Sie sind auf Seite 1von 102

Diary of Confederate Soldier ..

see page 20
;: ;
Published by
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027
Secretary of the Army
Deputy Commandant
Colonel John D. Bloom, Editor in Chief
lieutenant Colonel Dallas Van Hoose Jr , Managing Editor
Mrs. Eleanor K. Tate, Secretary
FEATURES: Major Sandor I. Ketzls, Associate Editor; Mr
Phillip R Davis, Books EditorGerman Translator
PRODUCTION STAFF: Mrs Dixie R Dominguez, Production
Editor. Mr. Charles Ivie, Art and DesIgn; Mrs. Betty J
Spiewak, Layout and Design; Mrs. Patricia H. Norman,
Manuscriptindex Editor; Mrs. Peggy A. Caltabiano,
ManuscnptsEditorial Assistant; Ms Pamela J Pietsch,
BooksEdironal Assistant; Mr. Amos W. Gallaway, Pnntmg
LATlNAMERICAN EDITIONS: Malar John D Hart, Editor;
Mr. Raul Aponte, Editor, SpanlshAmencan Edillon; Mr.
James Bennett, AssIstant Editor. SpanishAmerican Edi-
tIOn; Mr. FranCiSCO D. Alvidrez, Spanish Translator; Mrs
Winona E Stroble, Spanish Ednonal Assistant; Mr
Almerisio B. Lopes. Editor. BraZilian Edition
CIRCULATION: First Ueutenant Stephen M. Weicht, Busi
ness Manager; Staff Sergeant Mary L. Jones, Admmlstra
tlon; Mrs Merriam L. Clark and Mrs. Addi Parker, Subscnp
MR ADVISORY BOARD: Colonel Sidney L. Unver, Depart-
ment 01 Academic Operations; Colonel Edward J. Stein,
Department 01 Command; Colonel Joseph L. Van Camp,
Department 01 Combat Support; Colonel Donald A.
Ladner, Department 01 Joint and Combined Operations;
Colonel Clyde Tate, Department 01 Tactics; Colonel
William A. Stofft, Combat Studies Institute; Dr. David
3yrett, John F Morrison Chair 01 Military History; Colonel
W. T. Coffey, Army National Guard Adviser; Colonel
Donald C. Askew, Army Reserve AdViser
by Lieutenant Colonel Franklin Y. Hartline, US Army
by Colonel James R. Compton, US Army Reserve
edited by Larry G. Bowman and Jack B. Scroggs
by Major Michael R. Tarantola, US Army
by Lieutenant Colonel Larry H. Ingraham, US Army
by Major Laurence R. Sadoff, US Army
by Colonel Dantel Gans, US Army Reserve, Retired
74 REVIEWS the best from other Journals
89 BOOKS contemporary reading for the professional
MILITARY REVIEW is published monthly," English and Spanish and quarterly in Portuguese Use
of funds for printing thiS publication approved by Headquarters. Department of the Army. 25 April
1980 Controlled circulation postage paid at Leavenworth. KS 66048 and Topeka. KS 66608
English-language subscflptions $1400 per year US and APO/FPO; $16.00 foreign. Single copies
$1.75 US alld APO/FPO; $2 00 forelgn_ Address all mall to Military Review. USACGSC. Fort Leaven-
worth, KS 66027. Telephone (913) 684-5642 or AUTOVON 552-5642_ Unless otherWise stated. the
views herein are those of the aufhors and are not necessarily those of the Department of Defense
or any element thereof. BaSis of offiCial distribution is one per general officer and one per five field
grade officers of the Active Army, and one per headquarters (battalion and higher) of the Army Na-
tional Guard and the US Army Reserve_
MILITARY REVIEW (USPS 123-830) US ISSN.0026-4148

60 years of military service.

_ Yes! Send me MA for one year $14 US
and APO/FPQ ($16 foreign paid In US
currency by US bank draft or InternatIOnal
ThIs IS a new subscription
ThIs IS a renewal
This IS a 91ft subscription (Provide mfor-
matlon In next column)
Payment Included
Bill me
Please check all that apply:
(Include information for grft subscription
recIpient, If apphcable)
Active duty Army
__ Retired
Please change my address as follows

. RevIew
Gift tQ:
Gift from:
Rank./Tltle First name Inl\lai Last name
City State I Country Z,p Code
S ThiS professional mlhtary Journal IS tall deductible
Military Review
Comment Card
We need reader feedback Please use thiS card to
comment on thiS Issue and to mdlcate subjects of greatest
Interest to you for future Issues.
__ Would you like to contribute an
arttcle to If so. check. here
and we will send a copy of "Wnt
Ing for the Mllttary Review."
Rank/TItle FIrst name Initial Last name
City State/Country ZIP Code

US Army Command and General Staff College
Fort leavenworth, Kansas 66027

US Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

Military Review '8 Diamond Jubilee.
This month, Mz'litary Review reaches another milestone. Six
decades ago, its predecessbr, the Instructors' Summary of Military
Articles, began providing instructors of the then General Service
Schools with abstracts of current military writings appearing in
other publications, many of them from foreign countries.
Since that time, the magazine has seen world upheaval, economic
boom as well as depression, periods of wartime fervor and eras of
pacificism and protest. Mz'litary Review has endeavored, through
the years, to provide an important medium for presentation of cur-
rent Army doctrine and to serve as a for.llm for the expression of
informed opinion, as well as the critical analysis and frank evalua-
tion that are so essential for progress.
Mz'litary Review has gained a reputation as one of the world's
foremost military journals and enjoys an audience that reaches
into more than 80 countries. This success did not result wholly
from the efforts of dedicated past and present staff members, but is
due, in large measure, to the hundreds of innovative and forward-
looking authors who felt so strongly about a particular topic that
they took pen in hand and produced an article for publication. It is
only through this sort of interest that a journal such as Military
Review can make a worthwhile contribution to its readership and
the entire military community.
Looking to the future, we at Military Review are committed to
building upon the past in presenting the latest in military thinking.
To do this, we need your help both in articles for publication and in
comments about how well we are meeting your needs. Let us hear
from you.
'j,. :
, ,
to Watch For:
; "" "
Strategic for th.e1980s: Part I
Colonel William O .. Staudenniaier; US Army

The Battle on the German Frontier'
Lieut(mant Cotonel Barry R. McCaffrey. US Army

A Credible Deterrent?
B. L. Hadis
The US ArInY
Training SysteIn
. and the
Modern Battlefield
Lieutenant Colonel Franklin Y. Hartline, US Army
This article examines the training system used by the US Army
and compares it with those used in several other countries.
Capabilities of the US Army's system are evaluated in light of
requirements of the modern battlefield. The author suggests
that another system for training soldiers might better serve the
needs of this natioll.
HY does Private Johnson enlist
in Buffalo. New York, receive
seven weeks' basic com bat training at
Fort Dix. New Jersey. travel to Fort Ben
ning, Georgia. for advanced individual
training (AIT) and finally reach his unit
at Fort Ord, California? r i ~ a t e Johnson
has entered the US Army individual
training system. This system uses train
ing centers to teach military skills to indi
viduals who are then shipped as trained
replacements to units in the field. This ar
ticle investigates three questions: How
did this system evolve? Do other major
armies conduct individual training this
way? How effective is this approach to in
dividual training in the 1980s?
The current Army training system is a
relatively unchanged offspring of World
War II. Prior to this war. the Army used
a regimental training system. The com
paratively miniscule prewar Army used a
decentralized system in which each
Regular Army regiment trained its own
recruits. After processing and receiving
general military subjects in a regimental
or battalion recruit detachment. the new
soldier completed training in his unit
under the careful tutelage of his own non
commissioned officers (NCOs) and of-
ficers.' I n effect, the regimental or bat-
talion commander conducted basic train-
ing for his units. and the company com-
manders directed AlT.
World War II mobilization changed
this system forever. at least in the US
Army. Although attempts were made to
retain unit-based training by forming
units around cadre. the massive im-
balance between the prewar and draft
forces seemed to require the use of Army
training centers. The establishment of
many current Army posts. of course.
dates from this period.
The first training centers were estab-
lished by branch. Draftees assigned to in
fantry training centers were trained in in-
fantry and support (cooks. clerks. ar-
morers, and so forth) skills needed in the
infantry regiment. The branches designed
their own Mobilization Training Pro-
grams (MTPs) which varied in length and
content. Infantry and armor MTPs were
13 weeks in 1941 but. by 1943. were ex
tenqed to 17 weeks and changed to in
clude much more field training. This com-
pares to the present average initial train-
ing period of 16 weeks.
After World War II, AIT was returned
to the units. Basic training. however, was
retained in the mobilization centers and
standardized as an infantryoriented
course of eight weeks' duration. The
reasons for this important decisjon not to
return to unit-based individual training
are unclear. Perhaps a combination of
rapid demobilization, training centers in-
being and apparent cost savings held
The Korean conflict saw the return of
AIT to the centers. Recruits received a
common basic training followed by
center-based advanced training before
reporting to units as trained replace-
ments. With few modifications, this
mobilization-based training system has
endured to the present day.
The history of Fort Leonard Wood,
Missouri, Illustrates this evolution. It
was carved out of the Ozarks in 1941,
and, by 1945, more than 320,000 troops
had been trained there. After a period as a
ghost camp, maintained by caretaker per-
sonnel, Fort Leonard Wood was partially
reopened in 1950 for the Korean conflict.
A "Make Fort Wood Permanent Commit-
tee" was successful in making it a perma-
nent training center in 1956.' Its 25th an-
niversary as a permanent installation was
celebrated last year. Other training
centers have similar histories
The Vietnam, conflict had no funda-
mental impact upon the mobilization-
based training system. Initially, deploy-
ing forces went as units and were sup-
plied with individual replacements from
the training centers in support of a
13-month-combat-tour policy. This per-
sonnel policy has received much criticism,
especially in its effects upon unit cohe-
sion, but most detractors offer no policy
of their own. A system of rotating units
through the war zone on, for example, a
two-year basis could have been an option,
but this issue requires a study of Its own.
Suffice it to say that the basic system of
center-trained replacements assigned in-
dividually to units in the field had been
the US Army's training. system since
World War II.
After the Vietnam withdrawal and the
end of the draft, the Army continued to
rely upon the mobilization-based training
system. The compa.tibility of this system
with the All-Volunteer Force and Total
Force concepts was apparently not con-
sidered. Operation Steadfast, which
organized a separate US Army Training
and Doctrine Command, further sep-
arated individual training from US Army
units. How does this system compare
with training systems used by other ma-
jor armies?
As Emory Upton discovered a century
ago, the study of other armies provides
valuable insight into the solution of
similar problems. J This is especially true
for individual training since the contrast
is striking between the US system and
those of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, France, Great Britain and the
Federal Republic of Germany
The West German army is approxi-
mately 335,000 strong, half of which is
provided by a 15-month draft program.'
Each maneuver battalion has a training
company that conducts two six-week
training programs per quarter. A draftee
receives six weeks each of common sub-
jects and A IT in this unit before joining a
line company in the same battalion. Less
numerous military specialists report to
units in the same brigade or division.
Each company commander in the Ger-
man army uses a training skill catalogue
(similar to a Soldiers' Manual) that tells
him what basic and advanced skills are re-
qui red by soldiers at each stage of their
enlistment. The unit commander, there-
fore, develops individual skills to the
needs of his unit. It is interesting to note
that, unlike the US Army, the Germans
were able to maintain unit training com-
panies throughout most of World War II.
According to a classic study by Edward
Shils and Morris Janowitz, this unit-
based training system was instrumental
in the extraordinary cohesion of German
combat units during World War II.' The
German army has been experimenting
with an equipment holding/individual
training battalion concept to allow rapid
augmentation by reserve units and still
retain a unit-based training system.
Every brigade will have such a battalion.
France has a large army by world
standards-approximately 320,000.' For
patriotic and economic reasons, France
has a universal military training system.
Draftees incur a one-year obligation and
are drafted in two-month increments
throughout the year. Each French bat-
talion has an integral training company.
Draftees report directly to the battalion
with which they will serve their obliga-
tion. The company conducts basic train-
ing for six to eight weeks and specialized
training for four weeks. Collective (crew,
platoon, company) training is conducted
in the combat companies of the same bat-
talion for the remainder of the-draftee's
term of service. Small training centers are
used for specialized collective training
but on a short temporary duty basis.
'The trend in the French army is toward
eliminating even this low-level. collective
training company and having maneuver
companies train and retain their own
draftees throughout their term of service.
Whether these ideas are incorporated or
not. the French military training system
will continue to emphasize decentralized.
unit-related training. These principles are
well-ingrained in 'all nonUS armies. but
the Fronch are remarkable in that they at-
tempt very decentralized training in the
face of a very short (12-month) draft
Great Britain
The British army is not large (approxi-
mately 170.000)' but is included in this
survey because of its similarities to the
US Army: a volunteer force organized
from a culturally similar. postindustrial
society. The British army recruit is condi-
tionally enlisted at the recruiting station
ahd sent to a processing station for three
days of orientation and testing. He is free
to leave at any time. This somewhat
unique procedure is used to ensure that
the soldier selects a job and location
corresponding to his abilities and desires.
The British army is convinced that this
procedure pays for itself in reduced drop-
out rates and malassigned soldiers.
"Finally approved" recruits are. like the
other non-US armies discussed. sent to
training units of the regiment in which
they will serve. Here. in what is called a
Regimental Training Depot. officers and
NCOs of the regiment conduct a 16week
training course for new recruits. The
regimental commander is responsible for
The British army also uses Divisional
Training Depots for administrative
groupings of regiments of like branches.
The British try to negate some of the
problems of this low-level "training-
center" approach by using only regimen-
tal officers and NCOs to run the depot.
Recruits destined for a particular regi-
ment also wear distinctive insignia of
that unit-referred to as being "badged."
Qualified recruits choosing a specialist
field report directly to their branch school
which conducts its own short "basic
training" as part of the course. This dif-
fers significantly from the US Army's
training system. of course. in which all
recruits receive basic training together at
common training centers.
The Soviet training system is unique in
many ways. Although a very large army
(1.8 million. of which 1.4 million are con-
scripts)." its training is even more decen-
tralized than the non-US armies dis-
cussed earlier. The USSR now operates
under a 1967 Universal Military Training
Law that made two major changes in the
Soviet draft system. It reduced the term
of service from three to two years. and it
required 140 hours of preinduction train-
ing for secondary school children during
the two years preceding their actual in-
duction at age 18. Some of this training is
very specialized.
It is interesting to note that the US
Army used preinduction training on a
voluntary basis to prepare draftees for
service in World War II. The army pro-
vided educational literature. visiting in-
structors. surplus equipment and marks-
manship training. After induction. credit
was given toward military occupational
specialty (MOS) qualification.
Soviet recruits are inducted twice a
year (May-June and November-Decem-
ber) by the rayon (county) and are sent to
either a military district processing sta-
tion or directly to a unit. Here. they enter
a four-week period during which they are
tested. issued clothing and taught the
basic knowledge of military life. including
how to fire a rifle. The Soviets do not at-
tempt to do more than this common-
subjects training collectively. Recruits
are sent to their units where they are
trained by their own officers and NCOs
and where they will stay for their entire
two years of active duty.
IN THE 1980S
It is quite clear that the US Army's
center-based training system evolved
from the mobilizations of World War II
and Korea. Also apparent is that this
system is not used by any other major
army. draft or volunteer. The four armies
surveyed conduct very decentralized.
unit-focused individual training and are
convinced that relinquishing responsibil-
itY'for individual training to large centers
results in poorly trained soldiers and a
lack of unit cohesion. While being dif-
ferent is not the same as being wrong.
some justification seems to be in order as
to how the two approaches to individual
training compare by cost-effectiveness
and. most importantly. the requirements
of modern warfare.
Cost-effectiveness comparisons of
center-based and unit-based training
systems are very difficult to make. On the
cost side, center-based training would
seem to have a decided advantage since
resources are centralized for this very
reason. After all, World War II training
centers were established because the ex-
ceeaingly small Army did not have the
cadre to train a very large force quickly
and fight a global war at the same time. It
is much less clear today, however.
An Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) study estimated Fiscal Year 1979
costs for Army recruit training of $325
million, requiring approximately 8,800
support personnel and eight recruit train
ing bases for a workload (student man-
year) of 18,137." OMS concluded, quite
correctly in my view, that the Army has
far too many bases for its workload and
should put some bases in caretaker
status. Both the Army, and lately the
Congressional Budget Office," have
agreed. Unfortunately, political realities
have been paramount. For the purpose of
this inquiry, however, the important cost
consideration is that the center-based
system may not be less costly than a unit
based approach under current conditions.
Effectiveness comparisons of center-
based and unit-based traimng graduates
are also difficult to make. Results of the
:-; A TO tank gunnery competitions are
not a definitive measure. A US Army pro-
gram called advanced individual training
in units (AIU) appears to provide the best
evidence to date. The program trained
30,000 soldiers in 14 high-density MOSs
in Continental United States (CONUS)
combat divisions and separate brigades
during 1971-73. The AIU project was a
stopgap method to fill understrength
units affected by the drawdown from
Vietnam and to meet Unit of Choice en-
listment options by sending basic train-
ing graduates to their unit of assignment
for AlT. AIU provides, therefore. a
unique contemporary example of a decen-
tralized American training system for
The AIU project began in November
1971 at seven CONUS divisions and
separate brigades. Commanders were
allowed a surprising degree of latitude.
They could choose the method of training,
select the MOS in which the soldier was
to be trained (subject to enlistment con-
tracts) and award the MOS in the unit.
Although space does not allow providing
the details of the program, A I U met its
objectives extremely well." Some units
wanted to retain AI U after they reached
full strength. even though supporting
personnel slots and equipment were not
provided from the training base.
Two studies attempted to compare
training effectiveness of AIT and AIU
graduates." Surveys of unit officers in-
dicated unit-based training was. in most
cases. preferred. A comparison of MOS
scores also seemed to indicate a more ef
fective training achieved by AIU
although low sample size made most
results statistically invalid. Al U in
fantrymen, for example. scored 106.54 on
their MOS test compared with AIT
graduates' average score of 91.52.
Although the AIU program was con-
ceived as a temporary personnel filler and
ended after meeting that objective. it
makes unavoidable comparisons between
the current US Army training system
and those unit-based systems used by
other armies.
Individual Training and Modern Warfare
I t is my contention that the nature of
war and US military strategy have
changed since World War II. The advent
of nuclear weapons changed warfare
forever. It is extremely unlikely that
major powers will declare war upon one
another,' mobilize their total war-making
capability and commence military opera-
tions until "unconditional surrender" is
imposed by one side. Indeed. in the
nuclear age. wars among major powers
may resemble the limited conflicts of the
19th century and before. War objectives
and means employed will both be limited.
assuming credible nuclear deterrence.
This. in fact. has been the pattern since
Hiroshima. To paraphrase General
Douglas MacArthur. there may be many
substitutes for victory.
Conventional warfare has also changed
dramatically. High-technology and excep-
tionally destructive weapon systems have
made high-intensity warfare extremely
violent and of short duration. The brevity
of conflict is caused by the inability of
even highly industrialized nations to
supply war materiel and trained military
personnel to the battlefield in response
to devastating rates of loss or expend-
Support for this view is found' in the
history of recent conventional conflicts
(India-Pakistan. the various Arab-Israeli
wars). as well as the apparent inability of
even the richest nation on earth to sup-
port a conventional war in Europe for
more than a few weeks. Although a high
intensity war between industrialized na-
tions may consist of short campaigns
punctuated by negotiation rather than a
short war. the basic nature of modern war
remains: high technology. very destruc-
tive and short.
US military strategy has also evolved
from the World War II mobilization
period. Massive retaliation. a reflection of
US nuclear superiority, was quickly
proved ineffective by the Korean War and
1982 .
the USSR buildup of strategic forces. The
twin strategies of nuclear parity and flexi-
ble response also outlived their usefulness
with the continuing Soviet buildup and
the failure of US policy in Vietnam.
Americans. it turned out. were not willing
to "bear any burden" called for under this
Current strategy may require a catchy
title. but resembles the post-Vietnam
Nixon Doctrine: a US nuclear umbrella
over the free world. assistance. for alli'1s
and ready conventional forces to in-
tervene in support of vital American in-
terests. The training implications of such
a strategy are importaiit- favoring'
mobile. cohesive. highly trained forces
over a mobilization potential.
The US Army's individual training
system is a direct descendent of the
World War II mobilization It has re-
mained basically unchanged over the past
40 years despite the evolving nature of
modern warfare. US military strategy.
even cost-effectiveness considerations.
No major foreign army uses this system.
I t relies upon a concept that individual
replacements can be trained centrally and
sent to a unit with little adverse impact
upon the unit or. in fact. upon the individ-
The unit commander. it is presumed.
can concentrate upon unit readiness and
unit training-as if the whole is unrelated
to the sum of its parts. As most unit com-
manders know-and as an honest ap-
praisal of skill qualification test scores in-
dicates-individual training is an ongoing
challenge, inseparable from the unit in
either space or time. and integral to the
unit's effectiveness.
The concept of unit cohesion, now being
rediscovered as vital to combat effec-
tiveness, is largely a reflection of an indi-
vidual's relationship to the unit's effec-
tiveness. This relationship, I contend, is
even more important to the "crew-served
battlefield" of the 1980s. To retain a
common-skill, training-center focused,
mobilization-based training system from
World War II could be, for the reasons
stated, the greatest single institutional
impediment to fielding an effective fight-
ing force.
One hesitates from ending such a
presentation without offering at least the
outline of a recommendation. At the same
time, experience teaches that too detailed
a recommendation becomes the bureauc-
racy's target and subsequent rationale for
doing nothing. As a learned teacher used
to say, "Everyone's for progress-
as long as it doesn't entail change.""
With these caveats, it is clear that the
US training system must meet the basic
requirements of modern warfare and US
military strategy in the 1980s. Specif-
ically, common-skill training must be
limited to essential military requirements
(discipline, hygiene, physical fitness) and
other training organized to develop those
individual skills required by the unit of
assignment. The "crew,served battle-
field" requires soldiers to become
members of a crew and crews to become
members of a unit as soon as possible in
their enlistment. For these reasons and
for cohesion, the cement in any effective
unit's foundation, all training should be
done in the uni t of assignment.
The proper level of centralization (bat-
talion, brigade) could be determined by
experiment. I prefer the German ap-
proach over, say, an AIT train-and-retain
concepti' because iIltegral training units
can be used to expand the force quickly
during emergencies. The equipment hold-
ing individual training battalion concept
used by the German army also appears
uniquely suited to the US Army's Total
Force concept. This approach allows
rapid expansion of trained, nearly com-
bat'ready units-quite an accomplish-
ment in the age of $2 million tanks and
empty reserve units.
The above, therefore, outlines the indi-
vidual training system necessary for the
1980s and beyond. In my opinion, retain-
ing the mobilization-based individual
training system of World War II has been
a significant contributor to the "hollow
Army" described' today. Separating the
training base from Army units has helped
destroy unit cohesion and remove the
NCO from his rightful role as the in-
dividual trainer of the Army. This "Army
of strangers" has not served the nation as
well as it could have over this period.
Armies are, for reasons good and bad,
notoriously resistant to change. Theoreti
cally, armies have a choice between
preparing for the last war or the next. In
practice, major change occurs in incre-
ments, usually from external causes (such
as lost wars). An incremental approach is,
therefore,. indicated. The concept should
be tested, honestly and thoroughly, at a
CONUS iIlstaliation before evaluation
and possible use. The closing of a training
installation or the resumption of conscrip-
tion may present such an incremental op-
portunity. Then, with strong leadership
and some luck, an individual training
system for the 1980s may be imple-
mented, Then again, if the US beaches at
Normandy had not been on the right, we
might be in a better location for the
NATO central battle. C'est La guerre.
, <-
1 See Mark F Brennan, 81 al ,An EXfJ1oratoryStudV of the Army
Tralmng Cenler System, Human Resources Research Office,
Washington, 0 C 1969
ment Printing Office, WashIngton. 0 C 19411
11 RecruIt Trammg Study, US Oil Ice 01 Management and
Budget. Washington, D G . 19 September 1977
2 "20 Years at Ft Wood," The Kansas City Star 20 March 1976 12 Reducmg the Federal Budget. CongresSional Budget omee,
US Government Printing Office, WaShington, DC February 1981 p 2
3 John W Seigle, 'Training In the British Army" Militarv
ReVIew, November 1973, p 30
13 See Major Franklin V Hartline, The IndiVidual Trammg
01 the uS Army A Critical Evaluation, Research Report,
US Army Command and Genera! Staff College. Fort leav81worlh,
4 "The Military Salance, 1980181' An Force Magaz/fl8,
December 1980, p 82
5 Edward A ShtlS and Morns JanOWitz "COheSion and DrSlnle
gratlOn In the Wehrmacht In World War II, Pub"c Opinion Quar
ferly, Summer 1948, pp 287 88
6 The Milltar.,. Balance, 1980181 op Clf. P 79
14 Advanced Ind/vldual, Tramlng In Umts. PrOject Study. US
Arm,! TraIning and Doctrine Command Fort Monroe Va '1 Jcl.nuary
1974 and Ana/'1l/ng Trammg EffectIveness, Dratt Stud'!. uS Army
Tramlng and Doctrine Comma,-.d Fori Monroe Va. 15 January
8 Ibid, p6B
9 See COlonel Bernard Loeflke The SOvl8t Union Perspective
of an Army Attache' Parameters December 1980 p 54
15 Colonel Lee 0 Olvey- Professor of SOCIal SCiences, US
Mllrtary ,l'H.ddemy POint !II 'I
16 Captain Rodney B Mitchell, EnhanCing Unit CoheSion,"
Mliitani Revlev. Mdy 1981 pp 3043 10 'Pre-Induction Training US War Department US GOvern
---- '/
Ll(?utenant Colonel Franklin Y Hartline is a
member of the military faculty, Industnal Col-
lege of the Armed Forces, National Defense
University, Fort McNair, D.C He
received a B S. from the US Mliltary Academy,
an MBA from the "'harton University
of Pennsylvania, and lS a graduate of th'e
USACGSC. He has seTl'ed In callalrv UnLts In the
101 st Alrborne and 2d Armored DWlsions, In the
US Army Military Personnel Center and as an
Instructor at West Pomt
Guidelines for Swedish Defense Planning. Sweden's defense
will maintain its operational strength in all essential areas
during the 1980s, according to the recent government guide
lines for planning that will form the basis of the Riksdag's
decision on the defense organization for the period 1982-87.
Based on the recommendations in the defense committee's
recent report, the guidelines state that expenditures will
remain at the present level, Kr. 15,400 million ($3.42 billion) a
year at 1980 prices. An adjustment of Kr. 400 million up or
down is also being studied.
General conscription will be maintained. The peacetime-
defense organization will be trimmed in staffs, unit training
and joint authorities.
Civil defense planning will be based on an unchanged or
somewhat higher level. Protective masks will be procured for
entire population over a 10year period.
Commanders engaged in combat operations are usually faced
with a host of problems im'olving the cil,il sector. Civil-Military
Cooperation (ClMlC) is a program aimed at reducing t{le impact
of such problems, as well as facilitating further unit operations.
This article reviews ClMlC planning in US Army Reserve civil
affairs units and relates actiolls takell thus far ill this vital

A Force Multiplier for the Combat Commander
Colonel James R. Compton, US Army Reserve
MERGING amid new combat doc
. trine and force modernization con-
cepts in US Army Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC) Army 86 studies is
an enhanced and significantly more im-
portant role for US Army Reserve
(USAR) civil affairs (CA) forces. Called
Civil-Military Cooperation (<;::IMIC). the
role portends early mobilization and
deployment for CA elements, uitilization
in the forward combat zone as well as in
the communications zone, and a linking of
civil-military experts not only with US
forces (down to brigade level) but with
other NATO units.
CIMIC. a cooperative endeavor bet-
ween the United States and its allies,
recognizes CA capabilities as a force
multiplier for the combat commander .
This new thinking is evolving in Army
86 doctrinal and organizational blue-
prints' from the Combined r m ~ Combat
Development Activity (CACDA) at Fort
Leavenworth. Kansas. It 'is partially
reflected already in an.ongoing planning
and training program being conducted by
the Host Nation Activities IHNA) staff
section of US Army, Europe, and the
353d Ci.viJ Affairs Command, a USAR
unit located in New Yotk City.' .
CACDA is charged with developing the
Army organizational requirements that
will be needed to offset the numerical
superiority of Warsaw Pact forces in any
future NATO air-land conflict in Europe.
CACDA's concepts have already resulted
in Department of the Army approval of a
Division 86 organization. Emphasis is on
placing maximum firepower forward in
corps and division areas; combat with
smaller,' single weapon companies; arm-
ing, fueling, fixing and feeding forward;
organization for continuous combat
operations; and an increase in leader-to-
led ratios. Also supported are advanced
battlefield concepts that will incorporate
developmental weapons and equipment,
and that will take advantage of scarce
personnel resources.
Army 86 envisions new heavy armored
and mechanized corps and divisions sup-
ported by a theater army composed of a
combination of area-oriented and func
tional organizations commonly referred
to as echelons above corps.3 Within this
framework, USAR CA elements will be
smaller and more mobile than the CA
companies, groups, brigades and com-
mands that were borne of military
government perspectives in World War
II. These elements will be capable of
deploying to Europe rapidly. They will
then join up with US, German, Belgian,
Luxembourgian or Dutch forces to which
they will be linked through capstone
training oassociations and will stay with
those units as ttIe battle develops.
The CIMlC teams will be trained in the
lapguage of the area to which deployed
and will possess those specialties needed
mqst in E'ach respective area of opera-
tions. For example, teams assigned to the
brigades and diyisions in the forward
comb !It zone will,be able to concentrate
on problems of immediate concern to
those. commanders such as labor, legal
matters, transportation, civil supply,
civil defense, property control. and
displaced persons, refugees or evacuees
Cross-training' will have been' ac-
complished prior to mobilization. At each
higher level, the teams will be capable of
dealing with a wider variety of problems.
The CIMIC elements supporting theater
army, for example, would contain addi-
tional specialists ne<;ded in resolving
problems related to commerce and in-
dustry, food and agriculture, or the 12 to
13 other specialties that exist in currently
organized C A units. This concept essen-
tially places CIMIC personnel in areas
when and where they are needed most, do-
ing the things that are most germane to
the mission.
CIMIC by definition is cooperation be
tween US and allied forces in civil-
oriented matters that affect military
operations. Relegated to the history shelf
is the military government philosophy
that characterized the post World War II
occupations of Germany and ,J apan. How-
ever, CA units will retain military govern-
ment capabilities should they be needed
in a hostile nation environment.
Gone, too, within the definition of
CIMIC, is any thought that US forces
will solve all of the civil military problems
for the host nation in which they are
operating. Instead, on the basis of agree-
ments between the United States and the
host natIon, personnel from both nations,
working within clearly defined param-
eters, will solve problems together witb a
goal of developil'g solutions that benefit
As a simple example. consider a US
brigade in Germany needing a large
number of trucks for movement of evac-
uees. Instead of turning to division head-
quarters with hi'S request, the brigade
commander could direct his ClMIC team
to secure the needed transportation by
coordinating with the CIMIC team as-
signed to the German Territorial Army
(GTA) military region in which the
brigade is located. On tbe basis of
previously negotiated agreements. or ad
opportunity to Interact with NATO lorces personnel. CIMIC brings US civil al
lairs reservists Into direct contact with personnel 01 allied nations. Here, a civil al
lairs olllcer, left, discusses host nation support with a stall olllcer 01 the German
Territorial Southern Command.
hoc arrangements covered by such
agreements, it might be possible to ar-
range German commercial transportation
for this need.
This example' can be extended to a
myriad of problems that will undoubtedly
confront commanders,' both US and
allied, on the battlefield each day. And ac-
tions such as this will provide some of the
"elasticity'" that combat units will need
in future engagements.
This new emphasis on CIMIC, pro-
mulgated since late 1979 by US Army,
Europe (USAREURI, in its mutual sup-
port program with the 353d Civil Affairs
Command, and supported more recently
by CACDA and the US Army Institute
for Military Assistance (USAIMA), had
at least a partial origin in the CA units
themselves. The 353d, with its sister
units, the 351st of California and the 352d
of Maryland, worked with USAIMA sev-
eral years ago to formulate a new docu-
ment entitled Civil Affairs Support for
All Echelons (CASFAE),' which reflected
the thinking at that time regarding op-
timum CA operational philosophy.
This study did not depict all of the CA
deploYJ,llent and utilization concepts that
are now flowing from the CACDA studies
and from the capstone implementation
program, nor did it receive USAREUR in-
dorsement. However, it was the begin-
ning of the concept of CIMIC' as' a force
multiplier.' CASFAE .sugges'ted that Ac-
tive component and Reserve combat
organizations should make use of the
variety of talent 'in the nation's CA
forces. CASFAE acknowledged that
some tailoring of existing CA units would
be needed due to NATO's unique re-
On the basis of CASFAE and Army
Regulation 11-22, Mutual Support Pro-
grams, CA units established alliances in
the form of unfunded mutual support pro-
Realistic training. CIMIC oilers realworld training lor civil allalrs reservists. Here, "host nation civilians"
and civil alia Irs personnel are shown planning a cooperallve civilian supply program.
Outside Continental United States tours, as a pari of Ihe CIMIC concepl, oller reallsllc training lor Ihe
Army's civil affairs Iroops. Here, a group 01 "refugees" are delalned 01 an assembly polnl and are Inler
rogaled by CIMIC personnel.
grams with Active component. USAR
and Army National Guard organizations.
Through this means. Reserve units were
able to demonstrate that they could deal
effectively with the probl-ems associated
with civil-military operations. Some of
the mutual support efforts were sealed
with nO more than a handshake on the
part of the commanders concerned. and
many have blossomed into healthy. full-
blown working relationships.
CIMIC. including the early deployment
of CA elements. is not a philosophy
dreamed up in CA units. Neither is it a
solution awaiting a problem. It is the
recognition by our allies in Europe. and
our own troop commanders there. that a
sizable segment of the US military
capability was an un programed asset
that could help to make the difference
between defeat or victory.
Following presentations of its "CA
Support in a CIMIC Environment" con-
cepts to Army Readiness Mobilization
Region I. First US Army. US Army
Forces Command and the Office of the
Deputy Chief of Eitaff for Operations and
Plans. the 353d established a mutual sup'
port program with USAREUR in which
the 353d would provide USAREUR with
a continuing CIMIC augmentation
capability. The USAREUR HNA staff
extended' the relationship through con-
tacts with the GTA and the development
of the USAREUR CIMIC concept. This
recently approved concept calls for the
US Army. through its implementation of
capstone-designated USA R force
to provide GTA units with
US CIMIC capabilities.
This would be done through assign-
ment of USAR CA teams and detach-
ments down to VBK (Verteidigungbezirk-
kommandol level. The VBK region is
similar to our county. The concept also
called for USAR CA linkup with US.
Belgian. Luxembourgian. Dutch and.
eventually. other forces committed to
NATO. The provisi<?n of CIMIC support
below the VBK level-that is. to the VKK
(Verteidigungskreiskommandol subregion
level (similar to our citiesl-is left to the
discretion of the VBK commander.'
The USAREUR CIMIC concept. which
the 353d now concentrates on solely. sug-
gests CIMIC teams and detachments of a
limited size and with specifically defined
duties to meet NATO needs. But the 353d
has since developed a staff study. based
on the concept of coalition and rapid
deployment warfare. that. if approved by
Department of the Army. will not only
meet NATO requirements. but contingen
cies in other areas of the world as well.
The 353d plan increases slightly the sizes
of the CIMIC teams contemplated for
NATO and expands their capabilities.
The CA structure lfecommended for the
future by the 353d 'shown in the accom-
panying figure. The additional scope is
based on the fact that. while a particular
specialty such as public facilities might not
be needed in Europe because of the
sophistication of that environment. it might
very well be needed in CIMIC teams
deployed to less-well-developed areas of the
world. Most of the existing CA specialties
need to be maintained. at least to some
degree. in the force. The above recommen-
dations do this. It should be noted that the
353d relied heavily on the USAREUR con-
cept. together with the earlier results of
CASFAE. in developing its recommenda-
tions for a structure that will meet any
foreseeable contingency.
While Total Army Analysis and cap-
stone concentrate on a European
scenario. they do not ignore other poten-
tial trouble spots of the world. Capstone
does direct the tentative alignment of one
or more CA units each with. among
others. the Pacific Command. the
Southern Command, the Western Com-
mand, the Atlantic Command and the
Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. The
main diHerences between the USAREUR
'CIMIC concept and the 353d proposal lie
in numbers of personnel needed at team
levels and in the exact scope of their
The first real test of the CIM IC pro-
gram occurred when USAREUR asked
the 353d to provide 25 CIl\1It-trained
reservists to participate in WINTEX 81.
Drawing on its own headquarters' re-
sources, plus CA units in the northeast
First US Army area and the Fifth US
Army a ~ a the 353d dispatched the
needed individuals on schedule. They
subsequently were assigned for
Civil Affairs Command (90)
28 (19)
148 (8)
Civil Affairs Detachment
(Area Support)
Civil Affairs Group
(Area Support)
Civil Affairs Battalion 1 43' (23),
(Brigade Support) :
Civil Affairs Detachment 1
(Brigade Support) I
'-______________ .1
Legend Numbers without parentheses are
numbers of units recommended
Numbers In parentheses are numbers
of personnel per unit
"Of the 43 (IV I; affairs battalions recommended. 19
would have four detacnments each dnd 24 would have
three detaChments each
Civil affairs structure recommended by the 353d Civil Affairs Command"
for coalition and rapid deployment warfare. Recommendation provides for
a total of 227 units and 3,019 personnel.
WINTEX play at USAREUR Head-
quarters (lINA); at I II, V and VII Corps
Headquarters; at 21st Support Com-
mand, GTA Southern Command; and at
selected WBK (Wehrbereichkommando)
(similar to our states) and VBK Head-
quarters in the NATO Central Army
Group and Northern Army Group
All of the reservists assigned to Ger-
man units were fluent in the German
language, and all others had completed
the Defense Language Institute's Head-
start German-language program. US per-
sonnel assigned to GTA units were com-
pletely dependent on the Germans for
billeting, mells, communications, trans
portation and other exercise support.
A 353d team sent to Germany at the
conclusion of WINTEX to evaluate the
support given to liS and GT A forces
found that the reservists were able to par-
ticipate fully with minimum orientation.
Also, they provided additional realism to
the C I M I C portions of the exercise and
contributed their never-beforeavailable
expertise to the r\!solution of a bevy of
civil-military problems that confronted
US and GTA commanders. These find-
ings were confirmed by independent
evaluations conducted by the USAREUR
HNA staff. US G5s, HNA staff personnel
and GT A commanders supported the
utilization of USAR CA personnel in the
exercise and recommended further such
affiliation in the future.'"
The test also revealed that USAR
CIMIC personnel deployed to Europe will
benefit from further training in corps and
division operations, in GTA organization
and functions, and in transition-to-war
philosophy. Further, they will be even
more effective if all are trained to level 3
fluency in the German language. The
353d is taking steps now to ensure that
its personnel receive the additional train-
ing, and it is investigating various
avenues for getting the language capabili-
ty needed.
Also planned is a 'conference with CA
units throughout the country that are
linked to European-oriented Active com-
ponent and National Guard organizations
by capstone. In meetings of this kind,
plus expanded communications, neces
sary steps will be initiated for enhanced
dialogue and cohesive actions aimed at
the development of a first-rate CIMIC.
organizational capability.
In March 1981, the 353d tested its abil-
ity to mobilize and deploy rapidly. Begin-
ning with an assembly one Friday morn-
ing at various USAR centers in the New
York City area, elements of the 353d
Headquarters and several of its subor-
dinate units moved by convoy to
McGuire Air Force Base in New Jersey.
Personnel and equipment were loaded on-
to Air National Guard transports and,
within 10 hours of initial assembly, were
airborne en route to North Carolina.
Following arrival and debarkation at
Pope Air Force Base, they convoyed to
Fort Bragg and spent the weekend train-
ing with Active component counterpart
units there. The action was reversed on
Sunday, and, late that night, the units
and personnel were back in their New
York centers. The operation functioned
smoothly, without serious incident, and
provided practical planning and execu-
tion experience to the participating per-
Brigadier General James P. Harley,
commander of the 353d, commented:
What the operation demonstrated is
that our organization can, without major
outside assistance except for air trans-
port, mobiliu and deploy on short notice.
Once we were aboard the planes, we could
just as easily have been flown to any part
of the world. 1 believe that we put to rest
any allegation that CA reservists are not
ready to deploy on a timely basis. And,
/ our citizen-soldiers non' understand more
fully the implications in General Rogers'
statement that 'our Reserve Components
must expect to meet virtually the "ame
high quality enemy forces as Active
units, with little or no time to prepare. '"
Although the Army currently lives in a
crisis-driven environment," Army 86
forces are designed struct.urally to win on
a wide range of potential battlefields of
the 1980s.13 With the concept of deep at-
tack serving as a fundamental basis of
1 MaJor Paul A Blgelman DlvlSlon ar"a Corps 86 Force
Design for the Future Army June 1981 p 23
2 Memorandum of agreement between the COl11mander In
ehlet, US Army, Europe (USAAEURI and Seventh Arm'1. and the
comr'nandH'g general, 353d Civil Atfalrs Command dated 4
February 1980. which calls lor the 353d 10 prOVide coalition war'are
C.vII MIlitary Cooperalron assistance to USAJ:lEUR ",hole
a: the same lime, ImprOving the CIMIC capability a'1d readiness ot
the 353d
3 8rge1man Of) Crt p 24
4 Lieutenant Colonel Frederick J Manl"lIng ,n hiS Parameters
artIcle. September 1979 contendS that cross tla,nlng 1<; essential
at all levelS If contInuous operatIons are to be conducted rn future
5 General WIlliam E DePuy uS Army Rellred l=M 1005
RevIsIted. Army, November 1980 PO 1317
6 en,/I AffairS SVPfJOrt tor All Echelons US Arm'1 InstItute to'
Mlutar'1 ASSIstance, Fort Bragg N C 1977
7 A subsequent artIcle b'1 L,eutef"la'1t COlonel Wesle'1 A
GroeSbeck Civil Mlhtar'1 Operauons An Element rn W.nnlng the
,First Battle In Central Europe," MIlitary Rev,eV"r, Aprol 1979
1419. descrIbes the value of Clvrt mIlitary operations as a cOl11bat
S Personal communIcation by Colonel James R Compton wllI""I
tactical doctrine at all levels ... we are now
witnessing the development of a cohesive
force capable of exploiting all oppor-
tunities offered by emerging technology
in areas of surveillance. target acquisi-
tion. communications. computer support.
weaponry and. of course. Civil-Military
Within this context. it is gratifying to
see the Army exercise. in connection with
its civil affairs forces. what Barbara'
Tuchman describes as "that essential
component of truest wisdom-the self-
confidence to reassess."';
FreClrlCk C Schle ... song deputy chief Of slaft tcr ';osl Na
lIOn 11'111'8& Heauquarter& USAREuR and Seventh Al"Tly
9 ilndbOOI< lor the CooperatIon of the Gprman 1('rr//o{,al
Heaa uar/en W,fh the Armed rorees and Nallor'dl C,v,1
Au/ho,l,es Gelman TellllOna Army 1977
10 The performance at tra ned Clv.1 alfalrs reservists 'fl WINTE;..
81 re,n'or lIeute 1ant Gereral Andrew J Goodpaster s suppe'>l
t'on In Development 01 a Cohelent American Shategy An Ap
proach Parameters Ma.en 1981 P 8 that Ine poblem '$ not
rea 1'1' a quest,on 0' the aceQuacy of our 'esources II V"re p'Ooerly
lJ"e au' re'>Curces I bel,eve v.e CiJ'"I have great co.,fldence ,n the
SP-Jroty Of the US and our artles
11 Gene'al Bernard W Rogers Toe 10 Top W,th the 50'lel
Buotauo Delense 87 US Government Prlntlr.g OlbLe
Wa,>hlngto'1 DC June 19B1 p 19
12 Colone JOh'1 R y.,r,!herel ana lieutenant COlonel {p) Andrew
P 0 Meara Jr The A/my and !'1e 19BO $ Pafamelerf, December
1919. p 1\1
13 Lieutenant Ge"eral W"flam R Rlchardso" Wlnnrng Cn the
Bat!lel,eld A,my June 19B1, PO 3t142
1A General Donn A Starry Edel""ldrng tl"'e 8a!l.efleld
ReVIew Ma'ch 19B1
15 Balbdta Tucl"'mar An InqUiry Into the PelsI"tence of Ur
w'&dorn 1'1 GOvernment Parameters MarCh t9aO. 0 7
CoionelJames R Compton, US Army Reserve.
IS chief of operatwns of the Research Depart-
ment, Grumman Aerospace Corporatwn, Beth-
page, Long Island, New York He received aB S
from Texas A&M University. an M.P A from
the University of Oklahoma and tS a graduate of
the USACGSC and the US Army War College
Dunng 1973-78, he served on actwe duty at
Headquarters, Ftfth US Army, as an Army
recrultznglretention officer. lilS Reserve
'.l.ssignments have been with civil affairs units at
company. group and comrrtlLnd levels He is tur-
rently chief of staffofthe 353d Civil Affa,irs Com
mand, New York
One hundred t
nessee Wenig gears .
Was captured b Po ago this month Fo
soldier S. Gr/fnf. .forces Ten_
Moore 8' PriSoner durin t e IS the diary of command of
War describes hat .battle in Febru a Confederate
rs. e grim condit" ary 1862. J. C.
IOns faced b ..-
Y Civil
Diary of a
Confederate Soldier
Edited by Larry G. Bowman and Jack B. Scroggs
V-,.,-" ,., ,-vv .. /
z:..--- J \

Josephus C. Moore was born on 24 May 1842 in Bedford County, Tennessee. He enlisted
in the 18th Tennessee Regiment on 20 May 1861 and was taken captive when Fort
Donelson fell to the Union Army in 1862. Moore was transferred to Camp Butler, a Union
prison near Springfield, Illinois, where he spent six months as a prisoner of war. In early
September 1862, Moore signed an oath of allegiance to the United States of America, and,
after a brief stay in Illinois, he returned to his father's home in Bedford County, Ten-
nessee. On 30 June 1865, at the age of 23, Josephus C. Moore died. The following material,
presented as it appeared in the original. is Moore's personal record of his brief service in
the Civil War.
May 20 InIisted in the Service of Tennessee at Fosterville Depot. The Co (com-
pany) I joined had previously organized electing their officers' as follows
B. F. Webb Capt J. A. Nichols 3 Serg
A. Norris 1st Lieut C. T. Wells 4 Serg
J. M. Gilmore 2nd Lieut H. C. Naylor 1st Corp
Wm. Dozier 3rd Lieut N. Gilmore 2
F. G. Nichols 1st Serg A. Smith 3
W. J. Oakley 2nd Serg A. W. Kaey 4
23 West to Murfreesboro and was sworn in by Capt. Palmer.
27 Left Fosterville for Nashville by R.R. Camped that night at the fair
grounds where we received the most of our camp equipage. Cooking uten-
sils etc.
28 Started in the evening from the fair ground and went up through the City
and across the river into Edgefield where we remained until night Olnd
then took a train to camp. Trousdale at Richland station on the Louisville
and Nashville R.R. 15 or 20 miles north of Gallatin where we arrived
about 2 A.M.
29 Struck camp in the woods a few hundred yards East of the station.
June First sunday in camp which receives but poor attention. Dr Webb left for
home. Some of the boys geting home sick. I n the evening John Mcabe got
severely stabbed by a Mr. Pilkerton of Woods Co ..
5 Had regimental drill by Edwards before Gen. Zollicoffer.'
July Lay in the tent with the measles until the 6th of July when I was moved
out to Mr. Dorrisses by G.W. Nimmo where I stayed all night. I shall
never forget the kindness with which I was treated by Mr. Dorris and
Family. Aunt Serena was there.
7 Started for Trammel in the morning and had a long rough ugly trip of it
the road being very rough for a buggy. Landed safe at Trammel in the.
evening with a furlow for Ten days in my pockett but I do not expect to
spend it all here.
, >
*J. C. Moore's manuscript Journal of his experiences In the Civil Wa'r is located in the HIstOriCal Collection.
North Texas State University, Denton. Texas.
'8 A pleasant morning. Gran talks of going to Gallatin with some of the mill
9 Went with Gran in the buggy to Gallatin where !.found all well.
10 Stayed at AT [Aunt! Nancies all day and had a fine time of it.
11 Started Soon for Trammel where we landed about noon after breaking a
12 Stayed at Trammel all day.
13 Went to a little muster and when I got back found Elvira and Aunt
N ancie there.
14 Aunt Nancie went home, Elvira and I stayed all night with Colly.
16 Rainy damp day. Learned from a Volunteer that Col Hattons Reg (regi-
ment) had left Camp Trousdale for East Tennessee.
17 Elvira Lucy and Colly started for camp. G.W. and I went fishing in the
18 Went fishing in the evening and when we got back we found the folks at
home from the camp with news of the death of Abb Tucker and John
Lamb privates of our Co.
20 Came to Aunt Nancies in the evening.
21 Was in town this morning. Troops are passing through. Was at Mr.
Dodds in the evening.
23 Went on a visit to the two Jo Wallaces. Went from there to town and
from reports got uneasy about my Reg leaving me so I fixed up and left
Gallatin on the cars about 7 P.M. and arrived at camp about 9 P.M. found
the Co healthy but small. Col Battles 20th Tennessee Reg got marching
orders and left that night leaving the old 18th by herself.
26 Col Browns 3rd Tennessee Reg arrived here from Camp Chitham.
28 Capt Woodards Cavalry Co arrived here.
30 Elvira and Mrs. Key in camp and stayed all night.
31 Elvira. T.C. Wade and I walked out to Mr. Dorris's where we had a splen-
did dinner. Came back and had an artist to make two trials for our pic-
tures but failed to get a good one. The Voters all start home tonight to
vote for Governor. 2
Elvira. Add and Sallie Dorris came in and stayed until late.
Voters did not return.
The Co returned last night or at least the most of them.
J ,C. Burge. A. T. Ott and I spent the day very pleasantly together looking
for Company. We are looking for the 23rd and 24th Tenn. Regs from
Camp Anderson.
Burge started home with a furlow for 4 days. Elvira Aunt Nilla Laura
Stewart Jane and John Austin in camp today.
Elvira and Addaline came to camp today and as I was not very well I
went out with them.
Not much better yet of my colick. Would like a furlow but hardly know
whether I will get it or not. Nothing can surpass the kindness with which
I am treated here.
Received my furlow from camp today and came out to Abram Bradleys
near the station to be ready to start with the train in the mQrning. Ad-
daline Nimmo is going as far as Gallatin with us.
Took the cars soon for Gallatin. Stayed that night at Aunt Nancies.
Started by R.R. to Murfreesboro. Met Col Martins 23rd Tenn R1lg at the
NashV and Chatanooga Depot on there way to Trousdale. Stayed that
night at Cosbys.
Got to Fosterville 11 112 A.M. Found My Father and sister waiting for us
with horses.
J.E. Wallace and I went down to Marshall County and sawall the Con-
nection who were all well. Came back through the rain on the 26th.
Still raining.
Went to see Tarpley and other boys from the' camp.
I left home and made the trip safe to camp in one day finding all the boys
wei and in good spirits.
Acted as corporal of the guard at the station and had a fine time of it.
Saw Kimmons at his quarters.
J K Marshall arrived safe last night
G.W. Nimmo Adaline and her sister were to see me today. Slipped the
guard line and went out to try my gun which [ms. ill.l perfect.
A cool day for the time of the year.
My guard day, Porters Co of Artillery came to camp today from
Allen and John Austin were in camp today,
Pulled up stakes and moved to a new camp at Old Michelville &Mit-
chellvillee. A hard days work.
We worked hard arranging things at our new camp until about 10 A M
when we pulled up again and moved to Michelville station where we are
cooking provisions for 48 hours.
Took the cars about 2 A.M. for Bowling Green where we arrived at about
12 M. We then went out on the banks of Barren river and lay there all
Unwell today and went to the Hospital.
Left the Hospital this morning an,d found our tents near the ~ bridge
but the Co left yesterday in company with about 1700 other men starting
out West. Stayed at the camp waiting on the sick boys until 24th when
the rest of the Reg received marching orders.
Took the train for Russellville at daybreak where we arrived about 12 and
rested until 4 P M when we started in a Westerly direction marched 10
miles to Mud creek and slept badly.
Started early and marched hard all day and left the Reg before night and
went to Rochester where we found our Co. 27 miles today.
Stayed all day at Rochester. The Kentuckeans spent the day in tearing
out the lower gate of the lock at this place.
A winter camp of the Civil War with log huts and corduroy walkway
28 Was roused at 3 A.M. and cooked until day when we started in a south
westerly direction which we kept until 12 M when we halted at a meeting
house a few minutes for dinner. And from there for wood to within 1 mile
of Greenville where we camped all night. There was some frost for the
first we had seen.
29 After passing through the town we took a right hand road and eat all we
could get at Reynolds Mills on Pond River then we took a road that led
up a ridge and we arrived at the top of it about night then we had to get to
the bottom on the other side before we could get water which took us un
til after :\lidnight. We slept there the rest of the night without anything
to eat.
30 Joined our regt early in the morning then eat an enormous breakfast and
went ahead on our journey toward Hopkinsville. Marched slow but
steady until we arrived within about 2 miles of town where we halted for
the night: Our Advanced guard Capt Woodards Cavalry had some little
skirmishing with union men today had one man killed and killed 8 and
took several prisoners.'
Left our camp in the swamp in the eavening and went through town. We
camped for the night 1 mile N.E. of town.
2 Traveled about 6 miles to a little town called Salubria where we had a din-
ner presented to us by citizens then about 6 miles futher to within 2 miles
of Trenton and encamped.
3 Was on the road early and at the end of 13 miles found ourselves at Taits
Station on the Memphis RR which we took in the eavening and got to
Bowling Green at daybreak on the 4th. We have traveled no less than 125
miles on foot and none of our Co gave out except J.C. Burge.' We found
when we arrived at camp that Lynch of our Co had died.
We drew what Tenn owed us in good Tenn money. My share was $271/2.
Pulled up and moved 1/2 mile up the river. Kaey Oakley and Morris
arrived in camll with plenty of news and some bed clothes for me.
I was detailed with others to work on Bakers hill fortifications which is
on the opposite side of the river. There is works of this kind going on on
seven other hills around this place.
Sunday. Had a general review on the field with our knap sacks.
J.E. Wallace arrived here this morning with plenty of news.
Wallace left for home.
from the 11 th to the 20th we remained quietly at camp with moderate
duty and but little drilling. I went down in the bend of the river the other
day to cut down timber. The object in cutting down the timber is to pre-
vent the enemy from crossing the river at that point it being out of the
range of our guns.
21 We received marching orders about 12 M. Pulled up and sent the bagage
to the RR and now 4 PM we are ready to start at a minutes warning hav-
ing received orders preparitory for a march but we wil go part of the way
by R.R. Yet we do not know in what direction we wilstart. We took the
train at dark for Russellville where we arrived before midnight.
Wednesday. We remained in the cars until morning when we lit camp
fires near the Depot. Saw Ruben Billington and nocked about over town
until eavening when we set stakes about 1/2 mile North of the depot.
A fair day for the first in sometime. Our wagons came up about 3 P.M.
Troops are stil coming from Bowling Green. There is about 8 Reg's here
and three Co's Artillerry.
There was a general review at 10 A.M. before Generals Buckner Floyd
and Brown. It is thpught among the privates that we came here because
horse feed was so scarce at Bowling Green.;
A wet bad day. Nothing of importance this morning.
Stil another bad day.
J.E. Hoskins arrived here in the eavening.
Snowed and rained all day.
Another very bad day.
Went to the fairground to see Billington but he was sick in the country.
We Bob Work and I then took over the hills and back to camp.
We received orders to cook 3 days rations before we slept. Which we
We cooked 2 days rations more and then fixed ready to start by 8 P.M. It
is snowing and raining now about 10 P.M.
Took the train about 1 1/2 A M and started for Clarksville whete we
arrived at 7 A M and are at present 10 A M. We wil most probably leave
here sometime today for Ft Donelson. Ft Henry was surrendere'd day
before yesterday by Gen Tilman. We got off on a boat (Gen Anderson)
about 1 P M and got to Ft Donelson 1 mile before Dover a little town on
the left hand side of Cumberland River where we are likely to have a bad
nights rest.
Sunday. Very poor accommodation here for a soldier without tents. There
was considerable Pickett fighting today within hearing of here in which
our men were outnumbered and whipped. Our 1st Lt Norris got into a
Skirmish and made a narrow escape bringing off a wounded man. We
moved out in the eavening to some outside rifle pitts behind whichse
quartered ourselves. \
Rested but little last night as we had to do what sleeping we did do on the
frozen ground. We commenced work on our rifle pitts which is to be con-
tinued night and day.
Worked in the ditch from 1 until 3 A M Our bagage came in about mid-
night and we carried it up this morning distant 1 mile and 1/2. We re-
mained in the same place all day without pitching our tents in any order.
Another skirmish today within hearing of our fires the consequence of
which we can learn but little. .
Our Picketts were driven in about 1 P.M. after a running fight of an hours
length. The Gunboats fired a few shells at the fort but without effect. We
formed behind our works and soon all things became quiet. The boys
have become as quiet as if nothing was on hands Co C- 18th Tenn was on
piCkett they have been driven in without any loss. We are closed in en-
masse by division and we are on the right of the line of battle. One from
each mess are cooking 3 days rations. Sundown. Nothing done yet. The
enemy are cooking too I guess from the smoke they have raised.
The sun is not quite up yet. No material change has taken place. Our guns
threw a few shells at the enemys centre so we may consider the ball open.
'Our Tents are all thrown flat to be out of the way. Gen Buckner com-
mands the right wing Floyd the left and Pillow the whole.' 1 1/2 hours by
sun the gunboats are nearly in sight and there has been several shells
thrown at us but they have done no damage yet. We are getting impa-
tient. 10 A M The enemy have made one attack on the right and have
been repulsed and it is thought they are coming again. The Gunboats
have been silenced once but it is thought they are coming back. Col
Buckner of the Gen's Staff says "we are shipping them like hell" There
was two more charges made on the right with the same effect of the other.
I think the enemys loss is considerable as they were exposed to a cross
fire from Capt Porters Batterry.' Our loss is small. We have to keep
below our works on acount of the enemys sharpshooters who would just
as leave shoot a hole in a mans head as not. 3 P.M. The enemy have made
several desperate efforts Lo take our works on the centre and left but were
repulsed in all cases. The Gunboats fired a few rounds by way of Signal
for the land forces and retired out of range. We are expecting an attack on
the right wing every minute. Dark. There has been no more fighting of
consequence. The Sharpshooters kept up a constant fire on us until dark.
They have killed and wounded several of Porters Artillery men.
14 The most miserable night I have ever spent. Snowed all night and we
worked on our breastworks good part of the night then lay down in the
snow and when I tried to rise thlS morning I found my hair frozen to the
ground and my boots froze hard on my feet. The Sharp shooters com-
menced again. We moved to the extreme right to protect Capt Jacksons
batterry which landed here last night. The enemy are landing troops just
below the bend and the Siege guns are throwing a occasional shell over at
them. Floyd captured one batterry last night on the left. The Gunboats
came up and opened on the fort at :) 1/2 P.M. and the most severe engage-
ment took place that I ever herd or expect to hear. I t was one continual
boom and roar of the guns and bursting of shells in every direction for one
hour when the boats retired. They advanced to within 400 yards of the
batterry. There was heavy fighting all eavening on the left wing but all
became quiet at dark. We need reinforcements and must have them.
15 We remained in the rear of Jackson until an hour or two before day when
I took the hardest kind of a chill and the Reg mov2d to the left where they
fought from day until 1 P.M. without stopping a minute then they came
1982 27
Photos opposlt. (clockwise Irom top): General Ulysses S. Grant (center background)
with troops at Fort Donelson, Tennessee; General Grant; General Simon B. Buckner;'
captured Conlederate soldiers awaiting transportation to Northern prisons; and cook
ing In camp
back and stacked there arms and commenced getting something to eat as
we had not had time to eat anything for nearly 24 hours. But just as we
were getting a good start the enemy made a desperate rush on the works.
Just to the right of us and took them. We then fell into line at a double
quick and started across a hollow to help our men on the right as we
thought but in going down the hill 4 of our co fell in less than twenty
paces so we learned that our men had been driven from the works. So to
go ahead with 30 or 40 men was foolishness and to go back up the hill was
dangerous as our men were fireing from the top so the most of the boys
concealed themselves unti! the fireing partially ceased. For my part I
took down a hollow toward the river and concealed myself among some
logs from where I fired 15 rounds then retreated up the hill stopping and
fireing occasionally and the enemy fireing at me all the time until I got
out of the hollow. I then fell into line which was on top of the ridge
without any breast works and fired 20 rounds more when we were ordered
to cease fireing. We had 4 ~ wounded in this engagement George Kin-
son mortally, W.W. Puckett, G.D. Horton and J.P. Ross Severely. Our
reg was then ordered to the centre to protect Graves' Batterry' where we
are likely to stay all night.'
16 We were roused from our beds of snow and before day and we went to
town and back without knowing what the intention of the movement was
but when we got back we found a white flag flying in the works we then
knew the intention of the morning movement was to retreat but there
was no chance and then for the first time we learned that we were
Prisoners of War. Pillow and Floyd are gone but Buckner is here yet. The
Federals came in about 11 A.M. and took possession.'"
17 We have not been moved yet and there is no telling when we wi! be. We
were moved to the bank of the river on which we lay all night in mud knee
18 Took the stock boat Alec Scott and started down the river in the morning
got to Paduca [Paducah] just before dark.
19 Found ourselves at Cairo run all day without seeing anything worthy of
20 Passed Cape Jererdeau [Girardeau] before midnight.
21 Landed at St Louis about 2 A.M. and are sti! here at 11 A M We left St
Louis in the eavening and got to Alton Just before dark. Our officers
came with us to this place and then stopped or rather took some other
course. We then took a train toward Springfield and found ourselves at
Camp Butler 6 miles from Springfield on the morning of the 22nd. We
quartered ourselves tolerably comfortably in barracks. II
25 We just lie here without Seeing or hearing anything worthy of note.
There is a great deal of sickness among the prisoners and there has been
some deaths already since we have been here although we left all that was
sick when we passed St Louis there in the Hospitals.
28 I feel some better of my cold and am almost the only one in the Co that is
able to help bury the dead.
2 Sunday. We wrote out and signed a petition to be allowed to take the
oath of allegiance to the U.S. and return to our homes. This petition was
signed by. nearly every man inside on the 3 of March and sent to Gen
Halleck at St Louis and if approved by him we wil most probably get off
before a great while."
Nothing has been herd from the petition. It is most probably a failure.
Just one month out and no prospect of being released on any tearms.
Each of us sent up a paper according to order giving our residence and
age. These were to assist in filling up the bonds as they pretended but I
believe it was done through mear curiosity to khow how many would take
the oath. At any rate this is the last we ever herd of them.
Burton has been very sick for several days and I am somewhat fearful he
wil not get over his illness without quite a spell. Weather changeable.
Burton still no better. John Flemming is bad off. The rest doing tolerably
well. '
Burlf1n still worse.
The Island No 10 Prisoners arrived here today. They amount according
to count to 1015."
For' a week or two we have had a great deal of rain and there is but little
prospect of spring yet judging by appearances. It is something very dif-
ficult to describe ones feelings shut up in prison as we are. My thoughts
for the first few days were of home and the anxiety that would be felt for
me there. But that soon wore off to some extent and then my thoughts
were turned to the prospect % some time getting out of the infernald
place. My thoughts were for a time of making my escape which I could do
but whether this would better my condition or not was the question. As I
have no money I have concluded to wait for some fair means of getting
out of this supposing that such will certainly come soon. Then my
thoughts were turned to the condition of the country and now more than
ever I feel that I have a deep interest in the consequence of this war,
May 13 John Flemming died today, He was the smallest person in the Co and if
not the youngest the most boyish. If I ever am so unlucky as to join
another Co I want to join a Co of men not boys. John though not a bad
boy at least was always a pest to the Co and the same I might say of
others. One day in this infernal place is so much like another that a diary
is rendered almost useless. However since Major Fonda took charge of us
as Police Officer we have had more privalidges than we had before." We
are now allowed to go to the river to wash ourselves and clothes.
16 J.S. Shannon died today, Jim was one of my original mess and was a good
free hearted fellow but he like all the rest of us had his falts. His was in
drinking to much when he could get it and that led indirectly to his leav-
ing our mess. Not withstanding he was a brave boy and a good soldier.
He died suddenly having been sick but a few days.
21 One not acquainted with prison life would suppose this was anything but
a Solitary life and it is in one sence of the word but in another it is one of
the most solitary and loathsome lives a man can live at least so it appears
to me without having tried a great many ways of living. One day with us
is just like another while the outside world is moveing on with its every
day changes of which we can learn little or nothing let alone see or enjoy
any of them and our time is rendered sti! mOre lonesome in every sense of
the word by the sight of four or five ded bodies being transported to the
dead house every morning and also by the occasion at sight of a grave
yard with the rise of three hundred new graves all filled within the short
space of three months. One thing which makes us all feel so lonesome is
the knowledge of the fact that in a place like this it is every man for
himself and I might add the devi! for all. .
24 A fine day. Nothing new. Just 20 years old today according to the best of
my recollection.
27 Just 12 months ago today we left home and went into camp. And another
twelve months may find us all in hell or the southern army or possibly
neither. There was some Malitia arrived here last night for the purpose of
guarding us as tne 12th Cavalry (which has been our guard ever since we
arrived at this place) is ordered to Virginia. The Authorities refused us
any papers Yesterday or today. But we got one by "way of a Slant" from
which we learned something of a severe fight between McClelland and
Lee before Richmond in which it appears that :\1cClelland got the worse
of it. But we make no demonstration as we want to get more news in the
same way.
Sunday. There is and has been curious thoughts in my head several days
about the probability of getting away from here and it has struck me that
to make my escape is the surest plan although I know even that is a bad
one. My intention now is to make my escape soon and my conclusion is
that my condition cannot be worsted.
6 Owing to bad weather I have not carried my intentions through but I was
never better resolved on anything in my life.
7 J.A. Nichols J.T. Wells of our Co and T.C. Wade and T.T. Ott of Co C
made there exit this eavening. Such exits are quite common. Some 15 or
16 of Co A have left in this way. I have now made my arrangements and
wil not be here many days unless something happens. I have a tolerable
map of the country from here home and some good friends that wi! go
with me.
II Bad rainy wether for several days. The Col has driven in all the parolled
men today. There has been various letters and papers received here which
all go to prove that there is a fair prospect of a general exchange of
prisoners some time soon which if so as it appears to be it wi! please me
very weI. At any rate it has had the effect to delay my exit for a few days
at least.
18 Had a severe chill last night consequently I am rather under the wether
today. But as I am taking quinine by the fist full I guess I wi! have no
more chills.
21 C.F. Crocker died today in the hospital: He was rude boy but a good
23 Major Fonda assumed entire command of this post today. Col P Mor-
rison being defunct. He (Morrison) leaves today despized by both sides of
the line." The Papers still speak of the exchange of prisoners as certain.
25 The 12th Ill. Cavalry are to leave here on the 27th and Max Gering talks
of going part of the way with them. He is a german and joined our mess
about the time Shannon left it. He has since been connected with Porters
Battery as workman in which position he was taken prisoner. He was
rather cross and easily made mad but is a good fellow and if I have a
friend in the world Max is one of them.
27 The 12 III Cav left today and Max went with them. He intended to go as
far as Indianapolis where he was sure he could get work. There is heavy
fighting going on before Richmond and has been for several days.
2 Nothing new today so far. There has been some desperate fighting before
Richmond in which Lee has gained some ground.
15 The talk of an exchange has broken out afresh in which I place some con-
fidence but this is the last time I am going to be fooled if I am fooled this
25 The fact has become evident that there wi! be a chance to get away from
here before long. I received a letter from My Brother C.B. Moore yester-
day at Jerseyville in this state the last I had heard from him he was in
Ark. So taking all things together I have concluded to wait for some
,chance to get away that is sure if not quick."
C.B. Moore arrived here today direct from Jerseyville III and I was per-
mitted to see him for an hour or two. He left Ark shortly after writing to
me and came here via Wite and Jersey Cty's Illinois. He left T.S. Wallace
in White Cty. I was treated respectfully by the officers at head quarters
and I must say I have no right to complain at them as individuals.
On the 2nd 3rd 4th 5th & 7th C.B. was in to see me and each day I was
permitted to see him. But the Col now talks of not allowing any more
visitors within the enclosure.
28 It is now evident that' there wi! be an exchange of prisoners also all Ten-
nesseeans will be allowed to take the oath of allegiallce who may desire to
do so. I have the matter under consideration now as to the best course to
pursue with a decided tendency toward the latter expediency. My time
for which I enlisted is out and two or three months over so I am not
bound to report myself to Jeff Davis or anyone else. The oath I took on
enlistment .was substantially this "That I wi! bear true faith and
allegiance to the State of Tennessee and wi! do as Tennessee may direct
for the period of 12 months unless Sooner discharged." The oath to pro-

tect and obey my officers was concluded in the same way. ,There fore I
contend that this oath has nothing to do with me now so 1 wil act as 1
please'l alone being responsible for what I do. To some this change may
seem sudden but 1 could inform such persons that it is not altogether so
sudden as they might suppose. Hither too 1 have had no opinion of my
own but simply followed some leaders who 1 know had better chances of
knowing the true condition of things never once dreaming that there
designs might partake of anything like a selfish nature. Now whether I
take the oath of allegiance or not 1 intend to follow no man. If 1 cannot
form an opinion of my own 1 wi! keep silent unti! 1 can.
Monday. W.B. Campbell Commissioner from Andrew Johnson arrived
here this A.M. and has occupied the most of the day in signing bonds.17
He administered the following oaths to me and a similar one to about
three hundred others this P.M. "I J C Moore Co F 18th Tennessee Regt
of Bedford Cty Tennessee do solomnly swear that 1 will support protect
and defend the Constitution and Government of the United States
against all enemies whether domestic or foreign; that I wil bear true faith
allegiance and loyalty to the same. any ordinance. resolution or laws of
any States Convention or Legislature to the contrary notwithstanding;
and futher. that I will well and faithfully perform all the duties which
may be required of me by the laws of the United States; and I take this
oath freely and voluntarily. without any mental reservation or evasion
J.C. Moore (Seal)
"Subscribed and sworn to in duplicate before me this 1st day of Sept
A.D .. 1862 By authority of Brig. Gen Andrew Johnson Military Gov of
W B Campbell
Some of the prisoners are very much inclined to interfere with us in tak-
ing the oath. Whilst others take a more sensible view of the thing and say
that we have a perfect right to do as we please in this matter as they the
(Prisoners) are allowed to do. 1 would like very much to go home now but
do not think it safe so 1 wil most probably go to Jerseyville where 1 can
do something to pay for my board and can watch the course of things un-
til the proper time comes to go home which 1 hope wi! not be long."
2 Tuesday. C.B. starts to Jerseyville today on horseback. Some of the
released men have already started home and we wil all leave here this
P.M. We broke up camp and bid fare well to my first prison (and 1 hope
my last) and took the train stoped in Springfield a few minutes and off
again on the Chicago and Alton road arrived at a station called Shipman
where 1 got off and bid myoid companions in misery farewell. Put up at
the Shipman House where 1 came near suffocating with heat in a close
Josephus C Moore's diary ends with the 2 September 1862 entry. There is no known record
of hzs actwities from this time until his death at age 23 on 30 June 1865. -Edltor.
1 Bngadler General Fela K Zollicoiter was appointed
brigadier general In 1861 AI NaShville on 26 July 1862 he was
ordered to Knoxville to a5sume command of ihe East Tennessee
District John Trotwood Moore and Austm Foster Tennessee The
Volunteer Stale 17691923 Nashville Tenn 1923 VOlume I. P 473,
and War of the Rebellion OffICial Records of the Unton and Con
federate Armies US Government Pnnlmg Office Washington
18801901. Series 1 Volume IV, P 374
2 In 1861 William H Poll<.. the brother of former Presldenl
James K POlk. and Isham G Hams were candidates for go ... ernor
During the CIVil War. Iroops were frequently furloughed 10 vote In
state elections Philip M Homer, Tennessee A History 16731932
NY, 1933, VOlume 11. pp 553 54
3 Brigadier General SI'1101'1 B Buckner reported that the lOCk at
the mouth of Muddy River was destroyed on 26 September He also
reported taking Hopkinsville with a losS of one killed and one
dangerOUSly wounded War Of the RebellIOn Olliclal RecordS Of
tile Umon and Confederate Armies. op Cit, P 201
4 General Buckner commended the Iroops Men stood marCh
Of over 100 mIles remarkably well, their conduct excellent .. Ibid
5 At thiS time John C Brown, commanding the 18th Ten
nessee was not a general although he had beer'l recommended for
that promotion by Albert Sidney Johnslon Ibid p 478
6 Generals Simon 8 BuCkner John B Floyd and Gideon J
7 Captain Thomas K Porter was commended for this action
WhiCh he was wounded In the thIgh bv a'Mlnu ball War Of thp
RebellIOn OffiCial Recoras of the Unron and Confederate Armle.s
Of' Cit. Senes 1 Volume VII, p 31\9
8 Captain Rice E Graves Ibid
9 The report of COIOne! John C Brown corroborated In alt
essential details the actIOn descnbed by Moore Irom the 12th
through the 15th Ibid, pp 346-49 See also the report 01 Colone!
Joseph B Palmer, 18th Tennessee Infantry Ibid pp 351 55
10 On the night of the 15th the three generals conferred and
deCided on surrender Since both Floyd and Pillow refused 10 per
son ally surrender Floyd, the ranking olflcer relinquIshed com
mand to Pillow whO Immediately passed the command to BUCkner.
the Junior In rank BVCkner surrendered to Grant on 16 February
Ibid, P 284 With the fall of Donelson Confederate General Albert
Sidney JOhnston, commandIng lI'le Weslern Department. aban
doned Nashvllle and began an evacuation of Tennessee IbJa pp
11 Camp Butler was situated on the Great Weslern RaIlroad. SIl:
Larry G. Bowman is a professor at North
Texas State UniverSIty. He is a specialist in 17th
and 18th-century American history and author
of the book, Captive Americans: Prisoners of
War During the American Revolution
mIles from Springfield II consIsted 01 about 15 acres at high. roll
Ing ground enclosed by a high board fence Part of the prIsoners
were housed In wooden barracks and part In tents //)Id, Series 2
Volume IV, pp 25456
12 General Henry W Halleck., commanding the Department of
the Missouri
13 Island Number Ten on Ihe River, guarding the ap
proach to MemphiS, was surrendered 10 General John Pope on 7
April 1862
14 Major John G Fonda, 12th illinOIS Cavalry At thiS time. Colo
nel Pitcairn MorrIson was commanding at Camp Buller War of the
RebellIon OffiCial Records of the Union and Confederate Armies
op Cit, SerIes 2, Volume IV, p 161
15 The reports of poor administration at Camp Bvtler led
CommlssaryGeneral of Prtsoners COlonel William Hoffman. at
DetrOIt. to dispatch. 'On 1 July 1862, Captain H W Freed1ey for an
Inspection of the prison Ibid, pp 11213 Apparently. conoltlons
Improved after Fonda assumed command On 22 July. Freedley
reported that condillons under whiCh the prisoners lI'Wed was
generaUy good, with rations "g.ood and whole<;Ome" He further
reported, "As a class the pflsoners are Quite Ignorant Wild,
reckless and inclined 10 be insubordinate" Ibid pp 26263
t6 Charles B Moore, Josephus brother, was a Umonsst from
COllin County Texas, WhO made hiS way to Jersevville illinOIS
when Texas seceded from the Union Charles Moore, In hiS o",n
diary. relates hiS VISitS to hiS brother 11'1 the prison at Camp Butler
Entnes August through 3 September 1862. Charles B Moore
Diary, Historical Collection, North Tellas Slate UmverSlty, Den lon,
17 On 9 Augusl1862, Andrew Johnson. milItary governor of Ten
nessee, appOinted el( Governor WIlham B Campbell as commlS
sloner 10 viS 11 Norlhern prisons, determme WhiCh Tennesseans
would be exchanged and which released, and the lerms of Such
release under oath Johnson to Secretary of War Stanton and
Johnson to AdJutantGeneral Larezo Thomas 9 August 1862 War
of the Rebefllon Offlclaf Records of the Union and Canfeaerafe
Arm,es, op Cit. Series 2, Volume IV P 362 -
18 On 30 Avgust 1862, Commissary General of Pnsoners Hoff-
man wrote Major Fonda ordering all prIsoners belongll1g to the
Confederale Army transferred 10 Vlcksbvrg. MISSISSIppi for ele-
change, With the ellceptlon of the Tennesseans taklr'lg the oath of
allegiance The laller were fa be released and furnished Iranspor
tallon 10 Nashville Hottman to Fonda, 30 Avgusl1862 fblCl. p 471-
Jack B. Scroggs was a professor of history at
North Texas State UniversJ,ty from 1950 until
his retirement in 1981, He is a specialist in the
eLVil War and the Reconstruction and a contrib-
utor of articles to other journals
-Battalion Operations
Encircled Positions
Major Michael R. Tarantola, US Army
On the fluid battlefield, the dant of units becoming sur-
rounded is ever present. It is imperative that everyone know how
to react in such situations. This article cites historical examples
of success by surrounded units and discusses factors to be con-
sidered by unit commanders.
HE nature of the next war may find
battalions cut off from friendly
forces and forced to conduct operations
from encircled positions. Soviet inten-
tions toward such force groupings are
quite clear: "Advancing troops. in all
cases. must take measures to discover
and destroy them.'" Aware of this. what
can the battalion expect. and what will be
expected of the battalion? To examine
these questions more closely. let us
review the Soviet threat and our current
Combat with separated and by-passed
enemy subunits is an integrated maneu-
ver of Soviet offensive doctrine. In World
War II. maneuver was directed at en-
circling forces for subsequent destruc-
tion.' Y. Novikov and F. Sverdlov, in
their exceptional treatise Manoeuver in
Modern [.and Warfare, specifically point
out that:
Defense toda>: cunsists of a system of
strung points and center.' of resistance,
used In combznation uith counterattacks
launched from the depths by reser['es or
second echelons Characteristicallv there
are gaps b e t u ~ e n these strong - pUlnt,'
through uhich a fast movlllg attacker,
u'ith strong fire pou'er, particularly tanks,
can dril'e and cume out un the flank or in
the rmr of the defenders.'
This concept is substantially rem forced
by conclusions of the Defense Nuclear
Agency's "Study of Breakthrough Opera-
tions." The study examines the potential
force ratio for successful breakthroughs
and the use of nuclear weapons.
Soviet capabilities for offensive action
and conditions of the modern battlefield.
mentioned by Novikov and Sverdlov. in-
dicate that the possibility of force group-
Ings remaining in isolated positions will
be even greater in the next war. The con-
cept of the Soviet offense is continuous
momentum toward an objective. Maneu-
vering rapidly. Soviets an ticipate the
ability to attack in numerous directions.
further creating the possibility of isolat-
ing our units.' .
The Soviets realize that isolated forces
can disrupt advancing troops by firing
into the flanks and rear of those units.
Soviet doctrine recognizes that encircle-
ment for destruction requires consider-
able force and means which can lead to
time delays.'
The consideration given to the type of
isolated force groupings will determine
the means of force application necessary
to reduce the resistance. In Soviet doc-
trine, the primary means of destroying
forces "that appear on the flanks or in the
rear of attacking forces is the nuclear
weapon .... Along with this, an impor-
tant role will be played by aircraft and ar-
tillery,'" The battalion may. therefore. ex-
pect to operate at some poin t for
unknown periods as an isolated force.
This is not and should not be con-
sidered an alarming situation. History is
replete with examples of units at all
echelons in every war that have operated
from encircled positions. Study of these
situations provides many important in-
The Battle of Lodz during World War I
demonstrated the importance of timing
and breakout actions. The JOIst Airborne
Division encirclement at Bastogne in
World War II illustrated the relevance of
exfiltration and relief operations. The
Korean War showed the importance of
outside support for the 2d Marine Divi-
sion at the Chosin Reservoir. These
lessons are significant in the evolution of
our doctrine for encircled forces.
Present doctrine in Field Manual (FM)
100-5, Operations (Coordinating Draft).
identifies three alternatives for opera-
tions of encircled forces: breakout. defend
and ex filtration. The battalion "How to
February _
Fight" manual, FM 71-2, The Tank and
Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task
Force, concentrates on breakout opera-
tions. In either case, the options provided
suggest greater scrutiny.
In any scenario, a central issue is deter-
mination of when and by what force the
unit is encircled. Obviously, guidelines
presented are subject to interpretive ap-
plication to the specifics of the situation.
A common interpretation of a unit encir-
clement is the blockade, physically or by
fire, of all routes of egress. Time is impor-
tant. The moment the unit is determined
to be encircled, the decision must be made
whether or not to break ou t. History has
poignantly demonstrated this to be the
crucial decision. Vacillation or delay may
cause any action to be futile.
Deciding to break out, the battalion
must establish its operational plan
quickly. The operation will usually con-
sist of a preparation, organization and ex-
ecution phase. To be successful, efforts
must be made to deceive the enemy. con-
centrate maximum force at a weak point
and establish security at the flanks and
the rear.
In the preparation phase, consideration
of time, location of attack. speed. secur-
ity. and the evacuation of the wounded
and equipment or supplies is vital. The
force is then organized into a rupture
force. reserve force. support force and
rear guard. The execution phase is that
crucial time for conduct of the plan. Hav
ing carefully prepared and organized. the
force attacks toward friendly lines or
more tenable positions.'
The World War 11 action of the German
2d Battalion. 464th Infantry Regiment.
isolated in the Stalingrad pocket in
November 1942. exemplifies breakout
concepts. I n the first phase of the Rus-
sian counteroffensive west of Stalingrad
during November 1942. both German and
Russian headquarters lost contact often
with their subordinate units. Caught in
the tidal wave of Russian forces con-
verging from the northwest. individual
German units were launching local
counterattacks and seeking tenable
ground. They were ignorant of the fact
that the enemy ha:d driven past them and
that they had been cut off.
The Russians. on the other hand. were
equally ignorant of the general situation
and advanced in a generally northern
direction in massed columns' without
security or reconnaissance. Apparently.
they were under the impression they were
crossing territory that had already been
cleared of enemy forces. .
Early.on 20 November. the 2d Bat
talion. 464th Infantry Regiment. with a
sister battalion. attacked a large Russian
force moving northwest on the road from
Platonov. The attack stunned and con
fused the Russians. giving the German
force an hour of respite in which it moved
to and occupied the town of Verchnaja
Buzinovka. The Russians. after recover-
ing from the surprise attack. assembled
for an attack on the town.
In the early afternoon. supported by ar-
tillery fire. wave upon wave of Russian in
fantry attacked the outskirts of the small
town. The German commander realized
the town could not be held for very long.
He also realized that a daylight breakout
would result in heavy casualties since the
route chosen to the southeast went
thrQugh several miles of wide-open ter-
rain. There was no choice but to hold the
town until nightfall. For the remainder of
the afternoon. the defending force reo
pulsed the Soviet thrusts.
While the fighting raged. the force
made preparations for its breakout. The
German commander also initiated a ruse.
On the premise that Russian soldiers
were usually underfed. ,hungry and
. 37
greedy, German cooks were ordered to
prepare lentil and pea soup from stocks of
legumes left in the buildings. The
legumes were emptied into pots set over
open fires near the firsthouses the Rus
sians would reach upon entering the
town. Then, mail sacks containing
packages were emptied onto the streets.
By twilight, the situation had become
so critical that the Russians were ex-
pected at any moment. The German bat-
talion began withdrawing. Platoon by
platoon, company by company, the force
disengaged from the enemy. The self-
propelled assault guns and artillery
pieces continued to fire point-blank and
did not move until just before the last
rifleman. They then drove straight to the
southeast edge of town where the force
had assembled.
At that point, the ruse proved effective.
The Russian soldiers, who at first fol-
lowed close behind the withdrawing Ger-
man detachments, hesitated when they
smelled the soup and saw the packages.
The rush for the unexpected treat was ac-
companied by total confusion. The
resulting delay' permitted the German
battalion to attack to the southeast and
escape without being subjected to enemy
This example provides insights to the
key elements for breakout operations.
The German commander was totally
aware of the importance of firepower, in-
telligence, mobility, support and decep-
tion. Concentration of his firepower unW
the last possible moment was essential to
maintaining the position until the force
was ready to break out. Intelligence was a
matter of analysis of the situation, but,
more so, knowledge of the enemy and his
anticipated reactions were vital com-
ponents in the ruse.
Application of resources to the needs of
the unit for the breakout ensured mobil-
ity of equipment and personnel. The ruse
was obviously the central aspect of the
German plan. Though not on a grand
scale, it did provide the necessary time
for the battalion to break out to more
tenable positions. This, too, is an impor-
tant lesson. The breakout may not always
be intended to make a linkup, but may be
used to relieve pressure, to avoid destruc-
tion or to seek better positions.
Another alternative of operations from
encircled positions is staying put. Dig-
ging in may be the choice if, for example,
there are mass casualties, loss of mobility
or the time factor has been pre-empted. In
this context, simultaneous actions should
be taken almost immediately to continue
or re-establish a viable defense, the chain
of command, sec uri ty and com-
munications. Other important tasks will
be to establish a reserve, organize fir
support, organize logistics and see to the
wounded. The commander may then d'
rect the fight and maintain the force whil
the situation remains stable and the posi-
tion tenable.
The operations of B Company, l09th
Infantry, during the Battle of the
Hurtgen Forest in World War II offer an
example. Cut off for two days by a large
German force, the company resolutely
defended its positions. The company, in
communication with the battalion, was
low on water and ammunition. When a
relief force failed to break through, the
company held out for three more days un-
til relieved.'
Defending from encircled positions may
also be by design. In such instances, a
battalion-size force could be positioned to
hold a strongpoint or deception position
and operate as a pivot to an integrated
defense line. In either case, whether or
not by design, the conditions and consid-
erations applicable to isolated forces will
be pertinen t. .
The final alternative, ex filtration, may
be used to prevent destruction of the
force or to avoid capture. The com-
mander, in this case, has determined
or linkup is not possible. He
may further determine that preservation
of the bulk of the force is more conducive
to the overall operation. The force would
then be grouped into smaller cells under
competent leadership. This aspect is
essential to movement in good order and
control. Consideration would also be
given to leaving attendants and supplies
with the wounded. Other supplies or
equipment would be destroyed. This must
be done carefully to avoid telegraphing
the commander's intent to the enemy.
This article has not attempted to ad-
dress the .. how-to" aspects of each
maneuver in detail. There is substantial
guidance in field manuals and ample
historical precedence, We have discussed
highlights of the Soviet intentions and
what the battalion can expect. We have
also surveyed what is expected of the bat-
talion when operating from an encircled
In one final example, let us look at, the
bitter, foggy dawn of 29 November 1950,
The 2d Infantry Division was locked in
battle across the endless hills and cor-
ridors along Ch'ongch'on, Korea, while a
Turkish motor convoy drove north from
Sunch'on bound for the division rear. It
proceeded on a single-lane road carrying
supplies for the Turkish brigade. The con-
voy never arrived. A few miles. south of
the division area, it was destroyed in an
ambush. The division was slow to realize
it was encircled. The Chinese had moved
hundreds of troops, wearing captured
Republic of Korea uniforms, in behind the
division, blocking its withdrawal,
A decision was quickly made to break
out to the south along the Sunch'on road
to the safety of United Nations' fUN)
forces. The 9th Infantry Regiment would
lead the division through the gauntlet
Field artillerymen, lighting in the Hiirtgen Forest, Germany, reload rocket launchers lor liring a second
round, November 1944
and get out any way it could. Men of the
2d Battalion, 9th Infantry. worried and
shaken, but confident in their leaders,
started off. Moving along the road, they
were subjected to contil}uous attack and
indirect fire from the enemy. In the
lO-degree weather, the soldiers were
becoming exhausted and apathetic. Yet,
slowly and surely, the force moved
toward safety. it was dark and the
temperature dropped, creating further
difficulty. But the men of the 2d Division
fought into the night.
To the rear, pressure increased on the
23d Regimental Combat Team rear guard
action as major elements of the division
moved through the valley. I t was time for
the team to get out, and it withdrew. Its
direct support artillery battalion fired
round after round into the advancing
enemy. A total of 3,206 rounds went
through the tubes. Paint burned and
peeled from the guns. Then, when the am-
munition was gone, gunners removed the
sights and breach blocks and thermited
the tubes. They quickly moved to follow
1 V G Reznlchenko, TactiCS /The Officer's Libra'"" Foreign
TechnOlogy DIVISion OhiO, 1967. P 193
2 Y Novlkay and F SverdlOv ManoeL/vel In Modern L ana War
fare Progress Publishers Moscow USSR. 1972 D 132
:3 Ibl(l, P 47
4 Edward H CabaniSS 'The Soviet Tank. Ballaiion In the Offen
slve,' Soviet Armed Forces ReView Annual AcademiC InlernCl
Iional Press Gulf Breeze Fla 1979, Volume 3 D 244
5 Reznlchenko op cd
6 IbId
7 Field Manual 712 The Tank and Mechanrzed Infantry Bar
the division down the valley.
The division' on the night march under
fire left the road clogged with burning
vehicles. Unit by unit, they fought and
weaved their way to the pass. The last of
the men arrived in UN lines on the morn-
ing of 1 December. Thousands of Allied
wounded filled aid stations and hospitals.
Surgeons worked until they dropped,
then got up and worked again. Men lay on
the frozen ground for hours waiting for
treatment. However, not all of the 2d
Division men came out.
In summary, we can see that history
has many lessons about fighting from en-
circled positions. In the future, we face
the ever-present threat of Soviet confron-
tation. Soviet intentions are clear and
backed by an increasing offensive capa-
bility. Like a Greek tragedy moving
toward its conclusion, we
must show the Soviets our iron face of
war. We must train and discipline our
forces to ensure they are not lost in
supreme personal sacrifice to produce
temporary relief in local situations.
tdllon TaSk Force Department 01 the Army. WaShington, 0 C, JUly
1976, AppendiX D
B Department Of the Arm" Pamphlet 20 269. Small Umt Actions
During the German CampaIgn In RUSSia (Historical Study). Depart
men! of the Army WaShington DC . 31 JUly DD 4750
9 Reference Book 100-2, MIlitary Potential of Combat Umts
Isolated 1M 'he Enemy Rear. US Army Coml1'lQ.nd and General Staff
COllege. Fori Leavenworth. Kan , VOlume IV, DD '2 23
10 T R. Fehrenbach ThIS Kmd 01 War. The Macmillan Co NY.
1963, pp 325 50
A.fa)or MIchael R Tarantolll t6 senior mobtli-
zation planner, Army Readmess and
tlOn RegIon VIll. Aurora, tolorado He received
a B.A. from the Unrt:erstty of Tampa. an M.A
from Pepperdme (lniversity and is a 1981
graduate of the USACGSC He has servad In
Vietnam. Thatland and West Germany, and as
chief, Resources Alanagement. US Milllary En-
ltstment Processing Command
Controlling Drug Use:
for the CODlDlander
Lieutenant Colonel Larry H. Ingraham, J]S Army
Drug use by soldiers is a factor that I<I!quires the attention of
commanders in all units. The author examines "the problem"
and proposes measures aimed at controlling the effects of drug
The l'U?U'5 expressed in thIS artIcle are those of
the author and do not purport to reflect the pOSI"
tlon of the Department of the Army. the Depart-
ment of Defense or any other government office
or agency.-Eduor
OMMANDERS. clin;cians and re-
searchers have learned much about
drug use in the Army over the last
decade. Unfortunately. little of this
knowledge has seeped into policy and doc-
trine. The result is a confused and confus-
ing drug-abuse prevention effort that
serves the interests of neither com-
manders. clinicians nor identified drug
users. The purpose of this article is to
review current understandings of drug
use in the military and to suggest steps
concerned commanders should consider
in combating drug use in company-sized
The Problem Is Not Addiction. Health
or Performance
There is considerable confusion about
"the problem" drug use poses for the
Army. "The problem" is not addiction
although that threat is ever present. Ex-
cept for a brief time in Vietnam. the
numbers of addicted soldiers have been
trivial over the past 10 years.
The typical
pattern of drug use is recreational and op-
portunistic. depending on what is
available at reasonable cost. The typiCal
use pattern is poly-drug. and. when illicit
drugs are unavailable. the troops turn to
"The problem" is not one of health
although a threat to health is ever pres-
ent. Drug-using soldiers. like their non-
using compatriots. are young. healthy
and in good physical condition. Death by
overdose is extremely rare.' There are. to
be sure. numerous trips to emergency
rooms for treatment for acute overdoses.
but these seldom require hospitalization
and are not monitored statistically. Ex-
cept for an occasional outbreak of hepa-
titis. drug use does not unduly tax
medical resources or cause soldiers to be
withdrawn from duty status for medical

"The problem" is not performance in
either garrison or combat although the
threat is ever present. Typical usage pat-
terns reveal drug use as mostly an after-
duty activity with ample time for
recovery before returning to duty. Obser-
vations indicate drug use on duty is
typically moderate with no more debili-
tating effects than a beer or two with
lunch.' There is no publishecl evidence
that drug use degraded combat profi-
ciency in Vietnam. The evidence available
indicates small combat groups monitored
drug use among their members and ap-
plied whatever sanctions were necessary
to maintain the safety and integrity of
the group.'
The Problem Is Trust. Not Drugs
Throughout most of the past 10 years.
throughout most of the Army. drug use
has not posed a significant threat to
health or performance. Drug use has.
however. presented a significant divisive
force within the ranks. and this is the real
problem. Drug use is the symbol or meta-
phor around which the issue of who can
set and enforce standards gets played
out. Common soldiers complain. "You 've
got to get high or go crazy in this unit."
Noncommissioned officers (NCOs) retort.
"What do you expect of us when all we
have are potheads and junkies to work
Throughout most of the past 10 years, throughout most of the Army,
drug use has "ot posed a significant threat to health or performance.
Drug use has, however, presented a signficant divisive force within
t ~ ranks, and this is the real problem.
Drug, use symbolizes lack of trust
across the ranks. It is evident in the
anguish of company commanders after
having lost one of their best soldiers in a
drug-overdose death. Lack of trust, a
sense of betrayal, is obvious among first
sergeants who find needles and para-
phernalia outside their barracks. Lack of
trust is also evident among common
soldiers, one of whom said:
I was doing fine. Top was looking after
me until I came up positive on the urine
test. Then they turned against me. I
coultln't do anything right. They're pre-
judiced against drug users.
"The problem" is not drugs, but who
can set and enforce standards that will
ultimately come down to who can tell
whom the time has come to go and die.
That is the problem. The last time there
was disagreement on this issue, Charlie
company refused to move out, somebody
rolled a grenade under a sergeant's bunk
and thousands of American soldiers left
the battle to hide behind the skirts of the
medical tent with a diagnosis of drug
abuse. Drug use, as it is typically ob-
served, can be tolerated, but the prospect
of once again stretching the social fabric
of the Army to the breaking point cannot.
What Is the Concerned Commander to Do?
If the issue is trust, making drug use
legal solves nothing. If the issue is trust,
treatment in a facility outside the unit
achieves nothing. If the issue is trust,
drug education programs are a waste of
time. If the issue is trust, then effective,
remedial action can be taken only in
small, company-sized units.
Begin With Alcohol
A credible drug-abuse prevention effort
at unit level must begin with alcohol. This
is essential for credibility. The oft-heard
lament, "Why are you coming down on us
for doing drugs when no one does any-
thing about the drunks in the unit?," has
some truth to it. Commanders must make
clear to everyone that illegal and in-
temperate use of any substance is
unacceptable and will not be tolerated.
What does this mean in terms of
It means battalion commanders must
take the lead in publishing clear policy
stating possible consequences for in-
temperate drug use. It means, for exam-
ple, the battalion must be put on notice
that certain offenses-driving while in-
toxicated, drinking on duty or family
abuse while under the influence of alcohol
-are serious threats to discipline and
morale and will be dealt with accordingly.
It also means battalion members must
take care of their own by providing a
phone number to call when a unit member
fi,\ds himself too drunk to drive his car
It means the battalion sergeant major
must make a concerted effort to identify
problem drinkers in the NCO ranks and
encourage them to seek help before they
come to the attention of command. It
means the battalion commander must set
a yearly goal of having at least one
member of the unit entered into an
alcohol-treatment program and returned
to the unit as living testament that con-
tinued service and recovery from alcohol
abuse are not incompatible.
The battalion commander who is
serious about dealing with alcohol, drugs
and trust must also take the lead in
fostering unit (company or battalion)
lounges where alcohol is served. Drinking
is heavily controlled by social circum-
stance; drinking at the commander's New
Year's reception (we would hope) is not
the same as at a prop-wash ceremony.
The commander has the choice of setting
unit standards for drinking behavior or
having those standards set outside of
command influence. Unit lounges foster
drinking "at home" and, at the same
time, promote communication, cohesion
and trust across the ranks.
Similarly, company commanders are
obligated to pUblish clear policies con-
cerning alcohol abuse. They must strive
to have at least one active Alcoholics
Anonymous member in eaeh company to
serve both as an informal contact for
those thinking abou t changing their
drinking habits and as testament that
recovering alcoholics are welcome in the
Army. Company commanders must also
ensure that there is a number to call so
thqt no one in the unit need drive while
drunk and must ensure that wives and
children are included in social functions-
both to help set the standards for accept-
able drinking and to promote communica-
tion throughout the unit.
What About Drug Use?
With respect to illicit drugs, the com-
mander must separate endemic, "normal,"
day-to-day use from use that poses
threats of epidemic proportions. As for
"normal" use, the company commander
has little control over what substances
soldiers choose to 'ingest. If they insist on
using, the commander cannot stop them.
The commander can, however, exercise
considerable influence over where and
how illicit drugs are used.
Concerned commanders are unwilling
to tolerate evidence of drug use in the
company area. This means frequent and
rigorous health-and-welfare inspections
conducted by platoon sergeants and
squad leaders. It is the distrust, outrage
and betrayal that drug use engenders in
them that provokes commanders to pro-
test. .. But I can never get enough
evidence to nail them in court." Com
manders. in their outrage. have neglected
the purpose of these inspections-health
and welfare.
Inspections are a means of getting the
tools back in the motor pool. the china
back in the mess hall. molding food out of
the wall lockers and weapons and contra-
band (to include drugs and drug para-
phernalia) out of the barracks. The object
is not to "catch" anyone. but to ensure
the health and welfare of the unit. Confis-
cation is often penalty enough. In the
case of drugs or paraphernalia in common
areas. extra training in housekeeping
under the supervision of the group NCO
is in order. This is sergeants' business.
Unless daily inspections are made. the
commander is not seriously concerned
with the health and welfare of the unit.
The second response of a concerned
commander is to ensure responsive.
responsible medical attention within the
unit. A study of drug-overdose casualties
in US Army, Europe. shows the majority
of victims could have been saved with
prompt medical attention. This means
making it policy that no soldier be left
unattended while unconscious for any
Concerned commanders' contro.l drug fLse in their units. The
'v techniques are and understo.od. CQmma{lders. who. cannot or
will not set and enforce c,f/ntro.l Qfdnug,use,. in their units, therefore,.
require replacement by th,ose (who. can. " . ,.' . '
, 't< ... '"
reason. Soldiers must understand they
are dependent upon one another; that the
first priority is saving lives. Therefore,
failure to render aid to another soldier in
trouble-for whatever reason-may be
dereliction of duty and will result in
appropriate punishment. Drug-overdose
victims act much like chemical attack
victims on the battlefield. Therefore, en-
suring responsive buddy aid in the
barracks also pays dividends in readiness.
Finally, concerned commanders must
respond to "normal" drug use by concen-
trating directly upon communication and
cohesion. High-drug-use units differ from
low-drug-use units in the quality of com-
munication and the degree of trust and
confidence felt throughout the unit across
all ranks.'
Cohesion can be improved by all-ranks
after-duty activities, all'rank unit dining,
social activities or athletic contests. The
activity is not so important as the oppor-
tunity for all unit members to come to
know one another outside of the job-
setting which is dominated by rank. This
does not mean fraternization or neces-
sarily becoming buddies with the troops,
but creating settings in which all unit
members can come to know one another
as individuals united in trust. respect and
When to Worry
Concerned commanders are forever sniff-
ing around the unit seeking signs of
alarm. They find paraphernalia in the bar-
racks. rummage in garbage cans and note
the numbers and kinds of liquor bottles.
read the blotter reports and loop by the
emergency room to chat about trends.
They require unit medics to check rou-
tinely for needle marks and advise them
whether the incidence of "tracks" is up.
down or steady.' cultivate informants and
engage in extensive informal conversa-
tions with their charges. .
From all sources. they piece together a
composite picture of drug use in the unit.
As a rule of thumb. they should get
worried when any of their sources indi-
cates a sharp rise in either the type of
drugs or the ways they are ingested. They
get especially worried when either heroin
or needles appear on the scene.
When worried. the first step for the con-
cerned commander is to convene a
seminar with the Judge Advocate
General (JAG) and all unit officers and
N COs to review the rules of evidence for
search and seizure. Some will protest that
word will get out to the troops and make
it more difficult to "catch" the offenders.
Never mind-that is exactly the inten-
tion. Trust and confidence are not built
when one group is out to bust another. All
must understand who sets the standards
and that failure to comply will meet pre-
dictable consequences.
The JAG seminar should be followed by
an' assessment of unit climate with an
organizational effectiveness officer as a
consultant to pinpoint communication
problems in the unit. Consultation with
medical. drug/alcohol and law enforce-
ment officers is also important to pre-
clude unwarranted overreactions that
achieve nothing but "hassling" which ex-
acerbates distrust, When the commander
is convinced special action is required, ex-
plicit inspections for drugs have first
The use of drug-detection dogs and unit
urinalyses are also ways to communicate
the commander's willingness and desire
to set standards. Formal disciplinary ac-
tion may be required when necessary,
but, insofar as possible, extra training,
both individual and group, under the
supervision of the NCOs, is preferable.
There is no known "cure" for casual,
recreational drug use-the typical Army
pattern. Much is known, however, on how
to train soldiers, and that should be the
first priority. Drug use cannot be viewed
as an individual problem, but as a unit
problem. For this reason, users, nonusers,
privates, sergeants and officers must be
, ThiS article IS a condensatIon of a longer artIcle by the
author entitled, "Sense and Nonoense In the Army s Drug Abuse
Preyentlon Effort:' whiCh appeared In Parameters. Volume II
Number " 1981 PD 60 70
2 L N RobbinS, 0 H DaYls and 0 N Dureo, "How Permanent
Was VIetnam Drug AddIction?," Amencan Journal of Publtc Health
Supplement. December 1974, DD 38-43 and L H Ingraham ana F J
Manning. Orug -OverdOSe,. Among US SOldiers In Europe, 197879
PSYChOlogIcal AutopSies fOllOWIng Deatns and Near Deaths"
(paper, available Irom aulhOrs, has been '>ubmltted for
3 l H Ingraham, 'The BOYS If'! the BarraCkS Observations on
Amencan Gommon Soldiers In Garm,on.' Walter Reed Army In
5tltute Of ReSearch, Washington DC, unpubliShed manuSCript
4 L. 5 Holsenbeck, Drugs, AlCOhOl and Death In the Unlteo
States Army. Europe," U$AREUR Medical aullettn, April 1980 pp
1517, also Ingraham and Manning. op Cit
5 Ingraham. "The Boys In the BarraCkS Observallons on
committed to curbing evidence of illicit
drug use. Extra training is an effective
way to get all unit members involved.
Ten years of experience in dealing with
illicit drug use in the Army suggest that
it can be controlled, but not eradicated.
Furthermore, drug use can only be con-
trolled at the company level. Data at
hand indicate there are remarkably
"clean" companies in very "dirty" areas
and, conversely, problem companies in
areas that are comparatively free of drug
traffic.' Concerned commanders can con-
trol drug use in their units. The tech-
niques are known and understood. Com-
manders who cannot or will not set and
enforce control of drug use in their units,
therefore, require replacement by those
who can.
American Common Soldiers 111 Gam,>on . op Cit
6 L H Ingraham .. 'The Nam and The World' HerOIn Use by
US Army Enlisted Men 5erYIng In VIetnam," Psychlatr" May 1974
pp 11428
7 T 5 Mackpn]le Memo CAEAGA OEI for Chief 01 Human
Resources. Depul'l Chief 01 Stat! for Personnel. Headquarters, US
Army Europe and 7th Army 3 April 1979
8 In the author s experience, unit medical personnel do not
routinely cheCk tor needle marks durmg dispenSary VISits, they
thereby depnye Ihe commander 01 needed intelligence concerning
Ihe health ana welfare of the unIt Use of such eVidence for
prosecution requires staff judge advocate advIce but the pOint
here IS enabling the commander 10 kr"lO ..... the trends ..... Ithout yet
.... orrylng about prosecution or other interventions
9 Substance Abuse In Umted States Army Europe.' OffIce Of
the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Headquarters, US Army,
Europe, June 1981
Lieutenant Colonel Larry H Ingraham com-
mands the US Army Medfcal Research Unit.
Europe. a ,special foreign activity of the Walter
Reed Army Institute of Research He received a
master's degree in general psychology from
Kent State Uniuersity and a doctorate In soczal
psychology from the University of Iowa. He was
assigned to the Department of Military
Psychiatry at the Walter Reed Al'my Institute of
Research, Washington. DC He was the co-
author of "Cohesion: Who Nepds It. What Is It
and How Do We Get It to Them?," which ap-
peared In the June 1981 Military Review.
Standardization of military forces in NA TO has received much
attention in the past. However, according to the author, imple-
mentation has not been 8uccessful for a variety of reasons. He
suggests that, with appropriate modification of the concept, .
standardization can indeed play a role in the development of
conventional forces in NA TO during the next 20 years.
Major Laurence R. Sadoff, US Army

e of'


ESPITE past failures, standardiza-
tion can play an active role in de-
veloping conventional forces for NATO
during the next 20 years. To demonstrate
this, one must first have a clear under-
standing of the concept of standardiza-
tion. Also needed is a general knowledge
of the political, economic, technical and
military influences on standardization
since World War II. One must also
analyze why standardization has not been
very successful in the past.
From this analysis, it will be shown
that, with modifications, standardization
can play an important role in developing
conventional forces in NATO in the
future. Suggested changes are offered for
The NATO Glossary of Terms and
Definitions for Military Use defines
standardization as follows:
The process by which member nations
achieve the closest practicable co-
operation among forces, the most efficient
use of research, development and produc-
tion resources, and agree to adopt on the
broadest possible basis the use of:
Common or compatible operational.
administrative and logistical procedures.
Common or compatible technical
procedures and criteria.
Common, compatible or interchange-
able .supplies, components, w'eapons, or
Common or compatible tactical doc-
trine with corresponding organizational
Standardization policies are aimed at
achieving the following goals:
Politically, tq enhance the cohesive-
ness of the Alliance.
Militarily, to so upgrade the conven-
tional combat effectiveness of the Armed
Forces as to make them the co-equal of
the Warsaw Pact nations.
Economically, to make more cost-
effective use of limited financial
Technically, to take advantage of
concentrations of knowledge and ex-
The goals of this concept are far-
reaching and ambitious. It is against this
backdrop that standardization has been
implemented since World War II.
General Background
The history of standardization can be
traced to the aftermath of World War II
when Europe was equipped with surplus
US weapons. In 1951, a military agency
for standardization was established.
However, for the next 20 years, very little
standardization occurred. There was no
military threat to cause planners to pur-
sue standardization actively. The War-
saw Pact was just coming into being, and
the NATO Alliance was strong.
Additionally, the United States was the
major world economic power, possessing
overwhelming technological and produc-
tion superiority. Europe was surfeited
with arms. In the 1960s alone, the United
States sold $8 billion worth of military
equipment to Europe and bought only
$700 million in return.'
During the 1970s, several events that
influenced NATO brought the concepts of
standardization into sharper focus. With
the Soviet Union achieving strategic
nuclear parity. emphasis shifted to NATO
conventional forces. Many who believed
that a lack of compatibility could provide
a significant disadvantage on a coalition
battlefield looked upon standardization
as a way to improve conventional
Changing economies provided an
economic environment in which reduced
costs through standardization were
welcomed. These changing economies in-
cluded the rebirth of the European in-
dustrial might. galloping inflation and
the severe realignment of currency flows
owing to increased oil prices.
Additionally. the cohesiveness of
N A TO was often denigrated by the in-
fluence of such global events as Vietnam.
the 1973 Middle East War and oil em-
bargoes. These events often caused na-
tional interests among NATO countries
to become competitive and juxtaposed_
The standardization of systems develop-
ment and production could cement some
of these relationships.
Because of such reasons. the United
States. once an obstacle to standardiza-
tion. began to give support. The Culver-
Nunn Amendment to the 1975 Defense
Appropriations Bill directed the Depart-
ment of Defense (DOD) to actively pursue
standardization. The 1976 and 1977 DOD
Appropriations Acts continued to make
standardization a national policy_
In May 1977. President Jimmy Carter.
in a speech to NATO ministers. pledged
his support of standardization policies. In
September 1977. Ambassador Robert
Komer. appointed adviser to the
secretary of defense for NATO affairs.
devoted considerable efforts to achieve in-
creased standardization. The secretary of
defense emphasized standardization ob-
jectives in his annual reports. The United
States was now "politically committed."
But. even with this commitment. stand-
ardization did not work much better than
during the 1950s and 1960_s.
Standardization: Panacea or Plague'
As previously mentioned. events in the
1970s caused many to look at stand-
ardization as a way of providing a remedy
to some of NATO's ills. Let us examine
what supporters envision as benefits.
Economically. many see standardiza-
tion as a great cost saver because it
reduces dollar waste. Dr. Thomas A.
Callaghan. a noted European authority
on NATO. estimates allied wastes in ex-
cess of $10 billion a year because of lack
of standardization.'
This waste begins with the duplication
of research and development efforts.
There is a limited market for those who
successfully develop competitive prod-
ucts. One nation will often not buy a prod-
uct solely because it was not developed
within its own borders. There is a loss of
economies of scale because of milch
higher unit production costs associated
with separate weapon systems. There is
also a duplication of the quantities and
types of items stocked-that is. duplica-
tion of various national maintenance and
logistic systems.
Technically. unified standardization
policies would enhance the integration
and specialization in armaments produc-
tion. Supporters argue that -there would
M an increased efficiency because of
greater conrcentrations of knowledge an'd
experience, _ _ _
Militarily. the large number of weapon
systems. as shown in the accompanying
table. is considered by many to reduce
com bat effectiveness vis-a-vis the War-
saw Pact countries. According to General
Andrew J. Goodpaster, former supreme
Weapon Systems
Battle tanks
Armored personnel carriers
Antitank weapons
Families of combat aircraft
Tactical missile systems
Source PatficK Wall. "Can NATO Effect StandardlZatlon-A European View." Defense
Foreign Affairs Digest. April 1979. p 18
allied commander of Europe, the lack of
standardization reduces allied military ef-
fectiveness by about 30 percent.' With
common weapon systems, command,
training and logistic support systems
could become integrated. and combat ef-
fectiveness would increase.
Politically, combined efforts in stand-
ardization could draw the alliance closer
together and give it a sense of cohesion at
a most devisive time.
Although the arguments for stand-
ardization within NATO are powerful,
there have been many factors working
against it. One military school of thought
argues that standardization is not a valid
concept. I t is suggested that there are
strategic and tactical advantages to be
gained by expo<ing the Warsaw Pact to a
diversity of weapon systems. In times of
conflagration, diverse tactics, technology
and techniques would be required to com-
bat the NATO forces. Standardization
would reduce this tactical advantage for
N A TO forces.
Additionally, because NATO countries
have different tactics and doctrines, dif-
ferent systems are needed to support dif-
ferent strategies. Take. for example,
countries that consider defense suppres-
sion systems too expensive and feel that
defenses can be evaded perhaps by flying
at extremely low altitudes and taking ad-
vantage of terrain masking. Such coun-
tries would obviously not invest in sup-
pression systems.' Thus, the air forces of
those countries would be equipped dif-
ferently, trained differently and would
fight differently. How would one stand-
ardize among such nations? A necessity
for compromise could mean that specific
military needs by member nations could
no longer be met.
Others suggest that. while standardiza-
tion may be theoretically beneficial,
powerful domestic influences obstruct its
implementation. Nations and political
leaders give prime importance to
domestic issues at the expense of foreign
or defense-related issues. This results in
reduced standardization because of the
inordinately strong domestic influence.
The German Parliament linked pur-
chases of the airborne warning and con-
trol Eystpm fA WACS} to the US purchase
of German component' of the M 1 tank.
as,erting thaL otherwise. West Germany
could not afford AWACS. The US DOD
was criticized because of its purchase of
the MAGSS Belgian machinegun: the
reason-many jobs in !\laine were lost.
When General Dynamics changed plans
for production of the FI6 and gave more
jobs to a more French-speaking area in
Belgium. the resistance of French-speak-
ing nations was reduced.'
Many feel that political influences
hinder implementation because each
country maintains deeply ingrained
parochialism and will not accept systems
from other countries. Additionally, for-
eign sources are often considered
unreliable in times of crisis. Nations will
naturally resist any loss of self-
sufficiency. and increased arms imports
imply a loss of security. The dependency
on supplier countries is considered to
lessen freedom of action-that is. self-
Thus. while the United States did make
an initial purchase of the British
Aerospace A V Harrier. no follow-up order
was made. Rather. if negotiations are suc-
cessful. the United States will produce a
"new and improved" model' using Rolls-
Royce engines. The British will also pur-
chase a number of the A V8B Advanced
Harrier aircraft ..
One must also realize that NATO is an
international alliance with no suprana-
tional authority to compel nations to take
specific actions. Thus. although there was
an initial agreement to purchase the Boe-
ing E3A AWACS system for NATO. the
British decided it was not in their best in-
terests and elected to produce their
Nimrod." Nations simply have not
always been willing to accept short-term
political costs so that longer term'
economic and military benefits can be
Technical arguments against stand-
ardization indicate that there are often no
objective evaluations of competing proj-
ects and their priorities. Those who argue
against standardization policies state
that different countries have different
standards and requirements. Safety
specifications differ. Drawings differ as
do manufacturing processes. 11
Thus. these same individuals argue,
technical differences between nations pre-
vent effective implementation of stand-
ardization policies. Furthermore, decreas-
ing technological expertise in areas where
standardization leads to production could
lead to production monopolies by in-
dividual manufacturers. It is further
argued that. by reducing competition. one
reduces the edge to achieve and excel.
This can result in the development of
equipment and weapon systems that
would be less effective than that which
would be developed under a 'competitive
Other arguments indicate that, because
of diverse technological. safety. opera-
tional and testing requirements, it is ac-
tually more expensive to try to produce a
weapon that has been developed in
another country. Although some argue
that the development of the Franco-
German Roland surface-to-air ,missile by
the United States was cost-effective,I'
others argue that it cost more than $260
million in research and development just
to adapt it to US standards. I' It is argued
that the F16 will cost 18 percent more
than had it been produced in the United
States. I.
Another aspect of this argument is
,that. when one standardizes research and
development, one is. in fact, creating a
monopoly or oligarchy. This reduced com-
petition will ultimately increase costs. It
is argued that the F16 was kept as inex-
pensive as it was because of the competi-
tion from the French Mirage.
In summary, for a myriad of interact-
ing political, economic, technical and
military reasons, the concepts of stand-
ardization have not worked as originally
envisioned. even during a period of in-
creased emphasis. The question is: Where
do we go from here? Do we disregard
standardization as an idealistic. but not
viable. policy? Do we continue to pursue
it actively and make it work? Or do we re-
think our concept to decide if possibly
there is some modified role for standard-
ization in the development of conven-
tional weapons for NATO during the next
20 years? Can we integrate the re-
quirements of the politicians. soldiers.
technologists and economists to make
standardization work?
Although standardization policies
within NATO have not been implemented
successfully to date. standardization can
play an active role in the development of
conventional forcesin NATO during the
next 20 years. However. such implemen-
tation will not just happen. It must be
To begin. the concept of standardiza-
tion must be modified. The definition as
given in the NATO glossary is unaccept-
able. Complete standardization is an ideal
concept that is neither practical nor
desirable. There are real-world political.
economic. technical and military con-
straints that were not considered when
standardization policies were first
Once one realizes that the implementa-
tion of standardization is more limited
than presently envisioned. it becomes
necessary to develop a framework in
which the interdependent political.
economic. technical and military in-
fluences on specific standardization ap-
plications can be evaluated using an in-
tegrated approach. To date. the terms of
the arguments for and against standardi-
zation have been disparate in nature. Dif-
ferent groups have looked at different
parts of the policy without looking at the
total policy.
Leaders must realize that standardiza-
tion cannot be legislated. Enlightened
leaders voluntarily must be willing to
make sacrifices to improve the general
security and well-being of the NATO
Alliance. It is perceived that. if the con-
cepts and goals of standardization are
modified as suggested. leaders will not
feel as threatened and will be more
amenable to enter into limited coopera-
tive agreements.
The year 1982 finds the alliance fraught
with a myriad of uncertainties and
numerous competing national interests.
The explicit threat to NATO has been
clearly exacerbated by the Soviet Union's
invasion of as well as the
possibility of an impending invasion of
The highly volatile situation in the
Middle East has caused much consterna-
tion among our European allies. Almost
totally reliant on imported oil to keep in-
dustries running. Western Europeans
face either slower or negative growth.
Bilateral agreements are being made
among NATO parties and the Soviet
Union. For example. a multibillion-dollar
agreement between the Soviet Union and
West Germany has been negotiated
whereby the Soviet Union provides natu-
ral gas to West Germany in exchange for
goods and services.
Additionally. the United States. which
has long been accustomed to treating the
European allies as client states. must now
realize that it is a partner in the alliance.
It can no longer dictate its desires to
European allies and demand acceptancll.
This was clearly demonstrated when the
United States' demanded sanctions in
response to.. the Soviet Union's Afghan-
istan invasion were not approved nor en-
forced by all the NATO allies.
It is against this backdrop that Presi-
dent Ronald Reagan and other world
leaders can initiate and enforce standard-
ization policies that can assist in cement-
ing some of the cracks in the fragile
NATO Alliance.
Long-term identification of require-
ments. Until 1979, force planning was
conducted at the national level with
minimal integration within NATO. In
1979, NATO began to develop manage-
ment systems to improve standardization
and interoperability. The NATO Ar-
maments Planning Review (N APR) was
designed to review national equipment
replacement plans to identify potential
. areas for cooperation and provide for
military prioritization of areas requiring
standardization. The newly implemented
Periodic Planning System (PAPS) was
designed to allow interested nations to in-
itiate cooperation in pursuing solutions to
mutually agreed requirements.
These systems, which will eventually
merge, provide the capability to integrate
the long-term identification of require-
ments. These requirements must now be
emphasized. Member nations must look
to identifying NATO requirements as
well as national requirements. Nations
will often find that. with slight modifica-
tions, national requirements can become
NATO requirements if explicitly modi-
fied in the beginning of the plannipg proc-
ess. Once NATO requirements are iden-
tified, alternative systems can be
Thus, systems can be planned and
modified early in the acquisition cycle to
meet NATO requirements where appro-
priate. Duplication of effort can be
minimized, and the possibility of a
limited use of standardized equipment
can be improved. The framework has been
designed; it must now be used!
Letters of agreement. Presently, letters
of agreement and memoranda of under-
standing are used among NATO nations.
Their use must be strengthened and con-
tinued. While agreements ~ n always be
abrogated, clear understandings of inten-
tions can provide a basis for closer
cooperation among member nations. .
NATO procurement agency. NATO
needs to develop a central procurejIlent
agency to support the purchase by the
alliance of agreed-upon common systems.
For such systems, agreements could be
negotiated to take advantage of long pro-
duction runs and economies of scale.
Balance of payments could be monitored
to ensure an "equality" of economic fac-
tors." It should be emphasized that the
alliance proper would not own nor con trol
anything. Rather, member nations would
take advantage of economies of scale
while an "equality" of economic factors is
Family of weapons systems. Many
have suggested a concept in which each
nation would be responsible for the
research and development of a family of
weapons. Once developed, these systems
could be produced by the countries that
developed them or the rights licensed to
other NATO nations.
Such a system still has merit under the
new modified concept of standardization
as long as an explicit integrated evalua-
tion of a natiom.. military, political. tech-
nical and economic requirements is con-
sidered. Costs would be reduced because
duplication would be minimized. Even
limited applications will result in savings.
It is believed that the competitive nature
of firms within the countries will ensure
that excellence is maintained.
An excellent example of how this can
work is the family of advanced air-to-air
missiles_ In August 1980, the first family
of weapons memorandum of understand-
ing was signed by the United States, the
United Kingdom, France and Germany_
Under this memorandum, the Europeans
will develop the short-range, air-to-air
missiles, while the United States will
develop an advanced medium-range ver-
sion_ Estimated research and develop-
ment cost savings are $500 million_" Im-
proved combat capability for the alliance,
while not so easily calculated, is also ex-
pected to be substantial. Such efforts
must continue_
As previously discussed, standardiza-
tion policies will not provide a universal
panacea for all of the ills of the alliance.
1 NATO Glossary of Terms ana Def"lItlOns fOf Military Use.
quoted In John D Elliot tnterdependence- The Impacl on US
Security Delensp System Management ReView Summer 1977 P
? Han., L EDerhard Europea(1 and Transananltc Armaments
COOP?rat.on From the German ViewpOint NatIonal Defense. April
1960 P 37 JB
3 Furopean Defense Cooperation Hear,ngs uS Congress,
qIJotea In Dantel K Malone, ROland A Case for or Aga.nSf Stand
ardlzatlOn? National Defef1se Unll,erslty Washington 0 C, May
1980 D 7
4 Captain John L Clarke '!\jATO Slandard!z3tlon Panacea or
Plague') Mlldar,! Review Aplll 1979 P 59
'j RIChard M Sanders, . Stal"dardllatlon In Search 01 tne Holy
Grad" Army Febru<:J.ry 1979 P llj
6 Ibid
7 Seymour J De1lehman New TeChnOlogy and Military Power
They are not a substitute for adequate
defense spending. There will still be dif-
ferences in national interests. Good
standardization poUcies will not revolu-
tionize the concepts for the defense of
Western Europe. However, realistic
standardization policies can serve as a
unifying factor for cohesion of a badly
strained alliance.
Combat effectiveness can and must be
improved. A voidance of high costs of
project duplication, lowered develop-
mental costs and lower unit costs are
economic benefits that will be realized
from realistic standardization policies.
The fragile global situation of the 1980s
demands a strong NATO Alliance. Stand-
ardization policies can and must have a
role in that alliance.
General Purf)ose FOrces lor the 1980s and Beyond West'flew
Press. Soulder, COlO, 1979, P 193
8 Sanders Of) Cit D 17
9 Patrlck Walt. Can NATO Effect 5landardlzatlOn-A Euro
pean VieW' Defense Foreign Affairs Digest, Aprtl 1979 p 19
10 Ibid
11 Wll!lam E Stoney The Process of StandardlzallOn An O"er
Vie"" Defense System Management Review Summer 1977 p 14
12 Malone op Cit P 91
13 Ib1(1. pIal
14 fbI(]
15 A MartlT'! Lldy . NATO Slal"dardlzallon-An Alternative .lip
proach" Defense System Management ReView, Summer 197/, p
16 Rationalization/Standardization Wlfhrn NATO Department
of Defense Washington DC January 1981 p 83
.. \faJor Laurence R Sadoff IS deputy dlstrict
engmeer. Albuquerque DlStrict. US Army Corps
of Engmeers. Albuquerque. "New Mexico He
receiued a B S from the USMA. an Me E from
the Unwerszty of Illinois, an MBA from the
Southern Illinois Uniuersrty and is a graduate of
the Naval College of Command and Staff He has
served with the 8th Engtneer Battalion, 1st
Cavalry Divtsion, Fort Hood, Texas .. with the
Construction Engineer Research Laboratory,
Champaign. Illinois. and with the 503d Engineer
Company and the 9th Engineer Battalion in
West Germany.
In the final portion of this two-part article. the author discusses
the thinned forward defense concept and wargaming of covering
force operations. He concludes with a scenario for the covering
force battle in Central Europe. '
Solution to a Surprise Attack?
The vi('u's expre<;<.,ed In tIll" article ar,. tliu.,C' of
thC' author and do nut [Jllrpvrt to reflc( t (11(' Pt."'t-
floll of tlie Ucpartmr'llf of the Arm\" tIl(' [)('flOrt
ment of UC(f'ns{' or anv otliN l!Ol'Crnmf'nt office
or agency -Edlfor
Characteristics of
the Thinned Forward Defense
ONCEPTUAL basis. The concept
of a "thinned" forward defense is
not new. Several authors have recognized
that casualties decrease as troop disper-
Part II
Colonel Daniel Gans,
US Army Reserve, Retired
sion and weapon lethality increase.' Bat-
tle in the covering force area (CF Al is
characterized by the lowest NATO troop
density and the highest Warsaw Pactto-
NATO troop density ratio anywhere in
the combat zone. This section describes
how such a thinned defense can be aug-
mepted with an enhanced radiation (ER)
weapon system synergistically. Figure 1
is a schematic showing components of the
CF A organization concept.
The concept stems from two basic
Field Marshal Erwin Rommel's
"Devil's Gardens" in front of the Afrika
Part I of this article appeared," the January 1982 MIlitary Review
,1982 55
Organization of Covering Force Area
0-1 H
'" 20-
Inter-German Boundary
Trip-Wire Sector
Attrition Sector
Subpackage RED
DL 1
DL 2
Subpackage BLU E
DL 3
Subpackage GREEN
---r--_.J DL 4
Subpackage GRAY
Displaced Position

Main Line
legend .t:. ObsmatlOn post Scale
III 8-mch hOWitzer
10 15 20
! I I
Dl-Delay 1m,
Korps main line of resistance at El Ala-
me in, which were packed with diabolical
explosive devices to impede and reduce
the effectiveness of the attacking British
Eighth Army.'
An engineering design for protect-
ing equipment exposed to large impact or
missile loads with a shielding material
Figure 1
having a frangible, cellular or eggcrate
In both concepts, a lightly held or light
barrier zone is used absorb energy from
powerful blows striking at vital areas.
Conceptually, the CF A would be divided
into two sectors: the so-called "trip-wire"
sector, approximately 10 kilometers deep,
and an .. attrition" sector, 20 to 40 kilo-
meters in depth, depending on the loca
tion of the initial main line of resistance.
Trip-wire sector. The sector depth is
selected so that the covering force can
test the sincerity of Warsaw Pact war-
making intentions and establish pact
major axes of advance. Additionally, it
should allow time for the national com-
mand authority to be informed through
the operational chain of command and to
I approve the preplan ned employment of
"packages" of ER weapons in the CFA,'
and to complete civil defense (CD) evacua-
tion operations in the attrition sector and
main battle area (MBA).
)1;0 ER delivery systems would be posi-
tioned in this sector, and systems posi-
tioned in the attrition sector and :vIBA
would not be located so as to fire at max
imum range beyond the inter-German
border. Pact troops crossing the well-
publicized demarcation line betw<'n the
trip-wire and attrition sectors would be
entering a nuclear fire zone (NFZ) and the
resultant actions pre-aKl'ced to by all
NATO nations-a major undertaking!
A ttrition sector, This sector is orga-
nized to provide the maximum number of
principal delay position lines from which
covering force units assigned to major
axes of advance and supported with
artillery-delivered remote antiarmor mine
systems can force Warsaw Pact advance
guard battalions to deploy into optimum
attrition configurations. During
peacetime, these positions would be
strengthened by protected field fortifica-
tions, camouflage and cleared fields of
Throughout the attrition sector, in-
dividual 8-inch howitzer positions and
alternate positions would be surveyed,
marked, protected and camouflaged to
support covering force operations at max-
imum effective range. The forward posi-
tions would be occupied on an alternating
basis. Special ammunition supply points
with prescribed nuclear loads of ER
weapons would be located. at battery
headquarters and provided with a secur-
ity platoon, storage facilities and physical
security equipment.'
On mobilization, the security platoon
would be augmented with a German
militia security company equipped with
air defense artillery weapons. Lance posi-
tions would be located in a similar man-
ner within the MBA. Throughout the
trip-wire and attrition sectors. pre-
planned desired ground zeros IDGZs)
would be surveyed and surreptitiously
identified in front of the principal delay
positions and at terrain bottlenecks or
choke points. In turn, the ER weapons re-
quired to support each principal delay
position and affect the desired attrition
would be planned as subpackages by the
covering force commander and integrated
with other nuclear weapon requirements
by corps to form packages for approval
bv the national command authority.
'Jagdkommandos. The keystone would
be an organization of dual-purpose
observation/tank-hunter teams (JaKd-
kommandos) wholly constituted by local
West German militia squads. They could
be mobilized in place and could man
observation posts (OPs) throughrut the
CF A within 24 hours.' The 0 Ps would be
camouflaged, underground, reinforced-
concrete bunkers. They would be located
to observe major routes of approach,
large open spaces between population
centers and the preplan ned DG Zs therein.
A buried telephone system (with
ultrahigh-frequency radio backup),
organized to form command and control
sectors, would provide direct links be'
tween observer and howitzer/Lance posi-
tions and access for the covering force
and corps artillery commanders. OPs
would have overhead protection commen-
surate with their proximity to the nearest
DGZ. Hard-wired telephone lines would
be protected against nuclear electro-
magnetic pulses. .
Equipped with infantry weapons. the
Jagdkommandos also provide local
security for nuclear delivery means
operating within their area of respon
sibility. act as tankhunter teams at night
or during periods of limited visibility and.
if compromised. fight from forests as
"stay-behind" special forces. Having
Germans as the principal eyes for the
nuclear defense should strengthen their
resolve to use ER weapons. first! As
funds become available. the Jagdkom
mandos would be augmented with a
mixed network of remote sensors and in
trusion detectors to monitor. identifv and
locate targets in built-up or forested 'areas
that cannot be readily observed from
Civil defense. To minimize civilian
casualties during a surprise attack. while
keeping axes of communications clear of
evacuees <!nd open for troop and resupply
movements. all' civilians in the CFA and
MBA would be sheltered in cn facilities
"'ithin the nearest village or town. This
means the typical civilian will have to
conquer fears raised by his parents' and
grandparents' accounts of Red army
atrocities during the closing days of
World War II and to contt:ol very strong
impulses to flee to the West. The CD
shelters would be dualpurpose with suffi
cient radiation shielding to protect oc-
cupants from E R weapon effects. and
equipped with air seal and filtration
systems to keep out chemical warfare
Of the nine million people living within
the CF A. a little more than five million
(60 percent) live in cities and towns with
populations of 10.000 or greater. Approx
imately four million live within the
forested and open spaces filled with small
villages (less than 5.000 inhabitants)
which form the matrix connecting the
cities and towns. These spaces constitute
80 percent of the CF A and are the pro
posed nuclear killing grounds. the N FZs.
Based on recent evacuation experience.'
the four million people could be evacuated
to shelters in the nearest city or town
within 24 hours. German national
discipline and German conCern for
chemical protection for the population
would be relied upon to make the concept
work. Only then can we minimize evacua-
tion distances while rapidly clearing the
NFZs 'and roads in between for action.
Conduct of the thinned fom'ard defense
in the CFA. The covering force operation
changes little in concept from conven-
tional warfare except that supporting ar.
tillery firepower has been significantly
enhanced. A subsequent section of this
article suggests that the two major dif-
ferences are to increase delay times from
12 to 24 hours' to 48 to 72 hours while
severely attriting attacking forces. For
these reasons. it is reasonable to believe
that the corps commander would assume
direct control of the covering force battle
and the corps artillery commander would
assume direct control of all artillery. air
and nuclear fires within the CFA.
Responsibility for organization and oc-
cupation of the MBA would be delegated
to deputies. In addition. the deputy corps
and corps artillery commanders would
have the responsibility of fighting the
longrange interdiction battle throughout
the depth of the front attack. with special
emphasis on the second-echelon divisionsi
The armored covering force provides
the principal mobile eyes and ears of the
corps commander on the major axes of ad-
vance- in particular. those connecting or
bypassing cities. While normally occupy-
ing and fighting from alternate delay
positions. reinforced company or troop-
size units momentarily occupy principal
delay positions. With artillerv-delivered
minefields. they force Warsa;' Pact ad-
vance guard battalions to stop or to move
off the roads, deploy and prepal"e to at-
During these short time periods and
before pact nuclear delivery means can
respond. one or two tank. motorized in.
fan try or artillery battalion-size targets
on each axis would be engaged in rapid
succession with ER weapons. Under
cover of the resultant confusion, the
covering force continues the delay. or
launches local counterattacks to take ad-
vantage of nuclear shock effects and max-
imize destruction and then continues the
The potential nuclear targets would
have been passed along ("handed off')
from OP team to OP team with the sup-
porting 8-inch howitzers in pOSItion.
ready to fire at a preplanned DGZ on
order. After firing, the howitzers rapidly
displace to alternate surveyed positions
at least 500 meters away within two
minutes to forestall counterbattery and
chemical fire.' At the alternate positions.
the same sequence is repeated to attack
follow-on targets. impeded by first-strike
blowdown. prior to withdrawing to the
next principal delay position. Lance
missiles interdict long-range, stationary
targets that are reported by bypassed
The dispersed. single-piece. artillery
concept is consistent with current
thought that battery positions may be
out of date.' An unanswered concern is
that such single-piece operation may not
survive the Warsaw Pact helicopter
assault wave preceding advance guard
elements by up to 50 kilometers.
Conduct of the thinned forward defense
in the MBA. To place the CFA battle in
perspective. a brief description of the
MBA is warranted. The forward defense
of this area is characterized by mecha-
nized infantry with antitank guided
missile and divisional armor camouflaged
and dug-in. with overhead protection in a
checkerboard pattern between built-up
areas as suggested by Steven Canhy."
prepared for tactical nuclear war.
Separate infantry units would use the
strength of built up areas for com'en-
tional defense."
The checkerboard would be occupied by
company or reinforced half-size company
teams with up to 3 kilometers between
positions. Exact spacing would depend on
the smallest vield Soviet tactical nuclear
weapon. The- infantry strongpoints and
alternate strongpoints would be orga
nized into an antitank ambush network
up to 20 to 30 kilometers in depth I n-
filtration routes between the strong-
points would be presurveyed for ER
weapon strikes similar to the.CFA but
with fire control wholly hy troops occupy-
ing the MBA. The concept for the
organization of and the battle for the
MBA is to make it nonproductive for the
Warsaw Pact to use tactical nuclear
weapons and. if they are used. to bave
such use significantly impede forward
movement and make better targets while
minimizing NATO losses.
The major armored elements (divisions)
supporting each NATO corps would be
located behind the antitank ambush net
work in dispersed. camouflaged and pro-
tected reserve positions prepared to'
counterattack in support of the main line
of resistance and. ultimately. to be part of
the counteroffensive to eject pact forces
out of the Federal Republic of GErmany
(GE). This is the principal goal of a NATO
nuclear war-fighting capability!
War-Gaming the Covering Force Operation
The proof of a concept lies in its testing.
One way to preliminariiy test the pro
posed concept of covering force opera-
tions supported with ER weapons is to
field test elements of the operation on an
instrumented course, simulating nuclear
casualties by computer. Then, war-game
the entire scenario and compare the
results with conventional operations.
From the war game, one can estimate the
delay inflicted on the Warsaw Pact ad-
vance and the tank losses On both sides
for all typical applications in NATO
The basis for war-gaming a US corps
covering force operation in the Fulda Gap
is given in this section, and a narrative
description of the battle based on the war
game is given in the next section. How
ever, note that there is a strong possibil
ity the pact would strike wholly north of
the Fulda Gap to avoid striking US
The war-gaming method used here was
adapted from the method developed by
Colonel T. N. Dupuy and his associates.
The latter method and war game results
for conventional covering force opera
Lions are given in his book, Numbers.
Predictions and War." The Dupuy
method compares "the relative combat ef
fectiveness of two opposing forces in
historical combat by determining the .in-
f1uence of environmental and operational
variables upon the force strength of the
two opponents" and then compares their
combat power ratio "to a quantification
of the actual outcome of the battle."
The method was used successfully to
measure battle results for phases of the
1973 Arab-Israeli War. While there may
be controversy over any war-gaming
method, this method was chosen for its
simplicity of use, comparison purposes
and ready adaptability to the proposed
concept of covering force operations.
The scenario for the war game assumes
a surprise, conventional attack, from a
standing start, by a Soviet combined
ar,ms army followed by a second-echelon
tank army. The attack is on a 75-kilo-
meter front near the Fulda Gap held by a
US corps covering force of a reinforced"
armored cavalry regiment. The combined
arms army, supported by an artillery
brigade, has assembled near the inter-
German border and makes its advance in
two echelons. on a wide front, prepared
for a meeting engagement and fighting
under nuclear war conditions. The tank
army. supported by an artillery brigade,
is ready to follow up the attack from
home stations in the Leipzig-Dresden-
Cottbus area.
The depth of the CF A is 30 kilo-
meters," and the Soviet objective is to
seize and secure Frankfort on the Main
and the bridges over the Rhine River in
the vicinity of Mainz. All tables of
organization and equipment (TOE) have
been updated. and all units are assumed
to be at 100-percent TOE strength. The
assumed Soviet and US covering force
dispositions are depicted in Figure 2.
Under somewhat similar conditions of
conventional warfare, Dupuy would an-
ticipate that, in a main attack situation,
the US covering force could effect a delay
of one-half day, while losing 19 MBTs,
compared to a loss of 31 Soviet MBTs.
To adapt the Dupuy war-gaming
method to covering force operations sup-
ported with ER weapons, the following
mechanistic time-space model was used:
The CF A was organized as pre-
viously described with OP teams selec-
tively scattered throughout and with
center-to:center distances of 2 to 4
US-Soviet Dispositions at Fulda Gap
1st Echelon
First Guards
Tank Army
2d Echelon

Eighth Guards
Combined Arms Army
1st Echelon

I--f I-f 1--1 1---1 I-f 1--1 1--1 1--1
1-1 Inter-German
x V V
x x
Main line
of Resistance
0 10 20
Scale: ,
Figure 2
kilometers and in a ratio of 6-to-3-lo-1.17
OPs overrun by deploying advance guard
units were removed from problem play.
No credit was given for stay-behind ac-
tion, long-range antitank interdiction
fires or chemical warfare. The Soviet divi-
sions advance on a standard frontage of
16 kilometers. Four regiments are
abreast, each regiment in a column of bat-
talions in the characteristic tactical
march configuration shown in Figure 3. A
nuclear war distance between vehicles
(100 meters) and companies (300 meters)
and an interval between columns (4 kilo-
meters) is maintained."
Each regimental axis of advance is arbi-
trarily shown as a straight line through
the CF A. Typically, the march length of a
division advancing in four columns with
nuclear dispersion is 100 to 110 kilo-
meters compared with 60 kilometers with
conventional dispersion. Primary delay
Pact Division Tactical March Formations
Nuclear Dispersion

0 .0'
-- -- ---
0 0 fROG Multiple-Rocket launcher

-- ---

-- ----

-- -- ----

Motorized Rifle Division

0 0
o ,
-- --
. ---..,

, ,
:c: o.
=-: .
-- -- -----

0 0 FROG Multiple-Rocket Launcher
-- --
---- ---
-- -- ---
Tank Division
Main Force -------> 1
eArttliert Units
X MolortZed nfte IIll1ts
OTank units
Figure 3

1- Guard -I
o 5 10

lines are arbitrarily selected in the attri
tion sector based on one every 10
kilometers. Nuclear subpackages are
developed for each delay line based on
two weapons per axis of Soviet advance.
With divisions advancing abreast,
each corps 5ubpackage would constitute
24 ER weapons. In reality, the number of
subpackages should be based on the attri
tion required to reduce Warsaw Pact com
bat power ratios to manageable levels to
assure that the main battle, and then the
war, can be won!
Between principal delay lines, rates
of advance and conventional losses on
both sides are estimated u,ing the Dupuy
war-gaming method.
At each principal delay line, equip-
ment and manpower losses are assessed
for each nuclear package on the leading
battalion-size targets in their appropriate
deployed Or march configuration. A
target engagement sequence as shown in
Figure 3 and target effects shown in
Table 6 (MR, Jan 19h2, p are used.
Delays are imposed on pact forces to clear
tree blowdown with assigned engineers
and to move supporting units to resume
the attack using conventional timpspace
calculations. Combat power ratios are
recalculated after each nuclear pulse to
account for both nuelear and conven-
tionallosses on both sides.
No nuclear lusses are assigned to
the US covering force. However, a sensi
tivity analysis is made to gauge the illl'
portance of such losses.
Air equality exists, no credit is
given to helicopter assault operations and
the battle for the CFA is assumed to pro
ceed day and night with combat exhaus-
tion and nuclear shock effects accounted
for. The inability to wargame anticipated
Soviet helicopter assault operations in ad-
vance of their advance guard formation
and chemical warfare operations is can
sidered a significant shortcoming of the
war-gaming method used since they are a
major threat to the survivability of the
nuclear delivery means and covering
forces, .
To obtain an insight into the opera-
tional sequence of events. the time-space
factors involved and the losses incurred.
all buttressed with a touch of reality. let
us concentrate our analysis on the cover-
ing force battle in US V Corps sector-in
particular. the batLle of the 11 th Armored
Cavalry Regiment (ACRI-the Black
Horse Regiment.
The Battle of the Black Horse Regiment
To analyze the dynamics of the cover-
ing force battle in perspective. the general
and special SItuation at l\: ATO Center are
woven into a framework-a concept of
operation-as follows:
f)-2 dan. First-echelon divisions of the
Group of Soviet in Germany
(GSFGI and the Southwestern Front in
Cwchoslovakia occupy "maneuver" at
tack positions along the inter-German
and Czech borders.'" Second-echelon divi-
SIons III the German Democratic Republic
and Czechoslovakia are ready to support
the maneuvers from home garrisons. All
reserve (category Warsaw Pact divi
sions in Eastern Europe receive their
mobIlization alert. and NATO issues an
alert warning.211
The G E starts mobilizing its Territorial
Army, and civilians in the CF A and MBA
receive their evacuation alert. Major
N A TO commands in the G E start mov-
ing to operational positions. The 11 th
A CR occupies partially prepared. initial
delay positions in the US V Corps sector
and starts completing preparations.
D-1 day. Most major NATO commands
start closing in the MBA. Key mobile
military nuclear targets have been essen
tially evacuated. Ammunition supply
points start forward displacement. US
dependents and nationals start their
evacuation to ports of embarkation. West
Germans in the CF A and MBA start
assembling in CD shelters. Jagdkom-
mandos of the Territorial Army complete
mobilization and occupation of OPs.
Most tactical nuclear delivery means
complete occupation of operational posi
tions. In the CFA. 8-inch howitzers are
armed with Sub package RED. local
security is established around initial fir-
ing positions and the OPcommunications
network is checked. The commanding
general. US V Corps. assumes direct com-
mand of the covering force in sector.
Night. D-lID-day.21 West Geqnans in
the CF A complet(! evacuation to CD
shelters. Numerous telecommunication
and political centers in the G E are at-
tacked and occupied by leftist groups to
"protest mobilization." Parachute drops
are reported throughout the depth of the
CFA and MBA. ,Reports are received of
bridges blown. sabotage of communica
tions facilities and ambushes at transpor'
tation choke points. Most major military
installations report overflights by high
altitude reconnaissance aircraft. The II th
ACR reports heavy mechanized move-
ment noises east of the inter-German
boundary. Preparation of initial delay
positions is completed.
D-day." At beginning morning civil
twilight" more than 1.000 Warsaw Pact
aircraft supported by SS20 missiles
launch massive conventional and
chemical assaults on NATO air bases.
n,uclear storage areas, and command and
control facilities. Under cover of air
defense artillery shields. 13 lead pact divi-
sions cross the inter-German and Czech
borders on four major fronts.
Preceding the combined arms attack by
up to 50 kilometers are more than 1.000
helicopter gunships" carrying airborne
assault battalions to seize key transporta-
tion points and forestall NATO's mobi-
lization and deployment." Simultane-
ously, two or three Soviet airborne divi-
sions pass through cleared corridors in
N A TO' s air defenses to secure crossings
and facilitate passage over major water
obstacles. The allied tactical air forces are
fighting for survival!
In the 11th ACR sector. advance
guards of three motorized rifle divisions
cross the inter-German boundary (kilo-
meter location 0) at 0500 !local standard
time) in at least 12 columns on all of the
main and secondary roads. Despite the
alert warning. there is still substantial
surprise. The four equivalent advance
guard regiments attack against negli-
gible-toslight resistance with almost
5-to1 combat power odds through rugged
and heavily forested terrain. Supported
by all divisional and combined arms army
artillery. they reach the attrition sector
boundary (kilometer location 10) by 1500.
where their advance parties are stopped
at delay line I.
Only then was the first nuclear weapon
release received from the national com
mand authority. Initiated 10 hours
earlier. the accelerated release recon
firmed preplanned procedures and per-
missive action link instructions" for all
subpackages in the CF A. While advance
guard main forces closed and deployed
from march column to eliminate com-
pany-size opposition. a dozen bright
flashes appeared in the air as a ripple
across the corps sector within minutes of
1600. Bursting 500 feet aloft, with bright
60-meter fireballs which grew into black-
stemmed mushrooms nearly 10 times the
fireball size. the rapidly rising clouds
were followed by rolling claps of thunder
sounding like the distant detonation of
hundreds of tons of explosives.
Within minutes. a second pulse flashed
anew to complete Subpackage RED. In
those brief moments. the Eighth Guards
Combined Arms (CA) Army lost the
equivalent of a tank regiment. more than
a motorized rifle regiment and six bat-
talions of direct support artillery. (For a
graphic display of cumulative main battle
tank commitments and losses as a func-
tion of time and distance. see Figure 4.)
The 11th ACR launched local counterat-
tacks under cover of the resu1ting shock
and confusion and then continued the
withdrawal to occupy intermediate delay
positions. The advance halted in place as
signals f1ashed up through the Soviet
chain of command to Stavka" announc-
ing the new rules of the battlefield.
Main Battle Tank Cominitments and losses'
Fulda Sector, D-Day to 0+4

= <J
'" l-
Commitment Notes
CD Advanced Guard. 1st Echelon D,vISIOns
CD Main Force. 1st Echelon DIvIsions
CD Pas\3ge of lines. Advanced Guard.
2cV Echelon DIvIsions
C!:' Mam Force, 2d [Chelan DIvIsions
CD Reserve. 1st Echelon Army
Main Force. 2d Ecnelon Army
Front Commitments
1.200 D-l 1.200 D2
Figure 4
Front Advance
Subpac'age BLUE
Main Battle Tan. Summary
at End of Penod
Commitments losses
Front: 1.655 728
US V Corps 113 31
1.200 D3 1.200
40 '"
30 ;;;;:
While the Eighth Guards CA Army
waited for reconfirming instructions to
continue the attack, regimental com-
manders pushed to close the 20-kilometer
gap between the division main forces and
the remnants of the advance guards_
Meanwhile, engineers began to bulldoze
disabled tanks and BMPs from the roads
and to clear paths through burning tree
blowdown areas. All the while, the shock
of sickened and seared survivors trickling
back began to lay the latent seeds for
future panic.
There was still daylight when confirma-
tory instructions were received from
Stauka, and the advance continued at
2000." As the division main forces en-
gaged to brush aside remaining
resistance, the fighting continued
throughout the night in three dimensions
as the 11 th ACR was engaged from the
front and rear and from the air. During
this chaos, units which had been
chemicaHy contaminated had to find a
moment's respite to decontaminate, ex-
change clothing, eat and take care of
other natural functions. Sleep was out of
the question. By day's end, Stauka
paused to reckon the new costs. The
Eighth Guards CA Army had lost almost
100 MBTs compared with less than 10 by
the 11 th ACR.
D+1 day. Throughout the Central
Region, the four covering force battles
proceeded as on D-day. Soviet and
NATO troops were intermixed. Dutch
formations from the Netherlands ap-
proaching the MBA by road had their for-
ward movement reduced to less than 100
kilometers per day because of heavy air
attacks and blocked roads and bridges.
Fewer than half of the NATO divisions in
the GE had closed in the MBA.'"
In the US V Corps sector, the Eighth
Guards CA Army's first-echelon division
main forces were advancing in march col-
umn against negligible resistance with
combat power odds of IO-to-l. With
morale significantly affected by the
sights of nuclear devastation, the attack
was tempered by caution. By 0800, recon-
naissance units ran into 11th ACR units
holding strong positions on delay line 2
(kilometer location 22) through the
eastern outskirts of Fulda. As the main
force battalions closed to attack from
march column, minefields momentarily
stopped the leading units, and artillery-
delivered scatter mines fired into the in-
terbattalion gaps stopped or significantly
slowed the following battalions.
Within minutes of 0900, two pulses of
the second Subpackage (WHITE) caught
the tank and BMP-rich columns on the
road. The tank battalions leading the
main force were especially hard hit. With
a single stroke, two and one-half tank
regiments and more than one rifle regi-
ment became ineffective-the Black
Horse Regiment still had a kick! This
time, the Soviet regimental commanders
did not wait for instructions. Their orders
were to ram through at all costs, even
though fatigue was beginning to tell and
the morale of the combat troops had
plummeted to "poor."
By 1300, the way had been cleared of
trees and vehicles again, and, even
though an artillery preparation was fired
to bolster morale, the bulk of the 11 th
ACR had withdrawn to renew the battle
on the next line, to avoid a nuclear
riposte, to attend to serious rear area
security problems and to try to catch
some rest as surprise began to wear off.
CD preparations in Fulda paid off. Even
though heavy concentrations of chemical
agent HCN were fired to dislodge
defenders, civilian casualties were mini-
mal-only those who tried to run.
The 11th ACR again withdrew, offering
but slight resistance against combat
power odds of 4-to-1. But the Eighth
Guards CA Army commander had al-
ready read the handwriting on the wall.
He ordered his two concealed second-
echelon tank divisions to be prepared to
close the 40-kilometer gap separating
them during the hours of darkness. D + 11
D+ 2. and to pass through at 0400 to con,
tinue the attack. By day's end. Stavka
had cause to reprogram its war-gaming
computers to reflect the changing correla-
tion of forces. '"
The Eighth Guards CA Army had lost
almost 360 MBTs compared with less
than 20 by the lIth ACR" What hurt
most was that the losses were selective-
the combat arms battalions. Three divi-
sions from one army would be out of ac-
tion in a little less than two days of com-
bat. During the night and under cover of
early morning fog and mist. Jagd-
kommando teams applied the coup de
grace to undamaged but abandoned tanks
and BMPs. They also created havoc
among the sleepy Soviet march columns
before melting away into obscurity.
D+2 to D+4 days. Even though four
Dutch mechanized brigades were begin-
ning to close in the Northern Army
Group sector on D + 2. it would take two
more days for the two Belgian brigades to
arrive and another week or more for the
Danes. the French First Army (less II
Corps) and the first of the airJifted US
pre-positioning of material configured to
unit sets (POMCUS) divisions." Satellite
reconnaissance showed rail movements of
tank and motorized rifle divisions toward
the Central Region from Hungary.
Poland and all of the Western Military
Districts of the USSR."
NATO started to fight the interdiction
"Battle of the Railroads"" with vintage
F111s from Britain. All of the major
N A TO commands preparing positions in
the MBA were also fighting rear area
security missions throughout the MBA
and in the CF A as well. Thanks t ~ the
West German evacuation policy. chemi-
cal warfare casualties to the civilian
population were light. By' day's end.
Stavka had committed 10 tank and 14
motorized rifle divisions to the battle for
the CFA in e n t r ~ l Region."
In the US V Corps CFA. the first-
echelon So';iet divisions halted at 0300 to
prepare for and support the passage of
one Soviet and one East German tank
division." This day marked 'the .first use
of Warsaw Pact troops other than Soviet.
In eight columns. the division advance
guards started the passage of lines (kilo-
meter location 28) just before 0400 sup-
ported by all the artillery of the army.
During the night. all of the 8-inch
howitzer nuclear delivery means had been
displaced to final positions in front of the
main line of resistance. and SUbpackage
BLUE had been distributed to gun posi,
tions in preparation for such an un-
scheduled event. The congestion made
targets too good to miss! Before the ad-
vance cleared the forward edge of the bat-
tle area. it was stopped deaa in its tracks
at 0400 as two pulses of Subpackage
BLUE. a total of 24 weapons. ripped
through its ranks.
The commanding general, Eighth
Guards CA Army. did not need to wait
for casualty reports. He saw and heard
what had happened in the dazzling
flashes. He commited the second-echelon
tank division main forces without delay.
like meat into a grinder. Not long there-
after. his fears were realized. Between the
stationary motorized rifle divisions and
the tank division advanced guards. he
had lost the equivalent of another tank
and motorized rifle regiment and two bat-
talions of artillery.
Note that. at this point. if the depth of
the CF A had been only 30 kilometers. the
Eighth Guards CA Army would have
been approaching the main line of resist-
ance of the MBA and preparing to break
in. Since this article analyzes a CF A with
a depth of 50 kilometer.s, the narrative
proceeds on that basis.
Little did the commanding general,
Eighth CA Army, realize that the last of
troops would be hit again at kilo-
m cation 35 at 1000 (16 weapons of
Subpackage GREEN at delay line 4).
There, he was to lose another four to five
tank battalions and two battalions each
of motorized rifles and artillery. D + 2
days marked a major decision point-
"the point of no return"-for the army
and front commanders.
By now, the second-echelon tank divi-
sions had been coming under long-range,
laser-guided, rocket-assisted projectile
155mm (Copperhead) and 8-inch howitzer
fires from US V Corps artillery occupying
the MBA. The outlines of the MBA,
beyond kilometer location 50, were being
filled in by Soviet long-range air, ground
and satellite reconnaissance.
Quick estimates by the commanding
general, Eighth 'Guards CA Army, indi-
cated that to continue with the attack
unreinforced would be against slight-to-
moderate resistance with combat power
ratios of less than 3-to-l. To close on the
combat outpost line (COPL) under these
conditions would take more than 24 hours
of increasingly difficult fighting, fighting
day and night, to reach the close defen-
sive fires around 1600 the next day
(D+3). If he committed the remaining
army reserves to the attack, there would
be some additional delay in continuing
the attack, but the attack would close on
the COPL faster and somewhat earlier-
at approximately 1400.
With that timing, the commander
hoped to drive in the COPL before dark
and have the protection of proximity to
US forces to forestall nuclear attacks
throughout the night. However, the
strength of Eighth Guards CA Army
would be inadequate to pry open the US
V Corps main battle position unless the
planned, suprise nuclear attack was, in
fact, ordered by Stauka or the attack was
reinforced by the First Guards Tank
Only the commanding general, GSFG
Front, and Stauka could answer these
questions. Some were easy. The First
Guards Tank Army, with leading ele-
ments initially 120 kilometers east of the
inter-German border, had been displacing
forward each night approximately 40
kilometers. It would be prepared to rein-
force the attack earlY' on D+4 days, but
there were no troops following its first-
echelon divisions. The Stauka Reserve
from the Western Military Districts had
been programed to follow the main axis of
advance in the direction of Hanover-
Ruhr. Even if its rail movement be
redirected, it could not start reinforcing
the GSFG Front earlier than D+ 10
Stauka war-gaming computers" con-
firmed that the Eighth Guards CA Army
could close on the COPL by (D+3) 1400
after committing the army reserve. The
accumulative army losses until then
would total more than 700 MBTs and
11,000 prompt combat deaths, barring
any additional nuclear strikes, compared
with 30 tanks and 600 casualties for the
11th ACR.
If the US V Corps main battle position
could be infiltrated rapidly without tac-
tical nuclear weapons support, the war-
game computer suggested the corps front
held by the 8th Mechanized and 3d Ar-
mored Divisions abreast could be pene-
trated with moderate resistance and a
2-to-l combat power ratio at a rate of 3
kilometers per day. The 25;kiIometer-
deep main battle position could be over-
run in approximately One week (by D+12
days), but not before it could be rein-
forced by French First Army ( _).38 I f held
by the two divisions echeloned in depth to
50 the front could be
penetrated with slight resistance and a
3-to-l combat power ratio at a rate of 7
kilometers per day. The whole position
could also be penetrated in a week (by
D + II days), but not before the arrival of
French reinforcements.
Continuing the attack with conven-
tional means would only work if the
Stavka Reserve were committed on the
Eisenach-Frankfo_rt axis instead of the
main axis in the north. Continuing the at-
tack with tactical nuclear means would be
a gamble even though pact forces might
be safer intermingling with US V Corps
forces in the MBA.
Stavka estimated that pact forces in
the Central Region would be down 3,500
MBTs at the start of the break-in battle
out of the 7,300 tanks committed by
then," plus 55,000 prompt and 8,000
delayed deaths! These losses could not be
compared with NATO losses of 100 to
200 tanks and fewer than 3,000 military
casualties. The Warsaw Pact was quickly
losing the correlation of forces needed for
a quick victory. Moreover, the entire CF A
was now a seething quagmire with more
than 30,000 bypassed Jagdkommandos
cutting at the logistical arteries needed to
speed forward movement.
The following principal decision choices
lay before Stavka and the Presidium at
this "point of no return ":
Stop in place, dig in and negotiate a
peace with NATO under threat of
bilateral theater or intercontinental
nuclear war. The latter may not be re-
quired to convince the "better red than
dead" elements of the NATO Alliance.
Stop in place, dig in and wait for full
mobilization and deployment of the cate-
gory 2 (reserve) divisions after D+40"
before resuming the attack with the sur-
prise use of nuclear weapons. .
A combination of the two choices
above is most probable.
Continue the attack with nuclear
weapons, relying on the second-echelon
divisions of the second-echelon armies to
provide the rapid unit replacements to
compensate for escalating but un!mown
loss rates.
All were poor choices. If Soviets
had read "The Battle of the Black Horse
Regiment," they would have recognized
the real deterrent value of the ER
weapon-Kommando system! Rommel's __ ..J
Devil's Gardens had become the Devil's
Mushroom Gardens. Several members of
the Soviet Presidium are understood to
have growled, " ... if we only knew then
what we know now .... "
Battle summary. "The Battle of the
Black Horse Regiment" indicates that
ER weapons employed as part of a war-
fighting system can increase delay time
in the CF A from one-half day to two to
four days depending on the depth of the
area. Assuming no pact use of tactical
nuclear weapons prior to the break-in of
the MBA, the Black Horse Regiment in-
flicted tank losses in the ratio of 23-to-l
and prompt casualties in the ratio of
19-to-1. Even if all of the cavalry tanks
had been destroyed, the tank loss ratio
would have been almost 6-to-I.
If one extrapolates the use' of ER
weapons by the Black Horse Regiment to
all of NATO Center, fewer than 400 ER
weapons would have been used in the
CF A -enough to reduce significantly the
correlation of forces during a suprise at-
tack. The cost in collateral damage in the
CF A can be estimated as fewer than
6,000 civilian casualties, less than .1 per-
cent of the population, and fewer than
1,500 square kilometers of mostly wooded
farmland, or 3 percent of the CF A. 41 This
part of the possible tab for effective deter-
rence appears reasonable! The question
is: "Will the Soviets be .deterred from a
surprise attack if they know they cannot
win on the ground in Europe?"
A surprise attack by the Warsaw Pact,
supported with or without tactical
nuclear weapons, is a credible threat to
N A TO Center. This article evaluates the
use of ER weapons as a means to gain
time, save maneuver space and equalize
opposing strengths in the CFA. The
reader has to evaluate the article's prin-
cipal conclusions:
The Soviets believe that the first,
surprise and massive use of tactical
nuclear weapons throughout the depth of
the com bat zone will be decisive and
shorten the war.
A nuclear war-fighting capability
supported with ER weapons makes the
NATO concepts of "flexible response"
and "forward defense" credible. Such a
capability offsets the perceived NATO
weaknesses of armored strength, rear-
ward distribution of forces, ammunition
supply, time to occupy and organize main
battle positions, and the lack of maneuver
space. The assembly of armored reserves
capable of ejecting Warsaw Pact forces
from the GE becomes feasible.
Modern wars have demonstrated
that casualties declined on the battlefield
even as the lethality of firepower in-
creased. The reason is that unit mobility
and dispersion have increased at a faster
rate. In the CF A, the comparative mobil-
ity and dispersion of NATO and pact
forces favor NATO.
Important requirements for an im-
proved nuclear war-fighting capability
are better visual means for real-time ob-
servers to identify and engage moving
The ER weapon is just another
weapon with radiation effects equivalent
to aID-kiloton fission weapon and blast
effects equivalent to, say, a .6-kiloton
weapon. However, blast effects can be
significantly tailored (reduced) by in-
creasing the height of burst from 500 feet
to 3,000 feet. Soil and armor activation ef-
fects are not significant. ER weapons be-
come a "force multiplier" only when used
by a dedicated organization and commu-
nicatiOlis system under optimum condi-
tions of relative dispersion and mobility.
Based on the mating of radar with
the Observer Corps during the "Hattie of
Britain," a corps composed of dual-
purpose observation and tank-hunter
teams of local West German militia could
provide the organization and communica-
tions system to use ER weapons effec-
tively. Such a corps could be bunkered
throughout the CF A and supported by in-
dependent 8-inch hewitzers. Having Ger-
mans as the principal eyes for the nuclear
defense and having an evacuation policy
for civilians should strengthen German
resolve to store ER weapons and to use
them first! The evacuation concept also
minimizes chemical warfare casualties.
The Soviets probably have the capa-
bility to manufacture ER weapons and
have delivery means comparable to
NATO's. However, employed in an offen-
sive role in the CF A, they cannot compete
with the advantages inherent in the pro-
posed defense. They are ahead of NATO
in fielding the T72S MBT with cavity
armor that should provide improved
shielding against neutron radiation as
well as hollow charge missiles.
War-gaming the surprise attack of
two echeloned Warsaw Pact armies
against a typical US corps covering force
supported with four subpackages of ER
weapons shows that delay time can be in-
creased from one-half day without nuclear
weapons' to two to four days with, de-
pending on the depth of the CFA. The
rate at which pact armies penetrate' the
area can be reduced from 60 kilometers
per day to an average of 14 kilometers per
day. Tank losses are in the ratio of
Extrapolating this war-gaming data
to all of N A TO Center, fewer than 400 E R
weapons might be used during the cover-
ing force battle with fewer than 6,000
civilian casualties due to nuclear effects.
Total NATO military and civilian casual-
ties may number less than 9,000 com-
pared with 63,000 pact losses."
The "correlation of opposing
forces" might be so reduced that the pact
forces would either stop in place and
await full mobilization before continuing
the attack or negotiate a cease-fire. A
stronger deterrent-for example. inter-
continental ballistic missile warfare-
might not be necessary! Why escalate if
the ground forces cannot secure the
ultimate victory?" This is the major sell-
ing point for the proposed war-fighting
I n most instances, enough time is
gained by the covering force so that the
main battle positions can be occupied and
adequately organized. Two possible ex-
ceptions appear in the sectors of the
Dutch and Belgian corps. In these in-
stances. mobilization status. the rear-
ward location of main force units within
national boundaries and march interdic
tion by superior pact air power may
preclude timely arrival and defensive
preparations in the MBA. Without time
to organize these sectors fully. POMCUS
reinforcements could not be committed in
time to stop pact penetration of the initial
main battle positions.
I t is evident from this article that
NATO can and must develop a credible
tactical nuclear war-fighting capability.
especially now when its conventional
forces are significantly outnumbered by a
surprise attack .. One way to test the
viability of a war-fighting capability
based on ER weapons is to develop new,
conceptual models for nuclear defensive
operations and then test them with the
best war-gaming techniques. W)1at is not
evident is the need for the "draft" and
replacement/reinforcement and medical
systems to handle the increased casualty
rates inherent thereto. These "personnel
problems ... are more important than
equipment problems. ""
NATO must solve the immense politi-
cal problem of convincing several key
countries" that it is in their national in-
terest to enhance deterrence and offset
some existing conventional arms weak-
nesses by stationing ER weapons within
their borders and agreeing to use them
unilaterally if invaded. Even more im-
portant, it is in their national interest and
'survival to improve their mobilization
and deployment capability on short warn-
ing so as to minimize Warsaw Pact ad
vantages inherent to initiating combat
with a surprise nuclear attack.
What N A TO needs is a new dialogue so
that all concerned can participate in this
vital debate about our real war-fighting
options. But time is not on our side. As
Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping of the
People's Republic of China has stated, the
third world war "will break out in the 80s.
. . . The nex t ten years are very, very
dangerous. We should never forget this
fact. If we should do so, we may fail to
adopt measures and policies to postpone
its outbreak .... " .. Ultimately, actions
will speak louder than words!
1 Colonel Trevor N Dupuy. "Mllitary Weaponr'f-Ho ....
Lethal?," Armv. February 1979, pp 24 25. Major WHllam G Ste .... art
"Interaction of Firepower, Mobility, and DisperSion, MilItary
Review, March 1960, p 3D, R G Shreffler, The Neutron Bomb for
NATO Defense An Alterl"laUve." Orbfs. Volume 21 Number <1
Winter 1978, pp 959-67. and Steven Canby, The Alliance and
Europe Part IV, Militarv Doctrine ana Technology Aldephl Papers
Number 109, The lnternaUonallnstltufe lor Strategic Studies, Lon
don, Eng, 1974, DP 1,42
2 Ronald lewin, Rommel as Military CommanCJer. D Van
Nostrand Co Inc, Prlnceton, N J, 1968 P 167 The Devlrs Garden
consisted of a Wide band of Interconnected defenSive "boxes'
filled with ever)' kind of undergrOund 81!ploSIVe and occupied by
battle outposts .
3 Field Manual 100-5. OperatIOns. Department of the Army
Washington, 0 C. 1 Jut.,. 1976. p 106
4 Spec/a/ammunition supply pomts Current concentration of
nuclear warheadS at a relatlvel.,. few rearward located well
protected but Identified, speCial ammunitIOn supply pOints IS an
open InVitation to pre emptlVe aHack The proposal IS at Significant
vanance ...... lth current doctrine. especlall.,. SI01;e II recognizes Ihe
threat of enemy sabotage or capture by terrOrist groups The con
cept envisages an underground relnforced-concrele vaullllke
structure protected by Ihe latest anti IOlruSlOn deVices and
eqUipped With denial material dispensers for rigid loams that can
fill the vault within minutes Each vaull WOuld Slore the batter.,.
"package" at weapons for the coverlOg force operation Cfor exam
pie. less than 40 enhanced raolallon lEA) warheads) and WOUld be
protected by a secunty platoon There would be
three such faCilities IrI each corps covenng force area tCF Al
PhySical Securlly EqUipment-Research Development and Pro
curement Programs, . First User Brlellng Department of Defense
WashlOglon, DC 27 February 1979
5 General Sit John HaCkett, et at, The Thmj War/a War The
Macmillan Co, N Y 1979 pp 14546 The authors vlsuallle an 10
creased role for the West German Terr!loflal Army A nelwork 01
squads of reserVists, locally drawn and armed ...... Ith ATGW lantl
tank gUided weaponsl, (would be) Incorporated mto the operation
of c.overlng forces along the Irontler The first tier of delense
WOUld comprise a frontier defense almost entirely composed
of Jagd Kommandos Hankhuntlng and skirmishing units}
8aSed on secunty troops, of the home defense
mechanized mfantr.,. brlgOides, but InCluding 115 motoT1zed mfantry
battalions, t50 companies and 300 secunt}' platoons f The MilItary
Balance 1980 1981 The Internallona! Inslltute for Strategic
Studies London Eng 19aO. p 21), appTQ)Clmately 3500 observa
tlon posts lOPs) could be manned USIng OPS with center to center
spacings 01 2, .3 and 4 kilometers In a ratlD 01 6 to 3 101 almost all
of the open spaces between bUilt up areas could be observed but
WOuld reQuire all of the present Terrltonal Arm.,. strength 138,000) to
man them
6 Oems Amyot "The Mlssassauga Saga," J:leport of the
RegIOnal Director Emergenc.,. Planning OntariO Can undated
Dunng a railroad chemical Spill aCCIdent 2110.000 reSidents were
evacuated from 96 square kilometers m a lillie less than 211 hours
7 Colonel T N Dupuy Numbers Prealctlons and War, Babbs
Merflll Co Inc. indIana. lod , 1979, P 178
B LIeutenant General DaVid E Ot! Batter}' POSll1ons Are Out
of Date," Army March '980 pp 57 59 General OU Visualizes
howitzer operation Within battery areas with dimenSIOns of 5000
by 3.000 mElters SuCh a target. conslstmg of nuclear delivery
means. conceivably could lustlfy nuClear counterbattery
Therefore this article envisages smg!e hO .... ltzers operating .... Ithln
a 5,000 by 5.000meler gTld with a battery occupymg an area Of
20,000 by 5,000 meters With thiS disperSion one 8lnch hOWitzer
battalion could adeQuately cover a 60i\Uomeler corps Iront
9 IbId ,
10 SOVIet Army OperatIons lAG 13 U 78 Intelligence aftd
Threat AnalYSIS Center, uS Army Intelligence and Securtt.,. Com
mand, Arlington Hall Station, Arlington, Va April 1978
11 Canby, op Cit
12 Personal commumcatlon from General Frederick J Kroesen
20 MarCh 1980 "In Central Europe urban concrete and steet
across malar allack corndors and adjacent heavll.,. forested hili
country afford the Intantr.,. a ready made system of strong pOints al
WhiCh to block an armored attack or canalize It Into areas where
defending armor can be concentrated for a counterslroke ..
13 Personal communication from General Bruce C Clarke. 211
April 1981 'There IS a strong POSSibility that the RuSSIans would
strike north 01 the U S V Corps for tacllcal and straleglc reasons
The 'trip Wire' of U S ground troop!;> would present an Immediate
challenge to the U S people and the use 01 U S tactical nuClear
weapons WOuld have 10 be approved by our PreSident If the aUack
were against NORTHAG [Northern Army Groupl. thiS mIght be
delayed or never made US V Corps must be read.,. 10 face to the
left early"
11\ Dupuy,op CIf
15 The armored cavalry regiment IS assumed to be remfOiced
wlth a battalion 01 mechanized IOfantr.,. t ...... o battalions of armored
artillery lt55mm self propelled) and an air defen5e art Iller.,. batter.,.
16 Depth ot CF A Even though the depth of the CFA 1M the vlcml
I.,. 01 Fulda Gap IS appro)tlmately 30 kIlometers Ple war game IS
based on the hypothetical model 01 a to,kllomeler trip wIre sector
and a .<10 kIlometer atlfltlOn sector. a total depth of 50 kilometers
The ke.,. vanable IS the number of prinCipal dela.,. lines that can be
established wtlhm the attritIOn sector and thelefore the number
at nuclear packages to be fired The ...... ar game IS based on one
delay Ime every 10 kilometers m a 40 kllomete/ deep sector The
results WOUld be apprOl(lmately the same II there was one prinCipal
delay line ever.,. 5 kilometers m a 20 kilometer deep sector
17 Hackett et al OP CIt and The MIlitary Balance 19801981
op Cit
18 SovIet Army Operations. op Clf. pp 320 and 322 through
'" 19 COlonel Daniel Gans 'Neutron weapons SOlution to a SUI
pflse Attack?-Part I Milltar'l Januar.,. 1982 Figure 1 P
20 Colonel Dantel Gans FIght Oulnumberec and Win
AgaInst What Odds" MIlitary ReView Part I December 19aO Part
II Januar.,. 1981
21 Joseph D Douglass Jr SovIet MJlltdfy Sttategy rn Europe
Pergamon Press Clmsford NY. 1980
22 Gans . FIght Outnumbered and Wtn Agamst What
Odds? MIMarv ReView aD Clf
23 Dutmg June, begInning mornmg Civil tilllllighl m the Fulda
Gap regIon starts bel .... een 0219 and 0228 Zulu local standard
lime IS computed by addlrlg one hour Senior Master Sergeant
Manley J:I Blggerstatt DetaChment 12 5th Weather Squadron
Department of the Au Force 11 August 1980
24 Harold Brov..n Department 01 Defense Annual Reporf-
Fiscal "'ear 1982 5upenntenOent 01 Documents US Government
Pnn\lng Office Washmglon 0 C. 19 19B1 WI!hmlhe pac;t
'1\Ie or SI)( years over 1150 mOdern heavll.,. armed helicopters
were added to Pact torces deplo.,.ed oppostle NATO
25 Douglac;s op ell
26 FM 1005 Operations OP CIt p 109 The suggested nuclear
fire request sequence Initiated by the corps life Support coor
dlnalor up through NATO command channelc; 10 the national com
mand autl10nty and back down, may take as tong as 21 or 22 hours
lor new requests Usmg Identical communication transmiSSIon
limes but Shortened processmg times for prep!anned requests
one can estimate that the release sequence mCludlng the delIVer.,.
system Will take 10 hours
21 Slavlla the headquarters 01 the Supreme SOviet High Com
2a DUring June enOlng evemng CIVil twilight In the Fulda Gap
region ends between 2009 and 2024 Zulu Blggers!aff op CIt_
29 Gans . Outnumbered and Wm' Agalrlst What
Odds? Mil/tar" ReView OP Cit
30 Douglass op CIt pp 38 and 114
31 Gans Fight Outnumbered and Wm Agamsl What
Odds';!, Revlel't op CJt
32 IbId
33 IblG
34 Ibla
35 Ibid
36 'bId
37 Douglass op CIt pp 38 and 114
3B Gans 'Flght Outnumbered and Wm' I\gamst What
OddS? MIlitary ReVIew, op Cit, FrenCh Fm'll Arm}' (less FrenCh 1/
Corps, Assumed to conSist of three mechanized diVISions with 485
main battle tanks Mobllizallon and movement time to US V Corps
sector IS estimated complete by 0 .. 10 days Richard 0 lawrence
and Jeffrey Record, US Force Structure In NATO-An Alternative.
The Brooklngs Institution. WaShington DC 1974 P 105
39 Gans .. 'F'ight Outnumbered and Win' Against What
Odds?," Military Review, op Cit
40 Ibid
41 Collateral damage' Undesirable CIVIlian injuries or matenal
damage by the effects of friendly nuclear weapons' FM 10131 1
Staff Ott/cers' F,eld Manual. Nuclear Weapons Employment Doc
trme and Procedures. Department of the Army. Washington DC,
21 MarCh 1977 Estimates of collateral damage are made by tlslng
the number of Pact diVISions In the flrst,echelon armies
committed to the covenng force battle (Gans 'Fight Out
numbered and Wm Against What Odds?' Military Review, op
Cit) and mal\lng the follOWing assumptions Iwo subpackages of
eight ER warheads are used per diVISiOn tree biowdown controls
collateral effects In wooded areas 130 percent of the total) and
radlatron controls elsewhere In addition, the CIVilian population
whiCh does nol evacuate the nuclear tire lone IS assumed to be
five percent 01 the population of 10 000 or more 176 persons per
square kilometer} It has been observed \duflng evacuations
because 01 natural disasters and transportatIOn accidents) Ihat 5
percent of the populatron ",II! stay behind regardless 01 the
perceIVed riSk M t evenson and F Rahn Realtsllc Est,mates ot
the ConseQuences o( NuClear ACCIdents The ElectriC Power
Research InstItute Palo Alto Calif November 1980 p 18 For com
parlson With early war games In Europe "'IIh fiSSion-type
tactical nuclear weapons, ElI:erCl!ie CARTE BLANCHE provides a
baSIS for thB current belief that tactical nuclear weapons "wllt not
defend Europe. but destroy II '. "In the space of 48 tiours a total of
335 deVices ",ere <ell:ploded: 268 01 them on German territory Ger-
man casual lies. not Including those attributable to residual radla
tlon. were esllmated at between 1 5 and 1 1 million dead and 35
million wOunded" Jeffrey Record, US Nuclear Weapons In
Eurooe The BroO"'lngs InstttutlOn. Washington, DC, 1974' pp
42 To put Ihese four,day bailie losses Into some perspective
recall that, on both Sides, 51 000 were casualties In the three day
battle at Gettysburg. and tl'ley proved the turnIng pOlnl ollhe warl
No modern battle has been as lethal
43 Douglass, op erl.
44 Personal eommunrcatlon from General Bruce C Clarke 24
Apnllg81.op ell
45 Arthur L Gavshon, "Reagan's Hard Soviet LIlla Wornes
Some In NATO." rhe Boston Globe. 24 February 1961 p 11 Bf!
taln West Germany, Belgium Holland, and Norway all ..... Ith active
antinuclear lobbies, have Withheld endorsempf1t of deploying the
neutron weapon' and Bradley Graham, Dutch Are Leading Oam
palgn Against N Weapons, The Boston Globe 24 MiHCh 1981 P 6
The Dutch campaign for nuClear dIsarmament IS led by the Inter
church Peace Counclt SIxty percent 01 the Dutch favor removal of
nuclear weapons from the Netherlands We w<1nl to gel away
from battlefIeld nuclear weapons' said a spokesman 'or Ihe
Dutch Defense Ministry
46 Malar General J l Fant presentatIOn to the Mass Bay
ASSOCiation of the US Army 10 Apfll 1981

Coluncl Danlel Guns. US Armv Res('rt'('
Retlred. is a consultinJ; nuclear erlJ;lnCer 11 ah
Stone & Engmeerma rorporatlOn in
He receIVed a R S from North-
II estern UnH'ersltv. a B B.A and an A! S from
Northeastern Unlllf'r<'ltv and '" a USACGSr
gradu.ate He served on actll'e dut\! III the
pean theater dunng "'orld War II HIS USAR
command assignments mclude dut\' I{ lfh the
94th Infantry DWlszon and the 1R7'th Separate
Infantrv Rnaadc artlcie .. 'FIJ;ht Out
nllmbered and arm' Agam5t Odds?-
Part I and Part II" appeared In the /)ecember
1980 and Januarv 1981 Military Revie ..... s
Military Review Binders. Keep your back issues of the Military
Review in a sturdy, hardcovered binder. Available in maroon
with gold lettering, the binders hold 12 issues and are $7.50.
Orders should be sent to Military Review, US Army Command
and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027.
~ V I W S '
Hedging Against Surprise Attack
By Richard K. Betts
Survival, July-August 1981 (Great Britain)
Is there a solution to the problem of
how to adequately prepare to defend
against a Soviet surprise attack in
Western Europe? Or is there only one pru-
dent solution, to say; Anything can hap-
pen; therefore, be ready for everything?
The problem with this solution, according
to Richard K. Betts. is that, "To hedge
against everything is to commit against
Betts, who teaches courses in defense
policy at both Columbia and Johns
Hopkins Universities and is a research
associate at the Brookings Institution,
says there are only two methods of
making the surprise factor negligible. But
neither method would have much appeal
to Western societies.
The first would be to develop military
capability so superior to any possible
adversary that, even if a large portion of
the military force were neutralized at the
onset, triumph would still be assured
because of overwhelming military might.
The second, as equally effective as it is
unacceptable, would be to maintain such
high levels of readiness, unconstrained' by
a requirement for collective political
authorization to change alert posture,
that minimal warnings or decision time
would be necessary to prepare for com-
All other solutions between the ex-
tremes of not being adequately prepared
to defending when surprised and the
methods postulated above are com-
promises. But compromise is, in effect,
the reality of our current situation in
If past history has taught us anything,
the author suggests, it has taught us that
"warning is a secondary element in the
problem of sUrprise, and that the political
and psychological impediments to
response can be primary." To overcome
political problems, Betts suggests that
political exercises should be conducted to
help familiarize politicians with the types
of decisions to be made and the dilemmas
to be faced just prior to an attack.
Negotiated confidence-building
measures (CBMs) would help to reduce
the likelihood of surprise attack by
restricting force movements and permit-
ting force inspections. The most common-
ly suggested CBMs include: restricting
maneuvers, limiting the scale of troop
rotations, authorizing low-altitude sur-
veillance flights and stationing of inter-
national observers at NATO and Warsaw
Pact installations and at troop entry and
exit points. Other more ambitious CBMs,
such as demarcation of quasi-demilitar-
ized zones near East-West border areas
and the limiting of forces qualitatively
(by functional specialties such as bridg-
ing, signal, engineers, and so forth) rather
than quantitatively, have also been sug-
Another method of hedging against
surprise attack is to revitalize intelligence
reporting and analysis systems. One aim
would be to allow for a more formalized
and institutionalized dissent. Varying
opinions of warning indicators. would be
ensured proper evaluation.
In the final analysis, hedging against
surprise will always be difficult. In sum-
mary, he states, "In principle, defense
posture and doctrine premised on the like-
lihood of suprise should dissuade an
enemy from attempting a surprise attack;
it means that surprise would be no sur-
The US Rapid Deployment Force
By Edgar O'Baliance
Foreign Affairs Research Institute,
October 1981
Four years after its inception, the US
Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) is stilI
not a reality. Conceived as a force to
preserve uninterrupted access to vital
Persian Gulf oil and to deter Soviet in-
tervention in the Middle East, the RDF
has been plagued with problems from the
Edgar O'Ballance, well-known English
author and Middle East expert, believes
the major problem is one of distance from
the United States to the gulf regiqn. How
does one quickly transport and supply a
force more than 7,000 miles from the
United States? Frankly, the United
States lacks the transport aircraft to ac-
complish the task. For example, it took
six days to complete the movement of a
900-man infantry battalion from the
United States to Egypt in the autumn of
1980. Reliance on naval transport is also
not very promising. For such a unit, time
is of the essence, and the length of time
needed to assemble, load and sail would
be considerable.
To employ a force of division strength
would require, according to Department
of Defense estimates, at least three
weeks. On the other hand, the Soviets
possess the airlift capability to transport
the assault echelons of three divisions
simultaneously. In addition, most of the
US. Fleet is already earmarked for other
roles such as with NATO in Europe. Even
if more ships were available, they could
not be manned b.ecause of shortages of
naval personnel.
One alternative O'Ballance in-
vestigates is the pre-positioning of a por-
tion of the RDF, or at least the supplies
and equipment, in a friendly Middle
Eastern state. According to O'Ballance,
the manner in which the United States
announced the establishment of the force
and the implication that these states were
compliant satellites upset the highly na-
tionalistic Arab states. Moreover, the US
secretary of state, in his trip to the area
earlier this year, was rebuffed by the
Arab leaders for asserbing' that the
Soviets were the main threat to the
Middle East. In their opinion, Israel, not
the Soviet Union, ~ p r s n t s the primary
security threat. In any case, no
agreements were signed allowing US
bases in the area.
Other problems noted by a 'Ballance in-
clude interservice rivalry over composi-
tion and domination of the RDF. Al-
though the RDF is now a "completely
separate command," one should not ex-
pect that the rivalry will subside. "Over-
flying" permissions from neutral states
could constitute another problem for a
US-based RDF. Acclimatization will pre-
sent an additional obstacle. Finally,
O'Ballance believes that the RDF must
adopt a small, light, highly maneuverable
armored vehicle such as the Mobile Pro-
tected Weapon System of the Marines or
the M113, especially since the RDF will
be forced to use maneuver warfare tac-
tics. The 60-ton MI main battle tank will
not fill this role.
Besides recommending that the United
States establish a Fifth Fleet in the In-
dian Ocean with pre-positioning of "ware-
house" ships at Diego Garcia for the
RDF, O'Ballance concludes by in-
vestigating the possibility of inducing
countries like Great Britain and Turkey
to join the RDF. Such an international
RDF would certainly reduce the "dis- ,
tance and bases" difficulties. One would'
also hope that the next four years would
see greater progress than the preceding
four. Certainly, for the past four years,
the West has been "stretching its luck"
by experiencing no shutoffs in its Middle
- East lifeline and by no credi-
ble deterrent force in this very sensitive
Donald E. Nease,
Combined Arms Combat Devetopment Activity
The Ultimate Battleground:
Weapons in Space
By Gerald Steinberg
Technology Revtew, October 1981
Does the current space shuttle program
represent a new and awesome lead for the
United States in the development of anti-
satellite space :weaponry, or is this
capability being greatly exaggerated? Ac-
cording to Gerald Steinberg, who has
served as a consultant to the Department
of Energy and the Congressional Office of
Technology Assessment and is now a
postdoctoral fellow in the Arms-Control
Program at the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology Center for International
Studies, "The strategic value of space
weapons is generally overstated and the
risks and technological obstacles to their
deployment trivialized."
Steinberg believes that current
technology in this area is relatively un-
sophisticated and that the costs of
deploying effective systems make them
impractical for the foreseeable future.
Despite this, however, he claims that
both the United States and the Soviet
Union are currently spending large sums
of money on both research and develop-
ment in this area.
Initially, the United States entered the
space weapons field in 1957 by funding an
antisatellite program called SAINT
(satellite interceptor) in response to fears
that the Soviets were developing orbital
bombs, satellites and antisatellites to
"seize the high ground of space." The
Soviets similarly began an antisatellite
program as a reaction against US sur-
veillance satellites. The Kennedy admin-
istration canceled the anti satellite pro-
gram and the Soviets diminished their an-
tisatellite development when it became
obvious that a new and unproductive
space race would soon follow if this effort
continued. Both sides seemed content to
use space satellites for both surveillance
and communications purposes only.
In 1977, however, Secretary of Defense
Harold Brown reported that the Soviets
had developed an anti satellite capability,
and US efforts in this area began. Prior to
that time, the only reaction to Soviet anti-
satellite testing was defensive and in-
volved the "hardening" of satellites.
The US antisatellite effort centers on
the miniature homing vehicle (MHV).
This device destroys its target by
ramming into it. The Soviet program
generally involves the launching of anti-
satellite vehicles in close proximity to
targeted satellites and detonating their
antisatellites in order to destroy or
disrupt the targeted satellite.
Beyond these rather unsophisticated
systems are the directed-energy beam
and the space shuttle. The directed-
energy beam has the advantage of being
reuseable and possibly more flexible in
use. The problem is, at the current state
of the art, the system would be relatively
easy to defend against and its effective-
ness is questionable. Although the
Soviets have been doing more research in
this area than the United States, there
has been minimal success with this
system thus far. .
The US space shuttle also has its limi-
tations as an antisatellite vehicle. First, it
is not capable of operating effectively
beyond about 960 kilometers. Many
Soviet satellites now operate at greater
orbital heights. Also, the limited maneu-
verability of the shuttle curtails its effec-
tiveness as a satellite hunter. The only
possible use of the shuttle at this stage
might be as a vehicle for launching M HV s
into target orbits. This would give the
United States a capability comparable to
the Soviets in this area.
The age of sophisticated space weaponry
has not arrived yet. Possibly, what is
needed is a new treaty to limit the
development and deployment of anti-
satellite systems in space. This is a possi-
bility which could save both sides much
needless spending and unnecessary risks.
The MX and American National Defense
By Professor Andrew C. Tuttle
National Defense, September 1981
There is almost no question in the
minds of nuclear strategists that the
United States needs the MX intercon-
tinental ballistic missile (ICBM). The
question is: Which mode of deployment
for the MX will be the most effective,
least costly and quickest to implement to
meet US defense requirements?
According to Professor Andrew C.
Tuttle, chairman of the Department of
Political Science. University of Nevada,
Las Vegas, the only mode of MX deploy
ment which meets all the above criteria is
the Multiple Aimpoint System (MAPS).
This mode of deployment, however, may
not be under consideration because, if
adopted, it would be in violation of the
SALT II accords. Are there any viable
Tuttle discusses several alternatives
and briefly discusses why the United
States may now be presenting a "window
of vulnerability" to the Soviets. In this
regard, he believes this has occurred
because the US arms control advocates
sought peace and security through arms
limitation treaties, accords and
agreements while the Soviets were en-
hancing their strategic capabilities.
When the SALT process began in 1968,
the United States held the strategic edge.
By 1980, the Soviets had dramatically ad-
vanced their strategic capabilities and
had deployed extremely accurate SS18
and SS19 ICBMs. They now have the
capability to put most of our Minuteman
and Titan silos at risk.
The 200 MX ICBMs will be an effective
deterrent force, but time is a critical
factor. The deployment mode adds con-
siderably to the time required to deploy
the MX. Several alternative deployment
modes are currently being considered.
Initially, the Air Force proposed and
tentative presidential approval was given
to a land-based mobile system called the
"race-track." Under this proposal, each of
the 200 MX missiles would be located in a
large oval cluster of 23 vertical or hori-
zontal protective shelters. This would
overwhelm the Soviet capability by
presenting 4,600 MX targets plus
Minuteman, Titan and sea-launched
ballistic missiles. In 1980, this system
was shelved in favor of the "drag strip"
or linear deployment mode. Although
just as effective as the "race-track," it
would save two billion dollars. Deploy-
ment of either system would take approx-
imately 10 years following a goahead
Another method of MX deployment is
the Shallow Underwater Mobile (SUM)
system. In this proposal, two MX
missiles in waterproof containers would
be strapped on the sides of small. slow-
moving submarines. It would be less ex-
pensive than land basing and would not
impact negatively upon the environment.
The problem with SUM is that existing
submarines and even sea-launched
ballistic missile submarines, such as the
Trident, would require extensive struc-
tural modifications. Deployment of this
mode would be delayed until the 1990s.
MAPS is the most feasible deployment
mode and would cut the "window of vul-
nerability" to a minimum. In this mode,
several or as many as 23 vertical silos
would be built for each MX ICBM and in-
tegrated into the existing Minuteman
force. This mode would present the
Soviets with as many targets as the
"race-track" basing, and deployment
could be accomplished in a relatively
short period of time. The existing com-
mand and control centers of the Minute-
man sites would be used, and the cost of
this system would be far less than either
SUM or "race track. "
The primary problem with MAPS is
that it is in violation of the SALT II ac-
cords which o u n t ~ missile launchers. But
the world has changed since the signing
of SALT II, and the new administration
has indicated its willingness to reopen
arms limitations agreements. Rather
than discarding MAPS, it should be con-
sidered since it may be consistent with
future agreements.-SIK.
These synopses are published as a service to the readers. Every effort is made to ensure accurate
translation and summarization. However. for more detailed accounts. readers should refer to the
original articles. No official endorsement of the views. opmions or factual statements in these
items is intended or should be inferred -Editor.
New Voice Security System. A new voice scrambler that pro
vides a high level of tactical security for Manpack and mobile
radios has been developed by Datotek Inc., Dallas, Texas.
Called the DNV630, the system can be applied to all narrow-
band radio channels including single side band and high, very
high and ultrahigh frequency radios.
The new scrambler unit interfaces easily to all standard
Manpack radios and draws power from the host radio or an
optional power pack. The cryptographic strength of the
scrambler is derived from both time and frequency-processing
techniques controlled by Datotek. Up to eight separate codes
may be loaded in the DNV630 front panel key pad.
The scrambler's memory is internally powered for 30 days'
retention of codes and is also equipped for automatic erasure.
Inadvertent clear transmissions are not possible with the new
unit. The DNV630 shuts down and sounds an alert tone In the
operator's earpiece rather than transmit an uncoded signal.
Emergency clear transmissions are possible through a clear
voice override feature regardless of the code setting.-Military
Technology and Economics, 1981.
First Firepower, Then Maneuver
I am encouraged by Captain Anthony
M. Coroalles' article, "Maneuver to Win:
A Realistic Alternative" (Military
Review, September 1981). It is good to
see our bright young officers tackling our
most serious war-waging challenges. He
is a military reformer true to the contem-
porary school. His footnotes touch all the
intellectual bases associated with that
school of thought.
Few would disagree with the main
premise: We cannot rely on a pure fire-
power-attrition strategy to overcome the
Soviets in modern theater war. Nor can
we depend solely on modern weapons and
centralized command and control to
"service" targets on the road to military
Yet Coroalles and the military re-
formers do a disservice to today's mili-
tary by creating and fostering the
misconception that US military forces
base their war-fighting concepts on fire-
power attrition to the exclusion of all else.
The military reformers have seized on the
unfortunate statements in the current
Field Manual 100-5, Operations, July
1976, to make a contrasting case for the
benefits of "maneuver."
Most disturbing of all is the absence of
counterpoint or balance in this important
debate. As a result, the military re-
formers are making much headway in
Congress, in the press and even with the
public. The major casualty of this one-
sided debate is confidence in military
leadership. We are beginning to see this
eroding confidence manifest itself in thj'!
second thoughts Congress is having over
proposed increases in military spending.
How many times have you heard some
congressman say, ''I'm all for a strong
military, but I want to make sure we're
not spending Our defense dollars in a
mindless way: more, more, more."
Frankly, today's US military fighting
concepts are based on a mixed maneuverl
firepower-attrition approach. In the
mid-1970s, this balance began to emerge
as military planners realized annual
defense spending was in a chronic down-
trend and we would be unable to match
the Soviet military buildup. As a result,
new groups began to appear in the US
military apparatus. Known as net assess-
ment groups, these teams began to iden-
tify how best to exploit flaws in Soviet
doctrine, concepts, fighting organization
and weapons. Much of this vulnerability
assessment is classified, but it is the basis
for fielding and integrating these capabil-
ities into our fighting forces. "Maneuver"
is integral to virtually all of it, be it on the
scale of theater grand strategy or battle
field tactics.
I agree with Coroalles-his three main
concepts should be integrated into our
battlefield tactics. My sense is that much
of it is already there and modest adjust-
ments would accommodate the rest.
However, we should be very cautious
that "maneuver" is not By
itself, it is no panacea. Alone, it does not
hold the solution to battlefield success Or
theaterwide victory. Instead, we must
maintain a balanced perspective, even if
it means doggedly hanging on to un-
fashionable concepts that do not enjoy
contemporary acclaim.
Today's military reformers (self-
acclaimed, I should add) argue that we
should renounce our infatuation with fire-
power attrition and virtually revolu-
tionize our military concepts to favor
"maneuver" in all its forms. This would
seem very reasonable-if it were an ac-
curate appraisal of today's forces. In
large measure, Coroalles' has been swept
up in this reform movement, perpetuat-
ing the misconceptions discussed earlier.
There are three overworked claims that
the military reformers feed to Congress
and the media at every opportunity.
These are:
First, most military officers are
managers not leaders. True, our officer
corps can be more spartan-like. We can
reward warrior-like professional develop-
ment. But we should not delude ourselves
that the bureaucrat, technocrat and
analyst have no place in the modern mili-
tary. They need to be rewarded too.
Second, we should abandon our fixation
with complex, expensive weapons that do
not work very well. Instead, we should
emphasize the human elements of com-
bat. Here, too, the military reformers'
lack of balance shows. Very simply, we
need to put maximum emphasis on both
men and machines. As a nation, we must
not fool ourselves into trading one off
against the other. It is disturbing to see
those who have opposed defense spending
as a matter of course now lining up
behind the military reformers' banner.
We will not be able to overcome the
Soviets in battle by spending less, or even
about the same, on defense while putting
much more emphasis on tactical crafti-
ness. No, we must pursue both very
Third, the military reformers are quite
bold in asserting that smart, thoughtful
soldiers think in terms of "maneuver." It
is a sign that they are literate in military
history. These well-read strategists have
learned all the right lessons from the past
wars, or so it is said. Either the reformers
are truly ill-informed about "maneuver"
in modern military planning, or it does
not suit their purpose to acknowledge the
facts. Granted, there is always room for
improvement, but modest evolutionary,
not revolutionary, reform is in order.
My major message is this. There is no
question that "maneuver" concepts
based on mission tactics, focus of main ef-
fort and command from the front are im-
portant additions to force flexibility. Yet,
when making progress in one area, we
must guard against wholesale abandon-
ment of equally vital combat considera-
tions. We should not embrace "ma-
neuver" at the expense of badly needed
firepower capability. It would be very
easy for firepower capability to become
the "baby" thrown out with the fire-
power-attrition "bath water." This can-
not be a zero-sum game. The military re-
formers are dangerously close to making
it one.
A closer look at Coroalles' scenario
underscores the pitfalls of "maneuver" as
a simple solution to our problems on the
modern battlefield. Granted, the scenario
is designed to illustrate the "maneuver"
concept, and it succeeds in doing so.
However, it begs some questions as well.
Most important, the Blue defenders are
spared the penalties of what Clausewitz
called "friction" -those difficulties that
distinguish real war from paper war.
Clausewitz describes it as "the force that
makes the apparently easy so difficult."
The following questions illustrate the
point: .
What were the real effects of Soviet
long-range artillery which outnumber our
own by 5-to-!? What were the effects of
Soviet radio-electronic combat forces on
the brigade FME (focus of main effort)?
Was there no use of deception by the
Soviets? Did they really march right into
the box canyon and bog down?
Did we have air superiority over the
battlefield from the very outset? Where
were the enemy's frontal aviation aircraft
and Hind helicopters? Were there no
Soviet special forces dropped behind out
lines to disrupt our fire support and de-
fensive coordination?
Did the weather allow our' Cobra-
TOWs and AlOs to attrit 25 percent ot
the attacking forces during the light
covering force battle (pardon my use of
the word "attrit")? Why was Air Force
close air support used only in the covering
action? Would not priority of the brigade
FME warrant timely availability of these
centralized air assets?
Was our Cobra-TOW team really
that available for the timely counter-
attack? Did Air Force battlefield air in-
terdiction prevent follow-on Soviet units
from "passing through" their battle-
scarred vanguard?
Was the flank so easy to find for the
counterattack? Did adj acent Soviet
armored thrusts break through the non-
FME sectors, leaving our brigade FME
as a dangerously exposed salient? Were
our successful defenders in jeopardy of
being outflanked themselves?
As Soviet doctrine suggests, did a
lateral shift to adjacent breakthroughs
occur, making a successful counterattack
pointless? How would the brigade FME
have known this without some form of
communication with his superiors? Was
the brigade FME command post de-
stroyed, delaying a successful counter-
attack? What if the on-scene commander
elected not to counterattack when his
superiors thought he should?
Even without these "frictions." the
brigade FME enjoyed a rather limited
success-restoration of the status quo
line. How valid a concept is this objec-
tive? Can the brigade FME really rely on
timely and full resupply so badly needed
to face a fresh Soviet force tomorrow-or
even tonight? Would the Soviet follow-on
attacks exploit the lessons of their first
True, "maneuver" helped carry the
first encounter (the best possible case, I
should answer), but I cannot help but
think of Lanchester's Equation. We may
be employing "maneuver," but our adver-
sary is likely to employ a mixed maneu-
ver/firepower plan, attriting our forces as
he proceeds. How many encounters could
we stand without a strong firepower base
on which to draw?
No. "maneuver" is not THE answer.
only part of it. We may face a Soviet war
machine that can wear us down in a war
lasting only a few months. The Soviets
know that if they run us out of spare
parts. ammunition and trained soldiers.
we will be hardpressed to outsmart them
with "maneuver"-no matter how smart
we are.
There are times when "maneuver" is
good, and times when firepower is good.
and times when both are absolutely
necessary. We must have the flexibility
to use both concepts.
Thus. there is a danger in being swept
up in the military reform movement too
quickly. If we blindly pursue maneuver as
the "fix" and denounce big. thoughtless
defense increases and hardware-fixation
as the "problems." we are only deluding
ourselves and the public to the peril of us
It r.ol Walter Kross. USAF.
Research Olrectorate, NatIOnal Defense Umversity,
WaShington. 0 C
Letters IS a feature designed expressly to afford our readers an opportunity to air their opinions
and ideas on military tOpICS. It is not restricted to comments or rebuttals on previously published
material but is open to any variety of expression which may stimulate or Improve the value of
thought in the military community.
The right to edIt is reserved by the staff of the magazine and exercised primarily III deference to
available space.-Editor.
~ W S "
The conversion of M60A 1 to
M60A3 tanks'began at the Annis-
ton Army Depot late last summer.
The A3 modification incorporates
numerous technological improve-
ments to this tank that was first
built in the 1960s.
ApproxilT'ately 1,600 M60A 1
tanks will be refitted to the new
configuration by 1986. The conver-
sion includes major changes to the
armaments, fire control, stabiliza-
tion and engine systems and to the
outside structure. About 5,000 line
items (pieces, parts, screws, bolts,
and so forth) and 75 weldment
changes are required for this modi-
fication. .
The 50-ton M60A3 is a full-track-
laying, heavily armored, combat
tank operated by a four-man crew.
The main weapon is a 105mm high-
velocity gun. The tank also has a
7.62mm and a .50-caliber machine-
gun mounted in the turret. A smoke
grenade launcher system provides
the M60A3 with a smoke-screening
capability. There are three modes
of operation for the turret and gun
control system: power with stabili-
zation on, power with stabilization
off and manual.
Passive night vision and thermal
imaging tank sights allow accurate
firing at any time and under all
weather conditions. The tank is
also equipped to protect the crew
from nuclear, biological and
chemical attack. Limited water
fording is possible without the ad-
dition of special equipment.
The Military Review, the Department of the Army and the US Army Command and General
Staff College assume no responSibility for accuracy of mformatlon contained m the NEWS
section of this publication Items are printed as a service to tne readers. No official endorse-
ment of the views, opinions or factual statements is intended.-Edltor.
The Army has successfu lIy
demonstrated the effectiveness of
infrared optical sensors in moni-
toring the reentry of intercon
tinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)
during a flight test conducted over
the Central Pacific. This was the
fourth in a series of progressively
more complex test flights for the
designating optical tracker experi-
ment, generally referred to as DOT.
DOT is part of the Army's ballistic
missile defense (BMD) research
and development effort to provide
viable options for defending the
United States against an enemy
ICBM attack.
The long wavelength, infrared-
optics technology demonstrated
by the DOT experiment is a key ele-
ment in the development of an
overlay defense system capable of
tracking and destroying enemy
missiles above the atmosphere
Overlay is one of the major thrusts
of the Huntsville-based Army BMD
During the test flight, the DOT
sensor monitored the test firing of
a US Air Force Minuteman missile.
Several minutes after the US ICBM
was lau nched from Vandenberg
Air Force Base, California, the DOT
sensor, mounted in the nose cone
of a rocket vehicle, was launched
above the atmosphere from Roi-
Namur Island In the Kwajalein
Missile Range In the Marshall
Islands. From its vantage pOint,
the sensor was able to detect and
record the incoming ICBM target
complex. After successfully
gathering the reqUired scientific
data, the payload carrYing the
sensor was parachuted into the
ocean and recovered.
Boeing Aerospace Company,
prime contractor for the DOT pro-
gram, built the rocket vehicle,
prepared it for flight and con-
ducted the launch. Hughes Aircraft
Company bUilt the infrared sensor,
and Teledyne Corporation furnished
the real-time, on-board computer.
Rockel nose cone used In lesting of designating opticallracker experiment
Nineteen F18 Hornet strike
fighters (MR, Oct 11)81, P 79) have
accumulated more than 4,000
flight hours in development and
production. The 4,000flight-hour
milestone comes just 30 months
after the first Hornet flew in
November 1978.
F18 Hornets, built by McDonnell
Douglas, are flying on both the
East and West Coasts and are
being maintained by personnel of
both the Navy and Marines at
Naval Air Station (NAS) Lemoore
and at Point Mugu, California, and
at the Naval Air Test Center,
Patuxent River. Maryland. The air-
craft at NAS Lemoore are assigned
to VFA-125, the Hornet fleet readi
ness squadron, where Navy and
Marine pilots and maintenance
crews will train.
Seven production Hornets have
been delivered to the Navy for
training and follow-on testing. De-
velopment testing at Patuxent
River is concentrating on some
F18 air-to-ground capabilities, in-
cluding bomb accuracy assess
ment. The Hornet has a variety of
air-to-ground delivery modes in the
Hughes APG65 radar, plus a laser
spot-tracker system for accurate
delivery of laser-guided weapons.
Roll rate improvement tests with
differential leading-edge flaps are
demonstrating the ability of the
Hornet to meet operational re-
quirements for roll or banking ma-
neuvers. The Navy has also com-
pleted all AIM9 heat-seeking Side-
winder missile tactical firings at
the test center. Additional firings
of various armament types will
take place during the Navy's
fighter and attack operational
evaluations sCheduled this year.
The first guided launch of the
Raytheon Company's Advanced
Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile
(AMRAAM) was successfully fired
recently at White Sands Missile
Range, New Mexico. TheAMRAAM,
fired from an Air Force F15, made a
direct hit on an Fl02 drone target.
In addition to the control
system, which was demonstrated
in earlier flights, this test
demonstrated the active seeker
and its ability to acquire, track and
successfully guide to an airborne
The imaging infrared (IR)
Maverick air-to-surface missile
(MR, Jun 1981, p 82) recently com-
pleted the first phase of its devel-
opment and evaluation testing for
the US Air Force with seven of
eight test firings resulting in direct
The AGM65D Maverick, de-
veloped by Hughes Aircraft Com-
pany, was tested successfully in a
wide variety of shots against
tanks, a simulated radar van,
trucks and other ground targets
from A 10 and F4 aircraft. The one
miss was due to a loading pro-
cedure error and was not attributed
to either the IR guidance or opera-
tion of the missile.
The IR Maverick will provide Air
Force tactical air crews with the
ability to destroy tanks, bunkers,
ships, parked aircraft and radar or
missile sites around the clock, in
low visibility or battlefield smoke.
The test shots, designed to explore
representative points in the
missile's flight envelope, were
made during day and night at high
and low altitudes and at various
ranges and aircraft speeds.
Since completion of the initial
test firings, the Air Force has
started a series of approximately
20 more launches of the IR
Maverick to validate the missile's
tactical utility in more combat-like
conditions. The IR Mavericks will
be launched from F16, F111 and
F4G aircraft.
After completion of the final
round of tests, production of the IR
Maverick is expected to begin later
this year.
The first of 12 Westland Lynx
helicopters was formally turned
over to the Federal German navy.
The Lynx helicopters will
operate from the new F122 frigates
curreritly under construction. The
Lynx primary role is antisubmarine
warfare for which a new light
weight dipping sonar, the Bendix
ANIAQS18, has been developed
under a German Ministry of
Defense contract. In addition, the
Lynx, which has a searchand
rescue capability, will be used in a
surface surveillance role.
Germany is one of six European
nations to order the Westland
Navy Lynx. The helicopter is
already operating with the navies
of Great Britain, France,. the
Netherlands and Denmark and will
shortly go into service in Norway.
A total of 307 Lynx helicopters of
all types have been ordered to
date.-Navy International, of 1981
The navy of Uruguay has taken
delivery of three Beechcraft T34C1
aircraft, the international version
of the US Navy T34C primary
Uruguay becomes the seventh
foreign nation to purchase the
T34C1 or its civilian version, the
Beechcraft Turbine Mentor 34C.
Previous purchases of the T34C1
have been by Morocco (12),
Ecuador (23), Peru (six), Argentina
(15) and Indonesia (16). The air
force of Algeria has acquired six
Turbine Mentor 34Cs.
In addition, the US Navy has 183
T34C trainers in its inventory.

AMERIr.AN NATIONAL SEr.URITY Policy and Process by
Amos A Jordan and William J Taylor Jr 604 Pages Johns
Hopkms University Press, Baltimore. Md 1981 $30 00
clothbouod $10 50 DaDerbound
This well-researched survey is an ex-
cellent book that is destined to become a
seminal work on US national security.
The book was almost 10 years in the mak-
ing, but the results certainly have been
worth waiting for. The genesis of the book
was the idea from Dr. Frank Trager who
observed in 1972 that there was a crying
need for a college textbook on US na
tional security. He suggested that two
highly respected strategists on the West
Point faculty. Amos A. Jordan and
William J. Taylor Jr., undertake the task.
They, along with the assistance of many
associates, have provided a primer on the
US security process that is clear, direct,
comprehensive and analytically sound.
An examination of the main books in
the work reveals the major topics which
the authors have considered: "National
Security Policy: What Is It and How
Have Americans Approached Ie'; "Na-
tional Security Policy: Actors and Proc
esses"; "Issues of National Security";
"International and Regional Security
Issues"; and" Approaches to National Se-
curity for the 1980s." This broad outline
provides a systematic approach which
facilitates comprehension both for the
newcomer and the "old hand."
An additional outstanding feature of
the book is that the authors have taken
the time and made the extra effort to in-
clude thought-provoking questions at the
end of each of the 24 chapters. This inclu
sion makes the book ideal for both
graduate and undergraduate use. The
subject obviously lends itself to various
interpretations and conclusions. The
questions at the end of the chapters aid in
clarifying issues .and encouraging varying
points of view.
All analysts believe the 1980s will be a
particularly difficult time in the field of
US national security. The complexities of
today's world, plus growing interde-
pendence. nuclear proliferation, dwindl-
ing resources, the population explosion
and diverse military threats, have im-
posed an awesome burden on decision-
makers. Understanding these challenges
and trying to find ou t "how the pieces
fit" is a responsibility of all Americans.
This book helps in that understanding.
It Gol Robert F Gollins. USA.
Department 01 JOint and Combined DperallOns. USACGSC
1832-1854 by Elinor Kyle Senior 288 Pages McGllIQueen's
UniversIty Press Buttalo NY 1981 $2995
This book, written by Elinor Kyte
Senior. is well-researched and easy to
read. It is an account of the British garri-
son of Montreal at a time when the Cana-
dian nation. was developing its own
unique character following the British
conquest of French Canada and the wars
with America. The British garrison dur-
ing this period had a very significant in-
fluence on most facets of life in Montreal.
Its mixed population consisted of indig-
enous people and emigrants of every
religious difference and from various
social backgrounds in Britain, France and
Montreal had been the French military
headquarters in Canada until 1760 when
the first British troops arrived. Except
for a brief interlude in 1775-76, when it
was occupied by the US Continental
Army, the British garrison remained un-
til 1870 when it was finally withdrawn.
Montrealers of both French and British
origins had fought as comrades in arm to
repel further invasion attempts by the
United States during the 1812-14 war.
Since then, the role of the British garrison
had been seen as purely defensive
although, on several occasions during the
period under review, they were called on
to aid the civil authorities during various
disturbances and even as firefighters.
The author vividly describes the in-
volvement of the garrison in all aspects of
life in Montreal. She states very clearly
the problems faced then by military of-
ficers in providing support to civil author-
ities, a situation exacerbated in Montreal
where the opponents in one situation
became the legal authority in the next.
For example, the Patriotes, who were of
French background' and who were the op-
ponents in the 1838 disorders, repre-
sented the legal authority by the 1848
riots. She graphically describes the other
aspects such as the social influences of
the officers and soldiers, and also the
commercial interrelationship on a small
population supporting a military gar-
I personally found the book fascinating.
The author included several references to
my own regiment which served in Mont-
real during this period. I found close
similarities with the problems faced by
the British soldier in Northern Ireland
when he is surrounded by political un-
certainty and religious bigotry. The priee
and the content of the book suggest it is
not intended for general interest. It will,
however, be of considerable value to
students of Canadian history and to
students of sociology and British military
history. To their specific interests, Elinor
Kyte Senior has made a very valuable
Col Ian R. Cartwright, British Army,
British i a i s o ~ Officer, USACGSC
PATTON'S GAP: An Account 01 the Oattle 01 Normandy, 1944
by Major General Richard Rohmer 240 Pages Charles
SCrlbner's Sons. N Y $14 95
Patton's Gap is a fresh and suspenseful
double-barreled treat for the serious
historian and military buff alike, While
the primary purpose of his book is to set
forth a new answer to the riddle of the
Falaise Gap, Major General Richard
Rohmer accomplishes much more than
this, His in-depth and thoughtfully re-
searched analysis of Generals Dwight D,
Eisenhower, Omar Bradley and George S.
Patton and Field Marshal Bernard L,
Montgomery sheds new light on the
character and command style of each of
these great captains of World War II.
In the starkness of Rohmer's literary
spotlight, serious weaknesses and failures
are revealed in the Allied command struc-
ture at Normandy. Some readers will take
exception to Rohmer's answer as to the
cause for development of a significant
battlefield gap between US and British
forces operating in the Falaise area. Few
will fault his professional, step-by-step
method of historical inquiry into the
Two months after the June 1944 inva-
sion of Normandy, between 200,000 and
250,000 fighting members of the German
Seventh and Fifth Panzer Armies took
swift advantage of the Falaise Gap and
successfully escaped Allied tactical en-
circlement. With units intact, rolling
stock and weapons complete, this major
enemy force fought on and prolonged the
war for many months to come.
In the process of their escape, the flee-
ing Germans were virtually unmolested
by Allied air or ground forces. For 37
years, military historical writers have
been unable to explain satisfactorily how
the gap at Falaise could have occurred or,
once discovered, how a tactical blunder of
that magnitude could go uncorrected for
seven long days. Rohmer's book contains
new and intriguing evidence as to the
Reader appeal of Patton's Gap is two-
fold. First, it is an exciting, of ten-
amusing, adventure story told from a
youthful, minor participant point of view.
At the same time, the book is a skillful
and critical narration, carefully synchro-
nized by' a mature and well-published his-
torian. In both roles, as a 20-year-old
fighter pilot with a cockpit viewpoint of
the Battle of Normandy, and as a distin
guished military writer, Rohmer's creden-
tials are impressive.
In putting his work together, Rohmer
makes excellent use of war-time aerial
photographs, unit logs, situation maps
and never-before-published extracts of
top-level dispatches, directives and
private communications involving the
supreme authorities of both sides_ The
book's interest is enhanced by the inclu-
sion of postwar interviews of surviving
Allied and German leaders during the
Normandy action. Patton's Gap is a
fascinating and absorbing re-look at the
Battle of Normandy and its aftermath.
Maj Gon Stan l MeGlelian. USA. ReUred
OSS: Tho Sacrot History of Amoriea's First Contral Intol-
ligence Agency by R Hams Smith 458 Pages UniverSity of
California Press. Berkeley. Calif 1981 $6 95
The recent issuance of a paperback edi-
tion of R. Harris Smith's ass, nearly a
decade after the first edition, indicates
that Smith's sound scholarship endures.
It also indicates that interest continues in
what Smith calls "the most misunder-
stood bureaucracy of the American gov-
Highly readable because of its anec-
dotal structure, ass valuably adds to the
library of the military professional, par-
ticularly those in the intelligence com-
munity. During World War II, the of ten-
r(,'11anticized ass (Office of Strategic
Services) extended its interests from the
strategic planning in the Oval Office to
the tactical interests of the brave
operatives who worked with partisans-
the Resistance-in guerrilla actions
against the Germans. This range of in-
fluence doubtless contributed to the
diversity of the members of this
fascinating agency. The contrasts make
good reading.
In compiling his information, Smith
used available public sources-CIA (Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency) files were closed
to him-and, more personal
correspondence and interviews with
former ass operatives. These operatives
served not only in Washington near the
strategic decisionmakers, but also close
to the action in such places as England,
France, Spain, Yugoslavia. China and In-
dochina, including post-1945 with Ho Chi
Minh. Their experiences, skillfully
organized by Smith: form the heart of this
book. Not simply "war stories," these ex-
periences show men and women directly
shaping our involvement in the greatest
global conflagration in history.
The influence of the ass did not cease
after World War II. The story of our in-
volvement with Vietnam in 1945 and
thereafter will inform in a necessary way.
Having fought with England for the
liberation of France, the United States-
or so it would seem-should have been
able to rely on those two nations for clear-
headed common purposes in Indochina.
Alas, no side appears to have known or
cared about the foreign interests of the
other two in that tragically battle-scarred
corner of the world. From this confusion
was to result our own no-win frustration
in Vietnam.
In addition to entertaining tales of
behind-the-lines intrigues, there is
another worthwhile element in this book:
the young men and women themselves
who staffed the ass. Of course, there is
the obligatory information about General
"Wild Bill" Donovan. But, beyond that,
we learn of the highly intelligent
graduates of such schools as Harvard and
Yale, of the specially trained linguists, of
the mild-mannered professors who para-
chuted into Nazi-held territory and of the
rich boys-Vanderbilts, Mellons, Du-
Ponts-who peopled the ranks of the
Smith's book did not please some CIA
professionals when it was first published
in 1972; the Vietnam experience was too
close at hand. Perhaps now his book will
renew interest in the direct ancestor of
our CI A, recalling that unorthodox ac-
tions in a time of global war were some-
times necessary, but also reminding us
that peacetime abuse of formidable clan-
destine power today should be an abhor-
rent potentiality.
Lt Col Philip W LBon. USAR
348 Paqes William Mo"ow & CD NY 1981 $695
CANNON FOOOER An Infantryman's life on the Western
Front. 1914-1918 by A Stuart Do'oen 185 Pages Ster'lng
PubliShing CD N Y 1980 $1295
FRITZ' The World War I MemOirs of a German lieutenant by
Fritz Nagel Edtted bv Richaro A Baumgartner 116 Pages
Det Ang"" Publlcallons Hentlngton W Va 1981 $695
Their ranks are thinning fast these
days. More than four million Americans
served in World War I. Today. fewer than
500,000 remain. They are all in their 80s
or older. They remember a war that most
of America forgot long ago.
We forget World War I for a lot of
reasons, not the least of which were
World War II, Korea and Vietnam. Yet it
was the unfinished business of that first
world war that led to the second and may
yet lead to a third. It was the technology
(save the bomb) of that first world war,
perfected in the 1920s and 1930s, that
makes modern war so devastating. The
military and civilian leaders of the future
wars of the 20th century cut their teeth in
the Great War. And the soldiers-the can-
non fodder-made it all possible.
James L. Stokesbury, professor of
history at Acadia University in Nova
Scotia, Canada, has written a masterful
one-volume survey of World War I. Like
his earlier Short History of World War II,
Stokes bury offers the reader new to this
subject an excellent overview. For those
already familiar with the subject, Stokes-
bury's history of the Great War is an ex-
cellent review.
Stokes bury covers the political,
economic and social dimensions of the
war from the 1870s, when the alliance
systems that would ultimately come to
blows with one another formed, through
the war itself to the peacemaking process.
He devotes equally good coverage to the
campaigns and key battles in all fronts,
including the operations in the colonial
territories. And he does not ignore the
human side of war. Throughout, the
author gives us glimpses into the
soldiers' war.
One can read this book seriously or for
pure pleasure. The only flaw in Stokes-
bury's history of World War I is its
graphics. The maps that do accompany
the text are too few and lack detail.
While a survey like Stokesbury's can
provide glimpses of the human side of
war. it can do little more in that capacity
and remain a survey of the overall war.
The reader who seeks a deeper under-
standing of the soldiers' war must look
elsewhere. Recently published memoirs of
World War I soldiers provide the kind of
personal view of that war that a survey
history cannot.
A. Stuart Dolden was 21 when he
joined the London Scottish Regiment in
1914. He was posted to the regiment's 1st
Battalion in France in 1915 and saw ac-
tion at Loos and Hulloch that summer. In
1916, Dolden became a company cook.
Because of (or in spite of) that, he sur-
vived the war and mustered out in 1919.
Throughout his service, Dolden kept a
diary. Sixty years after the war ended,
when he was 86. he returned to his diary
and used it as the basis for Cannon Fod-
Dolden's memoirs provide the reader
with a view of the trenches on the
Western Front through the eyes of a com-
mon British soldier. There are moments
of deep insight as when Dolden describes
seeing a comrade killed for the first of
many times. But. despite these good
features. this book is sadly lacking.
Precisely because of his perspective as a
participant. and perhaps because of the
distance between the events and the
writing. Dolden is unable to distinguish
between the significant and insignificant.
Furthermore. his memoir is almost ex
c1usively descriptive. Only rarely does he
open up and reveal his thoughts and feel
ings about the horror that surrounded
No such flaws mar the memoirs of Karl
Friedrich Nagel who was born in Bremen
in 1892. Like all young men bound for col-
lege in Germany in the early years of this
century. he took a year off from his
studies in 1912 to train in the army. He
spent a year as a "volunteer" in a Hessian
field artillery regiment. In August 1914.
he was called to service. Fritz. as Nagel is
called. served as a private with his regi-
ment as it advanced through Belgiwn and
into France. In October. stricken with
dysentery. he was hospitalized and sent
home to recover. While convalescing. he
recorded his memories of the opening
days of World War I. When he returned
to service. he kept a diarv.
Fritz served on the Eastern Front from
January 1915 to October 1917 when he
returned to the Western Front where he
remained until the armistice. By 1915.
when he resumed active service. the
airplane was beginning to make itself felt
on the battlefield. and the German army
responded by creating a new kind of ar-
tillery formation: the antiaircraft battery.
Fritz joined one of the first "flak" bat-
teries. He rose through the ranks quickly
and received a field promotion to lieuten-
ant in 1916. In 1918. during the March of-
fensive in Flanders. he led a sectiqn of his
battery in a direct-fire assault on an
Australian stronghold in Albert. An hour
later; his section shot down a British
_____ : B ~ O O K S
fighter-a rare occurrence in World War
I. For these actions. Nagel received the
Iron Cross 1 st Class.
Nagel emigrated to the United States
in 1921. Fifty years later. he. wrote his
memoirs using his diary as a guide. The
difference between Nagel and Dolden's
memoirs is the presence of a third party-
the editor-in Nagel's work. Richard A.
Baumgartner edited Nagel's memoirs
with care. He has taken pain to corrobo-
rate the details of Nagel's account. The
result is a thoroughly readable and
fascinating story. Fritz should be of
special interest to several types of
military readers. I t is one of a Iiandful"of
German soldier memoirs in print in
English. It deals with war at the small-
unit level. Nagel gives more than a
description of war as he saw it; he tells
about war as he felt it. Artillerymen will
find his description of his training and of
the evolution of air defense artillery par-
ticularly interesting. I recommend this
book highly.
Unfortunately. Fritz is not available in
book stores. Der Angriff is a small
publishing house specializing in World
War I history. This book is available only
by direct order. Interested parties should
send $6.95 (plus 80 cents postage) to: Der
Angriff Publications; 1024 6th Street;
Huntington. WV 25701.
Historians are rediscovering World
War I. perhaps because they see the link
it has with modern times more clearly
than in earlier years. At the same time.
World War I memoirs. like those re-
viewed here. are coming into print more
The publishing trade too has redis-
covered the Great War. Military men and
women likewise should give this long-
neglected subject a fresh look. I t was war
on a massive scale. fought with new
weapons that few soldiers had hitherto
encountered. Problems of unit cohesion in
the face of mass casualties and unex-
pected changes in the conduct of war dic-
tated by the unanticipated consequences
of faulty strategy and tactics plagued
leaders on all sides of the conflict. Sound
familiar? Next time you start pondering
what the next war is going to be like, con-
sider taking a serious look at the Great
War. The time spent will be well worth
your while.
Maj Robert K Griffith Jr .. USA, Whit. House Fellow
AUSCHWITZ AND THE ALLIES hy Martin Gothe-t 368 Pages
Hott, Rinehart & Winston NY t981 $t595
Much has been published about the hor-
rors of the Holocaust. 1939-45. but Mar-
tin Gilbert's provocative study focuses on
the frustrating efforts to save Jews in
German-occupied lands. Jewish organiza-
tions tried to enlist Allied and neutral
governments in sundry schemes of es-
cape. Clever Nazi ploys deceived the out-
side world into believing that the en-
trapped Jews were being used as forced
labor only. Not until June 1944 was it
learned that European Jewry was being
exterminated and that the principal "kill-
ing center" was the Auschwitz group of
concentration camps in Poland. There,
from May 1942 to January 1945, the
Nazis killed two million Jews and another
two million non-Jews, mostly in gas
During late 1944, endeavors to develop
avenues of escape for the remaining Jews
in Hitler's Europe were intensified, but
only a relatively small number were
rescued. Fear of anti-Semitic reactions by
their own citizens made many Allied and
neutral nations' leaders wary of accepting
refugees. The Anglo-American military
chiefs rejected proposals by desperate
Jewish leaders in Geneva and Istanbul to
bomb the rail lines to Auschwitz and even
to bomb the concentration camps.
Gilbert, who has written three other
books on the Holocaust and a multi-
volume biography of Winston Churchill,
has produced in Auschwitz and the Allies
a moving story based on careful research.
He concludes that:
, .. the failures, shared by all the Allies,
were those ofimagination. of response, of
intelligence, of piecing together and
evaluating what was known, of co-
ordination. of initiative, and even at times
of sympathy,
Although his account is deeply disturb-
ing, it is important to know not only what
the Nazis did to their Jewish captives,
but also what the Allied and neutral na-
tions did not (or could not) do to relieve
their terrible plight.
D, Clayton James, MiSSissippi State University
AFGHANISTAN: Key to a Continent by John C Griffiths 225
Pages Westview Press Boulder, Coto 1981 $2000
John C. Griffiths has traveled exten-
sively in Afghanistan and has used his ex-
perience to produce an excellent book on
the history, particularly the recent
history, of that nation. Although the
author traces the entire development of
Afghanistan from the sixth century B.C,
to the present, he stresses the modern
era, 1 n a particularly fascinating chapter
titled "The Great Game," he deals with
the 19th and early 20th centuries when
Afghanistan stood at the confluence of
British India and czarist Russia.
Subsequent chapters treat Afghanis-
tan's social and economic structures and
significant territorial disputes with
Pakistan. The remainder of the book is
concerned with mid-20th-century history,
stressing the relationship between
Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. A
detailed description of the events which
culminated in the 1979 Soviet invasion is
included. It should be noted that a reader
seeking a comprehensive treatment of
Soviet military operations in Afghanistan
will not find it here. Griffiths confines
himself to a very brief discussion of the
campaign. However, the treatment of the
background to the struggle alone is worth
the price of the book.
Afghanistan: Key to a Continent is a
fine primer on the history and society of a
nation whose future could well be an in-
dicator of the future of all South and
West Asia. It is recommended to the
general reader.
Mal David L. Watkins. USAR
TERROR IN IRELAND: The Heritage of Hate by Edgar
O'Ballance 287 Pages PreSidio Press. San Rafael, Calif
1981 $1495
Only one Englishman has ever been
pope. In 1155, that Englishman, Adrian
IV, issued a papal bull that declared
Henry II of England king of Ireland.
Thus began one of the most complex and
protracted conflicts in history, a conflict
that rarely fails some mention on the
evening news more than 800 years later.
Some 20 miJIion Americans are of Irish
descent, while even more trace their
heritage to emigrants from England and
Scotland. While many Americans are
fascinated by the horror in Ireland, few
are able to sort through the complex
issues to gain an understanding of what is
really happening.
Edgar O'Bailance begins with several
chapters that present a brief, but sti1l
comprehensive and well-written, history
of the Irish conflict up to the 1950s.
These chapters set the scene and provide
the foundation for understanding the
events of the last quarter of a century.
These are then dealt with in detail as
O'Ballance takes the reader through the
violent 1960s and 1970s. He covers the
evolution of the Provisional I RA (Irish
Republican Army) from an activist move-
ment that protested the policy of the
Marxist Official IRA that the time was
not ripe for revolution to a highly secret,
cellularly organized, terrorist group
modeled on the Baader-Meinhof Gang
and some Palestinian organizations.
O'Bailance concludes with an excellent
summary of the demands of the four ma-
j or parties to the conflict. The Prqvisional
I RA, now the maj or terrorist force on the
Catholic side, want the British out of
Northern Ireland so it can pursue its goal
of a united Ireland under its rule. The
Ireland it seeks would be more akin to
Fidel Castro's Cuba than many of its
romantic American supporters would like
to believe.
The people of Northern Ireland are
united in their longing for an end to the
conflict. They are split, however, in their
long-term goals. This, naturally, is the
basis for the current confliCt. The major-
ity Protestants prefer to remain a part of
the United Kingdom. The Catholics, on
the other hand, who compose about one-
third of the population, would prefer
union with the rest of Ireland. Barring
that, they support direct rule from the
Westminster Parliament in the United
Kingdom to domination by the Protes-
tants in a provincial government.
The Irish government is in a difficult
predicament. Although it has consist-
ently sought a united Ireland, Dublin has
sought that goal through peaceful means.
The IRA has never been able to operate
as freely in Ireland as it would like, and,
at times, the I !'ish government has been
as harsh with the terrorists as the British.
Finally, what do the British want? The
government cannot accept a part of the
United Kingdom slipping away any more
than Washington would accept California
or Texas joining Mexico. The people,
however, are weary of the conflict and
fearful of its violent spread to the cities of
England. This creates a tension that is
hard to predict.
O'Ballance is an experienced journalist
and' prolific writer whose more than 20
books and countless articles have sought
to explain modern conflicts in Asia, the
Middle East and North Africa. For those
who seek a rational explanation of events
in Ireland, O'Bailance's Terror in Ireland
is a welcome volume.
Daniel E. Spector. US Army Chem;cal School
This hstmg IS publ.Jshed to bring ne ..... professIOnal books to the attention of rClld('rs Books nre IlvllJiubl(' for re"'lcw purposes to quahfiC!d
profl",!;'lOnalr:. For morc informatIOn. contact Mr Phillip It DB\lI1>, Books Editor, at 1913) 6 8 4 5 6 ~ or AUTOVON 552,5642
Wing Aircraft Since 1917 by Norman Polmar and Floyd 0
Kennedy Jr 370 Pages Naval Institute Press. Annapolis.
Md 1981 $2995
Robert a Neill and 0 M Horner 318 Pages Allen & Unwin
Win chesler Mass 1981 $2850
P Raslulls 95 Pages Canadian Institute of International Af
talrs. Toronto Can 1981 $4 75
FAMOUS SEA BATTLES by David Howarth 185 Pages Little
Brown & Co , Boston. Mass 1981 $2250
THE AMERICAN SUBMARINE by Norman Polmar 172 Pages
Nautical & AViation Publishing Company of Amenca, An
napolls. Md 1981 $1795
JANE'S 1981-82 MILITARY ANNUAL. Edited by Colonel John
Weeks 144 Pages Jane's PubliShing Co. N V 1981
THE GUAROS by John de 51 JOffe 256 Pages Ridge Press,
N V 1981 $2500
FROM THAT TERRIBLE FIELO' Civil War Leiters of James M
Williams, Twenty-First Alabama Infantry Volunteers EdlteO
by John Kent FOlmar 18t Pages UmlJerslty of Alabama
Press University. A!a 1981 $189J
NAM OOC by Wesley Grimes Byerly Jr 140 Pages Vantage
Press, NY 1981 $695
ROME '44' The Battle for the Eternal City by Raleigh
Trevelyan 348 Pages Viking Press, N V 1982 $t798
8Y SHIPS ALONE Churchill and the Oardanelles by Jeffrey 0
Wallin 216 Pages Carolina AcademiC Press Durham N C
1981 $14 95
MONTY The Making of a General, 1871-1942 by Nigel
Hamilton McGrawHIIi Book Co , N V 1981 $2295
Roman InvaSIOns to the Restoralion, 1660 by AnthOny Bruce
349 Pages ShOe Smng Pre,s Hamden Conn 1981
$31 00
CANAOA'S FLOWERS HIStory of the Corvettes 01 Canada,
1939-1945 by Thomas G Lynch 99 Pages Inlernatlonal
GraphiCS Corporation Bennmgton Vt 1981 $850
Case Studies by FranCiS P Hoeber 222 Pages Gordon and
BreaCh, SCience Publishers N V 1981 $5950
THE REAGAN WIT Edited by Bill AOler With Bill Adler Jr 128
Pages Caroline House Publishers ThornwOOd, NY 1981
Vltukhln Translated by Anato! Kagan 411 Pages Sphmx
Press, N V 1981 $1595
GENOCIOE ANO VENOETTA: The Round Valley Wars in North-
ern California by lynwood Carranco and Estle Beard 403
Pages UniverSity 01 Oklahoma Press, Norman, Okla 1981
Pages Dodd, Mead & Co , NY 1981 $1350
WARSHIPS OF THE WORLO by Antony Preston 224 Pages
Jane's PublIShing Co, N V 1980 $t695
MUSTANG, A Oocumentary History of the P-51 by Jellrey
Ethell 176 Pages Jane's PubliShing Co, NY 1981
HEINKEL HElll: A Oocumentary History by Heinz Howarra,
256 Pages Jane's PublIShing Co NY 1980 $1995
Derek Wood 512 Pages Jane's PUbliShing Co . N V 1979
$t 795
AIRCRAFT OF THE U S.A F ' Sixty Years in Pictures by Paul
EllIS 224 Pages Jane's publlSnlng Co N V 1980 $1995
WINGS OF THE NAVY: FlYln9 Allied Carrier Aircraft of World
War Two by Captain EriC Brown Edited by William Green and
Gordon Swanborough 176 Pages Jane's Publishing Co ,
NY 1980 $1995
1917-1945 by GebharO Aders 284 Pages Jane's PUblIShing
Co , N V 1979 $19 95
FOKKER Aircraft Builders to the World by Th'ls Postma 160
Pages Jane's Publishing Co N V 1979 $1995
MIGHTY EIGHTH WAR OIARY by Roger A Freeman 508
Pages Franklin Watts. N V 1981 $29 50
KG 200' The True Story by P W Stahl 206 Pages Franklin
Watts N V 1981 $1995
OPERATION GOMORRAH The Hamburg Firestorm Raids by
Gordon Musgrove 197 Pages Franklin Watts, N V 1981
CROSSING IN BERLIN by Fletcher Knebel 392 Pages
Doubleday & Co N V 1981 $14 95
AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE' The 10th Photo Group in World
War II. 200 Pages Aero PubliShers Fallbrook Callt 1981
SOVIET MILITARY THINKING Edlled by Derek Leebaert 314
Pages Allen & Unwin WinChester Mass 198t $3795
clothbound $14 95 paperbounO
F-4 PHANTOM II by Bert Kinzey 72 Pages Aero PUblIShers.
Fallbrook Calif t981 $695
NatIOnal SOCialism by Bruce F Pauley 292 Pages University
ot North Carolina Press Chapel HIli. N C 1981 $1900
STEICHEN AT WAR by Chrlslopher PhillipS 256 Pages Harry
N Abrams Inc N V 1981 $4000
VICTORY IN BANGLAOESH by Malor General Lachhman
Singh, Retired 302 Pages Natra] PubliShers, Dehra Dun In-
dia 1981 $1995
IN SlOE ANO OUT, Hostage to Iran, Hostage to Myself by
Richard Queen With PatriCia Hass 286 Pages G P 'Putnam's
Sons, N V 1981 $1395
JANE'S 1981-82 AVIATION ANNUAL. Edited by Michael J H
Taylor 159 Pages Jane's Publishing Co, NY 1981
JANE'S 1981-82 NAVAL ANNUAL, Edited by Captain John
Moore. R N 158 Pages Jane's PUbliShing Co NY 1981