkey's repression of the Kurds. During the Bush Administration, the State Department spokesperson actually commended the Turks (See Spokesperson Margaret Tutwiler press briefings, March 25 and 26, 1992.), In the Clinton Administration, the State Department once again convinced the White House to support Turkey's continued war against its 12 million Kurdish minority. In October, 1993 at a White House press conference with Turkish Prime Minister Ciller, President Clinton supported Turkey's actions against the Kurds. The current U.S. support includes the use of 6 cobra gunboat helicopters by Turkey in attacks on the Kurds in southeastern Turkey. Chairman Lee Hamilton asked Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Stephen A. Oxman: "Shouldn't we stop this aid for this purpose, period"" Oxman replied that the Administration supports Turkey's use of arms transfers against the PKK. (See Hearings, March 16, 1994, of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and the Near East.) The New York Times in an editorial (April 1, 1992) stated that "Turkish Kurds have been subject to systematic human fights violations, including torture." The editorial also stated that: "The international community immorally bound to demand that ... Ankara cease its ugly repression of Kurdish civilians before its becomes genocide."
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Turkey will divert aid to fund human rights abuses and military campaigns
GEORGE SAVIDIS May 17 2003 DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS AMERICAN HELLENIC EDUCATIONAL PROGRESSIVE ASSOCIATION (AHEPA) SENATE APPROPRIATIONS/FOREIGN OPERATIONS FY 95 FOREIGN OPERATIONS APPROPRIATIONS
We all know that the proposed $554 million in U.S. loans and grants for Turkey will, as money is fungible, subsidize exactly those by all accounts increasing human rights abuses in Turkey, as well as its illegal military occupation of the sovereign nation of Cyprus.
Aid props up Turkish occupation of Cyprus

HNA 2004 http://www.hellenicnews.com/readnews.html?newsid=650&lang=US It costs Turkey over $500 million annually for its illegal occupation of 37% of Cyprus. Money is fungible. Aid given to Turkey means that the U.S. taxpayer is subsidizing, in part, Turkeys occupation forces, the illegal colonists, and the Denktash regime.
Aid has empirically been diverted and used to wage genocide Amelia Brinczik 2003 School of Advanced INternational Study, John Hopkins University http://www.beyondintractability.org/servlet/util.servlet.GetFinalEssay?id=26876&cmd=view&bbId=494&internal= no
One of the most controversial examples of a humanitarian aid operation was in the case of Hutu refugee camps in Goma, Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) following the Rwandan genocide. Fearful of retaliation by the Tutsis, two million Hutus fled to neighboring countries for protection. In the Goma camps, Hutu militia members responsible for the genocide against the Tutsis continued to wield considerable power, terrorizing refugees, forbidding them to leave the camps, distributing anti-Tutsi propaganda, and recruiting and training troops from among them. Because of their position of authority, many aid agencies used the Hutu leadership to distribute food. This reinforced their power and enabled them to buy weapons, which they used for attacks on Rwanda. In early 1995 two major NGOs, Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) and International Rescue Committee (IRC), withdrew. MSF reported that, "The continued diversion of humanitarian aid by the same leaders who orchestrated the genocide, the lack of effective international action regarding impunity, and the fact that the refugee population was being held hostage, presented a situation contradictory with the principles of humanitarian assistance." The president of IRC said, "the whole aid community has been overtaken by a new reality." Humanitarianism has become a resource and people are manipulating it as never before. Sometimes we just shouldn't show up for a disaster. --Shawcross, p. 142-143
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The 2NC Hammer

Even if foreign aid isnt directly diverted it frees up earmarked funds that would have been used for those projects
Tarhan Feyzioglu, Vinaya Swaroop, and Min Zhu January 1998 THE WORLD BANK ECONOMIC REVIEW, VOL. 12, NO. 1: 2958. A Panel Data Analysis of the Fungibility of Foreign Aid http://www.worldbank.org/research/journals/wber/revjan98/pdf/article2.pdf The link between foreign aid and public spending is not straightforward because some aid may be fungible. An aid-recipient country could render earmarked aid fungible by reducing its own resources in the sector that receives aid and transferring them to other sectors of the budget. Some analysts claim that aid dollars are intrinsically more effective because they come as part of a package that includes the technical expertise and superior management skills of donor agencies. However, the crowding out of public spending and the use of aid at the margin have been contentious issues. The donor community has been increasingly concerned that development assistance intended for crucial social and economic sectors might be used directly or indirectly to fund unproductive military expenditures. (See UNDP 1994 for an analysis of the human development cost of arms imports in developing countries.) Given that donor agencies provide a significant portion of aid for specific projects or sectors (for example, projects in agriculture, health, and transport), they would like to know whether the aid increases net expenditures in those sectors or whether specific-purpose aid merely substitutes for expenditures that governments would have undertaken anyway. In this context, this article analyzes the fungibility of foreign aid across public expenditure categories.
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Aid Diversion Link Greece

Empirically, corruption in the Greek government prevents US aid from being utilized effectively. The New York Times, Greece Faces the Specter of Violence at the Olympics, December 29, 2000 But despite a trail of bombings, rocket attacks and shootings that have killed 22 people and injured dozens, no member of November 17 has ever been arrested, and the Greek authorities have yet to link anyone to the organization. "Everybody succeeded long ago in dealing with their assassination groups, except for Greece," R. James Woolsey, a former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, said in a telephone interview. "The United States has provided extensive assistance to the Greek government, and we have not seen anything come of it." Reports by Congress and the State Department earlier this year echoed old accusations that Greece lacked the will and the skill to pursue the group, which enjoyed a Robin Hood image in a nation with little fondness for American interests.
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Trafficking K 1NC (1)

A. The term trafficking in women is laden with mythical resonance, limiting the discursive space around which issues can be aired. The existing anti-trafficking framework merely serves to restrict womens freedom of movement, rather than to protect them from abuse. Furthermore, this approach establishes a dichotomy in which consenting women are viewed as whores and punished, while the innocent victim is aching for protection. The impact is to further subordination. Jo Doezema, Institute of Development Studies, U. of Sussex, Brighton, UK, Loose Women or Lost Women?, Gender Issues, Vol. 18, no. 1, Winter 2000, pg. 23-50, http://walnet.org/csis/papers/doezema-loose.html In line with their views on sex work, GAATW has been attempting to alter the paradigmatic view of the 'trafficking victim'. As mentioned above, they stress that the majority of women who end up in 'trafficking' situations are, or know they will be sex workers (Weijers and Lap-Chew 1990: 99). They also broaden the focus of 'trafficking in women' to include domestic labour and marriage, and link it to larger issues of labour migration and the lack of informal-sector labour regulation. The reality of female labour migration for the sex industry and other industries is complex, messy, and resists easy explanations and solutions. It certainly has very little to do with the stereotypical interpretation of 'trafficking in women'. Myth, on the other hand, is persistent precisely because it reduces complex phenomena to simple causes and clear-cut solutions: the victim and the villain. The myth of trafficking both creates and at the same time limits the discursive space around which these issues can be aired. The term 'trafficking in women' is laden with mythical resonance, and when an organisation like GAATW uses the term, it is not the complexity of women's work and migration that is pictured in the mind of the listener/reader, but the 'erotic-pathetic' (Murray 1998: 60) sex slave. The strategy of continuing to use the term 'trafficking in women' to get publicity and funding, a defence often used by feminist organisations who recognise the inaccuracy and damaging effects of the stereotype, [16] uses the discursive space created by the trafficking myth. However, attempts to combat the myth while using the terminology of trafficking are doomed by the limits to the discursive space imposed by the myth. Each repetition to the effect that 'trafficking in women' is a huge problem serves merely to reinforce the myth that campaigners are also attempting to break down, thus turning this into a futile effort. This damaging effects of continuing to view female labour migration for the sex industry through the lens of 'trafficking in women' has been recognised by sex worker rights activists (Doezema 1998, Murray 1998, PROS et al 1995), and by some anti-trafficking activists, such as Marjan Weijers of GAATW, as well: Moreover, given the history of the use of anti-trafficking measures to police and punish female migrants and female sex workers and to restrict their freedom of movement rather than to protect them from violence and abuse, serious doubts are raised as to appropriateness of the existing anti-trafficking framework (Weijers 1998: 26). As a consequence, the search is on to find a new framework to cover human rights and labour abuses in female migration, both within and between countries, for work in the sex industry, as well as other informal labour sectors (Leigh and Weijers 1998). An essential element in this new framework is the improvement of the legal and social position of sex workers. Sex workers' organisations have long argued that viewing prostitution as work is a necessary first step in protecting the rights of women and men involved in the sex industry. [17] The social stigma and legal restrictions surrounding prostitution mean that women and men in the sex industry are denied the legal protection granted others as citizens and as workers. Many of the problems described by anti-trafficking campaigners, including debt bondage, illegal confinement, coercion in the process of migration, deception and extortion are, in fact, covered by existing international and national labour and human rights standards, yet are not applied in the case of the sex industry (Bindman and Doezema 1997). The inclusion of women's work in prostitution and other informal labour sectors in existing labour and human rights mechanisms offers the most in terms of ensuring the rights of those involved in it (Bindman and Doezema 1997, Weijers and Lap-Chew 1997, Haverman 1998, Weijers 1998).
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Doezema Continued
Rather than new laws that target 'guilty' women at the expense of 'innocent' ones, that restrict women's ability to migrate and are based more on states' interests in controlling immigration and women's sexuality, policies towards trafficking must be based on women's interests: upon women's rights to control their own body, life, work and specifically, to migrate, to decide for themselves whether or not to work in prostitution and under what circumstances, and to be free from violence and constraint (Weijers and Lap-Chew 1997: 208). B. Trafficking is a term that is never applied to men women are trafficked, men migrate. This discourse sets up a dichotomy in which only women can be sexually exploited, while ignoring the experience of men. The result is to reinforce gender stereotypes of males as ultra-masculine and females as mere victims that need protection. Therese Blanchet, A Critical Look at Women Labour Migration and the Trafficking Within, Beyond Boundaries, Submitted to USAID, Dhaka, April, 2002, http://walnet.org/csis/papers/BEYOND.DOC The word "trafficking" is practically never applied to men in Bangladesh. As migrants, men are also known to suffer abuse and exploitation (including sexual), they are lured and cheated, yet, they are not said to be trafficked. One man met in Kuwait in the course of this study explained that men could not be trafficked because "a man can sleep anywhere at night". He was referring to a construction of male sexuality, which makes men unrapable, and untraffickable. His associating trafficking to a kind of vulnerability inherent to women's nature (read bodies) and a corresponding invulnerability in men is a common assumption. I suggest it needs urgent unpacking. Why should women's bodies be a source of vulnerability? Why can't they be a source of power and strength? And the same question arises for men. Values do not inhere in bodies but stem from social and power relations. Are
migrant women actually more victimized than men because of their bodies? A conversation held during this research is good to relate here.
In Kuwait, June 2001, a group of Bangladeshi men and women who worked for a cleaning company were met. Once in Kuwait, they were made to accept the same wages (22 Kuwaiti Dinar or 66 US$) per month. This salary, extremely low by any standard, had not been paid for 3 months. The situation was desperate, yet no one had informed their families about their plight. One man exclaimed: "The women here are better than us, at least they have something to sell". These men and women had been "trafficked" by manpower agencies whose business it is to trade in visa and in people. They were transported overseas even though there was no (or not enough) work for them to do. Men's situation was not any better than the women. They had paid even larger sums of
money to manpower agencies for the "privilege" of working in Kuwait. I saw men scavenging the dustbins of Hassabia for something to resell. An official at the Bangladesh Embassy stated that the suicide rate among the men was the highest. On what basis then should it be said that the dhanda 1(secret occupation) women resorted to made them into greater victims? Research on trafficking exclusively focusing on women obviously finds only women as victims. The trafficking in men is not even imagined; perhaps it hurts images of masculinity. Men who are sexually abused have been seen to be even more reluctant to talk about their ordeal than women are. The idea here is not to minimize the exploitation and the hardship suffered by women nor to deny that the types of jobs offered to them are often specific to their sex but to question the different criteria used to judge the exploitation of men and women. Trafficking in women leaves no one indifferent. The cause is good to use in awareness and fund raising campaigns but the benefits gained must be weighed against the potentially negative effect of the gender stereotyping it carries. An unbiased gender analysis of trafficking should include both men and women. Positing as a premises that men migrate, while women are trafficked, is a normative statement about gender wrongly taken as a fact.
[2 The word dhanda refers to an income earning activity which is generally low prestige and/or illegitimate and which is not revealed to outsiders. Here it clearly refers to sex work.]
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C. Trafficking in women is the re-telling of the myth of white slavery in a modern form, a new moral panic arising out of boundary crisis, involving fears of loss of community identity. Trafficking in women is better examined as a discourse, rather than a campaign for a set of policy actions to stop it. Revealing the truth to the myth makes the claims of the 1AC untrue. Our argument functions as a straight turn to their impact as the claims of the 1AC reinscribe gender norms and female subordination. Jo Doezema, Institute of Development Studies, U. of Sussex, Brighton, UK, Loose Women or Lost Women?, Gender Issues, Vol. 18, no. 1, Winter 2000, pg. 23-50, http://walnet.org/csis/papers/doezema-loose.html The repetition of core elements of the 'white slavery' myth in accounts of 'trafficking in women': innocence deceived, youthful virginity despoiled, the motifs of disease and death, the depraved black/Jewish/foreign trafficker, point in the direction of a new telling of an old myth. 'Trafficking in women' is the re-telling of the myth of 'white slavery' in a modern form, a new 'moral panic' arising in the context of 'boundary crises' involving fears of loss of community identity. In the west, communities feel under threat through immigration and multiculturalism; in the third world, communities worry about the perceived threat to tradition by encroaching western values; while in former communist countries, stress is caused by the difficult transition from communism to market economies. All over the world, communities are caught up in identity crises in the face of displacement, mass migration and globalisation. The myth of 'trafficking in women' is one manifestation of attempts to re-establish community identity, in which race, sexuality and women's autonomy are used as markers and metaphors of crucial boundaries. Thus, while incidents reported in accounts of 'trafficking' may be 'true', they may be at the same time mythical, to the extent that the events are (re)constructed in such a way as to conform to the framework established by the myth. In the face of the often horrific reports of violence that occur when women migrate for work in the sex industry, it may seem unaffordable luxury to step outside and examine 'trafficking in women' as a discourse, rather than to campaign for policies to stop it. Yet the consequences of failing to recognise the fears and anxieties that underpin the myth of 'trafficking' are severe. One of the most damaging effects of the myth is the 'spin' it puts on the experiences of women who migrate for work in the sex industry. Migration for the sex industry is, for some third world/non-western women, a way of expanding life choices and livelihood strategies. Insisting on viewing these women as victims means denying that they can have agency in their own lives. To the myth of the white slave's innocence has been added the 'third world difference' (Mohanty 1988: 22) of supposed ignorance, faithfulness to tradition, and sexual backwardness. The myth of 'white slavery'/'trafficking in women' is ostensibly about protecting women, yet the underlying moral concerns are with controlling them. Policies adopted to stop 'trafficking' that are based on the mythical notion of the 'coerced innocent' and the 'evil foreign trafficker' serve to reinforce the construction of state/gender relations that determine that women's purity and dependence are essential to family well being and national honour. Once it is recognised that debt-bondage and other slavery-like practices, when they occur, are actually problems for women who are already sex workers or who plan to be, it is impossible to get around the fact that these are abuses of sex workers' rights. However, this is unpalatable to many in anti-trafficking campaigns and in governments: it is one thing to save 'innocent victims of trafficking'; quite another to recognise that 'guilty' sex workers deserve respect for their rights as workers, as women, and as migrants. Women who migrate for the sex industry can only be freed from violations of their human rights if they are first freed of their mythical constraints. They must no longer be used as the canvas upon which societies' fears and anxieties are projected; be defined no longer as innocent, sexless, 'non-adults' or as the oppressed sex of backward countries; but as agents endowed with the ability to think, to act and to resist.
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Sex Trafficking Discourse (1)

The stereotypical innocent and brutalized trafficking victim bears little resemblance to most women migrating in the sex industry. Their use of the rhetoric of sex trafficking serves as a cover to regulate female sexuality under the guise of protecting women. Jo Doezema, Institute of Development Studies, U. of Sussex, Brighton, UK, Loose Women or Lost Women?, Gender Issues, Vol. 18, no. 1, Winter 2000, pg. 23-50, http://walnet.org/csis/papers/doezema-loose.html The campaign against 'trafficking in women' has gained increasing momentum world-wide, but in particular among feminists in Europe and the United States, in the last two decades. This current campaign is not the first time that the international community has become concerned with the fate of young women abroad. Modern concerns with prostitution and 'trafficking in women' have a historical precedent in the anti-white-slavery campaigns that occurred at the turn of the century. Feminist organisations played key roles in both past and present campaigns. While current concerns are focused on the exploitation of third world/non-western women by both non-western and western men, concerns then were with the abduction of European women for prostitution in South America, Africa or 'the Orient' by non-western men or other subalterns. Yet, though the geographical direction of the traffic has switched, much of the rhetoric accompanying the campaigns sounds almost completely the same. Then as now, the paradigmatic image is that of a young and naive innocent lured or deceived by evil traffickers into a life of sordid horror from which escape is nearly impossible. The mythical nature of this paradigm of the 'white slave' has been demonstrated by historians. Similarly, recent research indicates that today's stereotypical 'trafficking victim' bears as little resemblance to women migrating for work in the sex industry as did her historical counterpart, the 'white slave'. The majority of 'trafficking victims' are aware that the jobs offered them are in the sex industry, but are lied to about the conditions they will work under. Yet policies to eradicate trafficking continue to be based on the notion of the 'innocent', unwilling victim, and often combine efforts designed to protect 'innocent' women with those designed to punish 'bad' women: i.e. prostitutes. In this paper, I examine how narratives of 'white slavery' and 'trafficking in women' function as cultural myths, constructing particular conceptions of the issue of migration for the sex industry. The myths around 'white slavery' were grounded in the perceived need to regulate female sexuality under the guise of protecting women. They were indicative of deeper fears and uncertainties concerning national identity, women's increasing desire for autonomy, foreigners, immigrants and colonial peoples. To a certain extent, these fears and anxieties are mirrored in contemporary accounts of trafficking in women. My intent is to lay the two sets of discourses, as it were next to each other, and compare them, to evaluate to what extent 'trafficking in women' can be seen as a retelling of the myth of 'white slavery' in a modern form.
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Sex Trafficking Discourse (2)

White slavery and trafficking in women narratives express deeper anxieties about female sexual independence, and racist/nationalist fears of the other. Jo Doezema, Institute of Development Studies, U. of Sussex, Brighton, UK, Loose Women or Lost Women?, Gender Issues, Vol. 18, no. 1, Winter 2000, pg. 23-50, http://walnet.org/csis/papers/doezema-loose.html In this chapter, I examine some of the deeper meanings behind the common themes identified in chapter two. In particular, I will focus on how 'white slavery' and 'trafficking in women' narratives express deeper fears and anxieties about women's sexuality and independence, and racist and nationalist fears of 'the other'. There are other fears and anxieties that are important but beyond the scope of this paper to address, including the link between 'trafficking in women' discourses and a wider repressive moral agenda, particularly around child sexuality; and the intersections between discourses of disease -- syphilis and AIDS -- and 'white slavery' and 'trafficking in women'. Behind the myth The trigger for the 'white slavery' panic was the huge increase in migration between 1860 and the outbreak of the first world war, of which women formed a large part. The campaign against 'white slavery' coincided with the mass migration of thousands of women from Europe and Russia to the America's, South Africa, other parts of Europe, and Asia (Bristow 1982, Guy 1992). This increase was facilitated by the colonialism of the 'Pax Britannia', which made travel from the centre to the periphery a possibility for millions of working class people. It was also facilitated by new technology, especially the steamship and telegraph (Bristow 1977: 177). Another factor contributing to the widespread panic was the calculated use of the emotions generated by images of 'white slaves' to garner support for the repression of prostitution (Walkowitz 1980, Gibson 1986, Corbin 1990, Grittner 1990). Because of the lurid nature and sensationalism of 'white slavery', it gained more support than abolitionism ever could: Transformation of an individual concern into a "public problem" and onto the political agenda is never easy, but the ability to tie an issue to symbolically charged language can improve its chances of success (Grittner 1990: 7). But behind these material/political realities, other, deeper fears underlay the 'white slavery' panic. Grittner, in his analysis of the American myth of white slavery, describes it in terms of a 'moral panic' as defined by Stan Cohen: Societies appear to be subject, every now and then, to periods of moral panic. A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylised and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other right-thinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce their diagnosis and solutions; ways of coping are evolved or (more often) reverted to. ... sometimes the panic is passed over and is forgotten, except in folklore and collective memory; at other times it has more serious and long-lasting repercussions and might produce such changes as those in legal and social policy or even in the way society conceives itself (Cohen cited in Grittner 1990: 64).
While the discourse on white slavery ostensibly was about the protection of women from (male) violence, to a large extent, the welfare of the 'white slaves' was peripheral to the discourse. A supposed threat to women's safety served as a marker of and metaphor for other fears, among them fear of women's growing independence, the breakdown of the family, and loss of national identity through the influx of immigrants.
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Sex Work Language (1)

The rhetoric of prostitution as sex work reinforces systems of sexual exploitation that devastate the lives of prostituted women and children. Dorchen Leidholdt, Co-Exec. Director, Coalition Against Trafficking in Women, Presentation to UN Special Seminar on Trafficking, Prostitution and the Global Sex Industry Position Paper for CATW: Part Two, CATW, June 2, 1999, http://walnet.org/csis/papers/ The notion that prostitution is work--"sex work" is the dangerously misleading term--ignores both these powerful social forces of poverty, violence, and inequality that propel women and children into sexual exploitation and the harm that women and children sustain as a direct consequence of sexual exploitation. For some, the "sex work" model is a misguided attempted to bestow dignity on a stigmatized and marginalized population; what in fact it does, however, is to confer legitimacy on the systems of sexual exploitation that devastate the lives of prostituted women and children. It is not an accident that the organized commercial sex industry is one of the biggest promoters of the notion that prostitution is "sex work"--"a job like any other job." The notion that commercial sexual exploitation is viable work has been embraced by some governments, with catastrophic implications for poor women and girls. For example, one government in Central America proudly asserted in a report to an United Nations conference following the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing: "Recognized prostitution in [our country] is a gender-specific form of migrant labor that serves the same economic function for women as agriculture work offers to men and often for better pay." It should be noted that this country is a sex tourism center, with the second highest rate of HIV/AIDS in Central America. Representing sexual exploitation as sex work only entrenches sexual harms and violence against women, and represents complicity with the subordination of women through repressive sexual acts. Dorchen Leidholdt, Co-Exec. Director, Coalition Against Trafficking in Women, Presentation to UN Special Seminar on Trafficking, Prostitution and the Global Sex Industry Position Paper for CATW: Part Two, CATW, June 2, 1999, http://walnet.org/csis/papers/ The reasons behind the legitimization of sexual exploitation as "sex work" are obvious. Unlike domestic abuse, sexual exploitation makes billions of dollars that lines the pockets of pimps, traffickers, brothel owners, legitimate businessmen, and, sometimes, government officials. Conservatively estimated, the legal sex industry reaps an estimated 52 billion dollars a year annually, according to Forbes. Viewing sexual exploitation as work rather than abuse shields the industry from a powerful critique that could lead to legislative and policy changes that would impinge on the industry's profits. Many have a sexual stake in the perpetuation of the sex industry. Millions of men all over the world, in every strata of society, are sex industry consumers who get physical and psychological gratification from buying the bodies of women and children . Last year, for example, a contingent of Latin American heads of state of paid a recreational
visit to a notorious strip club in Venezuela. United Nations peacekeeping forces were prominent prostitution customers while stationed in Mozambique, Cambodia, and former Yugoslavia. It is
Viewing sexually exploited women and children as "sex workers"--free agents who are responsible for what is done to them in the sex industry--helps absolve prostitution customers of any feelings of responsibility. There are those who romanticize the sex industry as a glamorous "outlaw" profession and believe that but for acts of coercion or deceit it is beneficial to women. These supporters of prostitution contend that organizing "sex workers" to fight for the "right to prostitute" and to improve "working conditions" in the sex industry is the solution. Any problems faced by prostituted women, they argue, are the result of social stigma and criminalization. What is curious about this position is not only the gross denial of the magnitude of harm suffered by sexually exploited women and children and of the overwhelming misogyny that pervades the sex industry, but the obvious fact that even when assessed as a labor practice "sex work" is destructive to "sex workers." What other form of labor requires that the worker be physically invaded by those who view him or her with contempt, subjects the worker to tremendous risk of fatal disease, destroys the worker's reproductive health, systematically subjects the worker to "on the job" violence, leaves the worker psychologically traumatized, renders the worker employable for only a short period of his/her life span, and offers the worker no job skills with which to survive after s/he is not longer employable in the trade. When evaluated this way, it becomes clear CONTINUED
uncomfortable for men who patronize prostitutes to face the reality of what they are inflicting on the women and children whose bodies they purchase.
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Sex Work Language (2)

Leidholdt continued that "sex work" is akin to other forms of gross exploitation never dignified by the term "work"--exploitation as a "mule" in drug trafficking; exploitation by organ traffickers; and, for women, reproductive exploitation for the benefit of traffickers in infants. The term "sex worker" is false advertising that deceives the women and children recruited by the sex industry about its brutal reality. It suggests that not only are those who promote it apologists for the sex industry; they are complicit with it. Establishing a distinction between forced and voluntary prostitution and utilizing the rhetoric of sex workers increases sex trafficking and reinforces the subordination and commodification of women. Dorchen Leidholdt, Co-Exec. Director, Coalition Against Trafficking in Women, Prostitution: A Contemporary Form of Slavery CATW Presentation to the United Nations Working Group on Contemporary Forms of Slavery, CATW, May 1, 1998, http://walnet.org/csis/papers/
The third and most problematic distinction that has recently emerged is that between so called forced and so called voluntary prostitution. By limiting the pool of people who can be identified as victims while simultaneously protecting large segments of the sex industry, this is the best gift that pimps and traffickers could have received. This distinction creates a vision of prostitution that is freely chosen; a vision that can be maintained only by ignoring all of the social conditions that force women and girls into conditions of sexual exploitation. The proponents of this distinction are sending the following message: "Don't pay attention to the poverty, the familial pressure, the incest she survived, the battering by her boyfriend, the lack of employment options available to her. Just ask whether there is a gun pointed at her head or whether she is being overtly deceived. No gun, no deceit; then no problem; not only is she voluntarily in the sex industry, she is a 'sex worker.'" Under this analysis, the pimp who recruited her, the brothel owner who reaps profits by selling her to sex tourists, and the trafficker who sends her abroad are rehabilitated as so-called "third-party managers."
What are the consequences of conceptualizing prostitution as free or forced, and the legitimization of prostitution as "sex work" that inevitably follows? There are many. First, governments, especially those of poor countries, realize that they can reduce their unemployment rate and increase their gross national product by moving unemployed women and girls into organized prostitution. This is most likely to happen in countries with strong internal sex industries fueled by the profits of sex tourists. In Belize, for example, the government touts prostitution as work for poor women. Not only does it feel no shame at doing so, but proudly reports on this approach in its 1996 report to CEDAW, stating, "Recognized prostitution in Belize is a gender-specific form of migrant labor that serves the same economic function for women as agricultural work offers to men and often for better pay." When governments recognizes prostitution as sex work for poor women, organized prostitution, sex tourism and sex trafficking increase. Second, when prostitution is accepted by a society as sex work, it becomes even more difficult for poor women and girls, socialized into an ethos of self-sacrifice, to resist economic and familial pressures to enter prostitution. As the numbers of prostituted women and girls expand, growing numbers become infected with HIV and die of AIDS while a smaller but still significant percentage are murdered by pimps or customers. Those women fortunate enough to survive sexual exploitation emerge, usually in their 30's, when they are no longer marketable commodities, with no job skills, traumatized from years of enduring unwanted sex and violence, and physically debilitated from sexually transmitted diseases and the substance abuse necessary to endure the sex of prostitution. What is available to these women? Destitution or a career as a madam or mama san, helping the pimps control the younger women who are marketable commodities. Third, when prostitution is recognized as "sex work," legalization follows; pimps, sex industry cartels, and sex businesses openly flourish, regulated only by the demands of the marketplace. Fourth, when prostitution is legitimized as sex work, men and boys are sent the message that purchasing the body of a woman or girl for sex is no different from buying a pack of cigarettes. With no social stigma attached to buying prostitutes, the demand for prostitution escalates. At the same time, women and girls internalize the message that the female body is a marketable commodity. Girls begin to see prostitution as a career option, unaware that sex work is a trap that will deprive them of control over their lives..Fifth, when prostitution is legitimized as sex work, the values and dynamics of prostitution spill over into other areas of society, influencing the valuation and treatment of women and girls and lowering their status.
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Stories of Violence
Victimization of trafficked women is reinforced through repetition of stories of horrific violence. Jo Doezema, Institute of Development Studies, U. of Sussex, Brighton, UK, Loose Women or Lost Women?, Gender Issues, Vol. 18, no. 1, Winter 2000, pg. 23-50, http://walnet.org/csis/papers/doezema-loose.html The victimisation of the 'trafficked woman' is reinforced through the repetition of stories of horrific violence. According to a Ukrainian parliamentarian: many Ukrainian women seeking jobs abroad "are raped, beaten and drugged" while being coerced into being prostitutes (quoted in Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 14-04-98). The term "broken in", familiar from accounts of 'white slavery', also makes a reappearance: Most girls and women start out in these cheap brothels, where they are "broken in" through a process of rapes and beatings (HRW 1995: 232). As in 'white slavery' narratives, the emphasis on violence serves to underscore the complete victimisation of the woman: the more violence, the more helpless and truly victim she is (Grittner 1990: 68). It also titillates by presenting a popular sexual fantasy in a culturally acceptable manner. Headlines such as "$1m Trade in Sex Slaves," (The Australian, 23-02-98), "The Selling of Innocents" ( Kathmandu Post 10-27-97); "Sex Slaves: Fodder for Flesh Factories," (Toronto Sun 05-10-98) pander to prurient interest. Just as the 'white slave' was doomed to misery, disease and death as a result of her loss of virtue, today's 'victim of trafficking' shares the same inevitable fate: From desperate mothers to sex masters, they do not experience anything but humiliation, diseases, and death (Seraphini 1998:2). A woman tries to stand up, saunters [sic] and falls back...She doesn't say anything... can't say it... the words don't come out. She's embarrassed. She's sick. She's a sex worker (Kathmandu Post, 27-10-97). This is particularly striking in light of the AIDS pandemic: the 'white slave' was condemned to syphilis, her modern counterpart to AIDS.
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Claims of Innocent Victims (1)

Claims of the innocence of the victim are merely a ploy to condemn and punish the consenting. Jo Doezema, Institute of Development Studies, U. of Sussex, Brighton, UK, Loose Women or Lost Women?, Gender Issues, Vol. 18, no. 1, Winter 2000, pg. 23-50, http://walnet.org/csis/papers/doezema-loose.html
The effect of these motifs of deception, abduction, youth/virginity and violence is to render the victim unquestionably 'innocent'. Desperately poor, deceived or abducted, drugged or beaten into compliance, with a blameless sexual past, she cannot have 'chosen' to be a prostitute.
Maya Tamang... was a victim of ignorance, poverty, and the greed of an unscrupulous relative who sold her to a brothel in Bombay...Her story is not much different from hundreds of similar horror stories surrounding once beautiful and innocent young Nepali girls (Peoples Review, 25-01-96:
7). It happens every single day... throughout the world, where selling naive and desperate young women into sexual bondage has become one of the fastest-growing criminal enterprises in the
'Innocent' 'naive' and 'desperate' in these accounts are code for 'non-prostitute'. The construction of a 'victim' who will appeal to the public and the policy makers demands that she be sexually blameless. This is illustrated by a journalist's perceptive reaction to reports of a Toronto 'sex slave' ring: The day they were arrested, last fall, they were the darlings of the media and a favourite porn fantasy, all wrapped up in one righteous story of salvation: 22 victims of "sex trafficking" liberated from their debasement in Toronto's suburbs by a carefully planned police raid. Everywhere... they were droolingly described as "sex slaves," conjuring up a vision of exotic but helpless beauties. A day or two later, police revealed that the 22 women, mostly Thai or Malaysian, had willingly come to Canada to ply their trade; wiretaps caught them boasting, long distance, about the amount of money they were earning. Public opinion did an instant about-face. Now the women were hardened delinquents, illegal immigrants, tawdry, dismissable, selling their bodies of their own free will. Phew! No need to fret about their fate (Toronto Star 19-04-98). As with the public outcry against 'white slavery', the real concern for public and policy-makers is not with protecting women in the sex industry, but with preventing 'innocent' women from becoming prostitutes (Doezema 1998, Weijers 1998). A 'guilty' prostitute cannot be a 'victim of trafficking': as expressed by delegate to recent conference on trafficking: [12] "How can I distinguish an innocent victim from a sex worker?" (Weijers 1998: 11). Thus women who knowingly migrate to work in the sex industry and may encounter exploitation and abuse, are not considered to have a legitimate claim to the same sorts of human rights protections demanded for 'trafficking victims' (Doezema 1998, Weijers 1998).
robust global economy (New York Times 11-01-98).
The rhetoric of victims of sexual exploitation naturally constructs a victimizer, thus setting up a distinction that implies that someone is to blame and thus deserves to be punished. Larua MaAgustin, Society for International Development, Sex Workers and Violence Against Women: Utopic Visions or Battle of the Sexes, Development, Vol. 44, No. 3, September 2001, http://walnet.org/csis/papers/ Obviously, different terms function better or coincide more with different situations, but when social movements consciously work to change language they almost inevitably eliminate these differences. Since there are still plenty of places in the world where prostitutes are simplistically viewed as evil, contaminated, immoral and diseased, campaigns to change language so as to see the lack of choice and elements of exploitation in prostitutes' situations are positive efforts to help them. Why, then, do these positive efforts have to be based on finding a different villain, to replace the old one? I am referring to the discipline-and-punishment model that these efforts to change language and change perception inevitably use: in constructing a victim they also construct a victimizer the 'exploiter', the bad person. After that, it is inevitable that punishment becomes the focus of efforts: passing laws against the offense and deciding what price the offender should pay. This model of 'law and order' is familiar to most of us as an oppressive, dysfunctional criminal justice system. We know that prisons rarely rehabilitate offenders against the law; we know that in some countries prison conditions are so bad that riots occur frequently, and if they don't, perhaps they should. We also know that it is usually extremely difficult to prove sexual offenses (because of how the law is constructed, because of the difficulty of all these definitions of victimization, because legal advice can find ways out, etc.). Yet we continue to insist on better policing and more effective punishment, as though we didn't know all of this.
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The language of rescuing victims from trafficking eliminates the agency of the victims and masks the ongoing risks they face.
Martina Vandenberg 2002 Complicity, Corruption, and Human Rights: Trafficking in Human Beings, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 34 no3 323-33 Fall It is not only risky for non-governmental organizations in the field, it is risky for the victims themselves. While many people use the language of "rescue" and emphasize "rescuing victims," few people stop to reflect on what "rescue" means for the victims of trafficking into forced prostitution. More often than not, in countries around the world, rescue means nothing more than getting arrested and being held in a prison cell where you may be guarded by men who were your clients yesterday. It often means having a television camera thrust into your face, as those who conduct the raids prepare to garner publicity and additional funding. And in the most corrupt countries, "rescue" can mean being handed back over to your traffickers for a fee. The language of "rescue" is dangerous in this particular context. Not only does it strip trafficking victims of agency - they do not "escape," but are "rescued" by others - but it fails to acknowledge that the risk does not vanish once a victim has left the trafficker's immediate control. The debts do not disappear. Family members remain at home and in danger of retaliation from traffickers. Going home is not necessarily safe. The traffickers know where the women the women live, they know where their families are, and make threats that are both credible and completely terrifying. Approximately 80% of the imprisoned trafficking victims awaiting deportation that I interviewed in the Israeli Neve Tirza prison in 1997 had children. The primary reason that they had agreed to travel abroad, the very reason that they had agreed to work at all, to take this risk, was because they wanted to send money home to their children. Those children remained in the women's countries of origin - Ukraine, the Russian Federation, Lithuania, Romania - quite often living with the trafficked women's own mothers. Those children provided primary tools of blackmail used by the traffickers.
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Anti-Trafficking (1)
Their anti-trafficking rhetoric is simply a desire to constrain female mobility female migration is inherently seen as dangerous as it is linked with the perceived disintegration of the family. Jo Doezema, Institute of Development Studies, U. of Sussex, Brighton, UK, Loose Women or Lost Women?, Gender Issues, Vol. 18, no. 1, Winter 2000, pg. 23-50, http://walnet.org/csis/papers/doezema-loose.html During the 'white slavery' era, the 'moral panic' was in part provoked by the desire of women for increased independence. Accounts of white slavery served as 'cautionary tales' for women and girls (Guy 1991: 6), with a message of sexual peril as inevitable fate of women who leave the protection of the family. As Guy observes: Fears of white slavery in Buenos Aires were directly linked to European disapproval of female migration. Racism, nationalism, and religious bigotry fuelled anxieties. Men could safely travel abroad, but unescorted women faced sexual danger (1991:7). This disapproval was linked to insecurities about urbanisation and the appeal of city life to single women seeking independence, and the perceived disintegration of family, exacerbated by rapid processes of industrialisation (Bristow 1982, Grittner 1990). Women's independence was, and is, seen as a threat to the stability of the family and by extension, of the nation. Contemporary efforts to stop trafficking draw on underlying moral values of feminine dependence and ideals of women's role in the family. Sometimes this is made explicit, as in IMADR's report for the UN Working Group on Contemporary Forms of Slavery. Referring to state policies that support the export of female labour, the report says: State sponsored export of labor to foreign countries places increasing numbers of women at risk for sexual exploitation. Additional negative aspects... are linked to erosion of the family. Prolonged separation of husbands and wives can lead to divorce. Children left unattended and unguided may lapse into juvenile delinquency or fall victim to traffickers and paedophiles (IMADR 1998: 15).
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Anti-Trafficking (2)
Anti-trafficking policy efforts empirically hurt women more. Johanna Kantola and Judith Squires, Dept. of Politics, U. of Bristol, Discourses Surrounding Prostitution Policies in the UK, A Paper to be presented in the PSA Annual Conference, Aberdeen, April 5-7, 2002, http://walnet.org/csis/papers/BEYOND.DOC Despite the differences between the traditional moral, the child welfare, the human rights and the sexual domination approaches, they all share a common pre-occupation with the innocence of the victims of trafficking. Jo Doezema analyses the fascination felt about this innocence. She points out how the language of duped, tricked and lured enforces the image of women who did not know what was happening to them (Doezema 1998: 43). She also detects the constant emphasis on the poverty of these women. This serves a two-fold purpose: on the one hand, it shows an underlying rejection of prostitution as a profession. No normal woman would choose the work unless forced into it by poverty. On the other hand, the focus on poverty establishes the innocence of the trafficked victims and thus their eligibility of human rights protection (Doezema 1998: 43-4). Her own work draws on the sex work discourse. She argues that a number of todays campaigns against trafficking have become a platform for reactionary and paternalistic voices that advocate a rigid sexual morality under the guise of protecting women (Doezema 1998: 45). The discourse is limited to forced prostitution. In this process, the sex worker, the voluntary prostitute is ignored (Doezema 1998: 45). The distinction between forced and voluntary prostitution is employed in a way that reproduces the madonna/whore division within the category of the prostitute. The Madonna is the forced prostitute, the innocent victim, while the voluntary prostitute is the whore, she deserves what she gets (Doezema 1998: 45). It is open to question whether the feminist sexual domination discourse has been complicit in a reactionary moral agenda, but it is clear that the sex work discourse has again proved marginal to public and parliamentary debate, policy formation and implementation. The police raids in Soho, London, illustrate this last point. In the name of protecting women from trafficking, about 40 women were arrested, detained and in some cases summarily removed from Britain. The womens organizations and the ECP protested against the raids. They argued that most of the immigrant women prostituting in Soho were doing it voluntarily. Niki Adams from Legal Action for Women argues in The Guardian that government is trying to use prostitution as a way to make deportation of the vulnerable more acceptable (The Guardian 22 February 2001). Also Nina Lopez-Jones from the ECP argues: The Soho raids to liberate victims of trafficking was an abuse of power. Women were led to believe that they could expect protection, only to find themselves arrested and deported. This raid lays the basis for trafficking legislation which would give the police greater power of arrest, while the women on whose behalf they are supposedly acting would no longer need to give evidence the police, not the victim, would testify about the truth of her situation (The Guardian 22 February 2001). The deep skepticism that their views express has not received much attention in the public debates on trafficking in women and children and is entirely absent from parliamentary debates.
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Focus on Poverty
Solutions that place the blame for trafficking on poverty are merely using that as a guise to control womens sexuality and to maintain family cohesion. Jo Doezema, Institute of Development Studies, U. of Sussex, Brighton, UK, Loose Women or Lost Women?, Gender Issues, Vol. 18, no. 1, Winter 2000, pg. 23-50, http://walnet.org/csis/papers/doezema-loose.html More often, however, it is implicit. Most anti-trafficking campaigns target the west's development policies as a cause of 'trafficking', pointing out that women bear the brunt of poverty in the third world/former communist states. They also stress the need to develop more economic opportunities for women in the third world and in former communist countries. NGOs in trafficking 'origin' countries accuse governments of failing to direct development efforts at rural areas, forcing women to migrate to the city or abroad in search of work (India Abroad 06-06-97). But these laudable aims link all to easily into fears about women, and women' sexuality, running wild once away from family supervision. During the 'white slavery' panic, leaflets and posters at railway stations were produced to warn girls off venturing abroad or to the city (Coote 1910). Today, prevention efforts also concentrate on warning women of the sexual dangers of life away from home and hearth. Numerous videos and pamphlets directed at 'vulnerable' young women are produced by anti-trafficking organisations. Even some feminist organisations support the agenda of convincing women that they are safest at home. La Strada, a Polish anti-trafficking organisation connected with GAATW, recently produced a video in which the horrors awaiting unwitting girls who were lured to the west were shown in graphic detail (La Strada Poland, 1998).
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NO ESCALATION (CYPRUS/AEGEAN)
There is no risk of escalation in Cyprus or Aegean--star this card--well beat the advantage on this piece of evidence Wilkinson, 1999 (M. James, Moving Beyond Conflict Prevention, A Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, June) http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/wilk/wilk.htm
The governments in Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus are not eager for a fight. The risks are too great and the outcomes too uncertain. Past incidents have come from miscalculation, accident, or activities of private citizens that provoked emotional outbursts. The governments have generally responded to tense situations with restraint and common sense -- up to the point where something has ignited supranationalist emotions and caused events to spin out of rational control. Americans and Europeans have watched the near-outbreaks of military hostilities in the Aegean and the fatal incidents on Cyprus with deep dismay. Given the certainty that enormous costs would be entailed with little prospect of winning anything, many have termed another Greek-Turkish war "unthinkable." This might be true with reference to a full-scale war or extensive offensive operations, but mistrust is so pervasive that it is not at all difficult to imagine a shooting incident followed by initiation of combat operations with unforeseeable consequences. The United States, for its part, has expended a great deal of energy to keep itself informed and ready to stop just such a sequence. So have the UN, NATO, and the European governments. To the West's credit, it has since 1974 played an indispensable role in helping to prevent further outbreaks of deadly conflict. Cyprus is a textbook case of international peacekeeping, with time-tested mechanisms in place and working. Under the UN umbrella, there is a comprehensive approach to "operational prevention" -- that is, measures to avoid violence by monitoring to ensure early warning and early response, the use of preventive diplomacy, and a readiness to consider use of sanctions and/or military force.15 UNFICYP provides the first line of defense, a buffer as well as "eyes and ears" on the ground; the UN secretarygeneral's personal representative in Cyprus is a channel of communication and diplomatic action; and the UN Security Council backs up these mechanisms with its implicit power and formal reviews of the situation every six months. UNFICYP, however, is not constituted as a police enforcement unit and has not been able to prevent fatalities arising out of isolated incidents or demonstrations. It works hard to lessen the chances of such tragedies, but it functions primarily as a buffer to keep the sides from direct contact on the dividing line and a trip wire to energize preventive action if a resumption of hostilities appears likely. From there, active Security Council involvement, as well as parallel U.S. and UK engagement, ensures a rapid, high-level diplomatic response to any serious contingency and expedited consideration of more forceful measures. There is no similar UN mechanism in the Aegean or on the Greek-Turkish land border. Nonetheless, NATO governments -- with the United States and the United Kingdom in the lead or acting individually -- supply the requirements for early warning and timely response. In the most recent case, top-level U.S. diplomacy (President Bill Clinton and then-Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke) succeeded in averting disaster at the end of January 1996, when Greek and Turkish military units were about to collide over the sovereignty of the uninhabited Imia/Kardak islets. While the ad hoc U.S./European approach has averted deadly conflict to date, more reliable mechanisms are surely desirable. NATO has tried to promote the kind of arrangements that helped to avoid military collisions in the Cold War days: hot lines, transparency of exercises, avoidance of incidents involving military ships or aircraft, confidence-building measures of any reasonable sort. There are bilateral agreements on self-restraint and periodic suspension of exercises in tourist areas, and NATO has made a start on conflict avoidance mechanisms. It has been slow-going for NATO, to the dismay of those who would argue for maximum transparency and safeguards in a situation where military conflict such as that which nearly occurred on Imia/ Kardak (warships jostling on high seas, temporary landing of Turkish marines) would be pointless and absurd.
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NO ESCALATION: CYPRUS
No risk of war over Cyprus
Meier 2001 Cornell International Law Journal 34 Cornell Int'l L.J. 455
Greece and Turkey have committed themselves to peace for themselves and for Cyprus. n135 A new generation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots now control their respective communities. These Cypriots have never experienced and do not remember the past terrors of the intercommunal conflict. The wrongs of past generations can be forgiven, placing the people of Cyprus in [*470] an ideal position to embrace peace. n136 Despite the failure of the 1960 Constitution and past reunification efforts, reunification in the Republic of Cyprus is legally necessary and now likely to succeed, due to improved Greek-Turkish relations and the advantages of a reunified Cyprus's acceptance into the European Union.
Cyprus wont spiral into conflict-Meier 2001 Cornell International Law Journal 34 Cornell Int'l L.J. 455 Additionally, the underlying Greek-Turkish antagonism that was transplanted to Cyprus has since waned. Following World War II, Turkey's primary interest in Cyprus was security from Greek expansionism. n176 Greece, in turn, feared that Turkish expansionism would threaten the security of Greek Cypriots. n177 This security threat no longer exists, and, as a result, both Greece and Turkey have cut arms spending in 2001. n178 Although some security fears remain throughout Europe, the present stability and strength of NATO and the U.N. Security Council serve as an adequate protection from such
possibilities. n179
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NO ESCLATION: AEGEAN
AEGEAN DISPUTES WONT ESCALATE Falk, professor, expert on international law and human rights Turkish Daily News 8/11/03
The secondary issues that have served as flashpoints in past Turkish/Greek relations, such as those involving security zones in the Aegean Sea, the territorial waters of Greek islands, the authority over and width of the continental shelf of the two countries in the Aegean, and the status of unoccupied islets, are manageable or not depending on the overall relationship between the two countries. If the bilateral relations are generally good, and the leadership in Ankara and Athens wants them to get better, then these Aegean problems can be handled by imaginative diplomacy to the satisfaction of both countries, but if the political climate is negative then any of these questions that seem technical and somewhat peripheral could flare up in a crisis and even become a casus belli between the two countries. Actually, Turkey and Greece have much common ground, geographically, culturally, and economically, and share an Eastern Mediterranean relationship to the growing relevance of a Greater Europe, a commonality that will become more pronounced as Turkey moves closer to European Union membership in the coming years. It is my further impression that for a variety of reasons the Greek mainstream political leadership believes it is more beneficial at this point to have Turkey within the EU than without. Of course, should Turkey find the European door slammed closed for whatever reason, it could turn toward its Central Asian hinterland, and embark on a Greater Turkey project that would be received as an unwelcome geopolitical turn by Turkey, but one that does not seem likely at this point.
No escalation in the Aegean Clapsis, 2000 (Antonios, The Aegean Sea Conflict: A Recent Perspective, Spring, Brownstone Journal)
It is in the power of ethnic conflict that the post-Cold War decade has found its most telling characteristic. Its manifestations range from the killing fields of Rwanda to Kosovo and the mountains of Chechnya. But there is hope. In December of 1999 the Greek and Turkish governments took drastic reconciliatory steps in approaching a situation where common interests in the context of the European Union may prevail over centuries-old struggle. Public opinion debates, disputes over mineral resources, and territorial questions in the unique geography of the Aegean Sea are giving way to changing attitudes and policies of cooperation. From the brink of war three years ago over the continental shelf, Greece and Turkey are fast approaching the brink of lasting peace.
No escalation--EU accession will check Greek/Turkish conflicts

Keefer 2003 Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law 11 Cardozo J. Int'l & Comp. L. 55, *87
However, the dispute between Greece and Turkey contains unique elements that may lead to a peaceful outcome. Greece and Turkey, neighbors and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies for many years, may increase their contact through Turkish accession into the European Union (EU). Although these two countries have disputed territory in the Aegean Sea for many years, EU membership now presents a unique opportunity for resolving the conflict. The European Union could recommend dispute resolution procedures or condition Turkish entry on a solution to the conflict. Furthermore, the European position on the accession of Cyprus to the European Union could also influence policy.
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US will intervene before any Aegean hot war can escalate-Hellenic Resource Network 8/4/97 http://www.hri.org/news/greek/ant1en/97-04-08.ant1en.html The United States WILL intervene in case of a hot incident in the Aegean between Greece and Turkey, in order to prevent any escalation. That was said by the US ambassador in Athens Thomas Niles in his interview to Greek daily "To Vima". Talking to the Greek daily "To Vima", US ambassador to Athens Thomas Niles referred to an eventual incident provoked in the Aegean between Greece and Turkey. "The US will do its best to stop any incident and prevent others in the future", he told the newspaper. "What we want is to start a certain procedure during which Greece and Turkey will reduce the tension gradually, step by step", he added. The US ambassador expressed a restrained optimism over progress in general regarding the Greek- Turkish relations and the Cyprus issue. No impact in the Aegean: Greece wont extend territorial claims--US and UN will be able to check aggressive claims
Given these facts, maintainance of the current scheme in the Aegean benefits everyone. NATO, the European Community and the United States are particularly well situated to impress upon the Greeks the destabilizing effects of a precipitous extension of their territorial waters to the legal limit. At the same time, NATO and the United States must work to reassure Turkey that Greece has no intent to take such an action, and that therefore, Turkish saber rattling can only prove counterproductive. US intervention and cooperation in the sqo deescalates conflict in the Aegean UPI 5/24/96
Turkey has approved the confidence-building measures put forward by NATO for reducing tension with Greece in the Aegean Sea, the Foreign Ministry said Friday. NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana visited Turkish and Greek Cabinet ministers in Ankara and Athens this week to try to gain support for proposals meant to reduce bilateral tensions. ''We have agreed in principle to what the NATO secretary-general has proposed,'' ministry spokesman Sermet Atacanli said. ''In fact, some of his proposals are similar to our own proposals. As to the specifics, they still need to be worked out.'' Turkey and Greece, both NATO members but ancient adversaries, came to the brink of war in January over a disputed group of rocky islets in the Aegean, called Imia by Greeks and Kardak by Turks. The intervention of United States, however, gained a de-escalation of the conflict. Greece frequently accuses Turkish air force jets of violating Greek airspace; last week Turkey accused a Greek coast guard vessel of firing shots toward Turkish fishing boats in the Aegean. The Solana proposals include a telephone hot line between Athens and Ankara; the use of airborne warning and control systems planes to monitor flights over the Aegean during NATO maneuvers; observers on ships; and information exchanges, a NATO press spokesman said in Brussels. Asked about in whose office the hot line would be placed, Atacanli said: ''We're not there yet.'' Turkish and Greek officials would probably discuss the measures in Geneva next week, Atacanli said, with their foreign ministers taking matters further when they meet in Berlin on June 3. ''We have always wanted to talk to the Greeks about confidence- building measures,'' Atacanli said, ''but their side has not always been willing to talk to us. ''I hope that this time it will be different,'' he said. The NATO spokesman was more upbeat: ''We are pretty hopeful that the two sides are willing to start making progress on avoiding incidents.'' NATO would help implement these measures and also monitor them, he said.
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US NAVY RULES The 6th fleet checks risk of escalation in the Southern Theatre Institute for National Strategic Studies, Allied Command Structures in the New NATO, April 1997
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books%20%201997/Allied%20Command%20Structures%20in%20the%20New%20NATO%20%20 April%2097/afscont.html#top
The Sixth Fleet in conjunction with U.S. Army and Air Force units in the region represents the U.S. intention and ability to help friends and allies ensure stability and security in the region. Additionally, these forces possess the military capability to unilaterally or as a part of a NATO operation bring decisive military force quickly to bear on any threat. Having the U.S. naval forces chain of command parallel to the NATO command structure ensures that actions taken by the Alliance include U.S. involvement and in particular that of U.S. naval forces. The seamless connection of U.S. Sixth Fleet and NATO's Strike Force South is effected by dual hatting the Commander, as is ensuring that the Commander in Chief U.S. Naval Forces Europe and NATO's Commander in Chief South are the same individual. Increasingly, military capability in the Southern Region is characterized by joint combinations of Army and Air Force units with naval forces. This is best illustrated in Bosnia, where the ground, sea and air forces of member nations work together to restore stability to the area. As part of the multinational force, U.S. forces bring unique capabilities in the areas of logistics, command and control and intelligence gathering. Additionally, the massive sustainment infrastructure of the U.S. forces also supports allied forces, thereby allowing them to remain on station and operate effectively for a much longer period than otherwise possible. No escalation risk: US Naval forward presence deters risk of Greece/Turkey conflict-TIMOTHY E. KALLEY, JUNE 2001 THE IMPORTANCE OF UNITED STATES NAVAL FORWARD PRESENCE IN MEDITERRANEAN AFFAIRS. NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL'S DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
The United States Naval Forward Presence has also deterred conflict, while promoting interoperability and cooperation between NATO allies Greece and Turkey. This has not always been an easy task. But continuing efforts to bind these two adversaries into the NATO alliance have made a difference. Interoperability exercises provide additional benefits by peacetime training of Mediterranean partners on how to execute NATO tactics, so that they can operate effectively to counter an adversary during an emergency. By engaging both countries in NATO exercises and security assistance programs, the United States has provided them with constant reminders that their NATO membership responsibilities override their national differences and impose common obligations.49 Additionally, the United States Navy has allowed neither side to prevent United States aircraft or ships from operating in their zones of responsibility. Meanwhile, Greece and Turkey have begun negotiations on a series of bilateral agreements affecting tourism, economic and technological cooperation, maritime transportation, and fighting organized crime among other things, writes Center for Naval Analyses Research Manager Henry H. Gaffney in 1995.50
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US NAVY RULES US Naval hegemony squelches risk of Aegean escalation
Timothy E. Kalley June 2001 IMPORTANCE OF UNITED STATES NAVAL FORWARD PRESENCE IN MEDITERRANEAN AFFAIRS. Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy. Naval Post Graduate School. The Aegean region remains vitally important today as NATO reaches eastward toward the former Warsaw Pact nations. The Turkish Straits provide access to these countries and others surrounding the Black Sea. Maintaining peace and security there is a requirement for military-to-military partnerships with countries like Ukraine and NATO interoperability exercises with Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania. Potential problems there include Turkish security, ongoing conflicts between Greece and Turkey, and the possibility of the spread of a Balkans war into the region. Turkish instability and security problems revolve around relations with the PKK, a Kurdish nationalist group that began a campaign of terror against the Turkish government in 1984. The internal security problem has complicated traditionally difficult relations between Greece and Turkey, as Greece was recently discovered to have been facilitating the movements of one of the PKKs leaders, Abdullah Ocalan. Ankaras struggle against the PKK has also raised doubts in the minds of EU leaders about Turkeys suitability for Community membership in the near future. Additionally, the PKK problem has raised the possibility that Cyprus could be admitted to the EU before Turkey. Turkey points out that the international agreements that created Cyprus in the first place would be violated if Cyprus were allowed to join before Turkey. 143 Turkey sees itself as worthy of entry into the EU because it is a European country and because of its long-term NATO membership. It regards objections based on the PKK and the Cyprus issues as red- herrings raised by its traditional Greek rival. Militarily, Turkey possesses a numerical advantage in terms of troops, compared to Greece. But Turkey also shares borders with Iraq, Syria and Kazakhstan, giving it the distinction of bordering on some of the most unstable territory in the Middle East. According to Duygu Bazoglu Seza, The eastern Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf form a single entity with Turkey and Egypt providing a continental and maritime bridge between Europe and the Middle East.144 Keeping Turkey engaged via its NATO ties could prove beneficial to boosting their self-esteem and get them re-focused upon their ultimate goal of EU acceptance. United States Naval forces will continue to play an important role in the Aegean region, because the tensions between Greece and Turkey are too easily inflamed and often require outside intervention to squelch them.
The Navy solves your aff: United States Naval Forward Presence in the Mediterranean prevent regional conflict escalation-Timothy E. Kalley June 2001 IMPORTANCE OF UNITED STATES NAVAL FORWARD PRESENCE IN MEDITERRANEAN AFFAIRS. Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy. Naval Post Graduate School Maintaining United States Naval Forward Presence in the Mediterranean will help to prevent aggressor nations from utilizing anti-ship missiles against military or civilian shipping. 152 Additionally, maintaining a forward presence in the region will show that the United States is interested in the region and cause rogue nations to realize that retaliatory strikes against them will make the cost of terrorism and aggression too high. Even so, the United States must continue to design and utilize new and improved offensive and defensive techniques to protect vital SLOCs.
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US NAVY RULES US Navy checks conflict escalation in the Med. The region is too important to the USitll never escalate
Timothy E. Kalley June 2001 IMPORTANCE OF UNITED STATES NAVAL FORWARD PRESENCE IN MEDITERRANEAN AFFAIRS. Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy. Naval Post Graduate School Politically, the greater Mediterranean remains a region of extreme volatility. The Balkans and Southeastern Europe, North Africa, the Aegean, Central Asia, and the Middle East are all places where the United States has an interest in maintaining stability, fostering commerce, and deterring terrorism and war. United States Naval Forward Presence is one of our most effective and efficient ways to project our power and defend our interests there. One reason for this is that the U.S. Navy, through its CVBGs and ARGs, as well as other complex weapons systems, provides the flexibility and array of operational possibilities best adapted to this geographically and politically complex region.
Their escalation scenario is a joke: US Naval presence maintains peace in that part of the world--nor risk of escalation on our watch
Timothy E. Kalley June 2001 IMPORTANCE OF UNITED STATES NAVAL FORWARD PRESENCE IN MEDITERRANEAN AFFAIRS. Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy. Naval Post Graduate School The political and economic importance of the Mediterranean Region to the United States will no doubt increase as the global marketplace expands throughout the world. Maintaining stability in the region means that the United States must use its naval forward presence to remain engaged with NATO allies and economic partners so that they do not overreact to situations and to ensure they know that America is interested in their political and economic well being. Additionally, deterring troublemakers from aggression requires American naval vessels to be positioned close enough to react quickly and keep situations from becoming crises. United States Naval Forward Presence has been in the Mediterranean Sea for over 200 years in support of political and economic policies decided on by Americas leaders and will continue to provide sufficient military muscle to backup future American interests. Overcoming geographical difficulties and suppressing the capabilities of countries employing anti-access techniques requires the United States Navy to forge ahead with new and improved weapons systems. American naval forces forward deployed to the Mediterranean or units transiting enroute to the Persian Gulf must continue to have techno logically superior weapons that can guarantee their safety. Utilizing technological advances and innovative thinking can discourage rogue nations from believing that they have the upper hand and that their aggressive actions will not be met with an appropriate response by technologically superior forces. These advances are essential to enable Naval forces to operate safely in the littoral environment, in support of Small-Scale Contingencies or conventional operations against a more capable enemy. United States Naval Forward Presence has been and should remain in the Mediterranean Sea to protect vital sea-lanes of communication and to ensure that unfettered access is enjoyed by all nations whose ships transit this geographically significant Middle Sea.
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NO ESCALATION: AIRSPACE T/O
Current diplomatic initiatives with NATO have solved airspace issues between Greece and Turkey
Dyer 1998 British American Security Information Council. OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY. AUGUST 1998 NUMBER 29 http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/BP29.htm. Diplomacy and Arms: West Sends Mixed Messages to Aegean Adversaries While limited in their overall effect on stability in the region, diplomatic efforts to reduce tensions have made progress in certain areas. After months of negotiations, on 4 June 1998 Greece and Turkey agreed to a limited set of CSBMs proposed by NATO Secretary General Javier Solana. The two sides agreed to implement two declarations that had been signed in 1988 but with which neither country had entirely complied. The Memorandum of Understanding signed in Athens on 27 May 1988 and the Guidelines for the Prevention of Accidents and Incidents on the High Seas and International Airspaces signed in Istanbul on 8 September 1988 oblige the two countries to respect each others sovereignty and territorial integrity and recognise their rights to use the high seas and the international airspace of the Aegean. In their recent agreement they also agreed to allow NATO a role in monitoring air sorties over the Aegean. As a result, Greece and Turkey will be part of the NATO Air Command and Control System (ACCS) which will closely monitor the movements of their air force units.
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SQO SOLVES: CBMS INCREASING

GREECE/TURKEY CBMS INCREASING IN THE SQO--THEYLL SOLVE THE CASE WESTERN POLICY CENTER 5/30/03 http://www.westernpolicy.org/Countries.asp?Country=GR&Article=285
Greece and Turkey have agreed to conduct regular visits between senior staff officers of their armies, navies, and air forces as part of a new package of three confidence-building measures to further rapprochement between the two countries militaries. Up to now, direct military contact between Greece and Turkey has been extremely limited and has usually been carried out under the auspices of NATO. Prior to this decision, Greek government officials were reluctant to approve direct military-to-military communication with Turkey because of the disparity of influence between the Hellenic National Defense General Staff and the Turkish General Staff on the formulation of the countries defense policies concerning the Aegean and Cyprus. Since many of the bilateral problems between Turkey and Greece are related to military issues, it is believed that this initiative offers a significant opportunity to lower tensions between the two countries. The other two confidence-building measures in the package are the launching of a regular exchange of students between the Greek and Turkish military academies and the establishment of an Internet-based, information-sharing system between Greek and Turkish military hospitals. The package was announced following talks between Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou and Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul on the sidelines of a meeting of foreign ministers from European Union and Mediterranean countries, held under Greeces current EU presidency, on the Greek island of Crete. Since the rapprochement process between Greece and Turkey began in 1999, confidence-building measures have been primarily restricted to lower-level, non-military issues, such as tourism, the environment, and natural disasters. The political directors of the Greek and Turkish foreign ministries meet regularly to discuss bilateral issues. Greek Economy and Finance Minister Nicolaos Christodoulakis stated that the Greek government was promoting new initiatives to strengthen economic relations between Greece and Turkey.
MILITARY COOPERATION IN OUT OF AREA OPERATIONS WILL SPILL OVER TO AEGEAN AND CYPRUS ISSUES LT. COL. WILLIAMS 4/28/03 United Press International
Outside of the Aegean and Cyprus, it is a different story. Since NATO's Operation Allied Force and the defeat of former Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic's Serb forces, Greek and Turkish forces have served admirably in adjacent sectors in Kosovo. The instability in the region did not, as many critics feared, lead to another Balkan war among the Greeks, Turks, Bulgarians, Serbs, and others. Instead, it resulted in closer ties among them, even in the security field. The similarity of national Greek and Turkish positions on the Iraq war provides a foundation for cooperative efforts to ensure that, in the post-victory phase, Iraq becomes a stable, prosperous, and democratic country. For starters, a welcome sign to the Middle East and to the world would be a joint humanitarian effort in Iraq by the Greek and Turkish defense establishments -that is, by Christians and Muslims. The Multinational Peacekeeping Force Southeast Europe, also known as the Southeast European Brigade, or SEEBRIG, was formed in September 1998 with a rotating joint headquarters in Plovdiv, Bulgaria. The headquarters will be transferred to Constanza, Romania, in August 2003. The Greeks and the Turks spearheaded the initiative to establish SEEBRIG. The unit's first commander was a Turk, Major General Hilmi Akin Zorlu, who was recently the commander of the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul. SEEBRIG's second and present commander, Brigadier General Andreas Kouzelis, is a Greek. The deployment of SEEBRIG to either Iraq or Afghanistan would be further proof of Greek-Turkish cooperation and leadership. Joint military planning for "real-world" security problems in the Balkans, Iraq, and elsewhere will lead to greater bilateral trust. Once a modicum of trust is established, these militaries can begin to work on the core issues separating them: Cyprus and the Aegean.
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SQO SOLVES: CBMS INCREASING

GREECE/TURKISH JOINT MILITARY COOPERATION SPURS POSITIVE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP LT. COL. WILLIAMS 4/28/03 United Press International
Joint military cooperation and dialogue, if conducted solely for diplomatic purposes, will be hollow and short-lived. Staff talks and exchanges must look to the future and focus first on mutual security interests: transnational threats posed by terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, organized criminal enterprises, and the illicit movement of people and contraband. Working together, the Greek and Turkish militaries can effectively deny terrorist, criminal, and rogue organizations access to the eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans. The cooperative process will also result in finding ways to reduce military tensions without jeopardizing national positions. Both militaries are action-oriented and professional, and they have worked well together in NATO and in recent international operations. It is time to bring that cooperation closer to home. The Greek and Turkish militaries should be jointly coordinating a wide range of security issues on a regular and frequent basis, including those concerning the Aegean and Cyprus. The positive momentum in improving bilateral relations, dating back almost half a decade, need not sputter because of a military lack of vision.
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SQO SOLVES: CYPRUS

INDIGENOUS SOLUTIONS ARE SOLVING THE CYPRUS CONFLICT STEINBERG-DIRECTOR PROGRAM ON CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND NEGOTIATION BAR LLAN UNIVERSITY-6/27/2k3 JERUSALEM POST But for over 20 years, while our lives have been shattered by terrorism and suicide bombings, the level of violence in Cyprus has been steadily decreasing But for over 20 years, while our lives have been shattered by terrorism and suicide bombings, the level of violence in Cyprus has been steadily decreasing. The last major war took place in 1974, triggered by a coup supported by the military government in Greece and leading to a major invasion by Turkey's armed forces. As a result of this war populations fled or were driven from their cities and homes, and the island was divided in two, with the north under Turkish control and the south in Greek hands. And for a few years after the war the violence continued, with terror attacks across the cease-fire line, known as the Cypriot "green line." However, the violence subsided significantly after the Turkish authorities turned the green line into a dividing wall, passing along the entire length of Cyprus, including barbed wire, a wide buffer zone in some places, and even concrete barriers. On both sides military patrols guard the barrier, and in the capital city of Nicosia, the green line is a huge scar across the landscape. For good reason this fence is not loved by anyone, but the evidence is indisputable - the daily friction between the populations largely disappeared, and the division has brought a significant degree of stability and even relative prosperity. Since the 1974 war and the construction of this barrier along the dividing line, a new generation of Cypriots has grown up. For them, the conflict, wars and terror attacks are ancient history. Most Greek and Turkish Cypriots under 30 have grown up without encountering people from the other side, and the old hatreds, as well as the wall that divides them, appear anachronistic and ridiculous. A growing number of Cypriots from both sides of the island, whose total population is less than one million, became involved in inter-communal dialogue as a means of finding a way out of the deadlock. And suddenly, at the end of April, the Turkish leadership opened the barriers to allow for the free movement of both populations, and tens of thousands of Cypriots from both sides went to check out the other side. Refugees from the war were able to visit their old homes, and in many cases were able to retrieve their photo albums and family heirlooms that had been preserved for almost 30 years by the "occupiers" and "settlers" despite the intensity of the conflict. Greeks were able to purchase cheaper goods in the north and Turkish workers found employment on the booming southern portion of the island. Thousands of people go through the border crossings every day.
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SQO SOLVES: CYPRUS

CYPRUS RESOLUTION COMING IN THE SQO BBC Monitoring Europe - Political 9/11/03
Nicosia, 10 September: Nicosia and Athens have agreed on a common course of action with regard to matters of mutual interest relating to the European Court of Human Rights, the European Union, the Cyprus problem and the Islamic Conference with a view at safeguarding the interests of the two countries. Speaking after official talks at the foreign ministry here today, Greek Foreign Minister Yeoryios Papandreou and his Cypriot counterpart Yeoryios Iakovou stressed that the most important concern is to find a settlement of the protracted Cyprus question. Papandreou said bilateral ties are entering a completely new dimension as a result of Cyprus' accession to the EU and Iakovou said there was full identity of views on the steps that need to be taken to tackle mutual concerns. "Our bilateral ties will be governed by the new dimension of the EU, I am not talking about the Cyprus issue which is our first priority, I am talking about our cooperation within the union as two member states within the EU in many fields," he said. He explained that this cooperation does not refer to Cyprus' alignment with EU rules and regulations only but it relates to action on issues such as the new constitution, agricultural policy, economic development and EU foreign policy. "This new dimension is completely fresh in our bilateral relations, this is a policy that needs to be implemented because Cyprus is joining the EU," Papandreou said. In his remarks after the hour-long talks, Iakovou said discussions covered a wide range of issues, various aspects of the Cyprus question and EU matters. "We shall play a role within the EU as a full member and we briefed Minister Papandreou about our harmonization effort, our representation to EU institutions and the role we will play before and after accession in May 2004," Iakovou added. He said Cyprus is already active in the Middle East and will do the same in the Mediterranean. The Minister said they also discussed individual applications to the European Court and ways to deal with Turkey's manoeuvres to prevent Greek Cypriots from applying to the Court with regard to violations of their human rights by Ankara, whose troops occupy the island's northern areas. "We reviewed the situation, exchanged views and took various decisions on these matters and others, including how to deal with problems that may arise at the Islamic Conference, next month in Kuala Lumpur," he said. There is a full identity of views on the measures that need to be taken by the two governments, he added. Asked to comment on plans by the Turkish Cypriot leader to reveal a new peace deal, to replace a UN proposal on a comprehensive settlement to the Cyprus problem, Papandreou said Cyprus and Greece have the same approach towards the UN proposal (the Annan plan) and indicated that it was not necessary to comment every time a new idea is floating around. Replying to questions, Papandreou stressed that the solution of the Cyprus question was the priority of both Athens and Nicosia and pointed out that attention must be focused on finding a solution. Passage omitted
114 Nielson/Hahn
SQO SOLVES CYPRUS: PARTITION O.K.

SQ SOLVES-PARTITION STRATEGY IS SUSTAINABLE-2 REASONS ISHTIAQ AHMAD-ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AT THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN UNIVERITY-11/01 http://www.mfa.gov.tr/PrintPageE2.asp. WHY THE CRITICS OF PARTITION ARE WRONG As compared to the Subcontinent, the situation in Cyprus is more conducive for partition due to two reasons. First, ever since the Turkish intervention consolidated the de facto partition of Cyprus, there has been peace on the island. On the other hand, since partition, India and Pakistan have fought three wars. Kashmir, the unfinished agenda of partition, caused two of these wars. Even if it was not the partition per se which caused armed conflicts between India and Pakistan, the relatively prolonged peaceful situation in Cyprus is credible support for the legalisation of partition on the island. Second, in the Subcontinents case, even after partition, the number of Muslims residing in India is almost equal to that living in Pakistan. This is not the situation in Cyprus, where the internationally supervised migration of Greeks from northern parts of the island and Turks from its southern parts after 1974 has effectively solved the demographic problem. In the Subcontinent, for logistical and other reasons, all the Indian Muslims could not migrate to territories constituting the eastern and western wings of Pakistan, nor was it possible for all the non-Muslims from these two wings to migrate to present Indian territories. Although the number of non-Muslims, including Hindus, is far less in Pakistan than the number of Muslims in India, each country is required to tackle the demographic fallout of partition by providing safeguards to its respective minorities. Sometime, the failure in doing so results in Hindu-Muslim riots in India or minority rights violations in Pakistan. However, mostly, the religious nationalist forces on the two sides are deterred by the fact that a violent act by one will result in an equally, or more, violent reaction by the other. For instance, when Hindu nationalists destroyed the Babari Mosque in India in December 1992, the chauvinistic Muslims reacted by destroying more than 20 Hindu temples across Pakistan. The Muslim critics of Indian partition also raise the question that by creating Pakistan, the Muslim League under Jinnah not only left behind in India an equal number of Muslims but also the most important architectural monuments of the Mogul empire, particularly Taj Mahal. This is not the situation in Cyprus.
115 Nielson/Hahn
SQO SOLVES: GREECE/TURKEY RELATIONS UP

Theres no impact to the case---Greece and Turkey have mended their fences--peace is on the horizon and there is no risk of conflict
Lastly, and most importantly, the Greek and Turkish motherlands are making strides toward a lasting peace with each other. On January 21, 2000, George Papandreou, the Greek Foreign Minister, became the first Greek Minister to visit Turkey in thirty-eight years. n180 More than two [*476] decades after the invasion of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey have begun signing accords to renew peace in the Aegean. n181 Regulating double taxation, organized crime, illegal immigration, tourism and the Aegean environment, the accords provide a forum in which the nations can pledge themselves to peace. n182 The former warring nations have also begun planning future accords, visits to each other's nations, and joint hosting of the 2008 European Soccer Championships. n183 To ease tensions further, Greece recognized Turkey as a candidate for EU membership. n184 Without the underlying Greco-Turkish animosity, a unified international community may pressure the Turkish Cypriot leadership to soften its anti-Greek tone and return to discussions of reunification. n185
US INITIATIVES HAVE MENDED US-TURKEY RELATIONS Aliriza-Director, Turkey Project CSIS-6/5/03

http://www.csis.org/turkey/TU030605.pdf
To be sure, there has been no formal announcement from Washington during the past three months that the strategic partnership lauded by President Bill Clinton in Istanbul in 1999 is over or even that it is being seriously reviewed. Long-standing alliances do not wither rapidly and the hastily arranged visit to Ankara of Secretary of State Colin Powell in early April, as well as two subsequent telephone conversations between Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and President George Bush apparently reassured the Turks that the damage could soon be repaired. After all, Erdogan had argued in the Washington Post on March 23, just after taking over as prime minister, Turkey was part of the coalition, it had done its utmost to cooperate and wished to prevent any watershed in the relationship. The Turkish sense of optimism was further reinforced by the inclusion of $1 billion for Turkey in the supplemental U.S. war budget, reportedly through the lastminute intervention of Secretary Powell. Sqo solves--no risk of escalation Clapsis, 2000 (Antonios, The Aegean Sea Conflict: A Recent Perspective, Spring, Brownstone Journal)
To what extent Turkey can reconcile Europeanization with its Asiatic heritage remains to be seen. However, is evident that the integration of Turkey into the European framework gives the Turkish government and the Turkish people the incentive to continue recent developments. This incentive to change, together with the new mood of reconciliation introduced by George Papandreou in Greece, portends a future of cooperation and earnest efforts by both countries to resolve their remaining differences. It has shown that no matter how close they were to war in 1996, both Greece and Turkey have chosen peace.

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GDI 04 Greece/Turkey Neg

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Greek Nationalism 1NC Shell (1)

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Greek Nationalism 1NC Shell (2)

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Cyprus Impact Module (1)

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Cyprus Impact Module (2)

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Athens is the most anti-American European capital.

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Cyprus = Priority for Greece

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No Major Policy Changes

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Sex Trafficking/Human Rights Link

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US Military Presence Link

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Minority Rights/Immigration Unpop.

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Bad Economy Unpopular

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Womens Rights Popular

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Public Support Internal

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Karamanlis/Greece Key to Reunify Cyprus

Greece concessions are key to Cyprus resolution.

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Greece/Turkish Coop Impact

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TURKISH POLITICS DA SHELL

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TURKISH POLITICS DA SHELL

And, hardline political resurgence crushes Turkey-Israel alliance

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US/TURKEY COOP MODULE

cooperation is key to prevent war in the Middle East

Bagci, Turkeys Neighbourhood Part II, June 15 2003

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Turkish nationalists are dormant now but waiting to pounce

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NEW 2NC LINK

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INTERNAL LINK EXTENSION

Turkish Democracy vulnerable to coups National Review 3/8/99

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Turkish-Israeli alliance increases chances of Turkish EU accession

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