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Military Review
VOLUME LXIV DECEMBER 1984 NO 12
CONTENTS
PAGE 2 THE FALAISE-ARGENTAN ENCIRCLEMENT:
OPERATIONALLY BRILLIANT,TACTICALLY FLAWED
byMajorCole C. Kingseed, US Army
12 THE EIGHT-DAY ARTEP FTX
byLieutenantColonel William R. LynchIII, US Army
23 GERMAN ARMY GENERALSTAFFOFFICERTRAINING
byColonelNorbertMajewski, FederalRepublic ofGermanyArmy,
andLieutenantColonelJohn H. Peyton, US Army
35 LIGHT INFANTRY IN EUROPE:
STRATEGIC FLEXIBILITYAND CONVENTIONALDETERRENCE
byCaptain DavidH. Petraeus, US Army
56 40 YEARS AGO: THE BATTLEOFTHE BULGE
byMajorJohn A. Reichley, US Army, Retired
58 SOVIET PRISONERS OFWAR IN THE AIRLAND BATTLE
byMajorMark D.Beta, US Army
73 NEWS
80 LETTERS
82 BOOKS contemporaryreading forthe professional
90 INDEX-VOLUMELXIV, January-December1984
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Articles to Watch For:
J' , t.l I
Air Assault in the Desert: How to Fight , . .
Colonel W. Bruce Moore, US Army, and Major Glenn M. ,4fmy, \
. 1" 1 \
.. " ,." ..
"', v.,.t .; \
A Perspective on low-Intensity Conflict
V....iJ
Colonel James B. Motley, US Army, Retired

..
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<
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The Military Justice System and Command ;:,.., "
Major Charles J, Dunlap, US Air Force
. "" ......
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FALAISE-ARGENTAN
Some two months after the Normandy invasion, Allied forces
were on the verge of completely surrounding and trapping two
German armies. Delays in completing the encirclement deprived
the Allies of an opportunity to deliver an early decisive blow in
the war in Europe.
F
ORTY years after the Western Allies
successfully invaded Normandy,
the failure to properly close the Falaise
Argentan pocket still generates contro
versy. Why did General Bernard L. Mont
gomery not reinforce the Canadians in
their drive south from Caen? Why did
Lieutenant General Omar N. Bradley halt
Lieutenant General George S. Patton's
Third US Army when victory was ap
parently in its grasp? And did the escape
of an estimated 50,000 Germans prolong
the war in the West? These and similar
questions have plagued military histori
ans for decades.
To fully comprehend the intricacies in
volved in the command decisions relating
to the final phase of the Normandy Cam
paign, one must examine the operational
and tactical situation confronting the
Allied High Command in August 1944.
On 1 August, Bradley relinquished com'
mand of the First US Army to Lieutenant
General Courtney H. Hodges and as
sumed command of the Twelfth Army
Group.
At the same time, Patton's Third US
Army became operational. Montgomery
retained operational control of the Allied
ground forces in addition to his command
of the TwentyFirst Army Group, consist
ing of Lieutenant General Sir Miles C.
Dempsey's British Second Army and
Lieutenant General Henry D. G. Crerar's
Canadian First Army. The operational
situation at the end of July, however, had
not met Allied expectations. Casualties
had been far heavier than originally an
ticipated, and stalemate gripped the front
line.
There were several reasons for the slowed
Allied advance from the beachheads. On
the Allied left, Montgomery's failure to
seize Caen on Dday, coupled with deter
mined German resistance, precluded any
rapid exploitation in that sector. The
most serious attempt to break the
deadlock was Operation Goodwood (18
through 21 July), but it was a tactical
disaster of the first magnitude. Prepared
German defenses and the skillful use of ar
mored reserves limited the British ad
vance and cost the attackers 4,011
casualties and 493 tanks-36 percent of
the British armored force on the Conti
nenl.' Goodwood did succeed, however, in
drawing the bulk of the German panzer
reserves to the British sector.
Like Montgomery, Bradley had met lit
tie success in late June and early July.
Prior to the commencement of Operation
Overlord, no definitive analysis had been
conducted to determine the effect of the
bocage country of the Cotentin Peninsula.
The bocage was ideal defensive terrain,
and the Germans used it with devastating
effect. To the difficulties of bocage and
marshland was added the handicap of per
sistently inclement weather which
restricted air support.
2
As a result, the
First US Army had suffered 77,000
casualties since Dday.
To break this stalemate, Bradley con-
ceived Operation Cobra on 10 July. The
essence of Cobra was a multidivisional at-
tack on a narrow front, by
General J. Lawton "Lightning Joe" Col
lins' aggressive VII Corps. The assault,
preceded by a tremendous air bombard
ment, succeeded in penetrating the Ger
3
MILITARY REVIEW
man 'defenses on 25 July. Throwing all '
available reserves into the fray, Bradley
soon captured Avranches, an important
crossroads town at the base of the Coten-
tin Peninsula.
Contrary to Montgomery's postwar
claim that the Normandy Campaign had
conformed entirely to pre-D-day plans,'
none of the Allied commanders envisioned
that the battle for Normandy would be
anything more than a deliberate, con-
trolled advance of the sort encountered in
late J llne. Patton was the first to realize
that the destruction of the German left
flank had created an opportunity for the
very type of mobile warfare at which he
excelled. Convincing Bradley that the
seizure of the Brittany ports required
minimal resources, Patton dispatched a
single corps in that direction and the re-
Pallon, left, Bradley, center, Montgomery, right
mainder of the Third US Army eastward.
Bradley and Montgomery quickly
agreed with tllis modification and, by 3
August, the Allied High Command had
completely altered the preinvasion strat-
egy to exploit Bradley's success at turn-
ing the German left flank. As Mont-
gomery stated to Chief of the Imperial
British Staff Alan F. Brooke, "The main
business lies to the east.'"
The new strategy revised by Bradley
and Montgomery was a double envelop
ment of the German forces at the Seine.
Montgomery directed the British and the
Canadians to drive south via the Caen-
Falaise corridor. They would then pivot to
their left while Bradley's Twelfth Army
Group drove east through southern Nor-
mandy. The Allies could then be in posi-
tion to encircle the majority of the Ger-
December 4
FAlAISE-ARGENTAN
Engltsh Channel
Figure 1
man forces short of Paris. Whether this
strategy would have succeeded in its con-
ceptual state remains a 'moot point, for
Adolf Hitler seized this opportunity to
make one of the greatest strategic
blunders of the war. <:.
Due to the deteriorating situation in
Normandy, Hitler ordered Field Marshal
Gunther von Kluge, Army Group B com-
mander, to commit all available panzer
units in a desperate counterattack to seize
Avranches. It was, argued Hitler, "a
unique, never recurring opportunity for a
complete reversal of the situation.'" To
von Kluge, the order was paramount to
disaster as Hitler was eliminating his
freedom of maneuver by committing all of
his reserves.
Obediently, von Kluge attacked in the
late evening of 6 August in the vicinity of
Mortain. A determined effort by the US
30th Division, however, halted the Ger-
man attack after a gain of only 14
kilometers. Totally oblivious to the actual
tactical situation, Hitler ordered that the
attack be continued. The result was that
the center of gravity of von Kluge's forces
was drawing slowly westward. Such was
the situation that confronted Bradley on 7
August.
1984
5
MILITARY REVIEW
Convinced that Hodges' First US Army
could hold the German attack at Mortain.
Bradley conceived a brilliant operational
plan that might annihilate the entire Ger-
man force committed in the Mortain coun-
terattack. If Montgomery's Twenty-First
Army Group could attack south and seize
Falaise and subsequently Argentan. Pat-
ton would pivot on Le Mans and drive
north to meet the Canadians at Argentan.
If successful. the advancing Allied armies
would completely surround the German
Seventh Army and Fifth Panzer Army in
a pocket west of Argentan. As ground
commander for General Dwight D. Eisen-
hower. Montgomery rapidly approved
Bradley's shorter envelopment.
Accordingly. the Canadian First Army
launched Operation Totalize on 7 August
to seize Falaise. German resistance was
exceptionally fierce. and the attack made
little headway against prepared positions
manned by the best German divisions in
Normandy. As a result. the Canadian at-
tack stalled far short of its objective.
Meanwhile. Patton had dispatched Ma-
jor General Wade H. Haislip's XV Corps
eastward to Le Mans. On 8 August. XV
Corps turned north and. by 13 August. it
was on the outskirts of Argentan.
Separating the US and Canadian forces
north of Falaise was a 25-mile gap which
constituted the only escape route from the
noose slowly tightening around the Ger-
man forces.
Only when Patton turned north did the
Germans begin to realize the dire tactical
straits in which they found themselves.
Remarkably. neither Hitler nor von Kluge
made timely strategic decisions to extri-
cate their forces in Normandy. The war
diary of the German Seventh Army in-
dicates that von Kluge erroneously believed
that Patton's eastward thrust was only a
screen for the actual operations in Brit-
tany.'
Only when he received reports of US
reconnaissance units operating north of
Le Mans did von Kluge attempt to
remedy the situation. At that time. in vio-
lation of Hitler's orders to continue the at-
tack toward Avranches. he created Ar-
mored Group Eberbach and directed it to
protect the vulnerable left flank of the ex-
posed German front. The move came too
late to save the German Seventh Army
and the Fifth Panzer Army.
From 11 August to 13 August. the Ger-
man situation continued to deteriorate as
the battle for the Falaise pocket con-
tinued with undiminished ferocity. The
Canadians were still holding north of
Falaise. preparing for a renewal of their
offensive. Unfortunately. the two divi-
sions preparing for the assault - the Cana-
dian 4th Armored Division and the Polish
1st Armored Division-were relatively in-
experienced and had not worked together
prior to this campaign.
As a result. preparations were slow. and
Montgomery made a deliberate decision
not to reinforce these formations with
units from the veteran British Second
Army. Montgomery's actions completely
mystified his US counterparts who watched
in bewilderment as the Canadians sat
north of Falaise as Patton secured the
high ground around Argentan.
Why Montgomery did not press the at-
tack on Falaise continues to haunt
analysts of the Normandy Campaign. His
defenders claim he was devoting himself
to the campaign as a whole and was not as
concerned with the shorter envelopment
devised by Biradley. Montgomery claimed
that "it was essential from my point of
view to continue with the wide envelop-
ment movement. concurrently with the
Falaise-Argentan corridor. '"
One recent historian states that Mont-
gomery failed to comprehend how rapidly
US armored forces could move to close
December
6
FAlAISE-ARGENTAN
Figure 2
1984
7
MILITARY REVIEW
their part of the gap. Montgomery felt
that it would take the Canadians 48 hours
to capture Falaise, but Patton's rapid
movement surprised him as much as it did
the Germans. In short, Montgomery felt
the Canadians could take Falaise before
Patton took Argentan.'
Montgomery's faith in the Canadians
was misguided. Not only did Crerar, the
commander of the Canadian First Army,
not push his attack aggressively, but he
did not receive any additional rein-
forcements from Montgomery. Montgom-
ery's foremost biographer, Nigel Hamil-
ton, argues that Montgomery's plan, as
developed in a meeting with Bradley and
Dempsey on 13 August, was for the Cana-
dians to deliver a concentrated attack
within 24 hours to seize Argentan. To
assist the Canadians, Dempsey's British
Second Army would seize Falaise itself so
Crerar could proceed t.lirectly to Argen- .
tan.' In any event, Montgomery left the
Canadians to close the northern ap-
proaches to Argentan.
As rtbe Canadians prepared to renew
their/offensive north of Falaise, Haislip's
XV (::orps was approaching Argentan and
the boundary between the two Allied ar-
my groups. On 12 August, Haislip in-
formed Patton that he was on the out-
skirts of Argentan and requested addi-
tional instructions. Patton immediately
informed him to push slowly in the direc-
tion of Falaise to contact the Allied forces
advancing from the north.!O
When Bradley received word of
Patton's directive, he made the most con-
troversial decision of the campaign. In no
uncertain terms, he ordered Patton to
withdraw his advance patrols to Argen-
tan. Patton pleaded that, given free rein,
he would "go on to Falaise and ... drive
the British back into the sea for another
Dunkirk." "Nothing doing," replied

Bradley's decision to halt Patton at
Argentan ended any expectation of
destroying the bulk of the German forces
in the Falaise pocket. Bradley never
sought to disavow the responsibility for
countermanding Patton's orders. "The
decision to stop Patton was mine alone; it
never went beyond my CP [command
post]."!' Why, then, did Bradley halt Pat-
ton's advance?
Long after the event, Bradley offered
several explanations for his action. First,
Haislip's XV Corps had been advancing
along a wide front, and his left flank was
exposed to increasing German pressure.
When the Third US Army wheeled north
at Le Mans, a gap of more than 30 kilo-
meters separated Haislip's corps<from
elements of Hodges' First US Army.
Bradley obviously feared that any attack
toward Falaise would further jeopardize
Haislip's vulnerable position.
Second, Bradley claimed that Falaise
was in the British-Canadian sector and,
therefore, it was a matter of immense
prestige for the British. He reckoned that
it would be an "arrogant slap in the face
at a time when we clearly needed to build
confidence in the Canadian Army."!3 This
argument is fallacious as the boundary
between the Allied armies was never con-
crete, and Montgomery had been willing
to adjust boundaries whenever the tac-
tical situation warranted. Indeed, Argen-
tal1 itself lay 12 miles within the British
zone, and Montgomery had welcomed the
US advance to seize the strategic road
junction.
The thlrd reason Bradley offered for his
. action was that he feared a head-on colli-
sion with the Canadians advancing south
from the vicinity of Falaise. Any converg-
ing action becomes a dangerous and un-
controllable maneuver if coordination be-
tween the converging forces has not been
made with respect to the exact point of
December
8
FAlAISE-ARGENTAN
le Mans
juncture. This argument is also highly
questionable since Allied strategy dic
tated that US and Canadian units had to
converge if the pocket were to be closed.
Whether that point was at Argentan or
elsewhere seems irrelevant.
Finally. intelligence concerning the
number of Germans remaining within the
pocket was often contradictory. Even
with Ultra, the Allies were unable to
determine the exact number of enemy in
the pocket and how many had escaped.
Figure 3
The general impression was that the Ger
mans had already begun their with
drawal.
Consequently, Bradley prefer;ed "a
solid shoulder at Argentan to the possi
bility of a broken neck at Falaise." If 19
German divisions were stampeding to
escape annihilation, he reasoned that XV
Corps should brace for the assault and not
risk being smashed by the retreating Ger .
mans. Moreover, if the Canadians were
planning a carefully prepared assault that
1984 9
MILITARY REVIEW
could commence within 24 hours. there
wasnoneedfortheThirdUSArmytorun
theunnecessaryriskindrivingnorthinto
thefaceofincreasingGermanresistance.
Bradley'sdecision, therefore. wasapure-
lytacticaldecisionbasedontheavailable
intelligenceandmilitaryefficiency.
UnknowntoMontgomeryandBradley,
HitlerdidnotissueorderstovonKlugeto
initiate the withdrawal until 16 August.
Thus. the entire German Seventh Army
andtheFifth PanzerArmywerestillvul-
nerable to encirclement on 12 August
when Haislipapproached Argentan. Had
intelligence been more accurate, Bradley
would have certainly maintained his
"shoulder" at Argentan and reinforced
Haislipwithadditionaldivisions.
Theremainderofthe Argentan-Falaise
Campaignis quickly told. TheCanadians
did not capture Falaiseuntil 16 August,
bywhichtimetheGermanswereretreat
ing through the 12-mile gap between
Falaise and Argentan. Unable or reluc-
tanttoclosethegapon hisown, Bradley
dispatched Pattoneastward with the reo
mainder of the Third US Army to com-
plete the envelopment on the Seine. By
thetimeheandMontgomeryrealizedthe
true number of Germans still in the
pocket, itwas too late to recall Patton's
advancingdivisions.
Itwasnotuntil19AugustthatUSand
Canadian forces joined hands at Cham-
bois,severalmilesnortheastofArgentan.
Resistance within the pocket continued
until 22 August when the last defenders
surrendered. By that time. an estimated
50,000 Germanshadescaped.
On the positive side, the battlefield at
Falaise was unquestionably one of the
.greatkilling groundsofthewar.14 German
casualtiestotaledmorethan 10,000dead
and 50,000 captured. In addition, they
lost 220 tanks, 160 selfpropelled guns,
some 700 artillery pieces and more than
5,000 vehicles in the US sector alone.
Losses in the British zone were equally
high."
In short, those German units that did
managetoescapebroughtonlyfragments
oftheironce splendid divisions from the
pocket. Ofa totalofseven armored divi-
sions in theFifth PanzerArmy,the Ger-
mans could muster only 24 tanks and
1.300 men by the time they crossed the
Seine."Theseremnantscouldnothaltthe
renewed Allied advance and, by 25
August,Parisfell tothevictoriousAllies.
In retrospect, the failure to deliver a
decisive stroke against the Germans at
Falaiseon 13 Augustdidnotprolongthe
war in the West. By the time Paris fell.
therewas littletheGermanscould do to
stemtheAlliedtideshortofthebordersof
Germany itself. The Germans who es-
capedcaptureintheFalaisepocketfound
themselvesconfrontedwithanothermore
serious envelopment by Patton at the
Seine. Allied artillery and air power con-
tinued to take a horrendous toll on the
retreating Germans. It was logistical
shortfalls,notthenumberofescapedGer-
mans, that finally halted the Allied ad-
vance. Author Cornelius Ryan correctly
states that the Germans were losing
fasterthanthe Allies were winning."
In the final analysis, it is pointless to
argue the question of responsibility for
failing toclosethe Falaisegapina more
timelyfashion. Operationsinmid-August
were extremely fluid. and 'commanders
madedecisions basedon availableintelli-
gence. Inwar,nothingiscertain;Norman-
dy was no exception. Strategically, the
Falaise.Campaign was a masterpiece of
operational planning that was slightly
flawed in its tactical execution. Yet, the
campaign was successful enough that.
two and one-half months after theOver-
lord landings, theAllies wereirrevocably
entrenchedon theContinentofEurope.
December
10
FAlAISE-AR"GENTAN
NOTES
1 Omar N Bradley and Clay Blair A General'& LIfe, SImon &
Schuster, NY, 1983, P 275, and see Russell F WelQ!ey
E.lsenhower s Llfwlenants The CampaIgn of france and Germany,
19441945, IndIana Unwerslty Press, Bloomington, Ind 1981 P 146
2 See General Bernard L Montgomery S deserlpllon at the
bocage country In hIS Normandy 10 the BaIIlC, Printing & Stationery
Service, BrJtl'5h Army of the Rhine, Ger , 1946, P 87
3 Carlo D'Esle, DeCISIon <n Normandy, E P Dutton 8: Co > N Y
1983 P 487
4 Martln BlurnenSOf1, Breakout and PurSuit OffIce 01 the ChIef
01 Mlillary HISlory, Washington 0 C, 1961,0432
5 Forrest Pogue, The Supreme Command OfflC.e of the Crllel 01
Military Histor'l', WaShIngton DC, 1954.0207
6 German Seventh Army war DIary. 4 August 1944, 0 1
7 Montgomery op clf 0127, and see Nigel Hamilton. Master
of the Battlefield Montys War Years, 1942 1944, McGraw Hili Book
Go NY, 1983, PO 71680
8 D Este, op, CIt, PO 426 28
9 Hamlllon, op clf, p 786
10 J:leport After Combat, 31 July 1944 fa 31 Augu&1 1944, XV
Corps, US Almy
11 Bradley,OP cit, p 298
12 Omar N Bradley, A Soldla's Story. Henry Holt & CO. NY
19':)1 P 377
13 Bradley A General's Life. op Cit
14 DWIght 0 EisenhOwer, Crusaae In E.urope, Doubleday & Co
!nc NY, 1948 P 279
15 D Esle, op cJt, P 432
16 MarlIn 81umenson, 'General Bradley'S Dec.IS10n at Argentan
(13 August 1944)." Command DeCISions 011Ice of the Ch1ef of
Military History, Washington, DC, 1959 P 417, and see FIfth
Panzer Army Report 1650 28 August 1944
17 CornelIUS Ryan, A BfJdge Too Far, Simon & Schuster, NY
1974,059
Major Cole C. Kingseed lS currently serumg as
executwe officer of the 1st Battahon. 27th Infan-
try, at Schofield Barracks. Hawali, He received
an M A and a Ph.D [rom Ohio State UniverSIty
and lS a graduate of the USACGSC. Previous
asszgnments mclude serVlng with the Depart-
ment of Hzstory. US Mziztary Academy, wah the
1st Infantry Dwz5zon and with the 25th Infantry
Divlsion.
Generators to Suppress,Signatures. The Belvoir Research and
Development Center, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, has awarded two
contracts for three each 15,30 and 60-kilowatt signature-sup-
'pressed, dieselenginedriven (SSDED) generator sets to the
Kohler Corporation, Kohler, Wisconsin, and the Onan Corpora
tion, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for competitive prototypes,
SSDED generator sets will have suppressed acoustic and
thermal infrared signatures and will be nuclearhardened. Ex
isting generator sets can be easiiy located by the enemy
because of the uniqueness of their acoustic and thermal
signatures. The functions of a combat system, its echelon of
deployment and its level of importance on the battlefield may
also be determined through the analysis of signature emis
sions.
The contracts call for the delivery of nine SSDED generator
sets from each company in 1986. In addition to contractor
testing, these sets will be extensively tested by the Army to
fully determine their suitability for military use. If proven suit-
able and cost effective, SSDED generator sets will be type
classified and will replace current Department of Defense
standard generator sets in the acquisition cycle.
1984 11
The
Eight-Day
ARTEP
FTX
Lieutenant Colonel
William R:Lynch III,
US Army
It is imperative that units derive maximum benefit from their
training programs. The ARTEP FTX in the 1st Infantry Divi-
sion (Mechanized) is the basis for a program ofcontinuous
training. and evaluation aimed at development ofcombined
arms capabilities in critical battle tasks at each echelon.
12
December
T
HE most important thing soldiers
do in peacetime is train for war.
They must train as they will fight-as a
t:ombined arms team, under combat con-
ditions and to the standards necessary to
win on the AirLand Battlefield.
The AirLand Battle will be deadly for
those' who are not well-prepared. The
potential for destruction of entire units
clearly exists. The commander can expect
mass casualties. untrained rpplacements.
equipment loss. adverse weather and loss
of key leaders. Smoke. rubble. debris.
fatigue and disorientation will create dif-
ficulty in command and control.
To prepare for the conditions that can
be anticipated on the AirLand Battlefield.
commanders must conduct well-planned
training programs at every echelon. from
the individual soldier to the division. The
training should focus on the critical tasks
that must be performed in battle. A com-
mander should link everything that his
unit does to the mission and the environ-
ment to be found on the Air Land Battle-
field.
While specific missions vary among
units, the Army Training and Evaluation
Program (ARTEP) is a standard source
for training objectives. The ARTEP is the
Army's basic source document for collec-
tive and leadership training. Further, it
provides a written link between individual
and collective battle tasks. Based on its
ARTEP manual, a unit develops a pro-
gram to train its soldiers and evaluate
those tasks which are considered critical
battle tasks for that unit.
Previously, the 1st Infantry Division
(Mechanized) followed a training strategy
which included four-day field training ex-
ercises iFTXs) for evaluation of each task
force. These exercises, called ARTEPs.
were performed every 18 months. Most
battalion training programs were aimed
at peaking for these exercises.
ARTEPFTX
However, to be ready for the AirLand
Battle. training programs must exceed
the basic requirements in the training of
units. leaders and soldiers and then must
sustain a high level of combat proficiency.
A four-dav ARTEP once every 18 months
will not achieve sustainment and will not
allow evaluation of all critical battle
tasks. When a unit is evaluated in a
simulated combat environment. adequate
time and resources must be devoted to
allow the full exercise of all operating
svstems.
In the 1st Infantry Division (Mecha-
nized). the ARTEP is not viewed as a
single event that occurs during a selected
evaluation period. The ARTEP is a con-
tinuous program of training and evalua-
tion that is designed to develop combined
arms capabilities in the performance of
critical battle tasks at each ecbelon.
.. A RTE P FTX" describes a special field
training period devoted to the training
and evaluation of battalion task forces as
well as all other associated units. The
results of this kind of exercise form the
basis for bat talion and task force training
until the next ARTEP FTX.
The design of ARTEP FTXs includes
many considerations. However. the two
most important are:
The frequency that will allow units
to sustain high levels of proficiency.
Creation of a realistic environment
that will allow the unit to practice its war-
time general defense plan mission.
Frequency
Task force ARTEP FTXs must occur
more frequently than every 18 months.
The ideal frequency would probably be
every three months. This would permit
the training program for the following
1984 13
MILITARY REVIEW
quarter to be based on an FTX evaluation.
However. time and resource constraints
usually prohibit quartefly ARTEP FTXs.
Instead. a program of smallunit in
dividual and collective training. platoon
tests. companv and team ARTEP FTXs.
task force command post exercises and
tactical exercises without troops forms
the basis for task force ARTEP FTXs.
A task force in the 1st Infantry Divi-
sion (Mechanized) participates in an
ARTEP FTX as either the unit being
evaluated or the opposing force unit ap
proximately every six months. In the in
tervals between these exercises. com
manders focus their efforts on the im
provement of unit. leader and soldier
skills in complex areas and those areas
where the unit is found to be deficient.
The Eight-Dav ARTEP FTX
Based on an analysis of the ARTEP
tasks that must be evaluated. as well as
the availability of training time. terrain.
funds and other resonrces. the com
manders at Fort Riley. Kansas. concluded
that an eightday ARTEP FTX is the op'
timum vehicle for the training and evalud'
tion of units. Numerous battalion
ARTEP FTXs have been conducted since
that decision was reached.
The eight-day ARTEP FTX trains all of
the task force' s operating systems. the
brigade slice as well as separate bat-
talions. The exercise is normally con
ducted by a brigade that organizes and
trains the entire brigade slice throughout
the eight-day period. Combined arms
operations are achieved through the inte-
gration of infantry and armor task forces.
as well as the full participation of ar-
tillery. engineer. attack helicopter, taco
tical air. air defense. forward area support
team, chemical, military police and com-
bat electronic warfare intelligence assets.
The task orgainzation is based on a unit's
specific general defense plan mission.
ARTEP FTXs are also conducted for
separate battalions and artillery bat-
talions by their parent headquarters as
either separate exercises or while linked to
task force exercises.
A fourdav exercise tended to be too in-
tense. and there was insufficient planning
time. Furthermore, not enough critical
events could take place in four days.
Leaders did not rest; they "gutted it out."
The longer exercise is intense. but it
allows leaders time to rest-a critical
necessity on today's battlefield.
time varies along with the difficulty of
missions. If a unit does not successfully
perform a particular mission. that mission
may be assigned again. There is time
daily after-action reviews (AARs) for
every participating unit from platoon to
task force.
The eightday ARTEP FTX involves an
evaluated task force. an opposing force
task force and each part of the brigade
slice-engineer. artillery. air defense.
aviation (attack. scout and lift). Air Force.
combat electronic warfare intelligence.
chemical and forward area support team.
All units are players. An observer-con
troller group controls and evaluates the
task force and the brigade slice down to
platoon level.
A Realistic Scenario
The scenario for a recent eightday task
force ARTEP FTX is shown in Figure 1.
The exercise began with an alert and an
inspection of the unit. Every element was
inspected in accordance with a standard
precombat checklist. The inspected unit.
14
December
ScenarioforEight-DayARTEP FTX
DAY 1 Conduct precombat inspec-
tion; Redeye movingtarget
simulatorevaluation
Conduct tactical road march
and occupy assemblyarea
Receiveoperation order
After-action review
DAY 2 Conduct passage of lines,
movement to contact and
hastyattack
After-action review
Receive fragmentaryorder
DAY 3 Deliberateattack
After-action review
Receive fragmentaryorder
DAY4 Nightattack
After-action review
Operationorder
Displaceto battleposition
DAY 5 Defend to retain battle posi-
tion
After-action review
Fragmentaryorder
DAY6 Defend in sector
Rearward passage of lines
and withdraw to assembly
area
After-action review
DAY 7 Hasty river crossing and
counterattack
Defend
After-action review
DAY 8 Deliberate attack
Airassault
After-action review
Redeployment and postcom-
bat inspection
ARTEP - Army Training and Evaluation Pro
gram
FTX - Field training exercise
Figure 1
ARTEPFTX
received immediate feedback from the in-
spection. Afterward. the task force was
given a deployment order that was com-
parable to a wartime mission deployment.
The next morning. the task force moved
bv tactical road march to its assembly
area. Once in the assembly area. the unit
was ordered to conduct a passage of lines
and a movement to contact. All ARTEP
missions were based on missions that the
task force would be required to perform in
wartime.
Over the next eight days. the task force
performed the various missions on widely
varied kinds of terrain. Five missions called
for the task force to make major moves. A
rearward passage of lines and an addi-
tional deliberate attack against an oppos-
ing force strongpoint were included
because the task force had earlier ex-
perienced difficulty with these missions.
An opposing force task force had been
trained to use Warsaw Pact tactics. This
ensured that the appropriate opposing
force countertasks drove the mission ex-
ecution as well as the evaluation of the
task force. The Multiple Integrated Laser
Engagement Simulation (MILES) was used
to generate engagement realism. This
combination created realistic battles and
a high resolution of each mission. The
forces were allowed to maneuver and
assault objectives in daylight and at
night. There were no "controller" phase
lines to keep units separated.
MILES engagement results were used
to drive every operating systel!l in the
task force. I ncluded were such functions
as evacuation of casualties. replacement
of personnel. evacuation of damaged
vehicles. replacement of weapons sytems
and resupply of ammunition. Each func-
tion was allowed to run its full course. For
example. soldiers "killed" or "wounded"
in MILES engagements and vehicles
"disabled" or "destroyed" were evacuated
1984 15
MILITARY REVIEW
to the field trains. The unit had to perform
the evacuation properly and submit ap
propriate reports that would generate
replacements for the next mission. The
eight-day period provided ample time for
the full cycle of evacuation and replace-
ment to be run several times. Improve-
ment in these administrative and logis-
tical tasks was dramatic as the awareness
of their impact on mission accomplish-
ment was heightened.
The jamming and monitoring of radio
nets and imitative communication decep-
tion were commonplace. Simulated
persistent and nonpersistent chemical at-
tacks forced the task force to go to
mission-oriented protection posture IV
frequently and perform decontamination
procedures which provided training for
the chemical company.
Pyrotechnics were used to represent all
weapons systems and most ordnance. in-
cluding chemical munitions. Artillery fire
marking teams were linked to the fire sup-
port officer to provide real-time showing
of fires and an assessment of casualties.
Two smoke generator platoons performed
general defense plan-related missions. and
they also simulated artillery and mortar
smoke missions.
A forward area support team was fielded
as a player unit so that all links to the task
force were tactical. Making the combat
service support units active "players"
greatly increased the training value for all
units. The working of all administrative
and logistical functions created an ex-
cellent training vehicle for the newly
formed forward area support team. the
predecessor of a support battalion.
Engineer obstacles were constructed or
dug. and minefields were laid. Engineer
controllers killed the vehicles that hit
simulated mines. In turn. exposed
engineers were killed or wounded and
evacuated.
The controllers assessed near-real-time
kills by and against tactical air support
and attack helicopters. based on standard
probability tables and controller observa-
tion of air defense missions. Engagements
such as these for which MILES was
unavailable were done similar to REAL-
TRAIN engagements.
The brigade managed these events while
playing the roles of units adjacent to the
task force and while training its staff in
the command and control of combat
operations. The effect was to portray the
integrated battlefield to the task force.
and each operating system of the task
force was continuously pressed to func-
tion throughout the exercise. The primary
objective of a realistic general defense
plan-focused scenario was to train and
evaluate the task force and all participat-
ing units on critical battle tasks.
Train-Evaluate-Train
Well before an ARTEP FTX begins.
each headquarters in the division
analyzes the systemic deficiencies that
have been identified in past ARTEP
FTXs and rotations to the National Train-
ing Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin. Califor-
nia. The detailed evaluation received from
the center is an excellent source for identi-
fying systemic training deficiencies and
objectives. For example. in one recent ex-
ercise. the analysis caused increased em-
phasis to be placed on the simplicity of
plans and orders. offensive operations.
night operations and the assault of for-
tified positions. The analysis leads to the
identification of specific training objec-
tives from ARTEP 71-2. Mechanized In-
fantry/Tank Task Force. which. despite
changing doctrine. is still an excellent
source document.
16
Troops of the 1st Infantry
Division (Mechanized) in training
MILITARY REVIEW
Throughout the ARTEP FTX. the
observer-controllers focus on critical bat-
tle tasks. known deficiencies and the defi-
ciencies that are observed during each
mission. In addition. critical individual
soldier tasks are sampleddaily. The ob-
server-controller group keeps a record of
observations which becomes one hasis for
a comprehensive after-action report on all
individual and collective tasks that have
been evaluated. Time. although limited. is
provided to allow adjustments in task
force' standing operating procedures or to
correct weaknesses that are identified in
daily AARs.
After-Action Review
The AAR is probably the most impor-
tant link between training and evaluation.
During ARTEP FTXs. multi tiered AARs
take place after each mission. The first
tier is at platoon and staff section level.
The platoon AAR is held on the ground
about 30 minutes after maneuver ceases
and the unit consolidates its tactical posi-
tion. Administrative halts are not allowed.
The platoon AAR helps ensure that the
eight-day ARTEP FTX is a multiechelon
training exercise. It links the evaluation
with mission and task execution based on
the observations of all participants. The
training objectives-tasks. conditions
and standards-are taken directly from
the unit ARTEP.
Shortly after the platoon AAR. leader
AA Rs are held for the company team.
Separate AARs are also conducted for the
support units of the brigade slice. This im-
portant step puts a "game jersey" on
every participant in tbe exercise. About 3
hours later. there is a task force AAR for
.commanders. separate platoon leaders. the
staff and key brigade slice leaders. Every
other day. tbere is a logistical AAR which
involves the commander and key logisti-
cal managers. Each AAR follows a strict
format to ensure that it is focused on
ARTEP standards. generates a profes-
sional discussion and analysis of the train-
ing exercise. includes all participants and
identifies key lessons from the exercise.
Together. the AARs form a multitiered
approach which helps make the eight-day
ARTEP FTX a truly multiechelon train-
ing exercise.
Task Force After-Action Review
The task force AAR is the capstone for
each mission. The format is shown in
Figure 2. It is important to take a close
look at this critical training event.
The key tp success in the task force
AAR is getting the task force and sup-
porting unit leaders to participate in an
open and objective analysis of the exer-
cise. Each commander is given the chance
to briefly explain his mission. concept and
execution. The opposing force commander
explains his plan. then comes back to add
comments on what he thought or did in
reaction to each company or team and the
task force. The task force observer-con-
troller leads the discussion and em-
phasizes key points when they are made.
Teaching points are based on doctrine
rather than opinion and must be well-re-
searched. As doctrine changes. this step
becomes increasingly critical. After
several AARs. the analysis is done with
very little assistance from the task force
observer-controller. In many instances.
participants will make a key teaching
point more effectively than will the ob-
server-controller.
Once the plan and execution of the exer-
cise have been discussed. the observer-
December 18
ARTEPFTX
Task Force After-Action Report Format
Task force observer-controller Describe format and limit time
Brigade 83 Describe brigade concept
Task force commander Describe task force concept and how it was
executed
Task force engineer' Describe engineer operations
Opposing force commander Describe opposing force concept and how
it was executed
Opposing force engineer Describe opposing force engineer opera-
tions
Company team commanders Describe how mission was executed
Opposing force commander Provide comments to company team com-
manders' explanations
Task force observer-controller Lead a discussion of operating systems
Brigade commander- Provide a wrapup of significant lessons
exercise director learned
Note: At various times, other members of the task force slice are called upon to present
their concept and execution. Usually, this is done during the discussion of the operating
systems.
Figure 2
controller leads an analysis of each
operating system in the task force (Figure
3). An eighth system. survivability, is
added to facilitate discussion of opera-
tions security. communications security,
nuclear. biological and chemical opera-
tions. hot and cold weather operations
and other aspects of survivability. To
facilitate the discussion, an excellent ap-
proach used at the National Training
Center is followed. A representative
chart. which has been completed for one
operating system. is shown at Figure 4.
The observer-controller opens the dis-
cussion by identifying a problem that has
been observed within an operating
system. In the case shown at Figure 4, the
company teams were moving in a forma-
tion which invited and resulted in heavy
casualties. The task force observer-con-
troller used a leading question to get the
discussion going: "Team A Commander.
why did you move in a traveling forma-
tion?"
Often, a discussion will ensue. In this in-
stance. it was discovered that the com-
pany team commander had selected the
traveling formation partially" because the
task force did not tell him that enemy con-
tact was likely. This changed the analysis
shown in the "Reason" block to include:
"Dissemination of intelligence to com-
pany teams was not timely."
At the end of the discussion, the task
force observer-controller links key
teaching points to doctrine and moves to
the next operating system. The task force
AAR takes 1 to 2 hours. but it is time
1984
19
MILITARY REVIEW
Task Force Operating Systems
1. Command. control and communi
cations
2. Intelligence
3. Maneuver
4. Fire support
5. Mobility-countermobility
6. Air defense
7. Combat service support
8. Survivability
Figure 3
wellspent. Furthermore. the eight-day
ARTEPFTX allows enoughtimefor the
task force AAR to be done every day.
There is often time available to correct
deficiencies and repeat the missions or
tasksthatneed work.
Roles 01 the Division and the Brigade
Effective managementiscrucialto the
success of the eight-day ARTEP FTX.
Roles have been clearly established for
thedivisionandthebrigade.Thedivision
planstheexercisetoensurethatresources
arefocused. thecalendarislockedin.and
all elementsof the brigadeslice arepres-
ent.Theassistantdivisioncommanderfor
maneuver serves as the exercise direc-
tor. Inaddition. thedivisionstaffpartici-
pates by providing the task force ob-
server-controllerandexpertsinstafffunc-
tional areas. Company and platoon
observer-c.ontrollers are fielded by a
designated battalion. This forges a close
link between general staffplanning and
the execution of training for combat at
battalion level. It also provides for con-
tinuity of evaluation and a clear under-
standingoftheevaluationresultsatdivi-
sionlevel.
The brigade plans and executes the
ARTEPFTX for thedivision because. in
combat. thebrigadecommander controls
and orchestrates most of the basic com-
bat. combat support and combat service
support systems in the division. There-
fore. in a training environment. the
brigade commander must also forge the
combined arms team consisting of the
eightoperatingsystemswhich havebeen
discussed.Thebrigadecommanderbrings
togetherth!! brigade slice in the detailed
planning and execution of the ARTEP
FTX. The task force observer-controller
group and opposing forces also work
directlyfor thebrigadecommander.This
organization allows the brigade com-
mander to train and evaluate the task
force andthebrigadeslice.
Force Modernization
Theeight-dayARTEPFTXprovidesan
effectivevehicletoassistinforcemodern-
ization. The 1st Infantry Division
(Mechanized) is changing rapidly as it
convertsfrom the H-series totheJ-series
tableoforganization and equipment and
as it learns how toemploy newly fielded
systems. It is clear thatleaders must be
well-versed in emerging doctrine. that
soldiers must train and be evaluated on
new equipment and that new organiza-
tionsmustbetrainedandevaluated.
Theeight-dayARTEPFTXenablesthe
division to train and evaluate all of the
critical battle tasks which are driven by
forcemodernization. During AARs.
issues concerning new doctrine. equip-
ment andorganization areidentified and
December
20
-----
------- ------- ------------- ---- ------------
------ ---- ------
------ -------
ARTEPFTX
Chart for Conducting After-Action Review of Each Operating System
Operational system: Maneuver
------ ----
Event: Jy1ove!!1ent to contact - t\1ove
Effect: not providing overwatch between platoons when
contact is likely. Task force not providing overwatch between com-
teams when enemy contact is likely, _____. ________
Reason:.tJot following task force standing operating procedures. Nct using
QoundiD9 overwatctJ. (Later:. Timely dissemination of intelligence.)
-_. --- -- --- ----- --------
Cost: Heavy losses on Lnitial contact. N.o overwatching uoit to suppress.
Diffic.t!!!Lmoving "s.l!QPorLQyJire" unit into positio'-'-n"-.________
Doctrine: Army Training and Evaluation Program 71-2, Mechanized Infantry!
Lank Task Force (3-VI-1, Mission-:-!!1ove
L
Unit-battalion taskJorce, Task
Number 10:""move in traveling overwatch and Task Number 11-move in
b9unding_ overwa1ch); Final Draft FLeid Manl,lal 71-2, The Tank and Mecha-
nized Infantry _Battalion Task Force, Chapters 3 and 4; and Field Manual
[1:1 The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team, Chapter 4.
Figure 4
discussed. For example. on a recent
ARTEP FTX. much time was spent rec
onciling the doctrine stated in the Final
Draft Field Manual 712. The Tank and
Mechanized Infantrv Battalion Task
Force. July 1983. for the battalion task
force. the task force stl).nding operating
procedures and the task force
Thus. an important side benefit of the
ARTEP FTX is the identification of force
modernization problems that need to be
resolved quicklv by the division.
21
1984
MILITARY REVIEW
Conclusion
The eight-day ARTEP FTX is a multi-
echelon training exercise and an impor-
tant training event for the 1st Infantry
Division (Mechanized). It is designed to
train leaders and soldiers to fight and win
the AirLand Battle and to provide a basis
for sustainment training.
Company team, platoon, section, crew
and individual training must be done be-
tween ARTEP FTXs based on weak-
nesses that have been identified. The
eight-day ARTEP FTX is focused on the
wartime mission. Time is provided for
planning and AARs although planning
time is sometimes restricted to vary the
stress placed on leaders.
Through the use of MILES and the
simulation of all operating systems, a
realistic, integrated and "dirty" battle-
field is portrayed to the task force. An
aggressive, determined opposing force
unit is fielded. On this battlefield. soldiers
are killed or wounded when they make an
error. Stress is placed on all operating
systems in the task force, and they are
made to perform. The weak areas are
quickly identified. Important teaching
points which lead to correction of prob-
lems are brought out in daily AARs, and a
detailed evaluation of all ARTEP tasks is
provided at the end of the exercise.
The proof of the success of recent
ARTEP FTXs has come in the form of
comments from task force commanders
and other leaders. They say this kind of
exercise provides superb, realistic train-
ing. They uniformly appreciate the oppor-
tunity to be part of the analysis of train-
ing issues, and the clarity of the lessons
learned enables them to improve in many
areas while they train.
The Future
The success of the eight-day ARTEP
FTX will be sustained and developed
further in the future. The 1st Infantry
Division (Mechanized) is considering an
expanded live-fire phase with an evalua-
tion of platoons (platoon tests) in separate
exercises. Consideration is also being
given to exercising two task forces simul-
taneously, opposed by an opposing force
task force. In addition, the eight-day
ARTEP FTX will become a division vehi-
cle to assure standardization. As these
refinements are made, it is increasingly
clear that the eight-day ARTEP FTX is
the linchpin for training soldiers to fight
and win the Air Land Battle. "'k
Lieutenant Colonel Wdlwm R. !..vnch III IS
currfmtlv thecommander.5thBattalIOn. 16th In-
fantrv. ]<;t Infantrv DW1SlOn (fl,lechamzed), Fort
Rilev, Kansas He recewed a B S from the US
Al1litarv AcademvandanM.A (rom theUniver-
Sltv ofKan<;as He has served with the4th and
8th Infantr1' DWlslOns f!tlechamzed) He 1'l co-
author'(,ltk CaptaznGarthT Blo:dtamoft/war-
tlele "TrUlmng En the 8th Infantrv
(/l-lechanued)",dlich appearedIn theSeptember
1988 Militarv Review


, ",'
A:,...
December 22
S A
car
Colonel Norbert Majewski, Federal Republic of Germany Army,
and Lieutenant Colonel John H. Peyton, US Army
The training of a prospective German General Staff officer is
dljmanding. Its objective is to produce a talented. highly
",otivated officer who is ready to assume key assignments
within the German armed forces or NATO.
T
HE term "German army General
Staff officer" evokes varied emo
tions within n.llitruy circles. Students of
military history tend to relate it to Ger
man military tradition emanating from
the days of Karl von Clausewitz or to the
German army's performance during the
world wars. Others may view it as a sym
bol of "elitism" within a military estab
Iishment or as representative of a system
designed to produce the leadership of to
day's army of the Federal RepUblic of
Germany. Whatever the feeling, refer
ences to the German army General Staff
appear often in military literature of both
a historic and a contemporary nature.
1984 23
MILITARY REVIEW
Although there is no German army
General Staff in existence today, the
General Staff officer is alive and well. In
viewing the contemporary German army
General Staff officer, it should be realizE'd
that he is the product of a deliberate selec-
tion and training process. It is a process
designed to produce a talented, highly
motivated officer who is capable of oc-
cupying key positions in the Federal
Republic of Germany's armed forces (the
BundesU'ehr) and within the North Atlan-
tic Treaty Organization (NATO). As is
true with the US Army, this training
process is dynamic and is continually be-
ing reviewed and revised to meet the re-
quirements of a modern army.
BACKGROUND
Training and Experience
By the time a German army officer enters
General Staff training, he has received
extensive military and civilian education.
He has passed successive hurdles in the
career-progression process ranging from
initial entry training as an enlisted man,
to graduation from a German armed
forces university, to the successful com-
pletion of the Field Grade Officer Qualifi-
cation Course. In most cases, more than
three years of his military career have
been spent studying a civilian discipline
leading to the award of a Diplom, the
equivalent of a master's degree. More
than two years have been spent in other
forms of military or military-related train-
ing, of which about eight months have
been devoted to tactics and branch train-
ing. Almost all of the officer's practical
military experience has been with troop
units, and he has spent from two to five
years as a company commander.
As a result, he knows tactics and com-
mand and control from squad to battalion
level. His experience varies, however, ac-
cording to his branch of service. The
typical student is between 30 and 35 years
old and has about 12 years of service when
he reports for General Staff officer train-
ing.
Selection
The selection of individuals for army
General Staff officer training is based
upon efficiency ratings as well as upon
performance during attendance at the
Field Grade Officer Qualification Course.
This course is mandatory for all profes-
sional officers of the German armed forces
and determines whether an officer is
qualified for promotion to field grade
rank. The overriding factor in selection,
however, is the quality of the officer's effi-
ciency ratings which are received once
every two years. The "total man" ap-
proach is used to select an officer who is
not only intelligent but who also has
demonstrated the necessary leadership
and persona) qualities.
In additioh, the officer must be recom-
mended for General Staff/Admiral Staff
officer training by his division or equiva-
lent commander. Branch selection boards
convene at the Defense Ministry during
the first quarter of each calendar year.
Approximately 90 army, navy and air
force officers are selected, of which about
45 are army officers. About 20 officers
from other NATO countries also partici-
pate in the training, and three of them are
from the United States. An army officer's
basic branch is not considered in the selec-
tion process. Other criteria apply for the
selection of navy and air force officers.
From a given year group, about 10 per-
cent are selected. Because of the rigorous
selection criteria, almost all officers who
24
are selected eventually complete the
General Staff!Admiral Staff Officer
Course.
THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES
GENERAL STAFF/ADMIRAL STAFF
OFFICER COURSE
The General StafflAdmiral Staff Officer
Course is taught at the German Armed
Forces Staff College (Fuhrungsakademie
der Bundeswehr) in Hamburg and lasts
for two years. It should be emphasized
that German armed forces officers from
all three branches of service are trained in
a common course. Subjects of equal im-
portance to all three services,' such as
security policy, social sciences and man-
agement, are taught in joint seminars.
The common instruction for officers of all
branches promotes an understanding for
GERMAN GENERAL STAFF
the peculiarities and problems of the other
branches and serves as a precondition for
successful joint operations.
A new General Staffl Admiral Staff Of-
ficer Course begins every October. Thus,
there is always a junior course and a
senior course in progress. A class is sub-
divided into student sections consisting
of about 14 officers, of which two are nor-
mally from other NATO countries. Each
student section is supervised by a section
leader in the grade of lieutenant colonel or
commander who normally spends the en-
tire two-year training period with his sec-
tion. He observes the students continual-
ly and evaluates their progress through-
out the period. Usually, the section leader
has just completed a battalion or
battalion-equivalent command tour. The
section leader serves as an adviser,
evaluator and faculty member who
teaches command and control and tactics
subjects to the members of his section.
German Armed ForcesSlallCollege
MILITARY REVIEW
The course is designed to provide the
students time to assimilate what they are
learning. Normally. two afternoons each
week are free. as are weekends. and the
month of July is spent on leave. There is
no assigned homework. Rather. students
are expected to review that day's instruc-
tion. There are no written examinations.
Each student prepares a thesis during
the first year that examines a specific
topic relating to security policy. socio-
political relationships or organization/
training/employment problems. Most
thesis topics are recommended by various
government agencies to allow for research
in areas of current interest to the armed
forces and government.
The curriculum is dynamic in nature.
alternating between lectures. seminars.
exercises and student trips. Joint service
and service-specific subjects are inter-
spersed. Joint service training relates pri-
October
marily to subjects which are normally
taught at the senior service college level in
the United States. The German armed
forces have no equivalent to US senior
service college courses. Therefore. these
subjects receive appropriate emphasis
during General Staff/Admiral Staff of-
ficer training and impart that knowledge
required for service at high command and
staff levels. Time is provided for activities
such as sports. current events and admin-
istrative time. Figure 1 depicts the
course.
TRAINING OF THE ARMY
GENERAL STAFF OFFICER
The broad objective of the course is:
... to enable officers to perform General
Staff duties in an independent and respon-
October October
'llt Branch of lerJeospeClfl trammg
""
c
~
~ ~
:Of
~ ~
~ g g:
i
j j
i
E E
~
0
~ ~ '-'
Common service tramlng
_------------ Two years -------------__
'Army only
Figure I
December
26
GERMAN GENERAL STAFF
sible manner during peacetime, crises and
war, within their own branch and with
other branches of service, in national and
integrated (NA TO) areas and at all com-
mand levels.
Army-specific instruction is designed to
qualify officers to command, control and
employ army formations from brigade to
corps level; to refine the knowledge and
understanding of the principal staff nmc-
tional areas, particularly logistics; and to
develop capabilities for executing com-
mand and staff actions, A particularly im-
portant goal is to teach the student to im-
plement "mission-type orders (Fllhren
mit Auftrag), .. This means that, whenever
possible, broad, mission-type orders
should be issued, The details concerning
the execution of an ordpr are left to the ap-
propriate commander with the confidence
that, even when a mission cannot be ex-
ecuted exactly as had been planned, the
results will still be commensurate with
the original intent and objective of that
mission.
The student section leader is the key in-
gredient of army-specific training. He is
responsible for the tactic&! and the com-
mand and control training of his section.
He accompanies his section on trips, par-
ticipates in its social activities and, in the
two-year period, gets to know each indi-
vidual extremely well as their immediate
superior. In this regard, he makes a
valuable contribution to the student eval-
uation process by being able not only to
evaluate a student's performance but also
his character.
Other members of the army faculty pro-
vide instruction in specific areas such as
intelligence, logistics. air defense. com-
munications and the principles of all other
branches of the army. These faculty
members instruct. monitor and evaluate
student officers within their specific func-
tional areas.
PRECOURSE PHASE
Prior to reporting for the course, select-
ees study for three months at the Federal
Language Institute near Cologne. The
primary emphasis is on English to pre-
pare officers for NATO assignments.
Those officers already proficient in
English study another language such as
Russian. After the completion of the
language training and prior to the start of
the two-year course in Hamburg, the
students visit the infantry. armor. ar-
tillery and engineer schools over a t wo-
week period. During these visit.s, the
students participate in various map exer-
cises that are designed to bring their com-
petence to a common standard and pro-
vide a basis for participation in future
training.
COURSE CONDUCT
Early in the course.
ing begins with the introduction of the ar-
my's command and control system. The
system is defined as "the systematic in-
terrelationship of command and control
organization. procedures. and means
available for completing the military mis-
sion." Command and control procedures
are applied in a special command and con-
trol organization exercise. An under-
standing of these procedures is a precon-
dition for further training.
MAP AND COMMAND POST EXERCISES
The primary vehicles for the army-spe-
cific training are map exercises which. in
27
1984
MILITARY REVIEW
certain cases. are expanded into command
post exercises (CPXs). These exercises
take place over extended periods of time-
normally several months-which are in
terspersed with other instructional activi
ties and treat a specific form of combat at
a specific comri'rand level. Instruction
tailored to the exercise situation is pro
vided concurrently in areas such as in
telligence and logistics. Abbreviated map
exercises, which last for short periods and
ar" conducted under time pressures, also
take place during the overall exercise. The
training is reinforced by carefully pre
pared and executed terrain walks on the
terrain actually depicted in the exercise.
The area used in each exercise scenario
is in a different area of the Federal
Republic of Germany between the Baltic
Sea and the Donau River so that the
various terrain forms and their impact on
military operations can be conveyed. This
terrain appreciation is strengthened
through instruction and briefings by
military geography officers. Little use is
made of advance sheets, and there is no
homework. Staff groupings are formed,
officers receive specific command or staff
assignments, and it is up to each student
to become competent in his assigned area.
Upon completion of a specific portion of
an exercise. the student is critiqued by a
faculty member who is an expert on the
subject. During CPXs. an evaluation
group of student officers compiles notes
about overall performance. The notes are
used in an indepth critique that imme-
diately follows the exercise. This training
follows a normal progression from the re-
inforced battalion to corps level and
treats various forms of combat as well as
road movement and mobilization. Supple-
mentary tasks. such as the crossing of
water obstacles. the meeting engagement,
relief and the passage of lines. are also in-
cluded.
Tactical trammg ana exercises are
designed to develop the ability of
students not only to evaluate a given
situation but also to visualize how a deci-
sion would be carried out under varied
conditions or circumstances. Examples
are radio silence, the effect of unit
response times to orders, and the effects
of the enemy and the terrain on a given
task organization. By continually alter-
nating between instruction, exercise and
visits to tactical units, as well as partici-
pation in maneuvers and CPXs. a balance
is maintained between theory and prac-
tice. Figure 2 lists the exercises conducted
during the twoyear period which are:
The Battalion and Brigade Offense Ex-
ercise. The initial tactical exercise. which
depicts reinforced battalion and brigade
operations. serves as an introduction to
tactics instruction. I t provides or rein-
forces knowledge at battalion and brigade
levels as a basis for training at higher
command levels. Its fundamental purpose
is to convey knowledge in the command
and control of a reinforced battalion in the
offense and the planning of operations
and the issuance of orders at brigade
level. As is true for all follow-on exercises.
such fundamentals as mission analysis.
the issuance of warning orders. the or-
ganization of staff work. the estimate of
the situation. the decision and the prep-
aration of operations orders and graphic
orders are stressed. The exercise is con-
ducted over a two-month period.
The Movement Exercise. This exercise
trains the student in movement organiza-
tion and control using a Territorial Army
lTerritorialheer) brigade as a model to
familiarize the student with the Ter-
ritorial Army organization. It should be
noted that. in addition to those units
which would be committed to NATO in
time of war. the German army also con-
tains Territorial Army units which would
December 28
GERMAN GENERAL STAFF
Type of
Operation
Command
level '
Map
Exercise
CPX Terrain
Walk
Computer
Supported
Offense
%
X
X
Movement
X
D
X
Offensive
XX
D
X X X
Delay/
Defense
%
X X X X
Alert.
MobilIZation,
Deployment
LJ X
Defense
LJ
X X X
Symbol for a Territorial Army (TerntonalheerJ bngade
CPX - Command post exerCise
remain under national control. The Ter-
ritorial Army units have a different
organization and would be employed
primarily in the rear combat zone (com-
munications zone),
The crossing of water obstacles in rear
combat areas is included in the exercise as
is interfacing with various national
authorities that are responsible for traffic
coordination and control. Careful plan-
ning that will enable several units to cross
each other's march routes is stressed. The
importance of this exercise is illustrated
by the high density of people and vehicles
Figure 2
in the Federal Republic of Germany and
the critical need for the close control of
road movements during mobilization and
war. This exercise lasts about one month.
The Division Offense Exercise. As a
natural progression of the tactics instruc-
tion, a division offense exercise em-
phasizes water-crossing operations and
brigade operational planning. It includes
a terrain walk and concludes with a CPX.
The exercise extends over a two-month
period.
The Division and Brigade Delay and
Defense Exercise. To illustrate how the
1984 29
MILITARY REVIEW
exercises are conducted, this particular
exercise will be reviewed in more detail
than the earlier ones. The aim of this exer-
cise is to provide training and practical
application in delay and defensive opera-
tions in accordance with German army
doctrine. Specific objectives include a
strengthened knowledge of the inter-
action of army service branches and com
bined operations. as well as general com-
bat missions and the peculiarities of delay
and defensive operations.
Interoperability with US Army units is
also emphasized. The exercise provides
training in the functional areas of G 1, G2
and G4. as well as the branch of service
(artillery. engineers, air defense artillery,
signal, and so on) instruction. The plan-
ning of division-level defensive operations
is emphasized as is the preparation of
operations plans and orders for the delay
and defense at brigade level. Command
and control are exercised in real tactical
time in two abbreviated map exercises, a
spontaneous continuation of a previously
presented tactical situation. and a CPX.
The exercise is conducted in four phases
as depicted in Figure 3. These are:
Phase I-The initial phase lasts 15
days. After 6 hours of instruction on the
delay and defense. students are intro-
duced to the exercise through situation
briefings by the faculty. These briefings
present the situation of the German IV
Corps and are followed by the issuance of
a corps defense order. At this point. stu-
dent participation in the exercise begins.
Students in staff work groups of four of-
ficers each serve as members of the Ger-
man 16th Division. They complete an
estimate of the situation and present a
decision briefing. Concurrently. faculty
members present exercise-specific in-
struction in artillery support, engineer
support, communications, air defense,
nuclear. biological and chemical support,
and so forth. This phase concludes with
the preparation of an operations plan and
its annexes by the student staff group.
After presentation of the staff group solu-
tions, a .. school solution" is presented as
a common basis for the continuation of
the exercise. After Phase I. students par-
ticipate in the annual German army field
training exercise (FTX) conducted in the
REFORGER exercise time frame.
Phase II-This phase lasts eight
days. Using the school solution from
Phase I. the students are divided into
brigade staff groups to prepare brigade
operations plans. A three-day terrain
walk enables the students to evaluate the
actual terrain depicted in the exercise and
to determine if the brigade operations
plans that have already been developed
could actually be executed at battalion
level. Terrain orientation takes place,
short exercises are conducted. and battal-
ion-level planning requirements are con-
sidered. After returning to Hamburg. the
students have 10 instructional hours to
review and modify their plans based upon
the terrain appreciation received on the
ground. In each student section. orders
for the division's three brigades are com-
pleted and briefed. The best student solu-
tions are adopted for use during the CPX.
Phase III-This phase lasts eight
days. Two abbreviated map exercises and
a situation continuation train the
students under tactical real time in delay
and defense operations. In addition. a
historical example is presented in examin-
ing Operation Goodwood which involved
a British attack against a German defense
in Normandy in 1944. The students com-
pare and evaluate those doctrinal prin-
ciples that have current application. Tele-
vision tape interviews with participants
in the operation are viewed and. where
possible, actual participants review their
experiences.
December 30
GERMAN GENERAL STAFF
August September December (Second year) October November
LJ
I
t------;
X
II
D
Lt--I
X
D
III
L
LJ
~
~
L
IV
H
D
Phase IV-The exercise concludes
with a two-day. computer-supported CPX
which is immediately followed by an exer-
cise critique.
Alert. Mobilization. Deployment and
Defense Corps Exercises. The high point
and conclusion of army-specific training is
the corps operations exercise. It is pre-
ceded by an alert. mobilization and de-
ployment exercise. The first phase con-
sists of preparatory instruction on the
special aspects of command and control at
the corps level. The students are also
briefed by actual US. British and German
army corps commanders concerning their
concepts for corps operationR. The second
phase involves the preparation of a corps
general defense plan that incorporates
necessary decisions and the preparation
Figure 3
of requisite plans and orders. This is ac-
complished by forming two corps staffs
which work independently on common
operational problems. The solutions are
compared by section leaders and faculty
members. and the students are critiqued.
Selected subjects as well as problems
and solutions relating to corps operatiqns
are presented in the form of S ~ f f
studies" prepared by the students w ch.
in a special presentation. are briefed t the
German army chief of staff and the tree
German army corps commanders. He e.
again. an attempt is made to establish a
close relationship between theory and
practice in military operations in the
Federal Republic of Germany. The exer-
cise concludes with a two-sided CPX
which is computer-supported.
1984
31
MILITARY REVIEW
Computer Support 01 Exercises
Computer support in CPXs reduces the
time needed for the prep.aration and con-
duct of exercises and reduces the number
of control personnel required. It is also
used to objectively determine data concern-
ing personnel gains and losses. as well as
losses of terrain in high-intensity combat.
The simulation model used is called
KORA/OA. which is an extract of the
words Korpsrahmenubung-Offiziersaus-
bi/dung (corps CPX-officer training}.
and it consists of three interrelated parts:
the scenario. the environment and the
combat units. Its central structure is the
Land Battle Presentatioll. The organiza-
tion of the combat units involved in the
exercise is provided for a given scenario.
The availability of unit organic equip-
ment and personnel begins at 100 percent.
Additionally. the initial situation is pro-
vided as are all unit positions. missions
and task organizations. Theoeentral struc-
ture can determine. at any given time. the
combat situation of the tmrticipating
units. Specifically. it can provide unit
engagement. combat activity. losses.
movements and missions. This is done ac-
cording to basic assumptions and rules.
Calculation is done in increments of 15
minutes of exercise time. The control staff
has access to the results after 30 minutes
which allows for the portrayal of near-
real-time conditions.
The environmental conditions are of
special importance in the course of the
battle. They are the additional factors
which affect the combat value of the fight-
ing elements. Terrain. as one of these fac-
tors. is automatically analyzed according
to shape. vegetation. builtup areas. and so
forth. I t is also related to the capability of
units to move. find cover and camouflage.
and use their weapons. For this purpose.
two large areas in Germany-one in the
north and one in the south-have been
evaluated to provide the system's data
base. Obstacles and impediments. like
barriers and rivers. represent separate in-
puts.
Another factor which greatly influences
the operations is combat support. Ar-
tillery. engineers, antitank helicopters
and close air support are assessed in ad-
ditional models and considered in combat
analysis. An additional reconnaissance
model has been installed. This model
gives the results of all reconnaissance
missions ordered by the player staff. As
has already been indicated. the system.
directly supports the control staff. The
player staff receives the results of its deci-
sions and orders. The control staff can in-
fluence the exercise by adding new units
or by increasing the combat readiness of
given units. Other models for logistics
and air defense are being developed.
Abbreviated Map Exercises
Abbreviated map exercises are con-
ducted as part of the overall exercise.
These exercises are developed by student
sections and administered to other stu-
dent sections. Their purpose is to place
the student in a situation whereby he is re-
quired to develop a tactical decision under
the pressure of time. The student is placed
in a tactical setting at a particular com'
mand level. He receives radio reports
from higher and lower units which enable
him to evaluate the situation. He is then
forced under the pressure of time to make
an appropriate decision in allocating
available combat power to accomplish his
mission in accordance with the higher
commander's intent.
The objective of this type of exercise is
for the student to arrive at the right deci-
sion at the right time without additional
command guidance. If the student acts
December 32
tooearly.hedissipateshisresources. Ifhe
actstoolate.he"loses"thebattle.Theex-
erciseiscarefullycritiquedcomparingthe
variousdecisions madebytherespective
studentworkgroupsatvarioustimesdur-
ingtheexercise.
Special Subjects
Special subjects. such as military
history andmilitarytechnology. serveto
increasegeneralknowledge aspartofthe
army-specific training. In military
history. thedevelopmentofrelationships
among the armed forces. the state and
society is examined. In addition. the
developmentofmilitarystrategy.lessons
ofhistoricaloperationsandtheprinciples
of war. with their changing effects on
political and military leadership. are
studied. The goal is to enableofficers to
understandtheirpositioninthestateand
society from a professional standpoint
andin a historicalcontext.
In military technology. students must
acquirethecapabilitytorecognizegeneral
technical problems and supervise their
correction. They must also be able to
determine whether specialists have cor-
rectlyevaluatedtechnicalconsiderations.
Additionally. theylearnaboutimportant
military equipment systems. to include
productionandprocurementprocedures.
TRAINING IN THE PREPARATION ANO
CONOUCT OF EXERCISES
In another training phase. students
prepare and conduct exercises under
faculty supervision. Students are in-
structed on how to prepare and conduct
CPXs and FTXs atbrigade and division
levels. The practical application of this
tr'liningis forstudentstopreparea CPX
GERMAN GENERAL STAFF
or an FTX for an actual brigade or divi-
sion and then to act as umpires or con-
trollers during its conduct. Tl}is both
enhances the training of the student of-
ficers and assists the units being exer-
cised.
Whenever possible. joint service and
army-specific instruction are integrated.
Forexample. management instructionis
conductedtocomplementinstructionand
training in command and control. Eng-
lish-language instruction by US and
British liaison officers andtheparticipa-
tionofUSandBritish-armyofficersinex-
ercises complement the regular English-
languageinstruction.
Visits tonationalandintegrated head-
quarters. as well as visits to German
armed forces installations. roundout the
training. Anexchangeprogram with the
French. British. Italian and Dutch
militarycolleges duringwhich map exer-
cises are conducted also takes place. A
highlightofthecourseisa lO-dayvisitto
US militaryfacilities andcities.
The final phase of the courselasts for
two monthsandservesseveralpurposes.
Students participate in the annual Ger
man army FTX. and selected officers
servewithUSArmybrigadeanddivision
staffs during the REFORGER exercise.
Informationaboutcurrenttrendsinmili-
tary technology is also presented. Em-
phasisis placed upon trainingfor warin
peacetime.Themainthrustisontheprac-
tical requirements of a General Staffof-
ficeratdivisionlevelinpeacetimesuchas
preparation of training plans and con-
ductingtrainingatamajortrainingarea.
Students become familiar with the Ger-
manarmyHEROS computerinformation
system as well as "nonmilitary" opera-
tions such as disaster relief. They also
participate in seminars designed to
preparethemfortheirfirstassignmentas
GeneralStaffofficers.
1984 33
MILITARY REVIEW
After graduation from the course and
receipt of the General Staff officer desig-
nation-i.G. or im Generalstabdienst-
the officer's career is carefully managed.
With the exception of command posi-
tions, each General Staff position can only
be occupied by a graduate of the General
Staff Officer Course, with minor excep-
tions. Upon receiving his initial General
Staff officer assignment, the officer has at
least an idea of what his follow-on assign-
ment will be and what his chances are for
foreign military schooling.
A typical career pattern would include
assignment as G4 of a brigade, duty with
the Defense Ministry, attendance at a
foreign military college, battalion com-
mand, G 1 or G 3 of a division. NATO staff
duty and brigade command. About 10
percent of the graduates of a given
General Staff Officer Course will become
generals, and most of the class will be pro-
moted to colonel.
The overriding consideration for a Ger-
man army General Staff officer is that,
through his education and training at the
German Armed Forces Staff College, as
well as his professional experience. he
develops a true understanding of his
Colonel Norbert Federal Republic of
Germany Army. is currently the director. Army
Instruction Department. German Armed Forces
Staff College. Hamburg, West Germany He lS a
graduate of the German Armed Forces Staffeol-
lege. His command and staff positions include
serving as the G3 and the chief of staff of two
mechanized infantry divisions and as an instruc-
tor at the German Armed Forces Staff Col/ege.
duties and responsibilities to the German
state and to his subordinates. This is con-
sidered more important than the rank
which he will attain during his career. In
military leadership, the General Staff of-
ficer must possess the qualities of inter-
personal sensitivity, personal integrity
and self-confidence in addition to basic
military competence. The nurturing of
these qualities is a prime objective of the
German army General Staff officer train-
ing.
In conclusion, it should be emphasized
that the army-specific training outlined in
this article encompasses about 50 percent
of the total General Staff officer training.
The other 50 percent concerns strategy,
security politics, social sciences and com-
mand and leadership which are taught in
service-common blocks of instruction and
frequently in seminars containing officers
of all three branches of service. The use of
this system guarantees a uniform training
for all General Staff officers of the Ger-
man armed forces in areas having com-
mon application. This training is then
complemented by the service-specific
training which is the subject of this arti-
cle.
Lieutenant CololUIlJohn H. Peyton is current-
ly the chief, Army Section. Office of Defense
Cooperation. Bonn, West Germany. He 1>eceived
a B.A. from the University of Washington and is
a graduate of the USACGSC. His command and
staff assignments include serving as a liaison of-
ficer for the German II Corps and as an instruc--
torlliaison officer at the German Armed Forces
Staff College, Hamburg, West Germany.
34
Light
Infantry

In
Europe:
Strategic
Flexibility
and
Conventional
Deterrence
Captain David H. Petraeus.
US Army
35
MILITARY REVIEW
The light infantry has become a popular topic of discussion in
military circles. This article addresses sel'eral important
aspects ofthe light infantry such as the new units that are being
formed and their possible roles in Europe. the renewed emphasis
on NATO's cOIwenfiollal forces and fhe US Army's need for in-
creased tactical and strategic flexibility.
T
HE"most demanding challenge" for
theUSArmyofthe1980swillbeto:
...develop and demonstrate the capa-
bility to succf'ss{ullv meet threats to vital
interests outside oj" Europe. lcithout com-
promising the decis",e theater of Ct'ntral
Europe.'
That was the judgment in 1980 of
General E. C. Meyer. then the Army's
chiefofstaff.Thechallengeheidentified
then appears every bit as formidable to-
day.
FORWARO OEPLOYMENT
VERSUS STRATEGIC FLEXIBILITY:
MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE?
The problem has been that the two
parts of the Army's most demanding
challengehaveoftenseemedmutuallyex-
clusive.Thefirst partisthemaintenance
of theconventionaldeterrentforces com-
mitted to the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO). and the second is
theimprovementoftheArmy'scapability
tomeetthreatstoUSinterestsoutsideof
Europe-inotherwords.thedevelopment
ofunprecedentedstrategicflexibility.The
maintenance of the conventional deter-
rent forces committed to NATO has re-
sulted in the stationing in Europe of a
largeportionoftheActivecomponentof
the Army-approximately 200.000 of a
780.000memberforce-predominantlyin
theFederal RepublicofGermany.'
Traditionally. these forward deployed
forces have been "heavy." That is. they
have been built around maneuver ele-
mentsthataremechanizedinfantryorar-
mor units. Of the four and two-thirds
(plus) divisionsin Europe, theonly light
UScombatunitsarethebrigadeinBerlin
and oneairborneinfantrybattalioncom-
bat team stationed in Vicenza, Italy.
(However, because of their missions. it
cannotbeanticipatedthateitherofthese
unitswillbeavailabletotheUSforcesin
NATO'sCentralArmyGroup.)Giventhe
United States' limited air and sea lift
assets, and the difficulty of deploying
heavy units, the forces stationedin Ger-
many cannot be considered reasonably
availablefor emergenciesoutsideofCen-
tralEurope,evenweresuchadeployment
deemedpoliticallyandstrategicallydesir-
able.
There are, ofcourse, excellent reasons
for stationing so much of the Army in
Europe and for having that contingent
consistofheavyforces. NATOisthecor-
nerstone of US foreign policy_ Further-
more.thehugeWarsawPactconventional
forces facing NATO arelargely armored
and mechanized. And, in most cases,
aespite the advent of antitank guided
missiles, the best all-around antitank
weapon isstillanothertank.
Theproblememergeswhenonelooksat
thesecondpartofthechallengeidentified
by Meyer. Itis the challengeofdevelop-
ing the capability to successfully meet
threats to vital US interests outside of
Europe without compromising the Cen-
tralEuropeantheater.Giventhesmallest
December
36
LIGHT INFANTRY
Army since June 1950,' sizable forward
deployments in Europe, Korea and Panama,
and the global nature of US commit-
ments, there is concern that there may not
be enough ground forces to go around.
In August 1983, General John A. Wick-
ham Jr.. Army chief of staff, told re-
porters: "Traditionally, we've had a range
of contingency needs that probably ex-
ceed the force capabilities that we've been
able to generate. That probably applies
now."4
The retired chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, General David C. Jones, was less
cautious in expressing his concern. In the
summer of 1983, Jones said that the mis-
match between US military forces and
strategy "is !p'eater now than it was
before because "{e are trying to do every-
thing.'" ,
In fact, as William W. Kaufmann has
noted, of the 19 active duty divisions in
the Army and Marine Corps, 11 1/3 al-
ready have quite specific responsibilities.
Only seven and two-thirds divisions can,
therefore, be considered seriously as mak-
ing up an uncommitted reserve, and sev-
eral of them must be rounded out by Na-
tional Guard units to reach full strength.'
And, in the case of the units in Europe,
even if we wanted to move them from
Europe to another region during a crisis,
their "heaviness" would make the job ex-
tremely difficult considering the limited
air and sea lift assets.'
Given the emergence of regional threats
throughout the world, and the unlikely
prospect of a substantial increase in the
size of the Army, the conclusion is clear.
We must do better with what we have.
One central question quickly emerges:
How can we maintain the conventional
deterrent in Europe and still develop the
level of strategic and tactical flexibility
needed to narrow the gap between our
capabilities and our commitments?
STRENGTHENING NATO'S
CONVENTIONAL DETERRENT
Before tackling that question, however,
a new factor should be added. It is the re-
cent renewal of arguments to strengthen,
not just maintain, the NATO conven-
tional deterrent. As Samuel P. Hunting-
ton wrote not long ago:
The past sever.al years have seen in-
creasing support for shifting the deterrent
emphasis even further in the conventional
direction. This perceived need derives, of
course, from the facts of strategic (nu-
clear) parity between the United States
and the Soviet Union, Soviet achievement
of substantial predominance in theater
nuclear forces, and a continued, and in
some respects, enhanced Soviet superior-
ity in conventional forces. In these cir-
cumstances, in the event of a successful
Soviet conventional advance into West-
ern Europe, how credible would be the
threat of a nuclear response? In the face of
Soviet 'superiority at that level, why
would NATO resort to theater nluclear
weapons, with all the destruction to both
sides that would entail? Even more signif-
icantly, why would the United States use
or even threaten to use its strategic
nuclear forces, if that would ensure
massive Soviet retaliation against North
America?'
Huntington's conclusion, and the view
expressed by an increiising number of
defense experts (including former Secre-
tary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and
former Secretary of State Henry A. Kiss-
inger), is that the only reasonable use of
nuclear weapons in Central Europe is to
deter our opponent from using nuclear
forces. That is to say, the utility of nuclear
weapons in detei-ring conventional ag-
gression has been called into question.-
1984 37
MILITARY REVIEW
While there remains some disagreement
over that conclusion. there has lately been
considerable support for enhancement of
NATO's conventional deterrent to raise
the nuclear threshold. NATO's supreme
allied commander in Europe. General Ber-
nard W. Rogers. has been one of the
leading advocates of a strengthened con-
ventional deterrent." As he has noted:
(/n the past) many considered it suffi-
cient for NATO's conventional forces
merely to be capable of holding a Warsau'
Pact offensive long enough for decisions
to be made about NATO's nuclear re-
sponse. However, in this era of nuclear
parity-or less for NATO-the danger ex-
ists that the Soviets could perceive that
they possess both the capability to inflict
a quick conventional defeat on us and a
sufficient nuclear edge to deter our escala-
tion.
11
Given the new importance of N ..TOs
conventional deterrent. it appears that
our central question should be modified:
How can we maintain, or improve. the
conventional deterrent in Europe and still
develop the level of strategic and tactical
flexibility needed to narrow the gap be-
tween our capabilities and our commit-
ments?
ENTER THE NEW
liGHT INFANTRY DIVISION
The new light infantry divisions being
organized in the United States could pro-
vide part of the answer to our modified
central question. The first of these lean
new divisions will be organized at Fort
Ord. California. beginning in i 985. It is
projected to have a strength of slightly in
excess of 10.000. which is about 6.000 to
9,000 soldiers fewer than current divi-
sions. And it will. therefore. require con-
siderably fewer aircraft to deploy it.
For example. the current infantry divi-
sion has an authorized strength of 18.486
and a lift requirement of 29.202 short
tons. It would require 1.662 sorties by
long-range transport aircraft to move
overseas. That is more than four round
trips by the existing fleet of C5 and C141
aircraft and would require 11 days to com-
plete. Using only C141 aircraft. 19 days
and 1.662 sorties would be needed to
deploy the current infantry division. The
proposed light infantry division would
need only 461 sorties of C141 aircraft and
could be moved in as little as six days."
As Figure 1 shows. current plans call
for a three-brigade division (in the case of
the division being organized at Fort Ord.
one of the brigades might be a National
Guard unit) of nine light infantry maneu-
ver battalions. Because of its lean struc-
ture. the new division will have a "tooth-
to-tail" ratio of approximately 2.7-t0-1
which is considerably better than the
2-to-l ratio of the current infantry divi-
sion.
11
That impressive tooth-to-tail ratio.
however. is achieved at the expense of a
number of the combat. combat support
and service support assets organic to cur-
rent divisions. Thus. there are two ob-
vious questions: How would one of the
new light infantry divisions stack up
against a heavy division? And do light in-
fantry units belong on the Central Euro-
pean battlefield?
In comparison with heavies. the new
lights will be:
Much less costly and easier to main-
tain and support.
Better suited for operations in ur-
ban. heavily forested or rugged areas. and
in adverse weather.
Better suited (when provided air or
ground mobility) for most types of rear
area combat operations.
December
38
LIGHT INFANTRY
light Infantry Division
HHC - Headquarters and headquarters company ATK - Attack
MP - Military police RECON - ReconnaISsance
HHB - Headquarters and headquarters battery DISCOM - Division support command
CAC - Combat aviation company TAMe - Transportation aircraft Maintenance company
Much easier to deploy strategically,
thereby offering enhanced strategic op-
tions.
Better organized and trained for air
assault operations.
Structured to provide a better tooth-
to-tail ratio-that is, a relatively higher
ratio of "fighters" to support personneL
Of course, the new lights will suffer
several major disadvantages when com-
pared to heavies_ Specifically, they will
be:
Figure 1
Much less mobile unless provided
with additional air or ground transporta-
tion assets.
Unable to stand "toe-to-toe" with
enemy heavy forces in relatively open ter-
rain due to a lack of armored protection
and heavy firepower_
Provided with only minimal organic
indirect-fire support, being limited to
mortars and 105mm towed howitzers_
Much more vulnerable to heavy artil-
lery and nuclear and chemical attack.
1984
39
MILITARY REVIEW
Because of such serious disadvantages,
it would be foolhardy to consider, in an ef-
fort to enhance the Army's strategic flexi-
bility, replacement of a significant portion
of the heavy units in Germany with light
infantry. Nonetheless, the new lights will
have some utility in Central Europe. As
will be seen, the real issue should be one of
balance: finding the proper mix of heavies
and lights to suit the terrain, weather and
missions of Central Europe.
TERRAIN AND WEATHER
IN CENTRAL EUROPE
Military forces must be tailored not
only to the potential adversary but to the
terrain and weather as well. Field Manual
100-5, Operations, goes so far as to state
that "weather and terrain have more im-
pact on battle than any other physical fac-
tor, including weapons, equipment, or
supplies."" The weather in NATO's Cen-
tral Region is often adverse, and builtup
areas and forests cover more than half of
the German terrain." Despite these facts,
the US forces are all heavy and, therefore,
are best suited for open, rolling terrain
and less adverse weather.IWith respect to
weather, however, it should be noted that
the new thermal sights used on tanks and
TOW antitank systems have reduced the
problems experienced by heavy units in
dense fog, smoke and periods of dark-
ness.)
The average brigade sector in Germany
contains 25 villages, a ~ d the average
distance between them is only 3.5 kilo-
meters." In his study of "urban sprawl"
in Central Europe, defense analyst Paul
Bracken explains that:
Villages and forests compromise (sic)
nearly 60 per cent of the available terrain.
and-because of their spatial distribution
and the dominotion of roads and open
avenues of approach through the sector-
attacking Warsaw Pact tanks would be
unable to bypass one village without
almost immediately running into another. II
Figure 2 shows the increasing urbaniza-
tion described by Bracken. He is by no
means alone in his assessment. Retired
Lieutenant General James F. Hollings-
worth, who led a US armored regiment
across Europe during 1944-45, wrote in
1983:
On a recent trip to Europe, I could not
help but note how built up Germany has
become. There is very little open terrain
that is not broken up by forest and grow-
ing towns-most of which are less than
one or tu'o kilometers from each other.
!'viost tank engagement ranges are less
than 1,000 meters. There is plenty of in-
fantry country in Western Europe. IEm-
phasis:added.)16
German Major General Franz Uhle-
Wettler, commander of the Bundeswehr's
5th Panzer Division-a heavy unit-
shares Hollingsworth's view. In his book
Gefechtsfeld Mitteleuropa (Battlefield
Central Europe), Uhle-Wettler deplores
what he considers the Bundeswehr's over-
emphasis on the heavy armor and mecha-
nized infantry at the expense of the light
infantry. These units, he claims, would
"logically be expected to defend the 50%
of Germany that is too populated, too in-
dustrialized, too heavily forested or too
abrupt for the maneuver of the heavies. ",.
Highly critical of the heavy-light mix in
the Bundeswehr, Uhle-Wettler's book
clearly states, and buttresses with many
examples, that we must match our forces
to the terrain on which we fight.
What of the terrain in Germany that US
forces will defend? Most of the US for-
. ward deployed units are assigned to the
Central Army Group which, as Figure 3
shows, is responsible for defending the
December 40
East Germany
LIGHT INFANTRY
Area Development in West Germany
Netherlands
Belgium
o Sparse settlement
III Dense settlement
Very dense settlement
Source. Field Manual 100-5, OperatIOns, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C.. 20 August, p 3-9
Figure 2
1984
41
MILITARY REVIEW
southern half of Germany. In general.
that area is hilly. forested and populated
with many towns and cities. Even along
the Fulda Gap and the Hof Corridor-the
historic invasion routes leading into the
sectors of the US V Corps and VII Corps
-there are rolling countryside. lots of tree
lines and many villages and towns. The
Fulda Gap. however. does present far
fewer obstacles to the movement of large
armored units than does the Hof Corridor.
A much smaller number of US units are
forward deployed in the Northern Army
Group sector. The largest US element
currently stationed there is a rein-
forced armored brigade. But current plans
call for a corps based in the United States
to reinforce that region upon mobiliza
tion.
to
The major invasion route into this
region is the North German Plain (see
Figure 3) which is normally viewed as
favorable to the movement of large ar-
mored formations. It is not. however. ob-
stacle-free by any means. Although there
are no mountains and few forests on the
North German Plain. urban sprawl (espe-
cially that centered on Hanover) has
physically shrunk the open areas avail-
able for armored combat. And the urban
sprawl would make it increasingly diffi-
cult for armored units to move rapidly
should NATO forces choose to defend
some of the urban areas.
It is clear that Meyer had all of this in
mind when. in his 1980 White Paper. he
wrote:
Our current program for the rapid rein-
forcement of NATO has focused on the
early deployment of heavy forces. How-
ever, we must continually examine the
utility of light. rapidly deployable divi-
sions in Central Europe to achieve a bal-
ance of heavy and light forces that will
provide a better overall defense posture
given the terrain variations and urban
sprawl that exists and is projected in
much of the region. 21
EMPLOYMENT OF LIGHT INFANTRY
IN CENTRAL EUROPE
Given the terrain of Germany and the
tactical doctrine of the Warsaw Pact. how
could the new light infantry units be
employed on a high-intensity Central
European battlefield? The new lights
could effectively perform various mis-
sions: defense of urban areas or strong-
poin ts, rear area combat operations, air
assault operations and dismounted opera-
tions during periods of limited visibility
or in restrictive terrain.
As wi!! be explained. several of these
missions could be especially important in
strengthening the US conventional deter-
rent in Central Europe because they
would frustrate Soviet hopes for a quick
victory in a European war. As C. N. Don-
nelly. senior analyst at the Soviet Studies
Centre, Royal Military Academy. Sand-
hurst. in the United Kingdom. has writ-
ten:
Soviet military doctrine holds that. if
'rar breaks out in Europe, it must be won
quickly by the Soviet Union if it is to be
u'on at all. If the war drags on. there is a
high risk that it u'ill develop into a cata-
strophic nuclear exchange and/or that the
strains of u'ar will destroy the Soviet bloc
from the inside. 22
Thus, NATO conventional forces must
present a conventional deterrent credible
enough so that no clever Soviet briefer
could. in a crisis. present his superiors
with a conventional attack option that
could hold the prospect of a swift victory.
That briefer's job is not easy now. and cer-
tain uses of light infantry could make his
task more difficult."
December 42
LIGHT INFANTRY
Military Sectors in NATO's Central Region
and the Warsaw Pact Avenues of Approach
France
West German
British
Belgian
Frankfurt.

East Germany
Berhn.
North German
Plain
WUrzburg '1-
1
:1-
United t a t ~ y
West German
Stuttgart
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty OrganizatIOn
NORTHAG- Northern Army Group
CENTAG - Central Army Group MUnich
Figure 3
1984
43
MIlITARY REVIEW
Defense of Urban Terrain
or Strongpoints
Since it is a mlSSlOn that ties units
down, defense of builtup areas or strong-
points can most economically be per-
formed by light infantry, thereby freeing
the mechanized infantry and armor to bet-
ter use their mobility. With the number of
villages and towns in Germany, this could
be an important tactic.
As John J. Mearsheimer has explained,
light infantry defending contiguous urban
areas or strongpoints in the path of an at-
tack would force an attacker to concpn-
trate to achieve a breakthrough or to
canalize his forces should he attempt to
hypass. The increasing firepower of
sophisticated precision guided munitions,
however. increases the vulnerahility of
the enemy's forces should he mass them
to breakthrough or bypass a strongpoint.
Mearsheimer notes that the combination
of precision guided munitions and the
defense of builtup areas or strongpoints
would also force the enemy to abandon
rapid attacks unsupported by infantry
and artillery. Tanks would not be free to
outrun their supporting infantry or ar-
tillery. The record of Israel's 190th Ar-
mored Brigade in the 1973 Middle East
War dearly demonstrates that point."
Even when enemy forces have artillery,
infantry and close air support, light forces
could repel their attack if properly
employed in positions that are difficult to
bypass and are supported by tanks pro-
viding a mobile reserve. The Allies in
World War II learned the difficulty of
penetrating such a defense in the attempt
to break out of the Orne bridgehead in
July 1945 after the Normandy invasion.
In Operation Goodwood, three British
armored divisions attacking on an 8-mile
front with massive artillery and air sup-
port were held up by one weak German
regimental group. The Germans orga-
nized their defense around infantry posi-
tioned in villages supported by 75mm
guns used in an antitank role and some
hastily gathered tank units. The British
eventually broke through, but not until
they had lost 437 of 850 tanks, against a
German loss of 75 tanks and guns." Given
the increasing urban sprawl in Germany,
Operation Goodwood appears to contain
some tactical lessons for NATO's forward
defense.
A declared policy of urban defense
would also have an important deterrent
effect. In the words of European security
specialist Thomas A. Callaghan Jr.:
. it would say to the Russians that
however much you might covet Europe's
labor force and its technological-indus-
trial base. you "'ill never capture it intact.
It u'ould end the temptation to attempt a
short blitzkrieg of Western Europe.'
Rear Area Combat Operations
The new light infantry units will be
well-suited for countering attacks in
N A TO rear areas by special Soviet
forces." Among the forces expected to be
operating behind NATO lines are ele-
ments of Soviet deep reconnaissance com-
panies, frontal air assault brigades, air-
borne divisions and Spetsnaz (small units
which contain undercover saboteurs and
terrorists).28 These forces pose a very
serious threat to NATO nuclear and
chemical storage facilities and delivery;
command and control headquarters:
radar, electronic warfare and air detense
artillery sites; alrfields; ports; logistic in-
stallations: and even key civilian indus-
trial and utility installations.29 Yet, few of
these targets have a force assigned to de-
fend them. Thus, either combat units
must be diverted from the front lines or a
certain risk must be accepted.
44
MILITARY REVIEW
The special dilemma facing US com-
manders in Europe is that, even if they
choose to divert a maneuver unit to rear
area combat, they have only heavy units
from which to choose. But most of the
Warsaw Pact units which arf expected to
attack rear area targets are small, light
forces, and heavies are not ideally suited
to rooting such light forces out of forests
or towns. especially at night. In addition,
it seems unwise to use expensive tanks or
infantry fighting vehicles in such risky
operations. A far better way to counte,
enemy operations in our rear area would
be to employ light infantry units aug-
mented with the air or ground transporta-
tion assets necessary to enable rapid re-
sponse to enemy actions.
Air Assault Operations
The new light infantry forces will be
much better organized and trained than
mechanized infantry for air assault opera-
tions-that is, infantry assaults using
helicopters. In this respect, light infantry
forces could offer a new dimension of tac-
tical flexibility to the US forces in Europe.
Air assault operations with light forces
could be incorporated into either defen-
sive or offensive maneuvers. During the
defense, light forces could be shifted
rapidly from one place to another to rein-
force a threatened sector, to counter an
enemy helicopter or parachute insertion
behind US lines. or as part of a deep at-
tack against elements of the enemy's
second-echelon regiments or divisions. An
air assault capability is especially
desirable in conducting rear area combat
operations in which the key to countering
enemy helicopter or parachute insertions
is to respond immediately and destroy
them before they can disperse or hide.
I n the offense. air assaults with light in-
fantry could be used to seize key bridges
or passes ahead of the attacking heavy
forces or to attack the enemy' s flanks dur-
ing an exploitation. The capabilities of the
newly fielded Blackhawk helicopter make
such operations extremely attractive. .
Air assault operations have been con-
ducted in Germany during exercises and
have been highly successful, even when
conducted with infantry normally as-
signed to mechanized units. During
REFORGER 82, the 3d Infantry Division
{Mechanized} made extensive use of an air
assault team composed of an infantry
company, five to 10 dismounted TOW
teams and three Stinger air defense
teams. Using Blackhawk helicopters. this
force was repeatedly employed. using
"leapfrog" insertions, to protect with
long-range. antitank fires the flank of an
attacking Ml tank battalion and to secure
bridges and passes behind enemy lines."
In the same REFORGER. the 3d Bri-
gade, 82d Airborne Division. was placed
under the operational control of the 3d In-
fantry Division {Mechanized} during the
offensi ve phase of the exercise. One of the
battalions conducted a highly successful
parachute assault to seize a key bridge
over the Main River. Later. a second para-
troop battalion conducted an air assault
to seize key crossing sites over the auto-
bahn east of Wurzburg."
()jsmounted Operations
Although mechanized infantry forces
are trained to conduct dismounted opera-
tions away from their vehicles, the new
light infantry units will be better orga-
nized and trained to perform such opera-
tions. The new lights will be especially
well-suited for the following dismounted
missions.
In an attack which launches offensive
operations (or a counterattack during
defensive operations). light infantry could
December 46
make the initial penetration in enemy
lines and then hold the shoulders of the
penetration as heavy forces moved
through it. Lights would be especially
well-suited for such a mission during
periods of reduced visibility or in restric-
tive terrain. In addition. light forces
could. at night. infiltrate through enemy
lines and seize a key bridge or terrain
feature in advance of an attack by heavy
forces. During REFORGER 82. a para-
troop battalion under the operational con-
trol of the 3d Infantry Division (Mecha-
nized) successfully performed such a mis-
sion. moving by foot at night to seize an
opposing force ribbon bridge intact."
Other Operations
There are. of course. other missions that
could be assigned to light infantry forces.
Among these are the defense of a river
line. operations against bypassed enemy
pockets of resistance. the defense of a
mountain pass and the conduct of shallow
patrols behind enemy lines to destroy
enemy targets or gather intelligence. The
objective here. however. has been to high-
light those tactical operations most ap-
plicable to a high-intensity Central Euro-
pean battlefield-operations for which the
new light forces will be best trained and
for which they will be better suited than
heavy units."
THE ISSUE OF COST
Another important factor to consider is
the relative cost of light and heavy units.
It should be obvious that the "price" of a
mechanized infantry battalion is far
greater than that of a light infantry bat-
talion. The difference is becoming even
more marked as the force modernization
LIGHT INFANTRY
process proceeds. The M2 Bradley fight-
ing vehicle. which replaces the armored
personnel carrier. will bring a tremendous
new capability to the mechanized infan-
try. However. with a price tag in Fiscal
Year !FY) 1985 of approximately $1.49
million each (not including research and
development costs). it will greatly in-
crease the cost of mechanized units.
34
If. as currently planned. the new mecha-
nized infantry battalions contain 60 M2
and M3 (a slightly modified version of the
M2) fighting vehicles. the outlay for them
alone will be approximately $89.4 million
per battalion." Of course. when the costs
f
of mortar vehicles. improved TOW
vehicles. recovery vehicles. radios. trucks.
weapons and other equipment are added.
the price is even greater.
'- The cost. by contrast. of equipping one
of the new light infantry battalions will be
relatively insignificant. Probably the
most expensive item of equipment in the
new battalions will be the replacement for
the jeep-the high-mobility. multipurpose
wheeled vehicle-projected to cost about
$26.895 each in FY 1985." Light bat-
talions will contain only 33 of even these
vehicles.
The differences in cost do not stop with
the equipment. Given the density of more
complex equipment. mechanized units
cost considerably more to train and main-
tain as well.
37
Mechanized units consume
far more fuel. ammunition and spare parts
during training than will the new light
units. In addition. many more soldiers
must peFform logistic support tasks in
mechanized divisions than will be re-
quired in the new light divisions. As a
result. the number of "fighters" wiJ.l be
greater ib the new light units-although
their firepower will be far less lethal.
The costs involved with armor units are
even greater. both !for equipping and
training. The new Ml tank is projected to
1984
47
MILITARY REVIEW
cost approximately $2.44 million each in
FY 1985 (not including research and de-
velopment costs). Each of the newly
equipped MI tank battalions has 58 Mis
at a total cost of more than $141 million.
To that must be added the battalion's
seven M3 fighting vehicles ($1.49 million
each), six mortar vehicles and recovery
vehicles ($.88 million each) and wheeled
vehicles and equipment." Training costs
are higher as well because of the higher
price of tank parts and ammunition and
as a result of the increased fuel consump-
tion of the M I tank,"
The new vehicles and weapons systems
in the heavy battalions have awesome
capabilities and represent huge improve-
ments over their predecessors, They are
u'orth the cost. And, of course, these new
systems increase even more the tremen-
dous advantages in mobility, survivability
and firepower offered by mechanized in-
fantry and armor in comparison with light
units. But, as shown, their advantages do
have a price, Thus, if the new light forces
can do a mission as well as or better than
heavies, it makes sense to use lights. Like-
wise, if the addition of light infantry units
frees heavy units from tasks for which
they are ill-suited (such as rear area opera-
tions, air assault operations or operations
in restricti'Ve or urban terrain), it would
appear to be wise to use them-especially
as the new light units will offer a degree of
strategic flexibility not possessed by
heavies.
POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF
CHANGING US FORCE STRUCTURES
IN EUROPE
Before considering various ways in
which the new light infantry units could
be incorporated in the US force structure
in Europe, we should remember an impor-
tant fact about the NATO politico-mili-
tary climate: .. Any major change in the
size or composition (of US forward de-
ployed forces) almost automatically sets
the alarm bells ringing in foreign chan-
celleries. "<0
Reductions in US troops on the Conti-
nent would be equated by some to a weak-
ening of US resolve to defend Europe. In-
creasing the US forces would worry
others (as, for example, have the "offen-
sive" and "deep strike" emphases of the
new AirLand Battle doctrine") who do
not want to appear to threaten or provoke
the Warsaw Pact. And still others might
feel that increased emphasis on US con-
ventional capabilities in Europe would
reduce the credibility of our theater and
strategic nuclear deterrent."
In addition, we need to keep in mind the
congressionally imposed strength ceiling
on US forces forward deployed in Europe.
Thus, the N A"fO politico-military climate
and congressional strength ceilings will
necessarily limit the scope of force struc-
ture changes we could realistically con-
sider. Hence, we should limit ourselves to
relatively modest changes, remaining sen-
sitive to the desires of our allies and the
Congress. And. of course, no changes
should be announced or implemented un-
til after being agreed on in interallied con-
sultations,
OBJECTIVES IN INCORPORATING '
THE LIGHT INFANTRY
In putting light infantry into the US
Army, Europe (USAREUR). force struc-
ture, it should be clear by now that the ter-
rain and weather of Central Europe make
at least parts of it "light infantry
country." In addition, there are viable
December 48
LIGHT INFANTRY
missions for the new light infantry units
in Central Europe. Also. the relatively low
dollar cost of light infantry makes it
desirable to use lights whenever they can
accomplish any specific mission at least
as well as heavies. And. finally. the new
light infantry forces will. in most in-
offer a degree of strat()gic flexibil-
ity not enjoyed by heavy forces.
In an endeavor to incorpOli<).te light in-
fantry in the USAREUR force structure.
the objectives should be fourfold:
To maintain the conventional deter-
rent of USAREUR at its current level and
to enhance it if at all possible.
To improve the strategic flexibility
of the Army.
To ensure that the new light infantry
units will be in Europe before hostilities
begin. The threat to facilities in our rear
areas will begin at the same time. or
slightly before. any Warsaw Pact
attack." Light forces countering those
operations need to be in position well
before then. Furthermore. light forces
defending strongpoints in and around
builtup areas need time to reconnoiter and
plan those positions. as well as to
physically prepare and occupy them.
e To be realistic in terms of the politi-
cal impact of changes in the USAREUR
force structure.
THE OPTIONS
With those objectives in mind. there ap-
pear to be two different ways to put the
new light infantry into the USAREUR
force structure. The first would be to
replace heavy battalions with light infan-
try battalions in the forward deployed
divisions and brigades. Options A and B
represent application of this method:
Option A. Replace one mechanized in-
fantry battalion with a light infantry bat-
talion (organized the same as the new
light infantry battalions will be) in each of
the four forward deployed divisions and in
the separate brigades deployed at Gop-
pingen (the 1st Infantry Division (For-
ward)) and Garlstedt (the 2d Armored
Division (Forward)).
Option B. Replace one mechanized in-
fantry battalion and one tank battalion in
each of the four forward deployed heavy
divisions with three light infantry bat-
talions.
A second way to incorporate the new
light infantry in USAREUR would be to
attach the new light infantry units to the
forward deployed corps or divisions. Op-
tions C and D reflect this method:
Option C. Reinforce. with one of the
newly formed light infantry brigades.
each of the two forward deployed corps in
Germany. These light brigades would be
in Europe on a rotational basis from two
of the new light divisions in the Conti-
nental United States (CONUS). With
three light brigades per light infantry
division. each brigade would spend four
months per year in Europe and the other
eight months at home station in
CONUS." In the event of a crisis in
Europe. the remainder of each light divi-
sion would deploy to Germany where the
J
divisions would be attached to V Corps
and VII This option is similar to
the brigade rotations between CONUS
and Germany which took place in the
mid-1970s.
4S
The airlift to Europe in a crisis
could be performed in one of two ways:
e The light infantry divisions could be
integrated early-on into the regular flow
of the existing time-phased force deploy-
ment list (TPFDL) which currently has
heavy divisions scheduled first (specifical-
ly those four divisions for which' pre-
positioned unit sets of equipment are
already established il,l Central Europe).
1984
49
MILITARY REVIEW
The light divisions could be flown to
Germany by aircraft that are part of other
NATO countries' civil reserve air fleet.
This deployment would be separate from
and thus not interfere with the TPFDL
airlift being conducted by US aircraft."
Option D. Each of two new light infan-
try divisions being organized in CONUS
could have a forward planning element
and pre-positionli)G equipment deployed in
Germany. One planning element
would be assigned to each corps and
would coordinate contingency missions
for its respective light division. In the
event of a Warsaw Pact mobilization. the
light divisions could be flown to Europe
and their prepositioned equipment using
either of the airlift plans outlined in op-
tion C.
COMPARING THE OPTIONS
Before comparing these options. it
should be recognized that there are many
other alternatives that could be con-
sidered in the effort to incorporate light
infantry in the USAREUR force struc-
ture. By necessity. the options that have
been described here and the analysis that
follows must be relatively simplistic and
will inevitahly fail to take into account all
the myriad factors that would go into
such changes in the Army force structure.
The purpose here is to dis-
cussion on an important force
issue. not to settle on a specific proposal
for reorganization.
Option A
This option would probably be viewed
by US commanders in Europe as undesir-
able. It would result in divisions and the
separate brigades exchanging the fire-
power, mobility and survivability of one
of their mechanized infantry battalions
for the much inferior firepower, mobility
and survivability of light infantry battal-
ions. Although light battalions might
have higher "foxhole strength" and be
able to perform certain missions better
than their heavy counterparts. it seems
likely that few commanders would view
such a swap as desirable.
Option A would also create a rather odd
division-not pure heavy and just a little
bit light. Of course. the 2d Infantry Divi-
sion in Korea has an "odd" structure
(primarily due to the very rugged terrain
in its area of operations). and it is by all
reports an extremely capable unit."
Since the changes envisioned in this op-
tion are relatively modest. it can be an-
ticipated that there would be little
political objection. The smaller size of the
new light infantry battalions (approxi-
mately 544. as opposed to a Division 86
mechanized infantry battalion strength of
896
48
) would even leave extra spaces.
However, some of them would probably
be needed to supplement the divisions' air
and ground transportation assets to en-
sure the necessary mobility for the
predominantly foot-mobile light infantry
forces.
Finally. the Army's strategic flexibility
would be affected only to a small degree
by this option. The light battalions would
be far easier to move either within the
theater or outside of it. In a crisis outside
of Europe. however, whether they could
be assumed to be available to be removed
from NATO is a difficult qliestion.
Option B
This option would considerably change
the organization of the four forward
deployed heavy divisions. Instead of 10
maneuver battalions (five mechanized in-
December
50
LIGHT INFANTRY
fantry, five tark in the two mechanized in-
fantry divisions; four mechanized infan-
try and six tank in the two armor divi-
sions"), the divisions would now have 11
but, in each case, three of the battalions
would be light infantry. That change
would mean the loss of a significant
amount of firepower and maneuverabil-
ity. It would dramatically alter the divi
sions' modes of operation and would cer-
tainly call for other changes as well. Ex-
amples are increased air and ground
transport, changes in their combat sup-
port and service support structures, and
different tactics and doctrine.
With the exception of the 2d Infantry
Division in Korea and the experimental
TRICAP (Triple Capability) Division of
the early 19705,'" the Al'my has generally
avoided such mixtures of capabilities
v,ithin one division. Having just embarked
on the major reorganization that is part of
the Division 86 force modernization proc-
ess. option B would probably be met with
groans from the Pentagon and Europe.
Force development officers and logisti-
cians would shake their heads, and com-
manders who went to Germany to lead
"real maneuver units" would wince at the
whole idea.
It seems likely that commanders in
Europe would oppose option B. After all.
they would be losing a lot of firepower,
mobility and survivability to improve
their foxhole strength. They would gain
some tactical flexibility and different
capabilities, but most would probably
prefer the organizations as they are.
Such a change would not seem to pose
any major political concerns. Strength
ceiling problems would be minimal. The
two battalions being replaced would free
about 1.450 spaces, and the new light in-
fantry battalions would add approximately
1.632." And it is doubtful that the NATO
countries would object to such a change.
Overall, Army strategic flexibility
could be improved by such a move. In a
crisis outside Central Europe, the new
light battalions could, if all involved
agreed, be deployed to an out-of-theater
hot spot much more easily than their
heavy counterparts. Nonetheless, the
many organizational and doctrinal prob-
lems that this option would create-not to
mention that it would probably weaken
not strengthen USAREUR-would all be
reasons for rejection of option B unless
there was some accompanying change
that made such reorganization palatable.
Option C
This option contemplates significant
changes with its rotation of light brigades
through Germany in four-month cycles
and attachment of the rest of the light
divisions to the two forward deployed
corps in the event of a crisis. This option
would enhance the USAREUR conven-
tional force posture yet retain some stra-
tegic flexibility. With one brigade always
in Germany, even a standing start (sur-
prise) atta::k by the Warsaw Pact (judged
by most ob ervers to be extremely diffi-
cult to conc al and, in any case, not the
most desira Ie scenario for the Warsaw
Pact52) would find strengthened US forces
in Germany.
Given a mobilization period of 10 to 14
days prior to hostilities, a light division
would reinforce each corps, providing
much enhanced rear arpa combat opera-
tions, urban defense and air assault capa-
bilities. If the second airlift option proved
possible, this additional capability would
be achieved without displacing any of the
heavy divisions from the current TPFDL
sequence. If the first airlift option must
be used, the additional capability would
have to come at the expense of delaying
the arrival in Europe of a heavy unit.
1
1984 .51
MIlITARY REVIEW
Even with one light brigade from each
CONUS-based division in Europe
throughout the year. the remainder of
each light division would be at its home
station in the United States where it could
train for its NATO mission and for other
contingencies as well. Hence. this option
would retain considerable strategic flexi-
bility for the two light divisions involved
in this plan. In a crisis outside of Central
Europe. the remainder of each division
would still be available for deployment to
that area. If circumstances warranted. the
brigade on rotation in Europe could even
be moved to that area as well.
Option C does have political implica-
tions that should be considered. The rota-
tion of the brigades through Germany
might create strength ceiling problems.
The fact that the proposed light brigades
are relatively small would also minimize
this problem.
In the NATO political climate. option C
would most likely be welcomed. Taken in
a theater context, this proposal is still
relatively insignificant. and light infantry
units would probably be viewed as less
"offensive" than the much more mobile
and powerful heavy units. Thus. this
alternative might stand a good chance of
being seen for what it is intended to be-
an effort to strengthen the USAREUR
conventional deterrent. not an attempt to
develop a US blitzkrieg capability.
Option 0
This option offers the most strategic
flexibility of the four alternatives being
considered here. That flexibility is ob-
tained. however. at the expense of some of
the strengthened deterrence offered by
option C since the only light forces for-
ward deployed would be the planning
elements with each corps. Nonetheless.
this alternative does avoid the strength
ceiling problems of option C. and the pre-
positioning of certain equipment would
shorten the time required for deployment
to Europe in a crisis. If the second airlift
concept proved feasible. this option could
be quite attractive.
While USAREUR's conventional deter-
rent would not be strengthened as much
by option 0 as by option C. the Army as a
whole would retain more strategic flexi-
bility in option 0 because the light divi-
sions themselves would remain in
CONUS. There. they would train for their
missions in USAHEUR as well as for mis-
sions in other contingency areas. Since
they would not be forward deployed in
Europe. presumably their deployment to
areas outside NATO would not be SO sen-
sitive. (This would be the case if forward
deployed units were moved from Ger-
many in a crisis outside of Europe because
such a move might be viewed by some
Europeans as abandonment.1
Option 0 would probably be of little
concern in a political sense unless at-
tempts to arrange for the second airlift
method proved difficult. There would be
little or no strength cE'iling problems in
this option because only small forward
planning elements would be forward de-
ployed. Yet. the NATO reaction might
well be positive since the plan would in-
dicate a US commitment to a strength-
ened conventional deterrent.
The intent here has not been to argue
for or against any of the relatively
simplistic options presented but to show
that such options can have some merit.
The key to any decision will be a function
of which of the four objectives in incor-
porating light infantry in the USAREUR
is judged the most important. If. for ex-
ample. strategic flexibility for the Army
in a global sense is more important than a
significantly strengthened USAHEUR.
option 0 might provide the answer. But if
December
52
enhancement of USAREUR's conven-
tional deterrent were the top priority, op-
tion C might be the way to go.
The scope of the treatment offered here
has been. by necessity. limited. The com-
plexity of this issue defies brief summary.
Two conclusions do seem possible. how-
ever. First. the question should no longer
be whether light forces have a place on a
high-intensity Central European battle-
LIGHT INFANTRY
field. Rather, the question we should seek
to answer is what the balance between
heavies and lights in Europe ought to be
and how that balance can be achieved.
Second. as the options presented have
shown, the new light infantry units could
provide a way to strengthen the US con-
ventional deterrent in Europe while, at
tHe same time, enhancing the strategic
flexibility of the Army as a whole.
NOTES
1 General E C Meyer Wh<te Paper 1980 A Framework for
MorGlng the Arm\< of the 1980& fntc a DISCIpliner} Well Tralnea
Flghtmg Force US Government Prmtlng OHlce, WashIngton, 0 C.
25 february 19ao p 1
2 General Glenn K Otl<; and Major Oe..... ey A Browder, The
Enormous Rec;ponSlblhly Of Preventmg World War HI, Army. Dc
tober 1983. p 83
3 The size of the Army has' remained retan'weJ'I' stable at abOllt
780 ODD, WhICh IS the smallest U S Army Since June, 1950 General
John A Wickham Jr Continuity <;lnd Change Tempermg Army 01
"80s, ' Ibid. P 21
4 AlchClrd Halloran . Military Forces StretChed Thin Army
Chlel Says. The NellY York Times 10 Al.Iguf>t 1983, pAl
5 Ibl/1
6 Willl.;lm W Kaufmann, Planning COrlvenllonal Forces,
195080, The BrOOkings Institution WaShington 0 C, 1982, P 21
7 Because 01 shortages 01 crews and spare parts the US All
Force has onlt 27 percent of the alrilit capacity which the Depart
menl 01 DefenSe1DOO) and Congress have Judged necessarv With
lull crews and bins 01 spale paris, the Air Force would have a
capaclly 01 43 percent 01 the congressional/DOD goal E)panslon
plans are to bnng thaI to 73 percent by the end of 1988
RIChard Hdlloran, Air Force Wants New Cargo Plane" The New
Yorl< Times 5 MarCh 1984 pp Al and A15
a Samuel P Huntington Conventional Deterrence al1a Con
venllonal Retaliation In Europe," InlernDlJQnal Secuflty. Wlnler
198384, PD 32 33
9 Robert S McNamdra The Military Role of NUClear
Weapons Perceptions and M!sperceptlon& fore'gn AlfdlfS, Fall
1983, pp 59 60
10 General Bernard W Rogers 'The AtlantiC Alliance Prescllp
lions for a Dlilicult Decade Foreign AlfaifS. Summer 1982, pp
1,14556 For other art1cles on strengthening the conventlOnal
deterrent of the North AllantlC Treaty Organization (NATOI. see
Myra S McKlttflck, 'A Conventional Deterrent for NATO.'
Parameters, Volume XIII, Number 1. pp 51 58, General Bernard W
Rogers Greater for NATO's FleXible Response'
StrategIc Re'lIew, 1983 pp 1119, and Senator Sam Nunn,
"NATO Can the Alliance Be Saved? Report to the Committee on
Armed Services US Senate, uS Go..... ernment Prrntmg Office,
Washmgton, 0 C, 13 May 1982, p 3
11 General Bernard W Rogers. congress1onal statement and
tesflmony, 2 MarCh 1982, m House Armed SerVices CommIttee
Numbel 9733, Mllttdry Posture, Part One, US Congress, House
Armed SerVices US Government Pnntlng Office,
WaShington, 0 C 1982, p 940
12 Eric. C LudVigsen Elite Light D1\IIsions Among Major
Focuses In '85 Army Budget," Army, April 1984, p 35, and General
John A Wickham Jr , White Paper, repflnted In Army Times. 7 May
1984 pp 10-12 For olner mformatlon about the Army's new light
diVISion, see Jim Tlce, "Year 2000 Study Stresses SF, Light Units,
Army Times. 2 May 1983 pp 23 24. George C Wilson, The Foot
Soh::Her May Be the Army s Newest Fighting Machine," The
Wash,ngton Post, 29 AuguSt 1983, p A2, larry Carney, "Wickham
Says Time IS Right to Create light DIVISions," Army T,mes, 31 Dc
lober 1983, p 24, Colonel Wallace P Franz, "Light. FleXible, Mobile
Corps Needed: Army T,mes, 24 October 1983 pp 17 and 68, 000
OK's Ught Olvl<;lon for FV '85. Army TImes, 5 December '983, pp I
dnd 30 7th Intantry DIVISion to Be Reorgamzed Into Llghl DIVISion
In FY 85,' Army TImes. 12 December 1983, p4, Larry earney, 'Army
SeekS 2 New 2 Converted Light DIvISions" Army TImes, 9 January
1984 p 2, Larry Cdrney, .oLlgtlt DIVISion Gams Weight In Planning,"
Army T,mes, 30 January 1984 p B . Reagan Favors De..... eloptng New
Light DIVISion tn 1985, Army TImes, 6 February 1984. p 10 Drew
Middleton. "For US Army, New Kind Of Infantry DIVISion: r/le
New Yorl! rimes, 19 February 1984, p A9 Colonel Wallace P Franz,
'New Concepts Key to llCjht DIVISion S Potential:' Army TImes, 12
Maretl 1984, pp 21 and 63, Larry Carney. 't=our Posts Lett 10 Run,
mng fOI light DIVISion Site, Arm)t T,mes, 26 March 1984. p 15,
Elgl1t Posts Are Being ConSidered lor New Light DIVISion's Home
Ba'le, Army Times, 30 APfil 1984 P 3, 3 2d 10 8ns, New NG Unit
May Go llgtlt." Army Times, 7 May 1984, pp 1 and 32 and larry
Carney "PubliC Hearings In June Will ConSider Locallons for New
Light DIVISions," Army Times, 14 May 1984 p 4
13 LudVigsen op Cit
14 F1eld Manual (FM) 1005, Operations, Department of the Ar
my WaShington, 0 C, 20 AugUSt 1982, p 3 1
15 For an excellent study of urban sprawl In the Federal
RepubliC of Germany. see Paul Bracken Urban Sprawl and NATO
Defense SurVIval, November December 1976. pp 25460 In addl
tlon to urban spraWl, Bracken noted that. as of 1976, German
government reforestatIon programs were mcreaslng forested area.s
by about 8 percenl per year
16 FM 90 10, MIlItary OperatIons ,n Urbantzea Terram, Depart,
ment of the Army, WaShington 0 C, 15 August 1979 p 13
Bracken,OP Cit, puts the denSity of Villages much h1gher-at 85
vollages per' bflgade poslhon ' However, he uses a targer delen
slve hontage for bflgades-25 kilometers-as opposed to a US
planning figure of about 7 to 15 kilometers
17 IbId. P 255
18 lieutenant General James F HOllingsworth, US Army,
Retired, 'The light DIVISion:' Armed Forces Journaflnternatlonaf.
October 1983, p 85
19 Major General Franz Uhle Wetller, Ciefechtsfeld Mltleleuropa
(Batllef,eld Central Europe} There has been no translation of Uhl&
Wettrer s book mto English since ItS publlcallon In 1980 although
draft translations 01 It have CirCulated In the US Army The quota
tlon Cited JS from Major General John R GalVin. "The Heavyl
Light Concept,' Armed Forces Journal InternatIonal, July 1982, P
68, William P Mal<o, U S Ground and the Defense ofClmtr(J1
Europe, The Brookings InStitution, Washington, 0 C , 1983, p 35
Mako, of The Brookings Institution, notes that the Inspector of the
Bundeswehr replied to Uhle-Wetller's argument, stating that
'mountainS reduce the area (In Germany) available lor operationS,
leaVing only 24 percent of the relevant terrain Suitable for light m
fantry" The Bundeswehr Inspector would 'welcome an Increase Hl
light mfantry, but not al the expense of mechanIzed forces" Mako
adds thai the Bundeswehr recently moved to add two battalions of
motorIZed Infantry to eaCh of Its 11 regular diVISIOnS For a report
on the debate In the Bundeswehr, see UdO Philipp, "NATO Strategy
Under DiSCuSSion 10 Bonn:' (nternatlonal Defense ReView, Volume
13 Number 9,1980, pp 1.367,71
53
1984
MILITARY REVIEW
20 My anal\{SIS ot the terram In Ihe Northern Army GrOup seClm
draws on that provldea by John J MearShelrner ConventIonal
Deterrence Cornell Umverslly Press Ithaca, NY, 1983. PD 17980
Steven L Canby "Terntonal Defense In Centra! Europe," Armed
FOlces and Society Fall 1980, p 66 Defense consultant Canby ex
p!alnS that ihe North German P!am corndo' s wldec;! DOH'\1 be
'ween the Harz Mountams (Gaster) and the Luneburger Heanh
\Glfharn} IS 65 kl!ometers Of thIS distance 20 k'iometers .s laden
with village Complexes lyIng 8stnCle the secondary road network
Near Hannover the COfnClor narrOWE> and c.an be madp even mOl{>
restrictIVe
21 Meyer,op CIt p 3
22 C N Dormeuy The 50v'el Operational Maneuver Group A
New Challenge for NATO International Defense Rev,ew Volume
Number 9 1982 rReprmted rn Mdt/d'y Rev,et\ MarCh 19B3 p 44)
also see ColOnel Richard D Lawrence and JeHrey Record uS
Structure In IoJA TO An AlternatIVe The BrOOk.mgs Institution
Washington 0 C 1974 pp 5152, ano LIeutenant CoIoner John G
Hines and Phl!lIp A Petersen "Thp Soviet Conv(>nliona! OffenSive
,n Europe M,I,tary APril 1984 pp 2 29
23 J Should note hNe ll1al I ha"e deliberately aVOided a diSCUS
sian of the CO:nvf'ntlonal balance bplwepn NATO and thp WarSd""
Pact That tOPIC has been endles",l,. debated elsewhere and two
parllCu'arly good a.I'cles are Anlhon}, H Cordesman "The NATO
Central Region and the Balance of Uncertalnl\< Armea Forces
Journal International JUly 1983 pp '85B, and John J Mear
shelmer Wh.,. the SovlelS Can I Wto to Central Europe
International Securrty Summer 1982 pp 3 39
24 John J Mearshelmer Prec,,,,,on Guided MUnitions and Con
ventlOnalDeterlooce SurVival MarCh Apll 1979 p 69 FOI a cn
"quE' oj scrpE' oj Mearshelmer S 'deas on precl1OIO'" gUided mun,
trons IPGMsl see Daniel Gou'e and Goroon McCorm,ck PGM No
Panacea SUr\{IVal January February 1980 pp 15?2 For an a<fICle
on hOW 'he SO\{lets plan 10 operate ,n and arOu<1d bwlluO areas see
MalOr A E l-lemes1e\< SovIet M,J,ta.y Operations In BUill Up
Areas Infantry November Decemb81 1977
25 General S,r William Scolle' A Rore 01 Non l\IIechanlzt;'d In
lanlry Journal 01 the Roal un, ted Senf1ces Instllute 10' Opfence
Stud,es December 1980 pp 5962
2& Thomas A Callaghan Jr Can EUlope Be Delended" POlicy
Rel/levv Spring 1983 p 83
'27 MalO< Roger E Bort AI' Assault B'Igades Ne1/ll Element In
the SovIet Des ant Force Structure Rev,ew OctoPer 1983
pp 2138
28 VIl\tor Suvoro\{ Spetsnaz The SOvIet Union S SpecIal
Forces Internat,onal Delense Rev,ew VOlume 16 Number 9
1983 (Reprlnfed "'I Rev,ew March 1984 p 451
29 F 1005 OperatIons op Cd p 141 Fm more detailed 11110'
mal,on on US ArlT'y rear area cOlT'bal ope'al,ons doctrrne see US
Army Training and Doctllne Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525 30
US Army Operat,onal Cone;ept for Rear Area Protectron US Army
Tra,nll1g anJ Doctrine Command Fort Monroe Va 19 Apnl 1983
30 The Marne D'vlSlon REFORGER82 Inrtlallmpress/ons 3d In
fantry D'v's,oll\Mec"antzedl Wurzburg GE 1982 p6 For more 1<1
formation on all 2s5au'\ "'fiE' FM 90.4 Alrmoblte Opera
/,ons Department of the Army WaShington DC 8 October 19BO
31 lo'd
32 IO,d
33 The entrre spectrum of heavylllght operatIOns has been ac
Ilvel.,. pursued by the Army component umls earmarKed for the C!;,n
tlal Command [formerly known as the Rapid Deployment JOint
Task Force) MUCh of that ell per ence IS applicable 10 operalton5 Of
the new Ilgl1t Infantry units m Europe and has been drawn on In
WritIng thiS article The best 'eference lS GalVin op Cit, pp6780
Other reterences Include COlonel Jerome L Haupl Heavy/Ught
Ope.atrons-An Added VieWpOint, Armea Forces Journal/nterna
tionaI May 1983 p 85 Deep AttaCk' and 'HelwylLlghL un
published briefings by the commander, 24th Infantry DIVISion
{Mechanized). Fort Stewart Ga 1983
34 ThiS figure was determined by laking the Fiscal Year !FY)
1985 defense budget proposed funo,ng amount for the M2 and
M3-{$1 0564 mit liOn which does not InClude lesearch develop
men! test and evaluatIon {RDTEI-and divIding II by the procure
menl quantlty-710-whlch equals $149 million per weapons
system The FY 1985 defense budget figures came from the FY
1985 Report of Secretary Defense Caspar W Wernberger. Annual
Detense Department Report. F't 1985 US Government Prlntmg 01
flce Washington 0 C 1 February 1984 p 120
35 For Inlormallon 00 DIvISIon 86 orgamzallons. see Major
DaVid W Marlin and Major Stanlslaus Oashawetz, "Armor Mech In
lantry Team for Combat Power." Army December 1983, pp 3445,
"Force Modernlza!lon, Army 86190:' Commander's Calf. Janua,..,.
February 1982, pp 2 40. New Clout tor Mech Infantry' The M2 and
Alflartd 2000 Tacllcs," Army, August 1983. pp 1B 29. and UeutGrt
ant COlonel Jerry N Armstrong, "Mtnd Set Must Be AttaCk. Not De
fend Army, February 19B4 pp 14 25
36 ThIS Ilgure 'has determIned by ta!<mg the FY 1985 defense
budget proposed tunomg amount tor the high mobl!lt'l. muitlpur
pase wheeled vehlc!e-$31' 1 mlll,oo WhICh dOes not mctude
ROTE-and dlvl{llog II by lhe Army procurement
quantlly-11 b67-wtllch equals $26895 per vehiCle See Annual
Defense Department Report f y 1985, OP Cit. and LudVigsen op
Cit pp4647
37 E.Stlmates at tne annual operatmg and Supporl costs for
mechamzed Infantry battaUons eqUIpped WIth the Infantry fIghting
vehicle (lFV) range trom $274 mIllIon {Comptroller of the Army
estimate] 10 $3'336 millIOn \CongresslonalBlJdget Offlc-e estImate}
Annual operatmg and support costs for mechanized lI'1fanlr\< bat
lal,ons eqUipped WIth Ihe M113 armored personnel carner are
$2226 million These ligures inClude repair parts trammg SUP
olles overhedd prOCurement funded ",econdary l1ems and mIlitary
personnel costs See Army Ground Combat MorJetmZallon for the
198;)s POle lIUH COlilS and Effects for NA TO, Congresslonat
Budget Offle; '. Washmgt on. 0 C , November 1982, pp 52 55
38 1h(! cost 01 the M1 tank determIned b}' lakJ<1g the FY 19B5
defense budget proposed funding amount _$1 7588 million WhICh
does not Include RDTE or spare parts-and dIVidIng It by the pro-
curement Quant!ty -720-WhICh equals $2 44 million per tank The
f'gure for the M88A 1 recovery vehiCle was reached the same way
dIviding the funding amount requested-$1594 million-by the
procurement quantIty -180-whlch equals $ 88 millIon per vehicle
See Annual Defense Department Report. FY 1985 op Cit, and Lud
vlgsen op Cd
39 Estimates of the annual operating and Support costs for M1
lank battalions range from $24 71 million ,ComptrOller 01 the Army
estlmdtel to $29 5 million tCongresslonal Budget Office estImate)
a 17 percent 10 41 percent II1crease respectlvel}' over the annual
ccsts of an M60A1 tank battalion These figures Inc'ude repair
parts. tralnillg, supplies. overhead procurement funded secondary
Items and military personnel cosls See Army Ground Combar
Modermzatlon for Ihe 19805 Potential Costs ana Etrects lor NATO,
op Cit pp 49 52
40 Kaufmann op CI/
41 See. lor example, Mallhew A Evangelista, Offense or
Defense A Tale 01 Two CommISSions' Wor/rJ Polley Journal Fall
1983, pp 4569 Evangelista argues that the emphaSIS 011 deep
stnke proposals and offenSIve strategies lor NATO "Ihreatens to
provoke a new arms race In Europe, exacerbate East West political
relations and Increase the pos51blllty of military conflict" He
speCIfically focuses on the proposals In Strengthen,ng Conven
t,onal Deterrence In Europe Proposals for the 1980s, Report of the
Europea<1 Secuflfy StlJdy, St Martin s Press, NY, 1983
42 ThIS view has Surfaced penodlcally since the eart,. 19605
when the Kennedy admlnrs\ratlon ptaced spec tal emphasis on
bolsterrnQ NATO S conventional Capabilities ThiS emphaSIS was
opposed by many Europeans as well as by Bernard Brodie, the
promrnpof AmerICan strategist See Brodie, Escalation and the
NuClear Option, Princeton UnlyrrSlty Press, Princeton, N J 1966,
John L GaddiS, Strategies of Conta,nment. Ollford Unlverslly
Press, NY, 1982, P 217, and Lawrence and ReCOf(1, op Cit, p 102
'Greater
43 An example IS the attach scenariO Ifl General Sir John
Hackett, The Third WorlrJ War. Macmillan & Co NY, 197B, pp
1012, Bort, op Cit, Suvorov, op Cit, and IAG13U.78, SOVIet Army
Operations, Department of the Army, US Government Pnntlflg Of
flce. WaShington, 0 C, 11 April 1978. pp 71 to 78
44 LudVIgsen op Cit, P 35 Wickham. WhIte Paper, op Cit. T,ce,
op Cit, WIlson, op cit. Carney, "WIckham Says 'Time Is Right' to
Create Ught DIVISIOnS." op Cit, Franz, light. FleXIble. Mobile
Corps Needed," op Cit, "DoDOI<'s Ught DIVISion lor FY 'B5," Army
Times op Cit. "7th Intantry DIVISion 10 Be ReorganIzed Into Light
DIVISion Ifl FY 85,' Army TImes op CIt, Carney, Army Seeks 2
New 2 COnverled lIghl DIViSions:' op Cit, Carney, "light Division
Gains Weight In PlannIng," OP CII, "Reagan Favors Developing
New light DIVISIon In t985: Army Times, op Cit, Middleton, op
December 54
I
LIGHT INFANTRY
Cit, Franz. "New Concepts Key 10 light DIvIsIOn s Potential: Of)
CIt. Carney "'Four Posts let! rn Runnmg lor Ltght DIVISion Srte
op Cit, Erght Posts Are Being Consrdered for New Lrght DIVISion's
Home Base." Army TImes Of) cit. 32d lD 8ns. New NG Unit May
Go Light," Army Times op Cit. and Carney, Public Hfl3r!ngs In
June WIll ConsrCler Locations for New Lrght DIVISions: OJ) c,t
45 See Lawrence and Aecord op CIt. pp 51 76,for a Similar pro
posat made In 1974 Involvmg the rotatron of hpavy UIlII'"
46 The proposal 10use aircraft from Ihe CIVIl reserve air lIeet of
01her NATO nations IS reportedly under c.onsldelatton In Europe as
onp way to tilt US rptnforcemenlS to NATO more rapidly Ihan IS
achievable by USing only US Air Force and US clvrl ref,erve air fleet
arrcraft
47 Thp)d Intantry DIIIISlon In Korea I':> neither neavy nor Ilgnt In
addition 10Its squadrl..<n, the ld Infantry DIVISion has seven
maneul/er battahons -two tank, two mechanIZed Infantry and
three tight mfantry
48 For InformatIon on the 8& mechanized Inlantry bal
tallon, see New Clout for ME'Ch Infantry Tho M2 and A!rland lOOO
TactIcs" Army Of) e,l rOf InfO'matlon aboul the new Itghl rnfanlry
Units see LudVigsen op Cit. WKkham, White Paper op CIt Tree
Of) Cit, WIlson, op CIt, Carney 'Wlckham Says Time Is Rig!)! to
Create light DIVISIons Of) e't, Franz, . Ught Mobile
Corps Needed,' op Cit DoDOK'& Lght DIVISIOn for FY'S5,"Army
T,mes, op CIt 7'h Infantry DIvISion to 8e Reorganized Into LIght
ONISlon mFY 85 Army "mes op Cit Carney, "Army Seeks 2
New 2 Converted LIght O'l/lSlon,:>, . Of) Cit, Carney light
Ga!<1S Welghl 111 PlannlnQ Of) Cd 'Reagan Favors Deve!oplng
New Ught DlVlSl0n 111 Almy T,mes, Of) cd. Mldcl1etun Of)
CIt Franz New Concepts Key to light DIVISiOn 5 Potential, op
CIt, Carney Four Posts left m RUllrll'lg for Ught Oll/'lSlon SIte
Of) c,t. Eight Posts Are Being ConSIdered for New Light DIVISIon S
Home Base Army T,mes Of) cd 32d ID Bns. New NG Unll May
Go lIght: Army T,mes op CIt, and Carney. 'PUbliC Hearmgs In
June Will ConSIder locat,onS for New LIght D,vlSlons op Cd
49 Force ModernIzatIon Army 86/90 Commander's Call op
,,,
50 Gall/I'l op CIt p 70 As Galvtn eXplains Ihe Triple CapabIlity
(TAICAP) DIVISion combmed an armor bngade. an aumobile Infan
Iry bTigade and an air cavalry combat brIgade It tOI! on haro days
for a number of reasons "For one thmg II >'Jas. mIls begm"mgs
tess an mnovatlon than a mallei of necessrty The units at Fort
HOOd (Texas) al the ume (19711 were a mUted bag, so the'! were
Simply tasned toqetner 51flce II was not deSigned prlmaflly as a
test bed II IS probably not surprIsing thaI the testing of TRICAP
prOduCed m!led fc')ullS and the (unl!! was reconfIgured as an ar
mored divIsIon" Galliln notes that heavy and light bngades from
Rapid Deployment Force units ha....e worked together In recent eJeer
C!Se5 although It has been mote as a Shorl term force than asa per.
manent organlza\lon
51 See loo\nole 47
52 For an excellent diSCUSSIon at the diffiCultIes the SOli lets
would have achieving SUrpnS6 against NATO, see Peter Vigor
Doubts and D,lhcullies Confronting aWOuld Be SovIet Attacker ,.
Journal of rne Royal Unstea Services Institute for Defence Slu(1leS,
June 1980 pp 3238 Contrary 10 some reports. the most serious
threat to NATO IS nol thaI of a Sal/If'! standJllg,start attaCk but an
allad< after a short moblhzat!on peTiod Warsaw Pact forces WOUld
hotd a higher advantage over NATO two weeks after moblliZallon
thanIS the c.ase 'hllh Currently deplOyed forces For some
analysts e':>tlmate Ihat Ihe Warsaw Pacl COuld build up an ddvan
tage over NA TO of as mUCh as 2 4 to 1lfl combat personnel aHer 10
d3)'S at moblluatlon However thiS ratIO {ratio of combat personnel
nol weapons systems) m a stancllng start attacl<. would be cEase to
1 10 1 See Challenges 101 US Nallonal Securlly Part II, Camegle
Endowment for InternatIOnal Peacp Washington, DC 1981 A
good Ileatmenl Of combat personnel and armored dlVISIOI"l
between the Warsaw Pact anO NATO can be
found III Kurt Gottfried et al No First Use of Nwc!ear Weapons'
Sc,enld,c Ameflcan, March 1984, pp 3840, and Mako op Cit, pp
10534 the computation of armored drVI&lon eql.uva!ents
For a toreca5t of the effects of Ihp US Army s torce modernlzatron
program on force latlos In E:.urOpe S Centrat RegIon see Army
Ground Combat Moaermzat'on for the 1980s Potential Costs and
E:.lleets for NATO, op Cit> pp 27 34
Captain David H. Petraeus z'> currrmtl.v a
dent at th,> Woodrou' Wzlson School of Pubhc
alld IntC'rnatzonal AffaIrs, Pr!nceton Unwc>rslt\,
Pnnc('ton. Neu' Jc>r')C'v II.! recezt'ed a B S from
the US Alzhtary Academy and IS a graduate of
the USACGSC He has served .'Ith the 1st Bat
talLOn (Airborne), 509th Infantry, lIZ tTzcenza,
Italy. and WIth the 24th Infantrv Dll'ISlOll
(!tlC'chamzC'd) at Fort Stewart, Georgia. HIS arti-
cle "The Just War Tradltwn" appeared 11l the
Apnl 1984 Mllitary RevIew,
Soviet Aircraft and Missiles Received. Reports from the Thai
air force indicate that Lao air force pilots are currently flying
three new squadrons of MiG21 aircraft provided by the Soviet
Union. The 27 MiGs are stationed at the Wattai Air Base in
Vientiane. Laos already had one squadron of 10 MiG21s in its
air force inventory. Thai intelligence also indicates that a
number of new Soviet SA2, SA3 and SA7 surfacetoair missiles
have been deployed in Laos. These missiles were installed in
Vientiane and two other unidentified cities.-Defense &
Foreign Affairs, 1984.
55
1984
F
ORTY years ago this month, with the
world weary of war, a significant
battle was fought. GIs who had landed at
Normandy in June had slugged their way
across France and into Belgium, Luxem-
bourg and Holland. It was Christmas-
time, and the steamrolling Allied armies
were pausing to reflect on home and the
amenities of the season. The war, they
thought, was almost over.
Adolf Hitler and the German army,
however, had one more surprise waiting.
On 16 December 1944, the Germans
threw 30 divisions against thinly held
Allied lines on the Western Front. Caught
by surprise, Allied forces were overrun or
wiped out. or they surrendered. History
records the event as the Ardennes Coun-
teroffensive. the Battle of the Bulge or
Operation HERBSTNEBEL, the German
code name.
Hitler's objective was the capture of the
port of Antwerp and the destruction of
British and American forces between the
Ardennes Forest and the port. Initially,
the German plan worked like clockwork,
aided both by surprise and stormy
weather which prevented Allied aircraft
from flying.
Thanks largely to the world-famous ini-
tiative of the G I. however. pockets of
resistance quickly appeared along the
90-mile-wide bulge. The most famous
pocket was at the Belgian crossroads
town of Bastogne where a force reported
as "elements of the 101st Airborne Divi-
sion" claimed squatter's rights_ As the
German army flowed across Allied ter-
ritory, Bastogne became an olive-drab
island in a [eldgrau sea. Its capture by the
Germans and its retention by _the Allies
assumed a psychological importance far
greater than its tactical one.
Several years ago. some residents of the
Veterans Administration Medical Center
in Leavenworth, Kansas, gathered to
remiUisce about their experiences during
the Battle of the Bulge. One veteran had
been an 18-year-old jeep driver in the 83d
Infantry Division. When he drove into
40 Years Ago:
The Battle ofthe Bulge
Major John A. Reichley, US Army, Retired
Bastogne. he remembered that "One par
atrooper asked me for a drink of water.
His empty canteen had a big hole in it. I
gave him mine. and it made his day." An
exartillery forward observer in an infan
try unit remembered that "They told us
to get rid of our gas masks. We did. but we
kept the carrying bags. That's where we
carried our booze."
Today. the GIs are long gone from
Bastogne. Other areas of the world de-
mand our attention at this Christmas-
time. A Belgian army officer who at-
tended the US Army Command and Gen
eral Staff College some years ago said:
The people of Bastogne and Belgium
will never forget the GIs. Bastogne is the
most American city in Belgium. When
any American visits. especially World
War II GIs. they are treated as if they are
indeed 'at home.
Today. a World War II museum depicts
equipment and other items that were used
during the Battle of the Bulge. Around
the town square are memorials. including
a US tank that took part in the relief of
the city.
The guns are silent and impotent now.
the veterans aging. New generations. un
sullied by the memory of battle. are gen-
uinely friendly in their welcome to the
liberators and their descendants alike. It
is quite refreshing to visiting Amer-
icans-to be appreciated for something we
did for someone. "k
Ma}arJohn A. Reichley. US Army. Retired. a
frequcnt contributor to the Military Review. is a
curriculum evaluator ldth the Directorate of
Academtc Operations. USACGSr: Fort Leaven-
U orth. Kansas
57
PRISONERS OF WAR
There are numerous obstacles to be overcome in achieving suc-
cess on the battlefield. One that can be particularly troublesome
is dealing with enemy prisoners of war while attempting to con-
tinue unit operations. Adequate plans for handling large
numbers of prisoners must be made now 80 that this problem
does not threaten success on the AirLand Battlefield.
P
LANNING the Air Land Battle. with
its inherent emphasis on preserving
the initiative. striking deep. reacting
faster than the enemy and synchronizing
operations. requires a high degree of op
timism about the chances for success. The
basis for this optimism should lie in the
quality of US and allied soldiers and their
training. the amount and effectiveness of
weapons and equipment. the soundness of
doctrine and force structure. and the fact
that there is little choice but to suc
ceed.
Success on our part. however. implies at
least some degree of failure on the part of
an enemy. Such failure includes prisoners
of war (PWs) and. in the context of Soviet
military history. that means a multitude
of prisoners. Failure is not exempt from
the Soviet penchant for doing things in a
big way. The implication for a future war
is that. in addition to reducing the
numerical superiority of Soviet forces.
enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) may place
intolerable demands on the combat. com
bat support. and combat service support
capabilities of friendly forces. This poten
tial force or debilitator tor both sides
obligates military planners to review
historical data on the subject. identify
those friendly forces which may need ad
ditional resources and those traditional
EPW support methods which may require
amendment. and emphasize those meas
ures which might intensify the Soviet per
sonnel drain.
Background
The Russian PW situation during
World War I has been characterized as
"wholesale desertions" and "disorderly
flight" with replacements going" through
the revolving door into captivity.'" Rus
sian losses during the Galician Campaign
in September 1914 included 486.000 cap
tured. or 27 percent of the total losses.
Thirty thousand were captured during ac
tion along the Lower Vistula in November
1914. In January 1915. German forces.
employing a "lightning thrust" at the
Russian Tenth Army. destroyed the XX
Corps in the August Forest and took
110.000 PWs.' At just one camp in the
German XVIII Corps. an unannounced
visit by a Red Cross inspector revealed
58.004 Russians.'
Within the first two weeks after the
German attack against Soviet forces in
June 1941. Soviet losses were estimated
to be thousands of tanks and close to a
million men in what has been described as
.. a series of spectacular encirclements. ".
By the end of the year. almost four million
Soviet troops had been taken prisoner.
More than two million were captured in
just five battles:' Bialystok/Minsk.
July-320.000; Smolensk. July-300.000;
Uman. August-I03.000; Kiev. Septem-
ber-665.000; and Briansk/Viazma. Octo-
ber-665.000.
59
MILITARY REVIEW
Soviet prisoners 01 war. May 1942
The problem became so significant that
it impeded the advance of the German
forces and overburdened the supply
system. The result was that senior of-
ficers either would not or could not pro-
vide the necessary support to EPW opera-
tions. As General Walter von Unruh ad-
mitted. "Neither our personnel nor our
means were even remotely adequate to
meet the needs ....
Corps Deep Attack
If the implications of this for the Air-
Land Battle are not immediately evident
.consider this possibility. Suppose one ac-
cepts the prevalent view that the impetus
for the deep attack should come from
corps and that the objective of the deep
attack is enemy forces rather than terrain.
Further. to realize this objective. the
corps must be capable of swift passage
through the enemy forward positions.
deep strikes beyond the enemy first
echelon and defeat of high-value. uncom-
mitted enemy units in follow-on echelons.
If the corps C til accomplish this while
resisting decisive engagement and being
prepared to continue the attack on order.
then the following is how one possible
scenario might flow.
In the midst of a deep attack to secure a
division objective in support of a corps
operations plan. the brigade commander
conducting the main effort is behind the
Soviet first echelon and is racing toward
his objective. In keeping with Soviet
historical precedents. he is confronted
December 60
PRISONERS OF WAR
with a motorized rifle regiment more or
less willing to surrender. His need to drive
deep to reach his objective is suddenly
challenged. His mission includes resisting
decisive engagement, but the appearance
of the EPWs threatens that mission.
Reasons why the combat effectiveness
of the motorized rifle regiment has deteri
orated could be many. It may have been
engaged by other corps deep attack assets
or, being in a supposedly uncommitted
status, the sudden and unexpected, face
toface meeting with an enemy brigade
may have been too much for the regimen
tal command and control system to han
die. Regardless of the possible reasons,
our brigade commander has a problem.
His problem exists even if he does not en
counter an unexpected enemy force en
route to rus objective. If his objective is
force-oriented rather than terrain-
oriented, he must deal
with EPWs because he must be prepared
to carry the corps attack forward on
order.
The most obvious solution is simply to
disarm the Soviet unit, abandon it and
continue the attack. Not only is this easier
said than done, but it does not address the
longstanding, stated goals that the
United States applies to captured enemy
personnel. They include:
Establishing absolute, uncontested
control over EPWs.
Providing for the timely and effec-
tive intelligence exploitation of EPWs.
Providing for the protection and hu
mane treatment of EPWs.
Encouraging defection and weaken-
ing the will of the enemy to resist
capture.'
We must not, of course, tolerate pro-
cedures wruch may unnecessarily hamper
oUl: ability to conduct successful military
operations. And we must keep in mind
those goals which are designed not only to
enhance tactical operations but w ruch are
also designed to ensure our adherence to
prescribed standards of human behavior.
Forecasts
Solving the potential problem of large
numbers of EPWs must begin with proper
planning. Being prepared to cope with the
problem will likely hinge on a liberal
forecasting of capture
In almost every war in which the United
States has been involved, EPW opera-
tions have assumed the dimension of an
afterthought. Commanders tend to under-
estimate capture rates, resulting in an
unexpected burden on the entire force
structure with an adverse effect on com-
bat operations.
During World War II, operations in
Tunisia realized 275,000 EPWs instead of
the 12,000 to 14,000 expected. During the
Sicilian Campaign, 122.000 EPWs were
taken. In both cases, the demands for
properly conducted EPW operations were
far in excess of the resources available.'
The number of EPWs expected to be
taken during Operation Overlord was
greatly underestimated, almost as if the
success of the operation was not an-
ticipated. The Quartermaster Corps held
that the subject of EPW forecasting
deserved greater attention because the
problems in supporting EPW operations
were largely the result of underestimated
capture rates.'
E PW estimates during the Korean War,
including those for the Inchon land-
ing, were far below the actual numbers.
United Nations (UN) forces captured
171,464 EPWs, 95 percent of whom were
taken during the first year of the fighting.
The fact that the UN Commend could not
cope with these numbers should not be
61
1984
MILIlARY REVIEW
surprlsmg. I nitial forecasting. policies.
resources and. subsequently. control were
all insufficient. During December 1950.
135.000 EPWs in the Pusan region be-
came a "direct and severe threat" to the
UN Command. requiring the diversion of
"significant" resources.' The military
police (MP) board investigating EPW
operations during the Korean War con-
cluded that the problems encountered
were linked to "insufficient preplanning"
due to the perception of commanders that
the war would be short and that E PW
operations in previous wars could provide
the basis for planning."
Such perceptions continue to this day.
The EPW capture rates that are
presented in Field Manual (FM) 101-10-1.
Staff Officers ,., Field Manual: Organiza-
and Logistic Data. are
said to be based on "the experience of US
Army Forces in World War II and the
Korean war." The applicability of the
data to future conflicts is limited because
no estimates are given for operations that
might be conducted against a numerically
superior force. Moreover. the estimated
capture rates are so low that they can be
considered valid for planning only if one is
planning to lose the war.
December 62
PRISONERS OF WAR
Control
FM 19-40, Enemy Prisoners of War,
Civilian Internees and Detained Persons,
stipulates that the capturing troops must
disarm EPWs and then adhere to what is
known as the "five Ss"-segregate,
search, speed, silence and safeguard. Ac-
cordingly, EPWs should be:
Segregated by rank, sex, nationality
and medical status.
Searched for concealed weapons and
material of intelligence value.
Rapidly evacuated from the point of
capture to the forward EPW collection
point.
Prohibited from communicating
with one another.
Kept from harm and prevented from
escaping.
This is a difficult task for a brigade com-
mander who must maintain the momen-
tum of his deep attack. I t is difficult even
if one does not consider the commander's
mission but simply the potential scope of
the EPW operation. The problem became
so acute for German forces in 1941 that
only two or three guards were allocated to
every 1,000 Soviet PWs. Escapes were
common, and PWs often were left to make
their own way toward the rear."
Applying the German solution to our
own forces would not be advisable. What
if these Soviet soldiers are later mistaken
for combatants instead of unarmed, un-
escorted EPWs and are fired upon by US
units? What if they encounter combat-
effective Soviet units of the first echelon
and become the subject of a fratricidal
reaction to their unarmed, PW status?
What if they experience a change of heart
or, a strengthening of their will and
regroup into a sizable threat in our rear
area?
If one accepts the doctrinal view that
the security and accountability of EPWs
are initially the capturing unit's respon-
sibility. then the brigade commander
might logically add a sixth "S" to the five
standard ones-shift. Shift responsibility
to the supporting MPs. That would be a
good idea if it werf' not for the fact that.
normally, there is only one plbtoon of divi-
sion MPs at the brigade. Purther, MP
responsibilities also include area and
route reconnaissance and surveillance.
main supply route regulation, straggler
and refugee control. rear area combat.
physical security. area control. in-
telligence. and law and order. to name just
a few.
MPs can assist the brigade commander
by establishing the forward EPW collec-
tion point as near the fighting as possible.
for it is at this point that EPW account-
ability. custody and evacuation respon-
sibilities are accepted by the division
MPs." FM ,19-40 provides that. if this ex
c'leds the capability of the M P platoon
supporting the brigade. then "necessary
augmentation" will come from the divi-
sion MP company commander. However.
if this officer can respond with sufficient
resources and still meet his other obliga-
tions. then he has more authority than his
job title implies.
FM 19-40 further provides that MP
responsibilities for EPWs in the combat
zone are characterized by forward accept-
ance. firm control. accountability, hu-
mane treatment, maximum use of empty
transport, minimum essential field proc-
essing, wide dispersion and frequent dis-
placement of collection points. and auster-
ity of personnel. facilities and transporta-
tion. This last item. austerity. is probably
not last by accident. I t is, necessarily.
"the bottom line." FM 19-40 suggests
that "capabilities of the assigned military
police units may be To say
63
1984
MILITARY REVIEW
that this is an understatement would be
an understatement.
According to doctrine, additional MP
support could come from corps and eche-
lons above corps. However, given the
potential capture rates, the additional M P
responsibilities and the location of many
MP units in the reserve components,
would the support really be available
when and where it was needed? FM 100-5,
Operations, indicates that follow-on and
support forces would share the EPW bur-
den_ But that view assumes that they are
not engaged in blocking enemy reactions
to the corps deep attack, keeping open the
required lines of communication to sup-
port that attack, committed elsewhere or
worn down to the point of combat ineffec-
tiveness.
Despite these potential shortcomings in
our force structure and its capabilities,
the need to establish and maintain abso-
lute. uncontested control over EPWs re-
mains.
Intelligence
In addition to sensible forecasting and
firm control, an effective EPW system
will also require expeditious processing of
prisoners and sufficient numbers of well-
trained, forwardly deployed intelligence
personnel.
The rapidity with which E PWs are seg-
regated, evacuated and interrogated de-
termines, to a large extent, their value as
sources of intelligence. During World W m-
Il, the Germans learned quickly that So-
viet PWs were more willing to give reli-
able and accurate information when they
were still overcome with the depression of
being captured.1< Consequently, the Ger-
man army placed great reliance on the So-
viet PW as a source of intelligence and at-
tempted to devote a commensurate amount
of effort and resources to that end.
FM 30-15, Intelligence Interrogation,
supports such an endeavor when it sug-
gests that the goal of providing for timely
and effective intelligence exploitation of
prisoners is best served by an EPW opera-
tion that is "well organized and functions
smoothly," for it, therefore, is conducive
to the "proper conditioning of EPW for
interrogation." However, Major General
Alfred Toppe, writing after the war, ad-
mitted that the enormity of the German
task precluded efficient and effective
operations, for it soon became apparent
that both the quantity and the quality of
personnel available for screening and in-
terrogations were inadequate.
Aside from the sheer numbers ofEPWs
involved, a major problem for the Ger-
mans was the acute shortage of qualified
interrogators equipped to deal with the
customs of the many ethnic groups and
the peculiarities of their languages. Toppe
observed that, while most Soviet soldiers
could function in the .. Russian language
of command," few could adequately ex-
press themselves in it and had to resort to
their own native dialects. The result was
that the German goal of timely and effec-
tive intelligence exploitation of Soviet
PW s in tactical operations was not real-
ized."
FM 19-40 emphasizes dealing with EPWs
in their own language, and the Geneva Con-
ventions require it. Even though Soviet
education has improved since the war,
demographics indicate a nation that is
becoming increasingly more non-Slavic.'"
If US forces were placed in a predica-
ment similar to the Germans', the out-
'come would probably be the same, if not
worse. In fact, of the tactical intelligence
personnel who would be supporting our
brigade commander, the ability of most to
deal effectively with the Soviet PW pro-
December
64
PRISONERS OF WAR
gram can be questioned. Being able to
cope with the linguistic challenge, distin-
guish between the various ranks, insignia
and nationalities, recognize the signifi-
cance of certain equipment items, or read
a captured SQviet military map is normal-
ly not characteristic of the talents or
training found at that level. This lack,
coupled with the magnitude of the task,
couid result in the denial of information
esser. Ual for our brigade commander to
reach his objective.
Treatment
The time between the capture of a sol-
dier and his transfer to a forward collec-
tion point is probably his most dangerous
period as an EPW. He must rely totally
on the mood and character of his captors
and on their protection from the inherent
lethality of the modern battlefield, includ-
ing chemical and nuclear threats. I t is dur-
ing this time that he is a ward of the bri-
gade commander who is obligated by both
national and international law to provide
"humanitarian care and treatment. ""
Doctrinally, this obligation normally
translates into furnishing the necessary
food, water, clothing, shelter and medical
attention without delay and then prompt-
ly evacuating him." It is a burden which
the brigade commander shares with all
US personnel, "in whatever ... capacity
they may be serving. "" Army Regulation
190-8, Enemy Pn'soners of War: Admin-
istration, Employment and Compensa-
tion. stipulates that this responsibility,
which begins "from the moment of cap-
ture, " cannot be waived due to combat im-
peratives or enemy provocation. Failure
to meet this responsibility is a "serious
and punishable violation" under the
Uniform Code of Military Justice.
According to FM 19-40, providing suffi-
cient support is the responsibility of the
echelon having custody of the EPWs.
This is not only an incentive for proper
planning, but it should also prvvide the
necessary motivation to acquire enough
transportation to rapidly evacuate EPWs
to the rear.
In 1941, the initial German view on So-
viet PW needs was that it did not require
much to satisfy a Soviet and, therefore, no
"special strain" on the supply system.
would result.' That attitude soon
changed. Von Unruh reported that sup-
plies in the huge quantities required sim-
ply were not available." In preparation for
Operation Overlord, US and Allied com-
manders appeared to give little thought to
the supplies required for EPWs. Plans prior
to D-day estimated that 60.000 EPWs
would accumulate by D+90. The actual
figure was almost three times that
estimate."
Part of the solution is to make full use of
the supplies and equipment held by
EPWs at the time of their capture. In the
Ardennes offensive during World War II.
General Omar N. Bradley, at the urging of
his chief quartermaster, refused to accept
the surrender of an entire corps unless the
Germans brought their supplies and
equipment with them." The lessons of
World War II include serious difficulties
in adhering to the Geneva Conventions of
1929. The EPW supply problem was the
direct result of poor planning and,
forecasting and continued supply actions
based on friendly unit troop strengths
that did not include EPWs."
During the Korean War, in addition to
shortfalls in forecasting and planning, the
.. active and fluid" tactical situation
drastically limited the personnel and
logistic support required by both EPWs
and friendly forces." The implications for
the future should be obvious. Despite our
1984
65
MILITARY REVIEW
Lieutenant General Omsr N. Bradley snd German prisoners 01 war. August 1944
best intentions. the high tempo of opera
tions characterizing the Air Land Bat
tlefield may seriously inhibit our ability
to support not only EPWs but our own
forces as well.
Article 15 of the Geneva Conventions
dictates that captors provide EPWs with
the "medical attention required by their
state of health. "2. To facilitate this proc
ess and assist in evacuation. FM 1940
suggests medically classifying EPWs as
walking wounded and sick or as nonwalk-
ing wounded and sick. According to von
Unruh. one of the principal problems of
the German army in 1941 was treating
and transporting sick and wouilded So
viet PWs."
While it is evident that any clash with
an enemy will likely produce wounded
EPWs, it is the sick soldier which may
take on added significance in a conflict
with the Soviets. During World War I.
Russian PW s were found to be infested
with" fleas and vermin of all sorts"28 and.
when taken in large groups, the spread of
infection became a serious threat to the
health of the capturing forces.29
The problem remains today. Hepatitis.
intestinal disorders and dysentery appear
to be present in epidemic proportions in
the Soviet armed forces. These health
problems are apparently related to the
generally poor living conditions such as
substandard personal hygiene and sewage
systems, contaminated food and water
supplies. and barracks filth and over-
crowding.'" Since sanitation standards
normally decline in a PW situation. any
existing health problem can be expected
to worsen. The reSUlting moral and ethical
issues will have to be dealt with by our
forces.
The uncertainties involved in support
ing and protecting both our own forces
66
December
PRISONERS OF WAR
and EPWs on the modern battlefield, in-
cluding nuclear and chemical defense,
raise some uncomfortable questions. Does
the AirLand Battle doctrine create a po-
tential conflict of interest? Is there a con-
flict between our need to conduct aggres-
sive, fast-paced combat operations in
depth and our moral and legal commit-
ment to the provisions of the Geneva Con-
ventions? Can we afford to hesitate on the
battlefield to deal properly with PWs?
Can we afford not to deal with them?
The judicial doctrine of "indirect
responsibility" maintains that a com-
mander will be held responsible if he fails
to take corrective action when he knows
that persons subject to his command have
committed or will commit infractions of
the rules of warfare. According to Article
13 of the Geneva Convention, a com-
mander's responsibility covers acts of
omission as well as acts of commission.
The implication is that planning for
future operations using the current tac-
tical doctrine and force structure without
allowing for the necessary support, in-
cluding support of EPWs, could be con-
strued, in the final analysis, as pre-
meditated disregard for the provisions of
the Geneva Conventions.
The task of adequately supporting
large-scale EPW operations with the nec-
essary supplies, medical care and trans-
portation is immense. The scope of the
problem cannot be fully appreciated until
one considers the possibility of a deliber-
ate, mass surrender. No spedific number is
required. I t is a test of the of the
captors to adhere to standards
of conduct without being forced to sacri-
fice their tactical advantage or divert at-
tention from their mission. In addition, it
may be a reflection of the intent of the
enemy commander to force them to make
such a sacrifice.
The United States, because of the
values it holds as a society, its commit-
ment to prescribed standards of conduct
and its comparatively limited battlefield
resources, may be vulnerable. It may be
that the most serious ch!'llenge to our
forces is not the Soviet preponderance in
tanks and not the increasing stock of new
nuclear and chemical-capable artillery and
missiles. It may be our natural and
sincere desire to abide by the provisions of
the Geneva Conventions, with the poten-
tial result of greatly reducing the capabil-
ity of forces to continue to wage war.
A possible Soviet scenario exploiting
this Western vulnerability might involve
the deliberate and complete surrender of
the first combined arms army to make
contact with NATO forces. Our moral
commitment to human decency and rules
of warfare, along with a potential inability
to adequately fulfill that commitment,
might divert sufficient attention and
resources to collapse a critical portion of
the NATO defense.
However, such a scenario is probably
not likely. It would be very difficult to or-
chestrate and control. Also, people nor-
mally tend to assess other people in terms
of their own values, and it is doubtful that
the Soviets, given their value system,
could be counted on to react in such a
manner in the same situation. Therefore, a
Soviet assessment would probably not in-
dicate such a response by the United
States, but the possibility remains.
Motivation
Given the overwhelming numbers of
Soviet troops, the goal of encouraging
defection and weakening the will of an
enemy to resist capture becomes even
more desirable than in previous wars,
despite the added burden of potentially
67
1984
MILITARY REVIEW
large numbers of EPWs. There are many
possible reasons why a Soviet soldier or
any soldier might consider defection. sur-
render or limited resistance. The task is to
uncover these vulnerabilities in his char-
acter and then exploit them if the need
arises.
There is good reason to question whether
many Soviet troops are psychologically
prepared to cope with the type of warfare
that Soviet tactical doctrine espouses.
The expected nonlinear maneuver battles
may not be within the capabilities of
Soviet forces. as demonstrated many
times during World War II. Much of the
fighting, according to German General
Erich Rendulic, was characterized by in-
flexibility, lack of initiative and ag-
gressiveness. and a methodical approach
to tactics. 31
Being faced with the unexpected or fail-
ing to accomplish a specific mission did
not blend well with the rigidity of Soviet
procedures. Senior German officers. writ-
ing after the war, indicated that a typical
intercept was the frantic, "The enemy has
broken through! What shall we do?" Their
impression was that this was character-
lffl'fic. and only a few Soviet commanders
could deal with unexpected changes in the
tactical situation. This weakness was off-
set to some degree by the sheer numbers
of Soviet troops but, as the capture rates
indicate, numerical superiority was not
necessarily the answer.32
This may not only be a commentary on
the Sovi'et military during World War II.
It may also be a commentary on the So
viet system as a whole. While the Soviet
army of World War II is not the Soviet
army of today, the German assessment
may be one that is timeless, with the prob
lems inherent in the Soviet system
extending to the military. Seen in this
light, the adage about winning the first
battle assumes greater significance.
Based on their pervasive system of po-
litical indoctrination and the preoccupa-
tion with troop motivation and control,
the Soviet leadership appears to recognize
a potential reliability problem. Could it be
that they suspect that many of their sol-
diers may not be reliable without close
supervision and control? This same lead-
ership has demonstrated that it does not
trust its own civilian population. Why
should the Soviet soldier be regarded any
differently?
Soviet military history certainly would
support such a suspicion, and this has
serious implications for Soviet forces on
the modern battlefield. The Soviet need
for tight control and supervision of troops
may go unfulfilled because their soldiers
will be forced to fight in situations where
fire and maneuver will limit, if not elimi-
nate, the influence of commanders and po
litical officers. As FM 100-5 indicates,
this is when those "intangible factors"
such as reliability and motivation prevail.
The Soviets have employed drastic meas-
ures in the past to deal with this un-
quantifiable dimension of soldier'reliabil-
ity. In 1941. Lavrenti P. Beria was con-
cerned that troops would adhere to the
"old Russian custom of raiding the vodka
before going to the front" and recom-
mended the use of his NKVD (People's
Commissariat for Internal Affairs) units
for supervision." Special blocking units
were formed to prevent retreats, and "un-
reliable elements" were court-martialed.
Joseph V. Stalin actually admitted that
his troops were "given to panic and even
oriented toward the enemy" and that
"firm and steady commanders" were lack-
ing. The problem became so great that, in
1942, he authorized the "summary liq-
uidation of all panic-makers and cowards"
and branded all officers who retreated
without orders as "traitors.""
Despite these and other desperate meas-
December
68
PRISONERS OF WAR
ures. the Soviet personnel drain con-
tinued. It is a commentary on the degree
to which such drastic steps instill loyalty
to the regime which employs them_
During the first year of the war with the
Soviets. the Germans did not keep statis-
tics to distinguish between voluntary de-
sertions and other EPWs_ But. in the lat-
ter half of 1942. desertions alone yielded
61.000 Soviet soldiers." Ultimately. more
than one million reportedly volunteered
to serve the Wehrmacht. including
thousands of officers and political of-
ficers_" The problem continues to tills
day_ Hundreds of Soviet soldiers are esti-
mated to be in rebel hands in Afghan-
istan. and some have willingly joined their
ranks_" The reasons they give for their
action include physical and mental abuse
by their officers and a belief that the war
"cannot be won_""
Psychological operations (PSYOP)
units. if present in sufficient numbers at
the outset of hostilities. could well be the
critical combat multiplier in a future con-
flict. Forty-one percent of the EPWs held
Interrogator and prisoners of war in Korea, October 1950
1984
69
MILITARY REVIEW
by the UN Command during the Korean
War claimed to have been influenced by
surrender propaganda and other psycho-
logical warfare efforts which included a
"moral commitment to voluntary
repatriation."" After World War II.
senior German officers discussed the
"very pronounced herd instinct" of Soviet
soldiers. making them susceptible to
mass panics or surrender."
PSYOP units may find in Soviet forces
some fertile ground to cultivate. One topic
should be US war aims. including the lack
of designs on the territorial integrity. of
the Soviet Union., The Soviets have not al-
ways been incapable of effective troop mo-
tivation. There .are countless exam-
ples-one of the more famous being the
Battle of Stalingrad. Thore is a fundamen-
tal difference. however. between fighting
and dying in Western Europe or elsewhere
in the name of international peace and
socialist solidarity and fighting and dying
on Soviet soil to preserve the very ex-
istence of one's people.
Other PSYOP topics should address
Soviet policies and the treatment that
soldiers can expect to receive in the event
of surrender or capture. Soviet PWs in Af-
ghanistan relate stories of low morale in
Soviet forces. widespread disaffection. an
inadequate supply system and beatings
by their officers. One of the more telling
observations made by them is simply that
they are treated very well by their captors
and have plenty to eat."
The US reputation for treatment of
EPWs in accordance with the Geneva
Conventions is generally good. and we
must maintain that reputation and capi-
talize on it. The subject of fair treatment
for EPWs certainly deserves a place in
PSYOP. A study by the Navy in 1975 con-
cluded that. historically. the factor al-
ways considered by a potential defector is
the treatment he expects from the enemy
once he becomes an EPW." The results of
World War II interrogations of Soviet
soldiers. including political officers. sup-
port this conclusion. In fact. conversa-
tions within the German General Staff in-
dicate that stiffened resistance by Soviet
troops was the result of poor treatment af-
forded Soviet PWs."
The Soviet soldier appears to be sub-
jected to a harsh and extremely austere
existence. This. coupled with the realities
of the modern battlefield. may render him
vulnerable to certain psychological meas-
ures. reSUlting in a reduction of his
numbers. Once he becomes a prisoner.
making good on that promise of adequate
care and fair treatment may go a long way
in solidifying his new status in his own
mind. thereby relieving our own forces of
some of the security burden created by his
presence.
Conclusion
It could well be that the Soviet empha-
sis on political motivation and tight con-
trol and the apparent inclination toward
use of surrogate forces indicate a fear that
history may repeat itself. resulting in a
military and political disaster of such
magnitude as to shake the domestic and
December 70
international foundations of Soviet
power. Whether this is the case. the re-
quirement for US preparedness remains.
Part of that preparation. according to FM
100-5. is our brigade commander integrat-
ing "support and tactical plans."
Considering the requirements of the
AirLand Battle and the potential for sig-
nificant numbers of EPWs. traditional
support methods may not meet the chal-
lenge. Given a certain number of enemy
troops opposing our forces. the brigade
commander is faced with a limited num-
ber of options. To defeat them. he can kill
them. try to force their withdrawal or cap-
ture them. or he can attempt a combina-
tion of these three actions. His ability to
kill them will be limited by his weapons.
the target acquisition systems that serve
them and the ammunition that feeds
them. His ability to force enemy troops to
withdraw will be limited by his ability to
strike fear in their hearts and by the space
in which they can run. His ability to take
and deal with prisoners will be limited by
the readiness and capacity of his EPW
system and by the degree to which the
enemy is willing to resist.
. On the AirLand Battlefield. if the com-
mander expects to be successful in his
mission. he must be prepared to effective-
ly pursue all these options. Since EPWs
represent a threat capable of wearing
down his force. sensible war gaming of a
selected course of action prior to its initia-
tion should identify for him the resources
he needs to reach his objective.
Failing to plan properly may IeI'd to
una oidable diversions of battlefield
resources and a subsequent loss of the ini-
tiative and ability to react quickly and
decisively to strike deep at high-value
targets. The evacuation of EPWs will be
competing for badly needed and overly
committed transportation assets and
routes. To say simply that empty vehicles
PRISONERS OF WAR
returning to the rear could haul EPWs is
side-stepping the issue. Assuming that
the vehicles and routes exist and are
capable of being used. there would prob-
ably not be enough. and US or allied
wounded would have priority.
Assuming that the evacuation problem
is solved. the problem of custody remains.
Host nation support. if it exists at all.
will not come in the form of forwardly
deployed personnel. Eiupport will be
limited to the use of athletic arenas. zoos.
prisons. empty military installations and
other structures or terrain features which
would facilitate the confinement of large
numbers of people. This could reduce
custodial demands on friendly forces. but
then the problems of support. health and
intelligence exploitation remain.
The EPW problem should be approached
as would any other major battlefield
threat such as tactical nuclear weapons be
approached. To begin with. an awareness
of the possibility of such an eventuality
would go a long way in reducing the shock
associated with it. Second. training and
force structure adjustments along with
sensible forecasting could reduce the
adverse effects on our tactical operations.
resources for an effective E PW
system:and enough PSYOP units to help
feed that system could turn a potential
liability into an asset.
Historically. doctrine and force struc- <0
ture have often tended to reflect the cir-
cumstances of a previous conflict and did
not undergo necessary improvements un-
til subjected to some belated catalyst.
The subject of EPW operations is ap-
parently no exception. but it certainly is
not for want of historical support. Is it
simply a refusal to remember. or a failure
to think a combat operation through to its
logical conclusion. or the fact that a com-
mitment and preparedness to adhere to
prescribed standards of conduct are not
1984 71
MILITARY REVIEW
seen as having much deterrent value?
Whatever the reason, a general lack of
enthusiasm for the subject is evident. and
history may indeed repeat itself. By Oc-
tober 1941, the problem had become so
severe that Adolf Hitler complained, "We
used to say: 'Let's take prisoners!' Now
we think: 'What are we going to do with
all these prisoners?' .... Let us hope that.
on the AirLand Battlefield. we are
similarly blessed but are prepared to
answer that question.
NOTES
1 AUan K Wildman, The End of the RUSSJan Imperial Army,
PrincetonUniversityPress. Princeton, NJ , 1980 P91
2 Ibid. pp85<86 anCl 89
3 CarlP Dennett.Prisoners Of the Great War, HoughtonMifflin
Co Basion, Mass 1919,p 57
4 Aleltander RuSSia at War 1941 1945,E P Dutton Ny.
1964 P 131
5 Ale)<ander Dallln, German Rule ,n RuS518 19411945
Westview Press, BOulder, COlO. 1981, P69
6 WaltervonUnruh War Experiences m RUSSiaOf a German Of
flcer. 1941 HisloflcalD,VISion US EuropeanCommand, 1947 p40
7 A ReView Of Un,ted States POliCY on Treatment 01 Pnsoners
of War, PrisonerOf WarStudyGroup.OfficeoftheProvostMarshal
General, Department 01 theArmy WashIngton, 0 C.1968, p)(1 12
8 IbId, ppVII12and 3
9 WIllIamF Ross andCharles F Romanus The United States
Army 10 World War 1/ The Quarlermaster Corps Operations In the
War Against Germany Department oftheArmy.Washrngton. 0 C
196t1 P635
10 Warren Rees and Rabun C Sanders. HO&t NatIOn Support
Reliance on NA TO Host Nations for Tradllional Military POlJce M,s
Slons. USArmyWar College. CarlIsle Barracks, Pa 1978 p68
11 COl/eClton and Documentation of Matellal Relatmg to the
Pflsoner o( War Internment Program In Korea 1950 1953. MIlItary
Police Board ForiGordon.Ga, 1953. p15
12 Von Unruh,op Cit. pp28and 39
13 FIeldManual(FM)19 40. Enemy Pflsoners of War, C,vIl<an In
ternees and Detained Persons. Oepartment at the Army
Washrngton, 0 C,1976, P23
14 Alfred Tappe.German Methods of InU[rrogat,ng PI/soners Of
War In WOf/d War II, translated by A ROSf;'nwald, HIstOrical 01... 1
sian. US EuropeanCommand 1949 p 19
ttl IbId, pp 11 14and25
16 DepartmentoftheArmy PaMphlet55095,Area Handbook for
the Soviet UflJon US Governl"'le'lt Prrntrng OffIce. Washrngton,
DC.1971, pp15-9 and280
17 FM 194. M,litary Police SuPDO't Theater of Ooerallons
Department oftheArmy.Washington DC 1977. p83
18 FM 1940 Enemy Pflsoners of War Clv!llan Internees ana De
talned Person;;,. Of) Cit P 2 1
19 FM 194, M,/ltary Police Support Theater of Operations op
col
20 Dal!m. op elf, p 412
21 Von Unruh. op CII. P28
22 Ross and Romanus, op Cit pp531 32
23 Ibid p 731
24 A ReView of Umted States POlIcy on Treatment of Prisoners
of War. op Cit. P VIH 4
25 Collection and Documental/on of MateT/al Relating to the
Pflsoner of War Internment Program Ifl Korea, 1950 1953. op Cit, P
12
26 InternatIOnal Law Documents us Government Prrnllng Of
flce. Washrngton. DC. 1952. Volume XLVII, p 119
27 VonUnruh op Cit, P 40
28 Dennell,OP clt,p115
29 PaulP Gronsk\,andNIcholasJ Astra.... The War and the Rus
sian Government. YaleUniversityPress.NewHaven.Conn,1929,p
244
30 Hard and DIrty Ufe for Soviet Soldiers, Sovret World
Outlaol<. 15 August 1982. P 6
31 EnchRendullC The Flghtmg Qualities 01 the RUSSian Soldier,
HIstorIcalDIVISIon. US European Command. 1947. pp 710
32 Pf;'cu/lafilles of RUSSIan Warfare, HistoricalDIVISion. Depart
ment of the Army. WaShington 0 C,1949, pp 13 and46 47
33 Ivan Krylov, SOVIe! Staff Officer. translated by Edward Fltz
gerald PhIlosophIcal LIbrary Inc NY.1951. pp 11112
34 Oallm.op Cit. DP 64 and 142
35 Ibid p 604
36 Jurgen Thorwald Tile illUSion Soviet Soldiers ,n Hlffers Ar
mles. tranSlatedby RIchardWrnstonandClaraWmston. Harcourt
BraceJovanOVIch Inc.NY.1975. pp XIV and xv
37 NIkolai TOlStOy, The C'och IsTlckrng on Seven RUSSians:'
The W<.ill Street Journal, 9 November 1983,p 31
38 .Deserters From the Soviet Army In Afghanistan' The
Houston Post. 26 November 1983.p 28A
39 A ReView of Untted States POliCY on Treatment of Pnsoners
of War. op Cit, P111-168
40 PeculJafltles of RuSSian Warfare, op CIt, p 13
41 DesertersFrom1heSovIet Army rn AfghanIstan op Cit
42 E Mowry, C HutchinS and B Rowland, Tile Historical
Management of POWs. Naval HealthResearch, San D!ego, Calif.
1975 p58
43 Dauln op Cit P417
44 Ibid P 409
Major ft.fark D, Beta l5 currently assie,;ned to
the Defense Intelhgence Agency. Washington.
f) C lie recewed a B A from Sam Houston State
University and an M A. from Texas A & M
UnllJerslty lie is a graduate of the US Army
Russwn In5tltute and a 1984 graduate of the
USACGSC He has had vanOU5 m
the Continental United States, VH?tnam and
Europe, mcludmg serving as a IWlson officer to
the commander m chlef, Group of Sovlet Forces.
Germany
December 72
UNITED STATES
ACAP HELICOPTER DEBUT
The US Army/Sikorsky Aircraft
Advanced Composite Airframe
Program (ACAP) helicopter recent-
ly made its first public flight at the
Sikorsky Development Flight Test
Center, West Palm Beach, Florida.
The aircraft, developed under a
contract with the US Army Applied
Technology Laboratory, Fort Eus-
tis, Virginia, is the world's first all-
composite-airframe helicopter.
The Army set an ACAP target
weight savings of 22 percent, a
cost savings of 17 percent, and a
reliability and maintainability (R &
M) savings of 20 percent, all com-
pared to an equivalent "base-line"
metal airframe. The ACAP has bet-
tered all of these-24 percent in
weight savings, 23 percent in c ~ s t
savings and more than 20 percent
in R & M. The ACAP has 65-percent
fewer parts and 75-percent fewer
fasteners than an equivalent metal
airframe. This greatly reduces the
overall labor required for the air-
craft and cuts the assembly time.
Beyond demonstrating the feasi-
bility of a high-performance com-
posite airframe, the ACAP is de-
signed to meet stringent ballistic-
tolerance criteria. It also is in-
tended to allow its occupants to
survive a 42-foot-per-second ver
tical impact and rollover through a
combination of impact-absorbing
landing gear, long-stroke seat sup-
ports and crushable fuselage
structure.
Composites, which are layers
(plies) of fabric-like materials im-
pregnated with resins, have a
number of distinct advantages
over metal structures. They are
stronger and stiffer on a pound-for-
pound basis and are highly resist-
ant to corrosion and fatigue. The
mechanical properties of com-
posite materials-such as stiff-
ness and strength-are tailored to
the requirements of specific loca-
tions on the airframe by varying the
number of plies, their orientation to
each other and the type of com-
posite material used.
~ W S
1984
73
MILITARY REVIEW
ASPRO SMALL BUT POWERFUL
Productionhasbegunonacom-
puter so small it can fit in a shoe
box, yet so powerful it can help
Navy planes command 3 million
cubicmilesofairspace.Goodyear
Aerospace, Akron, Ohio, is build
mg 12ofthecomputers fortheUS
Navy'sE2C airborneearlywarning
aircraft under an Initial contract
from Grumman Aerospace
Corporation. the aircraft manufac-
turer. Deliveries will begin In
November1985.
The computer. called airborne
associative processor(ASPRO). IS
the most powerful airborne com- past20 years. Aparallelprocessor
mand and control computer In ex- is a computer that does its com-
istence. claims Goodyear One putations in parallel-all at the
ASPROunitaboardacarner-based same time-giving it a speed ad-
E2C can handlethousandsofcom- vantage over conventional com-
putationsatonetime.allowingitto puterswhichworkonitemsofdata
track enemy aircraft and surface oneafterthe otherin sequence.
ships while simultaneously direct- Other parallel processors are
Ing friendly strike aircraft. That used in advanced projects by the
calls for extraordinary processing military services and by the Na-
capacity in a "black box" that tional Aeronautics and Space Ad-
measuresonly8by9.5by10inches ministration. But ASPRO is the
and requires only 200 watts of first computerof this type to take
power. to the airwherethespacesavings
ASPRO gets its capacity from advantage of a parallel processor
tiny microminiature chips which offersgreat potential. Besides the
.makeitpossibletopackenormous airborne use. Goodyear is also in
proceSSing powerintoaverysmall the early stages of implementing
package. The compact computer associativeprocessing forsurface
has been In development for more applications on board ships and
thanfiveyears.Itdatesitsancestry has delivered a unit to the Naval
topowerfulassociative(orparallel) OceanSystemsCenter, SanDiego,
processors developed over the California, fortesting.
TheMilitary ReView. theDepartmentoftheArmyandtheUSArmyCommandandGeneralStaff
College assume no responsibility for accuracy of mformation contained In the News section of
thiS publicatIOn Items are prmted as a service to the readers No offiCial endorsement of the
views. opinions or factual statements IS Intended - Editor
December 74
NEWS
PURELY A MATTER OF REVERSE OSMOSIS
The US Army's Belvoir Res(Jarch
and Development Center, Fort Bel-
voir, Virginia, has awarded individ-
ual contracts for the design, fabri-
cation, assembly and testing of
prototype reverse osmosis water
purification units (ROWPUs). The
units are capable of purifying
water at the rate of 3,000 gallons
per hour (GPH). The contracts were
awarded to the Brunswick Corpora-
tion Defense Division, Deland,
Florida, and to Aqua Chem's Water
Technology Division, Milwaukee,
Wisconsin.
In the past, four units were reo
quired to process nucle'ar, bi-
ological and chemical-contam-
inated raw fresh water and to
desalinate salt water: 3,OOO-GPH
ERDLators, 150-GPH distillation
units, chemical and biological war-
fare pretreatment sets, and ion ex-
change units. These units are all
being replaced by ROWPUs. Under
the terms of the contracts, each
firm will produce three prototype
units for evaluation by the center.
The prototypes are scheduled for
delivery in December 1984 and wi"
be tested at Army facilities. Test-
ing will be completed in late 1986.
1984
75
MIlITARY REVIEW
COMPUTER-CONTROLLED TARGET RANGES
The US Army's Armament, Muni-
tions and Chemical Command has
awarded a contract to Sperry Cor-
poration to produce the first Army
standard marksmanship system
which uses moving targets for ar
mor and Infantry live-fire training.
The two-year production contract
for the Remoted Target Systems
(RETS) includes an option for addi-
tional ranges. If the option IS exer
cised, 15 Army installations in the
United States and South Korea will
be equipped initially with 32 sys-
tems
The ranges can be configured for
either infantry training or armor
trainlrlg, depending on the needs
of the Installation. Range training
officers can program the systems
to simulate many combat sce-
narios through a central computer
control console. The Infantry
targets are three-dimensional and
made of high-density polyethylene
which can withstand up to 2,000
hits before replacement. The tar-
gets move at variable speeds of up
to 8 miles per hour.
Sperry, under a separate Army
contract, has also developed an ar-
mor moving target carrier capable
of moving a full-scale, two-dimen-
sional plywood tank target at
speeds of up to 25 miles per hour.
The RETS equipment, combined
with the armor moving target car-
ner, will provide a fully automatic
live-fire system compatible with
the training requirements of the
newly fielded Ml tank and Bradley
fighting vehicle.
In both the infantry and armor
configurations, automatic sensors
record all hits on the target. A print-
out of the scores for each firing
lane is available within minutes
after completion of the training ex-
ercise. The target systems also
provide hostile fire and muzzle
flash simulation during night train-
ing exercises. Sperry has also
developed a portable version of the
fixed range which uses a radio con-
troller and stationary and moving
targets. Portable systems have
been delivered to US Army units in
the Continental United States,
West Germany and South Korea
and to the Egyptian government.
December 76
NEWS
USSR
1
GMZ TRACKED MINELAYERS IN SERVICE
The GMZ (gusenichi minoza-
gradltel) tracked minelayer is
issuedunascaleofthreeforeach
tankormotorizedrifleengineering
company and has now largely re-
plac.ed the earlier PMR3 towed
minelayers.
The GMZ tows a minelaying
plow devicesimilarin appearance
to the PMR3 but apparently is
capable of operating at higher
speeds and burying mines at in-
creased depths. The tracked
chassis of the GMZ is based on
thatoftheSA4 Ganef surface-to-air
missile system and is entirely
enclosed. This allows the loading
crew to operate the minelaying
plowundertop protection.
The mines are loaded into the
plow from the chute that extends
into the vehicle interior, and the
minescan be eitherburied orsim-
plyplacedon theground'ssurface.
The GMZ has abasiccrewoffour
althoughmoremencanbecarried.
Four mines can be buried every
minute,4 to5.5 metersapart. Itis
estlmatedthatitcancarry208anti-
tank mines of the TM46, TMN46,
TM57 orTM62 type. Reload time
for the vehicle is 12 to 15 min-
utes.-Jane's Defence Weekly,
1984.
1984
77
MILITARY REVIEW
SWITZERLAND
PC9TRAINER
Pilatus recently rolled out Its canopy is noticeably longer and
new PCg turboprop trainer. The deeper than that of the pe7
main differences from the highly because of the two Martin-Baker
successful PC7 are a more power- CH11 lightweight zero-height ejec-
ful engine, ejection seats and a tion seats. Wheels are larger, and
dive brake_ The use of the 860-kllo- high-pressure tires axe fitted
watt (1, 150-shaft horsepower) Pratt which probably precludes soft-
& Whitney of Canada PT6A62 tur- field operations. The wing profiles
boprop gives the PCg an im- have been modified from those used
pressive performance_ With more in the PC7, and the wing integral
than 60-percent greater power than fuel tanks hold 50411ters-30 liters
the PC7, but at 2,200 kilograms on- more than the pe7.
ly 300 kilograms heavier at its max- Pllatus IS offering comprehen-
imum training weight,' the peg has sive cockpit instrumentation in the
a sea-level rate of climb of 4,000 peg, With multipurpose color
feet per minute_ Its time from cathode-ray tube displays and a
releasing the brakes to 15,000 feet headup display. Engine control is
altitude is around 4_5 minutes, through a single power lever, with
some 3 minutes better than other revolutions per minute held con-
military turboprop trainers_ Its stant in flight at 2,000 revolutions
crUising speed at that height is 282 per minute. Electronic torque and
knots_ temperature control is fitted to the
Compared with the earlier ver- engine. The decision has apparent-
sion, the peg fuselage is slightly ly been made to go into production,
longer, and the greater torque and certification to Federal Avia-
necessitates a larger dorsal fin, tion Regulation 32 is expected by
rudder and rudder trim_ Torque ef- the end of 1985 at which time first
fect is reduced by offsetting the deliveries would start.-Interna-
engine centerline down and to the tional Defense Review, 1984.
right by 2 degrees. The cockpit
78 December
NEWS
FRANCE
SABRACAN PORTABLE ANTITANK WEAPON
The French company, Brandt
Armement, has designed a port-
able antitank weapon which any in-
fantryman should be able to use.
The development of SABRACAN is
intended to fill the requirement for
a reliable, rugged, nonrecharge-
able weapon that is shock-resist-
ant during handling, transport and
employment. It must also be
capable of destroying any armored
vehicles, including main battle
tanks, even in the 1990s.
The prototype SABRACAN used
a 130mm-caliber with hollow-
charge warhead, but consideration
is now reportedly being given to
changing the caliber to 140mm.
The operating principle is a
nonrecoil gun with disbursable
breeCh. This principle permits the
weapon to be used inside a shelter
(3 by 3 by 2.5 meters) without en-
dangering the gunner. The weapon
is delivered loaded and requires
only minimum instruction.
The complete weapon (130mm)
weighs 13 kilograms, has a trans-
port length of 1.20 meters and has
a firing length of 1.60 meters. The
high muzzle velocity of 210 meters
per second and a maximum speed
of 275 meters per second give a
very short flight time. The range
with the normal sight is 300 to 400
meters. Mounted on a vehicle
(such as the Sopelem-type SOP-
TAL 29), the range is up to 600
meters.-NA TO's Sixteen Nations,
All Rights Reserved.
1984
79

From Leadership to Commandership
After a recent talk on leadership and
commandership, a lieutenant general
came up to me and said, "I still think they
are about the same thing." Let us explore
his point of view. The civilian uses "leader-
ship" rather loosely, but we in the mili-
tary, who have a very distinct relation-
ship between officers and enlisted person-
nel and very distinct responsibilities as a
"commander" of a military unit by law
and regulations, must be more accurate
and exact in our use of the terms "leader-
ship," "commandership" and "general-
ship."
The laws governing military justice, our
tables of organization and our Army regu
lations are quite specific on the use of
these terms. For example, the head of a
squad or platoon has the official title of
"leader." The one placed in charge of a
company, battalion, regiment or brigade
has the official title of "commander." A
"commanding general" heads a military
organization whose responsibilities are
broader and embrace the handling of
several arms and services and several sub-
ordinate commanders, assisted by a more
complex staff. Thus, one who advances
from a platoon "leader" to a company or
higher "commander" acquires new au-
thority and responsibility by virtue of his
new official title of "commander. "
But, my critic says, "The commander at
all levels still has to exercise good 'leader-
ship. '" This is true. The commander must
exercise constantly such leadership in his
relations with and in the organization,
direction and control of the staff. In rela-
tions with all people, both in and out of
the service, the characteristics of a good
leader are of very great importance, and
they must not be forgotten.
It is not true that every person whose
rank is captaln to general has the respon-
sibilities and authority of a commander or
a commanding general even though they
are subordinate to one whose official posi-
tion is one of these. As a division chief of
staff. as a general staff officer of a large
command and as the assistant comman-
dant of a service school. I did not exercise
commandership or generalship, but I did
assist my commander or my commanding
general in the exercise of his commander-
ship or generalship duties and respon-
sibilities. His relations to me were more
that of my' leader because I was not a
subordinate commander in his command.
My relationship with those under me was
that of a leader.
We cannpt create outstanding units in
the Army I,without competent and dedi-
cated squad and platoon leaders. They
must be leaders who are trained and
coached to feel a responsibility for the
soldiers and leaders under them and who
Letters is a feature designed expressly to afford our readers an opportunity to air their opinions
and ideas on mihtary topics It is not restricted to comments or rebuttals on previously published
material but is open to any variety of expression which may stimulate or improve the value of
thought in the mIlitary community
The right to edIt is reserved by the staff of the magazine and exercised primarily in deference to
space.-Edltor.
December
80
LETTERS
perform their duties in the climate of good
commander.qhip established by good com-
pany, battalion and brigade commanders
and their staff above them.
When these differences are fully under
stood, the teaching of leadership, com-
mandership and generalship is relatively
simple and the practice of these military
arts and techniques is much more effec-
tive.
Gen Bruce C Clarke. USA. Retired.
McLean. Virginia
Reader Applauds Articles and Authors
The August 1984 issue of the Military
Review was one of the finest in recent
years. The articles "Blitzkrieg and the
AirLand Battle" by Major General John
W. Woodmansee Jr., "The Danger of
Logistics Dependency" by General James
P. Mullins, "Lessons of War: The IDF in
Lebanon" by Major Richard A. Gabriel
and "Doctrinal Credibility: A Problem of
Focus With FM 100-5" by Lieutenant
Colonel John A. Cope Jr. provided a
stimulating theme which should have had
a wide impact.
Three of the articles continued MR's
discussion of the implications of the Air-
Land Battle, and Gabriel's article on the
Israeli Defense Force in Lebanon was a
sobering balance of doctrine in practice.
Woodmansee's article is the best explana-
tion of the Army's current thrusts yet
available. Mullins' and Cope's articles
were good expansions on critical aspects
of the AirLand Battle which need more
treatment. .
The Army is going to receive increased
criticism about readiness resulting from
rapid modernization. Articles that treat
this area should be presented. A need ex-
ists for reflective pieces on the"Army of
Excellence." MR should seek the most
senior personnel to present this topic.
Again, a "Well done!" for both the MR
staff and the four authors of these ar-
ticles.
Arthur G Peterson, O"ec'or01 Operations,
US ArmyIntelligence and ThreatAnalysis Cen'er,
Arlington, Virginia
Multipurpose NBC Tent_ An improved protective entrance tent
has been developed for use in the nuclear, biological and
chemical (NBC) environment. The unit, which incorporates an
entry",decontamination compartment, a toilet-storage compart-
ment and a large, general-purpose compartment, is intended to
serve in a number of NBC protective roles. These include entry
and exit; integrated collective protection for mobile command,
control, communications and intelligence, and other similar
electronic missions; modular 'medical air stations; forward
area command posts; or as rest and relief stations for combat
troops.
The tent provides a basic 160 square feet of protective area
which can be complexed with additional identical units to
create either primary or supplemental space. In its transport
configuration, the complete tent packs into dual duffle bags
that weigh about 40 pounds each_-AirDefenseArtillery.
81
1984
~ O O S
AIR POWER IN THE NUCLEAR AGE by M J Armitage and R
A Mason 296 Pages University of illinOIs Press, Urbana, III
1983 $24 95.
Although the title implies a much more
finite view of airpower history and doc-
trine than the book actually covers, Air
Power in the Nuclear Age is a comprehen-
sive, well-written and surprisingly en-
joyable book to read. The authors, M. J.
Armitage and R. A. Mason, billed as "ad-
vanced and enlightened thinkers about
the doctrine of airpower ... ," manage to
live up to their accolades.
For the ground soldier, the title
may serve as a "not applicable" turnoff.
which-at least in this instance-is not
the case. The book holds many lessons for
the Army professional although its main
thrust and applicability are. of course. to
Air Force personnel. Particularly interest-
ing are the incredible parallels-mostly
repeated mistakes and lessons forgot-
ten-which the authors draw between
Vietnam and Korea where both ground
support and interdiction suffered from a
failure to understand the realities of an
Asian campaign. There is an especially
acute sense of deja vu in the airpower
campaigns against Pyongyang and
Hanoi. the Korean passes and the Ho Chi
Minh Trail. "The logistics needs of Asian-
style mass armies had been seriously
overestimated. while the resilience of a
coolie-maintained logistic system was
wildly understressed."
The book also covers various colonial
wars of the 1950s and early 1960s in
which airpower was used-or misused. as
the case may be-by the British in
Malaya. the French in hidochina and
Algeria. and the United States in Korea
and' Vietnam. Particularly well-handled
are the Middle East exploits of the Israeli
air force and the British campaign in the
Falklands where airpower played a deci-
sive role on both sides.
Willie such topics may be of more in-
terest ~ o airmen than to soldiers. the sec-
tions of the book dealing with the NATO
versus Soviet airpower balances and
capabilities (most notably in the area of
ground air defense potential) should rank
as required reading for "frontline" Army
folks. To those of us who became ac-
customed to on-call "fast-movers" in
Vietnam. some proposals by Armitage
and Mason may not sit well:
For as long as ground formations can
deal with the enemy to their immediate
front, they should be allowed to do so.
assisted, as far as resources will allow. by
armed helicopters organic to the ground
forces. Meanwhile. fixed-wing air should
be used against targets that are beyond
the reach of army organic weapons. Fixed
wing air support should be called in only
when an enemy breakthrough is develop-
ing. or when it has actually taken place.
Air Power in the Nuclear Age is a good
book. both in its summation of past
mistakes and of those things which once
worked and may work again. Its real
strengths. however. lie in the incisive and
reasonable proposals put forth by the
authors. Given the current trends in
airpower development-astronomically
higher costs and far fewer aircraft-
changes in airpower doctrine. partill'O.larly
its application in support of ground
forces. are both overdue and inevitable.
One is left with the uncomfortable feeling
that never again will platoon leaders and
company commanders have fast-movers
as close as the handsets of their PRC77s'-
at least not in any conflict whlch ap-
proaches the conventional.
Mal Aro Couch. USA. Retired
December
82
BOOKS
MILITARY LEADERSHIP: In Pursuit of Excellence. Edited by
Robert L Taylor and William E Rosenbach Foreword by
Malham M Wak,". 253 Pages Westview Press. Boulder.
Colo. 1984. $2500 clothbound $15.00 paperbound
Those looking for definitive answers to
the leadership dilemmas of the 1980s will
not find them in Military Leadership.
They will find. however. a thought-pro-
voking collection of readings designed to
"provide an interdisciplinary overview of
the critical elements in military leader-
ship at different organizational levels and
from a v'ariety of viewpoints."
Robert L. Taylor. former head of the
Department of Management at the US
Air Force Academy. and William E.
Rosenbach. acting head of the Depart-
ment of Behavioral Sciences and Leader-
ship at that institution. write to redress
what they believe is a "scarcity of
Iiteratur.e adequately developing the con-
cept of leadership." More than 2.000 ar-
ticles were considered for inclusion; only
23 were selected.
The authors' selections are organized
into four loosely related parts. Part One is
standard fare for a collection of writings
on military leadership. What are the
traits of a good leader? What can be done.
if anything. to train good leaders?
Although there are several excellent ar-
ticles by distinguished military leaders
such as Matthew B. Ridgway and S. L. A.
Marshall. there is nothing offered that is
unfamiliar to all but the beginning stu-
dent of leadership.
The same cannot be said. however.
about the remainder of the book. Having
examined the personal dimension of lead-
ership. the authors investigate the dis-
tinction between leaders and managers in
Part Two. Abraham Zaleznik's classic
1977 Haruard Business Reuiew article
"The Leadership Gap" and a comparison
between leadership in the military and
academia by Roy D. Voorhees provide in-
teresting perspectives on this issue.
None of the remaining articles was writ-
ten from the military perspective. a
method of presenting today's challenges
which the reviewer found stimulating and
refreshing. Part Three examines how the
changing technological. economic. social
and political environment is narrowing
the gap between leaders and followers.
What are the implications of the elimina-
tion of traditional differences between
leader and follower? Do leaders really
have "any substantive influence on the
performance of their organization"? Is
the development of leaders inhibited by
this changing enVIronment? What can or
should be done?
Part Four examines "contemporary
issues that affect leader behavior in the
military." Once again. however. the
issues are presented from nonmilitary
perspectives. Must successful leaders
emerge from the ranks of followers? How
do leaders get the opportunity to lead? Is
there a need for creativity in military
leadership? Are only men capable of true
leadership in today's Army?
Each reading in the book is well-written
and interesting. but the true value of the
work emerges only when considered as a
whole. This multidimensional look at
leadership affords the reader perspective
and insight unavailable elsewhere in a
single text. I recommend it to all who are
engaged in the study of leadership.
Capt Craig 0 Wildrick. USA.
Department of Social Sciences, USMA
THE BLUE AND WHITE DEVILS: A Personal Memoir and
History of the Third Infantry Division In World War II by Hugh
A Scott 173 Pages Battery Press. NaShVille. Jenn 1984
$1695
Author Hugh A. Scott comments in the
introduction to The Blue and White
Deuils that he had "the best seat in the
house" to watch the World War II opera-
tions of the US 3d Infantry Division. His
various assignments (division public rela-
tions officer. assistant G2. acting G2 and
division historian) kept him assigned to
1984 83
MIlITARY REVIEW
the division staff and required him to
know what was going on and.why. His
duties permitted him to participate in the
division's landing in North Africa (8
November 1942) where he was responsible
for the beaching and security of $50,000
in gold to buy information if necessary.
His description of the problems involved
in the landings and later operations in
North Africa is fascinating storytelling.
The History of the Third Infantry Divi-
sion in World War II was published by
the Infantry Journal Press after the war.
This is not it. Scott remarks that:
... this book is like a river with two
distinct currents. One current is a com-
plete, continuous-if somewhat con-
densed-account of the Division's combat
operations in World War II, from Novem-
ber 8, 1942, u'hen it landed at Fedala in
French Morocco, to V-E Day, May 7, 1945,
when it had reached Salzburg. Austria
and Berchtesgaden, Germany.
The :other current is the stream of
recollections that I brought home with
me, and that are as vivid today as they
were in those days, nearly forty years g ~
when they occurred.
I have made no conscious effort to
weave these currents together in one
coherent story, yet I hope that is what I
have achieved. It is told as a story, and
the characters and events appear just as
they crossed the stage of history as I
witnessed it.
The story is well-told. Scott relates the
oddities of the landings in Sicily, southern
Italy, Anzio and southern France. And he
describes the drives to the Vosges-Colmar
area and to the end of the division' s World
War II combat in Salzburg. The narrative
is relaxed, and it rings true. Anyone who
served on a division staff or expects to
should read it. It wouldbe good back-
ground reading for the courses at Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas, and alumni of the
3d Division will enjoy it. I think it is
worth the cost. I t is a good book!
Col Mark H Terrel. USA. Retired
FOUlOiS AND THE U.S. ARMY AIR CORPS. 1931-1935 by
John F Shmer 346 Pages US Governmen! Prln!ong Office.
Washmg!on. 0 C 1984 $1300
"Official history is bad history"-that
has been the traditional message of the
graduate historiography courses around
the land. Michael Gorn and Charles Gross
have convincingly contradicted this no-
tion in the March 1984 issue of Aerospace
Historian, at least insofar as Air Force
history is concerned. They assert that, in
that particular field, the official history is
clearly superior to that produced by the
academic community and the popular
writers. With Foulois and the U.S. Army
Air Corps, Colonel John F. Shiner erects
another pillar that supports that idea and
establishes a position for himself in the
front rank of airpower historians.
Although Shiner is himself a profes-
sional Air Force pilot with a substantial
combat record of his own, and although he
has long been a teacher of military history
at an official institution (the US Air Force
Academy), he does not succumb to the
common temptation of turning the chief
into a "Marble Man." To that Shiner has
added the academic qualification of a
Ph.D. from Indiana University which so
balances his other assets that his book
has a credibility enjoyed by few others.
The message of Foulois and the US. Ar-
my Air Corps is that, although the chief :)f
the air arm (Major General Benjamin D.
Foulois) definitely had his limits as a high-
level leader, the first half of the 1930s was
a period of advancement for the Air
Corpl His incessant 1Jressure on the War
Department's General Staff was vital to
this advancement although the conser-
vatism of the ground officers who were his
adversaries has been exaggerated in
airmen's memoirs and air history. All
branches of the Army were suffering
severely from the stringency of the day,
and Shiner fairly points out that the Air
Corps was suffering less than the rest.
The combination of Foulois' relent-
less drive and the willingness to compro-
December
84
mise on the parts of such people as Chief
of Staff Douglas MacArthur and Briga-
dier General Charles E. Kilbourne re-
sulted in substantial advances-although
they fell short of the desires of most of the
airmen.
Shiner's logical arrangement of his
arguments in functional chapters shows
that. during Foulois' tenure. the Air
Corps improved its equipment. doctrine
and organization in significant ways_
These improvements were to have an im-
portant effect on the way in which W orId
War II was fought and on the outcome,
This was achieved despite the fact that
Foulois was a flyer and mechanic much
more at home on the flight line than as a
bureaucrat in Washington. D.C. It was
achieved notwithstanding that he was far
from being a tactful man and was too
given to snap judgments. It was achieved
notwithstanding that Foulois was in con-
tinual trouble with the General Staff and
even with the Congress. It was achieved
chiefly through commitment and drive.
The layout. design and production work
on the book is worthy of an exceptional
manuscript. The volume was planned
with efficiency and taste. the photographs
are many and well-chosen. the editing is
outstanding and the work is a pleasure to
read. The documentation is all that could
be asked of an academic work. and the in-
dex and glossary are expertly done.
For a military historian. Foulois and the
U.S. Army Air Corps deserves a place. on
his shelf. for there is nothing better on
that subject. and it is not likely to be
superseded. For the Army officer. the
book is one that might be more useful to
the practical leader than many that have
been written on such Marble Men as
Robert E. Lee. It shows how a soldier
born with defects like those suffered by
most of us can. nonetheless. overcome his
handicaps to achieve important things for
his country. Read this book.
It Col David R. Mets, USAF, Retired
BOOKS
TO PROMOTE PEACE: U.S, Foreign Policy in the Mid-19BOs.
Edited by DenniS l Bark Foreword by W Glenn Campbell,
298 Pages Hoover Inslitution Press, Stanford, Calif 1984
$1995
This .collection of 17 essays is an am-
bitious undertaking that is worth reading.
This boQ!< and its o ~ p n i o n piece. To Pro-
mote Prosperity. are followons to a volume
titled The United States in the 1980s. The
original book contains 24 essays on domes-
tic and foreign policy problems written by
scholars from throughout the United States
and abroad and was published in early
1980. The stated purpose for all three books
is to contribute to the discussion of
domestic and foreign policy issues of con-
cern to the US electorate.
All of the authors in To Promote Peace
share the basic premise that an adequate.
credible defense is the best guarantee of
peace-an idea certainly compatible with
the current administration. The essays
are wide-ranging in both scope and sub-
ject matter while discussing some ex-
tremely controversial issues with recom-
mendations that contradict the conven-
tional wisdom. In the initial essay.
Melvyn Krauss argues that there is "no
greater threat to the prosperity of the
poorer nations today than, the welfare
state." and US giveaway programs have
largely been ineffectual. An essay by
Ronald I. McKennan argues for a restruc-
tured monetary system. with the US Fed-
eral Reserve playing a central role in
stabilizing prices and the money supply
throughout the world.
Distinguished physicist Edward Teller
tackles the thorny problem of energy and
peace and calls for the increased develop-
ment of two major national energy
sources: nuclear-generated electricity and
coal. In an essay titled "It' s Time to
Change the Atlantic Alliance." the author
calls for an end to "defense free-riding" by
the West Europeans and the Japanese.
He concludes that military subsidization
by the Uniteli States has contributed to
the "new neutralism" and "new
pacifism" in Europe. Arnold Beichman
1984 85
MIlITARY REVIEW
argues that much of the US advantage in
technology has been compromised. and
top priority 'must be given to the estab-
lishment of an effective. sophisticated in-
telligence network that is free from con-
gressional hinderance.
The book also contains essays by well-
respected analysts such as Robert
Wesson on the Americas. George Lenc-
zowski on the Middle East. Robert Con-
quest on Soviet foreign policy and
William VanCleave on arms control. The
issues are vital and compelling; the book
is highly recommended.
Col Robert F_ Collins. USA.
Oepartment of Military Science. Colorado State Untverslly
CONSCRIPTS AND VOLUNTEERS. Military ReqUirements.
Social Justice and the Ali-VOlunteer Force Edited by Robert
K Ful!mwlder 250 Pages Rowman & A!!anhe!d. Totowa,
N J 1983 $3750 clothbound $1995 paperbound
The debate on the merits. efficiency and
military effectiveness of the All-
Volunteer Force (AVF) just will not go
away. Since the expiration of Selective
Service in mid-1973. the AVF has been
prodded and probed by scholars and prac-
titioners in the field of military man-
power. Today. despite three of the best
recruiting and retention years in the
history of the US military's experience
with raising and maintaining forces on a
strictly voluntary basis. opponents of the
AVF continue to challenge the system.
From the "left" come charges that the
AVF unfairly draws disproportionately
from the poor and minorities and. because
the politically aware middle class is not
represented. leaves the executive branch
with a free hand to employ the force in
military adventures. Critics on the
"right" consider the AVF too expensive
and unable to attract recruits of sufficient
quality or in necessary numbers.
Since 1979. the AVF has been the sub-
ject of several major symposia. This
volume represents the results of one con-
ducted in 1980-81 by the Center for
Philosophy and Public Policy of the
University of Maryland. Unlike other ex-
aminations of the subject which generally
repeated the econometric analysis of the
issue established by the President's Com-
mission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force
(G ates Commission) in 1971. the emphasis
of the study under review here is on the
philosophical basis for military service in
the United States-compulsory or volun-
tary. As such it is a refreshing departure
from previous entries but. because it ex-
plores philosophical questions, it is hard
going for the casual reader.
Conscripts and Volunteers consists of
four parts. The first section contains a
straightforward analysis of the existing
AVF and its prospects for the future. The
authors generally agree that the AVF has
its problems but disagree on their causes
or cure. The selections evaluating the
status of the A VF and analyzing its pros-
pects and alternatives are useful but hard-
ly new. Their purpose is to set the
framework for the philosophical essays
that follow. These are divided into three
sections that deal respectively with the
issues of whether there is. in fact, a moral
obligation to serve. representativeness
and exemption for conscientious objec-
tion. and race and gender.
As noted, this collection of
essays on the philosophical bases for
military service is not for the light reader.
It is not a starting point for someone in-
terested in acquiring background in the
subject. There is no summary that
synthesizes the several arguments or at-
tempts to draw conclusions from the
authors' efforts. Editor Robert K. Fullin-
wider and the authors assume that the
reader is conversant with the major
arguments and issues associated with
military manpower.
Having thus forewarned potential
readers, I recommend this book highly,"
For too long. the opponents and pro-
ponents of the AVF have argued in terms
of quantity. quality and. lately. represen-
December
86
tativeness. while avoiding the fundamen-
tal moral basis for military service.
Ultimately. the issues come down to
whether compulsion is right or wrong.
Readers seeking answers to the phil-
osoJ?hical questions involved with this
subject would do well to start here.
lt Col Robert K. Grillith Jr USA.
US Army Center of Military History.
Carlisle Barracks. Pennsylvania
DROP ZONE SICilY: Allied AIrborne Strike, July \943 by
WIlham B Breuer Foreword by James M Gavm 212 Pages
PreSIdio Press. Novato, Calil 1983 $109'>
Combat history has long enjoyed a wide
audience; thus. the success of Drop Zone
Sicily is somewhat assured. Moreover.
William B. Breuer has
produceri a lucid battle account of the Ju-
ly 1943 beginning of the Western Allied
return to the Continent after the British
and French luckily escaped entrapment at
Dunkirk three years earlier.
The successful Allied invasion of Sicily.
part of what Adolf Hitler called his
Festung Europa, was a watershed in the
European war, for the Western Allies
started to fight Axis forces in Hitler's
European continental fortress as our
Soviet Allies had been doing since June
1941. Joseph Stalin had frequently com-
plained to Franklin D. Roosevelt and
Winston Churchill that their armed forces
were not doing enough to relieve the
Soviets who were bearing the brunt of the
German military might. From Stalin's
point of view. the Western Allied invasion
of North Africa in November 1942 was a
step in the right direction-North Africa
was cleared of Axis forces by May 1943.
Since Anglo-American forces were too
weak to launch an assault across the
English Channel against German-occu-
pied northwest France in 1943. alterna-
tive coalition strategies to take a larger
amount of the war home to the Germans
had to be developed. In 1943, this was
BOOKS
accomplished through the stepup of stra-
tegic air bombardment of German cities
and through the invasion of Sicily in July.
Breuer focuses on the airborne attacks
preceding the amphibious landings. par-
ticularly on the courageous and crucial ac-
complishments of less than 3,400 US par-
atroopers, His narrative is full-blown
from the takeoff in Tunisia of the para-
troop-laden C47s to the hookup of static
lines and the jump into the blackness of
the Sicilian night sky. Separation, injury
and unexpected German tanks all plagued
the airborne strikes, but the Allied troops
survived to cause so much havoc among
Axis forces that Radio Rome estimated
that there were between 60,000 and
120,000 enemy parachutists.
In a brief epilogue, Breuer makes some
interesting observations although pene-
trating assessments are not included. The
author notes that, by mid-August, when
the Allied occupation of Sicily was com-
pleted, three German and four Italian
divisions escaped to the Italian mainland.
These divisions consisted of more than
100.000 soldiers, 135 artillery pieces, 47
tanks. some 3,000 tons of ammunition
and fuel, and hundreds of vehicles. This
happened when Generals Bernard Mont-
gomery and George S. Patton had almost
total control of the air and sea around the
island. A more thorough and critical ex-
amination of Anglo-American generalship
in this instance would have been wel-
comed.
There are also some annoying shortcom-
ings at the outset of this book in the pro-
logue. For example, Breuer overstates the
real situation when he maintains that, in
1942-43. German U-boats "nearly
brought these two war partners (the
United States and Great Britain) to their
knees. .. Indeed, Allied construction of
new shipping in 1943 was more than twice
as great as the 1942 figure while. in 1943,
V-boats sank less than half the tonnage,
they had destroyed the previous year.
This is a fine book as far as the airborne
tactical aspects are concerned-it reads
1984
87
MILITARY REVIEW
very well. At the strategic level, however,
or when Breuer attempts to place his bat
tie account in broader perspective, the
work is far less convincing.
Carl Boyd, Old Domimon Umverslty, Norfolk, Vlfglma
NATO UNDER ATTACK: Why the Western Alliance Can Fight
Outnumbered and Win in Central Europe Without Nuclear
Weapons by F W von Melienth," and R H S, Stolfi with E
Soblk 164 Pages Duke Umverslty Press, Durham N C
1984 $22 75 clothbound $10 75 paperbound
One of the most important and con
troversial aspects of the defense of
Western Europe by the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NA TO) is the poten
tial use of tactical nuclear weapons should
C<1hventional defenses fail to deter and
halt a Warsaw Pact offensive. The pos
sibility of employing nuclear weapons as a
lastditch defense has caused much anxie
ty among member nations of NATO. Con
sequently, there has been a continual
search for a successful conventional
strategy to avoid resorting to nuclear
weapons.
The authors of NATO Under Attack
posit that the answer to this continual
search is close at hand and one most
suited to the Western style-namely, to
employ a mobile defense to deter and, if
necessary, defeat a Soviet attack. Too
many defense analysts continue to con
clude from the Warsaw Pact's apparent
numerical superiority that only by resort
ing to nuclear weapons can the West be
saved.
However, these analysts overlook the
qualitative aspects of the equation. These
factors of superior Western command
style (flexibility), combat spirit (elan) and
technology can be combined to clearly
overcome the rigid and mechanical Soviet
style of war. History has shown that vic
tory does not always go to the side with
the superior numbers but may lie with the
force that can outthink and outmaneuver
a numerically larger foe. Sole reliance on
quantitative factors alone disregards the
inherent benefits which derive from the
Western tradition of independent think
ing and individual initiative.
The historical examples chosen by the
authors center on the German experience
in World War II, especially the successful
campaign against France in 1940 and
selected battles oli the Eastern Front.
(These selections were no doubt chosen by
F. W. von Mellenthin, a noted panzer
general during World War II and author
of the bestselling Panzer Battles.) The
common thread connecting the examples
is the ability of outnumbered forces to win
when they are given free rein to employ
mobile warfare against a foe less able to
think fast and show initiative on the bat
tlefield. The Soviet soldier proved to be a
brave and hardy foe but one who was
totally unable to overcome the Germans
when it came to flexibility and daring
thinking. In the same way, the numerical
Iy superior Allied forces could not cope
with the German attack through the
Ardennes that carried the Germans to the
English Channel.
The authors make a valid point in em-
phasizing qualitative factors of combat,
and their thoughts on outmaneuvering
the aggressor certainly contain much
merit. Certain caveats do exist, however.
The first revolves around NATO being
able to produce battlefield commanders
and soldiers equal to the Germans in
World War II. Another presumes that the
Soviets will continue to remain inflexible
and unable to think creatively in the arena
of war. One final point needs to be
remembered: While the Germans did ex
hibit outstanding tactical and strategic
brilliance, they did lose the war to forces
that employed mass and, in many cases,
wetsllot as well led!
Capt Albert J. Golly Jr .. USAR
December 88
BOOKS
NEW BOOKS RECEIVED
This hstmgIS provided to hrmg recently pubhshed profe<;slOnnl books to the attentionofreaders Reviews of thes'
book" alreadybeenbohntedfrom ourcurrpntn,vle....Pfs Othf'fbooksareaVSllablefor rev1CW hyquahhedprofes
c,lOnale; FormformatJonauouttheBook RpV1PW Progrnm contuct\1r PhilhpR DaYI!'.. BooksEditor.at19131684-5Jl42
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THEDEATH MERCHANT' TheRiseand Fall01 EdwinP. Wilson
by J05eph C Goulden WIth Alexander W Ralho 456 Pages
Simon &SChusler NY 1984 $1795
MODERN FIGHTING AlACRAFT Volume V Harner by 8,1i
Gunston 64 Pages Areo Ptlbl!shlng NY 1984 $11 95
THE BOOK OF FLIGHT TESTS by Alan Bramson 223 Pages
Alco Pubhshlng NY 1984 $21 9,
GLOBAL OEMANDS' Limited Forces' US Army Deployment by
Stuart L PerktnS 123 Pages NatIonal Defense UnIversity
P'ess WaShington DC 1984
IRAQ East.rn Flank of theArab World by ChnSllne Moss
Helms 215 Pages Brookmgs Instlfu/ton. WdShlngton 0 C
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Martin 233 Pages lexmgton Books LeXington Mass
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KGB by Bnan Fleemanlle 192 Pages HOII Rinehart &
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Galland PublIShing NY 1984 $4900
MILITARY IN AFRICA' The Political and
EGpnomlC Risks of Arms Transfers by Bruce E Arllnghaus
152 Pages Weslvlew Press. Boulder. Colo 1984 $?350
NATIONAL EMERGENCY TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY'
Who's 10 Charge? by Colonel Robert A Re'nman USAF 55
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1984
THE UNITED STATES ANO BRAZIL' Opening aNew Dialogue
by Commander RObert J 8ranco:USN 118 Pages National
Defense University Press WaShington 0C 1984
OUR OWN WORST ENEMY The Unmakmg of American
Foreign Policy by I M Destler Leslie H Gelb and Anthony
La,e 3?0 Pages Simon &5chusler NY 1984 $1795
AFRICA IN THE PDSTDECDLONIZATION ERA Ed,led by
RIChard E Bisselland MIChaelS Rad" 763 Pages Transac
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$9 95 paperbound
THE BISHOPS AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS The Catholic
Pastoral Letteron Warand Peace byJamesE Dougherty 255
Pages Archon Books Hamden Conn 1984 $22 50
NATO POLITICOMILITARY CONSULTATION' Shaping
Alliance Decisions by COlonel Thomas J Kennedy Jr . USA
86 Pages NahOl')al Defense UniverSity Press Washington,
DC 1984
EXILE. The Unquiet Oblivion 01 RiChard M Nixon by Robert
Sam Anson 360 Pages Simon & Schuster NY 1984
$1795
.HIDDEN POWER: The Programming 01 thePresidentby ROland
Perry 232 Pages Beaulort Books NY 1984 $1695
IN HELL BEFORE DAYLIGHT. The Siege and Storming 01 the
Fortress01 Bada;oz, 16Marcht06AprlllBI2byIanFlelcher
135 Pages Hlppocrene Books. NY 1984 $22 50
AN ILLUSTRATED GUIDE TO MODERN SUB HUNTERS by
DaVid Miller 160 Pages Arco Publlshmg. NY 1984 $995
SONS OF THE BRAVE: The Story 01 Boy Soldiers by A W
Cockenll 236 Pages DaVid & Charles. North Pomlrel VI
1984 $24 9,
TAX INCENTIVES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH by Barry P
Bosworlh 208 Pages. Brookings InstitutIOn. Washmgton.
DC 1984 $26 95 clothbound $9 95 paperbound
AND WE SHALL SHOCK THEM. The BritishArmy inthe Sec
ond WorldWar by Dav,d Fraser 429Pages DaVid &Charles.
North Pomlrel. VI 1983 $2700
ARMS CONTROL: Myth Versus Realily. Edlled by R,chald F
Staar 211 Pages Hoover Institution Press. Stanford. Calif
1984 $1495
THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE' Optionslorthe
1980s and Beyond by John Van Dudenaren 90 Pages Rand
COIP .Santa MOnica Calli 1984
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Flank Barnaby 192Pages FaclsonFile NY 1984 $1695
FOR THE COMMON DEFENSE' AMilitaryHistoryot theUniled
States by Allan R Millett and Peler MaSlowski 507 Pages
Flee Press. NY 1984 $2495
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TheWhiteBurkettMillerCenterForums, 1983,PartIV. Edited
by Kenneth W Thompson 95 Pages UniverSity Press of
Amenca WaShington. DC 1984 $18 25 clOlhbound $650
paperbound
THE VIRGINIA PAPERS ON THE PRESIDENCY Volume XVI:
The White Burkett Miller Center Forums. 19831984. Part I
Edited by Kenneth W Thompson 128 Pages University
P,ess 01 Amenca WaShington. DC 1984 $t675 c101h
bound $6 50 paperbound
TURKEY IN TRANSITION The West's Neglocted Ally by Ken
neth MackenZie 39 Pages Institute for European Detence &
SlraleglC Siudies. London Eng 1984 350
LIEUTENANT CASTNER'S ALASKAN EXPLORATION. 1898 A
Journeyof Hardshipand Sullering. Edited by LleulenanlCOIO-
nelLyman L WOOdman. USAF Reilled 83 Pages COOk In1el
Hlsloncal Society Anchorage Alas 1984 $8 00
THE GERMAN PRISONERSOF-WAR INJAPAN, 19141920by
Charles BurdiCk and Ursula Moessner 128Pages UmverSlty
Pre55 ot Amenca Washmgton DC 1984 $19 75 cloth
bound $8 75 paperbound
THE FRENCH ARMY AND POLITICS, lB701970 by Allslalf
HOIOe 109 Pages Peler Bednck Books NY 1984 $1295
HOW TO SHOOT AGUN by Jerry Prelsel 64 Pages Berkley
BOOkS. NY 1984 $395
1984
89
INDEX
Volume LXIV
January-December 1984
CONTENTS
PAGE 91 Part I
Title Index
94 Part II
Author Index
97 Part III
Subject Index. Articles
105 Part IV
Subject Index. News
111 Part V
USACGSC Master's Degree Theses
Index compiled by
PalnCla H Norman. Edllonal Asslslant
f

"The asterisks shown in Parts I, II and 111 of this index designate articles reprinted or condensed
from other publications.
December
90
Part I
TITLE INDEX
TITLES PAGE MONTH
Abraham Lincoln 97 Feb
Aircraft Survivability, C. Hudson Carper Jr 64 Mar
Alliance. The. Col Darnel K. Malone. USA. Ret 35 Sep
Army Readiness Planmng, IR991917, John B. ""rilson 60 Jul
Battle of the Crater: A Combat Engmeef Case Study; Ma) Larry George. USA 35
Blitzkrieg and the AirLand Battle. MaJ GenJohn W Woodmansee Jr. USA 21 Aug
CAS' The Army', New Staff Officer Course. Lt Col Karl Farris. USA 39 Apr
Case StudIes In the Law of Land Warfare II': The Camprugn In the Falklands;
Maj Robert D. Higginbotham. USA 46 Oct
Center for Army Leadership 97 Aug
Challenge for t he Future Educating Field Gradp Battle Leaders and Staff Officers;
Col Huba Wa" de Czege, USA 2 Jun
Command and Control in Jomt Riverine Operations. CDR Brent L. Gravatt, USN 54 May
Commander and Battlefield AutomatIOn, The. MaJ Forrest G. Clark. USA 66 May
CommIttmg Your Reserve: l\1aJ RIchard P. Geier. USA 49 Jun
Danger of LOgIstiCs Dependency. The. Gen James P. Mullins. USAF 40 Aug
Designing the Light Division, 1935-44. Capt Jonathan!VI House, USA 39 May
Developing Military StrategIsts; MaJ!P1 Robert B. Killebrew. USA 44 Sep
Doctrinal Credibility' A Problem of Focus With FM 100-5; Lt Col John A CopeJr, USA 66 Aug
Eight-Day ARTEP FTX, The: Lt Col R Lynch Ill, USA 12 Dec
Evaluating CAS' Instruction; R. Anderson 27 Jul
EvolutIOn of US Armor MobIlity; Chri.topher R. Gabel 54 Mar
Falaise-Argentan EnCIrclement. The: Operatlonally BrilLIant, TactIcally Flawed;
MaJ Cole C. Kingseed, USA Dec
FIeld Artlllery System of the Future, The. A French Pomt de Vue,
Maj Jean Paul Perruche. French Army 25 Nov
FM 100-5; Conceptual :'>Iodels and Force Design;
Maj James M Dubik. USA, and Mal (PI James J. Montano, USA 16 Jul
FM 100-5; A VIeW From the Ivory Tower; Archer Jones 17 May
Force Development- The Old Way 97 I Nov
Force Integration; Lt Col Jack A LeCuyer, USA 17 Feb
40 Years Ago. The Allied Invasion of Europe. 6 June 1944 56 Jun
40 Years Ago' The Battle of the Bulge 56 Dec
German Army General Staff Officer Training;
Col Norbert Majewski. Federal Republic of Germany Army. and Lt Col John H Peyton, USA 23 Dec
Historical Mindedness in the Israeli Defense Forces;
Maj!P1 James W Rainey. USA. and Capt Robert W. MixonJr, USA 28 Jun
How to Change an Army. Col Huba Wass deCzege, USA 32 Nov
IG InspectIOn. The; A New Focus;
Col Charles R. Weaver. USA. and Lt Col Theodore W. Nell. USA 35 Jul
1984 91
MIlITARY REVIEW
TITLES
PAGE MONTH
Improving the Joint Doctrinal Process: Reinforcing Success; Col Leo M. Kosiba. USA
In Defense of US Strategic Nuclear Strategy; John M. Weinstein
Initiative Soviet Style, Maj Richard N, Armstrong, USA
Integrators of the AirLnnd Battle
Iran-Iraq War and the Future of the Persian Gulf, The. William J Olson
46
75
14
97
J 7
Jan
Oct
Jun
Jan
Mar
Just War TrarutlOn, The: Capt David H. Petraeus, USA 30 Apr
Kampuchea: Three Dilemmas. Capt James D Marett, USA
Kermit Roosevelt Lecture: Officer Trairung and Education; Gen William R. Richardson. USA
50
22
Nov
Oct
Leadership: A Personal Philosophy: Col Thomas B.Vaughn, USA
Legal ImplIcations of Targetmg for the Deep Attack: Lt Col Jonathan P. Tomes. USA
Lessons of War: The IDF in Lebanon; MaJ Richard A Gabriel, USAR
Light Infantry in Europe: Strategic Flexibility and Conventional Deterrence;
Capt David H. Petraeus, USA
Logistical Support for the AirLand Battle; Lt Col Bloomer D. Sullivan. USA
LongRange Desert OperatIOns: David Syrett
Low-Intensity Conflict: An Operational Perspective;
Maj Gen Donald R. Morelli, USA, Ret, and Maj (PI Michael M. Ferguson, USA
17
70
47
35
Nov
Sep
Aug
Dec
Feb
Jan
Nov
MOUT. The QUiet Imperative: John J. Mahan 42 Jul
National Guard History
NATO Nonnuclear Deterrence, A: Is It Affordable?: MaJ Bruce K. Scott, USA
New Hall of Fame Honorees
Night of the Long Knives, The: Lt Col Verner R. Carlson, USA, Ret
198485 USACGSC Class Under Way
Normandy Today
97
56
97
97
97
Oct
Sep
Apr
Aug
Sep
Jun
Old Blood and Guts and the Desert Fox. Truman R. Strobridge
On Coalitions: Col Thomas R. Stone, USA
One Step Beyond: Air Land Ba\.tle, Doctrine Not Dogma: Col Thomas A. Cardwell III, USAF
Operational Concepts: Col Walface P. Franz, USAR
33
25
45
Jun
Sep
Apr
Jul
Perspective on Leadership. Management and Command. A; Lt Col Boyd M. Harris. USA
Philosophical Basis of the AirLand Battle, The: Cadet Stephen W. Richey, USMA
Planning Aviation CrossFLOTOperations: Maj Charles L. Barry, USA
48
48
34
Feb
May
Jan
I'
REFORGER: Realistic Training for the ARNG:
Capt David W. Baer, ARNG, and Capt Paul H. Vivian, ARNG
Reminder, A: We Always Need Good Manuscripts
Reserve Component Dilemma. The: Mission versus Time;
Col Benjamin F. SharpJr, USA, Ret, and Maj Donald B. Skipper, USA
Ride to the River of Death: Cavalry Operations in the Chickamauga Campaigu:
Maj Jerry D. Morelock, USA
47
97
62
Mar
May
Nov
Oct
Siberian Intervention, The: Military Support of Foreign Policy: Capt Judith A. Luckett, USA
Soviet Armed Helicopters: Maj Henry S. Shields, USAFR
Soviet Conventional Offensive in Europe. The;
Lt Col John G. Hines, USA, and Phillip A. Petersen
54
58
Apr
Feb
Apr
92
December
TITLE INDEX
TITLES
SovietGeneralStaff'sNewRole':MaJ KennethCurrie.USAF
SovietOfficer.The APersonalObservation.MaJ Robert M Young.USA
SOVIet PnsonersofWarmthf'Air LandBattle;MaJ Mark D.Beto.USA
Spetsnaz: TheSovietUnIon'sSpecialForc('s*;ViktorSuvorov
StateDefenseForces:TheMissingLinkinNationalSecurity:GeorgeJ Stein
StayingAlive: Knowing WhattoDo Until the Medic Arrive5.
CaptLynnW Kaufman.USA. andLtColGregory LucasHelenky. USA
StumesIn ConflIct:ColClintonE.GrangerJr. USA.Ret
TargetingSovietForces. Lt ColDonaldL. Mercer. USA
Terrorism:AModeofWarfare:MajJeffreyW Wright. USA
Trainingfor Maneuver Warfare.
ColWayneA Downmg.USA.LtColJamesR Riley. USA;andCaptDavidM. RodrIquez. lJSA
UnderwaterHide-and-Seek. EdgarO'Ballance
"Unknown"Custer.The.MaJ JohnA. Reichley. USA. Ret
Urgent Need. An' Stockplhng Modern ChemIcal MumtIOns..
BrIgGenGeraldG Watson.USA,and LtCol(P)Raymond L Anderson, USA
WartimeMilitaryJustice.LtColE. A. Gates.USA.andMalGaryV Caslda. USA
WinnersOneand All
YompmgtoPortS,tanley;ColHarry G SummersJr, USA
PAGE MONTH
61 Oct
17 Sep
58 nec
30 Mar
2 Sep
2H Jan
58 Jun
23 May
35 Oct
16 Jan
64 Apr
72 . May
5H Jan
May
97 Mar
Mar
1984 93
Part II
AUTHORINOEX
AUTHORS PAGE MONTH
Anderson. Lt Col (P) Raymond L- and Brig Gcn Gerald G. \'Vatson:
Urgent Need, An: Stockpiling Modern Chemical MunitIons 58 Jan
Anderson, Mkhae-I R.; Evalul;ltingCASJ Instruction 27 Jul
Armstrong. MaJ Richard N : I nttiative SOl, iet Style 14 Jun
Baer. Capt David W. and Capt Paull!. Vivian: REFORGER: Realistic Trairung for the ARNG 47 Mar
Barry, Maj Charles L.; Planning Aviation Cross- FLOT Operations 34 Jan
Belenky, Lt Col Gregory Lucas and Capt Lynn W Kaufman;
Staying AlIve' Knowing What to Do UntIl the Medic Arrives 28 Jan
Beto. Ma] Mark D. Soviet Pnsonersof \-Var in the AirLand Battle 58 nec
Cardwell. Col Thomas A. III; One Step Beyond: Air Land Battle. Doctrine Not Dogma 45 , Apr
Carlson. Lt Col Verner R .. Night olthe Long Kruves. The 2 Aug
Carper. C. Hudson Jr. Aircraft Survivability 64 Mar
Casida. Maj Gary V. and Lt Col E. A. Gates. Wartime MilItary Justice 2 May
Clark, MaJ Forrest G.: Commander and BattlefIeld AutomatIOn. The 66 May
Cope. Lt Col John A. Jr. Doctrinal Credibibty. A Problem of Focus With FM 1005 66 Aug
Currie, MaJ Kennrth: SovIet General Staff's New Role* 61 Oct
Downing. Col Wayne A Lt Col James R Riley and Capt David M. Rodriquez:
Tratmng for Maneuver Warfare 16 Jan
Dublk. :""laj James M and MaJ IP) James J. Montano,
FM 100-5: Conceptual !'.Iodels and Force Design 16 Jul
Farris, Lt Col Karl; CAS1: The Army's New Staff Officer Course 39 Apr
Ferguson. Maj (P) Michael M and MaJ Gen Donald R. Morelb;
Low IntenSIty Conflict: An OperatIOnal Perspectlve Nov
Franz. Col Wallace P.: OperatIOnal Concepts Jul
Gabel. Christopher R: EvolutIOn of US Armor MobIlity 54 Mar
Gabriel. Maj Richard A.; Lessons of War: The!DF in Lebanon 47 Aug
Gates. Lt Col E. A. and MaJ Gary V. Casida. Wartime Military Justice May
Geier. MaJ Richard P. Committing Your Reserve 49 Jun
George, Maj Larry; Battle-of the Crater' A Combat Engineer Case Study 35 Feb
Granger. Col Clinton E. Jr: StudieS in ConflIct 58 Jun
Gravatt. CDR Brent L,: Command and Control in Joint Riverine Operations 54 May
Harris. Lt Col Boyd M.; A Perspective on Leadership, Management and Command 48 Feb
Higginbotham. Maj Robert D.:
Case Studies in the Law of Land Warfare II': The Campaign in the Falklands 46 Oct
Hines. Lt Col John G. and Phillip A. Petersen: Soviet Conventional Offensive in Europe. The 2 Apr
House. Capt Jonathan M .. Designing the Light Division. 193544 39 May
Jones. Archer: FM 100-5: A View From the Ivory Tower 17 May
Kaufman. Capt Lynn W. and Lt Col Gregory Lucas Belenky:
Staying Alive: Knowing ,"Vhat to Do Until the Medic Arrives 28 Jan
94 December "
AUTHOR INDEX
<'>
\ "
AUTHORS
Killebrew.Maj(PIRobertB..DevelopmgMIlitaryStrategists
Kingseed. Maj Cole C.;
Falaise-Argentan The: OperatIOnally Brilliant. TactIcally Flawed
Kosiba, Col Leo M, ImprovmgtheJoint Doctrinal Process. ReinforcingSuccess
LeCuyer.LtColJackA.; ForceIntegratIOn
Luckett, Capt Judith A.: Siberian InterventIOn. The: MIlitary Support of ForeIgn Policy
Lynch.LtColWilliamR III;TheEight-DayARTEPFTX
Mahan. JohnJ., MOUT: TheQuietImperatIve
Majewski.Col NorbertandLtCol JohnII. Peyton.GermanArmyGeneralStaffOfficerTraming
Malone.ColDanielK.;Alliance.The
Marett. Capt James D.; Three DIlemmas
Mercer. Lt Col Donald L. t Targeting SOVIet Forces
Mixon. Capt Robert \V Jr and Maj fP) James W. Rainey;
HistorIcal Mmdedness In the Israeli Defense ForcE's
Montano. Maj {PI JamesJ. aml Maj James M Dublk.
FM 1005:ConceptualModelsandForceDesign
Morelli. Maj GenDonald R. and Maj {PI Michael M. Ferguson:
Low- IntenSIty ConflIct- An Operational Perspective
Morelock. Maj JerryD;
Ride to the River of Death Cavalry Operations in the Chickamauga Campaign
Mullm&, Gen J arne:, P.; Danger of Logistics Dependency. The
Nell. Lt Col Theodore \t\'. and Col Charles R Weaver; IG InspectIOn. The, A New Focus
OBallance.Edgar;UnderwaterHlde-andSeek
Olson. \t\'ilham J : Iran-Iraq \Var and the Futureofthe Persian Gulf. The
Perruche. Ma] Jean Paul: Field Artillery System of the Future, The: A French POPlt de Vue
Petersen, Phillip A and Lt Col John G HInes. Soviet Conventional OffensiveinEurope. The
Petraeus. Capt David H .
JustWarTradition.The
Light Infantry in Europe: Strategic Flexibility and Conventional Deterrence
Peyton. LtCol JohnII.andCol NorbertMajewslu.GermanArmyGeneralStaffOfficerTrroning
Rainey. Maj (p) James \V and Capt Robert W. i\1ixon Jr:
Historical Mindedness in the Israf'li Defense Forces
Reichley. Maj JohnA.;
40 YearsAgo:TheBattleoftheBulge
NormandyToday
..Unknown" Custer. The
Richardson. Gen William R.: Kerrrut Roosevelt Lecture: Officer Training and Education
ftichey.CadetStephenW.. PhilosophicalBasisoftheAIrLandBattle.The
Riley. LtCol JamesR.Col Wayne A. DowningandCaptDavidM. Rodriquez;
Training for Maneuver Warfare
Rodriquez. Capt David M.. Col WayneA. DowningandLt Col JamesR. Riley;
TraIning for Maneuver Warfare
Scott.Maj BruceK.;NATONonnuclearDeterrence.A: IsItAffordable?
Sharp. Col Benjarrun F Jrand Maj Donald B. Skipper;
Reserve Component Dilemma. The: Mission versus Time
PAGE MONTH
44 Sep
Dec
46 Jan
17 Feb
54 Apr
12 Dec
42 Jul
23 Dec
35 Sep
50 Nov
23 'May
28 Jun
16 Jul
7'rov
Oct
40' Aug
35 Jul
64 Apr
17 Mar
25 Nov
Apr
30 Apr
35 Dec
23 Dec
28 Jun
56 Dec
97
J Jun
72 May
22 Oct
48 May
16 Jan
16 Jan
56 Sep
62 Nov
1984 95
MILITARY REVIEW
AUTHORS
Shields. Maj Henry S.: Soviet Armed HelIcopters
Skipper. Maj Donald B. and Col Benjamin F. Sharp Jr;
Reserve Component DIlemma. The: Mission VPfSUS Tlmf'
Stein. George J.: State Defense Forces' The Missing Link in National Spcunty
Stone. Col Thomas R.: On Coalitions
Strobridge. Truman R; Old Blood and Guts and the Desert Fox
Sullivan. Lt Col Bloomer D.: Logisllcal Support for the AirLand Battle
Summers. Col Harry G. Jr; Yomping to Port Stanley
Suvorov. Vlktor; Spetsnaz: The Soviet Union's Special Forces
Syrett. DaVId. Long-Range Desert Operations
Tomes. Lt Col Jonathan P .. Legal Implications of Targclmg for the Deep Attack
Vaughn. Col Thomas B ; Lf'adership' A Personal PhIlosophy
VIvian. Capt Paul H. and Capt DaVId W. Baer: REFORGER: Realistic Training for the ARNG
Wass de Czege. Col Huba:
Challenge for the Future: Educatmg Field Grade Battle Leaders and Staff OffIcers
How to Change an Army
Watson. Brig Gen Gerald G. and Lt CollPI Raymond L. Anderson:
Urgent Need. An' StockpIlIng Modern Chemical Munitions
Col Charles R. and Lt Col Theodore W. Nell; IG InspectIOn, The' A New Focus
Weinstein. John M.: In Defense of US Strategic Nuclear Strategy
Wilson. John B. Army Readiness Plannmg. 18991917
v\"oodmansee. !\1a) Gen John V\.'. Jr. BlItzkrieg and the Air Land Battle
Wright. MaJ Jeffrey W .. Terrorism: A Mode of Warfare
Young. Ma} Robert 1\1 : Soviet Officer. The' A Personal Observation
PAGE MONTH
58 Feb
62 Nov
2 Sep
25 Sep
33 Jun
2 Feb
Mar
30 Mar
Jan
70 Sep
17 Nov
47 Mar
Jun
32 Nov
58 Jan
35 Jul
75 Oct
60 Jul
21 Aug
35 Oct
17 Sep
December 96
Part III
SUBJECT INDEX
Articles
TIlLES
PAGE MONTH
Africa
Long-RangeDesertOperations
Aircraft
AIrcraftSurvIvability
SovietArmed Helicopters
AirLandBattle
BlitzknegandtheAlrLandBattle
DoctrinalCredibility:AProblemof FocusWithF1\1100-5
Eight-DayARTEPFTX,The i
ForceIntegration
LogisticalSupportfor t"he AirLandBattle
MOUT- TheQUIet ImperatIve
OneStepBeyond:Air LandBattle.DoctrineNotDogma
PhilosophicalBasisoftheAirLandBattle,The
PlanningAvinlionCross- PLOTOperation&
SeviNPrIsonersofWarmtheAlrLandBattle
TargetIngSovietForces
AmerIcanClvil War
BattleoftheCrater.ACombatEngineerCaseStudy
CommandandControlIIIJointRIVerineOperatIOns
RidetotheRIverofDeath:CavalryOperationsintheChickamaugaCampaign
"Unknown" Custer,The
Argentina
CaseStudIesIn theLawofLand~ a r f a r e II"
YompmgtoPortStanley
Armor
EvolutionofUSArmorMobility
Army Avltillon
AircraftSurvivability
PlanningAviationCross-FLOTOperations
Artillery
TheCampaignintheFalklands
FieldArtillerySystemoftheFuture,The" A FrenchPOl1lt de ViH'
Battalion
REFORGER RealistiCTrainingfortheARNG
Belgium
Alliance.The
40YearsAgo:TheBattleoftheBulge
Budget
:\ATONonnuclearDeterrence.A. IsItAffordable?
Cavalry
RidetotheRiverofDeath:CavalryOperatlonsintheCluckamaugaCampaign
CBRWarfare
UrgentNeed.An:StockpilingModernChemicalMunitions
CommandandControl
CommandandControlinJointRivermeOperations
Jan
64 Mar
58 Feb
21 Aug
66 Aug
12 Dec
17 Feb
2 Feb
42 Jul
45 Apr
48 May
34 Jan
58 Oec
23 :'!ay
35 Feb
54 May
Oct
7'2 May
46 Oct
Mar
54 :\lar
64 :\lur
34 Jan
25 No\
47 Mar
"35 Sep
56 Dec
56 Sep
Oct
58 Jan
54 May
1984
97
MILITARY REVIEW
TITLES PAGE MONTH
Communications
CommanderantiBattlefieldAutomation,The
Defense
NATONonnuclearDeterrence.A: IsIt Affordable?
StateDefenseForces:TheMissingLinkinNationalSecurity
UrgentNeed,An:StockpIlingModernChelTIlcalMunitions
Discipline
WartimeMilItaryJustice
Division
DesigningtheLightDIvisIOn. 1935-44
Eight-DayARTEPFTX,The
FOf(; Integration
Doctrine
BlitzkrIegandtheAIrLandBattle
CommittmgYourReserve
DoctrinalCredibility:AProblemofFocusWithFM100-5
FM 1005: AViewFromtheIvoryTower
FM 100-5: ConceptualModelsandForceDesign
ImprovingtheJointDoctrinalProcess:ReinforcingSuccess
IrutiattveSovietStylo:
LogistIcalSupportfortheAirLandBattle
OneStepBeyond.AirLandBattle.Doctrinei'.:ot Dogma
OperationalConcepts
PerspectiveonLeadership,ManagementandCommand.A
PhilosophicalBasisoftheAirLandHattie,The
PlanningA"iationCross- FLOTOperations
SovietGeneralStaffsNewRole*
Education-Training
CAS':TheArmy'sNewStaffOfficerCourse
ChallengefortheFuture EducatingFieldGradeBattleLeadersandStaffOfficers
DevelopingMilitaryStrategists
Eight-DayARTEPFTX,The
EvaluatingCAS3 Instruction
ForceIntegratIOn
GermanArmyGeneralStaffOfficerTraining
HistoricalMindednessintheIsraeliDefenseForces
HowtoChangeanArmy
KerITIlt RooseveltLecture:OfficerTrammgandEducation
MOUT:TheQuietImperative
REFORGER: RealisticTrmninglortheARNG
ReserveComponentDllemma. h e ~ MissionversusTime
StayingAlive: KnowingWhattoDoUntiltheMedicArrives
Trainingfor ManeuverWarfare
Engineers
Battle 01theCrater:ACombatEngineerCaseStudy
Equipment
CommanderandBattlefIeldAutomation.The
DangerofLogisticsDependency,The
TrainingforManeuverWarfare
66 May
56 Sep
2 Sop
58 Jan
May
39 May
12 nec
17 Feb
21 Aug
49 Jun
66 Aug
17 May
16 Jul
46 Jan
14 Jun
2 Feb
45 Apr
Jul
48 Feb
48 May
34 Jan
61 Oct
39 Apr
Jun
44 Sep
12 Dec
27 Jul
17 Feb
23 Dec
28 Jun
32 Nov
22 Oct
42 Jul
47 Mar
62 Nov
28 Jan
16 Jan
35 Feb
66 May
40 Aug
16 Jan
December 98
INDEX TO ARTICLES
TITLES
Falkland Islands
CaseStudiesintheLawofLandWarfareIII. TheCampRlgnmtheFalklands
YompingtoPortStanley
Force Modernization
FM lOO-f>: ConceptualModelsandForceDesign
ForceIntegration
StudiesinConflict
France
Alliance.The
Falaise-ArgentanEncirclement.The:OperationallyBrilliant.TacticallyFlawed
FIeldArtillerySystemoftheFuture,The:A FrenchPoint de Vue
Germany
GermanArmyGeneralStaffOfficerTraining
NightoftheLongKnives.The
PhIlosophIcalBasisoftheAir LandBattle.The
Great Britrun
CaseStudiesintheLawofLandWarfareIII: TheCampaIgnIn theFalklands
KermitRooseveltLecture:OfficerTrainingandEducation
Long-RangeDesertOperations
Yomping toPortStanley
Infantry
Light InfantryIn Europe:StrategIcFlexibilityandConventionalDeterrence '),
YompingtoPortStanley
InspectorGeneral
IG Inspection,The: A ~ e w Focus
IntellIgence
Spetsnaz: TheSovietUmon'sSpecialForces*
TargetingSovietForces
Iran
Iran-Iraq~ a r and theFutureofthePersianGulf.The
Iraq
Iran-Iraq\Varand theFutureofthePersianGulf.The
Israel
HistOrIcalMindednessintheIsraelIDefenseForces
LessonsofWar:TheIDFinLebanon
Kampuchea
Kampuchea,ThreeDilemmas
Law
CaseStudiesintheLawofLandWarfareIP:TheCampaignintheFalklands
LegalImplicationsofTargetingfortheDeepAttack
WartImeMilitaryJustice
Leadership
Alliance.The
ChallengefortheFuture:EducatingFieldGradeBattleLeadersandStaffOfficers
CommanderandBattlefieldAutomation.The
CommittingYourReserve
PAGE MONTH
46 Oct
2 Mar
16 Jul
17 Feb
'58 Jun
35 Sep
2 Dec
25 Nov
23 Dec
2 Aug
48 May
46 Oct
22 Oct
Jan
Mar
35 Dec
Mar
35 Jul
30 :\1ar
23 May
17 Mar
17 Mar
28 Jun
47 Aug
50 Nov
46 Oct
70 Sep
May
35 Sep
2 Jun
66 May
49 Jun
1984
99
MILITARY REVIEW
PAGE MONTH
TITLES
DevelopingMIlItaryStrategists
DoctrinalCredibility.AProblemofFocusWithFM1005
EvaluatingCASlInstruction
GermanArmyGeneralStaffOfficerTraInmg
HIstoricalMindednessintheIsraeliDefenseForces
HowtoChangeanArmy
InitiativeSovietStyle
KermitRooseveltLecture.OfficerTramingandEducation
Leadership:APersonalPhilosophy
LegalI mplicationsofTargetingfortheDeepAttack
OldBloodandGutsandtheDesertFox
OneStepBeyond:AirLandBattle.DoctrineNotDogma
OperationalConcepts
PerspectiveonLeadership,ManagementandCommand.A
SovietGeneralStaff'sNewRole*
SovietOfficer.The'APersonalObservation
WartImeMIlitaryJustice
Lebanon
Lessons TheIDFinLebanon
Trrorism' AModeofv..,' arfare
LOgI<;tics
DangerofLOgiStICS Dependency,The
LogisticalSupportfortheAuLandBattle
Maneuver
TrainingforManeuver\Varfare
Manpower
ReserveComponentDIlemma,The'MissionversusTime
StateDefenseForces.TheMissingLinkinNationalSecurity
Medical
StaYlOgAlIve'Knowing toDoUntiltheMedicArrives
Middle East
HistoricalMindednessinthe"IsraeliDefenseForces
Iran-Iraqv.:arandtheFutureofthePersianGulf.The
LessonsofWar:TheIDFinLebanon
Terrorism:AModeofWarfare
Military History
AircraftSurvivability
Alliance,The
ArmyReadinessPlanning,1899-1917
BattleoftheCrater:ACombatEngineerCaseStudy
DesigningtheLightDiVlsion, 1935-44
EvolutionofUSArmorMobility ,
Falaise-ArgentanEncirclement,The:OperationallyBrilliant,TacticallyFlawed
40YearsAgo:TheBattleoftheBulge:MalJohnA. Reichley,USA,Ret I
HistoricalMindednessin theIsraeliDefenseForces
JustWarTradition.The
Long-RangeDesertOperations
NightoftheLongKnives.The
44 Sep
66 Aug
27 Jul
23 Dec
28 Jun
32 Nov
14 Jun
22 Oct
17 Nov
70 Sep
33 Jun
45 Apr
2 Jul
48 Feb
61 Oct
17 Sep
2 May
47 Aug
35 Oct
40 Aug
2 Feb
16 Jan
62 Nov
Sep
28 Jan
28 Jun
17 Mar
47 Aug
35 Oct
64 Mar
35 Sep
60 Jul
35 Feb
39 May
54 Mar
2 Dec
56 Dec
28 Jun
30 Apr
Jan
Aug
100
December
INDEX TO ARTICLES
TITLES
OldBloodandGutsandtheDesertFox
Operational Concepts
PWlosophicalBasisoftheAirLandBattle,The
Ride to the River of Death: Cavalry Operations in the Chickamauga Campaign
SiberianIntervention,The:MilitarySupportofForeignPolicy
"Unknown" Custer. The
MilitarySchools
CAS':TheArmy'sNewStaffOfficerCourse
ChallengefortheFuture:EducatingFieldGradeBattleLeadersandStaffOfficers
Developing Military Strategists
Evaluating CAS! InstructIOn
German Army General Staff Officer Training ,
Kermit Roosevelt Lecture: Officer Training and Education
Mobility
Evolution of US Armor Mobility
Morality
JustWarTradition,The
Mutu'lllSecurity
On Coalitions
NatIOnalGuard
REFORGER: RealisticTrainingfortheARNG
State Defense Forces: The Missing Link in National Security
NATO
Light Infantry in Europe: Strategic Flexibility and Conventional Deterrence
NATO Nonnuclear Deterrence. A: Is It Affordable?
Naval Vessels
Underwater Hide-and-Seek
Navies
Command and Control in Joint Riverine Operations
Nuclear Warfare
In Defense of US Strategic Nuclear Strategy
Nuclear Weapons
NATONonnuclearDeterrence,A: IsIt Affordable?
Offense
FM100-5:AViewFromtheIvoryTower
LegalImplicationsofTargetingfortheDeepAttack
Soviet Conventional Offensive in Europe, The
Organization
Alliance,The
ArmyReadinessPlanning,1899-1917
DesigningtheLightDivision,1935-44
HowtoChangeanArmy
IGInspection,The:ANewFocus
Improving the Joint Doctrinal Process: Reinforcing Success
Light Infantry in Europe: Strategic Flexibility and Conventional Deterrence
OnCoalitions
SovietGeneralStaff'sNewRole'
Spetsnaz: The Soviet Union's Special Forces*
PAGE MONTH
33 Jun
2 Jui
48 May
2 Oct
54 Apr
72 May
39 Apr
Jun
44 Sep
27 Jul
23 Dec
22 Oct
54 Mor
30 Apr
25 Sep
47 Mar
Sep
35 Dec
56 Sep
64 Apr
54 May
75 Oct
56 Sep
17 May
70 Sep
Apr
35 Sep
60 Jul
39 May
32 Nov
35 Jul
46 Jan
35 Dec
25 Sep
61 Oct
30 Mar
1984
101
MILITARY REVIEW
PAGE MONTH
TITLES
Persian G uIf
Iran-IraqWar and theFutureofthePersianGulf.The
Personalities
Nightof theLongKmves.The
OldBloodandGutsandtheDesert Fox
OperationalConcepts
Siberianrntervention.The: MihtarySupportofForeignPolicy
"Unknown" Custer.The
Personnel
CASJ:TheArmy'sNewStaffOfficerCourse
DevelopingMilitaryStrategu,ts
Leadership: A Personal Philosophy
PerspectiveonLeaderslup,ManagementandCommand.A
SOVIet OffIcer, The'A PersonalObservation
StayingAlive: KnOWIng""'hat toDoUntiltheMedicArrives
PrisonGrs of \\'ar
SovietPrisonersofWarintheAirLandBattle
Reform
WartimeMIlItaryJustice
Reserves
ReserveComponentDilemma,The,MissionversusTlme
Scandmavia
UnderwaterHide-and-Seek
Sibena
SIberian Intervention.The: MilItarySupportofForeIgnPolIcy
Southeast Asia
Kampuchea:ThreeDilemmas
Special ForCt>S
Spetsnaz' TheSovietUnion'sSpecIalForces*
Strategy
DevelopingMlhtaryStrategIsts
FM 100-5: Conceptual Models and Force Design
InDefenseofUSStrategicNuclearStrategy
Iran-Iraq\-VarandtheFutureofthePersianGulf.The
Kampuchea:ThreeDIlemmas
Light InfantryinEurope.StrategIcFlexibilityandConventionalDeterrence
Low- IntensityConflict:AnOperationalPerspective
NATONonnuclearDeterrence,A: IsItAffordable?
OnCoalitions
SiberianIntervention,The:MilitarySupportofForeignPolicy
SovietConventIOnalOffensiveIn Europe.The
StateDefenseForces:TheMissingLinkinNationalSecunty
Studiesin Conflict
Support
Logistical Support for the AirLand Battle
Tactics
, Battle of the Crater: A Combat Engineer Case Study
l
17 Mar
2 Aug
33 Jun
2 Jul
54 Apr
72 May
39 Apr
44 Sep
17 Nov
48 Feb
17 Sep
28 Jan
58 Dec
May
62 Nov
64 Apr
54 Apr
50 Nov
30 Mar
J
44 Sep
1'16
Jul
75 Oct
17 Mar
50 Nov
35 Dec
Nov
56 Sep
25 Sep
54 Apr
Apr
2 Sep
58 Jun
Feb
35 Feb
102
December
INDEX TO ARTICLES
TITLES
BlitzkriegandtheAirLandBattle
CommandandControlinJointRivermeOperatIOns
CommittingYourReserve
DoctrinalCredibility:AProblemofFocusWithFM 100-5
Falaise-ArgentanEncirclement.The:OperationallyBrilliant.TacticallyFlawed
FM100-5: AVIew FromtheIvoryTower
InitiativeSOVIetStyle
LegalImplicationsofTargetingfortheDeepAttack
Low-IntensityConflIct: AnOperationalPerspectIve
MOUT:TheQuietImperative
PlanningAviatIOnCross-FLOTOperations
RidetotheHI""'''nfP"'ath:CavalryOperatIOnsIn theChickamaugaCampaIgn
SovietArmeoHeLIcopters
TargetingSOVIet Forces
Trainingfor !\1aneuver""'arfare
YampingtoPortStanipy
Terrain
Long- RangeDesertOperations
MOUT:TheQwetImperatIve
Terrorism
Terrorism: AModeofWarfare
Unconventional Warfare
TheSovietUnion'sSpecialForces
United Nations
SovietOfficer.The. A PersonalObservation
USSR
InitiativeSoviet-Style
SovietArmedHelicopters
SovietConventionalOffensiveinEurope,The
SovietGeneralStaff'sNewRole*
SovietOfficer,The:APersonalObservation
SO'netPrisonersofWarintheAlrLandBattle
Spetsnaz: TheSovietUnion'sSpecialForces*
UnderwaterHide-and-Seek
VietnamWar
AircraftSurVIvability
CommandandControlIn JointRiverineOperations
Warfare
CaseStudiesIn theLawofLandWarfareIIJ: TheCampaignintheFalklands
JustWarTraditIOn,The
Conflict:AnOperationalPerspective
StudiesinConflict
Terrorism: A ModeofWarfare
Trainingfor ManeuverWarfare
UnderwaterHide-and-Seek
Weapons
DangerofLOgiStICS Dependency,The
PAGE MONTH
21 Aug
54 !\lay
49 Jun
66 Aug
2 Dec
17 May
14 .Tun
70 Sep

42 Jul
34 ,Jan
2 Oct
58 Feb
23 May
16 Jan
J\.lar
Jan
42 Jul
35 Oct
30 i'.lar
17 Sep
14 Jun
58 Feb
Apr
61 Oct
17 Sep
58 Dec
30 Mar
64 Apr
64 Mar
54 May
46 Oct
30 Apr
Nov
58 Jun
35 Oct
16 Jan
64 Apr
40 Aug
1984 103
MILITARY REVIEW
TITLES PAGE MONTH
World War II
Evolution of US Armor Mobllity
Falaise-Argentan Encirclement. The: Operationally Brilliant. Tactically Flawed
40 Years Ago' The Battle of the Bulge
Long-Range Desert Operations
Old Blood and Guts and the Dpsprt Fox
OperatIonal Concepts
54
2
56
33
Mar
Dec
Dec
Jan
Jun
Jul
104
December
Part IV
SUBJECT INDEX
News
TITLES
PAGE MONTH
Air Defense
ADATSlAIrDefenseAntitankSystemIMissIle
AirDefenseTrainertUniledKingdom)
ARCS(AcquisitionRadarandControlSystem)(Norway)
OTH-BIOver-the-HorizonBackscatterlRadarSites
PLSS(PrecisIOn LocatIOnStrikeSystem)
Stinge",POST(PasslveOpticalSeekerTechnology)
TornadoF2ADVlAirDefenseVariant!AIrcraft!UnitedKingdom)
Aircraft
Fixed-Wing
C21A
f..'2X VersionofE2CHawkeyeforSingapore
F15EEagie
FI6FlghtlngFalcon(Turkey)
KflrC7i1sraeli
M,G21ILaosl
PC9 Trainer(Switzerland)
SeaHarrierCarriesSeaEagle
SkyfoxTraIner
330Sherpa
TornadoIFederalRepublicofGermanyl
TornadoF2(UnitedKingdom)
General
ACETSI Air-CushionEquipmentTransportationSystem)Platform
ACMIlAirCombatManeuveringInstrumentation)Range
ACMIlAIrCombatManeuveringInstrumentation)TrainingSystem(Thailandl
AirDefenseTrainer(Uruted KIngdom)
AirDeliverableCBU87BCEMICombinedEffectsMunition)
ArmyAviationMuseum
ASPRO(AIrborneAssociativeProcessor)Computer
Mission-AdaptiveWings
TR1 CarriesPLSS(PrecisionLocationStrikeSystem)
Helicopters
ACAP(AdvancedCompositeAirframeProgram)
AH1T+SuperCobra
A129Mongoose(italyl
CH47DChinook
HH60DNightHawk
HNVS!HelicopterNightVIsionSystem)
MH53EAMCMI AirborneMmeCountermeasures)
NavyLynx3I UnitedKingdoml
TransportableHelicopterEnclosure
Volcano MineDispenser
76 Aug
81 Feb
85 Sep
78 Aug
81 Oct
78 May
84 Jul
82 Mar
73 Jan
79 Jul
85 Apr
84 Api-
55 Dec
78 Dec
86 Nov
76 Jun
81 Jul
85 Jan
84 Jul
73 Jun
78 Feb
79 Jun
81 Feb
79 Aug
83 Oct
74 Dec
83 Apr
81 Oct
73 Dec
82 Apr
87 Mar
74 Jun
76 Jul
77 Feb
84 Oct
85 May
80 Jan
76 Feb
1984 105
MILITARY REVIEW
TITLES
VSTOL
A V8BHarnrrIJ
A V8R Harner]} HasFiberOptics
llarrtf!rTests PeJ.:a':ltts2 Enh'1ne(UmtedKIngdom)
Clothing
ANIPVS5A NightVIsionGoggles
CommUniCatIons
All-SourceAnalysl5System'EnemySituationCorrelationElementComputerSystem
A N/ARC186 TransceIver
ANIft,lLQ34 Jammer
ASPRO(AirborneASSoCIatIve Processor)Computer
Combat-NetRadioSimulator(UnitedKingdom)
ComplexMultipberlAccumulatorClup
EMIDS(ElectronicMessagpIntelhgt'nceDissernmatmnSystem)
FLCLI FamIlyLIfeCommUnIcationLIne)
JTIOStJomlTaoclcallnformationDIstributionSystem)
MobIle,\todd5025 AntennaSystem
PEPStPhotovoltmcElectricPo.er SYbotem)'
PLSSIPrecision LocatIOn StnkeSystem)
WWMCCS(Worldwlde!\llhtaryCommandandControlSystem)InformationSystem
Traming
ACMI(AirCombatManeuverIngIn5trumentation)Range
ACMIIAIr CombatManeuverIng Im,trumentationlTrainingSystem(Thailand)
AIr DefenseTraIner(UmtedKIngdom)
Combat-Net RadIO SImulator(UnitedKingdom)
COM1'SICombatSkillsComprehensivePhaselfor USACGSCStudents
CorrespondenceCourseCatalogs
FieldClrcular5
Mod,1997 A MISsileTarget
OfficerAdvancedCourse& Restructured
pe9 Trainer(Sw1tzerland)
PlasticTrmrungAmmunition
RETS(RemotedTargptSystems)
SA IVES ISmail-ArmsWeaponEffectsSimulatorllUnitedKingdoml
ServiceObligationforSchoolsSet
SkYfox Trainer
Smart Small- ArmsTramer
TankMaintenanceTramers
USArmy AVIat ionLogisticsSchool
Equipment
All-SourceAnalYSISSystem/EnemySItuationCorrelationElementComputerSystem
ANIPVS4 NightVisionDevices
ANIPVS5A NightViSIOnDevices
ANITVS5 :'>ightVISIOn Devices
ASPRO(AirborneAssociativeProcessor)Computer
ForeignMilitarySalesDown .
HNVS(HelicopterNightVisionSysteml
PADS(PositionandAzimuthDeterminingSystem)
Pegasus 2EngineTestedbyHarrier (UrutedKingdom)
PAGE MONTH
78 Jan
80 Sep
89 Mar
78 Jul
34 Jul
84 May
67 Jan
74 Dec
80 Feb
75 Jul
82 Jun
38 May
84 Nov
82 Nov
81 Aug
81 Oct
22 May
78 Feb
79 Jun
81 Feb
80 Feb
80 Mar
1
69 Jun
88 Jul
85 Nov
78 Sep
78 Dec
75 Jun
76 Dec
88 Mar
24 Sep
76 Jun
86 Sep
82 Oct
44 Apr
34 Jul
78 Jul
78 Jul
78 Jul
74 Dec
71 Jun
77 Feb
82 May
89 Mar
106 December
-,
INDEX TO NEWS
TITLES
POMCUSI Pre-PositioningofEquipmentConfiguredtoUnitSetslSite
Scanning Electron Microscope
SSDED{Signature-Suppressed,Diesel-Engine-DrivenlGeneratorSets
Food and Food Processing
ROWPU (Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit)
Information
Correspondence Course Catalogs
Field Circulars
MilitaryHistorySymposium
Space A Travel Rules Changed
Infrared DeVIces
ANIPVS1 Mini-Eye-SafeLaserInfraredObservationSet
Protective Coating for Optical Surfaces i
Installations
Army AviatIon Museum
Laser ApplicatIOns
ANIPVS6 Mini-Eye-Safe Laser Infrared Observation Set
Pulsed-LaserTechnologyIUnitedKingdom!
Robotic Laser
I.ogtstics
POMCUS(pre-PositioningofEquipmentConfiguredtoUnitSets!S,te
330 Sherpa Freighter Aircraft
Manpower
Armed Forces Expanded iBrazlH
Ranger Forces Increase
Reserve Troop Authorizations Increased'
l\1 aps and M<lppmg
CIG (Computer Image Generation) ApplIcations
Microfix
Medical
Wound Dressing
MilitaryHistory
Military History
Tankers'Museum
MilitarySchools
DefenseInformationSchoolAlumniSearch
Officer Advanced Courses Restructured
ServiceObligationforSchoolsSet
USArmyAviationLogisticsSchool
Naval Vessels
General
PierZulu
PlasticCupolasforShipGunsI FederalRepublicofGermany)
Sea Eagle SubmersibleISweden!
PAGE MONTH
21 Oct
74 Feb
II Dec
75 Dec
69 Jun
88 Jul
53 Apr
67 Jun
69 Sep
HI Mar
80 May
83 Oct
81 Mar
46 Mar
75 Jan
21 Oct
81 Jul
78 Jun
24 Nov
81 Nov
13 Jun
80 Jul
76 Sep
53 Apr
67 Jun
16 Nov
78 Apr
78 Sep (
24 Sep
44 Apr
85 Mar
79 Feb
82 Jul
1984
107
MILITARY REVIEW
TITLES
NBCWarfare
MUltipurposeNuclear.BiologicalandChemicalTent
ROWPU{ReverseOsmosisWater PunficatlOnUnit)
Orgarnzation
ArmedForcesExpandediBrazilI
Personnel
COMPS(CombatSkillsComprehensivePhaselfor USACGSCStudents
DefenseInformationSchoolAlumniSearch
FLCL(FamilyLifeCommunicationLinel
OfficerAdvancedCoursesRestructured
RangerForcesIncrease
ServiceObligationforSchoolsSet
SpaceATravelRulesChanged
Radars
ARCS(AcquisitionRadarandControlSystemllNorwayl
Crossbow-SGenericRadar
ELlM2I06
OTHBfOverthe-HorizonBackscatter)Sites
Pave Paws
RadarTestArch
Reserves
ReserveTroopAuthorizationsIncreased
Shelters
Defendress WeaponEmplacement(FederalRepublicofGermany)
MultipurposeNuclear,BiolOgIcalandChemlcalTent
TransportableHelicopterEnclosure
Solar Energy
PE \PhotovoltaicElectricPowerSysteml
Space
DevelopmentProgram(Japan)
HPPMIHigh-PerformancePropulsionModulel
H2 RocketIJapanl
Transportation
ACETS(Air-CushionEquipmentTransportationSystem}Platform
HoverbargeDesignforLAMp.HILighter,Amphibian- HeavyLift}
SpaceATravelRulesChanged
Vehicles
Air-Cushion
HoverbargeDesignforLAMP-HILighter,Amphibian-HeavyLiftl
Armored PersonnelCarriers
Fahd IArabRepublicofEgypt}
Saxon IUnifedKingdoml
General
AMACI AntiriotVehicleI UnitedKingdoml
PAGE MONTH
81 Dec
75 Dec
78 Jun
80 Mar
7S Apr
38 May
78 Sep
24 Nov
24 Sep
69 Sep
85 Sep
77 Jul
79 Oct
78 Aug
72 Feb
83 May
81 Nov
85 Aug
81 Dec
80 Jan
81 Aug
85 Oct
81 Jan
85 Oct
73 Jun
74 Jan
69 Sep
74 Jan
88 Nov
80 Jun
83 Jan
108 December
INDEX TO NEWS
TITLES
PAGE MONTH
Camouflage Patterns Changing
Desert Fox !FederalRepublicofGermany}
FAASV!FIeldArtilleryAmmunitionSupportVehicles)
FAV s(FastAttackVehicles)
Fluidic Maneuvering Aid
GMZ TrackedMinelayer!USSR)
LVT7AI AmphibiousAssaultVehicle
Minnow MineDispensingUnderwaterVehicle(UnitedKmgdom}
ROCOMP lRadioorComputerOperatedMobilePlatform}onPatrol
TH400 Armored Vehicle (Federal Republic of Germany)
Tanks
AMX40!France}
MI Abrams TestsBulldozerBladeKit
NewMediumTank(USSR)
Tank Maintenance Trainers
Tankers'Museum
VIsion Blocks for Ml Abrams
XKIlRepublic ofKorea}
Trucks
LAV(LIghtArmoredVehiclel
Weapons
Artillery(Tube)
M109E4 Howitzer
M1973 Howitzer(USSR)
M30 HeavyMortarSystem
Mere {MortarElevatIon and Rangmg EqwpmenU (New Zealand)
Robotic Loader for Howitzers
283 Howitzer(USSR)
General
AUG (ArmyUniversalGun)(Austria)
AVSS(AutomaticVideoScoringSystem)
CBU87B CEM(CombinedEffectsMunition)
Defendress WeaponEmplacement(FederalRepubhcofGermany)
ElectronicHandGrenades(UnitedKingdom)
FA MAS F3 Rifle!France)
ForeignMilitarySalesDown
Fz 5.56IMBELMDI Rifle(Brazil)
GMZ TrackedMinelayer(USSR)
HBAR (HeavyBarrelAutomaticRifle)(Austria)
LA W8D Antiarmor We1apon
LFETS(Live-FireEvasiveTargetSystem)
MH53E AMCM(AirborneMineCountermeasures)Helicopter
PlasticCupolasforShipGuns(FederalRepublicofGerm;'ny)
Plastic Training Ammunition
RETS(RemotedTargetSystems)
Sabracan AntitankWeapon(France)
SA WES (SmallArmsWeaponEffectsSimulator)(UnitedKingdom)
7.62mmMachinegnnMount
Smart Small-Arms Trainer
Super Rapid 76162 Gun(Italy)
77 Jan
87 May
79 Apr
73 Feb
82 Mar
77 Dec
86 Mar
87 Apr
77 Aug
84 Aug
84 Jan
79 Sep
86 Nov
82 Oct
16 Nov
76 Jan
82 Aug
76 Feb
84 Mar
81 Jun
81 Sep
82 Feb
77 Jun
81 Jun
83 Jul
80 Apr
79 Aug
85 Aug
87 Oct
86 Apr
71 Jun
82 Jan
77 Dec
83 Jul
16 Feb
80 Apr
84 Oct
79 Feb
75 Jun
76 Dec
79 Dec
88 Mar
75 Feb
86 Sep
84 Sep
1984 109
MIlITARY REVIEW
TITLES
VebaliSyndrom AntItank Weapon IFederalRepublic of Germany)
Volcano Mine Dispen&er
MissilesRockets
ADATS(AirDefenseAntitankSystem)
FOG-M
H2 SpaceRocket(Japan)
Improved HA vtlK for Singapore
MarteMk-2(Italy)
Mavenck for Singapore
Model997 ATarget
RBS70MISweden)
SA2. SA3andSA7(Laos)
SeaEagle(UnitedKingdom)
SpIke
Stinger-POST (Passive Optical Seeker Technology)
VerticalLaunchASROC(AntisubmarineRocket)
PAGE MONTH
86 May
76 Feb
76 Aug
72 Jun
85 Oct
73 Jan
83 Aug
73 Jan
85 Nov
86 Oct
55 Dec
86 Nov
82 Sop
78 May
77 May
110 December
Part V
us ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
MASTER'S DEGREE THESES, 1984
"
ThesetheseswerewrIttenbystudentsofthe1984classoftheUS ArmyCommandandGeneralStaffCollege
aspartoftheirrequirementfor theMasterofMIlitary ArtandSciencedegree. All thesesareenteredmtothe
Technical InformatIOn Center. CameronStatIOn, VirgInia. wluchWIll providecopies toqualifiedusers.
AIO EffectivenessAgainstSovietOffensiveOperationsIn Central Europe: LtColDavidK. Burke, USAF
Analysisof U.S. ArmyTacticalOperationsSecuntyProcf'dures. Maj JohnTartella. USA
Army LandingForc>. The: Maj Kevin McGoey. USA
Assessing thf' Need for an Air Mecharuzed DiviSion. An Alternativetothe"ArmyofExcellence" Corps Aviation
Brigade. Ma) Carlton L. Hood. USA
Back to Basics. A Fivp-Dlmpnsional rramf'work for Developmgand Maint3Jrunga IltghPerformingBattahon
or BrigadeStaff:Capt(PI WIlham H Speer; USA
BayonetsBefore Bullets:TheOrgamzationandTacticsoftheImpenalRussianArmy, l861-190ft;MajBruceW.
Mennmg. USAR
Can theAggrf'f>sors ContinuetoBf' EffectIve in thePSE?: Maj Donald M Krernpel. USAF
ComputerAssIsted FlightScheduleOptImization: Maj Robert D Drowley. USAF
Computersfor CommandandControl: An AirLand Battle Requirement!: Maj JosephW, McKinney, USA
CorpsCommander's/G3's Wargameofa TacticalCourseof Action, A; Maj (PI W. Edward Sturron. USA
Democracy by Coup: TheTurlushGovernment Under Military Control1196019631;
Mal Burt A. VanderCluteII. USA
DivIsIonAirDf'fensefortheDeepBattlf'ComponentoftheAlrLandRattleDoctrine.MaJ DonaldR. Kirk:, USA
EffectsofI nterdlctioninWorld"'" arII,The:TheEuropeanTheater ofOperations:MajThomasB. Poole.USAF
Historyof the UnItedStatesAir ForceAirborneForwardAlrControUerinWorld\Vaf II, theKoreanWar,and
theVietnamConflict; Ma) Charles D Hightower. USAF
Integrated :\'ational Police in Philippine CountennsurgencyOperations.The: A CaseStudy;Col VenancioR
DuqueJ r, PluLIppine Com,tabulary
Logistics Implicationsofthe OperatIOnalLevelOffensive: Capt,PI David F. Gross. USA
Manpower AnalysIs During the Army Force Development Process: A Systems PerspectIve; MaJ Felix G.
Harus II. USA !
OperationalConceptfortheBattlefieldDefeatof theSovietsBasedon anAnalysisoftheSovietDecisionCycle,
An. MaJ StevenJ Argersinger. USA
Preparednessfor Counterfn.... ,:'laj JosephA, Adelman. USA
PromulgatJonof NationalCommunicationsSecurityPolicy totheOperationalandTactIcal LevelsoftheU.S.
Army, C DaleNunley
Pubhc ImageoftheMihtarvasReflected in Leading Magazines tl98219831. The.
Ma) WiIliamiruenmg.uSAF
111
1984
MIlITARY REVIEW
Reducmg the Need to Communicate Electronically in the Command and Control of Combat Operations at the
Tactical Level: Maj James H. WIllbanks. USA
Reserve Component Dilemma. The: Mission versus Time. MaJ Donald B. Skipper. USA
Role of the Iranian Armed Forces in the Fail of the Shah. The. Col Anselmo S. Avemdo Jr. Philippine Army
Senior Leadership. The Crucial Element of Combat Power: A LeadershIp Analysis of Selected World War I I
Commanders. European Theater. 1944-1945: MaJ Jerry D. Morelock. USA
Tactical FM RadIO Frequency Management System. The' Can ItSupport the Air-Land Battle?; Maj Robert M.
Stewart. USA
Toward a Theory of Military Involvement In National Development in Underdeveloped Countries. Lt Col
Fredehno S. BautIsta. Philippine Army
Towards Combined Arms Warfare' A Survey of Tactics. Doctrine and Orgamzation in the 20th Century; Capt
Jonathan M. House, USA
United States Army's Regimental System, The: A Framework for \\'artime Personnel Replacement; Ma)
Thomas J. Strauss. USA
U S Air Force Air Base Ground Defense Doctrine: Are the ISSUE\s '\oVhich Arose Concerning Air Base Ground
Defense Dunng the Vietnam Conflict Recogmzed 10 Current U.S. Air Forre Doctrine?: Ma) Robert A.
Barlow. USAF
US Army Airborne Forces: An Instrument of Land Power. 19902000: Maj Joel J. Snow. USA
US Army Doctrinal EffectlVf'neSS 10 Bataan. 1942: The First Battle; Maj John W. Whitman. USA
U.S in Low-Intensity Conflict: Greece. 1947-49. Dommican Republic. 1965-66 and Vietnam. 1961-
65. Maj Ralph W. Hinrichs Jr. USA
Using U S Army NatIonal Trairung Center INTO Lessons Learned to Improve Combat Readiness; Capt William
G Webster. USA
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112 December