SIGNIFICANT DOCTRINES IN RULES ON EVIDENCE

APPLICABILITY OF THE RULES

It has been held that a reliance on the technical rules of evidence in labor cases is misplaced. Hence, the application of the concept of judicial admissions in such cases would be to exact compliance with technicalities of law that is contrary to the demands of substantial justice. (Mayon Hotel & Restaurant vs. Adana, G.R. No. 157634, 5/16/ 2 5!
ADMISSIBILITY VALUE AND PROBATIVE

%uestions concerning the credibility of a witness are best addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court as it is in the best position to observe their demeanor and bodily movements. ($lanto vs. Al&ona, 45 %)RA 2++, 1/31/ 2 5! The failure of a witness to recall each and every detail of an occurrence may even serve to strengthen rather than wea$en his credibility because it erases any suspicion of a coached or rehearsed testimony. The assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is best underta$en by the trial court. The testimony of a single witness if straightforward and categorical is sufficient to convict. "orroborative evidence is deemed necessary only when there are reasons to warrant the suspicion that the witness falsified the truth or that his observations had been inaccurate. (R"vera vs. .eo(le, G.R. No. 13+553, 6/3 /2 5!
Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus

The admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value. Admissibility refers to the question of whether certain pieces of evidence are to be considered at all, while probative value refers to the question of whether the admitted evidence proves an issue. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence. (He"rs o# $ourdes %ae& %a'an(an vs. )or*o(osa, G.R. No. 152+ 7, +12/ 2 3!
ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE vs.

Admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence, while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade. (,-. .ool o# A//red"ted 0nsuran/e )o*(an"es vs. Rad"o M"ndanao Net1or2, 0n/., 4+ %)RA 314, 3anuary 27, 2 6!
BASIC TENETS OF CREDIBILITY

The principle of #alsus "n uno, #alsus "n o*n"'us is not strictly applied in this jurisdiction. It deals only with the weight of the evidence and is not a positive rule of law. The rule is not an inflexible one of universal application. &odern trend in jurisprudence favors more flexibility when the testimony of a witness may be partly believed and partly disbelieved depending on the corroborative evidence presented at the trial. (.eo(le vs. Ne7osa, G.R. No. 142+56857, +/25/ 2 3!
COLLATERAL MATTERS

indings of credibility of the trial court will generally be respected on appeal! even findings of facts of the "ourt of Appeals, when supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive and binding upon the parties and not reviewable by the #upreme "ourt. (M"llares vs. .$,4, G.R. No. 154 7+, 5/6/2 5! actual findings of trial courts which have been affirmed "n toto by the "ourt of Appeals are entitled to great weight and respect and will not be disturbed absent any showing that the trial court overloo$ed certain facts and circumstances which could substantially affect the outcome of the case. (5ulo vs. .eo(le, 452 %)RA 7 5, 3/4/2 56 Mendo&a vs. .eo(le, 44+ %)RA 15+, 1/14/ 2 5!

'ariations in the declarations of witnesses in respect of collateral or incidental matters do not impair the weight of their testimonies, ta$en in their entirety, to the prominent facts, nor per se preclude the establishment of the crime and the positive identification of the malefactor. (.eo(le vs. A/osta, G.R. No. 14 3+6, 11/29/2 1!
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

In a criminal case, circumstantial evidence may be sufficient for conviction provided the following requisites concur( )*+ There is more than one circumstance! ),+ The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven, and6 )-+ The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
*

reasonable doubt. (.eo(le vs. %ev"lleno, G.R. No. 152954, 3/11/2 46 :n7sod vs. .eo(le, 47+ %)RA 2+2!

A conviction based on circumstantial evidence must exclude each and every hypothesis consistent with innocence. Hence if the totality of the circumstances eliminates beyond reasonable doubt the possibility of innocence, conviction is proper (Mallar" vs. .eo(le, 446 %)RA 74, 12/ 1 /2 4! "ircumstantial evidence may be a basis for conviction and such conviction can be upheld provided the circumstances proven constitute an unbro$en chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the accused to the exclusion of all others as the guilty person. .irect evidence is not the only matrix from which the trial court may draw the conclusions and findings of fact. (.eo(le vs. -ernal, G.R. Nos.1327918 14 465866, 9/2/2 2! "ircumstantial evidence is not a wea$er defense v"s8;8v"s direct evidence. (.eo(le vs. Mat"to, G.R. No. 1444 5, 2/2/2 4! As to probative value, the "ourt considers circumstantial evidence of a nature identical to direct evidence because no greater degree of certainty is required when the evidence is circumstantial than when it is direct. In both types of evidences what is required is proof beyond reasonable doubt. (.eo(le vs. -ernal, G.R. Nos. 132791814 465866, 9/ 2/ 2 2! .irect evidence is not a condition s"ne <ua non to prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. In the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial evidence. "rimes are usually committed in secret and under conditions where concealment is highly probable. If direct evidence is insisted on under all circumstances, the prosecution of vicious felons who commit heinous crimes in secret or secluded places will be impossible to prove. (.eo(le vs. %ev"lleno, G.R. No. 152954, 3/11/2 4!
JUDICIAL NOTICE OF DECISIONS

or are actually pending before the same judge. "ourts may be required to ta$e judicial notice of the decisions of the coordinate trial courts, or even of a decision or the facts involved in another case tried by the same court itself, unless the parties introduced the same in evidence or the court, as matter of convenience, decides to do so. 0esides judicial notice of matters which ought to be $nown to judges because of their judicial functions is only discretionary upon the court. It is not mandatory. (4='ol" A7ro80ndustr"al ,evelo(*ent, 0n/. (4A,0! vs. %ol"la(s", Ad*. )ase No. 4766, 12/27/2 2! JUDICIAL NOTICE OF FINANCIAL CONDITION OF THE GOVERNMENT

1udicial notice could be ta$en of the fact that the government is and has for many years been financially strapped, to the point that even the most essential services have suffered serious curtailment. ($a -u7al8-=laan 4r"'al Asso/"at"on vs. Ra*os, 445 %)RA1, 12/1/2 4! However, the allegation that there is a so2called consensus to extend the terms of barangay captains cannot be subject of judicial notice. (-ala>onda vs. )o**"ss"on on ?le/t"ons, 452 %)RA 643, 2/2+/ 2 5!
JUDICIAL NOTICE OF CERTAIN FACTS

3otwithstanding a person4s standing in the business community, the court cannot ta$e judicial notice of said person4s home address or office after his departure from the government as a cabinet member. (Garru/@o vs. )ourt o# A((eals, 44+ %)RA 165, 1/14/ 2 5! The "ourt ta$es notice that it is not unusual that $illings are perpetrated in front of witnesses. (Aelas/o vs. .eo(le, 4+3 %)RA 649, Mar/@ 2+, 2 6!
ADMISSIONS MADE IN THE COURSE OF COURT PROCEEDINGS

As a general rule, courts are not authori/ed to ta$e judicial notice in the adjudication of cases pending before them of the contents of other cases even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been tried
,

1udicial admissions do not require proof and may not be contradicted in the absence of a prior showing that the admissions had been made through palpable mista$e. (A'ar<ue& vs. .eo(le, 479 %)RA 225! An admission made by a party, under the rules of evidence, binds him and may be ta$en or used against him. If the admission was made in the course of the proceedings in the same case, it does not

require proof, and may be contracted only by showing that it was made through palpable mista$e or that no such admission was made. (Aesa7as vs. )ourt o# A((eals, G.R. No. 142924, 12/ 5/2 1! ADMISSIONS BY COUNSEL

5hile an admission made on the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party ma$ing such admission and that the same is conclusive as to him, it is also a hornboo$ doctrine that the authority of an attorney to bind his client as to any admission of facts made by him is limited to matters of judicial procedure. An admission which operates as a waiver, surrender or destruction of the client4s cause is beyond the scope of the attorney4s implied authority. (.eo(le vs. Her*anes, G.R. No. 139416, 3/12/2 2! 6ven the negligence of counsel binds the client. (%arra7a vs. -an/o B"l"("no %av"n7s & Mort7a7e -an2, G.R. No. 1437+3, 12/ 9/ 2 2! This rule is not however, without exception. In cases where rec$less or gross negligence of counsel derives the client of due process of law, or when its application will result in outright deprivation of the client4s liberty or property or when the interests of justice so require, relief is accorded the client who suffered by reason of the lawyer4s gross or palpable mista$e or negligence. (%ala&ar vs. %ala&ar, G.R. No. 14292 , 2/6/2 2!
ADMISSION BY SILENCE #ilence is admission if there was a chance for respondent to deny the charges. (,onton vs. $or"a, 4+4 %)RA 224, Mar/@ 1 , 2 6!

$nowledge, and! )e+ that the fact admitted from his silence is material to the issue. (.eo(le vs. .ara7sa, +4 %)RA 1 5! Thus, in one case, despite the many opportunities given to the respondent, he refused to comment and present his side. The gravity of the charges and the weight of the evidence against him would have prompted an innocent man to come out and clear his name. However, he opted to maintain his silence. His silence can easily be interpreted as an admission of guilt. (Crt"& vs. ,e Gu&*an, A.M. No. .8 3817 +, 2/26/2 5! UNCOUNSELED ADMISSIONS An admission is inadmissible in evidence under Art. III #ec. *,)*+ and )-+ of the "onstitution if it was given under custodial investigation and was made without the assistance of counsel. However, if the defense failed to object to its presentation during the trial, the result is that the defense is deemed to have waived objection to its admissibility. (.eo(le vs. %a*us, G.R. Nos. 13595785+, 9/17/2 2! In Aballe vs. 7eople, the "ourt held that the declaration of an accused expressly ac$nowledging his guilt of the offense may be given in evidence against him and any person, otherwise competent to testify as a witness, who heard the confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood it. The said witness need not repeat in verbatim the oral confession! it suffices if he gives its substance. In the recent case of 7eople vs. 8uela, the "ourt ruled that an admission made to a private person is admissible in evidence against the declarant pursuant to #ec. ,9 of :ule *-; of the :ules of "ourt, which states that the <act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. (.eo(le vs. ,e $a )ru&, G.R. Nos. 141162863, 7/11/2 2! ADMISSIBILITY CONFESSION OF EXTRAJUDICIAL

The rule on admission by silence applies to both criminal and civil cases although must be received with caution because not every silence is an admission. or instance, the silence of a person under investigation for the commission of an offense should not be construed as an admission by silence because of constitutional reasons. ()r"sosto*o vs. %and"7an'ayan, 456 %)RA 45, 4/15/2 5! 3ot every silence of a party is admissible. It is necessary that( )a+ that he heard and understood the statement! )b+ that he was at liberty to ma$e a denial! )c+ that the statement was about a matter affecting his rights or in which he was interested and which naturally calls for a response! )d+ that the facts were within his
-

The "ourt, with its constant tryst with retracting confessants, has drawn the cardinal requirements for an extra2judicial confessions to be admissible to wit( )*+ the confession must be voluntary! ),+ the confession must be made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel, preferably to the confessant4s choice! )-+ the confession must be express, and! )=+ the confession

must be in writing. (.eo(le vs. .or"o, G.R. No. 1172 2, 2/13/2 2!

his conscience. (.eo(le vs. $adao, G.R. Nos. 1 94 841, 11/27/2 1!

>nder #ec. - of :ule **- of the :ules of "ourt, and extrajudicial confession made by an accused shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. "orpus delicti means the body of the crime and, in its primary sense, that a crime has actually been committed. Applied to a particular offense, it is the actual commission by someone of the particular crime charged. (.eo(le vs. 4a'o7a, G.R. Nos. 144 +68+7, 2/ 6/2 2! The issue on the admissibility of an extrajudicial confession is addressed, in the first instance, to the judge, and since such discretion must be controlled by all the attendant circumstances, courts have wisely forborne to mar$ with absolute precision any rule limiting the admission or the exclusion of such confession. This judicial reluctance in accepting extrajudicial confession lin$ing an accused to the crime, particularly when subsequently disputed, can be appreciated when it is shown that the confession has been made freely and voluntarily, without compulsion or inducement, or hope of reward of any sort. (.eo(le vs. 4a'lon, G.R. No. 1372+ , 3/13/2 2!
In ascertaining whether or not an extrajudicial confession has been voluntarily made, courts resort to an examination of the confession itself, the language that is used, as well as how it is composed, and whether or not it is replete with details that could only be supplied by the accused himself and would not have been $nown to the investigating police officers. (.eo(le vs. 4a'lon, G.R. No. 1372+ , 3/13/2 2!

A confession of the accused constitutes evidence of a high order since it is supported by a strong presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and $nowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and his conscience. ?nce the prosecution has shown that there was compliance with the constitutional requirement on pre2 interrogation advisories, a confession is presumed to be voluntary, and the burden is on the accused to destroy this presumption. The declarant bears the burden of proving that his confession is involuntary and untrue. A confession is admissible until the accused successfully proved that it was given as a result of violence, intimidation, threat, or promise of reward, or leniency. (.eo(le vs. Ran"s, 3r., G.R. No. 129113, 9/17/2 2! 5here the prosecution failed to discharge the #tate4s burden of proving with clear and convincing evidence that the accused had enjoyed effective and vigilant counsel before the extrajudicially admitted his guilt, the extrajudicial confession cannot be given any probative value. (.eo(le vs. %uela, G.R. Nos. 13357 871, 1/15/2 2! "onsonant with the constitutional precept that a person under custodial investigation should have a right to counsel <in every phase of the investigation,@ the court has held in a number of cases that a person under custodial investigation should enjoy the right to counsel from its inception to its termination. Truly, the accused4s counsel of choice must be present and must be able to advise and assist his client from the time he answers the first question until the time he signs the extra2judicial confession. (.eo(le vs. Bel"D*"n"a, G.R. No. 125333, 3/2 /2 2! It has been held that the constitutional provision on custodial investigation does not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby the suspect orally admits having committed the crime. 3either can it apply to admissions or confessions made by a suspect in the commission of a crime before he is placed under investigation. 5hat the "onstitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under #ec. *, of the "onstitution are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by

A witness, who heard the confession is competent to testify as to its substance. 7roof of the contents of an oral extrajudicial confession may be made by the testimony of a person who testifies that he was present, heard, understood, and remembers the substance of the conversion or statement made by the accused. (.eo(le vs. %uela, G.R. Nos. 13357 871, 1/15/2 2! Having been obtained without infringing the "onstitutional safeguards, accused2appellant4s confession constitutes evidence of the highest order since it is bac$ed up by the strong presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and $nowingly confess to a crime unless he is prompted by truth and

the state as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. (.eo(le vs. -aloloy, G.R. No. 14 74 , 4/12/2 2! CONCEPT OF PHYSICAL EVIDENCE

7hysical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth, and it ran$s high in the hierarchy of our trustworthy evidence. (Ma/al"nao vs. Cn7, 477 %)RA 74 , ,e/e*'er 14, 2 5! or this reason, it is regarded as evidence of the highest order. It spea$s more eloquently than a hundred witnesses. (Ra'anal vs. .eo(le, 4+3 %)RA 6 1, Mar/@ 2+, 2 66 .eo(le vs. Mar2 E@"sen@unt, G.R. No. 123+19, 11/14/2 1!
PARAFFIN TEST

5hile a negative result on a paraffin test is not conclusive proof that an accused did not fire a gun, such fact if considered with the other circumstances of the case, which may be ta$en as an indication of his innocence. The prosecution4s evidence must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot draw strength from the wea$ness of the evidence of the defense. (.eo(le vs. Narvae&, G.R No. 14 759, 1/24/2 2!
BLOODSTAINED SHIRT

ailure to conduct a paraffin test is not fatal to the case of the prosecution as scientific experts agree that the paraffin test is extremely unreliable and it is not conclusive as to an accused4s complicity in the crime committed. (:n7sod vs. .eo(le, 47+ %)RA 2+2! 3egative results of the paraffin test do not conclusively show that a person did not discharge a firearm at the time the crime was committed for the absence of nitrates is possible if a person discharged of firearm with gloves on, or if he thoroughly washed his hands thereafter. The absence of powder burns in a suspect4s hand is not conclusive proof that he has not fired a gun. (.eo(le vs. -alleras, G.R. No. 134564, 6/26/2 2! #cientific experts concur in the view that the result of a paraffin test is not conclusive. 5hile it can establish the presence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand, it does not always indubitably show that said nitrates or nitrites were caused by the discharge of firearm. The person tested may have handled one or more of a number of substances which give the same positive reaction for nitrates or nitrites, such as explosives, firewor$s, fertili/ers, pharmaceuticals, and leguminous plants such as peas, beans, and alfalfa. A person who uses tobacco may also have nitrate or nitrite deposits on his hands since these substances are present in the products of combustion of tobacco. The presence of nitrates, therefore, should be ta$en only as an indication of a possibility but not of infallibility that the person tested has fired a gun. (.eo(le vs. .a/"#"/ador, G.R. No. 126515, 2/ 6/2 2!

The fact that there was bloodstain on the accused4s clothing could not be ta$en as an indication of guilt on his part. At most, this piece of circumstantial evidence may lead to suspicion. 0ut courts do not rely on circumstantial evidence that merely arises suspicion or conjecture. or circumstantial evidence to lead conviction, it must do more than just raise the mere possibility or even probability of guilt. It must engender moral certainty. (.eo(le vs. As"s, G.R. No. 142531, 1 /15/2 2!
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

As a matter of reliability and trustworthiness, a telephone conversation must first be authenticated before it can even be received in evidence. To this end, it is critical that the person with whom the witness was conversing on the phone is first satisfactorily identified, by voice recognition or any other means. (%andoval vs. Hret, G.R. No. 1493+ , 7/ 3/ 2!
PHOTOGRAPHS

According to American courts, photographs are admissible in evidence in motor vehicle cases when they appear to have been accurately ta$en and are proved to be faithful and clear representation of the subject. (Ma/al"nao vs. Cn7, 477 %)RA 74 , ,e/e*'er 14, 2 5!
ADMISSIBILITY OF OBJECT EVIDENCE

An object evidence is not ta$en in isolation. It is weighed in relation to the testimony of a witness. Also, in giving credence to a testimony, the court ta$es into consideration the physical evidence. If the testimony bears a stri$ing similarity with the physical evidence, the testimony becomes worthy of belief. (.eo(le vs. $arraFa7a, G.R. 13++74875, 7/21/ 2 5!
GENUINENESS OF A HANDWRITING; HOW PROVED

#ec. ,, of :ule *-, enumerates how the genuineness of a handwriting may be proved( )a+ by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of a person because )*+ he has seen the person write, or! ),+ he has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired $nowledge of the handwriting of such person, or! )-+ by a comparison made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the document is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. (He"rs o# A*ado )elest"al vs. He"rs o# ?d"t@a G. )elest"al, G.R. No 142691, +/5/2 3! DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

controversy as to the falsity of the certificate. (.an .a/"#"/ 0ndustr"al %ales )o., 0n/. vs. )A, 4+2 %)RA 164, Be'ruary 1 , 2 6!

'iew that what is contextually considered a public document is not the private writing but the public record. (5u/@en/o vs.%and"7an'ayan, 479 %)RA 1!
POLICE BLOTTERS

Although police blotters are of little probative value, they are nevertheless admitted and considered in the absence of competent evidence to refute the facts stated therein. (Ma/al"nao vs. Cn7, 477 %)RA 74 , ,e/e*'er 14, 2 5!
PRIVATE DOCUMENTS

As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for damage for loss of earning capacity. 0y way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence, provided that there is testimony either that the minimum wage under current labor laws and judicial notice may be ta$en of the fact that in the victim was employed as a daily wage wor$er earning less than the minimum daily wage under the current labor laws. (.eo(le vs. .a>otal, G.R. No. 142+7 , 11/14/ 1! A witness4 testimony cannot be considered as competent proof and cannot replace the probative value of official receipts to justify the award of actual damages, for jurisprudence instructs that the same must be duly substantiated by receipts. (,"no vs. 3ard"nes, 4+1 %)RA 226, ,e/e*'er 2 6!
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS/ EXAMINATION OF DOCUMENTS

>nder the :ules on 6vidence, documents are either public or private. 7rivate documents are those that do not fall under any of the enumerations in #ec. *B of :ule *-, of the :ules of "ourt. #ec. ,; of the same law in turn, provides that before any private document is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either by anyone who saw the document executed or written or by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the ma$er. (Malayan 0nsuran/e )o. 0n/. vs. .@"l"(("ne Na"ls and E"res )or(orat"on, G.R. No. 13+ +4, 4/1 / 2!
BAPTISMAL CERTIFICATE

5here the requisite circumstances exist, a party may be entitled to the production of records for inspection, copying, and photocopying as a matter of right. (%antos vs. .@"l"(("ne Nat"onal -an2, G.R. No. 14+21+, 4/29/ 2!
PUBLIC DOCUMENTS

A notari/ed document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and it has in its favor the presumption of regularity which may only be rebutted by evidence, so clear, strong and convincing as to exclude all

A baptismal certificate is evidence only to prove the administration of the sacrament on the dates therein specified, but not have veracity of the declaration therein stated with respect to a person4s $insfol$. The same is conclusive only of the baptism administered according to the rites of the "atholic "hurch, by the priest who bapti/ed the subject child, but it does not prove the veracity of the declarations and statements contained in the certificate concerning the relationship of the person bapti/ed. A baptismal certificate, a private document, is not conclusive proof of filiation. &ore so are the entries made in an income tax return, which only shows that income tax has been paid and the amount thereof. ($a'a7ala vs. %ant"a7o, G.R. No. 1323 5, 12/ 4/2 1!
BIRTH CERTIFICATE

 A birth certificate is the best evidence of a person4s date of birth and that late registration by the mother of her child4s birth does not affect its evidentiary value. (Cr#"la vs. Arellano, 4+2 %)RA 2+ , Be'ruary 13, 2 6!
BEST EVIDENCE RULE

?ne of the exceptions to the parol evidence rule is when a party puts in issue in his pleading the validity of the written document. (Alor"a vs. )le*ente, 4+3 %)RA 634, Mar/@ 2+, 2 6!
PAROL EVIDENCE; ACKNOWLEDGMENT RECEIPT

5hen the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document. (?'reo vs. ?'reo, 4+3 %)RA 5+3, Mar/@ 2+, 2 6!
SECONDARY EVIDENCE

An ac$nowledgment receipt is valid and binding between the parties who executed it, as a document evidencing the loan agreement of the parties cannot stand against the ac$nowledgment receipt presented by respondent. (%(ouses Reyes vs. )ourt o# A((eals, G.R. No. 14775+, 6/26/2 2!
QUALITY/NUMBER OF WITNESSES

It is axiomatic that before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original of a deed or document, the party has to prove with the requisite quantum of evidence, the loss or destruction or unavailability of all the copies of the original of the said deed or document. (?'reo vs. ?'reo, 4+3 %)RA 5+3, Mar/@ 2+, 2 6!
PAROL EVIDENCE

It is the quality not the number, of witnesses, which may be considered a factor in the appreciation of evidence, preponderance does not necessarily lie in the greatest number. (3"*ene& vs. )o**"ss"on on ?/u*en"/al M"ss"on and Relat"ons o# t@e :n"ted .res'yter"an )@ur/@ "n t@e :n"ted %tates o# A*er"/a, G.R. No. 14 472, 6/1 /2 2!
AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE

#ec. B of :ule *-; of the :evised :ules of "ourt provides that when the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement. #imply put, evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary, contradict, or defeat the operation of a valid contract while parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of a written contract. It cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in writing, unless there has been fraud or mista$e. It is basic that parties are bound by the terms of their contract which is the law between them. (M) ?n7"neer"n7, 0n/. vs. )ourt o# A((eals, G.R. No. 1 4 47, 4/ 3/2 2!
>nder the rule, the terms of a contract are rendered conclusive upon the parties and evidence aliunde is not admissible to vary or contradict a complete and enforceable agreement embodied in a document. (Rosar"o 4eDt"le M"lls )or(orat"on vs. Ho*e -an2ers %av"n7s and 4rust )o*(any, G.R. No. 137232, 6/29/2 5!

Affidavits ta$en ex2parte are generally considered inferior to the testimony given in open court, and affidavits of recantation have been invariably regarded as exceedingly unreliable, since they can easily be secured from poor and ignorant witnesses, for monetary consideration or through intimidation and are most li$ely to be repudiated afterwards. (.eo(le vs. %o*od"o, G.R. Nos. 13413984 , 2/15/2 2! An affidavit of desistance is regarded with suspicion as it can be easily obtained through intimidation and attains no probative value in light of the affiant4s testimony to the contrary. (.eo(le vs. A/o>edo, G.R. No. 13+661, 11/19/2 1!
RELATIONSHIP TO ACCUSED

:elationship per se does not affect the credibility of a witness. However, the "ourt ta$es cogni/ance of the facts that blood relatives tend to be naturally protective of each other and are giving false testimonies in favor of one another, especially a relative in danger of being convicted. (.eo(le vs. A/o>edo, G.R. No. 13+661, 11/19/2 1!
QUALIFICATION/DISQUALIFICATION OF WITNESSES; MENTAL INCAPACITY

 >nsoundness of mind does not per se render a witness incompetent, one may mentally or metaphysically insane, yet be capable in law of giving competent testimony in the trial of a case. The general rule is that a lunatic or a person affected with insanity is admissible as a witness if he has sufficient understanding to apprehend the obligation of an oath and is capable of giving a correct account of the matters which he has been or heard with respect to the questions at issue. It is now held universally that insanity or intellectual wea$ness of witness, no matter what form it assumes, is not a valid objection to his competency if, at the time he is testifying, he has mental capacity to distinguish between right and wrong, so far as the facts in issue and his testimony thereon are involved, he understands the nature and obligation of an oath, and he can give fairly intelligent and reasonable narrative of the matters about which he testifies. The issue of competence of witness to testify rests largely within the discretion of the trial court. (.eo(le vs. )a"n7at, G.R. No. 137963, 2/ 6/2 2! QUALIFICATION/DISQUALIFICATION OF WITNESSES; CHILDREN As a general rule, when a witness ta$es the witness stand, the law, on ground of public policy, presumes that he is competent. The court cannot reject the witness in the absence of proof of his incompetency. The burden is upon the party objecting to the competency of a witness to establish the ground of incompetency. #ec. ,* of :ule *-; of the :ules of 6vidence enumerates the persons who are disqualified to be witnesses. Among those disqualified are <children whose maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and relating them truthfully.@ 3o precise minimum age can be fixed at which children shall be excluded from testifying. The intelligence, not the age, of a young child is the test of his competency as a witness. It is settled that a child, regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he can perceive and, in perceiving, can ma$e $nown his perception to others and that he is capable of relating truthfully the facts for which he is examined.

In determining the competency of a child witness, the court must consider his capacity( )a+ at the time the fact to be testified occurred, such that he could receive correct impressions thereof! )b+ to comprehend the obligation of an oath, and! )c+ to relate those facts truly to the court at the time he is offered as a witness. The examination should show that the child has some understanding of the punishment which may result from false swearing. The requisite appreciation of consequences is disclosed where the child states that he $nows that it is wrong to tell a lie, and that he would be punished if he does so, or that he uses language which is equivalent to saying that he would be sent to hell for false swearing. A child can be disqualified only if it can be shown that his mental maturity renders him incapable of perceiving facts with respect to which he is being examined, and of relating them truthfully. The question of competency of a child witness rests primarily in the sound discretion of the trial court. This is so because the trial judge sees the proposed witness and observes his manner of testifying, his apparent possession or lac$ of intelligence, as well as his understanding of the obligation of an oath. #ince many of the witness4 manners cannot be photographed into the record, the finding of the trial judge will not be disturbed or reversed unless from what is preserved it is clear that such finding was erroneous. (.eo(le vs. .runa, G.R. No. 13+471, 1 /1 /2 2! QUALIFICATION/DISQUALIFICATION OF WITNESSES; MARITAL DISQUALIFICATION

>nder the marital disqualification rule, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in civil case by one against the other, or in criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter4s direct descendants or ascendants. However, objections to the competency of a husband and wife to testify in a criminal prosecution against the other may be waived as in the case of other witnesses generally. The objection to the competency of the spouse must be made when he or she is first offered as a witness. ).eo(le vs. .ansensoy, G.R. No. 14 634, 9/12/2 2!
QUALIFICATION/DISQUALIFICATION OF WITNESSES; MARITAL PRIVILEGE RULE

The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may be waived by failure of the claimant to object timely to its presentation or by any conduct that may be construed as implied consent. ($a/uro* vs. 3a/o'a, 4+4 %)RA 2 6, Mar/@ 1 , 2 6! QUALIFICATION/DISQUALIFICATION OF WITNESSES; DEAD MAN S STATUTE

guilt may be drawn only when it is unexplained and with an evident purpose of evading prosecution. (.eo(le vs. Mon>e, G.R. No. 1466+9, 9/27/2 2! OFFER OF COMPROMISE BY ACCUSED

The dead man4s statute does not operate to close the mouth of a witness as to any matter of act coming to his $nowledge in any other way than through personal dealings with the deceased person, or communication made by the deceased to the witness. (-ordla'a vs. )ourt o# A((eals, G.R. No. 112443, 1/25/2 2!
QUALIFIED COMMUNICATION PRIVILEGED

>nder #ec. ,C of :ule *-; of the :ules of "ourt, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. (.eo(le vs. A"ernes, G.R. Nos. 136733835, 12/13/2 1! Although the marriage of the accused in a rape case extinguishes the penal action (Alonto vs. %avellano, 3r., 2+7 %)RA 245!, an offer of marriage is, generally, spea$ing, an admission of guilt. (.eo(le vs. -ulos, G.R. No. 123542, 6/26 /2 1!
RES INTER ALIOS ACTA >nder #ection -=, :ule *-; of the :evised :ules of "ourt, evidence that one did a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did the same or similar thing at another time, although such evidence may be received to prove habit, usage, pattern, of conduct or the intent of the parties. "ourts must contend with the caveat that, before they admit evidence of usage, of habit or pattern of conduct, the offering party must establish the degree of specificity and frequency of uniform response that ensures more than a mere tendency to act in a given manner but rather, conduct that is semi2automatic in nature. It is only when examples offered to establish pattern of conduct or habit are numerous enough to lose an inference of systematic conduct that examples are admissible. (-oston -an2 o# t@e .@"l"(("nes vs. Manalo, 4+2 %)RA 1 +, Be'ruary 9, 2 6!

A written letter containing libelous matter cannot be classified as privileged when it is published and circulated among the public. (-uat"s, 3r. vs. .eo(le, 4+5 %)RA 275! ABILITY TO MAKE KNOWN PERCEPTION TO OTHERS THE

A deaf2mute is not necessarily an incompetent as a witness. They are competent where they( )a+ can understand and appreciate the sanctity of an oath! ),+ can comprehend facts they are going to testify on, and! )-+ can communicate their ideas through a qualified interpreter. (.eo(le vs. 4uan7/o, G.R. No. 13 331, 11/ 22/ 2 !
FLIGHT OF ACCUSED

The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. ?ne type of act that can be given in evidence against him is flight. In "riminal Eaw, <flight@ means an act of evading the course of justice by voluntarily withdrawing oneself to avoid arrest or detention or the institution or continuance of criminal proceeding. The unexplained flight of the accused person may, as a general rule, be ta$en as evidence having tendency to establish his guilt. In short, flight is an indication of guilt. (.eo(le vs. $"/ayan, G.R. No. 144422, 2/2+/2 2! Although as a general rule flight is an indication of guilt, the same should not be flippantly considered. light is a circumstance from which an inference of
B

Ei$e any other fact, habits, customs, usage or patterns of conduct must be proved. (.a78Asa %teel Eor2s, 0n/. vs. )A, 4+6 %)RA 475, Mar/@ 31, 2 6!
RECEIPT OF PROPERTY SEI!ED

The receipt of property sei/ed is issued by the police in accordance with their standard operating procedure in a buy bust operation to show what property was sei/ed. The receipt should not be treated as an admission or confession. Indeed, the receipt could not be considered evidence against the accused because it was signed by him without the

assistance of counsel. (.eo(le vs. )as"*"ro, G.R. No. 146277, 6/2 /2 2!

A suspect4s confession, whether verbal or non2verbal, when ta$en without the assistance of counsel without a valid waiver of such assistance, regardless of the absence of such coercion or the fact that it had been voluntarily given, is inadmissible in evidence, even if suspect4s confession was gospel truth. (.eo(le vs. %"a, G.R. No. 137457, 11/21/2 1!
HEARSAY EVIDENCE The term <hearsay@ as used in the law on evidence signifies evidence which is not founded upon the personal $nowledge of the witness from whom it is elicited and which consequently does not depend wholly for its credibility and weight upon the confidence which the court may have in him. Its value, if any, is measured by the credit to be given to some third person not sworn as a witness to that fact, and consequently not subject to cross2examination. If one therefore testifies to facts which he learned from a third person not sworn as a witness to those facts, his testimony is inadmissible as hearsay evidence. The reason for the exclusion of hearsay evidence is that the party against whom the hearsay testimony is presented is deprived of the right or opportunity to cross2examine the person to whom the statements are attributed. &oreover, the court is without opportunity to test the credibility of hearsay statements by observing the demeanor of the person who made them. (.eo(le vs. .runa, G.R. No. 13+471, 1 /1 /2 2!

As a rule, the inadmissibility of testimony ta$en by deposition is anchored on the ground that such testimony is hearsay, ".e. the party against whom it is offered has no opportunity to cross2 examine the deponent at the time his testimony is offered. The act of cross2 examining the deponent during the ta$ing of the deposition cannot, without more, be considered a waiver of the right to object to its admissibility as evidence in the trial proper. (%ales vs. %a'"no, 477 %)RA 1 1, ,e/e*'er 9, 2 5!
TESTIMONY"RAPE#CONVICTION SOLE TESTIMONY OF VICTIM ON

The rule is that there can be conviction even if there is no physical evidence to corroborate her claim. This is on the supposition that her testimony was clear and free from serious contradictions, and her sincerity and candor beyond suspicion. If the complainant4s testimony is not of such character, convincing corroborative proof is required. (.eo(le vs. -eno&a, G.R. No. 13947 , 11/29/2 1!
DOCTRINE OF INDEPENDENTLY RELEVANT STATEMENT

This doctrine holds that conversation communicated to a witness by a third person may be admitted as proof that, regardless of its truth or falsity, it was actually not secondary but primary, for in itself it( )a+ constitutes a fact in issue, or! )b+ is circumstantially relevant to the existence of such fact. (Re(u'l"/ vs. He"rs o# Ale>a7a, G.R. No. 146 3 , 12/ 3/2 2! 5hile it is true that the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another person, if intended to establish the truth of the fact asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement in the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such statement. ()o*"lan7 vs. -ur/ena, 4+2 %)RA 342, Be'ruary 13, 2 6!
DYING DECLARATION An ante mortem statement in articulo mortis is admissible under the following requisites( )*+ death is imminent and the declarant is conscious of that fact! ),+ the declaration refers to the cause and the surrounding circumstances of such death! )-+ the declaration relates to a fact which the victim is competent to testify to, and! )=+ the declaration is offered in a

The reliability of a testimony is based on the personal $nowledge of the witness. If a witness testifies on the basis of what others have told him, and not on facts which he $nows of his own personal $nowledge, the testimony would be excluded as hearsay evidence. This is because the witness cannot be effectively cross2examined on the matters he testified to. His answers to questions in open court would necessarily be based on the $nowledge of a person who is not in the witness stand. The latter called the outside declarant cannot be cross2 examined because he is not in court. The reliability and truth of the perception of this outside declarant cannot be tested and verified in court. Hearsay evidence if not objected to is admissible. However, even if admitted, it has no probative value. (Mallar" vs. .eo(le, 446 %)RA 74, 12/1 /2 4!

*;

case wherein the declarant4s death is the subject of the inquiry. The issue of whether a declaration was made under the consciousness of an impending death is a matter of evidence. It must be shown that such declaration was made under a reali/ation that one4s demise or at least its imminence, not so much its rapid occurrence, was at hand. This may be proven by the statement of the victim or inferred from the nature and extent of the victim4s wounds or other relevant circumstances. (.eo(le vs. Mendo&a, G.R. No. 142654, 11/16/2 1!

imminence not so much is rapid occurrence, was at hand. This may be proven by the statement of the victim or inferred from the nature and the extent of the victim4s wounds or other relevant circumstances. (.eo(le vs. ,e $eon, G.R. No. 144 52, 3/ 6/2 2! An ante2mortem statement or dying declaration is entitled to probative weight if( )*+ at the time the declaration was made, death was imminent and the declaarnt was conscious of that fact! ),+ the declaration refers to the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death! )-+ the declaration relates to the facts which the victim was competent to testify to! )=+ the declarant thereafter died, and! )A+ the declaration is offered in a criminal case wherein the declarant4s death is the subject of the inquiry. The significance of a victim4s reali/ation or consciousness that he was on the brin$ of death cannot be gainsaid. #uch ante2mortem statement is evidence of the highest order because at the threshold of death, all thoughts of fabricating lies are stilled. The utterance of a victim made immediately after sustaining serious injuries may be considered the incident spea$ing through the victim. It is entitled to the highest credence.

The rule on dying declaration does not require that the person should be at the time in the throes of death, or that he should die immediately, or within any specified time thereafter, in order to give the declaration probative force. 5here a person has been fatally wounded, is in sore distress therefrom, and he believes that he will not recover and is soon to die, his statement made in this belief relating to the cause of his injury is admissible, if it appears that he subsequently died from the effects of the wound, although he may have revived after ma$ing the statements or may have lived a considerable time thereafter, and may have again begun to hope for recovery. (.eo(le vs. Mendo&a, G.R. NC. 142654, 11/16/2 1!
.ying declaration, also $nown as an ante mortem statement or a statement in articulo mortis, is one that refers to the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant4s death and is made under the consciousness of impending death. 0ecause of its necessity and trustworthiness, it is admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule. 3ecessity because the declarant4s death ma$es it impossible for him to ta$e the witness stand, and trustworthiness, for when a person is at the point of death, every motive for falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most powerful consideration to spea$ the truth. An antemortem statement is admissible, provided the following requisites are present( )*+ death is imminent and the declarant is conscious of that fact! ),+ the declaration refers to the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death! )-+ the declaration relates to a fact that the victim is competent to testify to, and! )=+ the declaration is offered in a case wherein the declarant4s death is the subject of the inquiry. It must be shown that the declaration was made under a reali/ation that one4s demise or at least its

The crucial factor to consider is the contemporaneity of the moment when the statement was made and the moment of the reali/ation of death. The time the statement was being made must also be the time the victim was aware that he was dying. ).eo(le vs. .ena, G.R. No. 133964, 2/13/2 2! Apart from the statements of the declarant, his consciousness of impending death can be proved by surrounding circumstances, such as the nature of injury or by his conduct. (.eo(le vs. )ala7o, G.R. No. 141122, 4/22/2 2!. The rule is that a dying declaration may be oral or written. If oral, the witness who heard it may testify thereto without the necessity of reproducing the word of the decedent, if he is able to give substance thereof. An unsigned dying declaration may be used as a memorandum by the witness who too$ it down. (.eo(le vs. -oller, G.R. Nos. 144222824, 4/ 3/2 2!
RES GESTATE

The declarant4s utterance are considered part of res gestae when made

**

immediately after a startling occurrence. The admission of such utterances are based on the well founded belief that words spo$en instinctively at the time of a specific transactional event, without the opportunity for the spea$er to effectively concoct a fabricated version of the startling event can only be but credible. (.eo(le vs. )ala7o, G.R. No. 141122, 5/22/2 2! The term <res gestae@ comprehends a situation which presents a startling or unusual occurrence sufficient to produce a spontaneous and instinctive reaction, during which interval certain statements are made under such circumstances as to who lac$ of forethought or deliberate design in the formulation of their contents. #ince res gestae refers to those exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime before, during, or immediately after the commission of the crime, they should necessarily be the ones who must not have the opportunity to contrive or devise a falsehood but not the persons to whom they gave their dying declaration or spontaneous statement. In other words, the witness who merely testifies on a res geatae is not the declarant referred to in the second requisite whose statements had to be made before he had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood. (.eo(le vs. .ena, G.R. No. 133964, 2/13/2 2!

which are derived from his perception. "onsequently, a witness may not testify as to what he merely learned from others either because he was told, read or heard the same. #uch testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned. #uch is the hearsay rule, which applies not only to oral testimony or statements but also to written evidence as well. The hearsay rule is based upon serious concerns about the trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay evidence inasmuch as such evidence are not given under oath or solemn affirmation and, more importantly, have not been subjected to cross2examination by opposing counsel to test the perception, memory, veracity and articulateness of the out2of2court declarant or actor upon whose reliability on which the worth of the out2of2court declarant or actor upon whose reliability on which the worth of the out2of2court statement depends. There are exceptions to the hearsay rule, among which are entries in official records. To be admissible in evidence, however, - requisites must concur, to wit( )*+ that the entry was made by a public officer, or by anther person specially enjoined by law to do so! ),+ that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, and! )-+ that the public officer or other person had sufficient $nowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official information. ))ountry -an2ers 0nsuran/e )or(. vs. $"an7a -ay And )o**un"ty Mult"8.ur(ose )oo(., 0n/., G.R. No. 136914, 1/25/2 2! OPINION RULE

:es gestae utterances refer to those exclamation and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or after the commission of the crime when the circumstances are such that their statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. A declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and thus admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur( )*+ the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence! ),+ the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise, and! )-+ the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. (.eo(le vs. )anton>os, G.R. No. 13674+, 11/21/2 1!
ENTRIES IN OFFICIAL RECORDS A witness can testify only to those facts, which he $nows of his personal $nowledge, which means those facts,

Having testified on matters undeniably within the area of his expertise, and having performed a thorough autopsy on the body of the victim, an expert4s findings as to the cause of death of the victim are more than just speculations of an ordinary person. ()al"*utan vs. .eo(le, 4+2 %)RA 44, Be'ruary 9, 2 6!
EXPERT OPINION 6xpert opinion is to be considered or weighed by the court li$e any other testimony, in the light of their own general $nowledge and experience upon the subject of inquiry.

*,

The inclusion or exclusion by the expert of factors or elements that should or should not be considered in the determination of his opinion is to be considered in determining the wieht to be attached to his testimony. (.eo(le vs. Male>ana, 479 %)RA 61 ! OPINIONS OF HANDWRITING EXPERTS It is also hornboo$ doctrine that the opinions of handwriting experts, even those from the 30I and the 7", are not binding upon courts. This principle holds true especially when the question involved is mere handwriting similarity or dissimilarity, which can be determined by a visual comparison of specimens of the questioned signatures with those of the currently existing ones. Handwriting experts are usually helpful in the examination of forged documents because of the technical procedure involved in analy/ing them. 0ut resort to these experts is not mandatory or indispensable to the examination or the comparison of handwriting. (3"*ene& vs. )o**"ss"on Cn ?/u*en"/al M"ss"on And Relat"ons C# 4@e :n"ted .res'yter"an )@ur/@ 0n 4@e :%A, G.R. No. 14 472, 6/1 /2 2!. OPINION OF ORDINARY WITNESSES; IDENTIFICATION OF OFFENDERS

increased need to identify someone to show the police that they, too, feel that the criminals is in the line2up, and ma$es the witnesses particularly vulnerable to any clues conveyed by the police or other witnesses as to whom they suspect of the crime. The test is whether or not prosecution was able to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the in2court identifications were based upon observations of the suspect other than the line2up identification. (.eo(le vs. ?s/ord"al, G.R. Nos. 13+934835, 1/16/2 2! 5hile it might be easier for a witness to recogni/e the culprit if they are $nown to each other, an identification made by a witness is not less credible just because the accused is a stranger. 3either can the lapse of only a few seconds in witnessing the crime diminish the witness4 credibility. Time is not an accurate measure of a person4s ability to recogni/e a face. A startling or frightful experience creates an indelible impression in the mind that can be recalled vividly. (.eo(le vs. .unsalan, G.R. No. 145475, 11/22/2 1!

6yewitness identification is often decisive of the conviction or acquittal of an accused. Identification of an accused through mug shots as one of the established procedures in pinning down criminals. However, to avoid charges of impermissible suggestion, there should be nothing in the photograph that would focus attention on a single person. (.eo(le vs. A"llena, G.R. No. 14 66, 1 /14/2 2!
'arious social psychological factors increase the danger of suggestibility in a line2up confrontation. 5itnesses, li$e other people, are motivated by a desire to be correct and to avoid loo$ing foolish. 0y arranging a line2up, the police have evidenced their belief that they have caught the criminal. 5itnesses, reali/ing this, probably will feel foolish if they cannot identify anyone and therefore may choose someone despite residual uncertainty. &oreover, the need to reduce psychological discomfort often motivates a victim to a crime to find li$ely target for feelings of hostility. inally, witnesses are highly motivated to behave li$e those around them. This desire to conform produces an

7ositive identification requires essential proof of identity and not per se an eyewitness account of the very act of committing the crime. #uch identification forms part of circumstantial evidence which, when ta$en together with other pieces of evidence constituting an unbro$en chain, leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that accused2 appellant is the author of the crime to the explosion of the others. (.eo(le vs. Ru'ares, G.R. No. 143127, 11/29/2 1! 'isibility is indeed a vital factor in the determination of whether or not an eyewitness has identified the perpetrator of a crime. 5hen conditions of visibility are favorable and the witnesses do not appear to be biased, their assertion as to the identity of the malefactor should normally be accepted. Illumination produced by $erosene lamp or a flashlight is sufficient to allow identification of persons. 5ic$lamps, flashlights, even moonlight or starlight may, in proper situations, be considered sufficient illumination, ma$ing the attac$ on the credibility of witnesses solely on that ground unmeritorious. (.eo(le vs. )o/a, 3r., G.R. No. 133739, 5/19/2 2!
CHARACTER EVIDENCE

*-

 "haracter is the possession by a person of qualities of mind and morals. .istinguishing him from others is the opinion generally entertained of a person which is derived from the common report of the people who are acquainted with him, his reputation Fgood moral character4 includes all the elements essential to ma$e up such a character, among these are common honesty and veracity. 6specially in all professional intercourse, a character that measures up as good among people of the community in which the person lives or that is up to the standard of the average citi/en, that status which attaches to a man of good behavior and upright conduct. The rule is that the character of reputation of a party is regarded as legally irrelevant in determining a controversy, so that evidence relating thereto is not admissible. ?rdinarily, if the issues in the case were allowed to be influenced be evidence of the character or reputation of the parties, the trial would be apt to have the aspects of a popularity contest rather than a factual inquiry into the merits of the case. After all, the business of the court is to try the case, and not the man! and a very bad man may have a righteous cause. There are exceptions to this rule however and #ec. A* of :ule *-; gives the exceptions in both criminal and civil cases. In criminal cases, sub2paragraph * of #ec. A* of :ule *-; provides that the accused may prove his good moral character, which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged. 5hen the accused presents proof of his good moral character, this strengthens the presumption of innocence, and where good character and reputation are established, an inference arises that the accused did not commit the crime charged. This view proceeds from the theory that a person of good character and high reputation is not li$ely to have committed the act charged against him. #u2paragraph , provides that the prosecution may not prove the bad moral character of the accused except only in the rebuttal and when such evidence is pertinent to the moral that involved in the offense charged. This is intended to avoid unfair prejudice to the accused who might otherwise be convicted not because he is guilty but because he is a person of bad character. The offering of character evidence on his behalf is a privilege of the defendant, and the prosecution cannot comment on the failure of the defendant to produce such evidence. ?nce the defendant raises the issue of his good character, the prosecution may, in rebuttal, offer evidence of the defendant4s

bad character. ?therwise, a defendant, would have a license to unscrupulously impose a false character upon the tribunal. 0oth sub2paragraphs * and , of #ec. A* of :ule *-; refer to character evidence of the accused. And this evidence must be <pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged,@ meaning, that the character evidence must be relevant and germane to the $ind of the act charged, e.g., on a charge of rape, character for chastity! on a charge of assault, character for peacefulness or violence! on a charge for embe//lement, character for honesty and integrity. #ub2 paragraph - of #ec. A* of the said :ule refers to the character of the offended party. "haracter evidence, whether good or bad, of the offended party may be proved <if it tends to establish in any reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the offense charged.@ #uch evidence is most commonly offered to support a claim of self2defense in an assault or homicide case or a claim of consent in a rape case. (.eo(le vs. $ee, G.R. No. 139 7 , 5/29/2 2! GOOD MORAL ACCUSED CHARACTER OF

It is true that the good moral character of an accused having reference to the moral trait involved in the offense charged may be proven by him. 0ut an accused is not entitled to an acquittal simply because of his previous good moral character and exemplary conduct if the "ourt believes he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The affirmance or reversal of his conviction must be resolved on the basic issue of whether the prosecution had discharged its duty of proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. (.eo(le vs. )on/or/"o, G.R. Nos. 1212 18 2, 1 /19/2 1!
In the 7hilippine setting, proof of the moral character of the offended party is applied with frequency index offenses. In rape and acts of lasciviousness or in any prosecution involving an unchaste act perpetrated by a man against a woman where the willingness of a woman is material, the woman4s character as to her chastity is admissible to show whether or not she consented to the man4s act. The exception to this is when the woman4s act. The exception to this is when the woman4s consent is immaterial such as in statutory rape or rape with violence or intimidation. In the crimes of qualified seduction or consented abduction, the offended party must be a <virgin@ which is <presumed if

*=

she is unmarried and of good reputation@ or a <virtuous woman of good reputation.@ The crime of a simple seduction involves <the seduction of a woman who is single or a widow of a good reputation, over twelve but under eighteen years of age.@ The burden of proof that the complaint is a woman of good reputation lies in the prosecution, and the accused may introduce evidence that the complainant is a woman of bad reputation. In homicide cases, a pertinent character trait of the victim is admissible in two situations( )*+ as evidence of the deceased4s aggression, and! ),+ as evidence of the state of mind of the accused. The pugnacious, quarrelsome or trouble2see$ing character of the deceased of his calmness, gentleness and peaceful nature, as the case may be, is relevant in determining whether the deceased or the accused was the aggressor. 5hen the evidence tends to show that it produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger in the mind of the accused and a justifiable conviction that a prompt defense action was necessary. &oreover, proof of the victim4s bad moral character is not necessary in cases of murder committed with treachery and premeditation. ollowing the ruling in 7eople vs. #oliman, the presence of these aggravating circumstances negates the necessity of proving the victim4s bad character to establish the probability or improbability of the offense charged and, at the same time, qualifies the $illing to murder. (.eo(le vs. $ee, G.R. No. 139 7 , 5/29/2 2! BURDEN OF PROOF

readily be disapproved by the production of documents or other evidence probably within the defendant4s possession or control. &oreover, where the subject2 matter of a negative averment in an indictment, or a fact relied upon by defendant as a justification or excuse, relates to him personally or otherwise lies peculiarly within his $nowledge, the general rule is that the burden of proof as to such averment or facts is on him. (Herrera vs. )ourt o# A((eals, G.R. No. 14 651, 2/19/2 2!

As a rule the burden of proving the existence of a trust is on the party asserting its existence, and such proof must be clear and satisfactorily show the existence of the trust and its elements. (C/o vs. $"*'ar"n7, 4+1 %)RA 34+, ,e/e*'er 2 6!
TEST FOR DETERMINING BURDEN OF PROOF LIES WHERE

The test for determining where the burden of proof lies is to as$ which party to an action or suit will fail if he offers no evidence competent to show the facts averred as the basis for the relief he see$s to obtain. If the defendant has affirmative defenses, he bears the burden of proof as to those defenses which he sets up in answer to the plaintiff4s cause of action. Hence, if the defendant sets up the affirmative defense of prescription, he must prove the date when prescription began to run. (A&nar -rot@ers Realty )o., vs. Ay"n7, G.R. No. 144773, 5/16/2 5!
ALIBI AS A DEFENSE

It is the burden of the applicant to prove not only his own good moral character but also the good moral character of hisGher witnesses who must be <credible.@ (Re(u'l"/ vs. Hon7, 4+5 %)RA 4 5! It is well2settled that in administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in his complaint. ()a'arru'"as vs. A(ostol, 4+1 %)RA 2 , ,e/e*'er 2 6! The burden of proof is shifted to the defense once the prosecution has produced sufficient evidence to be entitled as a matter of law to a ruling in its favor. It is not incumbent upon the prosecution to adduce positive evidence to support a negative averment the truth of which is fairly indicated by established circumstances and which, if untrue, could
*A

5hen an accused4s alibi can only be confirmed by his relatives, who may not be impartial witnesses, his denial of culpability merits scant consideration. ?n the other hand, accused4s identification by credible prosecution witnesses as the author of the crime ma$es his alibi indefensible. (.eo(le vs. Ru'ares, G.R. No. 143127, 11/29/2 1! As a defense, alibi is inherently wea$ and crumbles in the light of positive identification by truthful witnesses. It is an evidence negative in nature and self2 serving and cannot attain more credibility than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify on clear and positive evidence. (.eo(le vs. $arraFa7a, G.R. Nos. 13++74875, 7/21/2 5! It cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused as perpetrator of the crime. In the face of positive identification of the accused by

the prosecution witness, such alibi crumbles li$e a sand fortress. (.eo(le vs. ?nr"<ue&, G.R. No. 15+797, 7/29/2 5!

or the defense of alibi to prosper, the following must be established( )*+ The presence of the accused in another place at the time of the commission of the offense, and! ),+ The physical impossibility for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. (.eo(le vs. $arraFa7a, G.R. No. 13++74875, 7/21/2 56 .eo(le vs. ?nr"<ue&, G.R. No. 15+797, 7/29/2 5! #elf2defense, li$e alibi is inherently wea$ because it can be easily fabricated. (Ru7as vs. .eo(le, G.R. No. 1477+9, 1/14/ 2 4! A denial evidence is the wea$est defense and can never overcome a positive testimony particularly when it comes from the mouth of a credible witness. (.eo(le vs. Mendo&a, 1/31/2 5!
MOTIVE

prima facie case created thereby, and which if no proof to the contrary is presented and offered, will prevail. The burden of proof remains where it is, but by the presumption the one who has the burden is relieved for the time being from introducing evidence in support of his averment, because the presumption stands in the place of evidence unless rebutted. It is true that said rule is not changed by the fact that the party having the burden of proof has introduced evidence, which established prima facie his assertion because such evidence does not shift the burden of proof! it merely puts the adversary to the necessity of producing evidence to meet the prima facie case. 5here the defendant merely denies, either generally or otherwise, the allegations of the plaintiffs pleadings, the burden of proof continues to rest on the plaintiff throughout the trial and does not shift to the defendant until the plaintiff4s evidence has been presented and duly offered. The defendant has then no burden except to produce evidence sufficient to create a state of equipoise between his proof and that of the plaintiff to defeat the latter, whereas the plaintiff has the burden, as in the beginning, of establishing his case by a preponderance of evidence. 0ut where the defendant has failed to present marshal evidence sufficient to create a state of equipoise between his proof and that of plaintiff, the prima facie case presented by the plaintiff will prevail. ($ee vs. )ourt o# A((eals, G.R. No. 117913, 1/ 2/2 2! PRESUMPTION THAT EVIDENCE WILLFULLY SUPPRESSED WOULD BE ADVERSE IF PRODUCED

&otive is never an essential element of a crime. It becomes inconsequential where there are affirmative, nay, categorical declarations towards the accused4s accountability for the felony. (.eo(le vs. A"lla*ore, G.R. Nos. 14 4 78 +, 1/15/2 2! 5hile the motive of the accused in a criminal case is generally held to be immaterial, not being an element of the crime, motive becomes important when the evidence on the commission of the crime is purely circumstantial. (.eo(le vs. 4urto7a, G.R. No. 135536, 6/ 6/2 2!
DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTIONS

The effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the need of presenting to overcome the prima facie case created, thereby which, if no contrary proof is offered, will prevail. ($astr"lla vs. Granda, 4+1 %)RA 324, ,e/e*'er 2 6!
.uring the trial of an action, the party who has the burden of proof upon an issue may be aided in establishing his claim or defense by the operation of a presumption, or expressed differently, by the probative value, which the law attaches to a specific state of facts. A presumption may operate against his adversary who has not introduced proof to rebut the presumption. The effect of a legal presumption upon a burden of proof is to create the necessity of presenting evidence to meet the legal presumption or

The presumption that suppressed evidence is unfavorable does not apply where the evidence was at the disposal of both the defense and the prosecution. (.eo(le vs. Ma&o, G.R. No. 136+69, 1 /17/2 1!
PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS

It should be stressed that while the court is mindful that the law enforcers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties, this presumption cannot prevail over the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent and it cannot, by itself constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption is precisely just that H a mere presumption. ?nce challenged by evidence, as in this
*9

case, cannot be regarded as binding truth. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails over positive averments concerning violations of the constitutional rights of the accused. In short, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor can constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. (.eo(le vs. )anete, G.R. No. 13+4 , 7/11/2 2! REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTY

other words, the ultimate purpose of cross2examination is to test the truth or falsity of the statements of a witness during direct examination. The basic rule is that the testimony of a witness given on direct examinations should be stric$en off the record where there was no adequate opportunity for cross2examination. ?f course, there are notable modifications to the basic rule which ma$e its application essentially on a case2to2case basis. Thus, where a partly had the opportunity to cross2examine a witness but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits his right to cross2 examine and the testimony given by the witness on direct examination will be allowed to remain on record. 0ut when the cross2examination is not or cannot be done or completed due to causes attributable to the party offering the witness, to the witness himself, the uncompleted testimony of a witness who dies before the conclusion of the cross2 examination, and the absence of a witness is not enough to warrant stri$ing of his testimony for failure to appear for further cross2examination where the witness has already been sufficiently cross2examined, which is not true in the present case, or that the matter on which further cross2 examination is sought is not in controversy. (.eo(le vs. Mon>e, G.R. No. 1466+9, 9/27/2 2! LEADING QUESTIONS

It was never intended that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty would be applied even in cases where there is no showing of substantial compliance with the requirements of the rules of procedure. (-an2 o# t@e .@"l. 0sland vs. %(ouses ?van7el"sta, G.R. No. 146553, 11/27/2 2!
CROSS#EXAMINATION It bears stressing that the cross2 examination of a witness is an absolute right, not a mere privilege, of the party against whom he is called with regard to the accused, it is a right guaranteed by the fundamental law as part of the due process. Article III #ec. *= par. ),+ of the *BDC "onstitution specifically mandates that <the accused shall enjoy the right to meet the witnesses face to face@ and :ule **A, #ec. *, par )f+, of the ,;;; :ules of "riminal 7rocedure enjoins that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall be entitled to confront and cross2examine the witnesses against him at the trial. "ross2 examination serves as a safeguard to combat unreliable testimony, providing means for discrediting a witness4 testimony, and is in the nature of an attac$ on the truth and accuracy of his testimony. The purpose of cross2 examination, however, is not limited to bringing out a falsehood, since it is also a leading and searching inquiry of the witness for further disclosure touching the particular matters detailed by him in his direct examination, and it serves to modify, or explain what has been said, in order to develop new or old facts in a view favorable to the cross2examiner. The object of cross2examination therefore is to wea$en or disprove the case of one4s adversary, and brea$ down his testimony in chief, test the recollection, veracity, accuracy, honesty and bias or prejudice of the witness, his source of information his motives, interest and memory and exhibit the improbabilities of his testimony. In

As a general rule, leading questions are not allowed. However, when the witness is a child of tender years, it is proper for the court to allow leading questions, as it is usually difficult for a child of such age to state facts without suggestion. Eeading questions are necessary to coax the truth out of their reluctant lips. (.eo(le vs. )ana, 4/22/2 2!
IMPEACHMENT OF ADVERSE PARTY S WITNESS; TESTIMONY OF CO#CONSPIRATOR

The fact that the witness may have been a co2conspirator in the commission of the offense is not in itself sufficient to dilute the credibility of or, mush less, be a ground to disregard altogether his testimony. Indeed, by way of exception, the testimony of a co2conspirator may, even if uncorroborated, be sufficient as when it is shown to be sincere in itself, because given unhesitatingly and in a straightforward manner, and is full of details which by its nature could not have been the result of deliberate afterthought.

*C

(.eo(le 11/21/2

vs. 1!

%"a,

G.R.

No.

137457,

HOW WITNESS EVIDENCE OF STATEMENTS

IMPEACHED BY INCONSISTENT

7revious extrajudicial statements cannot be employed to impeach the credibility of a witness unless his attention is first directed to the discrepancies, and he must then be given an opportunity to explain them. It is only when the witness cannot give a reasonable explanation that he shall be deemed impeached. (.eo(le vs. )orte&ano, G.R. No. 14 732, 1/29/2 2!
INCONSISTENCIES/DISCREPANCIES IN TESTIMONY

which the record is $ept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. The attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be, and must be under the official seal of the attesting officer. (Manu#a/turers Hanover 4rust )o. vs. Guerrero, G.R. No. 1366+ 4, 2/19/2 3! FOREIGN JUDGMENTS

It is recogni/ed in 7hilippine jurisprudence and international law that a foreign judgment may be barred from recognition if it runs counter to public policy. (Re(u'l"/ vs. G"n7oyon, 4+1 %)RA 457, ,e/e*'er 19, 2 6!
TESTIMONY IN A SEPARATE TRIAL

Inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness with respect to minor details and collateral matters do not affect the substance, veracity, or weight of the witness4 declarations. (.eo(le vs. )ond"no, G.R. No. 13 945, 11/19/2 1!
FORGERY A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimonies of handwriting experts, because the judge must conduct an independent examination of the questioned signature in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity. #ec. ,, of :ule *-, of the :ules of "ourt explicitly authori/es the court, by itself, to ma$e a comparison of the disputed handwriting <with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered or proved by the party to the satisfaction of the judge. (3"*ene& vs. )o**"ss"on on ?/u*en"/al M"ss"on and Relat"ons o# t@e :n"ted .res'yter"an )@ur/@ "n t@e :%A, G.R. No. 14 472, 6/1 /2 2! PROOF OF OFFICIAL FOREIGN LAW RECORD OF

>nder #ec. *)f+ of :ule **A of the :ules of "ourt, either party may utili/e as part of the evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased, out of, or cannot, with due diligence be found in the 7hilippines, unavailable or otherwise unable to testify, given in another case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the party having parties and subject matter, the adverse party having had opportunity to cross2examine him. (.eo(le vs. )on/or/"o, G.R. Nos. 1212 18 2, 1 /19/2 1!
EVIDENCES NOT OFFERED$ ADOPTED BY THE PARTY

3othing in #ec. -= of :ule *-, requires that the evidence be offered or adopted by a specific party before it could be considered in his favor. It is enough that the evidence is offered for the court4s consideration. (%u(re*e 4ransl"ner, 0n/. vs. )ourt o# A((eals, G.R. No. 125356, 11/21/2 1!
PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE AFTER JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION

>nder #ec. ,= of :ule *-,, the record of public documents of a sovereign authority or tribunal may be proved by( )*+ an official publication thereof, or! ),+ a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody thereof. #uch official publication or copy must be accompanied, if the record is not $ept in the 7hilippines, with a certificate that the attesting officer has the legal custody thereof. The certificate may be issued by any of the authori/ed 7hilippine embassy or consular officials stationed in the foreign country in
*D

As a general rule, the presentation of evidence after judgment of conviction has already attained finality is not allowed. However, it is well within the prerogative of the "ourt to admit such evidence at this stage of the proceedings in the exercise of its power to review. &oreover, the exercise of this discretion is as much a duty of the court especially where the reception of such evidence could save the accused from the grim and irrevocable consequences of a death sentence. Indeed, the rule on finality of judgment cannot divest the #upreme "ourt of its jurisdiction to execute and enforce a judgment for such finality does not mean

that the court has lost all its powers. (.eo(le vs. Alvero, G.R. No. 132364, 9/27/2 2! WAIVER In #ermonia v. "A, the court ruled that as the ground raised for objecting to the evidence presented was a violation of the rule on privileged communication, the petitioner was considered to have waived his right to ma$e an objection on the ground of the evidence being hearsay. In 7eople vs. "ompetente, the court also ruled that the failure of the accused to object to hearsay is a waver of the right to cross2examine the actual witness to the occurrence, thereby rendering the evidence admissible. (Man7"o vs. )ourt o# A((eals, G. R. No. 139+49, 12/ 5/ 1! An out2of2court identification of an accused can be made in various ways in a show2up, the accused alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification, while in a police line2up, and the suspect is identified by a witness from a group of persons gathered for that purpose. .uring custodial investigation, these types of identification have been recogni/ed as critical confrontations of the accused by the prosecution, which necessitate the presence of the presence of a counsel for the accused. This is because the result of these pre2trial proceedings might well settle the accused fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality. 5e have, thus, ruled that any identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police line2up, or in a show2up for that matter, after the start of the custodial investigation is inadmissible as evidence against him. However, if the defense failed to object immediately when the prosecution presented the witnesses or when specific questions regarding the matter were as$ed of them, as required by #ec. -9 of :ule *-, of the :ules on 6vidence, accused must be deemed to have waived his right to object to the admissibility of the testimonies. urthermore, the inadmissibility of these out2 of2court identifications does not render the in2court identification of accused2appellant inadmissible for being the Ffruits of the poisonous tree.4 This in2 court identification formed the basis of the trial courts conviction of accusedH appellant as it was not derived or drawn from the illegal arrest of accusedH appellant or as a consequence thereof, it is admissible as evidence against him

however, whether or not such prosecution evidence satisfies the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt is another matter altogether. (.eo(le vs. ?s/ord"al, G.R. No. 13+934835, 1/16/ 2! WAIVER; ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE ON MATTERS NOT ALLEGED IN THE PLEADINGS

The court may admit evidence on a matter not alleged in the pleadings without amendment thereof and even against the objection of the adverse party where the latter fails to satisfy the court that the admission of the evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his defense upon the merits. (%(ouses Cn7 vs. )ourt o# A((eals, G.R. No. 1445+1, 7/ 5/ 2!
PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE

raud is never presumed but must be established by clear and convincing evidence. A mere preponderance of evidence is not even adequate to prove fraud. (M) ?n7"neer"n7, 0n/. vs. )ourt o# A((eals, G.R. No. 1 4 47, 4/ 3/ 2!
EQUIPOISE DOCTRINE OR EQUIPONDERANCE

<6quiponderance of evidence rule states( 5hen the scales shall stand upon an equipoise and there is nothing in the evidence which shall incline it to one side or the other, the court will find for the defendant. >nder said principle, the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the wea$nesses of defendant4s claim. 6ven if the evidence of the plaintiff may be stronger than that of the defendant, there is no preponderance of evidence on his side if such evidence is insufficient in itself to establish his cause of action.@ (5u/@en/o vs.%and"7an'ayan, 479 %)RA 1! The doctrine refers to a situation where the evidence of the parties is evenly balanced or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates. In this case the decision should be against the party with the burden of proof. Hence, where the burden of proof is on the plaintiff and the evidence does not suggest that the scale of justice should weigh in his favor the court should render a verdict for the defendant. (Maru'en" )or(. vs. $"ra7, G.R. No. 13 99+, +/1 /2 1! In labor cases, if doubt exists between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter.

*B

(Mayon Hotel & Restaurant vs. Adana G.R. No. 157637, 5/16/ 2 5! PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT

:easonable doubt is not such a doubt as any man may start by questioning for the sa$e of a doubt suggested or surmised without foundation in facts or testimony. :easonable doubt must rise from the evidence adduced or from the lac$ of evidence, and it should pertain to the facts constitutive of the crime charged. (.eo(le vs. Gar/"a, G.R. No. 1334+9 & 14397 , 1/15/ 2!
CORPUS DELICTI

administrative proceedings against judges are highly penal in character and are to be governed by the rules applicable to criminal cases. The quantum of proof required to support administrative charges against judges should thus be more than substantial and requires proof beyond reasonable doubt. (,udua/o vs. $a<u"ndanu*, A.M. No. M438 5816 1, +/11/ 2 5! PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE vs. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

In murder, the corpus delicti refers to the body, foundation or substance, upon which the crime has been committed, e.g., the corpse of a murdered man. Its elements are( )*+ a certain crime has been committed, and! ),+ some person is criminally responsible for it. It does not refer to the autopsy report evidencing the nature of the wounds sustained by the victim nor the testimony of the physician who conducted the autopsy or medical examination. (.eo(le vs. )anno, G.R. No. 146346, 9/3 / 2!
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

The concept of <preponderance of evidence@ refers to evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing, than that which is offered in opposition to it! at bottom, it means probability of truth. ?n the other hand, substantial evidence refers to such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, eve if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise. (Re(u'l"/ vs. Guerrero, 4+5 %)RA 424, !
OFFER OF EVIDENCE

#ubstantial evidence, which is the quantum of evidence required to establish a fact in cases before administrative or quasi2judicial bodies, is that level of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. (.@"le*(loy %erv"/es and Resour/es, 0n/. vs. Rodr"7ue&, 4+6 %)RA 3 2, Mar/@ 31, 2 6! #ubstantial evidence, which is more than a mere scintilla, but is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, suffices to hold one administratively liable, the substantial evidence rule does not authori/e any finding to be made just as long as there is any evidence to support it. It does not excuse administrative agencies from ta$ing into account countervailing evidence, which fairly detracts from the evidence supporting a finding. )-aylon vs. Ba/tG B"nd"n7 0ntell"7en/e -ureau, G.R. No. 15 +7 , 12/11/ 2! In a relatively recent case however, while recogni/ing the rule that in administrative proceedings, complainants have the burden of proving the allegations in their complaints by substantial evidence, the #upreme "ourt held that

or evidence to be considered, the same must be formally offered, and that while a document has been identified and mar$ed as an exhibit, it does not automatically mean that it has already been offered as part of the evidence of a party. (Govern*ent vs. A'alle, 4+5 %)RA3 +! A formal offer of evidence is not required in certain cases( )a+ in a summary proceeding because it is a proceeding where there is no full blown trial! )b+ documents judicially admitted or ta$en judicial notice of! )c+ documents, affidavits and depositions used in rendering a summary judgment! )d+ documents or affidavits used in deciding quasi2judicial or administrative cases (-antol"no vs. )o/a )ola -ottlers, 0n/., G.R. No. 15366 , 6/1 /2 3!6 )e+ lost objects previously mar$ed, identified, described in the record and testified to by witnesses who had been subjects of cross examination in respect to said objects. (4a'uena vs. )ourt o# A((eals, 196 %)RA 65 ! The court shall consider the evidence solely for the purpose for which it is offered, not for any other purpose. (%(ouses Ra7udo vs. Ba'ella ?state 4enants Asso/"at"on, 0n/., G.R. No. 146+23, +/9/2 5! "ourts are required to resolve the admissibility the evidence offered

,;

immediately after the objection is made or within a reasonable time. (,euts/@e -an2 Man"la vs. )@ua 5o2 %ee, 4+1 %)RA 672, ,e/e*'er 2 6!

,*