Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
b. Court with jurisdiction over the party-defendant Ynot vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 659 (1987)
depletion. We do not see, however, how the prohibition of enforcement of the LOI to them would deprive them of
the interprovincial transport of carabaos can prevent their prop. They, therefore, have standing to challenge the
indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed validity of the LOI.
any where, w/ no less difficulty in on province than in (2) But the LOI cannot be declared void on its face.
another. Obviously, retaining the carabao in one province It has behind it the presumption of validity. The necessity
will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving for evidence to rebut such presumption is unavoidable. As
them to another province will make it easier to kill them underlying the questions of fact may condition the
there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply constitutionality of legislation the presumption of validity
to it as otherwise, so says the EO, it could be easily must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of
circumsbcribed by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. record overthrowing the statute. The LOI is an energy
However, if the movement of the live animals for the conservation measure; it is an apporpriate response to a
purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it problem.
should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their (3) Nor does the LOI deny equal protection to the
transfer as, not to be flippant, dead meat. petitioners. W/in the class to w/c the petitioner belongs the
(3) In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily LOI operate equally and uniformly. That the LOI does not
confiscated by the police station commander, were returned include others does not render it invalid. The govt is not
to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for required to adhere to a policy of "all or none."
recovery and given a supersedeas bond w/c was ordered (4) To the extent that the Land Transpo. Code does
confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when not authorize the impounding of vehicles as a penalty, to that
ordered by the trial court. The EO defined the prohibition, extent the memo. of the resps. would be ultra vires. VV.
convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed
punishment, w/c was carried out forthright. The measures
struck him at once and pounced upon the petitioner w/o
giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him Velasco v. Villegas, 120 SCRA (1983)
elementary fair play.
(4) It is there authorized that the seized prop. shall Ordinance Prohibiting Barbershops from Rendering
"be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar Massage Services Valid.
institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection
Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to F: The ordinance was enacted for a two-fold purpose:
deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of (1) To enable the City of Mla. to collect a fee for operating
Animal Industry may see fit in the case of carabaos." The massage clinics separately from those operating barber ships
phrase may see fit is an extremely generous and dangerous and (2) To prevent immorality w/c might probably arise
condition, if condition it is. It is laden w/ perilous from the construction of separate rooms.
opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption.
One searches in vain for the usual standard and the HELD: The SC has been most liberal in sustaining
reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the ordinances based on general welfare clause. VV.
said officers must observe when they make their
distribution. VV. Cruz v. Paras, 123 SCRA 569 (1983)
thereof." Moreover, the recentyly-enacted LGC (BP 337) exercise of the police power and likewise eminent domain.
speaks simply of the power to regulate the establishment, VV.
and operation of billiard pools, theatrical performances,
circuses and other forms of entertainment. Certiorari Sumulong v. Guerrero 154 SCRA 461 (1987)
granted. VV.
F: On December 5, 1977, the National Housing
Authority filed a complaint for the expropriation of 25
C. Due Process and Eminent Domain hectares of land in Antipolo, Rizal pursuant to PD 1224
authorizing the expropriation of private lands for socialized
The taking by the State of private property in an housing. Among those lands sought to be expropriated are
expropriation proceeding must be: (1) for public use, (2) the petitioners' lands. They brought this suit in the SC
with just compensation, and (3) upon observance of due challenging the constitutionality of PD 1224.
process.
HELD: Petitioners contend that socialized housing for the
Article III, Sec. 9. Private property shall not be purpose of condemnation proceedings is not public use since
take for public use without just compensation. it will benefit only a handful of people. The "public use"
requirement is an evolving concept influences by changing
Article XII, Sec. 18. The State may, in the interest conditions. Urban renewal or redevelopment and the
of national welfare or defense, establish and operate vital construction of low-cost housing is recognized as a public
industries and, upon payment of just compensation, purpose, not only because of the expanded concept of public
transfer to public ownership utilities and other private use but also because of specific provisions in the
enterprises to be operated by the government. Constitution. Shortage in housing is a matter of state
concern since it directly and significantly affects public
health, safety, the environment and, in sum, the general
1. Taking either for public use or public welfare. Petitioners claim that there are vast areas of lands in
purpose. Rizal hundreds of hectares of which are owned by a few
landowners only. Why should the NHA pick their small lots?
Public Use Expropriation is not confined to landed estates. The test to
be applied for a valid expropriation of private lands was the
Public use is equivalent to public purpose. It is not area of the land and not the number of people who stood to
confined merely to use by the public at large (e.g. roads). It be benefitted. The State acting through the NHA is vested
is enough that it serves a public purpose, even if it benefit a with broad discretion to designate the property. The property
large group of people short of the public in general (e.g. owner may not interpose objections merely because in their
expropriating property for the relocation of squatters). judgment some other property would have been more
suitable. The provisions on just compensation found in PD
Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes 123 SCRA 220 1224, 1259, and 1313 are the same provisions which were
declared unconstitutional in EPZA v. Dulay (1987) for being
F: The Philippine Tourism Authority sought the encroachments on judicial prerogatives. VV.
expropriation of 282 Ha of land in Barangay Malubog and
Babag in Cebu City. upon deposit of an amount equivalent
to 10% of the value of the property, the CFI authorized the 2. Just compensation must be judicially
PTA to take immediate possession of the property. The determined
charter of the PTA authorizes it to acquire through
condemnation proceedings lands for tourist zone Just Compensation
development of a sports complex. The petitioners who are
occupants of the lands, filed a petition for certiorari in the Just compensation is the fair and reasonable
SC. They contended that (1) the taking was not for public equivalent of the loss sustained by the owner of the property
use; (2) the land was covered by the land reform program; due to the taking; it is the fair market value of the property
and (3) expropriation would impair the obligation of measured at the time of the taking, no matter how long ago
contracts. it was taken (e.g. the time of the taking was in the 1920's,
the time of payment was in the 1960's, in the Ministerio and
HELD: The concept of public use is not limited to Amigable cases, supra), and using the conversion rates at
traditional purposes for the construction of roads, bridges, the time of taking (because according to those cases, Art.
and the like. The idea that "public use" means "use by the 1250 of the Civil Code applied only to contractual
public" has been discarded. As long as the purpose of the obligations).
taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes
into play. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever
may be beneficially employed for the general welfare EPZA v. Dulay 149 SCRA 305 (1987)
satisfies the requirement of public use. The petititioners
have not shown that the area being developed is land reform F: The San Antonio Development Corporation was the
area and that the affected persons have been given owner of a piece of land in Lapu-Lapu City which the EPZA
emancipation patents and certificates of land transfer. The expropriated in 1979. The commissioners appointed by the
contract clause has never been regarded as a barrier to the trial court recommended that the San Antonio Development
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZP G & ASSOCIATES
Corp. be paid P15.00 per square meter. EPZA filed a petition taken adn how much may be condemned thereof must be
for certiorari, arguing that under PD 1533 the compensation duly recognized, leaving only as a judicial question whether
should be the fair and current market value declared by the in the exercise of such competence, the party adversely
owner or the market value determined by the assessor, affected is the victim of partiality and prejudice. The SC
whichever is lower. now rules that such singling out of properties does not
foreclose judicial scrutiny as to whether such expropriation
HELD: The method of ascertaining just compensation by legislative act transgresses the due process and equal
under PD 1533 constitutes impermissible encroachment on protection and just compensation guarantees of the
judicial prerogatives. Although the court technically would Constitution. VV.
still have the power to determine the just compensation for
the property, following the decree, its task would be
relegated to simply stating the lower value of the property as
declared either by the owner or the assessor. Just 3. Due process must be observed
compensation means the value of the property at the time of
the taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss De Knecht v. Bautista 100 SCRA 660 (1980)
sustained. All the facts as to the condition of the property
and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities F: The plan to extend EDSA to Roxas Boulevard to be
should be considered. In this case, the tax declarations used ultimately linked to the Cavite Coastal Road Project,
as basis for the just compensation were made long before originally called for the expropriation of properties along
the declaration of martial law when the land was much Cuneta Avenue in Pasay City. Later on, however, the
cheaper. To peg the value of the lots on the basis of those Ministry of Public Highways decided to make the proposed
documents which are outdated would be arbitrary and extension pass through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets.
confiscatory. VV. Because of the protests of residents of the latter, the
Commission on Human Settlements recommended the
reversion to the original plan, but the Ministry argued the
Manotok v. NHA 150 SCRA 89 (1987) new route withh save the government P2 million. The
government filed expropriation proceedings against the
F: Petitioners are the owners of two large estates owners of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets, among whom
known as the Tambunting Estate and Sunog-Apog in Tondo, was petitioner.
Manila, both of which were declared expropriated in two
decrees issued by President Marcos, PD 1669 and PD 1670. HELD: The choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets is
The petitioners contend that the decrees violate their arbitrayr and should not receive judicial aprpoval. The
constitutional right to due process and equal protection since Human Settlements Commission concluded that the cost
by their mere passage their properties were automatically factor is so minimal that it can be disregarded in making a
expropriated and they were immediately deprived of the choice between the two lines. The factor of functionality
ownership and possession thereof without being given the strongly militates against the choice of Fernando Rein and
chance to oppose such expropriation. The government on Del Pan streets, while the factor of social and economic
the other hand contends that the power of eminent domain is impact bears grievously on the residents of Cuneta Avenue.
inherent in the State and when the legislature or the While the issue would seem to boil down to a choice
President through his law-making powers exercises this between people, on one hand, and progress and
power, the public use and public necessity of the development, on the other, it is to be remembered that
expropriation and the fixing of the just compensation progress and development are carried out for the benefit of
become political in nature and the courts must respect the the people. VV.
decision.
ground that the Legislature has since enacted BP 340 assessment, than the money equivalent of said property. Just
expropriating the same properties for the same purpose. The equiivalent has always been understood to be the just and
lower court denied tthe motion. Appeal. complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing
expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation.
RULING: While it is true that said final judgment of this The price or value of the land and its character at the time of
Curt on the subject becomes the law of the case between the taking by the Govt. are the criteria for determining just
parties, it is equally true that the right of petitioner to take cmpensation. Charo.
private properties for public use upon payment of just
compensation is so provided in the Constitution and the
laws. Such expropriation proceeding may be undertaken by D. Equal Protection
the petitioner not only by voluntary negotiation with the
land owners but also by taking appropriate court action or Art. III, Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of
by legislation. life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor
When BP 340 was passed, it appears that it was shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
based on supervening events that occured after the 1980 laws.
decision of the SC on the De Knecht case was rendered. The
social impact factor which persuaded the Court to consider Art. XIII, Sec. 1. The Congress shall give highest
this extension to be arbitrary had disappeared. priority to the enactment of measure that protect and
Moreover, the said decision is no obstacle to the enhance the right of all the people to human dignity,
legislative arm of the Government in thereafter making its reduce social, economic, and political inequalities and
own independent assessment of the circumstances then remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth
pravailing as to the propriety of undertaking the and political power for the common good.
expropriation of properties in question and thereafter by To this end, the State shall regulate the
enacting the corresponding legislation as it did in this case. acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition of property
The Court agrees in the wisdom and necessity of enacting and its increments.
BP 340. Thus the anterior decision of the Court must yield
to the subsequent legislative fiat. Charo.
1. Economic equality
F: For the construction of its 230 KV Mexico-Limay Art. XIII, Sec. 3. The State shall afford full
transmission lines, Napocor's lines have to pass the lands protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
belonging to respondents. Unsuccessful with its negotiations unorganized, and promote full employment and equality
for the acquisition of the right of way easements, Napocor of employment opportunities for all.
was constrained to file eminent domain proceedings. It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-
organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and
ISSUE: W/N petitoner should be made to pay simple peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike
easement fee or full compensation for the land traversed by in accordance with law. They shall be entitle to security
its transmissin lines. of tenure, humane conditions of work, and living wage.
They shall also participate in policy and decision-making
RULING: In RP v. PLDT, the SC ruled that "Normally, the process affecting the rights and benefits as may be
power of eminent domain results in the taking or provided by law.
appropriation of the title to, and possession of, the The State shall promote the principle of shared
expropriated property, but no cogent reason appears why responsibility between workers and employers and the
said power may not be availed of to impose only a burrden preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes
upon the owner of the condemned property, without loss of including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual
title or possession. It is unquestionable that real property compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.
may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of The State shall regulate the relations between
right of way." In this case, the easement is definitely a workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor to
taking under the power of eminent domain. Considering the its just share in the fruits of production and the right of
nature and effect of the installation of the transmission lines, enterprises to reasonable returns on investments, and to
the limitations imposed by the NPC against the use of the expansion and growth.
land (that no plant higher than 3 meters is allowed below the
lines) for an indefinite period deprives private respondents
of ts ordinary use. Art. XII, Sec. 10. The Congress shall, upon
For these reasons, the owner of the property recommendation of the economic and planning agency,
expropriated is entitled to a just compensation which should when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of
neither be more nor less, whenever it is possible to make the the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZP G & ASSOCIATES
sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such In Villegas v. Hiu Chiong Isai Po Ho, 86 SCRA 270
citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may (1978), the SC invalidated a city ordinance imposing a P500
prescribe, certain areas of investments. The Congress permit fee for aliens who wish to engage in the pursuit of an
shall enact measures that will encourage the formation occupation. The SC noted that this violated the uniformity
and operation enterprises whose capital is wholly owned of taxation, and deprived aliens of the right to earn a
by Filipinos. common livelihood.
In the grant of rights, privileges and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony, the State Villegas v. Hiu Chiung Tsai Pao Ho 86 SCRA 270 (1978)
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
The State shall regulate and exercise authority F: An ordinance of the City of Manila prohibited the
over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction employment of aliens in any occupation or business unless
and in accordance with its national goals and priorities. they first secured a permit from the Mayor of Manila and
paid a fee of P500. Respondent, an alien, employed in
Id., Sec. 2. xxx Manila, brought suit and obtained judgment from the CFI
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth declaring the ordinance null and void.
in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive
economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment HELD: The ordinance is a tax measure. In imposing a flat
exclusively to Filipino citizens. rate of P500, it failed to consider substantial differences in
situations among aliens and for that reason violates the rule
Art. III, Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and on uniformity of taxation. It also lays down no guide for
quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall granting/denying the permit and therefore permits the
not be denied to any person by reason of poverty. arbitrary exercise of discretion by the Mayor. Finally, the
ordinance denies aliens due process and the equal protection
Art. VIII, Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have of the laws. VV.
the following powers:
xxx In Vera v. Cuevas, 90 SCRA 379 (1979), Sec. 169 of
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection the NIRC requiring manufacturers of skimmed milk (non-
and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, fat) to put on its label the warning that the milk is harmful
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to for infants, was struck down as unconstitutional on the
the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal ground that it did not require the same labeling in the case of
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall filled milk (coco-fat added)
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all At that time of the decision thought, the law was
courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, already inoperative.
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rights of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies Vera v. Cuevas 90 SCRA 379 (1979)
shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court. F: Respondents are engaged in the manufacture and
sale of filled milk products. They brought an action in the
CFI for a declaration of their rights in respect of section 169
There are areas of economic activity which can be of the Tax Code. This provision required that "all condensed
limited to Filipinos. The Constitution itself acknowledges skimmed milk in whatever form, from which the fatty part
this in various places - exploitation of marine wealth (Art. has been removed totally or in part or put on sale in the
XII, Sec. 2 par. 2), certain areas of investment (Art. XII, Philippines shall be clearly and legibly marked on its
Sec. 10), to name a few. immediate containers with the words: This milk is not
suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of
In Ichong v. Hernandez, 201 Phil. 1155 (1937), the age.
SC upheld the validity of the law which nationalized the
retail trade. For the protection of the law can be observed HELD: Sec. 169 of the Tax Code has been repealed by RA
by the national interest. 344. At any rate, Sec. 169 applied only to skimmed milk and
not to filled milk. Sec. 169 is being enforced only against
respondent manufacturers of filled milk but not against
manufacturers of skimmed milk, thus denying them the
equal protection of the laws. VV.
Art. IX, C, Sec. 10. Bona fide candidates to public Art. XIII, Sec. 1. The Congress shall give highest
office shall be free from any form of harassment and priority to the enactment of measure that protect and
discrimination. enhance the right of all the people to human dignity,
reduce social, economic, and political inequalities and
remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth
In Dumlao v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980), the SC and political power for the common good.
upheld the validity of sec. 4 of Batas Blg. 52 disqualifying To this end, the State shall regulate the
retired elective local officials who have received retirement acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition of property
benefits and would have been 65 years old at the start of the and its increments.
term. It does not violate equal protection, for it gives .
younger blood the opportunity to run the local government.
In Igot v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980), however, 1. Requirements for Search Warrants
the disqualification of candidates convicted or simply
charged with national security offenses was struck down as
unconstitutional, for violating the presumption of innocence Yee Sue Kuy v. Almeda, 70 Phil. 141 (1940)
and thus ultimately the equal political protection.
F: By virtue of the sworn application of Almeda, the
Igot c. Comelec 95 SCRA 392 (1980) Chief agent of the Anti-Usury Board, a SW was issued to
search the store and premises of the petitioner, accused of
F: Romeo Igot, as taxpayer, voter and member of the violating the Anti-Usury Law. Receipt books, PNs and other
bar, and Alfredo Salapantan Jr., as taxpayer and voter, sued articles were seized and retained in the possession of the
for prohibition to enjoin enforcement of BP 52, sec. 4 of Anti-Usury Board.
which provides for the disqualification as candidate of any
person convicted of subversion, insurrection or rebellion or ISSUE: W/n the requirements for the issuance of valid SW
similar offenses. were complied with.
HELD: Neither petitioner has been convicted nor charged RULING: YES. The applicant, Almeda, in his application,
with acts of disloyalty nor disqualified from being swore that "he made his own personal investigation and
candidates for local elective positions. They have no ascertained that petitioner is lending money without a
personal or substantial interest at stake and therefore no license, charging usurious rates." The witness he presentted
locus standi. Neither can they sue as taxpayers because the testified before the judge and swore that he knew that YEE
statute does not involve disbursement of public funds. VV. was lending without a license because he personally
investigated the victims who secured loans from the
petitioner. Their affidavits were sufficient for, thereunder,
3. Social equality they could be held liable for perjury. The existence of
probable cause has been determined by the justice of the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZP G & ASSOCIATES
HELD: The statements made in the affidavits are mere Moreover, the judge did not examine Angeles in the
conclusions of law and do not satisfy the requirement of form of searching questions and answers. What appears on
probable cause. The language used is all embracing as to the record are leading questions answereable by yes or no.
include all conceivable words and equipment of petitioner
regardless of whether they are legal or illegal. The search (2) As to the claim that the SW failed to particularly
warrant under consideration was in the nature of a general describe the place to be searched, the SC ruled that the
warrant which is objectionable. VV. description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the
officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort,
ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched.
Bache & Co. (Phil.) v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 (1971) Here, the SW described the place as PUP, with its address
and specifically mentioned the offices of the "Dept. of
F: The Com. of Internal Revenue through Rev. Military Science and Tactics on the ground floor and the
Examiner de Leon filed an application for a SW against Office of the President at the 2nd floor and the other rooms
Bache & Co. and its pres., Seggerman for violation of the in that floor." This is deemed sufficient.
provisons of the NIRC. As Judge Ruiz was then conducting
a hearing, the deposition of de Leon and his witness, (3) There was also an issue as to w/n the SW was
Logronio, was taken by the Dep. Clerk of Court. The issued for one specific offense. The warrrant was issued for
deposition was later read to the judge who asked the witness violation of PD 1866 which punishes several offenses.
to take an oath as to the truth of his statements. The judge While there was failure to state the particular provision of
then signed the SW and accordingly issued the same. the law violated, the warrant itself qualified the description
of the offense as "illegal possession of firearms, etc." This
ISSUE: W/n the requirements for the issuance of valid SW suffices to cure the defect.
were complied with. The fact that the word "etc." was added to refer to
ammunitions and explosives did not violate the rule on
RULING: NO. The judge did not personally examine the single offense, for notwithstanding that possession of
complainant and his witnesses. The judge did not have the firearms, explosives and ammunitions are punished in
opportunity to observe tthe demeanor of the deponents and different sections of the PD, they are treated as belonging to
to propound initial and follow-up questions which his a single specie. An exception to the rule that a warant shall
judicial mind, on account of his training, was in the best be issued for a single offense is when existing laws
position to conceive. This is important in arriving at a sound prescribe a single punishment for various offenses. Charo.
inference on the all-importatnt question of w/n there was
probable cause. Charo.
Olaes v. People, 155 SCRA 486 (1987)
Prudente v. Dayrit, 180 SCRA 69 (1990) F: Petitioners claim that the SW issued by resp. judge
was invalid. They also question the extrajudicial confession
F: Judge Dayrit, upon applicatin of P/Maj. taken from them without according them the right to
Dimagmaliw, supported by a "Deposition of Witness," assistance of a counsel. The articles seized by virtue of the
executed by P/Lt. Angeles, issued a search warrant for the SW consisting of dried marijuana were admitted as evidence
search and seizure of arms, ammunitions and explosives in for violation of RA 6425 or Dangerous Drugs Act.
the premises of the PUP which were supposed to be in
possession of Dr. Prudente. In enforcing the warrant, 3 RULING: While it is true that the caption of the SW states
fragmentation grenades were found in the bathroom of the that it is in connection with "the violation of RA 6425," it is
office of Dr. Prudente. clearly recited in the text thereof that "there is probable
cause to believe that Olaes of Olongapo City has in his
ISSUE: W/n the searrch warrant was valid. possession and control, marijuana dried stalks which are
suject of the offense stated above." Although the specific
RULING: NO. section of the law is not stated, there is no question at all
(1) The warant was not issued on the basis of that the specific offense alleged to have been committed as
personal knowledge of the applicant and his witness. The basis for determining probable cause is alleged.
probable cause required under the Constitution for the Furthermore, the SW specifically described the place to be
issuance of a search warrant must be in connection with one searched and the things to be seized.
specific offense, and the judge must, before issuing the
warrant, personally examine in the form of searching As to the extrajudicial confessions of the accused,
questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the the same are deemed inadmissible against them. In People
complainant and any witnesses he may produce, on facts V. Galit, the Court declared that: " At the time the person is
personally known to them and attach to the record their arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform
sworn statements together with any affidavit submitted. him of the reason for the arrrest and he must be shown the
However, in the case at bar, Dimagmaliw merely stated in warrant of arrest, if any; he shall be informed of his
his application that his knowledge was based "on gathered constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that
infrmation from verified sources." The same holds true for any statement he might make could be used against him.
the affidavit of Angeles. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate
with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZP G & ASSOCIATES
expedient means - by telephone if possible - or by letter or F: Pursuant to the powers vested by PD 1920 and EO
messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting 1022, POEA Administrator Achacoso ordered the closure of
officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial the recruitment agency of Horty Salazar, having verified that
investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence she had no license to operate a recruitment agency. He
of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on further ordered the seizure of the documents and
his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of paraphernalias, being used or intended to be used as the
the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to means of commiting illegal recruitment. This order was
counsel may be waived but the wiaver shall not be valid enforced on 26 January 1988. Petitioner filed this suit for
unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement prohibition.
obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall Issue: May the POEA (or the Sec. of Labor) validly issue
be inadmissible in evidence." warrants of serach and seizure (or arrest ) under Art. 38 of
the Labor Code?
These requirements were even made stricter under
the 1987 Constitution which provides that the rights of a HELD: NO.
person under custodial investigation cannot be waived The provisions of PD 1920 and EO 1022, now
except when made in writing and in the presence of embodied in Art. 38 of the Labor Code, are the dying
counsel. Charo. vestiges of authoritarian rule in its twilights moments.
Under Art. III, Sec 2 of the 1987 Constitution, it is only
judges and no other, who may issue warrants of arrest and
Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force v. CA, 171 search. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal
SCRA 348 (1989) and undesirable aliens, whom the President of the
Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following
F: The PASTF was created by virtue of PD 1936 to a final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation.
serve as the President's arm called upon to combat the vice The Sec. of Labor , not being a judge. may no longer issue
of dollar salting or the blackmarketing and salting of foreign search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go
exchange. through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Art.
38, par. C of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no
ISSUE: W/N the PASTF is "such other officer as may be force and effect.
authorized by law" to issue warrants under the 1973
Constitition.
a. Existence of probable cause.
RULING: NO. The Court, in reviewing the powers of the
PASTF under its enabling law, sees nothing that will reveal Probable cause is such facts and circumstances as
a legislative intendement to confer upon the body, quasi- would reasonably make a prudent man believe that a crime
judicial responsiibilities relative to offenses punishable by have been committed and that the documents or things
PD 1883. Its undertaking is simply to determine w/n sought to be searched and seized are in the possession of the
probable cause exists to warrant the filing of charges with person against whom the warrant is sought. Without
the proper court, meaning to say, to conduct an inquiry probable cause, there can be no valid search warrant.
preliminary to a judicial recourse, and to recommend action
of appropriate authorities. In Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 385
The Court agrees that PASTF exercises, or was (1967), 42 search warrants were issued for alleged violation
meant to exercise, prosecutorial powers, and on that ground, of Central Bank Laws, the Tariff and Customs Code, the
it cannot be said to be a neutral and detached judge to NIRC, and the Revised Penal Code. The SC voided the
determine the existence of probable cause for purposes of warrants on the ground that it was impossible for the judge
arrest or search. Unlike a magistrate, a prosecutor is to have found probable cause in view of the number of laws
naturally interested in the success of his case. Although his alleged to have been violated by the petitioner. How could
office "is to see to it that justice if done and not necessarily he even know what particular provision of each law had
to secure the conviction of the accused," he stands been violated? If he did not know this, how could it be
invariably, as the accused's adversary and his accuser. To determined if the person against whom the warrant was
permit him to issue warrrants and indeed, warrants of arrest, issued was probably guilty thereof? In truth, this was a
is to make him both judge and jury in his own right, when fishing expedition, which violated the sanctity of domicile
he is neither. This makes to our mind and to that extent, PD and privacy of communications. To establish the require-
1636 as amended by PD 2002, unconstitutional. ment of probable cause, the rule is: One crime, one warrant.
The "responsible officer" referred to under the
Cosntitution is one not only possessing the necessary skills b. As determined by a judge
and competence but more significantly, the neutrality and
independence comparable to the impartiality presumed of a Under the 1987 Constitution, only a judge can issue
judicial officer. a warrant; the offensive and much abused phrase "and other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law" in the 1973
Constitution has been removed
Salazar v. Achacoso, 183 SCRA 145
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZP G & ASSOCIATES
c. After personally examining under oath or affirmation invalidated for the description was not at all particular or
the complainant and his witness. specific, thus making the warrants general warrants.
The examination conducted by the judge takes the When it comes to printed matters, the offensive
form of searching questions. material need not be set out in full. It is enough if it
specifies the issues and the title of the articles. The
The requirement that the judge must personally instruction to seize "subversive materials" is not valid
examine the complainant and his witnesses means that the because the determination of whether a material is
actual examination cannot be delegated to someone else, subversive or not is not for the police officer to decide; no
like the clerk of court. unfettered discretion must be granted to him.
So said the Court in Bache and Co. (Phil) v. Ruiz, 37 The matter is different if goods were searched and
SCRA 823 (1971). In this case, when the BIR agent and his seized because of their intrinsic quality (as when they are
witnesses arrived in court in the middle of a hearing, the stolen or smuggled), than if the goods were searched for the
judge suspended the hearing and directed the branch clerk to ideas they contain (as when a "subversive newspaper is
examine and take the testimony of the witnesses in his sought). In the latter case, a more detailed description of the
chambers. After he was through with the hearing, he went physical features of the item is required to avoid delegating
back to his chambers and finding that the examination was the appreciation of ideas, and thus threaten free expression.
finished, asked the BIR agent and his witnesses if they
affirmed what they what they testified to, after which he 2. When Search May Be Made without a Warrant
issued the search warrant in question.
(a) When search is made of moving vehicles
d. On the basis of their personal knowledge of the facts
that they are testifying to. The reason is the person may escape easily if a
warrant has to be applied for the mean time. In the Tariff
The determination of the reasonableness of the and Customs Code, customs agents are specifically
judicial warrant must be based on the affidavit of one who authorized to search and seize vehicles even without a
has personal knowledge of the facts to which he testifies. warrant.
The testimony cannot be based on mere belief. Neither can
it be based on a report. Otherwise, the warrant is void. Checkpoints are valid in some instances depending
on the purpose (e.g. apprehend a suspected criminal) and the
Thus, in Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800 circumstances (e.g. probable cause that the criminal is inside
(1984), reiterating the 1937 case of Rodriguez v. Villamiel, the car). There is no question that when a child has been
the testimony based on a military report that the newspaper reported kidnapped in a community, the police can stop all
We Forum was used for subversive were held to be not a cars and check if the detained child is in any one of them.
personal knowledge and so was inadmissible.
(b) When search is an an incident to a valid arrest.
Likewise, in Corro v. Lising, 137 SCRA 541 (1985),
the testimony based on investigation reports that certain Rule 126, Sec. 12. Search incident to lawful
items in the Philippine Times were subversive were held to arrest.-- A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
be not personal knowledge, and thus the search warrant dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as
issued was not valid. proof of the commission of an offense, without a search
warrant. (Rules of Court.)
e. The search warrant must describe particularly
describe the place to be searched and the things to be A person arrested may be searched for dangerous
seized. weapons or anything that proves the commission of the
offense. It follows that the search can only be made within
Failure to state with particularity the place to be the area of control of the arrested person, and within the
searched and items to be seized makes the warrant used for time of the arrest.
fishing evidence (a general warrant) which is void.
In Nolasco v. Cruz Pano, 139 SCRA 152 (1985);
In Burgos v. Chief of Staff, the description which Milagros Roque and Cynthia Nolasco were arrested at the
read "subversive documents, leaflets, papers to promote the intersection of Mayon and Margal Streets in QC at 11:30
objective of the Movement for a Free Philippines, the Light a.m., having been wanted as high officers of the CPP. At
a Fire Movement, and the April 6 Movement" were held not 12:00 noon, Roque's apartment located 2 blocks away, was
to be particular descriptions, thus making the warrant a searched and some documents seized. The SC at first held
general warrant. that the search was valid even if the warrant issued was void
for failing to describe with particularity the things to be
In Corro v. Lising, the search and seizure of "printed seized, because it was an incident of a valid arrest.
copies and dummies of Philippine Times, subversive
documents, articles, printed matters, handbills, leaflets, But after the EDSA revolution, the reconstituted SC
banners, and typewriters, tape recorders, etc." was again granted the motion for reconsideration and held that just
because there was a valid arrest did not mean that the search
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZP G & ASSOCIATES
was likewise valid. To be valid, the search must be revolver & 18 live bullets w/c they confiscated. They are
"incidental" to the arrest, that is, not separated by time or now the bases of the charge against the petitioner.
place from the arrest. If the basis for allowing incidental
searches is looked into, one can see that this situation is not RULING: Search warrant issued by resp. judge is hereby
one involving a valid incidental search. declared null and void and accordingly set aside.
The law allows the arresting officer to search a The petitioner claims that no depositions were taken
person validly arrested (by frisking him for instance) by the resp. judge in accordance w/ Rule 126, Sec. 4 of the
because (a) a weapon held by the arrested person may be ROC, but this is not entirely true. Depositions were taken of
turned against his captor and (b) he may destroy the proof of the complainant's 2 witnesses in addition to the affidavit
the crime, if the arrested officer has to first apply for a executed by them. It is correct to say, however, that the
search warrant from a judge. complainant himself was not subjected to a similar
interrogation.
If, in the Nolasco case, the search was conducted 30 By his own accounts, all that resp. judge did was
minutes after the arrest, there is no longer any danger that question Capt. Quillosa on the contents of his affidavit only
the captured may turn against the captor; and if the "to ascertain among others, if he knew and understood the
documents in the apartment were 2 blocks away, the search same," and only bec. "the application was not yet subscribed
would no longer be justified since there is no way for Roque and sworn to." The suggestion is that he would not have
to go back to the apartment and destroy the documents, asked any questions at all if the affidavit had already been
having been arrested already. completed when it was submitted to him. In any case, he
did not ask his own searching questions. He limited himself
to the contents of the affidavit. He did not take the
Nolasco v. Cruz Paño 139 SCRA 152 (1985) applicant's deposition in writing and attach them to the
record, together w/ the affidavit presented to him. Such
F: Milagros Aguilar-Roque was arrested together with written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may
Cynthia Nolasco by the Constabulary Security Group. be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence
Milagrso had been wanted as a high ranking officer of the of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person
CPP. The arrest took place at 11:30 a.m. of August 6, 1984. giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are
At noon of the same day, her premises were searched and false. (Mata v. Bayona.)
428 documents, a portable typewriter and 2 boxes were The applicant was asking for the issuance of the SW
seized. Earlier that day, Judge Cruz Paño issued a search on the basis of mere hearsay and not of info. personally
warrant for rebellion against Milagros. On the basis of the known to him. His application, standing alone, was
documents seized, charges of subversion and rebellion were insufficient to justify the issuance of the warrant sought. It
filed but the fiscal's office merely charged her and Nolasco was, therefore, necessary for the witnesses themselves, by
with illegal possession of subversive materials. Milagros their own personal info., to establish the applicant's claims.
asked for suppression of the evidence on the ground that it Even assuming then that it would have suffied to
was illegally obtained. The search warrant described the take the deposition only of the witnesses and not of the
things to be seized as "Documents, papers and other records applicant himself, there is still the question of the
of the CPP, NPA and NDF, xxx". sufficiency of their depositions.
A study of the deposition taken from witnesess
HELD: The search warrant is void because it fails to Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida, who both claimed to be
describe with particularity the things to be seized. It does not "intelligence informers," shows that they were in the main a
specify what the subversive books and instructions are and mere restatement of their allegations in their affidavits,
what the manuals not otherwise available to the public except that they were made in the form of answers to the
contain to make them subversive. There is absent a definite questions put to them by the resp. judge.
guideline as to what items might lawfully be seized, thus One may well wonder why it did not occur to the
giving the officers discretion regarding what articles they resp. judge to ask how the witness could be so certain even
should seize. It is thus in the nature of a general warrant. But as to the caliber of the guns, or how far he was from the
the seizure of the articles could be justified as an incident of window, or whether it was on the first floor or second floor,
a valid arrest. It is a general rule that, as an incident of an or why his presence was not noticed at all, or if the acts
arrest, the place of premises where the arrest was made can related were really done openly, in the full view of the
also be searched without a search warrant. witnesses, considering that these acts were against the law.
These would have been judicious questions but they were
(c) When things seized are within plain view of a injudiciously omitted. Instead, the declaration of the
searching party witnesses were readily accepted and the warrant sought was
issued forthwith.
Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 (1986)
SOL-GEN ARGUES THAT THE PETITIONER WAIVED
F: The challenged SW was issued by the resp. judge on WHATEVER DEFECT WHEN THE PETITIONER
5/10/84. The petitioner's house was searched 2 days later VOLUNTARILY SUBMITTED TO THE SEARCH AND
but none of the articles listed in the warrant was discovered. MANIFESTED HIS CONFORMITY IN WRITING.
The officers conducting the search found 1 colt Magnum
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZP G & ASSOCIATES
We do not agree. What we see here is pressure (d) Stop and Frisk
exerted by the military authorities, who practically coerced
the petitioner to sign the supposed waiver as guaranty Posadas v. CA, 188 SCRA 288 (1990)
against a possible challenge later to the validity of the search
they were conducting. F: Patrolmans Ungab and Umpar, both members of the
INP of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned w/ the Intelligence
Malum Prohibitum.-- It does not follow that bec. an Task Force, were conducting a surveillance along
offense is malum prohibitum, the subject thereof is Magallanes, St., Davao City. While they were w/in the
necessarily illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala premises of the Rizal Memorial Colleges, they spotted
prohibita, but the subjects of this kind of offense may not be petitioner carrying a "buri" bag & they noticed him to be
summarily seized simply bec. they are prohibited. A SW is acting suspiciously. They approached the petitioner and
still necessary. identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner
attempted to flee but was stopped by the 2. They then
Motion to Quash.-- Petitioner should have, before checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found 1
coming to the SC, filed a motion to quash the search warrant caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver, w/ 2 rounds of live
by the resp. judge. But as we said and did in Burgos, "this ammunition for a .38 cal. gun, a smoke grenade, & 2 live
procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this ammunition for a .22 cal. gun. Petitioner was brought to the
petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the police station for further investigation. He was prosecuted
consitutional issues raised." RAM. for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the
RTC of Davao City wherein after a plea of not guilty, and
trial on the merits, a decision was rendered finding
Pita v. CA, 178 SCRA 362 (1989) petitioner guilty. The CA affirmed the appealed decision in
toto.
F: Pursuant to the Anti-Smut Campaign of Mayor Hence, the petition for review, the main thrust of
Ramon Bagatsng, policemen seized and confiscated from w/c is that there being no lawful arrest or search and seizure,
dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers along the items w/c were confiscated from the possession of the
Manila sidewalks, magazines, publications and other petitioner are inadmissible in evidence against him.
reading materials believed to be obscene, pornographic, and The Sol-Gen argues that under Sec. 12, R 136 of
indecent and later burned the seized materials in public. ROC, a person lawfully arrested may be searched for
Among the publications seized and later burned was "Pinoy dangerous weapons or anything (w/c may be) used as proof
Playboy" magazines published and co-edited by plaintiff of a commission of an offense, w/o a SW.
Leo Pita. After his injunctive relief was dismissed by the
RTC and his appeal rejected by CA, he seeks review with HELD: From Sec. 5, R 113, ROC, it is clear that an arrest
SC, invoking the guaranty against unreasonable searches w/o a warrant may be effected by a peace officer or private
and seizure. person, among others, when in his presence the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
Issue: W/N the search and seizure was illegal attempting to commit an offense, or when an offense has in
fact, just been committed, & he has personal knowledge of
HELD: YES. the facts indicating that the person arrested has committed it.
It is basic that searches and seizure may be done At the time the peace officers identified themselves
only through a judicial warrant , otherwise, they become and apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to flee, they
unreasonable and subject to challenge. In Burgos v Chief did not know that he had committed, or was actually
of Staff (133 SCRA 800) , the SC countermanded the orders committing, the offense. They just suspected that he was
of the RTC authorizing the serach of the premises WE hiding something in the buri bag. They did not know what
Forum and Metropolitan Mail, two Metro Manila Dailies, by its contents were. The said circumstances did not justify an
reason of a defective warrant. There is a greater reason in arrest w/o a warrant.
this case to reprobate the questioned raid, in the complete However, there are many instances where a warrant
absence of a warrant, valid or invalid. The fact that the & seizure can be effected w/o necessarily being preceded by
instant case involves an obscenity rap makes it no different an arrest, foremost of w/c is the 'stop & search' w/o a SW at
from Burgos, a political case, because speech is speech, military or police checkpoints, the constitutionality of w/c
whether political or "obscene". has been upheld by this Court in Valmonte v. de Villa.
The authorities must apply for the issuance of the a As bet. a warrantless search and seizure (S & S)
search warrant from the judge , if in their opinion, an conducted at military or police checkpoints and the search
obscenity rap is in order. They must convince the court that thereof in the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed,
the materials sought to be seized are "obscene" and pose a the latter is more reasonable considering that, unlike in the
clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to former, it was effected on the basis of a probable cause. The
warrant State interference and action. The judge must probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously
determine WON the same are indeed "obscene": the and attempted to flee w/ the buri bag, there was a probable
question is to be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on the cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag
judge's sound discretion. If probable cause exist, a search and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect
warrant will issue. the same.
It is too much indeed to require the police officers to
search the bag in the possession of the petitioner only after
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZP G & ASSOCIATES
they shall have obtained a SW for the purpose. Such an ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest of the accused and the
exercise may prove to be useless, futile and much too late. seizure of the plastic bag were valid.
As the Sol-Gen said:
RULING: YES. The accused was caught in flagrante as a
"The assailed S & S may still be result of a buy-bust operation. There was no need for a
justified as akin to a 'stop and frisk' warrant. The policemen were not only authorized but were
situation whose object is either to also under obligation to apprehend the drug pusher even
determine the identity of suspicious without a warrant. The policemen’s entry into the house of
individuals or to maintain the status quo the accused without a search warrant was in hot-pursuit of a
momentarily while the police officers person caught committing an offense in flagrante. The
seeks to obtain more info. ... The US SC arrest that followed the hot-pursuit was valid. The seizure
held in Terry v. Ohio that "a police officer of the plastic bag was the result of the accused’s arrest inside
may in appropriate circumstances & in an the house. A contemporaneous search may be conducted
appropriate manner approach a person for upon the person of the arrestee and the immediate vicinity
the purpose of investigating possible where the arrest was made.
criminal behaviour even though there is
no probable cause to make an arrest." In ISSUE: Whether the documents signed by the accused
such a situation, it is reasonable for an during the investigation were admissible in evidence.
officer rather than simply to shrug his
shoulder and allow a crime to occur, to RULING: NO. There was no showing that accused was
stop a suspicious individual briefly in then assisted by counsel nor his waiver thereto put into
order to determine his identity or writing. (The rejection of these evidence would not affect
maintaing the status quo while obtaining the conviction of the accused in view of the abundance of
more info." other evidence establishing his guilt.) Bam.
(e) When there is a valid express waiver made voluntarily F: The incidents involved in this case took place at the
and intelligently. height of the coup d'etat staged in December, 1989.
Accused-appellant Rolando de Gracia was charged in two
Waiver cannot be implied from the fact that the separate informations for illegal possession of ammunition
person consented or did not object to the search, for it many and explosives in furtherance of rebellion, and for attempted
happen that he did so only out of respect for the authorities. homicide. Appellant was convicted for illegal possession of
The waiver must be expressly made. firearms in furtherance of rebellion, but was acquitted of
attempted homicide.
Surveillance was undertaken by the military along
People v. De lara EDSA because of intelligence reports about
a coup. Members of the team were engaged by rebels in
F: After a surveillance conducted, a buy-bust operation gunfire killing one member of the team. A searching team
was conducted by the police, as a consequence of which, raided the Eurocar Sales Office. They were able to find and
accused was arrested. The accused already pocketed the confiscate six cartons of M-16 ammunition, five bundles of
marked money and handed two foils to the police when he C-4 dynamites, M-shells of different calibers, and "molotov"
sensed the presence of police operatives. He tried to retrieve bombs inside one of the rooms belonging to a certain Col.
the two foils but he was prevented from doing so. He tried Matillano. De Gracia was seen inside the office of Col.
to escape by running inside his house. The police pursued Matillano, holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping through a
him and were able to subdue him. The accused admitted door. The team arrested appellant. They were then made to
that he kept prohibited drugs in his house. He even showed sign an inventory, written in Tagalog, of the explosives and
the arresting officers a blue plastic bag containing prohibited ammunition confiscated by the raiding team. No search
drugs. The team, together with the accused, proceeded to warrant was secured by the raiding team. Accused was
WPD headquarters for investigation. During the found guilty of illegal possession of firearms.
investigation, accused was apprised of his constitutional That judgment of conviction is now challenged
rights to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel. before us in this appeal.
When appellant was asked to give a written statement, he
refused to do so pending arrival of his lawyer. Accused Issue: Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure
contends that his arrest and the seizure of the bag containing in this case.
prohibited drugs was null and void. He also contends that
he was not assisted by counsel during custodial Ruling: YES
investigation, where he was forced to sign the photocopy of It is admitted that the military operatives who raided
the marked money, the Receipt of Property Seized, and the the Eurocar Sales Office were not armed with a search
Booking and Information Sheet. warrant at that time. The raid was actually precipitated by
intelligence reports that said office was being used as
headquarters by the RAM. Prior to the raid, there was a
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZP G & ASSOCIATES
3. Constitutionality of checkpoints and "areal target F: This is a petition for prohibition w/ prel. inj. to
zonings." prohibit the military and police officers represented by
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZP G & ASSOCIATES
6. Exclusionary Rule
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZP G & ASSOCIATES
in a despotic manner. By so doing, one can indirectly the case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job Reyes, the
inquire into the validity of the suspension of the privilege. proprietor of the forwarding agency, who made the search/
inspection. Such inspection was reasonable and a SOP on
the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure bef.
8. Search and Seizure by Private Persons delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs or Bureau of
Posts.
People v. Marti, 193 SCRA 57 (1991) Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not
convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a
F: Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of warrantless S & S proscribed by the Consti. Merely to
Customs and/ or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) observe and look at that w/c is plain sight is not search.
& husband of Anita Reyes, following standard operating Having observed that w/c is open, where no trespass has
procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. When he been committed in aid thereof, is not search.
opened appellant's box, a peculiar order emitted therefrom. That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Consti. is not
His curiosity aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals finds
allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. support in the deliberations of the Con Com.: " xxx The Bill
Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out a cellophane of Rights governs the relationship between the individual
wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves. and the state. Its concern is not the relation between
He made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and individuals, between a private individual and other
took several grams of the contents thereof. individuals. xxx" (Sponsorship speech of Commissioner
Job Reyes reported the incident to the NBI and Bernas.)
requested a laboratory examination of the samples he The constitutional proscription against unlawful S &
extracted from the cellophane wrapper. S therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the
It turned out that the dried leaves were marijuana govt and its agencies tasked w/ the enforcement of the law.
flowering tops as certified by the forensic chemist of the Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the
Narcotics Section of the NBI. restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of
Thereafter, an information was filed against power is imposed.
appellant for violation of RA 6425. It the search is made at the behest or inititiation of
the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and
APPELANT CONTENDS that the evidence subject of the private purposes, as in the case at bar, and w/o the
imputed offense had been obtained in violation of his consti. intervention of police authorities, the right against
rights against unreasonable searches and seizures and unreasonable S & S cannot be invoked for only the act of
privacy of communication and therefore argues that the private individuals, not law enforcers, is involved. In sum,
same should be held inadmissible in evidence. the protection against unreasonable S & S cannot be
extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to
The case at bar assumes a peculiar character since bring it w/in the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily govt.
discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a
private capacity and w/o the intervention and participation 9. In the issuance of warrants of ARREST, as
of state authorities. distinguished from SEARCH warrants, the judge may
rely simply on fiscal's certification as to probable cause
ISSUE: May an act of a private individual, allegedly in
violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked Compare Rule 112, Sec. 6 (on warrants of arrest) with Rule
against the state? 126, Sec. 4 (on search warrants.)
HELD: We hold in the negative. In the absence of Rule 112, Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may
governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the issue.-- (a) By the Regional Trial Court.-- Upon the
Consti. cannot be invoked against the State. This filing of an information, the Regional Trial Court may
constitutional right refers to the immunity of one's person, issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused.
whether citizen or alien, from interference by govt. xxx (b) By the Municipal Trial Court.-- If the
(Villanueva v. Querubin.) municipal trial judge conducting the preliminary
The contraband in the case at bar having come into investigation is satisfied after an examination in writing
possession of the govt w/o the latter transgressing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in
appellant's rights against unreasonable searches and seizures the form of searching questions and answers, that a
(S & S), the Court sees no cogent reason why the same probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of
should not be admitted against him. placing the respondent under immediate custody in
Appellant, however, would like this Court to believe order not to frustrate the ends of justice, he shall issue a
that NBI agents made an illegal search and seizure of the warrant of arrest. (Rules of Court.)
evidence later on used in prosecuting the case. The
arguments of appellant stands to fall on its own weight, or
the lack of it. Rule 126, Sec. 4. Examination of complainant;
First, the factual considerations of the case at bar record.-- The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
readily foreclose the proposition that NBI agents conducted personally examine in the form of searching questions
an illegal S & S of the prohibited merchandise. Records of and answers, in writing and under oath the complainant
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZP G & ASSOCIATES
and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally have examined in writing and under oath the complainant
known to them and attach to the records their sworn and his wirtnesses by searching questions and answers; he
statements together with any affidavits submitted. must be satisfied that a probable cause exists; and there must
The requirement in the case of warrants of arrest is relaxed be a need to place the accused under immediate custody in
in that the judge can rely on the certification of the fiscal order not to frustrate the ends of justice. It is not obligatory,
that the latter has conducted the preliminary investigation but merely discretionary, upon the investigating judge to
and has found probable cause on the part of the accused. issue a WA, for the determination of whether it is necessary
The judge can issue the warrant on the basis of the to arrest the accused in order not to frustrate the ends of
information filed by the fiscal and the certification of justice, is left to his sound judgment or discretion.
probable cause. The fiscal should, instead, have filed an information
immediately so that the RTC may issue a warrant for the
The SC has allowed this practice in Amarga v.
arrest of the accused. Bam.
Abbas, 98 Phil. 739 (1956), noting that it has been practice
long settled and that a judge can issue an order to arrest on
the basis of the certificate.
Beltran v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 (1988)
Of course, if the judge is in doubt, he can always ask
F: The Pres. of the Phils. filed a complaint for libel
the fiscal to submit the records of the preliminary
against the petitioners, who were publisher and columnist of
investigation, so he could determine for himself if, on the
the Philippine Star, based on the following statement in
basis of the affidavits, there exists probable cause. It he is
Beltran's column of Oct. 12, 1987 entitled "The Nervous
satisfied with the affidavits, he need not summon the
Officials of the Aquino Administration:" "If you will recall,
affiants.
during the Aug. 29 coup attempt, the Pres. hid under her
bed, while the firing was going on-- perhaps the first
Amarga v. Abbas, 98 Phil. 739 (1956)
Commander-in-Chief of the AFP to have to do so."
Instead of submitting his counter-affidavit, Beltran
F: Municipal Judge Samulde conducted a preliminary moved to dismiss the complaint. The fiscal deniend his
investigation (PI) of Arangale upon a complaint for robbery motion after finding a prima facie case against the
filed by complainant Magbanua, alleging that Arangale petitioners and filed the case in court w/c thereafter issued
harvested palay from a portion of her land directly adjoining warrants of arrest against the petitioners. The petitioners
Arangale’s land. After the PI, Samulde transmitted the filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition.
records of the case to Provincial Fiscal Salvani with his
finding that “there is prima facie evidence of robbery as HELD: The addition of the word "personally" after the
charged in the complaint”. Fiscal Salvani returned the word "determined" (Art. III, Sec. 2) and the deletion of the
records to Judge Samulde on the ground that the transmittal grant of authority by the 1973 Consti. to issue warrants to
of the records was “premature” because Judge Samulde "other responsible officer as may be authorized by law," has
failed to include the warrant of arrest (WA) against the apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Consti. now
accused. Judge Samulde sent the records back to Fiscal requires the judge to personally examine the complainant
Salvani stating that although he found that a probable cause and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for
existed, he did not believe that Arangale should be arrested. the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate
Fiscal Salvani filed a mandamus case against interpretation. What the Consti. underscores is the exclusive
Judge Samulde to compel him to issue a WA. RTC and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy
dismissed the petition on the ground that the fiscal had not himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying
shown that he has a clear, legal right to the performance of himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance
the act to be required of the judge and that the latter had an of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally
imperative duty to perform it. Neverhteless, Judge Samulde examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following
was ordered to issue a WA in accordance with Sec. 5, Rule established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally
112 of the 1985 Rules of Court. evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted
by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and,
on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on
ISSUE: Whether it is mandatory for the investigating judge
the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may
to issue a WA of the accused in view of his finding, after
disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of
conducting a PI, that there exists prima facie evidence that
supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
the accused commited the crime charged. conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. Sound
policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be
HELD: THE PURPOSE OF A PRELIMINARY unduly laden w/ the preliminary examination and
INVESTIGATION DOES NOT CONTEMPLATE THE investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating
ISSUANCE OF A WA BY THE INVESTIGATING JUDGE on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.
OR OFFICER. xxx
Under Rule 112 of the 1985 ROC, a PI is conducted 10. When arrest may be made without a warrant
on the basis of affidavits to determine whether or not there is
sufficient ground to hold the accused for trial. To determine
whether a WA should issue, the investigating judge must
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZP G & ASSOCIATES
Rule 113, Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when no such personal knowledge in this case. Hence the arrest
lawful.-- A peace officer or a private person may, of the appellant was illegal.
without a warrant, arrest a person: (2) Consequently, the incidental search and seizure
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be were likewise illegal and the firearm and document are
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is inadmissible in evidence.
attempting to commit an offense; (3) The prosecution argues that the appellant
(b) When an offense, has in fact just been admitted ownership of the gun and claims that it was he who
committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts pointed to the place where the subversive documents were
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed hidden. However, as the appellant was not informed of his
it; constitutional rights at that time, his admission is
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner inadmissible under [Art. III, Sec. 12 (1).] It is true that 6
who has escaped from a penal establishment of place days later he executed a confession before the fiscal w/ the
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily assistance of counsel, but it was then already too late.
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while (4) As the remaining evidence against the appellant
being transferred from one confinement to another. is the testimony of Cesar M. and it is uncorroborated and
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) unreliable, the appellant should be acquitted, but the gun and
hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be the subversive documents must be confiscated.
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail,
and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with People v. Rodriguez, 232 SCRA 498 (April 25, 1989)
Rule 112, Section. 7. (Rules of Court.)
F: Pat. Marvin Pajilan received a phone call from the
desk officer of Sub-Station I, namely, Michael Orbeta, who
Rule 113, sec. 5 talks of "citizen arrests", cases informed him that a person named 'Alyas Allan' was selling
where an arrest can be made either by the peace officer or a marijuana at No. 8199 Constancia St., Makati, Metro Manila
private person without need of a warrant. and requested that said person be apprehended. Acting on
The key element in the first case is that the offense this phone call of desk officer Michael Orbeta, a team of
was committed "in his presence". The key element in the policemen posted themselves about 10 to 15 meters from the
second case is that he has "personal knowledge". house located at 8199 Constancia St., Makati. They saw a
tricycle with 3 persons on board, a driver and 2 passengers,
Thus, in People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 (1986), the stop in front of the house at 8199 Constancia St. They also
arrest made by the constabulary without a warrant of a saw a male person come out of the said house and approach
farmer on the basis of information that he was a subversive and talk to the driver of the tricycle. After a while they saw
was held unconstitutional, since there was no personal the male person go back to the house and a little later come
knowledge of the offense itself. back and hand to the tricycle driver 'a suspicious stuff of a
cigarette, a marijuana cigarette', they further saw the tricycle
The gun and subversive documents found by the driver in turn give something to the male person. Pat. Pajilan
officer and admitted by the former to be his were likewise together with his companions approached the male person
held inadmissible because the admission violated the and the tricycle driver and after introducing themselves as
Miranda rule. police officers, they asked the male person, the tricycle
driver and his 2 passengers to bring out the contents of their
a. Strict enforcement of rule pockets, which the male person, the driver and the
passengers of the tricycle did. The male person brought out
People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 (1986) from his pockets 2 small plastic bags containing suspected
marijuana leaves. The tricycle driver brought out from his
F: On the basis of info. given by Cesar Masamlok, the right front pocket 3 sticks of suspected marijuana cigarettes.
appellant was arrested while plowing his farm in Tiguman, Nothing illegal was found in the pockets of the 2 passengers
Davao del Sur, on May 13, 1982, on charges of illegal of the tricycle.
possession of firearm in furtherance of subversion. A .38 The appellant contends that the police officers had
caliber revolver was found buried under his house. no personal knowledge that he was indeed handing
Subversive documents were also seized from a place near marijuana to Enrico Bacod as they were 10-15 meters away
his house. Two arresting officers testified that the appellant from the alleged sale transaction. The arrest therefore was
had readily admitted ownership of the gun and the not valid as the requirements for a warrantless arrest were
documents. The appellant was found guilty of the charge not complied with.
and sentenced to 20 years of reclusion temporal, as
minimum, to reclusion perpetua, as maximum, and the gun Issue: Was the warantless arrest valid?
and documents were ordered confiscated.
Ruling: YES.
HELD: (1) Under R 113, Sec. 5 (a), the arresting officer The warrantless arrest made by the law enforcers
must have personal knowledge that the crime has been was valid since it falls under the provisions of Rule 113,
committed, is being committed, or is about to be committed, Sec. 5(a) of the Rules of Court which provides:
in order to justify an arrest w/o a warrant. The offense must Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace
also be committed in his presence or w/in his view. There is officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZP G & ASSOCIATES
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested dismissed, since the writ does not lie in favor of an accused
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to in a crim. case, who has been released on bail.
commit an offense; As to Dural, he was not arrested while in the act of
shooting the 2 soldiers. Nor was he arrested after the
Having caught the appellant in flagrante as a result commission of said offense for his arrest came a day after
of the buy-bust operation, the policemen were not only the shooting incident. However, Dural was arrested for
authorized but were also under obligation to apprehend the being a member of the NPA, an outlawed subversive
drug pusher even without a warrant of arrest. The police organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the
officers were tipped off by an informer about the illegal arrest of Dural w/o warrant is justified as it can be said that
trade of the accused. The exact location where this trading in he was committing an offense when arrested.
drugs was taking place was given to them. The 'suspicious The arrest of persons involved in rebellion whether
stuff' taken from the accused were confirmed to be as its fighting armed elements, or for committing non-
marijuana after tests were conducted on them. The attendant violent acts but in furtherance of rebellion, is more an act of
circumstances taking place before their eyes led the police capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell
officers to reasonably conclude that an offense was actually the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately
being committed. prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest,
therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the
prosecution of offenses w/c requires the determination by a
b. Exceptions to strict enforcement judge of the existence of probable cause bef. the issuance of
a judicial warrant and the granting of bail if the offense is
(1) "Continuous" crimes of subversion bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no
legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons
Umil v. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311 (1990) committing overt acts of violence against govt forces, or any
other milder acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious
These are 8 petitions for habeas corpus (HC) filed movement. xxx (Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile.)
bef. the Court. The Court finds that the persons detained Dural was found guilty of the charge and is now
have not been illegally arrested nor arbitrarily deprived of serving the sentence imposed upon him by the trial court.
their constitutional right to liberty and that the Thus, the writ of HC is no longer available
circumstances attending these cases do not warrant their
release on HC. II
An arrest w/o a warrant, under Sec. 5, pars. (a) and
(b) of Rule 113, ROC, as amended is justified when the The arrest of Amelia Roque and Wilfredo
person arrested is caught in flagrante delicto, viz., in the act Buenaobra, w/o warrant is also justified.
of committing an offense; or when an offense has just been
committed and the person making the arrest has personal In view of the revelations made by Rogelio Ramos, a
knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested former NPA, the Constantino house in Marikina Heights
has committed it. was placed under military surveillance and on 8/12/88,
The persons in whose behalf these petitions for HC pursuant to a search warrant , a search of the house was
have been filed had freshly committed or were actually conducted at 5 PM by CISC-NCD & CSG. In the course of
committing an offense, when apprehended, so that their the search were found several firearms, regular power
arrests, w/o warrant were clearly justified, and that they are, supply, antennae, speaker and subversive documents.
further detained by virtue of valid informations filed against When confronted, R. Constantino (RC) could not
them in court. produce any permit or authority to possess the firearms,
ammunition, radio, etc. He was brought to CIS HQ for
I investigation. When questioned, he refused to give a written
statement, although he admitted that he was a staff member
In Umil v. Ramos, RIOU-CAPCOM received of the executive of the NUFC and a ranking member of the
confidential info. about a member of the NPA-Sparrow unit International Dept. of the CPP.
being treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes Hospital At about 8 PM, same day, Buenaobra arrived at RC's
in Roosevelt Ave., Q.C. It was found that the wounded house. When arrested, he readily submitted to the military
person, who was listed in the hospital records as Ronnie agents that he is a regular member of the CPP/ NPA and that
Javelon, is actually Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA he went to the place to deliver letters to "Ka Mong,"
liquidation squad, responsible for the killing of 2 CAPCOM referring to RC and other members of the rebel group. Also
soldiers the day before. Dural was then transferred to the found in Buenaobra's possession was a piece of paper
Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM. containing the jumbled tel. no. of Florida Roque, sister of
Upon positive identification by an eyewitness, Dural Amelia Roque, aka. "Ka Nelia." They went to the address
was referred to the Caloocan City Fiscal who conducted an on 8/13/88 and arrived at the place about 11 AM. After
inquest and thereafter filed w/ the RTC-Caloocan City an identifying themselves as military agents and after seeking
info. charging Dural w/ the crime of "Double Murder w/ permission to search the place, w/c was granted, the military
Assault upon agents of persons in authority." agents conducted a search in the presence of the occupants
The petition for HC, insofar as Umil & Villanueva of the house and the barangay captain of the place.
are concerned, is now moot and academic and is accordingly The military found the place to be another safehouse
of the NUFC/ CPP. They found firearms, subversive
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZP G & ASSOCIATES
documents, ledgers, journals, vouchers, among others. HELD: Vicky O. was arrested in flagrante delicto so that
Amelia admitted ownership of the documents seized. her arrest w/o warrant is justified. No. prel. inv. was
Roque was brought to the Caloocan City Fiscal for conducted bec. she was arrested w/o a warrant and she
inquest after w/c an info. charging her w/ viol. of PD 1866 refused to waive the provisions of Art. 125 of the RPC,
was filed. Another info. for viol. of the Anti-Subversion Act pursuant to R112, Sec. 7, ROC.
was filed against Roque and also to Buenaobra.
A petition for HC was filed bef. this Court on behalf V
of Roque and Buenaobra. At the hearing, Buenaobra
manifested his desire to stay in the PC-INP stockade at The petitioners Ocaya, Anonuevo, Casiple and
Camp Crame, Q.C. Accordingly, the petition for HC on his Roque claim that the firearms, ammunitions and subversive
behalf is now moot and academic. documents alleged to have been found in their possession,
when arrested, did not belong to them, but were planted by
III the military to justify their illegal arrest.
The petitioners, however, have not introduced any
Anonuevo v. Ramos. evidence to support their claim. On the other hand, no evil
motive or ill will on the part of the arresting officers that
The arrest of Domingo Anonuevo (A) and Ramon could cause the said officers in these cases to accuse the
Casiple (C) w/o warrant is justified. petitioners falsely, has been shown.
At about 7:30 PM on 8/13/88, A and C arrived at the As pointed out by the Sol-Gen, the arrest of the
house of RC w/c was still under surveillance. The military petitioners is not a product of a witch hunt or a fishing
noticed bulging objects on their waist lines. When frisked, expedition, but the result of an in-depth surveillance of NPA
the agents found them to be loaded guns. They were asked safehouses pointed no less than by former comrades of the
to show their permit or license to possess or carry firearms petitioners.
and ammunitions but they could not produce any. Hence, VI
they were brought to PC HQ for investigation.
At the PC stockade, A was identified as "Ka Ted," Espiritu v. Lim.
and C as "Ka Totoy" of the CPP by their former comrades.
On 8/15/88, an info. charging them w/ viol. of PD Deogracias Espititu is the Gen. Sec. of PISTON.
1866 was filed bef. RTC-Pasig. On 8/24/88, a petition for Petitioner claims that at about 5 AM of 11/23/88, while he
HC was filed bef. this Court. was sleeping in his home located at Sta. Mesa, Mla., he was
awakened by his sister who told him that a group of persons
HELD: The petitioner's claim that they were unlawfully wanted to hire his jeepney. When he went down to talk to
arrested bec. there was no previous warrant, is w/o merit. them, he was immediately put under arrest. When he asked
The records show that they were carrying unlicensed for the warrant, the men bodily lifted him and placed him in
firearms and ammunitions in their person when their owner type jeepney. He demanded that his sister be
apprehended. allowed to accompany him, but the men did not accede to
There is also no merit in the contention that the info. his request.
filed against them are null and void for want of prel. inv. An info. charging him w/ viol. of Art. 142, RPC
The filing of an info., w/o a prel. inv., having been first (Inciting to sedition) was filed against him.
conducted, is sanctioned by Rule 112, Sec. 7, ROC. In the afternoon of 11/22/88, during a press-con at
Petitioners refused to sign a waiver of the provisions the NPC "Deogracias E. through tri-media was heard urging
of Art. 125, RPC. Nor did petitioners ask for prel. inv. after all drivers and operators to go on nationwide strike on
the informations had been filed against them in court. 11/23/88 xxx."
Policemen waited for petitioners outside the NPC in
IV order to investigate him, but he gave the lawmen his slip.
He was next seen at about 5 PM at a gathering of drivers and
Ocaya v. Aguirre. sympathizers, where he was heard as saying,
"Bukas tuloy and welga natin ... hanggang sa
On 5/12/88, agents of the PC Intelligence and magkagulo na."
Investigation Division of Rizal PC-INP Command, armed Since the arrest of the petitioner w/o warrant was in
w/ a search warrant, conducted a search of a house located accordance w/ the provisions of R 113, Sec. 5 (b), ROC, and
at Marikina Green Heights, believed to be occupied by the petitioner is detained by virtue of a valid info. filed w/
Benito Tiamson, head of the CPP-NPA. In the course of the the competent court, he may not be released on HC.
search, Ocaya arrived in a car driven by Danny Rivera.
Subversive documents and several rounds of ammunitions VII
for a .45 cal. pistol were found in Vicky Ocaya's car. They
were brought to the PC HQ for investigation, when O. could Nazareno v. Station Commander.
not produce any permit or authorization to possess the
ammunition, an info. charging her w/ viol. of PD 1866 was At about 8:30 AM of 12/14/88, one Romulo Bunye II
filed w/ RTC-Pasig. Rivera was released from custody. was killed by a group of men in Alabang, Muntinglupa,
On 5/17/88, a petition for HC was filed on behalf of MM. One of the suspects in the killing was Ramil Regala
these 2. who was arrested by the police on 12/28/88. Upon
questioning, Regala pointed to Nazareno as one of his
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZP G & ASSOCIATES
PETITION SEEKING SEPARATE MOTIONS FOR On good faith.-- The peace officers who arrested
RECONSIDERATION FROM THE COURT'S DECISION Dural are deemed to have conducted the same in good faith,
PROMULGATED ON 9 JULY 1990
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZP G & ASSOCIATES
considering that law enforcers are presumed to regularly peace officers to make the arrest, w/o warrant, at the time
perform their official duties. the words were uttered, or soon thereafter, is still another
A few days after Dural's arrest, an info. charging him thing. In the balancing of authority and freedom, w/o
w/ Double murder w/ assault against agents of persons in obviously becomes difficult at times, the court, has in this
authority was filed in RTC-Caloocan City. He was placed case, tilted the scale in favor of authority but only for
under judicial custody. On 8/31/88, he was convicted and purposes of the arrest (not conviction.)
sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
Supervening events made this case moot and
As to A. Roque., W. Buenaobra, D. Anonuevo, R.. academic. for E. had bef. arraignment asked the court a quo
Casiple & V. Ocaya, their arrests, w/o warrant, are also for re-investigation, the peace officers did not appear. Case
justified. They were searched pursuant to a warrant issued against E. has been provisionally dismissed and his bail
by a court of law and were found w/ unlicensed firearms, cancelled.
explosives and/ or ammunitions on their persons. They
were, therefore, caught in flagrante delicto w/c justified NAZARENO'S ARREST.-- Although the killing of
their outright arrest w/o warrant under Sec. 5 (a), R113, Bunye II occured on 12/14/88, while Nazareno's arrest w/o
ROC. A few days after their arrests, informations were filed warrant was made only on 12/28/88 or 14 days later, teh
in court against said petitioners placing them w/in judicial arrest falls under Sec. 5 (b), R113, since it was only on
custody and disposition. Buenaobra's petition is moot bec. 12/28/88 that the police authorities came to know that
he had chosen to remain in detention. Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of
The reason which compelled the military agents to Bunye II and the arrest had to be made promptly, even w/o a
make the arrests w/o warrant was the info. given to the warrant (after the police were alerted) and despite the lapse
military that 2 safehouses (one occupied by RC and the of 14 days to prevent possible flight.
other by Benito Tiamson) were being used by the CPP/ NPA Nazareno has since been convicted by the court a
for their operations, w/ info. as to their exact location and quo for murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
the names of RC and BT as residents and occupants thereof.
And at the time of the actual arrests, the following ADMISSIBLITY OF EXTRA-JUDICIAL ADMISSION.
circumstances surrounded said arrests (of Roque,
Buenaobra, Anonuevo and Casiple), w/c confirmed the These admissions strengthen the Court's perception
belief of the military that the info. they had received was that truly the grounds upon w/c the arresting officers based
true and the persons to be arrested were probably guilty of their arrests w/o warrant, are supported by probable cause,
the commission of certain crimes: first, the search warrant i.e., that the persons arrested were probably guilty of the
was duly issued to effect the search of the Constantino commission of certain offenses, in compliance w/ Sec. 5, R
safehouse; second, found in the safehouse was a person 113, ROC. To note these admissions, on the other hand, is
named RC, who admitted that he was a ranking member of not to rule that the persons arrested are already guilty of the
the CPP, and found in his possession were unlicensed offenses upon w/c their warrantless arrests were predicated.
firearms and communist equipment; third, at the time of The task of determining the guilt or innocence of persons
their arrests, in their possession were unlicensed firearms, arrested w/o warrant is not proper in a petition for HC. It
ammunitions, and/ or subversive documents, and they pertains to the trial of the case on the merits.
admitted ownership thereof as well as their membership in
the CPP/ NPA. And then shortyly after their arrests, they
were positively identified by their former comrades as CPP/ (2) Illegal Possession of guns or drugs
NPA members.
An arrest is in the nature of an administrative
measure. The power to arrest w/o warrant is w/o limitation People v. Linsangan, 195 SCRA 784
as long as the requirements of Sec. 5, R 113 are met. This
rule is founded on an overwhelming public interest in peace F: Accused Linsangan was arrested after a “buy-bust”
and order in our community. operation. The two marked ten-peso bill were retrieved
"xxx The legality of the detention does not depend from him. He was asked to sign his name on the two
upon the fact of the crime, but xxx upon the nature of the marked bills. The ten handrolled cigarette sticks confiscated
deed, wherefrom such characterization may reasonably be from the accused were submitted for examination. After
inferred by the officer or functionary to whom the law at the finding these positive for marijuana, a case was filed for
moment leaves the decision for the urgent purpose of violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law. Linsangan denied
suspending the liberty of the citizen." (US v. Sanchez.) the charge. The trial court found Linsangan guilty. Upon
appeal, one of the assertions of Linsangan was that the trial
ESPIRITU was arrested w/o warrant, not for court erred in not holding that when the policemen required
subversive or any "continuing offense," but for uttering the him to initial the marked bills, they violated his
words "Bukas tuloy ang welga natin xxx hanggang sa
constitutional right to counsel, to remain silent, and not to
magkagulo na" w/c in the perception of the arresting
incriminate himself while under custodial investigation.
officers, was inciting to sedition.
Many persons differ as to the validity of such ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A
perception and regard the language as falling w/in free VIOLATION OF THE ACCUSED’S CONSTITUTIONAL
speech guaranteed by the Consti. But, the authority of the RIGHTS WHEN HE WAS MADE TO SIGN THE
MARKED BILLS.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZP G & ASSOCIATES
of the interrogation is to evince evidence that can be used to Indeed, in the US, it is said that an "unconstitutional
prosecute the person. coercion will render inadmissible even the most
unquestionably true inculpatory statements." xxx This is
For instance, when A, a policeman, sees X running not bec. such confessions are unlikely to be true but bec. the
with a stained knife away from an apparently dead man, he methods used to extract them offend an underlying principle
can rung after X and having grabbed him, ask him for an in the enforcement of our criminal law: that ours is an
explanation as to what he saw without reading his Miranda accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system -- a system in
rights. But once A arrests X and starts interrogating him in w/c the State must establish guilt by evidence independently
the police precinct, then his rights must now be read, for and freely secured and not by coercion prove its charge
there can only be one purpose to the questioning, and that is against an accused out of his own mouth xxx." (Rogers v.
to elicit evidence to be used to prosecute him. Richmond, J. Frankfurter.)
in Mla. The next day, he was included in a police line-up of For "if a statement made wore in fact exculpatory, it could ...
5 detainees and was pointed to by the complainant as a never be used by the prosecution, in fact, statements merely
complanion of the main suspect on the basis of w/c the intended to be exculpatory by the defendant are often used
accused was ordered to stay and sit in front of the to impeach his testimony at trial or to demonstrate untruths
complainant, while the latter was interrogated. The accused in the statement given under interrogation and thus to prove
was then charged w/ robbery. The accused moved to guilt by implication."
dismiss the case against him on the ground that he had been
denied the assistance of counsel during the line-up. His EXCEPTIONS TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
motion was denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
The phrase "for any purpose in any proceeding"
HELD: The right to counsel attaches only upon the start of conveys the idea that the rule excluding evidence illegally
an interrogation, when the police officer starts to ask obtained is absolute. No similar phraseology is used in the
questions designed to elicit info. and/ or confessions or exclusionary rule implementing the Miranda rule. Does this
admissions from the accused. As the police line-up in this mean there can be instances, where uncounselled statements
case was not part of the custodial inquest, the petitioner was may nevertheless be admissible in evidence, albeit, for a
not entitled to counsel xxx. limited purpose?
The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in HELD: The police line-up was not part of the custodial
"custodial interrogations," or "in-custody interrogation of inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, at such stage,
accused persons." And, as this Court has already stated, by to counsel. VV.
custodial interrogation is meant "questioning initiated by
law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in US v. Wade, 388 US 218 (1967)
any significant way."
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZP G & ASSOCIATES
HELD: The right to counsel during custodial interrogation HELD: It is doubtful, given the tenor of the question
may be waived provided the waiver is made intelligently whether there was a definite waiver by the suspect of his
and voluntarily, with full understanding of its consequences. right to counsel. His answer was categorical enough, to be
In this case, the statement made only a perfunctory opening sure, but the question itself was not since it spoke of a
question, after informing the suspect that he was under waiver only "for the moment." As worded, the question
investigation, that he had a right to counsel and that suggested a tentativeness that belied the suspect's supposed
anything he said could be used for or against him and after permanent foregoing of his right to counsel, if indeed there
asking whether he was willing to answer questions and he was any waiver at all. Moreover, he was told that he could
answered "yes." The statement was in Tagalog which the hire a lawyer but not that one could be provided for him for
defendant, a native of Samar, had not been shown to be fully free. VV.
acquainted with. The date of execution of the statement
before the municipal court was not indicated. The separate Since Royo's conviction for murder was based on a
statement signed by the defendant stating he was made to written confession showing that he was apprised of his right
read the opening statement containing the Miranda warnings not only by the police but also by the fiscal, but that he
and that they were explained to him all the more engenders waived these rights, then the waiver found to be voluntary,
doubt as to whether the defendant was properly informed of knowing and intelligent and thus admissible.
his right.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZP G & ASSOCIATES
HELD: The confession of the defendant is inadmissible People v. Lim, 196 SCRA 809 (1991)
because it was obtained through torture. The NBI
investigators covered the defendant's face with a rag and In People v. Nabaluna, 142 SCRA 446 (1986),
then pushed in into a toilet bowl full of human waste. It was Nabaluna et. al. were convicted of robbery with homicide on
only after they had broken his will that the defendant signed the basis, among others, of extrajudicial confessions taken in
the confession and posed for pictures for reenactment as 1977. The confessions and the special counsel before whom
directed by the investigators. The defendant is from Samar the confessions were signed prove that the Miranda
and there is no showing that he understood Tagalog. It was warnings were given, but these were not made in the
two weeks after he executed the salaysay that his relatives presence of counsel. The SC, in allowing the confession,
were permitted to visit him. His statement does not contain ruled that the GAlit ruling could not have a retroactive
any waiver or right to counsel and yet during the effect, especially since in this case the trial court decision
investigation he was not assisted by one. These constitute was already rendered before the SC pronouncement.
gross violations of his right. The SC cited the case of
Morales v. Ponce Enrile where it laid the procedure in
custodial investigations: No custodial investigation shall be
conducted unless it be in the precense of counsel engaged by People v. Lasac 148 SCRA 624 (1987)
the person arrested, or by any person on his behalf, or
appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee F: Appellant was convicted of parricide on the basis of
himself or of anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may a confession and circumstantial evidence which the trial
be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with court found substantial to establish guilt.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZP G & ASSOCIATES
6. The burden of proving voluntariness of waivers is on The right to remain silent and to counsel, which are
the prosecution the effectuations of the Miranda rights, can be waived.
The burden to prove that there was a valid waiver of What cannot be waived are:
the Miranda warning devolves upon the one seeking to
present the confession, that is, on the prosecution. This rule 1. The right to be given the Miranda warnings. (For
applies whether in the pre-Galit, Galit, or 1987 rule. how can one waive what one does not know?)
In People v. Jara, 144 SCRA 516 (1986), the SC 2. The right to counsel when making the waiver of
noted that the stereotype "advice" appearing in practically the right to remain silent or to counsel.
all extrajudicial confessions which are later repudiated has
assumed the nature of a legal form. Investigators
automatically type it together with "opo" as the answer, or 8. Exclusionary rule
ask the accused to sign it or even copy it in their
handwriting. Its tired punctilious, fixed and artificially Art. III, Sec. 12. xxx
stately style does not create an impression of voluntariness (3) Any confession or admission obtained in
or even understanding on the part of the accused. violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
Whenever a Constitutional protection is waived by
one entitled to that protection, the presumption is always
against the waiver. Thus, the prosecution must prove with Note than under [Art. III, Sec. 3(2)] the exclusionary
strongly convincing evidence that indeed the accused rule reads: (any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
willingly and voluntarily submitted his confession, and preceding section shall be inadmissible "for any purpose in
knowingly and deliberately manifested that he was not any proceeding."
interested in having a lawyer assist him during the taking of There are two exceptions to the exclusionary rule.
that confession. One, to impeach the credibility of the accused. Two, public
safety.
F: Appellants were found guilty of robbery with The unwarned or uncounselled confession is not
homicide for the killing and robbery of Ampara vda. de totally without use. While it is not admissible to prove the
Bantigue on June 9, 1978. In another case, two of the guilt of the accused, it may be used against him to impeach
appellants were found guilty of homicide for the killing on his credibility by showing that he is lying in court, so ruled
the same date of Luisa Jara while Felicisimo Jara, the the U.S. Supreme Court in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S.
husband of the deceased, was found guilty of parricide. Two 222 (1971).
of the appellants, Raymundo Vergara and Bernardo
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZP G & ASSOCIATES
1. When right may be invoked With the abolition of the death penalty (III, 20), and
the automatic commutation of a death sentence to reclusion
perpetua, it is contended that when the 1987 Constitution
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZP G & ASSOCIATES
People v. Donato, 196 SCRA 130 (1991) Art. III, Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of
changing the same within the limits prescribed by law
3. Bail in courts-martial shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the
court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except
Commendador v. De Villa, 200 SCRA 80 (1991) in the interest of national security, public safety, or public
health, as may be provided by law.
4. Standards for fixing bail
Rule 114, Sec. 6. Amount of bail; guidelines.-- In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, 142 SCRA 149
The judge who issed the warrant or granted the (1986), the SC disallowed a person released on bail to travel
application shall fix a reasonable amount of bail abroad for a business trip. The Court gave 2 reasons why
considering primarily, but not limited to the following bail operates only within the country.
guidelines:
(a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail; One, the accused may be placed beyond the
(b) Nature and circumstances of the offense; jurisdiction of the court if he were allowed to leave the
(c) Penalty of the offense charged; Philippines without sufficient reason, thus affecting one of
(d) Character and reputation of the accused; the conditions in the grant of bail, namely to have the
(e) Age and health of the accused; accused available whenever the court requires his presence.
(f) The weight of the evidence against the
accused; Two, implicit in the bail is the agreement between
(g) Probability of the accused appearing in trial; the State and the surety that the State will do nothing to
(h) Forfeiture of other bonds; make it difficult for the surety to arrest the defendant upon
(i) The fact that accused was a fugitive from order of the court. If the court thus allows his to leave, then
justice when arrested; and the State loses its right to order the forfeiture of the bond
(j) The pendency of other cases in which the because it itself has breached its obligation to the surety.
accused is under bond.
Excessive bail shall not be required. The case leaves the question of allowing an accused
under bail to go abroad for humanitarian reasons open-
ended. This reason was not foreclosed by the Court, which
Where the right to bail exists, it should not be hinted that the accused could be allowed to leave if he had
rendered nugatory be requiring a sum that is excessive, "sufficient reason". What the Court found insufficient was
otherwise, it becomes "a promise to the ear to be broken to the business trip.
the hope, a teasing illusion like a munificent bequest in a
pauper's will" (Jackson). Thus, said the SC in De la Camara
v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1 (1971). Manotoc v. CA, 142 SCRA 149 (1986)
In this case, a bail of P1.195 million imposed against F: Petitioner is a principal stockholder of two
Mayor Camara for charges of 12 murders and 12 frustrated corporations, in one of which he was the president. The
murder was found excessive. firms were placed under a management committee by the
SEC and petitioner was placed "on hold" by the
The SC laid down the following guidelines in fixing Commission of Immigration. Petitioner was charged with
the amount of bail in Villasenor v. Abano, 21 SCRA 312 estafa. He later asked for permission to leave the country for
(1967), later contained in sec. 6 of Rule 114. business reasons, but his request was denied by the courts.
He filed a petition for certiorari but his petition was also
1. Ability of the accused to give the bail. dismissed for lack of merit. He appealed to the SC.
2. Nature of the offense.
3. Penalty for the offense charged. HELD: The condition imposed by Rule 114, sec. 1 upon the
4. Character and reputation of the accused accused to make himself available whenever the court
5. Health of the accused. requires his presence, operates as a valid restriction on his
6. Character and strength of the evidence. right to travel. The constitutional right to travel is not
7. Probability of the accused appearing in trial. absolute, but is subject to lawful orders of the court. VV.
8. Forfeiture of other bonds.
9. Whether the accused was a fugitive from justice
when arrested. 6. Waiver of the Right to Bail
10. If the accused is under bond for appearance at
trial in other cases. People v. Donato, 198 SCRA 130 (1991)
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZP G & ASSOCIATES
Art. III, Sec. 14. (1) No person shall be held to Issue: W/N the constitutional presumption of
answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. innocenec of the accused has been overcome.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and HELD: YES
shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, Though there is no direct evidence to link the
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation 3 accused to the killing of the unknown victim, the
against him, to have a speedy, impartial and public trial, circumstantial evidence presented satisfied Sec. 4,
to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have Rule 133 ROC namely: (1) there is more than one
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences
and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all
after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the circumstances is such as to produce conviction
the absence of the accused provided that he has been beyond resonable doubt.
duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. With regard to the EJC of Accused Castro to Police
Cpl. Cunanan, there is no evidence that Cunanan had any
motive to falsely testify against accused. While it is true
1. Presumption of innocence that accused's EJC was made without the advice and
assistance of counsel, hence inadmissible as evidence, it
In People v. Dramayo, 42 SCRA 69 (1971), the SC could be treated as a verbal admission of the accused
noted that the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt established through the testimonies of persons who heard it
is a necessary corollary of the constitutional right to be or who conducted the investigatiuon of the accused (Peo v
presumed innocent. Molas 218 SCRA 473). Moreover in Peo v Alvarez, the
court ruled that an extrajudicial confession is admissible
against a co-accused when it is used as a circumstantial
In Igot v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980), a law evidence to show the probability of the participation of said
disqualifying candidates charged with national security co-accused in the crime committed.
offences was struck down as unconstitutional, for violating
the presumption against innocence. 2. Right to be heard personally or by counsel
The proceedings in the trial court are irregular from evidence by the defense, contending that the present
the beginning. It is expressly provided in our rules of Court, procedural practice and laws precluded the defense in
Rule 112, section 3 (now Rule 116, Sec. 6), that: criminal cases from presenting any evidence after it had
presented a motion for dismissal with or without reservation
If the defendant appears without attorney, he must and after said motion had been denied, and citing as
be informed by the court that it is his right to have attorney authority the case of United States vs. De la Cruz, 28 Phil.,
before being arraigned., and must be asked if he desires the 279. His Honor Judge S. C. Moscoso sustained the
aid of attorney, the Court must assign attorney de oficio to opposition of the provincial fiscal and, without allowing the
defend him. A reasonable time must be allowed for accused to present evidence in their defense, convicted all of
procuring attorney. them and sentenced the herein petitioner to suffer seven
years of imprisonment and to pay a fine of P2,000.
Not one of these duties had been complied with by
the trial court. Issue: Whether the accused should be allowed to present
One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by evidence after the denial of their motion to dismiss on the
our Constitution is that "no person shall be held to answer ground of insufficiency of evidence of the prosecution
for a criminal offense without due process of law", and that
all accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and Ruling: The accused should be allowed to present evidence.
counsel." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing
unless the accused be given the opportunity to be heard by 1. The refusal of Judge Moscoso to allow the
counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it accused-petitioner to present proofs in his defense after the
does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the denial of his motion for dismissal was a palpable error
most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the which resulted in denying to the said accused the due
science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, process of law guaranteed in the Bill of Rights embodied in
and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is the Constitution, it being provided in Article II, section 1
guilty but because he does not know how to establish his (17), of the Constitution that in all criminal prosecutions the
innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right counsel and to have compulsory process to secure the
to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has attendance of witnesses in his behalf. There is no law nor
become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that "procedural practice" under which the accused may ever be
under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to denied the right to be heard before being sentenced.
apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not Now that the Government cannot appeal in criminal
enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, cases if the defendant would be placed thereby in double
but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio if jeopardy (sec. 2, Rule 118), the dismissal of the case for
he so desires and he is poor grant him a reasonable time to insufficiency of the evidence after the prosecution has rested
procure an attorney of his own. terminates the case then and there. But if the motion for
dismissal is denied, the court should proceed to hear the
evidence for the defense before entering judgment
Q: What happens if the accused files a demurrer to regardless of whether or not the defense had reserved its
the evidence of the prosecution (on the ground that the right to present evidence in the event its motion for
prosecution failed to tender a case) and this motion is denied dismissal be denied. The reason is that it is the constitutional
-- could the defense still present its own evidence? right of the accused to be heard in his defense before
sentence is pronounced on him. Of course if the accused has
In Abriol v. Homeres, 84 Phil 525, (1949), the SC no evidence to present or expressly waives the right to
ruled in the affirmative, contending that the right of the present it, the court has no alternative but to decide the case
accused to present his evidence is a constitutional right upon the evidence presented by the prosecution alone.
which cannot be defeated by the dismissal of the motion of
demurrer. 2. The main question to decide is whether the writ of
habeas corpus lies in a case like the present.
Filing of demurrer to evidence is a WAIVER of right to be We have already shown that there is no law or
heard (Rule 119, Sec. 15.) precedent which could be invoked to place in doubt the right
of the accused to be heard or to present evidence in his
Abriol v. Homeres, 84 Phil 525, (1949) defense before being sentenced. On the contrary, the
provisions of the Constitution hereinabove cited expressly
F: Fidel Abriol, together with six other persons, was and clearly guarantee to him that right. Such constitutional
accused of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. right is inviolate. No court of justice under our system of
After the prosecution had presented its evidence and rested government has the power to deprive him of that right. If the
its case, counsel for the defense moved to dismiss the case accused does not waive his right to be heard but on the
on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence to prove the contrary as in the instant case invokes that rough, and the
guilt of the accused. After hearing the arguments for and court denies it to him, that court no longer has jurisdiction to
against the motion for dismissal, the court held the proofs proceed; it has no power to sentence the accused without
sufficient to convict and denied said motion, whereupon hearing him in his defense; and the sentence thus
counsel for the defense offered to present evidence for the pronounced is void and may be collaterally attacked in a
accused. The provincial fiscal opposed the presentation of habeas corpus proceeding.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZP G & ASSOCIATES
Although the sentence against the petitioner is void preliminary examination. President Mckinley made the first
for the reasons hereinabove stated, he may be held under the a part of the Organic Law in his Instructions to the
custody of the law by being detained or admitted to bail Commission by imposing the inviolable rule that in all
until the case against him is finally and lawfully decided. criminal prosecutions the accused 'shall enjoy the right ... to
The process against him in criminal case No. 1472 may have assistance of counsel for the defense' ". Today said
stand should be resumed from the stage at which it was right is enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for, as Judge
vitiated by the trial court's denial of his constitutional right Cooley says, this is "perhaps the privilege most important to
to be heard. Up to the point when the prosecution rested, the the person accused of crime."
proceedings were valid and should be resumed from there. "In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless
the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel.
The right to be heard would be of little meaning if it does
People v. Donesa, 49 SCRA 281 (1973) not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most
intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science
Grant of demurrer is equivalent to an acquittal of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and,
without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is
F: After prosecution presented its witnesses, the guilty but because he does not know how to establish his
defense moved for dismissal of the case on the ground of innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who
insufficiency of evidence. The judge granted the motion. are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right
to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has
Issue: Did such dismissal operate as an acquittal of the become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that
accused? under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to
apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not
Ruling: YES enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney,
A dismissal ordered after the termination of the but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio
presentation of the evidence for the prosecution has the for him if he so desires and he is poor, or grant him a
force and effect of an acquittal. Since there is a failure to reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own."
prove the guilt of the accused, the case must be dismissed, This right to a counsel de oficio does not cease upon
and it will be a bar to another prosecution for the same the conviction of an accused by a trial court. It continues,
offense even though it was ordered by the Court upon even during appeal, such that the duty of the court to assign
motion or with the express consent of the defendant, in a counsel de oficio persists where an accused interposes an
exactly the same way as a judgment of acquittal. intent to appeal. Even in a case, such as the one at bar,
where the accused had signified his intent to withdraw his
Rule 119, Sec. 15. Demurrer to evidence.-- After the appeal, the court is required to inquire into the reason for the
prosecution has rested its case, the court may dismiss the withdrawal. Where it finds the sole reason for the
case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence: (1) ont withdrawal to be poverty, as in this case, the court must
its own intitiative after givint the prosecution an assign a counsel de oficio, for despite such withdrawal, the
opportunity to be heard; or (2) on motion of the accused duty to protect the rights of the accused subsists and
filed with proper leave of court. perhaps, with greater reason. After all, "those who have less
If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the in life must have more in law." Justice should never be
accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When the limited to those who have the means. It is for everyone,
accused files such motion to dismiss without express whether rich or poor. Its scales should always be balanced
leave of court, he waives the right to present evidence and should never equivocate or cogitate in order to favor
and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the one party over another.
evidence for the prosecution. (Rules of Court.) It is with this thought in mind that we charge clerks
of court of trial courts to be more circumspect with the duty
3. Right to free legal assistance imposed on them by law (Section 13, Rule 122 of the Rules
of Court) so that courts will be above reproach and that
Art. III, Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and never (if possible) will an innocent person be sentenced for
quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall a crime he has not committed nor the guilty allowed to go
not be denied to any person by reason of poverty. scot-free.
In this spirit, the Court ordered the appointment of a
counsel de oficio for the accused-appellant and for said
People v. Rio, 201 SCRA 702 (1991) counsel and the Solicitor General to file their respective
briefs, upon submission of which the case would be deemed
F: On 29 December 1989, the accused-appellant submitted for decision.
Ricardo Rio, in two (2) letters dated 14 December 1989,
addressed to Division Clerk of Court Fermin J. Garma and From the records of the case, it is established that
to Assistant Clerk of Court Tomasita M. Dris, manifested his the accused- appellant was charged with the crime of rape in
intention to withdraw the appeal due to his poverty. a verified complaint filed by complainant Wilma Phua Rio,
duly subscribed before 3rd Assistant Fiscal Rodolfo M.
Paraphrasing Mr. Justice Malcolm, "Two (2) of the Alejandro of the province of Rizal, which reads as follows:
basic privileges of the accused in a criminal prosecution are That on or about the 24th day of March, 1984, in
the right to the assistance of counsel and the right to a the Municipality of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, Philippines,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZP G & ASSOCIATES
a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the The Court hereby admonishes members of the Bar to
above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation be more conscious of their duties as advocates of their
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have clients' causes, whether acting de parte or de oficio, for
carnal knowledge of the undersigned Wilma Phua against "public interest requires that an attorney exert his best
her will. efforts and ability in the prosecution or defense of his
On 26 June 1985, at the arraignment, the accused- client's cause." Lawyers are an indispensable part of the
appellant, assisted by Atty. Leonido Manalo of the Makati whole system of administering justice in this jurisdiction.
CLAO office, as counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not And a lawyer who performs that duty with diligence and
guilty to the offense charged. candor not only protects the interests of his client; he also
xxx serves the ends of justice, does honor to the Bar and helps
The trial court found the accused-appellant guilty maintain the respect of the community to the legal
of the crime of rape. profession. This is so because the entrusted privilege to
practice law carries with it correlative duties not only to the
The theory of the defense at the trial level was client but also to the court, to the bar and to the public.
grounded on alibi. The accused claimed that at the time of While a lawyer is not supposed to know all the laws,
the alleged commission of the crime of rape he was in he is expected to take such reasonable precaution in the
Romblon. This claim was corroborated by the accused's discharge of his duty to his client and for his professional
brother, Amado Rio. However, this claim was, as guidance as will not make him, who is sworn to uphold the
aforestated, rebutted by the prosecution's submission of the law, a transgressor of its precepts.
voter's affidavit executed by the accused in Muntinlupa, The fact that he merely volunteered his services or
Metro Manila on 31 March 1984 when appellant claimed he the circumstance that he was a counsel de oficio neither
was in Romblon. diminishes nor alters the degree of professional
responsibility owed to his client. The ethics of the profession
HELD: On appeal, appellant's counsel de oficio changed require that counsel display warm zeal and great dedication
the theory of the defense. The new theory presented by to duty irrespective of the client's capacity to pay him his
counsel de oficio is that Wilma Phua consented when fees. Any attempted presentation of a case without adequate
accused-appellant had sexual intercourse with her on 24 preparation distracts the administration of justice and
March 1984. It was stressed by counsel de oficio that the discredits the Bar.
rape occurred on 24 March 1984 and that, allegedly, it was
the fourth time accused had abused complainant. This 4. Right to be informed of nature and cause of
allegation as well as the fact that complainant failed to lock accusation
the door to the bathroom could only have been due to the
fact that there was consent. The charge was filed, according The arraignment in criminal prosecution is precisely
to defense counsel de oficio, only because the complainant's intended to comply with the right of the accused to be
mother caught them. informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
This theory of the defense on appeal that there had him. As noted in Vera v. People, procedural due process
been consent from the complainant, fails to generate doubt requires that the accused must be informed why he is being
as to the accused's guilt, for it would be an incredulous prosecuted and what charge he must meet.
situation indeed to believe that one, so young and as yet
uninitiated to the ways of the world, would permit the Borja v. Mendoza, 77 SCRA 422 (1977)
occurrence of an incestuous relationship with an uncle, a
brother of her very own mother. The Court notes the sudden No valid trial in absentia without arraignment
swift in the theory of the defense from one of total denial of
the incident in question, by way of alibi, to one of F: Petitioner was accused of slight physical injuries in
participation, that is, with the alleged consent of the the City Court of Cebu. After one postponement due to
complainant. This new version could only be attributed by petitioner's failure to appear, the case was reset. Again,
the Court to the fact that counsel on appeal is different from petitioner failed to appear, despite notice to his bondsman.
the counsel in the trial court. Although the Solicitor General The court then allowed the prosecution to present evidence
has suggested that this sudden shift be interpreted as an despite the fact that petitioner had not been arraigned. After
afterthought by the accused or a desperate effort to get the offended party had testified and presented documentary
himself acquitted, the Court deems it more likely that this evidence, the court found petitioner guilty. The CFI affirmed
shift was caused by counsel de oficio's preparation of the the decision. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
appellant's brief without examining the entire records of the
case. If the appointed counsel for the accused, on appeal, HELD: Respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of
had read the records and transcripts of the case thoroughly, discretion and his decision is void. Because petitioner was
he would not have changed the theory of the defense for not arraigned, he was not informed of the nature and cause
such a shift can never speak well of the credibility of the of accusation against him. Arraignment is an indispensable
defense. Moreover, the rule in civil procedure, which applies requirement in any criminal proceeding.
equally in criminal cases, is that a party may not shift his
theory on appeal. If the counsel de oficio had been more 5. Right to speedy, impartial and public trial
conscientious, he would have known that the sudden shift
would be violative of aforementioned procedural rule and (1) Speedy Trial
detrimental to the cause of the accused-appellant (his client).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZP G & ASSOCIATES
The right to a speedy trial means one that is free There was no evidence to substantiate the claim that any
from vexatious and oppressive delays. Its objective is to other person was excluded from the chambers. It is thus
free the innocent person from anxiety and expense of a court evident that what took place in the chambers of the city
litigation, or otherwise, to have his guilt determined within court judge was devoid of haste or intentional secrecy.
the shortest possible time, compatible with the presentation The trial must be public. It possesses that character
and consideration of whatever legitimate defense the when anyone interested in observing the manner a judge
accused may interpose. conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do so. There
is to be no ban on such attendance. His being a stranger to
While reasonable delay may be allowed as the litigants is of no moment. No relationship to the parties
determined on a case to case basis, an unreasonable delay on need be shown. The thought that lies behind this safeguard
the part of the prosecution to present its case, thereby is the belief that thereby the accused is afforded further
causing the threat of penal liability to remain hanging over protection, that his trial is likely to be conducted with
the head of the accused for an extended period of time, regularity and not tainted with any impropriety. It is not
violates the right of the accused to a speedy trial. amiss to recall that Delegate Laurel in his terse summation
the importance of this right singled out its being a deterrence
The remedy of the accused in this case is habeas to arbitrariness. It is thus understandable why such a right is
corpus if he has been restrained of his liberty, or certiorari, deemed embraced in procedural due process. Where a trial
prohibition or mandamus for the final dismissal of the case; takes place, as is quite usual, in the courtroom and a
and dismissal based on the denial of the right to speedy trial calendar of what cases are to be heard is posted, no problem
amounts to an acquittal. arises. It the usual course of events that individuals desirous
of being present are free to do so. There is the well
So said the SC in Acevedo v. Sarmiento, 36 SCRA recognized exception though that warrants the exclusion of
247 (1970), a case involving the prosecution for damage to the public where the evidence may be characterized as
property through reckless imprudence which had been "offensive to decency or public morals."
pending for 6 years, the last step taken being the start of the What did occasion difficulty in this suit was that for
cross-examination of the complaining witness, who did not the convenience of the parties, and of the city court Judge, it
appear thereafter. The SC ordered the case dismissed with was in the latter's air-conditioned chambers that the trial was
prejudice, thus acquitting the accused. held. Did that suffice to investigate the proceedings as
violative of this right? The answer must be in the negative.
(2) Public Trial There is no showing that the public was thereby excluded. It
is to be admitted that the size of the room allotted the Judge
A public trial does not require that the entire public would reduce the number of those who could be present.
can witness the trial. It is enough if it is conducted at a Such a fact though is not indicative of any transgression of
place where one's relatives and friends can be this right. Courtrooms are not of uniform dimensions. Some
accommodated and the public may know what is going on. are smaller than others. Moreover, as admitted by Justice
Black in his masterly In re Oliver opinion, it suffices to
The right is not absolute. The court can order the satisfy the requirement of a trial being public if the accused
public out of the trial room in the interest of morality and could "have his friends, relatives and counsel present, no
order. matter with what offense he may be charged."
Then, too, reference may also be made to the
In Garcia v. Domingo, 52 SCRA 143 (1970), the SC undisputed fact at least fourteen hearings had been held in
dismissed the contention of one party that the trial was chambers of the city court Judge, without objection on the
conducted inside the chamber of the judge on the ground part of respondent policemen. xxx
that the objection came too late (the party only complained
after the 14th hearing) and that the place was agreed upon (3) Impartial trial
by the parties for their mutual convenience (the judge's
room was air conditioned). One aspect of an impartial trial is a neutral
magistrate who exercises cold impartiality.
Garcia v. Domingo, 52 SCRA 143 (1970) In Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), it was held
that a town mayor who was paid on the basis of the fine he
The pivotal question in this petition for certiorari and imposes for every conviction for violation of the drinking
prohibition, one which thus far has remained unresolved, is laws, could not be an impartial judge. Under such a
the meaning to be accorded the constitutional right to public situation, he would be interested in convicting those he tries
trial. so he would earn more.
Issue: Is the holding of trial in the chambers of the judge Another aspect of an impartial trial is an impartial
violative of the right to a public trial? tribunal bound by the Bill of Rights and the strict rules of
evidence and procedure.
Ruling: NO
The defendants in this case agreed that the hearings In Olaguer v. Military Commission, 150 SCRA 144
be held in the chambers. On fourteen separate occasions (1987), the SC held that a civilian cannot be tried by a
this was the case and there was no objection on their part. military court (in connection with the Light a Fire
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZP G & ASSOCIATES
Movement) so long as the civil courts are open and attend trial (which presupposes arraignment), without any
operating, even during Martial Law. justifiable cause, the prosecution can proceed with the
presentation of the evidence, and thereupon, the court may
6. Right to confront witness consider the case submitted for decision. The court will
decide the case on the basis only of the prosecution's
The purpose of this right is to enable the accused to evidence. This does not violate the constitutional
test the credibility of the witness. The best means of presumption of innocence because it does not mean that the
confrontation is the process of cross-examination. judgment of the trial court will result in conviction.
7. Right to secure attendance of witnesses (and the So ruled the SC in People v. Salas, 143 SCRA 163
production of evidence in his behalf) (1986), which further ruled that trial in absentia applies
even to capital cases.
There are various means available to the parties to
compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of
documents and things needed in the prosecution or defense People v. Salas 143 SCRA 163 (1986)
of a case in an adversarial manner: subpoena and subpoena
duces tecum: depositions and other modes of discovery; Trial in absentia applies even to capital cases
perpetuation of testimonies.
F: Mario Abong was originally charged with homicide
8. Trial in Absentia in the CFI Cebu but before he could be arraigned, the case
was reinvestigated on motion of the prosecution. As a result
Although the right to be present is not explicit in the of the reinvestigation, an amended information was filed,
provision, it is inferrable from the phrase "trial may proceed with no bail recommended, to which he pleaded not guilty.
notwithstanding the absence of the accused" Trial commenced but while it was in progress, the prisoner
took advantage of the first information filed and succeeded
This right to be present may, however, be waived by in deceiving the city court of Cebu into granting him bail
the accused. Rule 115, sec, 1(c), talks of 3 ways that the and ordering his release. The respondent Judge, learning of
waiver may take place: (a) express waiver pursuant to the the trickery, cancelled the illegal bail bond and ordered
stipulations set forth in his bail bond, unless his presence is Abong's re-arrest. But he was gone. Nonetheless, the
specifically ordered by the court for purposes of prosecution moved that the hearing continue in accordance
identification; (b) implied waiver when the accused with the constitutional provision authorizing trial in
without any justifiable cause is absent at the trial on a absentia. The respondent Judge denied the motion and
particular date of which he had notice; and (c) implied suspended all proceedings until the return of the accused.
waiver when the accused under custody who had been Hence, this petition.
notified of the date of trial escapes.
In cases in which there have been a waiver of the HELD: The doctrine laid down in People v. Avanceña has
right to be present, whether expressed or implied, the trial been modified by Art. IV, sec. 19 [now Art. III, sec. 14(2) of
may be held "in absentia". The requisites of a valid trial in the 1987 Constitution] which allows trial in absentia. The
absentia are: (i) the accused has been arraigned; (ii) he prisoner cannot by simply escaping thwart his continued
was duly notified of the hearing; and (iii) his failure to prosecution and possible eventual conviction provided only
attend the trial is unjustified. that (a) he has been arraigned; (b) he has been duly notified
of the trial; and (c) his failure to appear is unjustified. The
There can be no valid trial in absentia unless the right to be present at one's trial may now be waived except
accused has been arraigned, ruled the SC in Boria v. only at that stage where the prosecution intends to present
Mendoza, 77 SCRA 422 (1977), a case involving a charge witnesses who will identify the accused. The defendant's
for slight physical injuries where the accused failed to escape will be considered a waiver of this right and the
appear and so the trial court allowed the prosecution to inability of the court to notify him of the subsequent
present its evidence even if the accused has not yet been hearings will not prevent it from continuing with his trial.
arraigned. Arraignment is crucial because it informs the VV.
accued of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him. Conviction without arraignment violates due process
and ousts the court of its jurisdiction. Trial in absentia was introduced only in the 1973
Constitution to remedy a situation in which criminal
Boria v. Mendoza, 77 SCRA 422 (1977), supra. prosecution could not move because the accused has either
escaped or jumped bail.
HELD: The subsequent trial in absentia deprived petitioner
of his right to be heard by himself and counsel. The In People v. Prieto, 84 SCRA 198 (1978), the SC
indispensable requirement for trial in absentia is that it ruled that trial in absentia does not justify the accused to
should come after arraignment. VV. jump bail. Just because th Constitution allows trial in
absentia does not mean that the accused is now free to
waive his right to be present during the trial. If he does, he
Waiver of the right to be present implies also waiver runds the risk of having his bail bond forfeited.
of the right to present evidence. Thus, if the accused fails to
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZP G & ASSOCIATES
HELD: The innovation introduced by the present c) Promulgation of judgment, except that
Constitution goes no further than to enable a judge to when the judgment is for a light offense, he may be
continue with the trial even if the accused is not present represented by his counsel or a personal emissary.
under the conditions therein specified. It does not give the
accused the right to jump bail. VV.
HELD: Was the jurisdiction lost when the accused escaped People v. Salas, 143 SCRA 163 (1986), supra.
from the custody of the law and failed to appear during the
trial? No. As we have consistently ruled, jurisdiction once HELD: The right to be present at one's trial may now
acquired is not lost upon the instance of parties but be waived except only at that stage where the
continues until the case is terminated. The lower court was prosecution intends to present witnesses who will
correct in proceeding with the reception of evidence but it identify the accused.
erred when is suspended the proceedings as to the
respondent. The court need not wait for the time until the c. Promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a light offense,
accused finally decides to appear. To allow this delay is to in which case accused may appear by counsel, or a
render ineffective the constitutional provision on trial in representative (Rule 120, Sec. 6.)
absentia.
E. Priviledge against self incrimination
9. When presence of the accused is a DUTY
Art. III, Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to
In People v. Avancena, 32 O.G. 713, the SC held that be a witness against himself.
(a) the accused has the right to be present during trial; (b) if
he is in the custody of the law, presence in all stage is Any confession or admission obtained in violation of
likewise a duty during (i) arraignment, (ii) entering a plea, section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against
and (iii) promulgation of judgment. This rule however has him. [Art. III, Sec. 12 (3)]
been modified.
1. Scope of privilege: Compulsory
As things stand, the following are the rules: Testimonial self-incrimination
1. Generally, the accused has the right to be present The privilege covers only testimonial incrimination
at all stages the trial (from arraignment to rendition of obtained compulsorily. It refers therefore to the use of the
judgment). mental process and the communicative faculties, and not to
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZP G & ASSOCIATES
a merely physical activity. If the act is physical or compelling a man to exhibit himself, for when he is
mechanical, the accused can be compelled to allow or exhibited, whether voluntarily or by order, even if the order
perform the act, and the result can be used in evidence goes too far, the evidence if material, is competent.
against him. The prohibition contained in section 5 of the
Philippine Bill that a person shall not be compelled to be a
Thus the accused can be required to allow a sample witness against himself, is simply a prohibition against legal
of a substance taken from his body (U.S. v. Tan Teng. 23, process to extract from the defendant's own lips, against his
Phil. 145 (1912)). will, an admission of his guilt.
Mr. Wigmore, in his valuable work on evidence, in
F: This defendant was charged with the crime of rape. discussing the question before us, said:
He was found guilty of the charge. He appeals the decision If, in other words, it (the rule) created inviolability
on the ground that the lower court erred in admitting the not only for his [physical control] in whatever form
testimony of the physicians about having taken a certain exercised, then it would be possible for a guilty person to
substance from the body of the accused while he was shut himself up in his house, with all the tools and indicia of
confined in jail and regarding the chemical analysis made of his crime, and defy the authority of the law to employ in
the substance to demonstrate the physical condition of the evidence anything that might be obtained by forcibly
accused with reference to a venereal disease. It was overthrowing his possession and compelling the surrender of
discovered that the rape victim was infected by venereal the evidential articles a clear reductio ad absurdum. In other
disease so that the finding of venereal disease in the accused words, it is not merely compulsion that is the kernel of the
was material to his conviction. privilege, . . . but testimonial compulsion. (4 Wigmore, sec.
Upon this information the defendant was arrested 2263.)
and taken to the police station and stripped of his clothing The main purpose of the provision of the Philippine
and examined. The policeman who examined the defendant Bill is to prohibit compulsory oral examination of prisoners
swore from the venereal disease known as gonorrhea. The before trial. or upon trial, for the purpose of extorting
policeman took a portion of the substance emitting from the unwilling confessions or declarations implicating them in
body of the defendant and turned it over to the Bureau of the commission of a crime. (People vs. Gardner, 144 N. Y.,
Science for the purpose of having a scientific analysis made 119.)
of the same. The result of the examination showed that the The doctrine contended for by appellant would
defendant was suffering from gonorrhea. prohibit courts from looking at the fact of a defendant even,
for the purpose of disclosing his identity. Such an
Issue: Whether or not the information that the accused has application of the prohibition under discussion certainly
gonorrhea may be used against him could not be permitted. Such an inspection of the bodily
features by the court or by witnesses, can not violate the
Ruling: YES. The accused was not compelled to make any privilege granted under the Philippine Bill, because it does
admissions or answer any questions, and the mere fact that not call upon the accused as a witness it does not call upon
an object found on his person was examined: seems no more the defendant for his testimonial responsibility. Mr.
to infringe the rule invoked, than would the introduction in Wigmore says that evidence obtained in this way from the
evidence of stolen property taken from the person of a thief. accused, is not testimony but his body his body itself.
The substance was taken from the body of the
defendant without his objection, the examination was made
by competent medical authority and the result showed that The accused can be ordered to expel the morphine
the defendant was suffering from said disease. As was from his mouth (U.S. v. Ong Sio Hong 36 Phil 735, (1917)).
suggested by Judge Lobingier, had the defendant been found
with stolen property upon his person, there certainly could U.S. v. Ong Sio Hong 36 Phil 735, (1917)
have been no question had the stolen property been taken for
the purpose of using the same as evidence against him. So Counsel for appellant raises the constitutional
also if the clothing which he wore, by reason of blood stains question that the accused was compelled to be a witness
or otherwise, had furnished evidence of the commission of a against himself. The contention is that this was the result of
crime, there certainly could have been no objection to taking forcing the accused to discharge the morphine from his
such for the purpose of using the same as proof. No one mouth. To force a prohibited drug from the person of an
would think of even suggesting that stolen property and the accused is along the same line as requiring him to exhibit
clothing in the case indicated, taken from the defendant, himself before the court; or putting in evidence papers and
could not be used against him as evidence, without violating other articles taken from the room of an accused in his
the rule that a person shall not be required to give testimony absence; or, as in the Tan Teng case, taking a substance from
against himself. the body of the accused to be used in proving his guilt. It
But the prohibition of compelling a man in a would be a forced construction of the paragraph of the
criminal court to be a witness against himself, is a Philippine Bill of Rights in question to hold that any article,
prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion, to substance, or thing taken from a person accused of crime
extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his could not be given in evidence. The main purpose of this
body as evidence, when it may be material. The objection, in constitutional provision is to prohibit testimonial
principle, would forbid a jury (court) to look at a person and compulsion by oral examination in order to extort unwilling
compare his features with a photograph in proof. Moreover confessions from prisoners implicating them in the
we are not considering how far a court would go in
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZP G & ASSOCIATES
RULING: The extrajudicial confessions are inadmissible. The privilege is available in any proceedings, even
They were made in the presence of a counsel summoned by outside the court, for they may eventually lead to a criminal
the NBI and not of appellants' own choice. He cannot prosecution.
therefore be said to have been acting on behalf of the
accused when he lent his presence at the confession In Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners, 28 SCRA
proceedings. 344 (1969), the SC held that the privilege against self-
But the accused were denied their right to counsel incrimination extends to administrative proceedings which
not once but twice when they were forced to re-enact the possess a criminal or penal aspect. In this case, it was held
crime. Forced re-enactments like uncounselled and coerced that a doctor who was being investigated by a medical board
confessions come within the ban against self-incrimination. for alleged malpractice and would lose his license if found
This constitutional privilege has been defined as a protection guilty, could not be compelled to take the witness stand
against testimonial compulsion but this has since been without his consent.
extended to any evidence communicative in nature acquired
under circumstances of duress. Essentially, the right is Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners, 28 SCRA 344
meant to avoid and prohibit positively the repetition and (1969)
recurrence of the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling
a person, in a criminal or any other case, to furnish the F: Arsenio Pascual, Jr., petitioner-appellee, filed on
missing evidence necessary for his conviction. February 1, 1965 with the Court of First Instance of Manila
an action for prohibition with prayer for preliminary
People v. Go, 237 SCRA 73 injunction against the Board of Medical Examiners, now
respondent-appellant. It was alleged therein that at the initial
F: After a buy-bust operation accused were arrested by hearing of an administrative case for alleged immorality,
the police. Upon the presentation of a search warrant, the counsel for complainants announced that he would present
house of the accused was searched, and several prohibited as his first witness herein petitioner- appellee, who was the
drugs were seized. They were charged with and convicted respondent in such malpractice charge. Thereupon,
of violation of the Dangerous Drugs law. They contended petitioner-appellee, through counsel, made of record his
that they had not been shown a search warrant. In objection, relying on the constitutional right to be exempt
concluding that a search warrant had been presented to the from being a witness against himself. Respondent-appellant,
accused prior to the search, the trial court relied on a the Board of Examiners, took note of such a plea, at the
document entitiled “Certificate of Re-conduct of Search”, same time stating that at the next scheduled hearing, on
signed by the accused. February 12, 1965, petitioner-appellee would be called upon
to testify as such witness, unless in the meantime he could
ISSUE: Whether or not such document is admissible in secure a restraining order from a competent authority.
evidence. A decision was rendered by the lower court on
August 2, 1965, finding the claim of petitioner-appellee to
RULING: IT CANNOT BE ADMITTED IN ITS be well-founded and prohibiting respondent Board "from
ENTIRETY. compelling the petitioner to act and testify as a witness for
The second paragraph of the Certification amounts to the complainant in said investigation without his consent
an implied admission that shabu, the marked money, and and against himself."
shabu papaphernalia had been found by the police
authorities at the residence of the Go spouses and therefore, HELD: Petitioner could suffer the revocation of his license
subject to the control and custody of the accused (the as a medical practitioner, for some an even greater
spouses) and necessarily in their possession. To this extent, deprivation.
the “Certification” is a declaration against the interest and Why it should be thus is not difficult to discern. The
tacit admission of the crime charged. The second paragraph constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an
of the Certification is a self-incriminatory statment made at accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not go
a time when the spouses were not assisted by counsel and unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such
under circumstances (in the course of or immediately after desirable objectives should not be accomplished according
the search of the residence and seizure of quantities of to means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect
shabu) which render intelligent waiver of their right against accorded the human personality. More and more in line with
self-incrimination open to serious doubt. the democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual
The Court considers that there is nothing to prevent even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given
admission of the “Certification” to substantiate the fact that due weight. To quote from Chief Justice Warren, "the
a search warrant issued by a judge had been brought to the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the
attention of the spouses in the course of the raid or buy-bust respect a government ... must accord to the dignity and
operation carried out at their residence and that in the course integrity of its citizens."
thereof, no force or intimidation had been exercised upon Thus according to Justice Douglas: "The Fifth
the spouses. Amendment in its Self-Incrimination clause enables the
Notwithstanding such, the accused were convicted of citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may
the crime charged against them. not force to surrender to his detriment." So also with the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZP G & ASSOCIATES
observation of the late Judge Frank who spoke of "a right to When the State requires testimony to be made before
a private enclave where he may lead a private life. That right a board or body, it has to grant immunity by means of law to
is the hallmark of our democracy." In the light of the above, the persons testifying, so as not to violate their right against
it could thus clearly appear that no possible objection could self-incriminatrion. This is the only way to reconcile two
be legitimately raised against the correctness of the decision conflicting values; public interest to get certain relevant
now on appeal. We hold that in an administrative hearing information, say, to legislation, that can only be supplied by
against a medical practitioner for alleged malpractice, the testimony of certain persons and the highly primed
respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot, constitutional right not to make a person a witness against
consistently with the self-incrimination clause, compel the himself.
person proceeded against to take the witness stand without
his consent. Through an immunity statute, the state in effect
exchanges immunity for the testimony of a witness. The
In Galman v. Pamaran, infra, the privilege was held problem concerns the extent of immunity that the State must
to extend to fact-finding investigation by an adhoc body. grant in order to protect the privilege against self-
incrimination.
A person can be compelled to testify provided he is given In a transactional immunity, a person is given
immunity co-extensive with the privilege against self- immunity from prosecution of the crime in connection with
incrimination which he gave his testimony. The immunity is from the
prosecution, not merely from the use of the testimony.
F: The respondents led by General Fabian Ver and Thus, even if the guilt of the person testifying can be proven
Major General Prospero Olivas testified before the Agrava by independent means, he can not be prosecuted anymore.
Board looking into the killing of former Senator Benigno
Aquino. They were subsequently accused of murder in two Use and Fruit Immunity
cases for the killing of Sen. Aquino and Rolando Galman.
They were charged as accessories in both. The prosecution In a use and fruit immunity, a person is exempted
offered in evidence the testimony of Ver and Olivas before from the use of his testimony as well as the leads (fruits)
the Agrava Board, but on the latter's objections, the that the testimony opened up in a criminal prosecution
Sandiganbayan excluded the testimony. The private and arising from what he testified on. The immunity in this case
public prosecutions filed petitions for certiorari. is from the testimony given. Thus, if the state can procure
evidence, independent of the testimony and its fruits, it can
HELD: The persons summoned to testify before the Agrava prosecute the person testifying nevertheless.
Board were "under investigation for the commission of the
offense" within the meaning of Art. III, sec. 12. It is to be
noted that the framers of the Constitution did not adopt the History in the United States
Miranda reference to "custodial investigation." The subject
matter dealt with and the questioning before the Agrava In Councilman v. Hitchcock (1892), the SC ruled
Board indubitably evinced purposes other than merely that the only way to respect the right against self-
determining the surrounding facts and circumstances of the incrimination is to give transactional immunity; anything
assassination. The respondents were called to determine less violates the constitutional right.
their probable involvement in the crime. Yet they were not
informed or at the very least warned of their right to remain Thus, Congress in 1893 passed the Compulsory
silent and that any statement given by them may be used Testimony Act, providing for transactional immunity.
against them. The first portion of Sec. 5 of PD 1886 denied
them the right to remain silent, and gave power to the Board In 1964, the U.S. SC in Murphy v. Waterfront
to punish refusal to testify. The SC said it is not satisfied that Commission of New York hinted that it was not really
when they testified they waived their constitutional right not necessary to give transactional immunity in order to protect
be compelled to be a witness against themselves, much less the right against self incrimination.
their right to remain silent. The SC also said it cannot be
contended that the privilege against self- incrimination This gave the U.S. Congress the cue to revise the
applies only to criminal prosecutions. Art. III, sec. 17 of the Compulsory Testimony Act and provide for a "use and fruit
Const. provides that "No person shall be compelled to be a immunity".
witness against himself."
With the validity of this limited immunity was
raised, the SC in Castigas v. U.S. and Zicarelli v. U.S. ruled
that the right is amply protected by the use and fruit
Compare People v. Ayson, 175 SCRA 216 (1989), supra. immunity.
Galman v. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 274 (1985), supra. Issue: Whether or not Chavez right against self-
incrimination was violated
HELD: Immunity statutes may be generally classified into
two: one, which grants "use immunity" and the other, which Ruling: YES
grants what is known as "transactional immunity." The The right agianst self-incrimination is "not merely a
distinction between the two is: "Use immunity" prohibits formal technical rule the enforcement of which is left to the
use of a witness' compelled testimony and its fruits in any discretion of the court"; it is mandatory; it secures to a
manner in connection with the criminal prosecution of the defendant a valuable and substantive right; it is fundamental
witness. On the other hand, "transactional immunity" grants to our scheme of justice.
immunity to the witness from prosecution for an offense to The constitutional proscription was established on
which his compelled testimony relates. PD 1886, sec. 5 broad grounds of public policy and humanity; of policy
grants merely immunity from use of any statement given because it would place the witness against the strongest
before the Board, but not immunity from prosecution by temptation to commit perjury, and of humanity because it
reason or on the basis thereof. VV would be to extort a confession of truth by a kind of duress
every species and degree of which the law abhors.
Therefore, the court may not extract from a
4. Exclusionary rule defendant's own lips and against his will an admission of his
guilt. Nor may a court as much as resort to compulsory
Art. III, Sec. 12. xxx disclosure, directly or indirectly, of facts usable against him
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in as a confession of the crime or the tendency of which is to
violationof this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible prove the commission of a crime. Because, it is his right to
in evidence against him. forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZP G & ASSOCIATES
the witness stand with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his served his sentence. Years later, Chavez went to the SC on
own free, genuine will. habeas corpus, contending that his convictioin was void
Compulsion as it is understood here does not because it was rendered on the basis of evidence obtained in
necessarily connote the use of violence; it may be the the violation of his right against self- incrimination. The SC
product of unintentional statements. Pressure which operates granted the petition and released him.
to overbear his will, disable him from making a free and Habeas Corpus, as shown by this case, is an
rational choice, or impair his capacity for rational judgment extraordinary post-conviction, mid-sentence, remedy. The
would in our opinion be sufficient. So is moral coercion petition for habeas corpus is such that it inquires into all
"tending to force testimony from the unwilling lips of the questions of illegal detention. When the judge compelled
defendant." the accused to take the witness stand, he was ousted of his
Petitioner, as accused, occupies a different tier of jurisdiction and all subsequent proceedings became void.
protection from an ordinary witness. Whereas an ordinary Ultimately, the judgment of conviction and even the
witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and sentence were likewise void, thus making the detention of
claim the privilege as each question requiring an Chavez illegal, and thus actionable by habeas corpus.
incriminating answer is shot at him, and accused may The case also illustrates the difference between the
altogether refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to ordinary witness and the accused. A witness can be
answer any and all questions. For, in reality, the purpose of conmpelled to take the stand; he can only object to the
calling an accused as a witness for the People would be to questions as they come, invoking his right against self-
incriminate him. incrimination.
But in the case of the accused, he cannot even be
xxx With all these, we have no hesitancy in saying made to take the witness stand, for the only purpose of such
that petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate himself, in is to incriminate him.
full breach of his constitutional right to remain silent. It Of course, the moment the accused agrees to take the
cannot be said now that he has waived his right. He did not stand, he is deemed to have waived his right, and must now
volunteer to take the stand and in his own defense; he did thus submit himself to cross-examination.
not offer himself as a witness; on the contrary, he claimed
the right upon being called to testify. If petitioner E. Right to an impartial tribunal and trial of civilians by
nevertheless answered the questions inspite of his fear of military courts
being accused of perjury or being put under contempt, this
circumstance cannot be counted against him. His testimony Animas v. Minister of National Defense, 146 SCRA 406
is not of his own choice. To him it was a case of compelled (1986)
submission. He was a cowed participant in proceedings
before a judge who possessed the power to put him under F: This petition challenges the jurisdiction of a
contempt had he chosen to remain silent. Nor could he military tribunal to try twelve accused persons, only one of
escape testifying. The court made it abundantly clear that his whom is in the military, for the offense devoid of any
testimony at least on direct examination would be taken national security or political complexion and committed
right then and thereon the first day of the trial. long before the proclamation of martial law,
The course which petitioner takes is correct. Habeas The petitioners were charged with murder in
corpus is a high prerogative writ. It is traditionally connection with the alleged killing of Yanson, a political
considered as an exceptional remedy to release a person leader,during the November 11 elections.
whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the The accused were arrested almost a year later, on
accused's constitutional rights are disregarded. Such defect September 21, 1972 after martial law was proclaimed. It was
results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction and therefore only in 1974 that a "summary preliminary investigation"
invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the was conducted by a PC captain belonging to the Judge
accused whose fundamental right was violated. That void Advocate General Service. The petitioners were
judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral recommended for prosecution before the Military Tribunal,
attack, which precisely is the function of habeas corpus. considering that one of them, petitioner Sgt. Rodolfo
Habeas corpus is proper to challenge a conviction where the Animas is a military personnel. Thereafter, the Judge
consitutional rights of the accused were violated. Advocate General filed the corresponding charge sheet, but
A court which denies the accused of his he modified the crime charged from "Murder" to "Violation
constitutional rights is ousted of its jurisdiction. The of Section 878 of the Revised Administrative Code" in
judgment of conviction pronounced by a court without Relation to Section 2692 of the same Code and Presidential
jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned thereunder may Decree No. 9, " Illegal Possession of Firearms with
obtain release of habeas corpus. Murder."
On February 16, 1978, the Minister of National
Notes on the case: In this case, the accused Chavez Defense referred the case to the Military Tribunal's Branch
was compelled by the judge with the threat of being held in of the Judge Advocate General's Office (JAGO) which in
contempt to take the witness stand, in spite of his objection turn assigned the same to respondent Military Commission
that he had the right to remain silent and not to be a witness No. 27.
against himself. And so he took the witness stand and was
convicted by qualified theft. He appealed but the lawyer Issue: Whether or not Military Commission No. 27 is
failed to file the appellant's brief and so the appeal was without jurisdiction over the criminal case
dismissed, the judgment became final and executory, and he
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZP G & ASSOCIATES
HELD: NO
A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts 2. Debts and civil obligations
punishment without trial. Its essence is the substitution of a
legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. The Art. III. Sec. 20. No person shall be imprisoned
constitutional ban against bill of attainder serves to for debt or non-payment of a poll tax.
implement the principle of separation of powers by
confining legislatures to rule-making and thereby
forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function. What the law prohibits is imprisonment for non-
When the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it payment of a contractual obligation.
will be seen that it does not specify the Communist Party of
the Phils (CPP) of the members thereof for the purpose of When one is convicted of estafa and sent to prison,
punishment. What it does is simply to declare the Party to the imprisonment is not for the non- payment of debt but for
an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the the deceit or abuse of confidence employed by the convict.
Government for the purposes of the prohibition against
membersip in the outlawed organization. The term "CPP" Thus, in Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 123 (1986),
is used solely for definition purposes. In fact the Act applies the SC again upheld Batas Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law)
not only to the CPP but to "any other organizatuiion having as not unconsitutional for being violative of the rule against
the same purposes and their successors". Its focus is not on non- imprisonment for debt. It is true that under this law
individuals but on conduct. deceit is not necessary. It is, however, a valid exercise of the
Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of State of its power to determine what acts constitute a crime.
attainder, it would be totally unnecessary to charge
Communists in court, as the law alone, without more would What the Consitution further prohibits is
suffice to secure their punishement. But the undeniable fact imprisonment for non-payment of poll tax, which is a tax
is that their guilt still has to be judicially established. The imposed on certain persons regardless of their property or
Government has yet to prove at the trial that the accused business. The prohibition does not apply to non-payment of
joined the Party knowingly, willfully and by overt acts, and property taxes and taxes on privilege.
that they joined with the specific intent to further its basic
objectives.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZP G & ASSOCIATES
Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323 (1986) 1. Makes criminal an act done before the passage of
the law which was innocent when done, and punishes such
F: BP 22 punishes any person "who makes or an act;
draws and issues any check on account or for value, 2. Aggravates a crime , or makes it greater than it
knowing at the time of issue that he does not have was, when committed;
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for 3. Changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
the payment of said check in full upon presentment, punishment than the law annexed to the crime when
which check is subsequently dishonored by the committed;
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds xxx" 4. Alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes
Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of BP 22 conviction upon less or different testimony than the law
on the following grounds: 1) It offends the required at the time of the commission of the offense;
constitutional provision prohibiting imprisonment for 5. Assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies
debt; 2) it impairs freedom of contract; 3) it only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for
contravenes the equal protection clause; 4) it unduly something which when done was lawful; and
delegates legislative and executive powers; and 5) its 6. Deprives a person accused of a crime of some
enactment is flawed because the Interim Batasan lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as
prohibited amendment of the bill on 3rd reading. the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of amnesty. [Quoting Mekin v. Wolfe, 2 Phil.
HELD: The gravamen of the offense punished in BP 74 (1902)]
22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check This constitutional prohibition refers only to
or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for criminal laws which are given retroactive effect.
payment. It is not the non- payment of an obligation While it is true that Sec. 18 penalizes a violation of
which the law punishes. The law punishes the act any provisin of RA 6132 including Sec. 8(a) thereof, the
not as an offense against property but as an offense penalty is imposed only for acts committed after the
against public order. Recent statistics show that one approval of the law and not those perpetrated prior thereto.
third of the entire money supply of the country There is nothing in the law that remotely insinuates that its
consists of currency in circulation. These demand provisions shall apply to acts carried out prior to its
deposits in the banks constitute the funds against approval.
which commercial papers are drawn. The amount
concerned justifies the legitimate concern of the state B. What punishments cannot be imposed
in preserving the integrity of the banking system.
1. Involuntary servitude
3. Acts which when done were innocent
Art. III, Sec. 18 (2) No involuntary sevitudes in
Art. III, Sec. 22. No ex post facto law or bill of any form shall exist, except as a punishment for a crime
attainder shall be enacted. whereof the party shall have been convicted.
solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of HELD: Art. III, section 19 does not change the periods of
detention are prohibited. the penalty prescribed by Art. 248 of the RPC except insofar
as it prohibits the imposition of the death penalty adn
reduces it to reclusion perpetua. The range of medium and
Assuming that judgment has been rendered and the minimum penalties remain the same. VV.
accused has been convicted the Constitution now further
prescribes certain standards as to the punishment that can be
meted out. After all, due process prohibits barbaric and People v. Lubreo, 200 SCRA 11 (1991)
disproportionate penalties.
F: A complaint for homicide was filed with MTC of
The employment of physical, psychological or Del Carmen, Surigao del Norte, charging Remelito Lubreo
degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee, or along with crime of Homicide in connection with the killing
the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under of Mamerto Sanico. Judge Gorgolon of said court
subhuman conditions, shall be dealt with by law. [Art. III, conducted both the preliminary investigation and
Sec. 19 (2).] preliminary examination. Thereafter, he forwarded the
records of the case to the Office of Provincial Fiscal. The
In 1935, the prohibition was against "cruel and fiscal conducted his own PI and on the basis thereof, he filed
unusual" penalty, in 1973; it was against "cruel or unusual " an information for murder not only against remelito but also
penalty; in 1987, the prohibition is against "cruel, degrading against Lucresio Lubreo. Trial Court find them guilty of the
or inhuman" punishment. The purpose in changing the crime charged.
phraseology is to allow for experimentation, and not to fix
the concept of what is cruel to the standards of the present ISSUE: W/N the constituional presumption of innocence in
civilization, or those of antiquity. This notion is supposed to favor of Lucrecio has been overturned by the prosecution
expand and grow, so that what today is considered as
acceptable may in the next generation be deemed as cruel HELD: NO.
penalty. An accused is presumed innocent until the contrary
is proved. The burden of proof is upon the prosecution and
Whether the cruelty of a punishment depends on its until such burden is sufficiently discharged , the accused
form or whether it depends on its severity has been continues to enjoy the presumption of innocence. In the
ambivalently answered by the SC: instant case, the lower court convicted Lucrecio on the basis
of its conclusion that he was positively identified by
In People v. dela Cruz, 92 Phil. 900 (1953) the SC witnesses Nenita Monter and Epifanio Pangatungan as one
ruled that it was the form of punishment as fixed in antiquity of the assailants, and that therefore, his defense of alibi
(pillory desembowelment, etc.) and not its severity, that would not prosper. Unfortunately, the testimonies of the
constituted "cruel and unusual" penalty under the 1935 abovementioned witnesses did not categorically stated or
Constitution. Thus a disproportionate penalty (10 years proved that Lucrecio took part in hacking the victim.
imprisonment for theft) is not cruel or unusual because it is Though Monter categorically stated in her direct
only a matter of severity of an acceptable form of examination that she saw the accused Lucresio hacking the
punishment (imprisonment). victim, in the "re-enactmment", she however candidly
informed the court Lucresio was just standing by and she
The SC spoke in a different way in People v. Borja could not remmenber as to who actually hacked the victim.
91 SCRA 340 (1979), Borja was sentenced and he served at From her version, the participation of Lucrecio is at one
the national penitentiary for 20 years before the case came enveloped inserious doubt. It is worse in the case of
to the SC. The Court said that Borja had been living in the Pangatungan. While he stated that "Lucrecio abetted in
shadow of death. Although the sentence was initially valid, hacking as if they will come one after the other in hacking
it had become cruel by the lapse of time. And yet, this was a his mind (sic) and the neck", he never elaborated as to what
form of penalty that was neither cruel nor unusual. "abetted in hacking " means. He could not even specify the
part of the body of Mamerto which was hit by Lucrecio.
There is evidently insufficient evidence to show the
People v. Munoz, 170 SCRA 107 (1989) actual participation of Lucresio in teh crime. There being no
evidence of conspiracy, he cannot be held for the acts of his
F: The accused are four of the 11 bodyguards of a co- appellant.
mayor who killed three persons on suspicion that they were
cattle rustlers. They were found guilty of murder. Three 4. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado and
appealed to the SC which found them equally liable for the other forms of detention and the use of substandard or
killing. The penalty for murder under the RPC is reclusion inadequate penal facilities
temporal to death. The question concerns the penalty to be
imposed in view of Art. III, sec. 19 which provides that
"Neither shall the death penalty be imposed, unless for Art. III, Sec. 12. xxx
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, Congress (2) No torture, force, violence, threat,
provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free
reduced to reclusion perpetua." will shall be used against him. Secret detention places,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZP G & ASSOCIATES
solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of subjected the victim to another medical examination and
detention are prohibited. found a wound, that it was the fault of the prosecution if
they had an incompetent medical examination.
Id., Sec. 19. xxx
(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or (3) The plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made
degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee without the consent of the fiscal and the offended party.
or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities
under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law. Identity of offenses and identity of act
necessarily includes the offense charged in the former was then inexistent, no jeopardy could attach therefor during
complaint or information under any of the following the first prosecution, and consequently a subsequent charge
instances: for the same cannot constitute a second jeopardy. Suzette.
(a) the graver offense developed due to
supervening facts arising from the same act or omission
consituting the former charge; People v. City Court of Manila, Branch XI, 121 SCRA 637
(b) the facts constituting the graver charge (1983)
became known or were discovered only after the filing of
the former complaint or information; or F: This is a petition to review the order of the City
(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was Court of Manila Branch XI, dismissing the information for
made without the consent of the fiscal and of the homicide thru reckless imprudence filed against Gapay, in a
offended party. criminal case on the ground of double jeopardy. Respondent
In any of the foregoing cases, where the accused court held that the accused having been previously tried and
satisfied or serves in whole or in part the judgement, he convicted of serious physical injuries thru reckless
shall be credited with the same in the event of conviction imprudence for the resulting death of the victim would place
for the graver offense. the accused in double jeopardy.
prosecuted anew for frustrated murder for the same act the sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of
committed against the same person law. The SC dismissed. Meanwhile, the Sandiganbayan
rendered its decision acquitting all the accused of the crime
HELD: NO. charged. Respondents submitted that in view of the SB
In order not to violate the constitutional prohibition decision, the case has become moot and academic.
on double jeopardy, there is the indispensable requirement Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the SC
of the existence of a new fact which supervenes for which ruling. The SC created the Vasquez Commisssion to look
the defendant is responsible changing the character of the into petitioners' allegations.
crime imputed to him and together with the facts existing
previously constituting a new and distinct offense. RULING: The report of the Commission revealed that Pres.
In this case, there is no supervening fact which Marcos used the overwhelming resources of the
occurred to justify the non-existence of double jeopardy. Government and his authoritarian powers to corrupt and
The wound causing the delay in the healing of the injuries make a mockery of the judicial process in this case. The
caused to the victim was already in existence at the time of unwholly scenario for the acquittal of the accused after the
the first examination of the doctor. Said delay was caused rigged trial would accomplish the two principal objectives
by the very superficial and inconclusive examination then of satisfying the public clamor for the suspected killers to be
made resulting to a later finding of fracture. Suzette. charged in court and of giviing them, through their acquittal,
the legal shield of double jepardy.
Barlongay: When defense of double jeopardy However, double jeopardy does not attach where a
available.-- (1) Dismissal based on isufficiency of criminal trial was a sham. A dictated, coerced and scripted
evidence; (2) dismissal bec. of denial of accused's right to verdict of acquittal such as in this case is a void judgment.
speedy trial; (3) accused is discharged to be a state witness. In legal contemplation, it is no judgment. It neither binds
nor bars anyone. The criminal collusion as to the handling
When defense of double jeopardy not available.-- When and treatment of the cases by public respondents completely
the case is dismissed other than on the merits upon motion disqualified them and voided ab initio the SB verdict. DJ
of the accused personally, or through counsel, such cannot be invoked where the prosecution, which represents
dismissal is regarded as w/ express consent of the accused, the sovereign people in crimnal cases is denied due process.
who is therefore deemed to have waived the right to plea
double jeopardy.
People v. Obsania, 23 SCRA 249
Yap v. Lutero, April 30, 1959
F: The information filed by the fiscal alleged that
F: Yap was charged with reckless driving in violation through violence and intimidation, Obsania had carnal
of a city ordinance. Later he was charged again in another knowledge of one Erlinda Dollente against the latter's will.
criminal case in the same court with serious physical injuries Later, the fiscal amended the complaint to allege therein that
through reckless imprudence. Yap moved to quash the latter the offense was committed with lewd designs. The accused
information. Meanwhile, petitioner was acquitted in the first after pleading not guilty moved for the dismissal of the case
case. on the ground that the first information was fatally defective
for failing to allege "lewd desiigns," and that the amended
ISSUE: W/N there was double jeopardy. information did not cure the jurisdictional infirmity. The
motion of the defense was sustained by the judge. Hence
RULING: YES. From the viewpoint of Criminal Law, as this appeal by the fiscal.
distinguished from Constitutional or Political Law - the
offenses with which petitioner was charged constitute, RULING: The failure of the prosecution to allege "lewd
strictly different offenses, although, under certain designs" in the first information does not affect the
conditions, one offense may include the other, and sufficiency in substance of the information, for unchaste
accordingly, once placed in jeopardy for one, the plea of motives are deemed inherent in the very act of rape itself. In
double jeopardy may be in order as regards the other. any case, the lower court erred in dismissing the case by
Thus, if the injuries mentioned in the second failing to distinguish between the concept of jurisdiction and
information were not established by the evidence, petitioner insufficiency in substance of an indictment.
could be convicted in the first case of the very same As to the question of double jeopardy, the following
violation of municipal ordinance charged in the first case, requisites must have been obtained to invoke the
unless he pleaded double jeopardy. Charo. constitutional protection against it:
(1) a valid complaint or information;
(2) a court of competent jurisdiction;
Galman v. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43 (3) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and
(4) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the
F: The petitioners filed an action to nullify the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated
proceedings on the trial of the Aquino-Galman duble murder without his express consent.
case alleging that respondents Tanodbayan and
Sandiganbayan committed serious irregularities constituting The only remaining and decisive issue in this case
mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross seems to be as to whether or not the case was dismissed
violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and without the prior consent of the accused.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZP G & ASSOCIATES
The SC ruled that as a general rule, when the case is of the arrest or detention, or any other restraint to liberty.
dismissed, other than on the merits, upon motion of the When all else is lost, it is the last recourse to get someone
accused, such dismissal is to be ragarded as with the express out of his illegal detention.
consent of the accused and consequently he is deemed to
have waived his right to plead double jeopardy and/or he is 1. Functions of the writ
estopped from claiming such defense on appeal by the
Government or in another indictment for the same offense. Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 P 778 (1919)
The exception to this is where the dismissal is sought
by the accused on the ground that they were denied their Habeas corpus is available not only for those who
right to a speedy trial and that the government failed to are in actual detention but even for those whose liberty is
prosecute; in which case double jeopardy will set in. The merely restrained. Thus, in Moncupa v. Enrile, 141 SCRA
case of herein accused falls under the general rule. 233 (1986), the SC granted habeas corpus to petitioner who,
though temporarily released, could not travel outside Metro
D. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus Manila, could not change his residence, could not be
interviewed by media, and had to report to the military.
Art. III, Sec. 15. The privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of
invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it. 2. The writ of habeas corpus as a post-conviction
remedy
compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture guaranteed under the fundamental law and constitutes a
or similar practices, and their families. virtual denial of petitioner's freedom to express themselves
in print. This state of being is patenly anathematic to a
3. Compensation to, and rehabilitation of, victims of democratic framework where a free, alert and even militant
tortures press is essential for the political enlightenment and growth
of the citizenry.
Art. III, Sec. 12. xxx
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil New York Times v. Sullivan, 380 US 51 (1964)
sanctions for violations of this section as well as
compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture 3. For individual protection
or similar practices, and their families.
B. Prior Restraints
If the communication is only qualifiedly privileged Direct Incitement Test: The consitutional guarantees
(Art. 354 enumerates the 2 instances: fair and true reporting of free speech and press do not permit a State to forbid or
of an official proceeding; legal moral or social duty), the proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation,
burden is shifted on the prosecution to prove malice-in-fact, except where such advocacy or peech is directed to inciting
which the defense can overcome by proving the truth of the or producing imminent lawless action, and is likely to incite
defamatory statement (which in the case of public officials or produce such action. [Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
may or may not constitute a crime, so long as related to the (1969), cited in Salonga v. Cruz Pano, 134 SCRA 438
conduct of his office) and good motive. (1985).]
C. Content-Based Restrictions The test emphasizes the very words uttered: (a)
What words did he utter? (b) What is the likely result of
1. Test of validity of content-based restrictions such utterance? It criticizes the clear and present danger test
for being top dependent on the circumstances. Speaker may,
The U.S. Supreme Court and, by haphazard when tested show no incitement but you know the speaker is
imitation, the Philippine Supreme Court, have evolved inciting to sedition.
certain tests to regulate the contents of speech.
Balancing of Interest Test: The court must undertake
Dangerous Tendency Test: When the legislative the delicate and difficult task of weighing the circumstances
body has determined generally, in the exercise of its and appraising the substantiality of the reasons advanced in
discretion, that utterances of a certain kind involve such support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of rights.
danger of a substantive evil that they may be punished, the [American Communication Ass'n v. Douds, 339 US 383
question whether any specific utterance coming within the cited in Gonzales v. COMELEC, 27 SCRA 835 (1969A)]
prohibited class is likely, in and itself, to bring the
substantive evils, is not open to consideration. In such The test applied when two legitimate values not
cases, the general provision of the statute may be involving national secuirty crimes compete. Involves an
constitutionally applied to the specific utterance if its natural appoint of the competing interest. (Gonzales v. Comelec)
and probable effect was to bring about the substantive evil
which the legislative body might prohibit. [Gitlow v. New In Aver v. Capulong and Enrile, for instance, it is a
York, 268 US 652 (1925).] question of balancing the freedom of expression of the
producer and the right to privacy of Enrile.
Example: Art. 142. Inciting to sedition. When the
legislature has decided that one who advocates a certain (not in VV's revised outline)
conduct is guilty of a crime, the court cannot intrude. As it Balancing of Factors Test: The truth is theat the
evolved, this test was supposed to apply when there is a clear-and-present danger test is over- simplified judgement
statute, in contrast to the clear and present danger rule which unless it takes into account also a number of other factors:
applies when the speech is not prohibited by statute. (1) the relative seriousness of the danger in comparison
with the value of the occasion for speech or political
Clear and Present Danger Test: The question in activity, (2) the availability of more moderate controls than
every case is whether the words used are used in such those the State has imposed, and perhaps (3) the specific
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear intent with which the speech is launched. (Freund, quoted
and present danger that they will bring about the substantive in Dennis v. United States in the concurring opinion of
evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of Justice Frankfurter).
proximity and degree. [Schenck v. United States, 249 US 47
(1919).]
2. Applications of tests in various contexts
The emphasis of the test is the nature of the
circumstances under which it is uttered. The speech itself a. Freedom of expression and national security
may not be dangerous. As Holmes said: "Many things that
might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its Babst v. National Intelligence Board 132 SCRA 316
effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men (1984)
fight." Or saying "Fire" in a crowded movie house.
F: Petitioners are journalists and columnists. On
Grave-but-improbable danger: Whether the gravity different dates in July 1980, they were summoned by
of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies such an military authorities for interrogation regarding their work,
invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger. feelings, sentiments, beliefs, associations and even private
[Dennis v. United States, 341 US 494 (1951), quoting Judge lives. In addition, one of them was charged with libel by a
Learned Hand.] General who sought to recover P10 million in damages.
They brought an action for prohibition to stop the NIB from
This test was meant to supplant the clear and present questioning them and from filing libel suits on matters that
danger. They both emphasize the circumstances of the had been the subject of inquiry by the NIB.
speech, but this latter test consider the weighing of values.
HELD: The petition has become moot and academic. Be
that as it may, it is not idle to note that, while ordinarily, an
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZP G & ASSOCIATES
invitation to attend a hearing and answer some questions is published a news item based on petitioner's letter to ASAC.
not illegal or constitutionally objectionable, under certain This became the basis of an action for libel brought against
circumstances, however, such an invitation can easily petitioner and his clients. Petitioner moved to quash the case
assume a different appearance as when it comes from a but his motion was denied.
powerful group composed predominantly of ranking
military officers and the designate interrogation site is a HELD: From the viewpoint of procedural and substantive
military camp. law, the charge is defective. The letter constitutes privileged
communication. It was sent by petitioner in his capacity as
b. Freedom of expression and criticism of official conduct: lawyer in the discharge of his legal duty to his clients. He
The Test of "Actual Malice" could also invke his civic duty as a private individual to
expose anomalies in the public service. The complaint was
Read Revised Penal Code, Articles 353-354 and 361- addressed to the official who had authority over them and
362 could impose proper disciplinary sanctions. As an index of
good faith, the letter was sent privately, directly to the
Freedom of expression and libel addressee without any funfare nor publicity. As for the news
report, it is difficult to believe that the petitioner, an ordinary
Freedom of speech versus right to reputation. Libel citizen without known ties to newspaper, could have by
is the most common form of subsequent punishment. himself caused the publication. It does not appear either that
Although one cannot be prevented from saying something the report was paid for like an advertisement. At any rate,
before he actually says it, one can be held liable for what the news item is a true and fair report of a judicial
one has said if it causes damage to the rights of others. proceeding, made in good faith and without comments or
remarks. VV.
F: The President of the Philippines filed a complaint for F: Petitioner was sued for libel in connection with the
libel against the petitioners, who were the publisher and publication in the Feb. 23, 1981 issue of Newsweek of the
columnist of the Philippine Star, based on the following article "An Island of Fear." The plaintiffs, sugar planters of
statement in Beltran's column of Oct. 12, 1987 totle "The Bacolod, complained that the article portrayed them as
Nervous Officials of the Aquino Administration": "If you exploiters of sugar workers. Petitioner moved to dismiss the
recall, during the August 29 coup attempt, the President hid complaint on the ground that the article was not libelous
under her bed while the firing was going on - perhaps the since it did not single any particular individual. The trial
first Commander-in-Chief to do so." Beltran did not submit court denied the motion and petitioner filed a petition for
a counter affidavit and instead, moved to dismiss the certiorari in the IAC which was dismissed. Thus, this appeal
complaint. The fiscal denied his motion. Thus, this petition to the SC.
for certiorari.
HELD: Where the defamation is alleged to have been
HELD: xxx directed at a group or class, it is essential that the statement
(3) As regards the contention of petitioner Beltran must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to every
that he could not be held liable for libel bec. of the individual in that group or class, or sufficiently specific so
privileged character of the publication, the Court reiterates that each individual in the class or group can prove that the
that it is not a trier of facts and that such a defense is best defamatory statement specifically pointed to him, so that he
left to the trial court to appreciate after receiving the can bring the action separately if need be. The disputed
evidence of the parties. As to petitioner Beltran's claim that portion which refers to plaintiff Sola never singled out Sola.
to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a "chilling The news report merely stated that the victim had been
effect" on the press freedom, the Court finds no basis at this arrested by members of a special police unit brought into the
stage to rule on the point. VV. area by Sola, the mayor. Hence, the report referring as it
does to an official act is within the realm of privileged and is
Manuel v. Cruz-Pano, 172 SCRA 225 (1989) protected by the constitutional guarantees of free speech and
press. VV.
Libel suits based on official criticisms should be dismissed
outright unless made in bad faith Notes: Since the Newsweek artciles "Island of fear
in the Visayas" did not specify any individual, it cannot be
F: Petitioner wrote the Chairman of the Anti- libelous. An article must be sufficiently, specific or at least
Smuggling Action Center denouncing abuses allegedly sweeping as to apply to all members of a group, in order to
committed by ASAC agents against petitioner's clients. be deemed libelous.
Petitioner said the agents subjected Ng Woo Hay to
indignities and took her necklace and bracelet and her son's Lopez v. Court of Appeals, 34 SCRA 116 (1970)
wristwatch plus HK$ 70. But the agents were exonerated so
petitioner filed criminal charges of robbery. Petitioner found The pictures of a former mayor was inadvertently
prosecutors unsympathetic so he filed a civil action for published and mistaken for another man who was a sanitary
damages against the agents. Later, the Bulletin Today inspector and fooled the authorities about the Babuyan
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZP G & ASSOCIATES
Islands, claiming of murders there, so they could go and he him by the trial court, w/c was affirmed by the CA.
could be rescued. An erratum was published by the This Petitioner appealed to the SC contending that he was forced
Week magazine. The SC, quoting Quisumbing v. Lopez, to enter into the agreement only to avoid financial loss
however, found for plaintiff, but with reduced damages, caused by delay in the showing of the movie and the
since the error in in this case could have been checked relatives of Padilla did not have a property right in the life of
consideringing that this was a weekly magazine and not a M. Padilla since Padilla was a public figure.
daily.
HELD: Petitioner's averment is not well taken. Being a
Quisumbing v. Fernando, 96 Phil 510 (1955) public figure does not automatically destroy in toto a
person's right to privacy. The right to invade a person's
Newspapers should be given leeway and tolerance to privacy to disseminate public information does not extend to
enable them to courageously and effectively perform their fictional or novelized representation of a person, no matter
important role in our democracy. In the preparation of how a public figure he or she may be. In the case at bar,
stories, press reporters and editors usually have to race to while it is true that petitioner exerted efforts to present the
their deadlines; and consistently with good faith and true-to-life story of Moises Padilla, petitioner admits that he
reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a included a little romance in the film bec. w/o it, it would be
point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in a drab story of torture and brutality.
the choice of words. Freedom of expression, indeed, occupies a preferred
. position in the hierarchy of civil liberties. It is not,
however, w/o limitations. In the particular circumstances
Mercado v. CFI of Rizal 116 SCRA 93 (1982) presented and considering the obligations assumed by
petitioner under the agreement, the validity of such
F: Petitioner was accused of libel on the basis of a agreement will have to be upheld particular bec. the limits of
telegram which he sent to the Secretary of Public Works freedom of expression are reached when expression touches
requesting investigation of Mrs. Virginia Mercado of the upon matters of private concern. [In the agreement signed
Public Service Commission "as we have reason to believe by him, petitioner admitted that in the picture produced, he
that she has enriched herself thru corrupt practices xxx." He had "exploited the life story of Moises Padilla for pecuniary
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that his gain, and other profit motives, and (had) encroached upon
communication was privileged, but his motion was denied. the privacy of Moises Padilla's immediate family, and (had)
He filed another motion which was also denied. Thus, this in fact included, in the PICTURE's case, persons portraying
petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition in the SC. some of MOISES PADILLA's kin..."]
truthful and historical in its presentation of facts. There must court of appeals affirmed. The Court of Criminal Appeals of
be no showing of a reckless disregard of truth. Texas reversed, holding that the desecration statute as
applied violated the defendant's right to freedom of speech
Notes: Ayer sought to produce a movie on the 4-day under the Federal Constitution's First Amendment, because
revolution. Enrile, who had previously been asked for the the statute (1) was too broad for First Amendment purposes
use of his character in the movie and had refused the offer, as it related to breaches of the peace, and (2) was not
sued to enjoin the filming because he did not want any adequately supported by the state's purported interest in
mention of his and his family's name. The SC lifted the preserving a symbol of unity.
injunction issued by the lower court on the ground that it
amounted to prior restraint, which is no better if imposed by ISSUE: Whether the flag desecration statute is
the courts than if imposed by administrative bodies or by unconstitutional
ecclesiatical officials.
HELD: YES. Decision Affirmed.
In Ayer, the reference to Enrile is unavoidable Johnson's conviction was inconsistent with the First
because his name is part of history and this cannot be Amendment under the particular circumstances because (1)
changed or altered; thus his name can be used so long as Johnson's conduct was sufficiently imbued with elements of
only his public life is dwelled only. But in Lagunzad, communication to implicate the First Amendment, given
although Moises Padilla was also a public figure, the movie that this flag burning was the culmination of a political
dealth with both the public and private lives of Moises demonstration and that the state conceded that the
Padilla. protester's conduct was expressive; (2) the state's interest in
preventing breaches of the peace was not implicated on the
d. Freedom of expression and administration of justice record in this case, since (a) no disturbance of the peace
(contempt of court) actually occurred or threatened to occur because of the flag
burning, (b) it cannot be presumed that an audience which
In re Ramon Tulfo, AM NO. 90-4-1545-0, April 17. 1990 takes serious offense at a particular expression is necessarily
likely to disturb the peace, and (c) the flag burning does not
Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, 170 SCRA 1 (1989) fall within the small class of "fighting words" that are likely
to provoke the average person to retaliation and thereby
Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102 Phil 152 (1957) cause a breach of the peace; and (3) the state's asserted
interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and
A contempt imposed by the court on the party who national unity does not justify the conviction, since (a) the
sent a letter to the Presidential Action Committee attempted restriction on expression is content-based, and
complaining about the delay in the disposition of the thus subject to the most exacting scrutiny, given that the flag
agrarian case, was lifted by the SC. It held that although desecration statute is aimed not at protecting the physical
such a letter should have been sent to the SC and not the integrity of the flag in all circumstances, but only against
PAC, it was nevertheless a valid exercise of speech which impairments that would cause serious offenses to others and
did not significantly destroy, the orderly administration of is aimed at protecting onlookers from being offended by the
justice. ideas expressed by the prohibited activity, and (b) although
the state has a legitimate interest in encouraging proper
People v. Alarcon, 60 Phil 265 (1939) treatment of the flag, it may not foster its own view of the
flag by prohibiting expressive conduct relating to it and by
A person can be held liable for making comments on criminally punishing a person for burning the flag as a
a pending case (sub judice) which have the tendency to means of political protest.
impair or obstruct the orderly administration of justistice.
But if the case is not pending, such comment is a valid f. Movies Censorship
exercise of the freedom of expression.
While prior restraint is the general rule, censorship in
e. Symbolic Expression-- The Flag-burning case the movies is tolerated because by the nature of the medium,
it has a greater impact on the audience and produces instant
Flag burning when done to express dissent is protected reaction for the ideas it presents, unlike newspapers which
speech. are read by people separated by walls.
HELD: Motion pictures are important both as a method for But radio deserves greater regulation than
the communication of ideas and the expression of the artistic newspapers because it could invade the privacy of everyone
impulse. The power of the Board is limited to the for no fee, and it is such that one is likely to listen to what is
classification of films. For freedom of expression is the rule being said.
and restrictions the exception. The power to impose prior
restraint is not to be presumed, rather the presumption is
against its validity. Censorship is allowable only under the Eastern Broadcasting Corp. (DYRE) V. Dans, 137 SCRA
clearest proof of a clear and present danger of a substantive 647 (1985)
evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any
other legitimate public interest. The Board committed an F: The petitioners filed this action to compel
abuse of discretion in subjecting petitioner to difficulty and respondent government officials to allow the reopening of
travail before the movie was classified as "For adults only" Radio Station DYRE after it had been closed for allegedly
without deletion. However there is not enough votes to having been used to incite the people to sedition. The
consider the abuse of discretion grave as it explained that petitioner contended that it was denied due process because
there were reasons for its action because of the scenes no hearing was held and no proof was submitted to establish
showing women erotically dancing naked and kissing and a factual basis for the closure. However, before the Court
caressing each other like lesbians. VV. could promulgate its decision the petitioner filed a motion to
withdraw its action on the ground that it had sold the radio
station to Manuel Pastrana and that the National
Notes: The movie involved in this case was "Kapit Telecommunications Commission had expressed its
sa Patalim" which the censors wanted to cut in some part willingness to grant the requisite license.
and to label "For Adults". The SC rules that movies are
within the constitutional protection of freedom of HELD: The case has been moot and academic. However,
expression, so that censorship is presumed to be valid as for the guidance of the inferior courts and administrative
constituting prior restraint. The only case whe the Board of bodies, the following guidelines must be observed: 1) The
Censors can order a deletion is when there is a clear and cardinal primary requirements in administrative proceedings
present danger of a substantive evil against national security as laid down in Ang Tibay v. CIR should be followed before
or public morals or other public interest. In all other cases, a broadcast station may be closed; 2) All forms of
the Board can only classify. communication are entitled to the broad protection of the
freedom of expression clause. Necessarily, the freedom of
But a different standard must be followed in television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in
television because of the pervasive and intrusive influence scope than the freedom accorded to newspapers and print
of the medium on people who watch its programs without media. This limitation derives from the fact the broadcast
having to pay anything. media have a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all
Filipinos; 3) The government has a right to be protected
On the issue of obscenity, the SC held that sex along against broadcasts which incite listeners to violently
is not necessarily obscenity, the test being whether, using overthrow it; and 4) Broadcast stations deserve the special
contemporary community standards, the dominant appeal us protection given to all forms of media by the due process
to the prurient interest. (Miller v. California). Thus on this and freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution.
score, it found abuse of discretion of the part of the Board
for subjecting the producer to difficulty and for entertaining h. Freedom of Information
a narrow view of obscenity, but it lacked the votes to rules
that the abuse was grave. Art. III, Sec. 7. The right of the people to
information on matters of public concern shall be
Tests of obscenity: recognized. Access to official records, and to documents
(1) Whether the average person, applying and papers pertaining to, official acts, transactions, or
contemporary community standards, would find that the decisions, as well as to government research data used as
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest. basis for policy development, shall be afforded the
(2) Whether the work depicts or describes, in a citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined law.
by the applicable law.
(3) Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks Baldoza v. Dimaano, 71 SCRA 14 (1976)
serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. (Miller
v. California, 37 L. Ed. 2d 419.) Access of official records (the docket book) for any
lawful purpose (to look into the criminal cases for a report
g. Radio Broadcast on the peace and order situation of the municipality) is
guaranteed. But it is subject to reasonable conditions by the
In Eastern Broadcasting Corp. v. Dans, 137 SCRA 647, the custodian of the records.
SC held that radio broadcast also enjoys the protection of
the freedom of expression. If closed down, the owners
enjoy the rights to due process according to the standards set Garcia v. BOI, 177 SCRA 374 (1989)
in Ang Tibay v. CIR.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZP G & ASSOCIATES
F: Petitioners herein were representatives of mass Public Assembly Act of 1985 (Batas Blg. 580)
media which were prevented from selling and donating
space or air time for political advertisements under RA A permit to hold a rally must be filed with the Office
6646. of the Mayor at least, five working days before the day of
the rally.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6646 constitutes a violation of
the constitutional right to freedom of expression. But no permit from the mayor is required in case the
rally is going to be held in (i) freedom parks, (ii) inside a
RULING: NO. The Comelec has been expressly authorized private property (provide with consent of the owner), and
by the Constitution to supervise or regulate the enjoyment or (iii) campuses of state universities (which are left to
utilization of the franchises or permits for the operation f university authorities)
media of communication and information. The fundamental
purposes of such power are to ensure "equal opportunity, The application must be in writing and must include:
time, and space, and the right to reply," as well as uniform (1) names of the organizers and leaders, (2) date and time,
and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such media place and street, (3) size (4)manner of the use of the street,
facilities, in connection with "public information campaigns (5) sound system to be used (6)purpose. It must also have a
and forums among candidates." statement of the duties of the rallyists.
Of course, the law limits the right of free speech and
of access to mass media of the candidates themselves. The The written application is filed with the Office of the
limitation however, bears a clear and reasonable connection Mayor. Acknowledgemet is given of its receipt. If the
with the objective set out in the Constitution. For it is Mayor refuses to accept the application, then it is enough for
precisely in the unlimited purchase of print space and radio filing purposes if a copy is posted in the premises.
and television time that the resources of the financially
affluent candidates are likely to make a crucial difference. The Mayor has 2 working days to act on the
application. If he does not act, it is deemed granted.
Adiong v. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 712 (1992)
But if he thinks that the rally creates a "clear and
F: Petitoner, Adiong, a 1992 senatorial candidate, present danger" to public peace, order, health, etc., and he
assails Comelec Resolution No. 2347 insofar as it prohibits has proof of this, he should not deny the application right
the posting of decals and stickers on mobile places, public or away. He should hold a hearing during which the applicant
private, and limits their location or publication to authorized can be heard. If after hearing he is still not satisfied that no
posting areas. danger exists, then he can deny the application.
ISSUE: Whether or not the resolution is constitutional. The applicant can then go to any court other than the
Supreme Court for the review of the decision of denial of
RULING: NO. The prohibition unduly infringes on the the mayor. The courts have 24 hours to act on the petition.
citizen's fundamental right of free speech. There is no public If the judgment is a reversal of the denial, or in any case if
interest substantial enough to warrant the kind of restriction the applicant is satisfied with the decision, the judgment
involved in this case. The posting of decals amd stickers in becomes final and executory immediately, and no appeal can
mobile places does not endanger any substantial government be taken by the local authorities anymore.
or public interest. Under the clear and present danger rule,
not only must the danger be patently clear and pressingly But if the decision is not satisfactory to the
present but the evil sought to be avoided, must be so applicant, then he has 48 hours from receipt to appeal to the
substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a SC.
writing instrument to be stilled.
Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by During the rally, the police must be limited to
the prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or the maintaining peace and order and so must stay away by 100
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZP G & ASSOCIATES
meters from the rallyists. They must be in full uniform, with might threaten breaches of the peace and disruption of
their names visibly written. They can carry no firearm public order.
except a nighstick, but they are allowed protective devices.
ISSUE: W/n the Mayor can refuse to grant the permit.
If they anticipate trouble, the police must call the
attention of the leader of the rallyists. When trouble actually RULING: NO. The police power granted to the Mayor
erupts, the police must not disperse the crowd right away but under the Ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board
first give a warning. If violence persists, they must give a pursuant to its authority under the Revised Administrative
second warning. If still violence continues, only then can Code which pertains to the use of streets and public places,
they fight back. can be construed only to mean the power to regulate, which
means and includes the power to control, govern, and to
If a rally does not have a permit, the police can restrain but cannot be construed as synonymous with
disperse the crowd, but they cannot use violence. Penalty is "suppress" or "prohibit."
imposed only on the leaders and organizers. The Court quoted with approval the decision in the
American case Cox v. State of New Hampshire, " a statute
Among the duties of the rallyists are: (a) to inform requiring persons using public streets for a parade or
the members of their duty under the law, (b) to police their procession to procure a special license therefor from the
own rank, and (c) to cooperate with local authorities in local authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgement of
maintaining peace and order. the rights of assembly or of freedom of speech and press,
where, as the statute is construed by the state courts, the
licensing authorities are strictly limited, in the issuance of
Notes: The freedom to use public places to licenses, to a consideration of the time, place, and manner of
peaceably assemble is best expressed thus: "Wherever the the parade or procession, with a view to conserving the
title or steets and parks may rest, they have immemorially public convenience and of affording an opportunity to
been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of provide proper policing, and are not invested with arbitrary
time have been used for purposes of assembly, discretion to issue or refuse license..."
communicating thought betwee citizens, and discussing
public questions." (Justice Roberts. Hague v. CIO)
But under the same ordinance, the SC, in Navarro v.
Although under a "permit system", before one can Villegas, 31 SCRA 730 (1970), upheld the mayor's refusal to
use a public place, one must first obtain prior permit from grant permit to a group during weekdays, on a finding that
the proper authorities, the principle has always been that one everytime there was an announced rally, stores closed and
has the right to a permit, subject only to reasonable business was gravely affected because of violent incidents.
regulation. The validity of the permit system has been It found the policy of the mayor to allow rallies only during
upheld by the Court, provided, (a) it is concered only with weekends to be reasonable.
the time, place and manner of assembly ad (b) it does not
vest on the licensing authority unfettered discretion in
choosing the groups which could use the public place and Navarro v. Villegas, 31 SCRA 730 (1970)
discriminate others.
F: The petitioner, acting in behalf of the Movement for
As held by the SC in Primicias vs Fugoso, 80 Phil. a Democratic Philippines (MDP), an association of students,
71, the City Ordinance of Manila giving authority to the workers and peasants, applied for a permit from the Mayor
Mayor to issue permits for parades should be construed to of Manila to hold a rally at Plaza Miranda. Respondent
be limited to the time, place, and manner of the parades Mayor denied the application to hold the rally on the date
socially to secure public order, convenience and welfare. and time specified by petitioners in view of the events that
Thus, denying the Nacionalista Party a permit to hold a rally transpired during the last demonstration held by them which
at the Plaza Miranda on the ground that passions raised by ended in the destruction of public and private property, loss
the recent national election were still high and a rally to of a few lives, injuries to a score of other persons and the
protest election anomalies could only exacerbate the matter, closing down of schools, offices and many stores. The
was overturned by the court. Mayor suggested that the MDP utilize the Sunken Gardens
near Intramuros for its rally and that the rally be held during
weekends and earlier during the day so that it may end
Primicias vs Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71 before dark.
Petitioner challenged the action of the Mayor on
F: This is an action for mandamus instituted by the ground that the same constitutes a violation of their right
petitioner Primicias, campaign manager of the Coalesced to freedom of assembly. Petitioner contended that the right
Minority Parties, to compel Mayor Fugoso of the City of of the people to peaceful assembly and to petition the
Manila to issue a permit for the holding of a peaceful public government for redress of grievances may be exercised
meeting at Plaza Miranda for the purpose of petitioning the without the prior necessity of securing a permit from the
government for redress of grievances. The Mayor denied the government and that such right cannot be fully enjoyed
application on the ground that passions still run high due to without the corresponding right to use public places for that
the recent election, and a rally to protest election anomalies purpose.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZP G & ASSOCIATES
ISSUE: Whether or not the Mayor`s denial to issue a permit Geneva Convention that requires the host country to protect
amounted to a violation of petitioner`s right to freedom of the premises and personnel of the embassy.
assembly.
Then it gave guidelines for the issuance of permits
HELD: NO. (now in BP 9801 (i) any group which applies must do so
The respondent Mayor has not denied nor absolutely within a sufficient time so the authority can have time to act:
refused the permit sought by petitioner. He has expressed (ii) if a disagreement arises over a denial of a permit, the
willingness to grant the permit for the peaceful assembly applicant can question the denial in the lower court, which
during certain days and time, and at a place when they can try questions of fact and law, and (iii) appeal can be
would not disrupt the normal activities of the community. made to the SC on an expedited procedure.
The respondent mayor possesses reasonable
discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places J.B.L. Reyes v. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553 (1983)
to be used for the assembly in order to secure convenient use
thereof by others and provide adequate and proper policing F: Retired Justice JBL Reyes, on behalf of the Anti-
to minimize the risks of disorder and maintain public safety Bases Coalition, sought a permit from the City of Manila to
and order. hold a peaceful march and rally on Oct. 26, 1983 starting 2
Petitioner has failed to show a clear specific legal p.m. from Luneta to the gates of the US Embassy. He filed
duty on the part of respondent Mayor to grant their this petition because as of Oct. 20, there was yet no action
application for a permit unconditionally. Experience in on his request to hold a rally.
connection with present assemblies and demonstrations have
shown that they pose a clear and imminent danger of public HELD: Free speech, like free press, may be identified with
disorders, breaches of the peace, criminal acts, and even the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of
bloodshed as an aftermath of such assemblies, which, public concern without censorship or punishment. There is
petitioner has manifested, it has no means of preventing. to be no previous retraint whether in the form of libel suits,
Charo. prosecution for damages, or contempt proceedings unless
there is a "clear and present danger of a substantive evil that
the State has a right to prevent." There can be no legal
In Ignacio v. Ela, 99 Phil. 346 (1956), the majority objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger
upheld the mayor's denial of permit to members of the of a substantive evil to the holding of a peaceful rally at
Jehovah's Witnesses sect for the use of a klosk within the Luneta. Neither can there be objection to the use of the
town plaza in order to avoid any untoward incident with streets up to gates of the US Embassy. A statute requiring
members of the Roman Catholic Church, whose tenets are persons to secure a special license to use public streets for a
opposed to those of the petitioners, and whose church is procession is not unconstitutional. The licensing of
very near the klosk. authorities are strictly limited to the consideration of the
time, place and manner and the authorities are not invested
with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse a permit.
Ignacio v. Ela, 99 Phil. 346 (1956) In German v. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514 (1985), the
SC upheld the power of the city authorities to close JP
F: The Mayor denied a permit to the members of the Laurel Street fronting Malacanang from all rallies as a form
Jehovah's Witnesses to use the kiosk in the town plaza for of "area restriction", in order to protect the President and his
the purpose of holding a public lecture on the ground that family, based on the incident in the early 70s when the gates
the permit, if granted, may give rise to disturbance of the of the palace were almost stormed. The rallyists in this case
religious ceremonies being performed by the Catholic purported to merely worship at St. Jude's.
Church which was said to be within hearing distance from
the kiosk and which might lead to any untoward incident In case a rally is held in a private place, no permit
with members of the rival denomination. from the mayor is required. However, the consent of the
owner of the place must be acquired.
ISSUE: W/N the denial is valid.
German v. Barangan 35 SCRA 514 (1985)
In J.B.L. Reyes v. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553 (1983),
the SC found no basis for the denial of permit to the Anti- F: On Oct. 2, 1984 the petitioners who were
Bases Coalition to hold a march from Luneta to the street businessmen, students and employees, met on JP Laurel
fronting the U.S. Embassy. It affirmed the general rule that Street in Manila for the ostensible purpose of hearing mass
the use of streets is free to all. It found the fear entertained at the St. Jude Chapel which adjoins the Malacañang
by city authorities that the rallyists might be agirated by grounds. They wore yellow T-shirts and, with clenched fists,
provocateurs to be unfounded, given the report of the NPD marched on the street and shouted anti-government
that adequate security measures were provided by the police. invectives. They were stopped from proceeding to the
chapel by the Presidential Security Command. They brought
The Court did not rule on the validity of the an action for mandamus.
ordinance of Manila prohibiting any rally within 200 meters
from any foreign embassy as a means of complying with the HELD: The yellow T-shirts worn by some of the marchers,
their fists clenched and chants of anti-government investives
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZP G & ASSOCIATES
support the government's claim that the petitioners purpose Notes: Note that while the permit system is not
was not really to worship at the chapel but to hold an anti- allowed in the case of publication, it is allowed in the case
government demonstration close to the residence of the of assembly. In publication, censorship is presumptively
President. The restricted use of JP Laurel Street is justified. unconstitutional. There is very little possibility or
The need to secure the safety of heads of states cannot be justification for the regulation of news. The remedy in this
overemphasized. The threat to their lives is constant and felt case is prosecution or subsequent punishment.
throughout the world. The petitioners were not restrained in But in assembly regulation is allowed because it is
their freedom of religion but only in the manner by which needed by the very nature of the expression, when people
they had attempted to translate the same into action. use streets, they may deprive other groups which want to use
In Malabanan v. Ramento, 129 SCRA 359 (1984) the streets too. So as long as only the incidents of speech
and Arreza v. GAUP, 13 SCRA 94 (1985), the SC upheld are regulated, the measure is constitutionally acceptable.
the right to expression of students who held a rally in a
private university. But since they held it beyond the time
granted in a place other than the one allowed by the Nestle Phils. Inc. v. Sanchez 154 SCRA 541 (1987)
administration, their suspension was condoned.
F: While these cases were pending in the SC, the labor
Malabanan v. Ramento, 129 SCRA 359 (1984) unions involved intensified the pickets they had been
conducting in front of the Padre Faura gate of the Court and
F: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student set up picket quarters, at times obstructing access to and
Council of the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation. egress from the Court's premises. When required to show
They were granted a permit to hold a meeting to protest the cause why they should not be held in contempt of court,
merger of two units of the university. On the scheduled date, their lawyer apologized and assured that the above incident
the students continued their meeting beyond the scheduled would not be repeated.
time and held it in a different place from that indicated in
the permit. They expressed in a vehement language their HELD: The Court will not hesitate in future similar
opposition to the merger and as a result, classes and office situations to apply the full force of the law and punish for
work was disturbed. Petitioners were placed under contempt those who attempt to pressure the Court into
preventive suspension. On appeal, they were found guilt of acting one way or the other in any case pending before it.
holding an illegal assembly and oral defamation. They were Grievances must be ventilated in the proper channels, i.e.
suspended for one academic year. They filed a petition for through appropriate petitions or pleadings in keeping with
certiorari in the SC. the respect due the courts as impartial administrators of
justice. Moreover, "parties have a constitutional right to
HELD: The petititon may be considered moot and academic have the causes tried fairly in court by an impartial tribunal,
considering that the TRO issued by the SC allowed the uninfluenced by publication or public clamor xxx" The acts
students to enroll. But there is a need to pass squarely on the of respondents are not only an affront to the dignity of this
constitutional question. Respect for the constitutional rights Court but equally a violation of the above-stated right of the
of peaceable assembly and free speech calls for the setting adverse parties and the citizenry at large.
aside of the order of suspension. Suspending them for one
year is out of proportion considering that the vigorous 3. Freedom of Association and the right to strike in the
presentation of views was expected. The excitement of the public sector
occasion, the propensity of speakers to exaggerate and the
exuberance of the youth should be taken into consideration. Art. III, Sec. 8. The right of the people, including
those employed in the public and private sectors, to form
unions, associations, or societies for purposes not
Arreza v. GAUP, 13 SCRA 94 (1985) contrary to law shall not be abridged.
F: Petitioners were officers and members of the Student The inclusion of the right to unionize in this article is
Council of the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation. ill-advised because while the right to unionize is an
They were refused enrollment for having led a rally on Sept. economic and labor right, the right to association in general
28, 1982. is a civil- political right.
Discussed elsewhere is the argument why public
HELD: As held in Malabanan v. Ramento: "If in the course employees cannot engage in collective bargaining and
of such demonstration, with an enthusiastic audience strike.
goading them on, utterances, extremely critical, at times
even vitriolic, were let loose, that is quite understandable.
They would be ineffective if during the rally they speak in SSS Employees Assn vs CA, 175 SCRA 686 (1989)
the guarded and judicious language of the academe. At any
rate, even a sympathetic audience is not disposed to accord F: SSS filed w/ the RTC-QC a complaint for damages w/ a
full credence to their fiery exhortations. They take into prayer for a writ of prel inj. against petitioners SSSEA,
account the excitement of the occasion, the propensity of alleging that the officers and members of the latter staged an
speakers to exaggerate, the exuberance of youth. xxx" The illegal strike and barricaded the entrances to the SSS
refusal of the university to enroll the students is a highly building preventing non-striking employees from reporting
disproportionate penalty. to work and SSS members from transacting business w/
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZP G & ASSOCIATES
SSS. The Public Sector Labor-Management Council progress of the class;" that it would be "to the best interest
ordered the strikers to return to work but the strikers refused (of the petitioner) to work with a faculty that is more
to do so. The SSSEA went on strike bec. SSS failed to act compatible with her orientation. Garcia assailled her
on the union's demands. expulsion for being unreasonable; that the reasons given
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint therefor were invalid for nowhere did it appear that her
for lack of jurisdiction, w/c motion was denied. The conduct constituted a violation of the school's regulations
restraining order w/c was previously issued was converted and grave misconduct.
into an injunction after finding the strike illegal. Petitioners
appealed the case to the CA. The latter held that since the ISSUE: Whether or not the FAC can be compelled by
employees of SSS are govt employees, they are not allowed mandamus to readmit petitioner.
to strike.
RULING: NO. The Constitution recognizes the enjoyment
HELD: Employees in the Civil Service may not resort to by institutions of higher learning of the right to academic
strikes, walkouts and other temporary work stoppages, like freedom. The school decides for itself its aims and
workers in the private sector, in order to pressure the Govt. objectives and how best to attain them. It is free from
to accede to their demands. As now provided under Sec. 4, outside coercion or interference save possibly when the
Rule III of the Rules and Regulations to Govern the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a
Exercise of the Right of Govt. EEs to Self-Organization wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice
which took effect after the initial dispute arose, the terms of the students.
and conditions of employment in the Govt, including any The collective liberty of an organization is by no
political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and govt. means the same thing as the freedom of the individual
owned and controlled corporations with original charters, members within it. In considering the problems of academic
are governed by law and employees therein shall not strike freedom, one must distinguish between autonomy of the
for the purpose of securing changes thereof. university, as a corporate body, and the freedom of the
The statement of the court in Alliance of Govt individual university teacher.
Workers v. Minister of Labor and Employment (124 SCRA The personal aspect of the freedom consists of the
1) is relevant as it furnishes the rationale for distinguishing right of each university teacher to seek and express the truth
bet. workers in the private sector and govt employees w/ as he personally sees it, both in his academic work and in his
regard to the right to strike? capacity as a private citizen. This status of the individual
teacher is as important as the status of the institution to
Since the terms and conditions of govt. which he belongs and through which he disseminates
employment are fixed by law, govt. learning.
workers cannot use the same weapons On other hand, the internal conditions for academic
employed by workers in the private sector freedom in a university are that the academic staff should
to secure concessions from their have de facto control of the following functions: (a)
employers. The principle behind labor admission and examination of students; (b) curricula for
unionism in private industry is that courses of study; (c) appointment and tenure of office of
industrial peace cannot be secured through academic staff; and (d) allocation of income among the
compulsion of law. Relations bet. private different categories of expenditure. It is the business of a
employers and their employees rest on an university to proviide that atmosphere which is most
essentially voluntary basis. Subject to the conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an
minimum requirements of wage laws and atmosphere in which the four essential freedoms of a
other labor and welfare legislation, the university prevail - to determine for itself who may teach,
terms and conditions of employment in what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be
the unionized private sector are settled admitted to study.
through the process of collective For the above reason, mandamus is not available for
bargaining. In govt employment, the petitioner. There is no duty on the part of the School to
however, it is the legislature and, where admit her to study since the School clearly has the discretion
properly given delegated power, the to turn down even qualified applicants due to limitations of
administrative heads of govt w/c fix the space, facilities, professors and optimum classroom size and
terms and conditions of employment. And component considerations. There are standards to meet and
this is effected through statutes or policies to pursue. What a student possesses is a privilege
administrative circulars, rules, and rather than a right.
regulations, not through CBA's
UP v. Ayson, 176 SCRA 647 (1989)
E. Academic Freedom
F: In 1972, the UP BOR approved the establishment of
Garcia v. Faculty of Admission, 68 SCRA 277 (1975) the UPCB Highshool to serve, among others, "as a
laboratory and demonstration school for prospective
F: The FAC of the Loyola School of Theology refused teachers - provided that UPCBHS must be self-supporting."
to readmit petitioner, Garcia, in its M.A. program because However, the Dept of Professional Education in Baguio was
they felt that "her frequent questions and difficulties were never organized. So, the BOR decided to phase out
not always pertinent and had the effect of slowing down the UPCBHS for failing to attain the conditions for its creation.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZP G & ASSOCIATES
The UPCBHS Foundation Inc. sought to restrain the The clause prohibits excessive government
University from phasing out the UPCBHS. entanglement with, endorsement or disapproval of religion
[Vicoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54
ISSUE: Is secondary public education demandable in an (1974); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 US 668 (1984) (O'Connor,
institution of higher learning such as the UP? J., concurring); Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburg
ACLU, 492 US 574 (1989).]
RULING: NO. UP invokes its exercise of academic
freedom. Private respondent invokes the right to quality The clause prohibits the State from establishing a
education and to free secondary education. religion. In assessing the validity of the law, the questions
The rights invoked by private respondent may be to be asked are:
asserted only as against the Government through the DECS. a. Is the purpose of the law religious, or is it
UP was created under its charter to provide advanced secular?
tertiary education. An institute of higher learning cannot be b. Does it or does it not inhibit or advance religion?
compelled to provide for secondary education. c. Is its effect to promote or to avoid an excessive
It is beyond cavil that UP as an institution of higher entaglement between the State and religious matters in
learning enjoys academic freedom. UPCBHS was religion?
established subject to a number of conditionalities. Failing
on such conditions, UP can order its abolition on academic The Non-Establishment clause is violated when the
grounds. Charo. State gives any manifest support to any one religion, even if
nothing is done against the individual.
UP v. CA, Feb. 9, 1993 It is likewise violated if the State favors all religions,
for there may be atheists who are not so favored.
F: Former PANAMIN Minister Manuel Elizalde and
the Tasaday representative filed a complaint for damages 1. Operation of sectarian schools
and declaratory relief against UP Professors Jerome Bailen
and Zeus Salazar who disputed the authenticity of the While the ownership, creation and management of
Tasaday find and made a proposition in various conferences educational institutions must be in the hands of Filipinos or
attended by them that Elizalde merely fabricated the 60% Filipino-owned corporations, sectarian schools and
discovery of the Tasadays. those run by religious groups and missions board are
UP intervened, aaserting its duty to protect the exempted from these requirements, provided the
respondents as faculty members for acts and utterances administration is in the hands of Filipinos, who could be
made in the exercise of academic freedom. The lower court sectarian. [Art. XIV, Sec. 4(2).]
denied UP's motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of
action. Hence this petition.
2. Religious instruction in public schools
RULING: With respect to the prayer of the complaint for
"judgment declaring the Tasadays to be a distinct ethnic
community, the lower court is cautioned that the same is Provided it is upon the written petition of the parents
akin to a prayer for a judicial declaration of Philippine and it is at no cost to the State (although this is not entirely
citizenship which may not be granted in a petition for possible, because the use of classrooms and electricity are
declaratory relief. The complaint was filed mainly to costs in the State), religious instruction in public elementary
vindicate plaintiff's dignity and honor. and secondary schools during class hours, by one approved
Indeed, it is beyond the province of the court to by the authorities of the religion of the child or ward is
make pronouncements on matters beyond its ken and allowed. [Art. XIV, Sec. 3(3).] Religion can even be
expertise. To be sure, in resolving the complaint for integrated in the school curriculum. [Civ. Code, 359 (1).]
damages, the court may find congruence in what is
justiciable and what falls within the field of the sciences. 3. Anti-evolution laws
Still, it is best to keep in mind that its proper role and
function is the determination of legal issues. In Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), the SC
held that the teaching of the Darwinian theory of evolution
V. FREEDOM OF RELIGION cannot be prohibited from public shools by parents whose
religions finds the theory offensive.
Art. III, Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting
an establishment of religion; or prohibiting the free 4. Prayer and Bible-reading in public schools
exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, without discrimination In Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1967), the SC
or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test disallowed the conducting of an interdenominational prayer
shall be required for the exercise of civil or political before the start of classes in public schools as, violative of
rights. the Non- Establishment clause.
F: The respondent Board of Education upon the inhibition of religion, then the enactment exceeds the scope
recommendation of the State Board of Regents, directed the of legislative power as circumscribed by the First
School's District principal to cause the recitation in public Amendment. To withstand the strictures of the establishment
schools of a brief, denominationally neutral prayer. Its clause, there must be a secular legislative purpose and a
observance on the part of the students was voluntary. primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.
The place of the Bible as an instrument of religion
RULING: The Court ruled that the State of New York, by cannot be gainsaid. This is particularly so where the State's
using its public school system to encourage the recitation of recognition of the pervading religious character of the
the Regent's prayer has adopted a practice wholly exercise is evident from the rule's specific permission of the
inconsistent with the Establishment Clause. The prayer was alternative use of the Catholic Douay version of the Bible as
composed by govt officials as part of a governmental well as from a recent amendment permitting non-attendance
program to further religious beliefs. The constitutional at the exercises, none of those factors being consistent with
prohibition against laws respecting an establishment of the contention that the Bible is used either as an instrument
religion means at least that it is not part of the business of for non-religious moral inspiration or as a reference for the
the government to compose official prayers for any group to teaching of secular subjects.
recite as part of a religious program carried on by the govt.
The clauses of the 1st Amendment which prohibit 5. Tax exemption
laws respecting an establishment of religion and abridging
the free exercise thereof, although overlapping in certain Art. VI, Sec. 28. xxx
instances, forbids two diff kinds of governmental (3) Charitable institutions, churches, parsonages
encroachment upon religious freedom. The stablishment or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit
clause, unlike the free exercise clause, does not depend upon cemeteries, and all lands, buildings and improvements,
any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious,
violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official charitable or educational purposes shall be exempt from
religion, whether or not those laws operate directly to coerce taxation.
non-observing individuals. It rests on the belief that a union
of govt and religion tends to destroy govt and to degrade
religion, and upon an awareness of the historical fact that The ruling in Bishop of Nueva Segovia v. Provincial
governmentally established religion and religious Board, 51 Phil. 352 (1927) is modified to the extent now
persecutions go hand in hand. that the property must be "actually, directly and exclusively"
used for religious purposes to be exempt.
In Abington School District v. Schemp, 374 U.S. 203
(1963), it likewise disallowed the reading of a passage from If not for religious purposes, educational purposes.
the bible without comment in public schools as contrary to
the Non- Establishment clause. Bishop of Nueva Segovia v. Provincial Board, 51 Phil. 352
(1927)
Abington School District v. Schemp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)
F: The plaintiff, the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church,
The issue was whether the establishment clause was violated represented by the Bishop of Nueva Segovia, is the owner
by a Pennsylvania Statute or a rule of the Board of and occupant of a parcel of land in San Nicolas, Ilocos
Commissioners of Baltimore adopted pursuant to statutory Norte. On the south siide is a part of the church yard, the
authority requiring the reading without comment, at the convent and an adjacent lot used as vegetable garden. In the
opening of each school day, of verses from the Bible and the center is the remainder of the churchyard and the church. On
recitation of the Lord's prayer by the students in unison. The the north side is an old cemetery and the base of what was
students and parents may refuse to participate in the school once a tower. The Prov. Board imposed a tax on the whole
exercises. These exercises were prescribed as part of the land.
curricular activities of students who are required by law to
attend school and held in school buildings under the ISSUE: Whether or not the taxation is legal.
supervision and participation of teachers employed in those
schools. RULING: NO. The exemption in the payment of the land
tax mandated in the Constitution in favor of the religious
RULING: YES, the establishment clause was violated. entities refers to the home of the priest who presides over
The establishment clause prohibits a state from the church and who has to take care of himself in order to
placing official support behind the tenets of one or all discharge his duties. It therefore must include not only the
orthodoxies and the free exercise clause guarantees the right land actually occupied by the church but also the adjacent
of every person to freely choose his own course with ground destined for the ordinary incidental uses of man.
reference to religious training, teaching and observance, free Except in large cities where the density of the
from any compulsion from the State. population and the development of commerce require the
The test in determining whether a legislative use of large tracts of land for buildings, a vegetable garden
enactment violates the Establishment clause which belongs to a house and, in the case of a convent, its use is
withdraws all legislative power respecting religious belief or limited to the necessities of the priest. Therefore, which
the expression thereof, is the PURPOSE and the PRIMARY comes under the tax exemption.
EFFECT of the enactment. If either is the advancement or
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZP G & ASSOCIATES
As to the lot which was formerly the cemetery, while In Ignacio v. Ela, supra, the dissenting opinion of
it is no longer used as such, neither is it used for commercial Justice Concepcion pointed out that the mayor disapproved
purposes and, accdg to the evidence, is now being used as a the application for a permit not so much because he was
lodging house by the people who participate in religious afraid that breach of peace would ensue but because he
festivities. The same constitutes an incidental use in wrongly though the kiosk should be used for public
religious functions. It also comes within the exemption. purposes only and not for religious purposes. When the
Jehovah's Witness members use the public squares, they are
6. Public aid to religion no different from ordinary pedestrians or promenaders who
use the street: that they are performing religious acts is only
The payment or use of public money or property for incidental. So long as the use of public property is only
any religious institution or clergy is not allowed; except in incidentalally and temporarilly for religious purposes and so
those cases provided in the Constitution: priests assigned in long as the use is such as to be reasonably compatible with
the AFP, penal institution, government orphanage, or the use to which other members of the community are
leprosarium. [Art. VI, Sec. 29 (2)] similarly entitled, then the non-establishment clause is not
violated. The tests then are (1) Is the use of the public
But in Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201 (1937), the SC facility compatible with general use? (2) Is the resulting
held that the stamp printed by the government showing the benefit to the religious group only incidental.
map of the Philippines with a rosary to commemorate the
33rd International Eucharistic Congress to be held in Manila B. Free Exercise Clause
did not violate the Non-Establishment clause because its
main purpose, was to call the world's attention to Manila as 1. Flag Salute
the site of an international congress, and whatever benefit it
gave the Catholic Church was only incidental. Ebranilag v. Division Superindentent of Schools of Cebu,
219 SCRA 256 (1993)
health or any other legitimate public interest, that the state informed the plaintiff that it was conducting the business of
has a right and duty to prevent. Absent such a threat to general merchandise without securing the necessary license
public safety, the expulsion of the pets. from the schools is and paying the requisite fee in violation of the City
not justified. ordinance. Plaintiff protested against this requirement as
xxx constituting a restraint upon the exercise of religion. It
Although petitioners do not participate in the claimed that it is not engaged in business which necessitates
compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in external the securing of a license as it never made any profit from the
acts or behavior that would offend their countrymen who sale of its bibles.
believe in exercising their love of country through the
observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance as applied to
attention during the ceremony to show their respect for the petitioner is unconstutional for being in restraint of
right of those who choose to participate in the solemn petitioner's right to free exercise of religion.
proceedings. As there is no disruption, expulsion is
unwarranted. HELD: YES. The power to tax the exercise of the privilege
However, if they should commit breaches of peace is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment. Those who
by action that offend the sensibilities, both religious and can tax the exercise of religious practice can make its
patriotic, of other persons, the school authorities have the exercise so costly as to deprive it of the resources necessary
power to discipline them. for its maintenance. It is true that the price asked for the
religious articles was in some instances a little bit higher
than the actual cost of the same, but this cannot mean that
Compare West V. Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 US plaintiff was engaged in the business or occupation of
624 (1943) selling said "merchandise" for profit. The mark up can only
be treated as contributions by the faithfuls to the religious
F: The State Board required public school pupils to cause. The Ordinance CANNOT be applied to plaintiff
salute the flag of the United States while reciting a pledge of society, for in so doing, it would impair its free exercise and
allegiance under penalty of expulsion entailing liability of enjoyment of its religious profession and worship, as well as
both pupil and parents to be proceeded against for unlawful its right to disseminate religious beliefs.
absence. Appellees, members of the Jehovah's Witnesses,
consider the flag as a graven image which they are 3. Exemtion from union shop
forbidden to salute under their religious beliefs. The State
asserts the power to condition access to public education. Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54
(1974)
ISSUE: W/N the compulsory flag salute is valid.
F: Benjamin Victoriano is an employee of the Elizalde
RULING: NO. Rope Factory. In 1962, he resigned from the respondent
In connection with pledges, the flag salute is a form labor union on the ground that the Iglesia ni Kristo of which
of utterance. It requires an affirmation of a belief and an he is a member prohibits union membership. As the union
attitude of mind. It is now a commonplace that censorship or demanded his dismissal from employment pursuant to a
suppression of expression of opinion is tolerated by the closed shop agreement, Victoriano brought this action for
Constitution only when the expression presents a clear and injunction. The CFI ruled in his favor exempting from the
present danger of action of a kind the State is empowered to closed-shop contracts members of religious sects which
prevent and punish. Here the power of compulsion is prohibit affiliation of their members in any labor
invoked without any allegation that remaining passive organization. The union appealed.
during a flag salute ritual creates a clear and present danger
that would justify an effort even to muffle expression. HELD: The statute does not violate the rights of
To sustain the compulsory flag salute, we are association. It does not impair the obligation of contracts for
required to say that a Bill of Rights which guards the not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix
individual's right to speak his mind left it open to public the obligation of the parties but the reservation of essential
authorities to compel him to utter what is not in his mind. attributes of sovereign power is also read into such
The Court applies the limitations of the Constitution contracts. Neither does the law constitute an establishment
with no fear that freedom to be intellectually and spiritually of religion. It has been held that in order to withstand
diverse or even contrary will disintegrate the social objections based on this ground, the statute musr have a
organization. To believe that patriotism will not flourish if secular purpose and that purpose must not directly advance
patriotic ceremonies are voluntary and spontaneous instead or diminish the interest of any religion. Congress acted
of a compulsory routine is to make an unflattering estimate merely to relieve persons of the burden imposed by union
of the appeal of our institutions to free minds. security agreements.
American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 101 P 386 (1957) Pamil v. Teleron 86 SCRA 413 (1978)
F: Plaintiff is engaged in the distribution and sale of F: In 1971, Fr. Margarito Gonzaga was elected mayor
bibles and religious articles. The City Treasurer of Manila of Albuquerque, Bohol. A petition was filed against him on
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 ZP G & ASSOCIATES
the basis of section 2175 of the Revised Administrative RULING: The right involved in this case is not the right to
Code providing that "in nocase shall there be elected or travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the
appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in Philippines. Essentially, the right involved is the right to
active service, persons receiving salaries from provincial return to one's country, a totally distinct right under
funds, or contractors for public works." The CFI dismissed international law, independent from although related to the
the petition on the ground that the ineligibility has been right to travel.
impliedly repealed by section 23 of the 1971 Election Code. The right to return to one's country is not among the
rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which
HELD: The voting of the SC was inconclusive. Seven treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but
justices held that section 2175 is no longer operative. Justice it is the Court's well considered view that the right to return
Fernando held that section 2175 imposed a religious test on may be considered as a generally accepted principle of
the exercise of the right to run for public office contrary to international law, and under our Constitution, is part of the
Art. III of the 1935 Constitution. Justice Teehankee held that law of the land. However, it is distinct and separate from the
section 2175 had been repealed by the Election Code. Five right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the
justices held that section 2175 is constitutional. Intl. Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e. against
being arbitrarily deprived thereof.
The request or demand of the Marcoses to be
VI. LIBERTY OF ABODE AND OF TRAVEL allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in
the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing
Art. III, Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of liberty of abode and the right to travel. It must be treated as
changing the same within the limits prescribed by law a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual
shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and
court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to
except in the interest of national security, public safety, safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such
or public health, as may be provided by law. request or demand should submit to the exercise of a
broader discretion on the part of the President to determine
whether it must be granted or not.
Salonga v. Hermoso 97 SCRA 121 (1980)
Right to travel