Revised10May2013 Symposium:

TheConceptofElectoralIntegrity
PippaNorris
McGuireLecturerinComparativePolitics KennedySchoolofGovernment HarvardUniversity Cambridge,MA02138,USA Pippa_Norris@Harvard.edu www.pippanorris.com ProfessorofGovernment&IR TheUniversityofSydney DepartmentofGovernment&IR NSW,2006 Australia www.electoralintegrityproject.com

Abstract: A rapidlygrowing body of research by scholars and applied policy analysts is beginning to explore three questions: when do elections meet international standards of electoral integrity? When do they fail to do so? And what can be done to mitigate these problems? To address these issues, Part I in this introductory essay outlines the concept of electoral integrity, proposing a comprehensive and broad definition founded upon global norms and international conventions. Part II identifies four sub fieldscontributingtowardsunderstandingelectoralintegrityandmalpractices,includingthestudyof:(i) public sector management (analyzing problems of electoral maladministration in the United States and other established democracies); (ii) political culture (examining whether citizens confidence in electoral procedures affects institutional trust, support for democracy and feelings of political legitimacy, voting behavior and political participation); (iii) comparative institutions (focusing on comparing types of electoral systems, hybrid regimes, and electoral processes of democratization); and (iv) peace and conflict (determining the triggers of electoral violence). The emerging subfield of electoral integrity, cuttingacrosstheseconventionaldisciplinaryboundaries,ischaracterizedbyitsproblemorientedfocus andglobalcomparativeframework,aswellasbyitsuseofpluralisticmethodsandanalyticaltechniques. Part III summarizes the particular contribution made towards this research agenda by each of the studiesincludedinthisspecialsymposiumofElectoralStudies. Keywords:elections,voting,electoralintegrity,democracyanddemocratization,fraud,corruption

Countries around the world share challenges in meeting international standards of electoral integrity. Firstorder malpractices, used by many repressive rulers, include imprisoning dissidents, harassing adversaries, coercing voters, voterigging counts, and finally, if losing, blatantly disregarding the peoples choice. Such problems are exemplified by voting irregularities in Putins Russia, repression of opposition parties in Nazarbayevs Kazakhstan, widespread complaints of fraud in Karsais Afghanistan, and repression used by the security forces and ZANUPF supporters in Mugabes Zimbabwe. The most egregious and overt cases, violating human rights and undermining electoral credibility, are usually widely condemned by domestic observers and the international community (Donno 2010, Kelley 2012). Countries free of these problems can still experience secondorder malpractices, however, exemplified by inaccurate voter registers, maladministration of polling, vote buying, clientalistic politics, progovernment media, erroneous counts, campaigns awash with money, and excessively high legal barriers to elected office. Secondorder malpractices can occur everywhere, even in longestablished democracies, exemplified by the notorious hanging chads in Florida in 2000 (Hasen 2012), more recent accusations of voter suppression through overzealous identification requirements during the ObamaRomney contest (Jones and Simons 2012), and security vulnerabilities inUKpostalballots(Buckley2011). As illustrated by the contributions towards this symposium, interest in problems of electoral integrityhasincreasinglyflourishedontheresearchagendaamongboththeacademicandpolicymaking communities. Comparativists have explored the causes of electoral malpractice (Birch 2011) as well as the impact of flawed contests, notably for regime classifications and the persistence of autocracy, and for electoral transitions (Lindberg 2006, 2009, Bunce and Wolchik 2006, Brownlee 2007, Levitsky and Way 2010). Conflict studies have analyzed the root causes of problems of electoral violence (Basedau, ErdmanandMehler2007,CollierandVicente2011,Bekoe2012,FrazerandGyimahBoadi2011,Global Commission 2012). Behaviorists have examined citizens lack of confidence in elections to determine whetherthishasinfluencedfeelingsofpoliticallegitimacyandpoliticalbehavior(Birch2008,2010,Rose and Mishler 2009, McAllister and White 2011). Studies in public administration have highlighted problems of voter registration processes, the security of convenience voting, and the performance of election management bodies (EMBs) (Alvarez and Hall 2008, Alvarez, Atkeson and Hall 2012, Hamner 2009). Policy analysts have sought to evaluate the effectiveness of remedies designed to deal with malpractices, including monitoring by electoral observers, strengthening the capacity of electoral officials, improving dispute resolution mechanisms, auditing EMBs, and reforming the legal framework regulating voter registration, party finance and campaign broadcasting (Bjornlund 2004, GoodwinGill 2

2006,Alvarez,HydeandHall2008,Young2009,Hyde2011,Kelley2012).Asreviewedintheconcluding chapter(Norris,thisissue),multipletechniquesandmethodshavebeendeployedtomonitorthequality of elections, including casestudies, participant observation, mass surveys, expert indices in new cross nationaltimeseriesdatasets,fieldexperiments,postelectionballotaudits,crowdsourcingsocialmedia, andelectoralforensics. Tomapthisrapidlyexpandingsubfield,PartIinthisintroductionopensbyclarifyingtheconcept of electoral integrity, providing an overarching theoretical framework which can help to understand the variety of challenges highlighted by this special issue. This concept can be framed, alternatively, by notions of electoral fraud, maladministration, or democratic values, each providing partial insights. A more comprehensive, abstract, and politicallylegitimate concept is proposed, where the notion of electoral integrity is understood to rests upon the foundation of international conventions and global norms. Part II identifies several characteristics of the emerging subfield studying electoral integrity, including its problemoriented focus and worldwide comparative framework, cutting across conventional disciplinary boundaries, as well as its pluralistic methodological toolkit. The research agenda melds four subfields in political science, studying public sector management, political culture, comparative institutions, and peace and conflict. Part III summarizes the particular contribution made towards this agenda by the articles in this special issue of Electoral Studies. This symposium covers severalcommonvarietiesofelectoralmalpracticesfoundinmanypartsoftheworld,ranginginseverity, including when and why actors deploy state repression and electoral violence (Bhasin and Gandhi this issue), how the governing party maintains power by manipulating electoral laws in Singapore (Tan this issue), the impact of techniques of votebuying and perceptions of electoral unfairness on turnout in Latin America (Carreras and Irepoglu this issue), problems of effective electoral administration in the U.K. (James this issue), and the most effective reforms to the voter registration processes in the U.S. (Hall this issue). The conclusion (Norris this issue) summarizes the work presented in the symposium, describes and evaluates the growing body of crossnational data monitoring both mass perceptions and expertevaluationsofelectoralintegrity,andoutlines theremainingpuzzlesfacingtheevolvingresearch agenda. I:Theconceptofelectoralintegrity The intellectual and methodological foundations for understanding electoral integrity are starting to crystalize and coalesce, although studies remain somewhat fragmented and scattered across severaldistinctsubfields.What,ifanything,doseeminglydisparateproblemsofelectoralintegrityshare 3

in common whether flaws and irregularities in electoral administration in longstanding democracies, citizens lack of confidence in electoral institutions, electoral malpractices restricting party competition in hybrid regimes, or outbreaks of deadly electoral violence commonly reported in many parts of Africa andAsia? The overarching concept of electoral integrity helps to unify our understanding of these diverse phenomena. When electoral observers offer positive assessments of elections, echoing the language of the1948UniversalDeclarationofHumanRights,theyfrequentlydescribetheoutcomeasreflectingthe genuine will of the people or more simply and conventionally as free and fair. By contrast, when election problems arise, these are often described as fraudulent, malpractices, manipulated elections, or violations of democratic principles and human rights (Kelley 2012, Donno 2010, Hyde 2011). This soft and foggy language serves diplomatic purposes well, avoiding hard and sharp cutting edges. But for this very reason, it fails to provide sufficient conceptual clarity for scholars seeking to operationalize and measure this phenomenon (Elklit and Svensson 1997, Bjornlund 2004, Elklit and Reynolds2005). Alternative definitions of electoral integrity are common in the research literature. Hence lawyers commonly emphasize violations of domestic electoral laws, especially fraudulent manipulation of polling and tabulation (Young 2009, Vickery and Shein 2012, Alvarez, Hall and Hyde 2008). This is useful for practical guidance in the courts. Scholars of public sector management draw upon the language of electoral maladministration, emphasizing technical capacity of electoral procedures and processes (Alvarez and Hall 2006, Alvarez, Atkeson and Hall 2012). Democratic theorists, drawing upon ideas of liberal democracy, usually emphasize the failure of electoral procedures to meet certain normative values, such as those of accountability, inclusiveness, and transparency (Birch 2011). Each of these approaches provides useful insights into this complex phenomenon, but, as argued later, they provideanincompleteunderstanding. Asconceptualizedand definedbythissymposium,theoverarchingnotionofelectoralintegrity is understood to refer to agreed international conventions and global norms, applying universally to all countries worldwide throughout the electoral cycle, including during the preelectoral period, the campaign, on polling day, and its aftermath. Conversely, electoral malpractice is used to refer to first andsecondorderviolationsoftheseglobalnorms. This conceptualization emphasizes four distinct features: (i) global norms are grounded in multilateral agreements, international conventions, treaties and international laws (rather than the 4

principles of liberal democracy or Western normative values); (ii) a distinction between first and secondorder malpractices, according to the severity of their potential consequences; (iii) shared standards applying universally to all countries and types of regimes (not simply a problem confined to electoral autocracies); and (iv) the notion of an electoral cycle, where a range of electoral malpractices occur at any stage in a sequential process (not limited to fraudulent acts on polling day and its aftermath).Letusunpacktheseideas. (i)Globalnorms Thefirstpartofthisdefinitionseeselectoralintegrityascontestsreflectingglobalnorms,where contestsareevaluatedaslegitimateiftheyrespectagreedinternationalconventionsandstandards.This approach is firmly grounded in international treaties which the worlds governments have endorsed for more than half a century. Global norms are universal standards which reflect a broad consensus around the world (Finnemore and Sikking 1998, Simmons 2009). The diffusion of global norms means that it is nolongeracceptableforagovernmenttomakesovereigntyclaimsinresponsetotheabuseofelectoral integrity (Donno 2010, Hyde 2011). This approach avoids arbitrary judgments. Although global norms are powerfully shaped by prominent states, endorsement by the international community weakens the chargeofapplyingculturallybound(WesternorAmerican)valueswhichdonottranslateaslegitimate standardsin regionsandsocietieswith otherhistoricalpolitical traditions.Over time,global normshave become accepted as the appropriate international and domestic yardsticks to judge the quality of electoral procedures. Empirical evidence suggesting the existence of widelyshared global norms of electoral integrity, indicated by congruence between expert evaluations and public assessments, is examinedlater(Norristhisissue) The foundation for global norms of electoral integrity rests upon Article 21(3) in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), which constitutes the legal basis and the core principles legitimating international support to elections and electoral assistance. Article 21(3) specifies that The willofthepeopleshallbethebasisoftheauthorityofgovernment;thiswillshallbeexpressedinperiodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures. While the language remains abstract and imprecise, especially the phrase will of the people, certain rights and principles are clear in this statement, notably that government authority flows from contests held at periodic intervals, with universal and equal suffrage, whereballotsareconfidentialandsecure.

Agreement about the global norms which should govern the conduct of elections were further expanded in Article 25 of the UN International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR of 1966), specifying the need for: 1) periodic elections at regular intervals; 2) universal suffrage which includes all sectors of society; 3) equal suffrage, in the idea of oneperson, onevote; 4) the right to stand for public office and contest elections; 5) the rights of all eligible electors to vote; 6) the use of a secret ballot process; 7) genuine elections; 8) and that elections should reflect the free expression of the will of the people.1 These standards are also understood as embodying rights to selfdetermination, after Article 1(1). Since the ICCPR Covenant came into force in 1976, it has created pressure of compliance from global norms of legitimacy and binding legal obligations for the 167 member states which endorsed the treaty,includingcountries wheremany ofelectoralrightsarelacking,suchasChina,Russia,Cuba,Togo, Equatorial Guinea, Iran, Syria, and Tajikistan. There are also moral, if not legal, obligations for states whichhavenotyetendorsedthetreaty,includingSingapore,SaudiArabia,UAE,andMyanmar.2 Insubsequentdecades,globalnormshavebeenhammeredout bytheinternationalcommunity and endorsed in a series of human rights instruments, conventions, legal instruments, and more detailed working standards (Young 2009). Standards have been developed in the practical guidelines for electoral observers issued by regional intergovernmental organizations, exemplified by the OSCE ElectionObservationHandbook(6thedition)(OSCE2010).Similarguidelineshavebeenpublishedbythe African Union, the European Union, and the Organization of American States (Donno 2010). The Carter Center compiled a comprehensive Database of Global Obligations to assess the quality of electoral processesagainsthumanrightsconventionswhichmemberstateshaveendorsed.3 Globalnormsreflectabroadconsensuswithintheinternationalcommunityabouttheprinciples whichshouldguideminimalstandardsofelectoralprocesseswithinstates,includingtheneedforequal and universal suffrage, equal opportunities for candidates and parties to run for elected offices, and unfettered rights to freedom of expression and assembly (Bjornlund 2004, IDEA 2002). These provide theinternationallegalmandateforelectoralactivitiesbyintergovernmentalorganizations,includingthe deployment of observer missions evaluating the quality of elections, as well as the guiding framework for United Nations agencies and international NGOs when providing electoral assistance for member states. The most succinct statement of these norms is provided in the UN General Assembly resolution 64/155(8thMarch2010)StrengtheningtheroleoftheUnitedNationsinenhancingperiodicandgenuine elections and the promotion of democratization. This version reflects and extends similar statements of principleendorsedregularlybytheUnitedNationssince1991.

Nevertheless many global norms which are almost universally endorsed as abstract principles have not yet been translated and codified into practical standards. In this sense, global norms establish only minimal standards of electoral integrity. A range of advocates human rights NGOs, regional organizations,andreformmovementsseektoextendtheboundaries. Political finance illustrates the limits of global norms. This issue has generated considerable scholarly interest in recent years, especially comparisons of financial regulations in the United States and other longestablished Western democracies (CasesZamora 2004, Nassmacher 2009, Lessig 2011, Boatright 2011, Koss 2011). Corruption in general is widely condemned, including election bribery. The values of transparency and accountability are also widely recognized in general as essential for good governance. The United Nations recognizes certain minimal provisions governing political finance standards. Article 7(3) in the UN Convention against Corruption adopted in 2003 specifies the need for transparency, in accordance with domestic law, when funding candidates for elected public office and funding political parties.4 The Council of Europe has gone further in securing agreement on these mattersamongits memberstates. Similarlythe OrganizationofAmericanStateshaspublisheddetailed guidelines for standards of party finance and election campaigns.5 Reports by several prominent NGOs including IFES, International IDEA, and Global Integrity, compare information about national legal regulations and enforcement mechanisms for the disclosure, spending limits, and party subsidies governing political finance (IDEA 2004, hman and Zainulbhai 2011). Nevertheless the international community has not yet endorsed broader global norms and more detailed working standards about these matters. Despite the obvious importance of campaign finance for standards of electoral integrity, it remains difficult to establish a legitimate international yardstick to evaluate financial practices on issuessuchascontributionandspendinglimits(Young2009). Similarly, global norms also remain minimalist in terms of campaign communications. There is widespread agreement about the basic principles of freedom of expression and information which are universallyrecognizedrights,reflectedinArticle19oftheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights(1948). The worst transgressions, through state censorship, the intimidation or imprisonment of reporters, and restrictions on the independence of newspapers and broadcasters, are widely regarded as violating fundamental human rights. At a more practical level, however, global norms provide minimal guidance about the principles which should be followed in regulating campaign communications and the appropriateroleofpublicservicebroadcastingduringelections.

No internationallyagreed conventions specify more detailed principles for media coverage, for example by recognizing that public service broadcasters should provide balanced, inclusive, impartial and equitable coverage of all parties and candidates, or that paid political advertising on TV and radio should be regulated fairly and equitably. Leading advocates are seeking to expand the normative standards in this area, for example observer missions by the OSCE and others commonly monitor the role of the news media during campaigns, and the Organization of American States has developed principles and methods which their observers use for this purpose.6 UNESCOs Media Development Indicators (2008) provide another broad normative framework where the international community has endorsed the general principles of media pluralism and access. Nevertheless as yet no general conventions or protocols have outlined the principles which should govern legal regulation of mass and social media during election campaigns. Thus global norms are powerful mechanisms for international and domestic pressure but they establish only minimalist standards. The abstract language in internationalhumanrightsconventionsalsoallowsconsiderableroomforinterpretationaboutthemore specificmechanismswhicharemosteffectiveforimplementingelectoralintegrity. (iii)Firstandsecondordermalpractices Although global norms are universal, it is appropriate to distinguish types of malpractices based onthe potentialseverityoftheir consequences. Eastoniannotionsofsystemsupportare conventionally understood as involving multiple levels including support for the authorities, for regime institutions, and for the nationstate (Norris 1999, 2011). Similarly, the overarching concept of global norms of electoralintegritycanbeusefullydividedintofirstorderandsecondorderlevels.Thepreciseboundary between these levels remains to be determined. But firstorder problems can be loosely defined as those which involve deadly violence and major violations of fundamental human rights, whether instigated by state security forces, governing or opposition parties, communal leaders, or any other actor, all of which pose fundamental challenges to regime stability. These acts may trigger reform concessions;furtherstaterepression,oraperiodofrevolutionaryupheavalandsocialturmoilseekingto overturntheregime. Secondorder problems, by contrast, can be broadly understood as those characteristically involve more mundane issues of maladministration, lack of technical capacity, or human error which undermine the integrity of the electoral process. Feelings of system support is conventionally understood torangefromsupportforspecificactorsandauthorities,suchas trustinelectedleaders,to more diffuse confidence in regime institutions, approval of regime performance, support for regime 8

principles, and feelings of identification with the nationstate, at the most abstract level (Norris 1999). Inlongestablisheddemocracies,wherefeelingsoflegitimacyarederivedfromrepeatedexperienceofa succession of popular elections, even if one particular contest is flawed by second order problems, this may not necessarily undermine confidence in regime institutions, or more abstract and diffuse feelings of system support, such as satisfaction with the overall performance of democracy. In states with less experience of competitive elections, however, such as in Kenya, even minor secondorder irregularities may spread to catalyze first order problems. In this context, where channels for peaceful protest are limited,minorelectoraldisputesandsmallirregularities(suchasa shortdelayinannouncing theofficial results)maytriggermassviolenceinvolvingciviliancasualtiesorfatalities,intercommunalriots,andthe destructionofpropertythroughlootingandarson.Moreoverautocraticregimescanalsobeexpectedto be more willing to use the techniques of domestic repression against their own citizens to reduce dissentandsuppressprotests,suchasusingphysicalcoercion,intimidation,andoutrightviolencebythe security forces and gangs of armed supporters (Davenport 2007, Gandhi and LustOkar 2009). Electoral malpractices may therefore arise from intentional restrictions on democratic human rights, such as where autocratic rules seek to manipulate electoral rules unfairly to limit opposition, but they may also be caused by second order maladministration and lack of governance capacity, such as administrative errorsinregistrationrolls,orthestateslackofcapacitytomaintainsecurity. (iii)Shareduniversalstandardsandtheglobalcomparativeframework Thethirdcomponentofthisconceptualizationunderstandsglobalnormsofelectoralintegrityas universally applicable, where violations of shared principles and standards have the capacity to undermine the quality of elections in every society, including in longestablished democracies. The most egregious violators of electoral rights in places such as Belarus, Afghanistan and Ukraine are commonly highlighted by dramatic news headlines. Yet our understanding is too narrow and partial if scholars simply focus upon the worst firstorder cases of overt malpractices involving repression in electoral autocracies.Firstordermalpracticesinautocraticstatesgeneratewidespreadinternationalconcern.But secondorder challenges of electoral integrity reflect universal problems which may damage the legitimacy of electoral contests in any country including in AngloAmerican democracies such as the United States, Britain and Canada.7 Malpractices, from this perspective, may be manipulated or accidental, legally sanctioned or illicit, arising from violations of democratic rights or from lack of technicalcapacity,orindeedalloftheabove.

An important reason for adopting this broader conceptualization is a historical perspective: issuesofelectoralintegrityhavelongbeenofconcerninWesterndemocracies,exemplifiedbyproblems of endemic bribery and treating during nineteenth century Britain (OLeary 1962), progressive attempts to clean up machine politics in Tammany Hall (Gosnell 1968) and fraud at the ballot box (Campbell 2006), restrictions on the electoral franchise for women and the working class in Europe (Romanelli 1998), practices of voter suppression and racial discrimination in the United States (Keyssar 2009), and the introduction of compulsory voting and the secret ballot in Australia (Sawer 2001). Nor are these issues simply historical curiosities in established democracies; contemporary challenges in American elections are exemplified by the notorious problem of hanging chads and faulty voting machines in Florida,thesubstitutionofvotesfordollarsbysuperPACs,andincreasinglyrestrictivevoterregistration laws and identification requirements (Overton 2006, Minnite 2010, Lessig 2011). Even where many basic conditions are met, expectations of electoral integrity are not frozen in time; instead new challenges continue to arise. A broad consensus surrounds many of the basic nutsandbolts conditions required to achieve minimal standards of electoral integrity, such as the requirements of an inclusive adult franchise, honest and accurate vote tabulations, and the use of secret ballots. But debate continuesaboutthemostappropriateresponsetocomplexnewchallenges,includinggrowingdemands for gender equality and minority representation, the deployment of digital voting technologies and online balloting, demands for convenience polling, and the appropriate regulatory framework governingpoliticalfinance,campaignbroadcasting,andpoliticaladvertising. Secondorderproblemofelectoralintegritycanarise anywhere,althoughtheconsequences are

expected to be most serious in states lacking lengthy historical experiences of competitive electoral processes. Longestablished democracies are expected to have a deep reservoir of diffuse support for democratic principles and practices accumulated from experience acquired over many decades or even centuries. Many, although not all, established democracies have developed independent election management bodies capable of administering contests according to professional standards of impartiality,efficiencyandtransparency(IDEA2006).Legalchannelsresolvedisputespeacefullythrough the courts. The consequences of any secondorder electoral irregularities can be expected to prove more corrosive of regime legitimacy, and thus potentially destabilizing, in countries lacking these conditions.Inparticular,citizenslivingindeeplydividedsocietieswithrecentexperienceofdeeprooted conflict can be expected to display minimal trust and confidence in state authorities, legal institutions, and electoral processes, and to have low reservoirs of social trust and tolerance. In this situation, the potential dangers of electoral violations are also expected to be heightened by winnertakeall contests 10

which raise the stakes, such as the 2011 presidential elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2011 and the 2010 presidential contests in Afghanistan. In this context, secondorder problems of popular unrest and violence may be triggered or reignited where losing parties seize on even minor technicalinfringements,suchasthelackofofficialballotpapersinafewpollingstationsorsomeclerical errors in electoral registration lists, to challenge the legitimacy of the outcome (Kalandadze and Orenstein2009). (iv)Theelectoralcycle Lastly, much attention in the news media and in the research literature has focused upon the problem of fraudulent ballots and vote count malpractices, acts at the end of the electoral process. Hence the U.S. heated debate about voter fraud versus voter suppression on polling day (Hasen 2012), with less attention to the deeper structural problems of American elections, such as the role of campaigns flooded money or the state restrictions on ballot access for third party candidates. But the international community has moved towards understanding that electoral assistance and electoral observation should not be focused purely upon electionday, or even on the shortterm period of the official campaign. Instead, elections should be seen as a sequential process or cycle involving a long series of steps (OSCE 2007). As the ACE project suggests, the cycle involves all stages in the process of elections: from the design and drafting of legislation, the recruitment and training of electoral staff, electoral planning, voter registration, the registration of political parties, the nomination of parties and candidates, the electoral campaign, polling, counting, the tabulation of results, the declaration of results, the resolution of electoral disputes, reporting, auditing and archiving. After the end of one electoralprocess,itisdesirableforworkonthenexttobegin:thewholeprocesscanbedescribedasthe electoralcycle.8 [Figure1abouthere] Figure 1 illustrates the main stages in this electoral cycle. The most visible types of electoral malpractice involve illegal acts on pollingday or immediately afterwards, such as vote tabulation fraud, carousel voting, or ballot stuffing. In fact, however, problems can occur at any stage in the electoral cycle. As emphasized by Birch (2012), the more technical and subtle forms of malpractice, through the strategic manipulation of the legal framework governing elections, occur well in advance of polling day, and these may also be the least visible to observers. This can include designing overly restrictive or cumbersome nomination requirements for gaining ballot access, patronage appointments eroding the independence of broadcasting regulatory bodies and the management of statecontrolled television 11

channels, the partisan gerrymandering of constituency boundaries to favor incumbents, or the passage of restrictive voter registration laws, discouraging turnout. These types of legal strategies are also less likely to incur critical media headlines, international condemnation, and domestic protests than more overtformsofintimidationandcorruptionattheballotboxonpollingday.Theideaofanelectoralcycle is also similar to the way that Andreas Schedler (2002) understands the notion, as he suggests that problems of democratic elections involve a menu of manipulation which ranges sequentially from restrictionsontherangeofelectoralofficesthroughtheformationandexpressionofpreferencestothe consequences of voting choices. If conceived in this way, breaking any single link in the chain is capable ofunderminingthelegitimacyofelections. Alternativeconceptualizations:domesticlaws,maladministration,anddemocraticprinciples Several disciplines offer alternative approaches to conceptualizing the idea of electoral integrity and identifying a framework of normative standards, including those based more narrowly on domestic laws, administrative criteria, and democratic values. These can be most useful for establishing practical guidelines for specific elections. Each has certain important limitations, however, making them less suitable for comparative studies than a more comprehensive overarching framework derived from globalnorms. Legalconceptionsofelectoralfraud Perhaps the most common legalistic approach to integrity has focused upon electoral fraud, implying illegal acts, especially those associated with the final act of casting and counting ballots (Young 2009,Donsanto2008,Alvarez,HallandHyde2008, Minnite2010,Vickeryand Shein2012). Thisframing is particularly popular with activist groups such as True the Vote in the United States.9 In its strict usage, fraud refers to interference with the electoral process which violates domestic laws, usually perpetrated intentionally by governments, incumbent officeholders, electoral officials, party workers, or citizens. Fraud can be defined as attempts at wrongdoing, exemplified by voter intimidation, bribery, andballotstuffing(Donsanto2008).Alegalisticandculturallybounddefinitionofintegrityfocusesupon those acts which are in accordance with domestic statutes and judicial rulings within each state. Where actors clearly transgress against domestic electoral laws and regulations in each country, this can have serious repercussions for integrity. Legal texts, procedural regulations, and court cases in common law provide a concrete and practical national standard open to interpretations by lawyers and the judiciary. This is attractive for election management bodies seeking to stamp out blatantly illicit acts, such as forgingvotercards,votebuying,orballotstuffing. 12

This approach is unsatisfactory for comparative studies, however; elections in autocratic states can be conducted according to domestic legal standards but still violate widelyendorsed normative standards. For example, certain acts once widely tolerated are universally condemned today, such as practices of bribery and treating (plying electors with food, drink, or entertainment) in 18th century British rotten boroughs (OLeary 1962), or the systematic discrimination experienced by black voters until the 1965 Civil Rights Act in the United States (Keyssar 2009). Similarly, as illustrated by Tan (this issue) with the case of Singapore, electoral laws can violate basic conditions essential for democratic contests, for example by incorporating excessively high vote thresholds for candidates and parties to qualify for seats, by gerrymandering constituency boundaries, or by excessively difficult hurdles discouraging ballot access for third party or opposition candidates. Electoral laws and regulations also vary from one society to another, including in many federal states among provinces and regions within countries. It is therefore problematic to use domestic laws to compare integrity across nations on a consistent basis. Indeed countries with stricter cultural norms could be expected to generate more rigorous legal standards and more active prosecutions of electoral malpractice, whereas societies with greater tolerance of corruption, baksheesh, and clientalistic politics could demonstrate a more lax legal record. Thus violations of domestic legal standards, while one form of malpractice, do not provide a consistentyardstickofelectoralintegrityforcomparativeanalysis. Electoralmaladministration For those concerned with public sector management, problems at the polls can also be framed as electoral maladministration, a term conventionally referring to more routine flaws and unintended mishaps by election officials. These problems can arise from managerial failures, inefficiency, and incompetence, and lack of bureaucratic capacity, exemplified by the existence of excessively long lines at polling stations, inaccurate or dated electoral registers, the lack of security ink, the insufficient provision of ballot papers, the misplacement of ballot boxes, the breakdown or technical inaccuracy of electronic voting machines, or mathematical errors during the vote count. Maladministration is exemplified by many common problems arising from the decentralized and highly partisan nature of American electoral administration, where local officials are responsible for many aspects of the registration and voting process. The poor and confusing design of ballot papers in Broward County, Florida in 2000 was widely attributed to incompetency and human error by local officials, for example, rather than any intention to defraud electors of their rights, although these problems were rooted in

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largerstructuralflaws,suchasthedecentralizedandpartisannatureofAmericanelectoralmanagement bodies(AlvarezandHall2006,Alvarez,AtkesonandHall2012,Hallthisissue). The concept of maladministration is useful but also relatively narrow and it would be stretched too far if applied to first order problems of electoral malpractice, such as those occurring under authoritarian states with the imprisonment of dissidents or opposition leaders, disqualifications for ballot access for presidential candidates, or the intentional and systematic disenfranchisement of major groups of citizens. Maladministration also assigns primary responsibility for any problems with electoral officials, rather than other actors, such as the leaders of political parties or community groups who use heightened rhetoric and claims of fraud triggering electoral violence, private corporations which bribe politicians or provide onesided TV broadcasts, or repressive acts conducted by the security forces. Moreover in many cases it remains difficult to distinguish between genuine human error and intentionally fraudulent acts, for example where certain names are missing from electoral registries, or where the use of insecure absentee ballots facilitates duplicate names. Equally importantly, perhaps, there are no internationallyagreed standards of maladministration which would allow the quality of elections to be benchmarked, compared and evaluated. Thus while some Election Management Bodies prefer paper ballots, on the grounds of efficiency, transparency, and security, others opt for electronic votingmachines,advancingthesamereasons(IDEA2006).Somestudiesassumethattheindependence of Election Management Bodies from executive agencies is important for their impartiality (IDEA 2006), while others suggest that pluralistic partisan composition can prove equally effective (Birch 2011). Performance standards are starting to be developed and implemented by several national electoral management bodies (see James this issue) but these have not yet been standardized crossnationally as internationalinstruments. Democraticvaluesandprinciples Lastly,perhapsthestrongestchallengetotheconceptualizationofferedinthisstudyarisesfrom political philosophy and from alternative definitions derived from theories and principles of liberal democracy. Thus elections which fail to reflect the values of transparency, inclusiveness and participation can be seen as lacking integrity. The most ambitious approach has been proposed by Birch (2011), who defines electoral malpractices as the manipulation of electoral processes and outcomes so that personal or partisan benefits are substituted for the public interest. Birch develops a comprehensive theoretical framework which proposes that elections meet democratic principles where they are inclusive, facilitating policydirected voting, and allowing effective aggregation. Contests 14

involving malpractices are understood by Birch to violate these principles through the manipulation of institutions (such as gerrymandered electoral laws biased towards incumbents), vote choice (such as through limiting campaign activities and information), and the voting act (such as through ballotbox stuffing). The framework provides perhaps the most sophisticated theory which has attempted to root the concept of electoral malpractice in the core values of liberal democracy. The approach is attractive byprovidingafarbroaderandmorecoherentframeworkthantheminimalistcriteriaindorsedbyglobal norms and international conventions. Nevertheless this general approach suffers from several limitations. In particular, there is no single canonical source for interpreting democratic theory; where classical philosophers discussed detailed principles and aspects of electoral integrity and malpractice, theyoftendifferedsharplyintheirunderstandingofthesematters.Duringthecontemporaryera,Dahls notion of polyarchy provides the overarching framework used to understand conventional notions of liberal democracy, covering many abstract general principles. But the core principles of polyarchy also provide only limited guidance when it comes to interpreting the legitimacy of many detailed standards of electoral integrity and malpractices. Moreover Birch (2012) favors the classic mandate theory of democratic elections, whereby political parties should offer voters clear policy platforms and programs, avoiding more clentalistic appeals based on the delivery of material benefits to groups of supporters. In many countries, however, clientalism can also be regarded as another legitimate form of political representation, where elected officials deliver public goods and services to local areas and constituents (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). Thus scholars do not agree upon a single understanding of democratic principles and values which could provide a common or universal standard for evaluating the quality of elections around the world. In addition, even if scholars could hammer out a cohesive and comprehensive theoretical framework, rooted in contemporary democratic principles and values, this still would not be regarded as imposing legitimate, authoritative or binding obligations by the international community. International law requires rights and obligations which are discussed, coded, and endorsed by governments in member states through multilateral conventions and regional organizationguidelines,notphilosophicalprinciples.Thereisahierarchyofconceptualizations,fromthe specific practical administrative guidelines used by electoral management bodies to abstract philosophicalideals.Butglobalnormsofelectoralintegrityarenotnecessarilydeeplyrootedinidealized andabstractdemocratictheories,norcantheybereducedtotheseprinciples.

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II:Theemergingsubfieldstudyingelectoralintegrityandmalpractices During the last decade, the subfield of research analyzing issues of electoral integrity and malpractices has emerged with the promise to enrich and transform the conventional study of electoral systems, campaigns, and voting behavior. Recently varied strands of research developed initially in separate intellectual silos within the subfields of public sector management, comparative institutions, political behavior, and conflict studies have started to coalesce and crossfertilize each other (see Figure 2). This process is generating an important and innovative research agenda with the potential to upend many taken for granted assumptions rooted in the traditional microlevel study of voting behavior and the macrolevel study of electoral systems. While still somewhat fragmented across disparate professional sections and areas of specialization, links among these diverse phenomena are increasingly becoming recognized. The emerging research agenda studying these issues displays several distinctive characteristics, including its problemoriented focus and global comparative framework cutting across conventional disciplinary subfields, as well as the adoption of pluralistic toolkits and new datasets. The problems range in severity, including those which can be regarded as administrative challenges in public sector management and problems of civic engagement in political behavior, restricted party competition in hybrid regimes, and arguably the most severe problems of violence, instability,andcivilwarsinfragilestates. Publicsectormanagement:problemsofelectoraladministration The relevance of electoral integrity for countries around the world is easily grasped by glancing at the news headlines. Problems of electoral administration are evident in many long established democracies. In the United States, ever since Florida in 2000, claims of voter fraud (by Republicans) and voter suppression (by Democrats) have become bitterly litigious, fought in state legislatures and court battles (Fife 2010, Scher 2010, Minnite 2010, Hasen 2012, Hanmer 2009). Since 2000, antiquated American voting machines have been mothballed in favor of modern technologies, but antiquated administrative arrangements remain unreformed (see Hall this issue, Jones and Simons 2012). Moreover,the2010U.S.SupremeCourtdecisionon Citizens Unitedopenedthefloodgates ofcampaign spending (Lessig 2011, Boatright 2011). While possibly exceptional in the problematic nature of its electoral administration, the United States is far from alone in this regard. In Britain, the Election Commission was established in 2000 in the attempt to raise performance standards (see James, this issue), but still claims of ballotrigging, registration fraud, and irregularities in postal ballots have heightened concern about electoral security (Buckley 2011). Schaffer (2008) documents the way that 16

many other established democracies have sought to reform administrative processes in elections, including by expanding the role and capacity of professional electoral management bodies, switching to electronic voting machines, improving the accuracy and security of electoral registers, increasing citizenship education programs for young people and minorities, and implementing convenience polling facilities. The effect of these varied initiatives, and their unintended consequences, remain under debate.Administrativechallengesindevelopingcountriesareevenmoreproblematic,includingthelack ofcapacityandindependenceofElectionManagementBodies(MozaffarandSchedler2002,IDEA2006). Politicalculture:electoralmalpractices,institutionaltrust,andpoliticalbehavior Problems of electoral administration are intrinsically important subjects for research and they have also been found to have significant consequences for microlevel electoral behavior and political participation among ordinary citizens. In particular, the context of electoral integrity is expected to shape public confidence in electoral institutions and satisfaction with the performance of democracy, patternsofvotingturnoutandprotestpolitics,therangeofpartyandpolicychoicesavailabletocitizens, and the accountability and responsiveness of elected representatives. Comparative research and case studies using mass surveys are starting to unpack some of these consequences (Birch 2008, Birch 2010, Rose and Mishler 2009, McAllister and White 2011). Hence Carreras and Irepoglu (this issue) demonstrate that citizens who believe that elections are unfair are less likely to cast a ballot, although conversely votebuying in Latin America has the opposite effect. Similarly Norris (2012) demonstrates that where elections are seen as unfair, corrupt, or flawed, this strengthens public perceptions of electoral malpractices, undermines feelings of political legitimacy, dampens voter turnout, and encourages protest politics. By contrast, where elections meet international standards of electoral integrity, contests are widely regarded as legitimate by the general public, encouraging civic activism andreducingprotestpolitics. Comparative institutions: Electoral systems, hybrid regimes and opportunities for democratization Problems of electoral integrity are also central to understanding and comparing the effects of electoral institutions and the stability of many socalled hybrid regimes. The central issue for much recent work is whether manipulated multiparty elections which restrict party competition still provide a figleaf of legitimacy which reinforces the control of governing parties within autocracies or whether suchcontests,evenifdeeplyflawed,providegenuineopportunitiesfordemocratization(Lindberg2006, Lindberg 2009, Gandhi and LustOkar 2009). Hybrid cases are understood as regimes stranded 17

somewhere in the grey zone located between the handful of residual absolute autocracies without any competitive multiparty national elections (such as Saudi Arabia, China, or Cuba) and younger democracies which have successfully held a succession of popular contests during recent decades (such as Ghana, Chile, or Latvia). Hybrid regimes hold flawed elections for national office which are characterizedbyseriousrestrictionsoffundamentalhumanrightsandpartycompetition.Thesedefining featureshavebeenclassifiedascompetitiveauthoritarianregimes(LevitskyandWay2011)orelectoral authoritarianism(Schedler2006).Electoralobserverscommonlyreportincidentsarisingatanystagein the electoral cycle (Hyde 2011, Birch 2011, Kelley 2012). This includes violations arising from grossly unfairelectorallawsandofficialregulations(seeTanthisissue);thelackofalevelplayingfieldinmedia, staff, or financial resources during the campaign; bribery, intimidation, voting or counting irregularities on polling day (see Carreras and Irepoglu this volume); and violence and repression of opponents in its aftermath (see Bhasin and Gandhi this volume). Numerous recent examples can be cited. In Russia, for example, the December 2011 State Duma and March 2012 Presidential elections triggered massive demonstrations protesting alleged vote stealing and ballotstuffing (Volkov 2012), following flaws repeatedly observed in a series of Russian contests (White 2011). In response to the outcry, the Duma passedmorerestrictivelawscrackingdownonpublicprotests.InMexicoCity,aswell,followingtheJuly 2012 presidential elections, tens of thousands marched through the streets following allegations that PRI distribution of grocery prepaid giftcards buying millions of ballots. The long history of PRI electoral fraud bequeathed a legacy of deep mistrust in the electoral process (Magaloni 2006, Ugues 2010, CarrerasandIrepogluthisissue). Conflictstudies:Electoralviolence,politicalinstability,andcivilwars Peaceful protests can turn into electoral violence, which may occur at any stage of the electoral cycle. This problem signals perhaps the most obvious breakdown of democratic principles and cause for concern as a potential catalyst of social instability and civil wars. Conflict may be triggered by agents of the governing party using techniques of state repression to violate human rights, or else by losing parties and supporters refusing to accept the legitimacy of the process and outcome by mobilizing violent uprisings, intercommunal conflict, and riots, or else by titfortat coercion used by leading supportersondifferentsidesofanelectoralcontest.Themostseriousfirstorderchallengestoelectoral integrity have the capacity to generate popular uprisings, to destabilize regimes, and to generate fatal outbreaks of violence. These difficulties are exemplified by the case of Kenya, a country with an emerging economy which once appeared to be steadily on the path towards democratization and

18

development,leadingthe region,butwhichwassuddenly derailedbysocialinstability,riots,anddeadly conflict following the 2007 elections (Smith 2009, Boone 2011, Dercon and GutierrezRomero 2012). Thedisputetriggeredmonthsofurbanriotsandintercommunalconflict;theUNHighCommissionerfor Human Rights (2008) estimated that after this contest, more than 1,200 were killed and thousands injured, including cases of sexual violence, about 42,000 houses and many businesses were looted or destroyed, with more than 300,000 people displaced, costing the country more than one billion dollars anddeterringpotentialinvestors(Kiai2008,Chege2008).Estimatessuggestthattheseproblemsarefar fromisolatedorsporadic;deadlyriotserupted duringorimmediatelyafterelectionsafflictedaboutone fifth of contests in SubSaharan Africa, such as in Nigeria, Kenya and Cote dIvoire, as well as in many Asian countries such as the Philippines, Bangladesh, and Pakistan (UNDP 2011, Global Commission 2012). Opposition protests following claims of stolen and fraudulent elections are thought to have triggeredseveralcolorrevolutions,suchasinSerbiaandUkraine(KuntzandThompson2009). Pluralisticmethodologicaltoolkitsandnewdatasets To address all these issues, the study of electoral integrity is in the process of developing valid and robust metrics using diverse methodological approaches, datasets, and techniques. Scholars have helped to sharpen the conceptualization and delineation of the normative standards underpinning the concept of electoral integrity (Elklit and Svensson 1997, Elklit and Reynolds 2005, Lehoucq 2003, Schedler 2002, Bjornlund 2004, Birch 2011). To operationalize these concepts, systematic empirical evidence to monitor standards and identify failing elections has employed multiple methods. This includes the use of the statistical techniques of electoral forensics (for example, Myagkov, Ordeshook and Shakin 2009, Breunig and Goerres 2011, Mebane 2012); analysis of natural or randomized field experiments (for example, Donno 2010; Marcus and Johannes 2009, Ichino and Schuendeln 2012); crossnational and timeseries datasets drawing upon content analysis of international electoral observers and human rights reports (Hyde 2011, Kelley 2012, Birch 2011); historical studies describing electoral fraud, the expansion of the franchise, and voter suppression (Campbell 2006, Keyssar 2009); legal analysis of specific laws and court cases of electoral malpractices (Bjornlund 2004, GoodwinGill 2006, Young 2009); event analysis of electoral violence or protests (Bhasin and Gandhi this issue); the use of administrative performance indicators and postelection ballot audits developed by election management bodies (Alvarez and Hall 2008b; Alvarez, Atkeson and Hall 2012); and mass surveys of the general public (Bratton 2008, Birch 2008, Birch 2010, Rose and Mishler 2009, McAllister and White 2011). The electoral use of social media, crowdsourcing and big data analysis from Twitter feeds,

19

Google searches, and similar sites are also a potentially valuable new source for data. As discussed earlier, typologies classifying the manipulation of electoral processes have been operationalized to identify hybrid regimes (Brownlee 2007, Levitsky and Way 2010). Moreover evaluation studies have analyzed several policy interventions, particularly the effect of deploying international observers to monitor malpractices (Hyde 2011, Kelley 2012). For a phenomenon thought hard to measure, comparisons suggest that in fact the crossnational metrics which have been developed independently byseveralrecentstudiesareactuallyremarkablyrobust(Norristhisissue). Analysts have therefore used multiple tools and pluralistic research designs to understand problems of electoral malpractices (see Norris, this issue). Studies often combine multiple methods, datasets, and techniques, melding together participant observation and elite interviews, expert indices and mass surveys, content and event analysis, electoral forensics, game theory, randomized field experiments, and qualitative casestudies. By emphasizing how citizens and elites make choices within institutionalcontexts,studiesalsocommonlyemploymultilevelanalysis.Individualpoliticalbehaviorby citizens and elites is understood to operate within the broader framework of institutional rules, constraining and structuring opportunities for action. Several new datasets have recently become available in the public domain for secondary analysis to quantify and measure the quality of elections (Birch 2011, Hyde and Marinov 2011, Kelley 2010). On issues such as electoral violence, the legal framework for electoral integrity, and expert and public perceptions of electoral integrity, further work is currently underway. Just like the issue of corruption prior to the 1995 launch of Transparency Internationals Corruption Perception Index, problems of electoral malpractices, once thought to be immeasurable, are starting to be gauged systematically using crossnational timeseries indicators. Independentmeasuresdevelopedbydifferentprojects,usingdifferentconceptualframeworks,sources, and techniques, display remarkable robustness, strengthening confidence in these indices (Norris this issue). Public perceptions are also monitored in several surveys although often with only one or two items.Unfortunatelyunidimensionalindicesofintegritymayfailtocapturethefullcomplexitiesofwhy elections fail and varieties of malpractices can be identified, whether relatively minor procedural errors or administrative shortcomings, (exemplified by outofdate voter registers or administrative errors in particular polling stations), problems of votebuying and gerrymandering, and major violations of basic human rights, such as the coercion and intimidation of voters, party supporters and candidates, and incitementtointercommunalconflict.Researchisalsostartingtopioneerinnovativetechniquessuchas electoral forensics and randomized control fieldexperiments, to detect the distribution and analyze the

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causes and consequences of electoral malpractice (Alvarez, Hall and Hyde 2008a, Myagkov, Ordeshook andShakin2009). As illustrated by the studies included in this symposium, the new research agenda marks an important departure from the standard approach which predominates in the contemporary study of elections, campaigns, and voting behavior. In particular, the subfield adopts an explicitly problem oriented approach and policyrelevant normative framework. Studies identify challenges where elections fail to meet certain domestic laws, democratic principles, or international standards, whether through overt state repression, manipulated electoral laws, votebuying and fraud, or failures of electoral administration. Researchers have also sought to evaluate the effectiveness of policy remedies designed to deal with malpractices, including electoral observation monitoring, strengthening the capacityofelectoralmanagementbodies,improvingdisputeresolutionmechanismsthroughthecourts, andreformingthelegalframeworkregulatingpoliticalfinanceandcampaignbroadcasting(GoodwinGill 2006, Young 2009). Work on electoral integrity therefore often seeks to link the concerns of scholars with practitioners and organizations in the international community, combining pure research and applied consultancy work. This includes developing data, indices, and evidence measuring the scope of problems, analyzing the underlying drivers of electoral malpractices and examining their consequences, identifying potential policy solutions to realworld problems, and evaluating programmatic initiatives. Moreover another characteristic of the subfield is that this has the potential to provide a unified global comparative perspective which covers problems of elections occurring in all regions and types of regimes worldwide, ranging from issues of electoral administration and campaign finance in established democracies to problems of restricted electoral competition and violations of human rights in electoral autocracies. Hence one popular stream in the research literature has explored the potential impact of flawed contests in electoral autocracies, notably for the persistence of autocracy, regime transitions, and processes of democratization by elections (Lindberg 2006, Schedler 2006, Brownlee 2007, Lindberg 2009,LevitskyandWay2010). III:Overviewofthespecialissue The papers which form the basis of this symposium were first discussed at the inaugural workshop of the Electoral Integrity Project in Madrid in July 2012. They span a range of issues and countries. Bhasin and Gandhi (this issue) examine the timing and targeting of state repression in authoritarian elections. Autocrats face a fundamental tension: how to make elections appear credible (and thus maintain legitimacy) without losing control over their outcomes (and thus losing power). In 21

this context, the authors claim that incumbents choose the timing and targets of state repression strategically.Theytheorizethatbeforeelections,regimeswillmoderatetheiruseofviolencedirectedat ordinary citizens, while simultaneously directing statesponsored repression at opposition elites. If ordinarycitizensaretargetedby thestate,weexpectthatthey willexperiencerepressiononlyafterthe election. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature on elections and repression. Section 3 discusses the unique eventsbased data that we use to analyze the timing and targeting of electoral repression. Section 4 compares the results of analyzing all presidential elections in authoritarian regimes from 1990 to 2008. The evidence confirms that in the months prior and during the election, opposition leaders experiencegreaterratesofrepressionthanvoters. The next paper by Tan (this issue) turns to understanding how electoral laws are manipulated, examiningthecaseofSingapore.Theliteratureonelectoralauthoritarianismhasdrawnattentiontothe use of electoral institutions for undemocratic outcomes. This paper adds to this body of work by showing how a sophisticated hegemonic party manipulated its majoritarian electoral system to manufacture its legislative supermajority. By measuring the psychological and mechanical effects of electoralreformsin Singapore,Tanclaimsthattheseriesofchangesto therulesofthegameinthelate 1980s boosted the incumbents legislative dominance despite its declining vote shares. The study offers new evidence to demonstrate that electoral manipulation, or selective tweaking of electoral rules, can entrenchanunevenplayingfieldthatsystematicallydisadvantagesoppositionparties. Carreras and Irepoglu (this issue) turn to the impact of malpractices on voting participation.

They argue that although national elections in Latin America are now described as reasonably free and fairbyinternationalobservationsteams,electoralprocessesarestillaffectedbyaseriesofmalpractices (such as unequal access to the media and public resources, registration problems, and vote buying). These irregularities reduce citizens trust in elections. This paper analyzes the consequences of trust in elections and exposure to vote buying practices on electoral participation in Latin America. Using data from the last wave of LAPOP surveys (2010), the study finds that perceiving that a contest is unfair reduces the willingness to participate. Nevertheless receiving material incentives during the campaign (votebuying)hastheoppositeeffect,byincreasingvoterturnout. James (this issue) considers the problem of errors in electoral administration by local officials whichhaveraisedconcerninmanycountriesinrecentyears.Thisarticlearguesthatkeyprincipalagent relationships in electoral administration can be managed by adopting appropriate policy instruments. James provides a case study in the use of performance benchmarking schemes in the UK 20082010.

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Semistructured interviews were undertaken with 74 local election officials from 41 organizations subject to newly devised performance indicators. The research demonstrates that performance benchmarking can encourage learning amongst local electoral officials and strengthen control for principals. The personal reputations of officials provided a strong incentive for them to comply with centrallydefinedstandards,astheydidnotwishtobeassociatedwithfailure. Lastly Hall (this issue) continues the theme of electoral maladministration, turning to developments in the United States. The 2000 U.S. elections triggered concern about the voter registration process. Since then, two main reforms have been attempted in America: the use of state (top down) voter registers and the use of Election Day Registration. What has been the effect of these initiatives? Which would prove the most costeffective reform? Section 2 describes the background to these reforms. Section 3 discusses the evidence available to evaluate their effects. Using data from the 2000 and 2008 U.S. Census Current Population Survey Voter Supplements, it is possible to compare and determine which initiative is more effective. Section 4 presents the results of the analysis. Section 5 summarizestheconclusionsandimplications.Thestudyconcludesthatthefederalgovernmentinvested hundreds of billions of dollars on new state registers. This produced a modest effect on voter registration. As an alternative strategy, if the federal government had required that states move their voterregistrationclosedateto15days,therewouldhavebeenamodestbutsignificantreductioninthe percentage of citizens not voting because of registration problems. If Congress had mandated Election Dayregistration,theimprovementwouldhavebeenevenmorepronounced. The conclusion (Norris, this issue) turns to the next steps in the research agenda and the evidence which is beginning to emerge. In particular, this study focuses upon measuring mass and elite perceptions of electoral integrity to see whether there are shared global norms. When international observers criticize the quality of elections, do their evaluations reflect Western/American values? Alternatively aretheresharedevaluationsofelectoralintegrityand malpracticeby experts andordinary peoplelivingindiversecultures,suggestingtheexistenceofglobalnorms?Toconsidertheseissues,this study compares mass and elite indicators, including a new battery of nine items carried in the 6th wave of the World Values Survey (WVS6) 201012. The results confirm the strong and significant correlation between mass and elite measures; it seems that public and elite judgments largely coincide, suggesting the existence of shared norms. The indices and datasets which have been developed independently differ in their design, conceptualization and measurement, but nevertheless the results appear to be

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relatively robust. The conclusion summarizes the main findings and considers their implications for the futureresearchagenda.

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Figure1:Cyclicalstagesofelectoralintegrityandmalpractices

Stagesof electoralintegrity andmalpractices

Preelection

Campaign

Pollingday

Afterelection

Electorallaws

Politicalfinance regulations

Pollingfacilities

Dispute resolution mechanisms

Voter,partyand candidate registration

Campaign communications regulations

Ballotcount

RoleofEMB

Boundary delimitation

Voredeclaration

25

Figure2:Subfieldsinthestudyofelectoralintegrity

Publicsector management

Comparative institutions

Peaceand conflict studies

Political culture

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Young, J.H. Ed. 2009. International Election Principles: Democracy and the Rule of Law. Chicago: AmericanBarAssociation. 1 http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm
2

http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV4&chapter=4&lang=en http://www.cartercenter.org/dessearch/des/Introduction.aspx http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/ http://www.oas.org/es/sap/docs/deco/Financiamiento_partidos_s.pdf http://www.oas.org/es/sap/docs/deco/ManualMetodologia_WEB2.pdf For example, Elections Canada reported receiving tens of thousands of complaints concern fraudulent

phone calls made during the campaign for the May 2011 federal election, where voters were directed away from their correct polling station. Reuters. Canada agency swamped with 2011 election complaints 2 March 2012. For the UK, see the House of Commons Library. Postal voting and electoral fraud200109SN/PC/366714March2012.
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http://aceproject.org/eroen/topics/electoralmanagement/electoral%20cycle.JPG/view http://www.truethevote.org/

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