'" ,

I
Military
Thp Profpssional of thp , March 1981
,THE PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL OF THE US ARMY
Published .by
US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERp,l STAFF COLLEGE
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LIEUTENANT GENER.I4.L WiLLIAM
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Military Review
VOLUME LXI MARCH 1981 NO! 3
PAGE 2
10
22
31
51
56
62
66
73
78
81
89
CONTENTS
NEW DOCTRINE FOR THE DEFENSE
by Colonel Clyde J. Tate. US Army. and
Lieutenant Colonel L. D. Holder. US Army
THE SUPERPOWERS' TUG OF WAR OVER YEMEN
by Malor John B. Lynch. US Army
FIELD ARTILLERY INTEROPERABILITY
by Major Rolland H. Berry Jr . US Army
EXTENDING THE BAITLEFIELD
by General Donn A. Starry. US Army
SOVIET AITACK HELICOPTERS. RETHINKING THE THREAT
by Captam Steven A. Frith. US Army
CLAUSEWITZ
by Colonel Walter von Hobe. Federal Republic of Germany Army
AN EMERGING TRIAD OF POWER
by Colonel Robert L. Dtlworth. US Army
SOVIET RADIO-ELECTRONIC COMBAT IN WORLD WAR II
by David R. Beachley
REVIEWS the best from other loumals
LEITERS
NEWS
BOOKS contemporary reading for the professIOnal
MILITARY REVIEW IS published monthly In English and Spanish and quarterly In Portuguese Use of funds
for printing this publicatIOn approved by Headquarters. Department of the Army. 25 April 1980 Controlled
CIrculation postage paid at Leavenworth. KS 66048 and Kansas City, Me) 64106 English-language sub-
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- , JI\./,';':" -_,_
(' . .. Winners AJI--)
The voting is in, and the winner of the 1980 Mlhtary RevIew Award for Excel- i
lence in Tactical Writing is Colonel Robert E. Wagner, commander of the 2d
Armored Cavalry Regiment, Nuremberg, Germany. His article "Active Defense
and All That," which appeared in the August issue, has earned him the $250
prize money and a certificate attesting to his scholarship.
The second-place article was "Gain the Initiative With an Armored Raid"
(June) by Major Richard P. Geier. Third place went to "The Warsaw Pact
Short-Warning Nuclear Attack: How Viable an Option?: Parts I and ll"
(October-November) by Major Donald L. Mercer.
These authors were not the only winners, however. The Tactical Writing
Awards Program has inspired numerous officers to share their thoughts on
tactical concepts and battle doctrine. This presentatIOn of differing perceptIOns
and the frank discussion of problem areas has been instrumental in stimulating
professional thought and the broadening of our professional knowledge base.
Such a trend works for the betterment of us all; In the end, the winners are
the men we lead and the country we serve. As General Omar Bradley once
said, "For most men, the matter of learmng is one of personal preference. But
for Army officers, the obligation to learn, to grow In their profeSSIOn is clearly
a public duty." The MIlztarv RevIew is also a winner, for in publishing these
articles MR serves as a major forum for the professional growth of the US
Army.
To those who have won the laurels, our congratulatIOns. To those who have
contributed to the forum, our thanks. To the entire officer corps, our encourage-
ment to join the discussion, to air your views and to share your thoughts.
Specifically, we encourage you to submit your article for consideration in the
1981 awards program. Many excellent articles have been received already, but
__________________ =-____
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ChOnlicJl dIe r>,J.<J, .. -ro
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The C0111ba: i :eratds VlctOi'V
LIt"url-'tl, 1'1 C(/,;!'t" ,H:lff/f) C f '';'/!f'1 US
f'4ev\/ Thoughts on t.\iiack Hf Doctrine
!1'1djOf Dt'fL /" [.iI/lf.' us ,...l.'rnv
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ne
Colonel Clyde J. Tate, US Army,
and Lieutenant Colonel L. D. Holder, US Army
The Army's defensive doctrine has been a center of contro-
versy sincc its publication in 1976. In the near future, Field
Manual (FMI 100-5, Operations, will bc republished. Its ap-
proach to defense will retain the classic purposes of defense
-to gain time, conserve forces, stop the enemy and to win
-but will also emphasizc the need to suit the form of the
defense to the operational situation at hand and stress the
use of offensh'e tactics in the conduct of the defense. Initia
tive, violence, integration and depth will be the foundations
of the new manual's attempt to provide the Army with doc-
trine suitable for units of .. II types in all parts of the world.
N
o TACTICAL subject has provoked
as much debate m the US Army
as that of the active defense. Gallons of
ink have been spIlled and dozens of Jeep
h,ods dented in ~ g u i n g the merIts and
deficienCIes of our defenSIVe doctrine
and in trying to define its essence.
Certainly, this debate has been worth-
while: Th'e quality of the exchange has
been hIgh; fresh concepts have been
elaborated'm crItIcizmg and defendmg
current ideas; and most serving officers
have been stimulated into closer examina-
tion of the operational problems of de-
fense, including the effects of electronic
warfare and nuclear, biological and
chemical weapons It is likely that the
debates engendered by the actIve defense
wIll be that doctrine's greatest legacy to
the Army.
March
The central question of how we should
defend, however, has not been fully
answered. Critics have identified weak-
nesses in current doctrine while support-
ers of the active defense have stressed Its
realism and its principal strengths Still,
no real synthesis has appeared, and,
today, with a new edition of FM 100-5 in
draft, arguments are still swirling around
the Army's defensi ve concept.
This article is presented to return the
debate to its start point by outlIning the
form defensive doctrine will take in the
Army's new field manuals. It attempts to
clarify questIOns raised by the doctrine of
1976 and establish a line of continuity be-
tween that concept of defense and the con-
cept which will be described m the new
FM 100-5. Its thesis is that defenSive oper-
ations will vary greatly With operatIOnal
conditions and that no smgle technique of
defense can be universally apphcable.
Whatever form is chosen must he exe-
cuted With the greatest possible VIOlence
to allow the defender to seize the mltlatlve
at the earliest opportunity aVaIlahle. Our
new approach to the d['fense must con'
tmue to stress concentratIOn, economy of
force secunty and combat In depth, but It
must alse emphaSize speed, maneuver and
surprise far more than the active defense
does.
The Background
Much of the problem With current de-
fen.sive doctrine hes m a misunderstand-
Ing of what was origInally Intended The
tactics described In the 1976 editIOn of
FM 100-5 were Intended to provide gener-
al guidance suitable for applicatIOn in any
circumstances but specifically deSigned
to handle the "worst case"-war in
Europe. In fact, the manual sets out very
1981
NEW DEFENSE DOCTRINE
few hard and fast rules and allows con-
Siderable latitude to commanders in or-
ganIzmg the defense.
In the conferences preceding the writing
of FM 100-5, senior commanders agreed
that this latitude was a necessity. They
also concurred in emphasiZIng the impor-
tance of maneuver and the necessity of
reclamllng the initiative at the earliest
pOSSible opportunity when defending. The
exact form of defense was understood to
be variable, depending on the factors of
mISSIon, enemy, terrain and troops avail-
able IMETT) m each case. In short, the
doctrine designed for our manuals and
actually written into FM 1005 was nota-
bly flexible and delIberately nonrestric-
tive. In fact, Initially, it was simply called
'The Defense."
Wbat developed, unfortunately, in the
doctrine's extensIOn Into other manuals
(notably FM 71-100, Armored and Mech-
anzzed v l s l ~ n OperatIOns {How to FIght! I
and In its applIcation In the field was a
highly structured and rigid conceptIOn of
how to defend. ThiS stylized version ofthe
"actl ve defense" called for deployment of
defendIng forces "well forward" behmd
coverIng forces of a single typt' With a nar-
rnwly der;ned miSSIOn. It ngorously pro-
hlhIted the retention of substantial re-
serves for fear of thmnIng out committed
forces to an unacceptable degree and called
Instead for concentration by lateral move-
ment along the forward edge or the battle
area 1 FEBA I.
Depth was to be achieved by maneuver,
but, m execution, this was often translated
into a retrograde which ended With a
hnear defense at the brigade rear bound-
ary. Offensive action WIthin the defense
was anathematized beca use of the antic-
Ipated numerical advantage of the enemy,
but risks In the form of stripped-out flank
sectors were recognized as a necessity.
The requirement for defending well for-
MILITARY REVIEW
ward in Europe, continued analysis of the
1973 Middle East War and the numerical
inferiority of our deployed forces in Europe
all played a part in reducing the original
conception of a flexible defensive doctrine
into a dogmatic set of rules. But even more
influential in the process was the exag-
geration the mechanical-technical as-
pects of war which accompanied the pub-
lication of FM 100-5.
The manual's introductory assumptions
about the lethality of the battlefield en-
couraged the growth of a tendency to over-
stress firepower factors in relation to all
others. The fighting system comparisons
and the hit probabihty-kill probability
charts of the manual oriented doctrinal
development in an extreme and unfortu-
nate direction. As the theme of firepower
dominance was developed, the rough com
parlsons necessary to mlhtary estimates
degenerated into a form of deceptively pre-
cise mathematics for staff college students,
war game designers and maneuver um
pires. The "advantages of the defender"
(meaning the operation of directfire
weapons from covered positIOns) assumed
such value that counterattacks or resump-
. tion of the offensive became too risky to be
seriously considered.
Simulations, in particular, remforced this
view with their crude comparisoris of fire-
power potential. Moral factors, the effects
of enfilading fire and the impact of sur
prise which have decided so many real bat-
tles were acknowledged as incalculable
and totally suppressed. Maneuver, which
is the means through which these effects
are obtained, was similarly discounted.
Equations tactics on the game
boards, and realism suffered as a result.
The art ofterram appreciation and utiliza-
tion was forsaken for ratios. Tenacity, sur-
prise and seizing upon opportunities
seilted by a vulnerable enemy were lost in
the "calculus of battle."
4
Using the methodology of our war
games, Stonewall Jackson's flank blow at
Chancellorsville would have been defeat-
ed by the firepower score of Oli ver O.
Howard's corps even though the Union
rifles were, for the most part, stacked
around the campfires. The audacity which
won Napoleon the Battle of Austerlitz
would have c;ost him dearly in today's
computer assisted simulations.
By 1978, the flexible concept of defense
conceived at the preliminary planning
conferences had hardened into an inflexi-
ble set of rules for a single type of defense.
Surely, this was not the intent of its origi-
nal "fathers." It was this rigidly limited
form of defense which attracted most of the
attention of critics and prompted the long
series of debates which still goes on.
Toward a New Defensive Concept
If we are to make proper use of the les-
sons we have learned in studying and
debating current doctrine, we must restate
our defensive doctrine carefully and pre-
cisely. Our reVised doctrine must incor-
porate the strengths of current thought
and the improvements urged by construc-
tive critics. Our doctrine must be specific
enough to guide commanders in devising
effe'ctive tactics but sufficiently flexible
to be useful in any part of the world under
any conditions of combat. Doctrine was
never intl"nded to be dogma, and effective
use of sound doctrine requires the judg-
ment of its user.
While retaining our appreciation for the
destructiveness of weapons, we must
also consider the human factors which in-
fluence operations, the advantages ob-
tainable through maneuver-particularly.
offensive maneuver-and the changing
nature of terrain throughout the world.
March
. : '<
It is also Important that our restated de-
fensive doctrine reflects the needs and im-
portance of light forces as well as mech-
anized and armored units, maintains the
time-tested emphasis on combined arms
cooperation, takes full advantage of new
units and weapons and devotes adequate
attentIon to the special challenges of
nuclear-chemical warfare and the simul-
taneous battle in depth.
To meet these challenges, the new de-
fensive concept will propose concentration
on foul' key elements. These are initiative,
VIOlence, integration and depth.
Initza{lt'e is the attacker's greatest ad-
vantage It must be seized from him tem
poraI'lly whenever possible and finally
wrested from him altogether. ThiS re-
quires more than mere reaction to his at
tack: The defender must counter the at-
tacker's initiatives With his own and pre-
vent him from dictating the pace of battle
throughout its course.
VIOlence is the essence of decIsive com-
bat. The defender must concentrate com-
bat power rapidly In response to the attack
and then deliver a stunning counterstroke
to halt and shatter the attacker. Nuclear
fires are especially valuable In dealing
such a blow, but the modern conventional
weapons already in our hands also make
us capable of concentrating fires against
an attacker on very short notice. Mounted
ground maneuver forces, air maneuver
units and airborne/airmobIle forces can all
move fast, strike qUIckly and finish rapid
lyto defeat enemy forces piecemeal.
IntegratIOn is the coordination of every
weapon, unit and system aVaIlable In pur-
SUIt of victory. Since the defender is nor-
mally outnumbered, it is of particular
importance that he use hiS strength fully,
economically and effiCiently, multiplYing
1981
NEW DEFENSE DOCTRINE
its actual force through full exploitation
of every advantage. Fires, barriers and
maneuver must be meshed perfectly and
carefully fitted to the ground. Air and
ground operations must be fully comple-
mentary. Nuclear and conventional weap-
ons, electronic warfare, combat support
and logistical support must also be
harnessed to the commander's concept if
the defense is to succeed.
Depth is Important on both sides of the
line of contact. We must see deep into the
enemy's territory so that we can fight a
Simultaneous, coordinated battle against
him throughout the depth of his forma-
tIOns. We must organize our defenses In
suffiCient depth to permit us to absorb the
shock of the attack and regain the initia-
tive Surveillance and long-range fires
are the keys to fighting the enemy from
his first appearance forward of the line of
contact to separate his forces and deny
him the concentratIOn and early success
he requires. Closely coordinated maneu-
ver and fire through the entIre depth of
the defended area are also vital to break-
ing up the enemy's momentum and
defeating his forces.
These four fundamentals characterize
all defensive operations and set objectives
for their conduct. They do not dictate how
the battle is to be organized.
The exact form of defense cannot be
standardized. It will depend on the com-
mander: the terrain and the factors of
METT. The commander may defend well
forward or in considerable depth if he is
not specifically reqUIred to hold a desig-
nated position. He may even choose to pre-
empt thf' attacker with spoiling attacks if
conditions favor such tactics.
The actual range of defensive optIOns
is very Wide. It can be visualized as a con-
tinuum of combinations which proceeds
from an absolutel:t static position defense
MILITARY REVIEW
at one extreme to a totally dynamic form of
defense at the other. Between these poles,
there are almost infinite possibilities for
the combination of position and maneuver.
Neither extreme is practical as a form of
defense for a sizable force-the most dy-
namic defense requires some static frame-
work, and the most powerful strongpoint
needs at least an internal reactIOn force.
In practice, commanders will combine
active and positional elements in propor-
tions to suit each situatIOn.'
When a defensive mission is restrictive,
terraIn limits maneuver or the troops
available are of limited mobilIty, a pre
dominantly positional defense will be
chosen When the opposite conditions
exist, a commander may elect to base his
defense on mobl IIty, seeking to defeat the
enemy by fire wi thin the defensi ve sector
and by carrYIng the fight to the enemy by
early counterattacks Into the flanks and
rear of his formations.
The figure summarizes this concept
graphicall.
Within a defensive concept, the com-
bination of active and positional elements
may be based on the geography of the bat-
tlefield (as at Orsha where Gotthard Hein-
rici defeated superior forces by concen-
trating on a single strong position sup-
ported by a wide screen and lateral rein-
forcement) or on the capabilities of the
forces at hand (as at Kharkov where Erich
von Manstein used infantry to limit the
Russian per:etration and then liquidated
it with armor). Forces of markedly dif-
ferent mobility can cooperate in such de-
fenses. Light infantry, for instance, can
hold strongpoints, forested areas, villages
or towns to facilitate the maneuver of
armor units while denYIng otherwise ex
cellent avenues of approach to the enemy.
The basic organization of the battlefield
will not change. A covering force will still
be used to provide security to the defender
and to begIn pestruction of the enemy's
leading forces. The decisive battle will
continue to be fought in the main battle
area (MBA). And a rear area will still be
Range of Defensive Techniques Available
to Maneuver Units
Static
Terrain
RetenllOn <E(;----------+-----------:):..
Or.lented
"POSitIOn Defense" "Active Defense"
Technique Employed IS Determined
In general by METT (MISSion. Enemy. Terram and Troops Available)
In particular by'
Terrain-Defensibility and obstocle value and depth available
Troops available-mobility and degree of armored protectIOn
DynamiC
Force
DestructIOn by
Fife and Maneuver
OrIented
March
organized for the support of operations.
However, greater freedom will be allowed
to commanders in organizing their de-
fenses, and new emphasis will be placed
On the tactical interdictIOn battle con-
ducted simultaneously in the area beyond
the line of contact, giving depth and flexi-
bility to the defense.
The covering force battle provides warn-
ing of the enemy's approach and informa
tion on the nature of his attack. Covering
forces may be large or small, d!'pending
On the operational conditions and the com-
mander's plan for the defensp. Whatever
its size, the covering force must protect the
defending main body from surprise and
direct observation
If the covering force IS a heavy one, It
can also provIde substantial reaction tIme
to the defending commander by sloWIng
the enemy's approach and destrOYIng hIS
leading UnIts. When the covering force
succe!'ds in stopping some attacks or IS
not challenged at all In some parts of the
battlefield, It can remain forward, per-
mIttIng the main force to concentrate
against the most serIOUS threats and con-
trollIng forward areas whIch offer obser-
vation and attack of the enemy's flanks.
Whatever ItS compOSItIOn or functIOn,
the covering force must be viewed as an
integral part of the dpfense WIth a speCIfic
role to play In the commander's concept of
operation. It can screen areas in whIch
enemy progress is acceptable while delay-
ing, defending or even attackIng else-
where to provide a greater degree of res is-
tance and protection.
. In any case, its fundamental missions
will remaIn to establIsh and maIntain con-
tact WIth the enemy: determine the
strength, location and general directIOn
of enemy attacks; and deceIve the enemy
as to the location of the main defenses.
The MBA battle IS the deCISIve battle
fought along and behind the FEBA by the
1981
"
NEW DEFENSE DOCTRINE
defender's major forces. Within the MBA,
all forces available to the defender are
combined to structure the battlefield with
fires, barriers and maneuver to create op-
portunIties to stop the enemy, Isolate his
forces and defeat him. A careful intelli-
gence preparation of the battlefield pre-
cedes deployment of defending forces to in-
dIcate where the defender must concen-
trate initially and where he can expect to
Interdict the enemy's approach and fight
him In depth.
The operatIOns conducted in the MBA
depend on METT. The commander may
choose a static, terrain-oriented form of
defense, a dynamic defense based pre-
dominantly on maneuver or a balanced
operatIOn whIch combines position and
maneuver In appropriate measure. The
commander's preference, the operational
situation and the terrain available to him
will all influence his chOIce, but almost
every defense wIll contain elements ofpo-
sltlOn and movement. Thus, in any defen-
sIve Operf<tlOn, mISSIOns of subordInate
units "jill vary. DIvisions may have offen-
sIve mISSIOns in the conduct of a corps
defense. Committed brIgades may delay as
part of essentially positIOnal division de-
fenses, and battalIons may screen or de-
fend strongpoInts In the course of an actIve
defense conducted by the brIgade.
A vital element of the defense, which is
ininImized in our current manuals, is
maneuver. OffenSIve actIOn as part of the
defense IS a vital means of upsetting the
!'nemy's plan, counteracting his inItiative
and destroying his exposed forces. The de-
fender must avoid premature offensive
action and must not commit himself
frontally against superIor forces. lIe can-
not, on the other hand, expect to win a
head-on sluggIng match of attrItIOn
against a numerically superior enemy if
he remains entirely passive. He must take
the offensive.
MILITARY REVIEW
The defender must aSSlJme the offensive
to gain full advantage of his successes in
stopping or separating enemy forces. He
must take every opportunity to crush iso-
lated attacking units and attempt to de-
stroy the enemy's supporting forces by
maneuvering over indirect approaches to
firing positions behind and on the flanks
of the attacker. These counterstrokes are
most effective when the enemy's initial
impetus has been checked by the defense
and he is bringing up forces to overcome
the resistance.
Moving between carefully sited ob-
stacles under .the cover of planned direct
and indirect fires over familiar terram, the
defender's mobile forces can inflict terrific
damage on undeployed forces, artillery
and command posts from offset firing posi
tions. The psychological shock induced by
this exercise of the initIative bv the de-
fender can be paralyzmg to an'dttacker
whose plans are suddenly :iisrupted by the
appearance of unidentified forces to his
rear.
Air maneuver units and airmobile
forces can be employed in such counter-
strokes when the attacker's concentrated
forces are moving on narrow axes which
permIt movement between them. The long
range of infantry and attack helicopter
weapons and the improved effects of long-
range artillery make such tactics even
more reahstic. .
The other distinctive features of our new
defensive doctrine are greater freedom to
retain sigmficant reserves and a stated
need for commanders at levels above
brigade to fight an extended battle beyond
the FEBA.
Reserves are necessary in the defense to
meet unexpected contingencies, reinforce
threatened areas, eliminate penetrating
enemy units and strike the attacker when
opportunities arise. The size of the re-
serve will depend again on METT, but
8
some reserve is essential to any defense.
The improved mobility of the Abrams
tank and the infantry fighting vehicle will
enhance the range of reserve forces and
increase their effectiveness when they are
committed.
The tactical interdiction effort begins
before the enemy closes with the defend-
er's maneuver force, goes on throughout
the decisive battle and, in many instances,
will continue after direct contact between
the main forces of combatants has ended.
This deep interdiction battle is the re-
sponsibility of army, corps and division
commanders. When fighting a significant-
ly larger enemy, the deep battle may de-
termine ultimate success or failure.
In all cases, it can enhance the defend-
er's chances of success by disrupting the
enemy at long range, breaking up his coor-
dination and momentum and battering his
follow-on forces before they can be com-
mItted. Alr-dehvered weapons, tactical
nuclear arms, aIr maneuver units and im-
proved surveillance systems make battle
at extended ranges practical now. New
weapons on their way to the field-
FASCAM (family of scatterable mines)
systems, the Copperhead. the Multiple
Launch Rocket System and others-
promise to make tactical intetdiction even
morE' effecti ve
This battle in depth also extends to the
rear where enemy forces may penetrate
or be inserted. It may even have to be
fought on the flanks of corps and divisions
when gaps are created by the use of nu-
clear weapons. The corollaries of such !'ton-
linear combat are increased responsibili-
ties for senior commanders (who can no
longer be completely absorbed in concen-
trating the force and allocating resources),
a changed view of the rear area and com-
bat service support and a need for closer
coordination between the Army and the
Air Force. Our coordination with the Air
March
Force for the deep battle will be partIcular-
ly important SInce the Air Force will carry
many of the sensors and weapons which
make long-range combat possible.
The "new" defensIve doctrine clearly
bears many marks of its predecessor.
Other connections are more subtle. In
combInIng the statIc and dynamic forms
of defense, it consummates what the doc-
trIne of 1976 Intended and places Impor
tant new emphasIs on offensive maneuver
and tactical in.terdiction.
Colonel Cl .. Je J Tatt' I.'> dIrcctor (If thj> Depal!
mt'n! IIf Tuctlcs. USA('(;SC lIe rn'clt'cd a B 5
from A10Ullt SI Mar;'., of .Han/ancl alld
1'; a g1{ulttntt' III thl! {TSA(,GSC al/(l the Armv
War Collq:c Iii- IWb C011ll1lalldrd In/alltn u/Ills
and 5(,/,,('11 uS ,Ille(. Uf/cnt.c Committee Df'part.
men! of [TSACGSC
NEW DEFENSE DOCTRINE
The new formulation will be less pre-
scriptive and more elastic, but it does not
really represent revolutIOnary change.
The best defensive commanders, from
Hannibal at Cannae to Bruce C. Clarke at
Saint-VIth, have uniformly sought to fit
their forces to the ground and the enemy.
Also, they have c'lnsistentiy capitalized
on every opportunIty to seize the initiative
and strIke, constructing their defenses ac-
cording to Clausewltz as "a shield of
blows." We must do the same. "4..
Llcutenant Colonel L D IIolder IS a doctrine
U'nteru llh thrDepartment o{Tactlcs. L'SACeSC'
lIe reLen'ed a R A from P & M UnwerSlt\,
an AI A from Ilarrrord Umverslly and 15 a grad-
uate of the USACGSC lIe has commanded troopt>
In Germany and Vlctnam and sen'ed as S3, 2d
Armored Cavalry Reglment
Cruise Missile Tries Water Wings. An overwater test of the US Air
Force air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) was successfully completed
late last year when the Boeing AGM868 was recovered in mid-air by
an Air Force HH53 helicopter (MR, Nov 1979. pp 84-85). The
flight was primarily designed to examine the Inertial navigation
system. The specially equipped helicopter snatched the missile
at the end of Its flight as it floated toward the Pacific Ocean off
the coast of Southern California.
1981
The flight lasted approximately three and one-half hours and was the
fifth in a series aimed at preparing the missile for operational use.
The miSSile was staged from the Air Force Flight Test Center at Ed-
wards Air Force Base. California, and conoucted over the Pacific Mis-
sile Test Range near Vandenberg Air Force Base and Point Mugu.
California. The nearly 21-foot-long miSSile was launched from
under the wing of a 852 bomber.
Amid the swirling sands of southern Arabia. the United
States and the Soviet Union are competing for influence over
the "poorest yet most populated country of the peninsula
-North Yemen,'" Why? In this article. the background and
reasons for North Yemen's seesaw flirtations with the
East and West are examined,
Major John B. Lynch, US Army
The Superpowers'
Tug 0' War
OverYemen
10 March
GEOGRAPHY
T
HE Yemen Arab Republic INorth
Yemen) IS a small country located
In the southwestern corner of the ArabIan
Peninsula Just north of the passageway
between the Red Sea and the Gulf of
Aden, Its eastern boundary with Saudi
Arabia and southern boundary wIth the
People's Democratic RepublIc of Yemen
(South Yemen) have not been conclusively
TUG OF WAR OVER YEMEN
established (Figure 1l.2
Apart from a hot, dry coastal plain
hugging the Red Sea, called the Tihama,
the rest of the country is mountainous, It
rIses steeply from the coastal plain to a
high mountain plateau on which rests
San'a, the capital, at an elevatIOn of over
7,000 feet. 3 The Tihama IS barren and
sparsely populated, Generally, it is sepa-
rated from the sea by swamps and lagoons,
An arid wilderness stretches inland to the
foothills of the central hIghlands, Rainfall
in this area is sparse, yet, because of Ir-
rigatIOn systems, the area is conducive to
....... sou
........ Z"04Rf /
Sa'dah ...... u"o /
1981
....... .!.!./J'rD ,-'"
"""' ~ * /
"( ;;;,,,,<Y
.Haradh :$-".1
Vemen Arab Republic I '0<1;"'/
(N h V )
I / PEOPLE'S
ort ernen )/ DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
*San'a Marlb// OF YEMEN
Dhamar

Yarlm
1/ (SOUTH YEMEN)
1
- - J I ....
oJ )
1
r"\_/
Figure 1
11
MILITARY REVIEW
the cultivation of tobacco, dates and
cotton.'
In contrast, the mountamous interior of
the country reaches elevations in excess
of14,000 feet Rainfall is relatively heavy,
varying from 15 to 32 inches per year
in the north and southwest mountam
regions respectively. This condition,
coupled with an ingemous irrigation sys-
tem deVIsed centunes ago," has served
to make Yemen one of the mDSt fertile
areas on the Arabian Peninsula. The
climate and fertility of the soIl permIt the
cultivation of almost every fruit, vege-
table and gram Imaginable.
DEMOGRAPHY
The population of Yemen IS estImated
at 6.5 millIon. with an annual growth rate
of 3 percent. Only about 10 percent of the
populatIOn is urbanized Other national
ities on the peninsula are, for the most
part, nomadic. The Yemenites, however,
are predommantly sedentary and dwell
in llamlets and small towns strewn
throughout the countryside. The great-
est concentrations are found on the moun-
tain plateaus and are engaged m farm-
mg Although prImarily of Semitic
origin, the population does show evidence
of NegrOId strams confined mostly to
the Tlhama regIOn.
The people are dIvided religiously be
tween the two major Islamic relIgIOUS
sects. The Zaidi community of the Shi'a
are located in the northern, central and
eastern regions of 'the country, and the
Shafe'i community of the Sunni reSIdes
primarIly m the south and southwest por-
tions of the country. Another sect, the
Ismailis, are relatively few in number
and are generally found in the remote
mountain villages.
b
12
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Pre-Islamic Period
RIch in hIstory, Yemen is the former
home of enumerable ancient ciVIlizations,
the most notable being the kmgdom of
Sheba' The remains of both the Great
Dam at Marib and the temple of Queen
Bakis still stand in testimony to the great-
ness of this civilization. Figure 2 depicts
the kingdom of Sheba nearly one cen
tury B.C
A decline in trade coupled with inva-
sions by Abysslnians, Persians, Romans
and EthIOpians led to the demIse of those
ancient Yememte kmgdoms"
Arab Conquests
The legions of Islam Invaded and con-
quered the Yemen in the seventh century
and qUIckly spread their religIOn among
the mhabitants, thereby underminIng
the JeWIsh and Christian influence of
prevIous rulers." FIgure 3 portrays
Yemen's boundarIes as an Islamic state.
Ottoman Rule
Yemen remained under Arab control
untIl the 16th century when it was con-
quered by the Turks and nommally
assimIlated into the Ottoman Empire for
the next four centuries. '" Turkish control
was never wholly effective and was prin-
cipally restricted to the Tihama. The
ZaidI imam and his mountain followers
jealously protected their independence
against foreign domination. In fact,
because of the Turks' inability to subju-
gate the mountains, they withdrew from
Yemen altogether in 1636 for a couple of
centunes.' ,
March
TUG OF YEMEN
The remains of the Great Dam at Marib
Figure 2
Figure 3
1981
13
The remains 01 the temple 01 Queen Bakls
Suffice It to say that the Turks maIn-
tained varying degrees of control over
Yemen from the 16th century onward,
with the last total occupation being from
1872 to 1918 when Ottoman troops were
withdrawn after World War I I Figure 41."
The Road 10 Independence
In 1904, Imam Yahya led a partially
successful revolt agaInst the Turks and
was subsequently elected Imam of
Yemen." Another Yahya-Ied revolt m
1911 resulted m the Treaty of Daan I'
This truce splIt the rountry mto two ad-
minIstratIve dIVISIOns and set the stage
for Yahya to take thp reins upon the
evacuat Ion of the Turks.
WIth that -done, he moved qUIckly to
unite the country under a smgle author-
Ity, qUite a chore for a country that had
been dIvIded mto minor pnnclpalItIes and
mcorporated Into a large empIre by for-
eign conquerors" Y ahya then laId the
theoretical claIm to Aden Ithen a British
colony), as well as other lands which nOW
compi'ise the country of South Yemen.
After a reIgn of 43 years, Imam Yahya
TUG OF WAR OVER YEMEN
was assassinated in 1948 in an unsuc-
cessful coup, but not before Yemen was
admItted into both the Arab League and
the UnIted N"tions. Imam Sa If ai-Islam
Ahmad, Yahya's son, succeeded him
and rulpd for 14 years before succumbing
to an assassin's bullet His reign is pri-
manly noted for frequent border clashes
With the Aden Protectorate of which he
laId claIm. HIS successor, whose reign
lasted only one week, was overthrown by
an army coup led by Colonel 'Abdallah
al-SalaI'. ThIS abolished the
Imamate and the Yemen
Arab RepublIc.
l
..
Imam Muhammad al-Badr surVIved
the coup and retreated north where the
ZaidI tnbes rallIed behind hIm. At the re-
quest of the new regIme, Egypt dIspatched
men and equipment to assist m combating
Badr and hIS royalIst forces who were
beIng backed by Saudi Arabia and Jordan.
A bloody CIvil war raged on untIl
1970 when royalist leaders accepted inte-
gration under the republican regime as
a result of an informal peace settle-
ment arrIved at during talks between the
SaudiS and republican leaders.
Smce that time, Internal as well as
external struggles have plagued North
Yemen. This VIOlent perIOd will be diS-
cussed in detail later in thIS article.
YEMEN AND THE SUPERPOWERS
Pre-Civil War Period
As mentioned earlier, the long-runnmg
dIspute between Britain and Yemen over
the latter's irredenta, Aden and the
Protectorates, resulted in VIOlent border
clashes during the reign of Imam Ahmad.
In an attempt to further show his disdain
for the BrItIsh, as well as bolster his
15
MILITARY REVIEW
nation's defenses, Ahmad solicited the
aid of another British enemy, the Soviet
Union 17 Thus, on 1 November 1955,
Yemen and the Soviet Union concluded
another treaty of friendship and com-
merce.'" It was, as we will see anon, much
more substantive than the one agreed to in
1928.'9
Almost immediately, the Soviets pro-
vided $30 million in milItary assIstance
whIch Included vintage tanks, bombers,
small-arms weapons, antiaircraft guns
and a small training cadre.
20
ThIs move
Inspired other Communist bloc coun-
tries to establish trade agreements WIth
Yemen.
2l
Given that the leadershIp in M05cow
had seemingly nothing In common WIth
the feudal Imamic regime in San'a,
what then motivated the Soviets to de-
vote so much effort to thIs ImpoverIshed
state'? The answer to thIs question rest,; In
the fact that Yemen was, and remains
today, a spoke in a MIddle East regional
policy wheel desIgned by the SOVIets to
enhance theIr Influence and facilItate
their global expansion." SpecIfically, a
foothold in Yemen was Important to
Moscow for the following reasons:
First, they could reduce BntIsh in-
fluence in the regibn by continuing to
nurture the "antl-Imperaflst" sentIment
breWIng in the area, lJ
Second, a considerable amount of
US trade and a large portIOn of oIl exports
to the West were transported through the
Suez Canal vIa the Red Sea. Contl'Ol of the
Strait of Bab el-Mandeb by the USSR
could have a severe impact on W"stern
trade,24
ThIrd, Yemen's strategic location
could provide the SovIets with an excel-
lent staging area for future endeavors into
East Africa,25
Fourth, the area was a potential
source of oil and other natural resources.
2
"
16
FIfth, and finally, Yemen could
be used by the Soviets as a base for po-
litical propaganda, as well as support for
other Arab radicals on the peninsula.
2
?
Having now reviewed Soviet interests
in Yemen, it IS lIttle wonder that Moscow
jumped at the opportunity to befriend the
Imam. In addition to the military as-
sistance deSCrIbed above, the Soviets also
prOVIded in excess of $20 million in eco-
nomIc aId to the YemenItes prior to the
civil war ThIS aid included the develop-
ment of a port complex at Hodeida and a
jet airport at San 'a. It is no coincidence
that these faCIlities were deSIgned to ac-
commodate the Soviet aIr and sea
fleets!" An ancillary benefit of this aid
was that it prOVIded the Yemenites with
much-needed lInes of commUnICatIOn,
thereby contributIng to their economic
growth.
It was not untIl 4 March 1946 that the
United States recognized the complete
and absolute Independence of Yemen.
Two months later, a treaty of frIendshIp
and commerce was SIgned, as well as an
agreement to exchange diplomats.
2
" In
195 I, the j mam requested conSIderable
US aId and assIstance. Washington,
however, was unWilling to grant the re-
quest presumably because officials
feared that such aId would be used against
the I3ritish in Aden.
For the next six years, US involve-
ment in Yemen was confined to mostly
philanthropic and cultural ventures. As
US Investments in the Persian Gulf in
general, and the Arabian Peninsula
in partIcular, took on significance, US
policymakers sought to protect thIS eco-
nomic stake in the region. It did so by
shunning its indifferent attitude toward
the imamate In favor of a benevolent ap-
proach, thereby attemptIng to buy in-
. fluence:
ltl
It was at this point that the true impact
March
of Washington's decision not to support
the imam m his time of need became clear
Now the Americans needed him, and he
knew It. His ambivalence toward the
Umted States caused him to allow nomi-
nal US presence in Yemen primarily
to serve as a hedge against total domina-
tion by the Soviets. 1I
In January 1959, Yemen accepted Its
first mstallment of US aid which con
slsted of foodstuffs Subsequent trans-
actIOns generally involved food and
medical supplIes. The only substantive
project undprtaken by the Umted States
m Yemen was the constructIOn of a
modern highway which connpcted Mocha
with San'a. Total US outlays m eco
nomic aid to Yemen during the period
amounted to $16 mIllion.'i MIlitary as-
slstancp for thp same penod amounted
to a mere 51,000. jl
The Era of Civil War
FollOWIng the 1962 revolutIOn whIch
overthrew the imam and established
the Yemen Arab Republic, and through-
out the subsequent civil war, the SOVIets
contInued to providp unambiguous sup-
port to the YemenItp leadershIp In
fact, economiC aid alone had almost
tnpled by 1965." The extent of milItary
assistance durmg thIS perIod IS some-
what more difficult to gauge smcr the
Soviets employed Egyptian prOXIeS to
carry out their program. Indications are
that total Soviet expenditures in military
aid durmg the period totaled $70 mIl
lIon."
'The Soviets were in part ~ e s s u r e to
mtenslfy their economiC blitz in Yemen
because of efforts by the People's Re-
public of China and the United States to
reduce Soviet influence. The Chmese and
Americans mamly confined their efforts
to road construction projects. But the
1981
TUG OF WAR OVER YEMEN
Soviets provided a health, education and
welfare package whicli! resulted in the
establishment of a cement factory, fish-
enes, a hospital, several schools and a
stadium, as well as roads.
36
Direct Soviet involvement in the war
prior to 1967 was limited to the establish-
ment of a military mission specifically
deSigned to help train YemenIte troops:"
However, the Soviets were forced to de-
viate from this policy in 1967 when a
series of complex developments threat-
ened to undermIne their stake on the
peninsula. First, Gamal A. Nasser's
88,OOO-man expeditionary force was with-
drawn from Yemen precipitated by cir
cumstances surroundmg the Middle East
War. Then, a coup snipped the strmgs on
Moscow's marionette in San'a, President
Salal. These occurrences placed the suc-
cess of the republicans m jeopardy.
Soviet policymakers were quick to em-
brace the new leadership in San'a and
pledged to fill the void left by the Egyptian
withdrawal. Almost at once, Moscow dis-
patched a shipment of emergency mIli-
tary supplies, as well as technologically
advanced aircraft. IndicatIOns are that
Soviet pIlots actually flew some combat
missions.
JH
It IS considered that thiS
prompt Soviet reactIOn, combined With
continued milItary assistance, ensured
the surVivability of the republican regime
in Sana.'9
In 1968, followmg the Withdrawal of the
British from Aden and the birth of the
independent People's Democratic Repub-
lic of Yemen, the Soviets began to shIft
their attention southward In an effort to
gain another foothold in the area. By 1971,
Moscow had scaled down its economic ald
to North Yemen significantly m order to
focus on the Marxist South Yemen. Mili-
tary aid had been cut off in 1970.'" The
reasons for this major policy shift will be
addressed later.
17
MILITARY REVIEW
Washington's hesitation to recognize
North Yemen further hindered any US
efforts to expand its influence in Yemen
41
despite the fact that it invested $36 mil-
lion in economic assistance during the pe-
riod 1962-67,42 The fledgling republican
regime was involved in 'a bloody fight for
,its very survival and wanted bullets, not
beans, to aid its cause-a commodity the
United States was unwilhng to provide,4,'
Instead, WashIngton sought to bring
about peace through diplomacy and
mediation, a strategy that proved to be
ineffective,
In a surpnse move that caught US
policymakers off guard in 1967, San'a
severed diplomatic relations with Wash-
ington because of American involvement
in the Arab-Israeh war 44
Conciliation: The Path to Peace
By 1968, It was clear that General Has-
son al-'Amri, President Salal's succes-
sor, was seeking ways of ending the war,
In a concIliatory move, he opened up com-
munications WIth tnbal defectors and
former royalists to ascertam the best way
to aSSimilate the royalists into hiS
regime 'Amri's expressed concern for
restoring central control of his govern-
ment rather than prolongmg the fight-
ing Impressed the Saudis The conserva-
tive trends exhibited by the San'a
regime encouraged Kmg Falsal to open
secret contacts In January 1969, result-
ing in an informal peace settlement.
The Soviet UnIOn understood the im-
plicatIOns of reconcilIatIOn between these
two Arab nelghbo,"s and realigned its
priorities, The Soviets discontinued mili-
tary aid completely and provided Just
enough economic assistance to maIntaIn
a positive relationship with the Yemen-
ites." Now, Moscow was free to trigger
another economic bombardment on the
18
Arabian Peninsula. The target, South
Yemen, was vulnerable to a penetration.
Ports, airfields and other facilities leu by
the British were more sophisticated n
those of North Yemen and mol' than
tempted the Kremlin. Similar ideo ogical
beliefs and mutual needs led to a short
courtship and early marriage bet een
Moscow and Aden.
NORTH-SOUTH FIGHTING:
EAST-WEST INVOLVEMENT
The stnfe-ridden Yemenites found the
decade ofthe 1970s as tumultuous as any
period of their turbid history. Once again,
the socioeconomic development of these
indigent people was relegated to second-
ary importance by a political leadership
preoccupied with war, crises and coups,
and pestilence
In 1970, with the Soviets on sabbatical
m South Yemen, the mutual needs of the
SaudiS and Yemenites combined to allow
these former enemIes to put their Inimical
past behmd them and get on with the bUSI-
ness at hand-namely, stability and
development Tempered by the disastrous
effects of a severe drought, the initial
results of this major shift In Yemenite
foreign policy must have be'en encourag-
ing to 'Amri. Albeit signs of initial
progress were evident, continued growth
was contingent on sustenance provided
from outSide sources.
4h
The Yememtes insatiable need for
economic aid prompted San'a to initiate
a resumption in relations with the United
States In 1972. Despite political rhetoric
to the contrary,47 Washington's support
to Yemen between 1972 and mid-1976 was
tepid at best. US pohcymakers seemed
content to let the Saudis and other bene-
factors bear the brunt of the costs since
March
US interests had already been placated.
It appears that Washington provided
just enough aid during this period to keep
taut the string of relationship with Saudi
Arabia. The United States knew that an
expression of less than full commitment
in Yemen would jeopardize relations
wIth the SaudIs. In thIs regard, the United
States provIded $16.8 mIllion In eco
nomic aid and a mere $200,000 In milItary
aid'S as opposed to the Saudis who granted
over $100 millIon annually in economic
assistance alone.
4
<J
Despite the fact that both North and
South Yemen share the ultimate obJec
tive of natIOnal reunificatIOn, ideological
differences between the two have pro
duced chronIc InstabilIty along thplr
border. Armed conflIct between the two
In September 1972 and again In May 197:l
pOInted to the need for North Yemen to
amelIorate its defenses. Knowing the
United States' averSIOn to provIdIng
weapons, compounded by US publIc sentI'
ment over future involvement in other
Vletnams, the YemenItes In :-.!ovember
1975 dispatched a military delegatIOn (0
the Soviet UnIon. Now, as before, this
little Arab country was dpmonstratIng
its ability to maneuver the superpowers to
its own advantage:'"
Fearing that North Yemen would reo
turn to Moscow's WIng for shelter, the
UnIted States and Saudi ArabIa devised
a 10year milItary modernization pro-
gram for North Yemen which they quickly
announced in January 1976. The first five
years of thIS plan called for $139.5 mIl-
lion in Saudlfinanced, US-supplied mIlI-
tary equipment, as well as an additional
$80 million In SaudI-financed, French
supphd military eqUIpment.
Although the extent of the last five
years of the program was less definitive,
it must have been sizable because the
Yemenites chose it over a $500-mIlhon
1981
TUG OF WAR OVER YEMEN
package proposed by the Soviets. 51 In a
move apparently designed to keep its op-
tions open, however, San'a did accept-
delivery of 18 T55 and T34 tanks and 100
trucks [rom the Soviets in mid-1976.
5
"
Malevolence intensified in southern
Arabia beginning in October 1977 with
the assassInation of North Yemen's pres-
ident, Ibrahim Muhammad al-Hamadi.
In early May 1978, Lieutenant Colonel
'Abdallah 'Abd al-' Alim, an army
commander, led a brief unsuccessful re-
volt in Tarzy, after which he took asylum
In South Yemen. Shortly thereafter, in a
dramatIc sequence of events, the presI-
dents of both North and South Yemen
were killed almost simultaneously;
Ahmad Husayn alGhashmi of North
Yemen on 24 June and Salim Rubay 'i
'AII of South Yemen two days later.
5
.!
At thIS point, anticipatIng conflict
between north and south, the United
States accelerated delIvery of milItary
eqUIpment agreed to in 1976. In Septem-
ber 1978, the United States had agreed
to consider an urgent request from thp
Saudis to supply an additional $400-mil
lIon worth ofmihtary hardware. Included
were jets, tanks and armored person-
nel carriers, as well as training teams,
adVIsers and technICIans."' Then, In Feb-
ruary 1979, South Yemen forces, sup-
ported by Cuban and Soviet adVIsers
attacked North Yemen and penetrated the
northerners along a broad front.""
In an unprecedented move, President
Carter waived arms-control restric-
tions, declared an emergency and sent
North Yemen the arms package described
above. In addition, he sent a carrier task
force Into the Arabian Sea and dispatched
two US AIr Force radar warning planes
to SaudI Arabla'b
'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, the new pres-
ident of North Yemen, still wanted more.
BeSIdes just equipment, he wanted the
19
MILITARY REVIEW
United States to prove its resolve by pro-
viding a cadre to assIst in the training,
maintenance and administration of em-
ploying this arsenal. W{th the "Vietnam
syndrome" alive and well. one can under-
" stand Salih's suspIcions.
In May 1979, the Soviet Union's mili-
tary adVIsory team in North Yemen
totaled more than 200 as compared to
eight mIlitary men from the United
States.'" Indications are that Salih con
sidered the quantIties of his US-
supplied weaponry Insufficient com-
pared to that of the Soviet-supplIed South
Yemen. Beyond that, he was dissatis-
fied with the pace of delivery which was
contingent upon Saudi ArabIa's paymg
for the hardware.'"
Then came the shock. In mid-September
1 DepaHfTl8ntofSlareBullE'lm 14 Jul'l 1975 074
2 The north SOuth boundary waf, demarcated In 1904 nol b". lrp
Yernerllte people tul b". Bnj'5h and Tur1<-'" "'hO controlled A.:len
and Vp.rnen re5pect've'-,.
3 Mantred W Wenner MOdl'rn Yemen 1918 1966 Thp J0I1,1<:.
Hopkins U"'vers1f'y Press Bailll'Tlore Ma 1967 pp 24 27
.:I R P Owe'" SOlJlhern Arabia WorlrJ Survey Oelober 1973
p3
5 'Yemenlte plateaus and vaile,;s have been terraced Iro'll thel'
SummitS to the wadi lIoors bPIow Sloraqe lank." have also been
emplac.ed ThiS three to rour mlltenn,um s".<;lem t..se<; and reu<;es
ellery drop of .... ale. preclud,ng II tram draIning ,nlO Ihe hot sdr"ds of
T,hama
6 Wenner op Cif p 38
7 Tom little Soutn Arabia-Arena Of Conflict PraeQer Publishers
NY 1968 pp 1 2
8 Ibid pp d b
9 Don Pererz The M,ddle [ast TOdBy Holt R nehar! a"d
Winston Inc N 'y 1978 P 444
10 The Arabldn PenrnsLlla" YhE' Yemen The British
April 1966 .
11 M'ddle East YearbOOk 1979 ICr..' Magaz,nes Lid LOfljon
Eng 1979 p 231
12 Perelz 00 Of
13 Jane SmIley Hart Ba!:.lc ChronOlogy 10' a Hlslo.". ol\l1e YemE'r
The Middle fast Journal Numbers 1 and 2 Wln!er SpYIng 1963
p 148
14 Wenner op Cit pp 47 49
15 Ibrd p 555
16 Owen op Cit p 6
17 Wynfred Joshua Sov,et Penetration /{TIO the M,ddle East
National Strategy Information Center Inc NY 1971 pp 27 28
18 Nimrod NOVlk On the Shores 0/ Bab AIMafl(Jab OJ
p/omacy ana Ref}!9nal DynamICS Monograph Number 26 Foreign
POliCy Research Instrtute Phlladelph,a Pa 1979 p 4
19 On 1 November 1928 the USSR recognized Yemen and con
CIUdea a treaty or friendship and commerce w'th Imam '1ahya AI
though Ihe USSR recalled lIS diplOmats a decade late' the treaty was
renewed m 1939 See Hart o/J CI/ p 148 Between 1928 and 1953
trade ,yas of minor conseQuence
20 Novik..o/J c<l
20
1979, having thought it had San'a in
its hip pocket, Washington discovered
Soviet MIG21s, tanks and a variety of
other modern military equipment being
off-loaded in North Yemen. 59 Once-again,
this little Arab nation had driven a stake
In Washington's polItical heart. Regard-
less of his motives. Salih used his leverage/
polItIcal jujitsu against the superpowers.
Where thIS saga will end is anyone's
guess. There has been speculation that
Salih has emplaced a modern-day
"Trojan Horse" which will result in his
UnIfying both Yemens, then turning on
SaUdI ArabIa to take over the world's oil
supply"" One thing is certain:
Yemen has a vast milItary arsenal to
draw on for whatever objectives it has in
mind hi What's next?
NOTES
21 Chanes B McLane SOvletM,ddle East Rela! (Ins Sov,et
Th,rd World Rela/tons M,ddle East Columb,a Unlllers,ly Press
Irving N'y 1913, Volume 1. p 113 In February 1956 Yemen and
CZechoSlovakia estabhshed an arms agreement at Soviet urgmg
22 ForeIgn ASSIstanCe Actllll\le5 of the CommunIst BloC afld
TheIr fmplicatloflS for me Unded Slates Stud". Number 8 The
COunCillor Economrc anij Indus!ry Research Inc March 1957 p 621
23 Ibl(1 P 667
24 Soviet penetration Iflto EgYD' .... ,ts locahon ao;tr.de the Sue.;:
COupled With ItS gnp on Bab elMandeb allowed the SOviets 10 con
trOI traff.c mto and oul of tM Red Sea See Wenner op Cit. pp 176 89
25 Joshua 00 Cit P 28
26 Mclane OP c,t pp 111 13 SovIet geG1oglsl'r; \'rere dIS
patched to 'yemen to study mmeral rpsources In January 1958
?7 Novlk op Cit. pp 6 7
28 Joshua Of) Cit P 28
<'9 Hart 00 Cit pp 148 49
30 Wenner o/J CJt pp' 77 82
31 Ibid
32 'U 5 Overseas loans and GranlS and ASSistance From Inter
natronal OrgamlatlonS-Obflgalions and Loans AuthOrizations Jul". 1
1946 to September 30 1978 a report prepared b". the Olltce of Piafl
nlng and Budgelrr19 In the Bureau lor Program and POliCy Coordins
lIon of Ine Agency lor Intetnatlonal Development WaShIngton
D C prepared at the request of vanous CongreSsional comm,ttees
p 31
33 MIlitary ASSiStance and Foreign Military Sales Facts SeLlInl".
ASSistance AgenC'f US Department of Defense WaShington DC
May lq73 p 8
34 McLane op Cit, p 120
35 Ibid p 121
36 Ibid, P 112, and Joshua, 01) Cit P 29 (SOVlstS buill the San a..
Sada Highway)
37 Mclane op Cit. P 112
38 J C HOI'ewllz Middle East PO/trICS The Mtfltary DimenSion
Praeger PLlblishers N Y 1969 P 261
39 Novlk op Cit pp 4 6
40 J Bower Bell Soulh Arabia Violence afld Confltct Studies
The Institute for the Study of Conillct London Eng. November
1973 p 9
March
41 Wenner Of] CIt P 202 aM McLane op CIt D 113 AUhough
Salal announced the establ'shment of t'le Yemen Arab Republic on
27 September 1962 It wa50 not unlll 19 December 1962 thaI tM United
Stales granted recogmtlon to tile republican regime SovIet recognll<On
was Immediate
42 US Arms Pollcles In the PerSian Gulf ahd Red Sea Areas
Past Present and Future repon of a slall survey miSSion 10 EthiOPia
Iran and the Arabian Pen,'lsula H46262 pnnled for the use 01 the
COmmittee on International Relations ptJfsuanl to H Res 313 DF'cem
ber 1977 pp 7476 and US OverseaS Loans and GranlS and AS
sl<;lance Fotom Internatlollal Organlzat,ons- Obl,gallons a"d Loans
AuthOtlZ8tlons J.J1y 1 1946 to September 30 1978 op (II
43 Mllllar'y ASSIMance and Foo'elgn Military Sale:. Facts 00 Cit
44 US Arms POliCIes 1'1 tre PerSian Gulf and Red SC'd A'ea:'
Past F '<;ent and F ulure Of] Clf P 73
45 Bell L''1 CI/ DP 8 9
46 Countries prO\/ldmg a,d 10 Yemen 101l0 ..... 'ng the eclopse 01
SOviet aid 1f"I 1970 mcluded Saud' Arabia France the People s
RepLJbllc 01 China an,j the Federal Repub",c 01 Ger(l18"y 11 ShOUld
be DOlnted Ollt that Ihe USSR slill lllaln1alned a reSidual oreserce
47 Josepn J S,<,CO US POI,Cy 'n '''e Pers an Gu I and Arab'a'
PenInsula Department of State Bulletm 14 JUly 191'j RonalO
I Sp,eIS, US National Secur,t'y POliCy n the Ind'an OLean A,ea
Department Of StatB BulleM. 23 Augu,>t 1971 and R,ct'a'd M
F-orelgn As-s<stanc8 10' me 5evenloec, lT1essa'le to Qt'20t ConqreS$
Second Ses'Olon US Hou'20e 0
1
Representatives DocLomenl f'lulT1ber
91 3851H380 5) Supe"'"lpnOent 01 Docu<TJents US P'nl
.ng Office Wast"ngto" DC I'J Sr>pteIT1I:lP' 1970
TUG OF WAR OVER YEMEN
48 US Arlll& POliCies In the Persian Gull and Red Sea Areas
Past Present and Future Op CIt PD 7476 and US Overseas
Loans al1d Grants and Asslslance From Internallona! OrganiZations- -
Oblogal,ons and Loaos Aulhoflzallons Jul., 1 1946 to SeDlern
bef 30 1978 op Cit
49 Middle fast 'r'earboofj 1979 op Cit D 233
50 Novlk Of) Cit P 10
51 US Arms PoliCies In the PerSian Gulf and Red Sea Areas
past Present allp Future op CIt P 80
'j2 Ibid
53 Novllt op Cit PO 14 19
54 Wlilam R Crawlord Yemen Department 01 Stafe Bulletm
wa!>h I1glon, 0 C June 1979 pp 39 40
55 leWIS B Ware Turmoil ,n Southern A'abla Military ReView
Novembel 1979 DD 5154
56 Crawford Of) Cit p 40
'j7 Yemen 5lradd'eS Ea.,1 Wesl With US Soviet AdVIsorS al1d
Weapons The WastlinglOn Suu 7 May 1980
58/D,d
59 Daniel Soulherland yemen Arm!> Deal Red Faces lor US
J lIer'20 lor SaLJdls The OmSllan Suerlce MonllOf 29 November 19
7
9
P 1 and Fred 5 Hoffman Reds Arm 'femenlS The Kansas Glly
Slar 13 5pptemtJer 1979
60 W,lloam 5allre 50vlels Inroads In Yemen The
Kansas Oty T'mes 4 December 1979
61 The M'lltury Balance 1919 19BO Tt's Ifl\ernatlonal ,>'lsillule
for Slrateq'c Stud,es London E.ng
Major ,John B Lynch lS an a"''>l::.tQ'lf pro/!' ...
sur of 111ll11ar\ .'1Cl('llcr nt Old Drunllll01l l'1I1
1981
l t'THt .... :\'or{nlh, \"lrgl1l1a Ife r(,( ell'cd a B S
m ({)ml11('rCe and {nOll
the U11ll'er .... IIY (II A/ahoma, an M A 11l polwen!
sCIence from thl' lflllfcr::.llv 01 /{(lll"'u .... and (l
198{J nf the USACGSC lie
sen ed u,lth th!! 1 sl Cm air .... and the
25th Infantry Ihl'I, ... Wll
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21
The aim of interoperability is to facilitate smooth and
effective operation of multinational forces. This article
looks at considerations affecting a US field artillery
brigade's participation in such a force.
Field Artillery
Interoperability
Major Rolland H. Berry Jr., US Army
O
N EVERY major US exercise in
Germany, US units practice inter-
operability with allied forces. Among the
most active are US field artillery Units,
particularly in operations with the
Bundeswehr. Interoperability is US
policy.! In fact, equipment standardiza-
tion is too. But, for many reasons, eco-
nomic sovereignty being foremost, it is the
opinion of this writer that standardization
is a difficult at best dream-at least in the
near to midterm. One need only look at the
perceived relative differences in the US
"active defense" and the German "posItion
defense" to see that even the standardiza-
tion of tactics is a near-term impossibility.
Interoperabihty, on the other hand,
"the ability of systems, units or forces to
provide services 'to and accept services
from other systems, units or forces and to
use the services so exchanged to enable
them to operate effectively together,"2 is
possible and indeed practiced by US forces
in Europe. Some would contend that inter-
operability has not been just a buzz word
in US Army, Europe, since about 1974 but,
rather, a necessity." If it was not a buzz
word, it certainly has been a state of mind
that allowed doors to open for activities
that might not have been conducted.
The purpose of this article is to examine
one aspect of interoperabIlity-a US field
artillery !FA) bngade augmenting Ger-
man dIvisional field artillery. The per
tinent questIOns are: What is the best use
of the FA brigade In this situation? How
is the German division commander lIkely
to employ it? What are the interoperability
INTEROPERABILITY
considerations of such an arrangement?
Some basic assumptions have been
made which admittedly reflect the bias of
the writer:
Interoperability is absolutely neces-
sary to modern coalition warfare.
Standardization is a questionable
objective in the near to intermediate time
frame.
German nondivisional FA will not be
available to augment US divisional FA
during the defense of NATO territory.
NATO would be the defender against
an armored Soviet attack in Europe {at
least the lead maneuver echelons will be
armoredJ. j
Many artIcles and discussions support
the first assumption: InteroperabilIty is
a necessIty in NATO.4 Just how far down
in the command structure interoperabllIty
can or should be conducted is subject to
some debate. It appears that brigade or
higher level interoperability is the most
desirable." However, in FA terms. this
may be an FA brigade/group or a US FA
battalIon supporting German elements.
Second, the Impossibility of achieving
standardizatIon is best explaIned in an
Army magazine article titled, "Standardl
zation: In Search of the Holy Grail." If the
title does not tell all, the concluding state
ment of the article does: "The standardiza-
tion effort will test the skill of NATO's
leaders to the utmost."6
With regard to the third assumption,
German corps artillery, ifit exists at all in
a particular corps, has no more than three
battalIons-probably of light artillery.'
US-deployed corps artillery consists of 10
to 15 battalions of heavy and missile
artillery, and It can reasonably be ex-
pected that reinforcements from the
United States will contain FA brigades
and battalions. Simple arithmetic indi-
cates the validIty of this assumption that,
if any artillery reinforcement IS provided,
MILITARY REVIEW
INTER OPERABILITY - The ability of systems, units or forces to
provide services to and accept services from other systems, units
or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to
J. operate effectively together.
-Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1
it will be US FA supportmg German.
Concerning the fourth assumption, the
lead echelons of a Soviet attack in Europe
will probably be an armored force, against
which conventional FA is not very effec-
tive. However, a significant portion of FA
supporting that attack and command
vehicles controlling that attack are not
armored.
8
That is a vulnerabilIty.
Current US Field Artillery Thinking
US FA doctrine is currently being con
figured by forward thinkers in the FA
community to take advantage of thIS
vulnerability. The US FA target acquisi.
tIOn capability (currently a target acquisi-
tion battery) has been moved from non-
dIvisional artIllery to the direct control of
the division artillery.
Current US FA phIlosophy is that the
proper role of an FA brigade is attachment
rather than the tradItional mIssion of
reinforcing or general support reinforcing
to the division artillery. Such actIOns can
easily be interpreted as additional and
more responsive FA support for maneuver
force generated targets.
However, thIS mterpretation must be
tempered by a careful readmg of a recent
incisive analysis of "Field Artillery
Employment in the Active Defense"
(Mlhtary RevIew, February 1980). Of the
several excellent points made in the
article, one is of greatest interest here. The
author argues that FA priorities in the
24
acti ve defense should be normally
weighted toward, first, Soviet artillery
and, second, target acquisition equipment
and, third, command and control facilities.
The definitive US doctrine, Field
Manual !FM) 6-20, FIre Support in Com-
bzned Arms Operations, dl!fines the target
acquisitIon battery as the main component
of FA target acquisition. FM 71-100,
Armored and Mechamzed DWlsion Opera-
tzons, says that diviSIOnal field artillery
can acquire targets from several sources,
including the target acquisition battery,
fire support teams and aerial observers.
The US diviSIOn operations manual does
not hst any combat electronic warfare
intelligence as a target acquisition
capabIlity for divisional FA. FM 6-20
further says that the target acquisition
battery produces counterfire targets
almost exclusively. Certainly, the fire
support team and aerIal observers will not
locate enemy command posts or enemy
target acquisition equipment except by
pure luck.
Aside from the observation that doctri-
nally it would appear that US intelligence
and US FA operations within US divisions
should do a better job of "inter operability ,"
the purpose of the foregoing discussion is
an attempt to portray the orientation of
the US field artilleryman as he prepares
to support German elements. It should be
quite clear that the US FA is oriented to
attacking counterfire targets rather than
command and targets.
The following discussion explains why
the US FA brigade is the primary tool the
division artillery has for the counterfire
task. The reason is that there are four FA
battalions in an armored or mechanized
division artillery, three m direct support
and, whether artillerymen like it or not,
controlled by maneuver brigade com-
manders. The fourth battalion is virtually
"given" to the direct support battalion
located in the area of the expected pene-
tration. The division artillery commander
IS left with:
A tactical operations center (TOe)
which FM 6-20 says:
... has been reorganized and augmented
{or counter{ire management ... This pro
vldes the commander and FSCOORD
[{Ire support coordinator! the Single
source management o{the dIVISIOn cou nter-
INTER OPERABILITY
{ire program . ... The TOe IS responsible
{or collecting data, targeting, and appzyzng
the best fire support means to de{eat the
threat.
A target acquisition battery which
produces exclusively counterfire targets.
Three and four heavy cannon battal
ions (the Lance battalions having been
retamed under corps controll.
An FA brigade headquarters.
The likely use of US FA brigade assets
by US division artillery, then, is for
counterfire. The need for the FA brigade
assets must be obvious to US commanders
since there is currently no move afoot to
diminish the numbers of nondivisional
artillery battalions. In fact, the need is
obvious to German force structure
Members of the German III Corps and US V Corps on a recent field exercise in the Federal Republic of
Germany. The soldiers are preparing communications for installment of a fire direction center.
MILITARY REVIEW
planners who are in the process of pro-
curing additional corps artillery.
Interoperability Considerations
Numerous documents, not the least of
which is FM 100-5, OperatIOns, purport to
describe the factors affecting interoper-
ability of US forces working with German
or other allied forces. An article con
cerning the work in 1976 of a trinational
division sums it up rather succinctly as
language-trained liaison teams; communi
cations compatibility; and standardization
of arms, logistic support and doctrine 10
A more realistic approach is taken by FM
100-5 which lists 13 factors that, with
some reduction in clarity, can be reduced
to language, liaison, clear command
relationships and knowledge of allied
doctrine.
Language. Language study is a problem
that is being addressed by US Army,
Europe," but, in the writer's opmion, IS
not gomg to be solved from the US side
in the near term. Language is a very
important interoperability consideration,
just as standardization is very important,
but It ~ not going to be solved in the fore-
seeable future
LWlson. Given the language problem,
liaison IS the recognized solution. It is
. clearly recognized that knowledgeable
US liaIson officers must head competent
and fairly large, well-equipped liaison
teams. FM 100-5 says:
Team members should be bilzngual, and
must be knowledgeablJe of organIzatIOn,
procedures, and equIpment of both US
forces and other NA TO countrzes with
which they will be operating. (Emphasis
added.)
Although FM 100-5 does not say it, the
most important aspect of that statement is
26
that a US liaison team must be knowl-
i' edge able concerning US organization,
procedures and equipment. The Germans
already know what their capabilities are
-the US liaison officer must know what
his forces' capabilities are. In general, if
the US liaison officer is not considered
capable of being the operations officer of
the US force from which he comes, it is
not likely that he will be able to interpret
the thinking ofthe US operations officer to
a German operations officer, no matter
what the language capability. Equipment
requirements of the liaison team are also
important, but they have been discussed
extensively in other publications and so
will not be explored further here.
Clear command relationships. Clear
command relationships are also very
important-quite simple in theory but
exceedingly political and difficult in
practice. Simply stated, lines of national
authority and NATO authority must be
clear. The NATO authority must be
supported by national authOrity in all but
the most blatant cases. Detaileddiscussion
ofthis interoperability factor is beyond the
scope of this article.
Knowledge of allIed doctrzne. The knowl-
edge of allied doctrine gets at the main
point of this article. What is the German
division artillery commander likely to do
with a US FA brigade? It appears that he
has two options. The first is to employ the
battalions separately, very likely assign-
ing the tactical mission of Feuerlfeteilzg-
ung (fire participation\. ,
This mission is translated most of the
time as general support reinforcing, and
it has a very familiar ring for US field
artillerymen. The mission is really more
analogous to the US reinforcing mission,
but the Germans have a tactical mission
they call Peuerverstizrkung-literally,
reinforcement of fires (reinforcing) which
is for yet another purpose.
A lot of work has been done on this
f ~ e t of interoperability. A clear, con-
cise discussion of tactical FA mISSIOns is
in the VII Corps Multinational Inter-
operabIlity Handbook and "Interoper-
ability-Key to Success in Allied Opera-
tions" (Field ArtIllery Journal, July-
August 1977)' The conclusions of the
FIeld Artillery Journal article are basical-
ly that aggressive, intelligent lIaison
could have solved just about all problems
of interoperability during the tactIcal
exercise described. The problem of am-
mUnition was not addressed.
However, an after-action report of a
similar exercise (Joint GYM-X. 9-10
August 1977) as well as a NATO tactical
doctnne study {conducted by the 1st
Infantry DiVIsion I Forward 1 and Panzer
Brigade 30 In 1974 and 19751 Identified
ammunitIOn selectIOn, supply and ac-
INTEROPERABILITY
countability as the critical FA inter-
operability problems. Of the problems
associated with this option of the com-
mander, ammunition logistics is a major
one. Although these are the problems
most frequently studied, the German di-
vision artillery commander appears to
have a second option: giving the US FA
brigade the counterfire mission.
German Use 01 a US Field Artillery Brigade
The German usc of a US FA brig e in
the counterfire role appears to e the
most synergistIc use of avaIlable field
artillery assets. Even so, what will the
German diVision artIllery commander do
A Bundeswehr inspector general exits a jointly operated fire direction center of the 3d Armored Division, V
Corps, and the German III Corps in a recent field exercise in Hohenfels, West Germany
MILITARY REVIEW
with this additional field artillery asset?
From the point of view of the US field
artilleryman, the use of the FA brigade in
the counterfire role fills a vacuum in the
German force structure. If executed prop-
erly, it avoids many traditional FA inter-
operability problems such as differences
in tactical missions, fire missIOn formats
and ammunition logistics. Also, it gains
all the advantages of unity of command
and mission-type orders .being given to a
brigade-size headquarters of one nation-
ality from the division artillery com
mander of another nationahty.
German defensive tactics can be
characterized as maneuver-oriented!2
as opposed to the US firepower-oriented
approach or; further, as a position de-
fense!3 as opp.osed to the US active de-
fense. In any case, German defensive
doctrine is to hold teI;rain and positIOns
and "use maneuver to create conditions
for surprise and shock .... "11 The use of
the US FA brigade in the counterfire role
complements the maneuver-oriented ap
proach. Soviet artillery can be expected to
bombard any defensive positions. There-
fore, the German maneuver commander
must either shift maneuver forces or \lse
the additional firepower assets of an FA
brigade to reduce the Soviet capability
to direct fire at will on forward defensive
positions.
Such use complements German tactics
but does not impose the US firepower-
oriented approach On the German division
commander There is great emphasis in
German defensive doctrine on creating
conditions that call for the employment of
the reserve in the counterattack.!5 It may
well be that the appropriate use of the fire-
power available from the assets of an FA
brigade during a counterattack would be
to seal a penetration or to provide counter-
battery fires. In either case, centrally con-
trolled US F A battalions would be of
28
more use to the German division com-
mander than ones parceled out to rein-
force brigade-artillery (US direct sup-
port FA) battalions. The correct tactics
may well pr.ove again to be the opinion of
the "senior officer present."
Counlerfire Role Inleroperabilily
How can the US FA brigade propedy
execute the counterfire role for the Ger-
man division? By considering the four fac-
tors of liai-
son, clear command relationships and
knowledge of allied doctrine-we find the
following. The language skill requirement
is mimmized by the proposed arrange-
ment except at the brigade TOC where
language 'capability becomes quite im-
portant. The US FA bngade has two liai-
son teams already constituted that are in-
tended for full-time use ilt the US division
artillery, thereby ehminating the require-
ment to form ad hoc liaison teams for in-
teroperability.
The requirement for knowledge of al-
lied doctrine is reduced sigmficantly. The
fires of US battalions are controlled by a
US FA brIgade headquarters, thereby
eliminating any liaison or language or
command relationship problems. Instead
of four or five battalion headquarters hav-
Ing interoperability requirements, the reo
quirements exist only at the FA brigade
TOC. The interoperability capabilities
can be pooled at brigade. Clear command
relationships are enhanced for the same
reasons.
The critical juncture of this whole ar-
rangement is the interface of the German
target acquisition battalion and the US
FA brigade TOC. Since a US FA brigade
does not contain a target acquisition sec-
tion, target data must come from the
March
German divIsIOn artillery target acqUIsi-
tion battalion. There are several ways to
do this. The easiest and most efficient is
to collocate the headquarters of the target
acquisItion battalion of the German divi-
sion artIllery with the US FA brigade
headquarters as shown schematically m
the figure.
The normal tactical employment of the
German target acquisition battalion head-
quarters is apart from the diVIsion artil
lery TOC. With the proposed arrange-
ment, it stays apart from the dIvision ar-
tIllery ,!,OC-only now a US FA brigade
TOe is collocated with the target acquisi-
INTEROPERABILITY
tion battalion headquarters. Targeting in-
formatIOn of a counterfire nature is
passed dIrectly from the target acquisition
battalion headquarters to the US FA bri-
gade TOC which generates counterfire
mISSIOns.
The German division artillery com-
mander commands rind controls his target
acquiSItion battalion and takes the target
mformatIOn he or his headquarters desires
through normal German communications
channels. The FA brigade locates its or-
ganic liaIson teams with the German divi-
sion artillery to facilItate close coopera-
tion.
Tactical Schematic
x
x
1981
Counterfire
Radar
x
German
Control all
German
battalions

Sound
Batteries

Flash

x
x
x
US Brigade
Control all
US battalions
Collocate
29
MILITARY REVIEW
Conclusion
The major problem created by the pro-
posed solution to the FA interoperability
problem is that the normal German
method for using more than one artillery
headquarters of brigade-size in the dIvi-
sion area is to assign one headquarters to
control fire support in half of the division
sector and the other to the other half of
the sector. Such an arrangement probably
would not work. or at least would create
more problems than it would solve. if one
headquarters were German and the other
US. Howev,"r, so many interoperabIlity
1 Army Regulation 34 2 Ratlonal.18l1on Standardlzat,on ana
Inreroperabihty Department 01 the w2[,hlngton DC 15 May
1979 021
2 JOint Cposis of Staff Publicahon 1 Department Of Defense
D1ctronal} of Military ana ASSOCIated Terms Oepartl"'1enl :I' Defense
WashIJ'gton DC 3 Seplembe' 1974 p 180
3 L leutenanl Colonel WIII'am B Howerton and lV'alor Phlll D W
Childress lnleroperabillty- Ke\t to Suer-ess I" Allipd Operallof''>
Field Artillery Journal JUly August 1977 PO 6668
4 For el(amp1e see Ibid or l,eu'enant A.ust,n Bay The T ".,ahonal
Fo ........ard February 1977 DO 14.17
5 NATO Tacllcal Doctrine Study ot l::;t Intantry D,VISion (Forwaro)
and Panzer Brigade 30 119751 rep'oduced on Reterence BOOk I RBI' 00 3
(nferooerat)/f/fy of BritiSh German anCl US {'orees uS AIm\, CQ'1l'TId01d
and Gereral Stall Co(leg8 Fort Leavenworth Kan JUly 1979
6 Caplal" Richard M Saunders Standardization In Search Of
Ina Holy Grall Army Februa!) 1979 pp 14 20
7 RS 1003 100{erOperablhty 01 British German ana US FOrces 00
Cit p212
NOTES
problems are eliminated by the arrange-
ment proposed in this article that those
created appear to be minimal.
. The proper way for a German di vision to
employ a US FA brigade is in the counter-
fire role or at least in a centrally controlled
mode to support the counterattack. It
appears quite likely to this observer that
a German division commander would do
just that.
This article has not addressed nuclear
warfare. and that is certainly one of its
limitations. The implications of tactical
nuclear coalition warfare should be ex-
amined to determine the effect on the
proposed counterfire role oCa US FA bri-
gade augmenting a German division_
8 C N Donnell>y T achcal PrOblems F aCing the Soviet Army Recent
Debales In the Soviet Mlllla!) Press Part I Mthtary Rev'ew June 1979
pp , 8 26 condenSed from Interna/lOnal Defense ReView VOlume 11
Number9 1976
9 RB 1003 lnteroperabM'I of BntlSh German ana uS Forces op
or p29
10 Bay.op Cit
11 General George S 81ancnard Language Interoperabi'l!y- A Key
lor Increased E ftecllVeness If! NATO Military Rev'eVr OctOber 1978 pp
5663
12 Lieutenant Colonet Steven l Canby NATO Strategy
Pohtlcal Military PrOblemS of Divergent Interests and Operallonal Con.
cept M,/lJary Re.llew April 1979 p 57
13 MulJma!lonal Iflteroperab!J!ry HandbOOk Department of the Arm)'
US VII Corps Motlrlngen GE 15 June 1976
14 Canby. 00 elc
15 AS 1003 Interop8rabl)l/y 01 Brlfl['h German ana uS Forces OP
CIt pp 3 23 and 3 24
Major Rolland II Berry dr Ui U Ilh the Flcld
30
Arfdlery Sectwn. US V Corps, Frankfurt, Ger-
mall} He receIved a B S from Vlr,lfulW Poly-
techmc Instllute, an M A from EU'itcrn Kentudz}
llnlt'erslt)' and a 1980 graduate of the
L\sACGSC He has commanded ballerlc,.;;, 111
Germany, the Continental Umted States anu the
4th lnfantr .... Dlvlswn, Vletnam He has bert'cd
as senIOr /0 the commanuwg
Menerai, US Army Arr Defense Center. Fort Bhss.
Te.xas, and as asslstant to the commandtng
general, US VII Corps Artrllery, In Germany .
The combined capabilities of acquisition, targeting and
weapons systems available to the commander today are
astounding. The author contends that these systems, sup-
plemented by new ones being fielded, allow the COnif'\
mander to "see" far beyond the front line of troops onto an
"extended" battlefield, a battlefield upon which the full
potential of our weapons must be exploited if victory is to
be attained. While the idea of the extended battlefield is not
new, the author argues that the extended attack must be
an integral part of every Army combat unit's capability.
Extending
the Battlef eld
General Donn A. Starry, US Army
MILITARY REVIEW
T
HE extended battlefield concept
primarily deals with war in areas
of the world where there ar' large num-
bers of relatively modern. well-equipped
forces who use Sovret-style operational
concepts and tactics. Quite naturally.
therefore. the threat against which the
concept is designed is typified by the
Warsaw Pact in Central Europe. the
larger aggregations of mechanized forces
in the Middle East or the threat from the
north 'in Korea.
The concept emphasizes the a II too
frequently ignored or misunderstood
lesson of history that. once political
authorities commit military forces In
pursUit of pohtlcal aims. military forces
must win something. or else there will be
no basis from which political authorities
. can bargain to win politically. Therefore.
the purpose of military operations
cannot be simply to a vert defeat, but,
rather. it must be to Win.
This article does not .propose new and
radical ways to fight the battle to win.
Rather. it describes an extension of the
battle and the battlefield which is pos-
sible to accomplish now and which, If ap-
plied. will reinforce the prospects for
winning.
The extended battlefield is not a new
concept. It IS a more descriptive term for
indicating the full potential we must
realize from our acqUisition. targeting
and weapons systems .. The battlefield ayd
the battle are extended in three ways:
First. the battlefield is extended in
depth. with engagement of enemy Units
not yet in contact to disrupt the enemy
timetable. compJicate command and
control and frustrate his plans. thus
weakening his grasp on the initiative.
Second. the battle is extended forward
in time to the point that current actions
such as attack of follow-on echelons.
logistical preparation and maneuver
32
plans are interrelated to maximize the
likelihood of winning the close-in battle
as times goes on.
And. lastly; the range of assets figuring
in the battle is extended toward more
emphasis on higher level Army and sister
service acquisition means and attack
resources.
What emerges is a perception of the
battlefield in which the goal of collapsing
the enemy's ability to fight drives us to
unified employment of a wide range of
systems and organizations on a battlefield
which. for corps and divisions, is much
deeper than that foreseen by current doc-
trine. The word "doctrine" is used
advisedly. It must be acknowledged atthe
outset that there is probably little set
forth In this article which is not already
being done and done well in some opera-
tional units. The purpose of this article
is less to suggest innovation than it is
to pull together many good ideas for
making extended attack an integral fea-
ture of our combat capability-in all Units.
In essence, Our message can be dis-
tilled In four primary notions:
First. deep attack is not a luxury;
it is an absolute necessity to winning.
Second. deep attack. particularly In
an environment of scarce acqUisition and
strike assets. must be tightly coordinated
over time with the decisive close-in
battle. Without thiS coordinatIOn.
many expensi ve and scarce resources
may be wasted on apparently attractive
targets whose destruction actually has
little payoff In the close-in battle. The
other side of this coin is that maneuver
and logistical planning and execution
must anticipate by many hours the vul-
nerabilities that deep attack helps
create. It is all one battle.
Third. it is important to consider
now the number of systems entering the
force in the near and middle-term future
March
(see Figure 1). These are o t ~ t weapons
of greater lethality and great I' range, but
automated systems and co munication
systems for more responsiv command
control, as well as sensor s stems to
find, identIfy and target the e emy and
to assess the effectiveness of d ep attack.
Finally, the concept IS designed to be
the umfymg Idea which pulls all these
emerging capabilities together so that,
together, they can allow us to realize
theIr full combmE'd potential for winning
The extended battlefield is not a futur-
Istic dream to remain on the shelf until
all new systems are fielded. WIth minor
adJ'ustments, corps and divIsions can
and must begm to learn and practIce fight-
ing the extended battle now-during
1981. The payoffs in read mess for combat
will be enormous, and Implementing
the concE'pt today means that we are
buIlding the receptacle mto which every
new system can be plugged Immediately,
EXTENDING THE BATILEFIELD
minimizing the buildup time to full
capability.
To ensure that the extended battlefield
concept is understood m the full context
of the integrated conventional-nuclear-
chemical battlefield, this article will
first review, in a broad sense, major
aspects of the concept. Then, it will
describe how, by attacking assaulting and j
follow-on echelons simultaneously, the
prospects for winning increase dra-
matically
The Concept
In peacetIme, the purpose of mili-
tary forces, especially in the context of
operatIOns m areas critIcal to US in-
'\ terests, is to reduce to a minimum what-
ever incentives the enemy's leadership
mIght perceIve as favorable to seek-
A Substantial Step Toward Future Capabilities
e
'
) (Command, control. commUnications and intelligence)
esws (Corps support weapon system)
GlCM (Ground-launched crUise missile)
MlRS (Multiple launch rocket system)
FASeAM (Family of scalterable mines)
Figure 1
1981
..-;::::===77
1986
SOTAS (Stand-off target acquISition system)
TAeFIRE (Tactical fife directIOn)
33
MILITARY REVIEW
ing military solutions 'to political
problems. In NATO, in the Middle East
and in Korea, our defensive strategy
must extend beyond simply denying vic-
tory to the other side. It must, instead,
postulate a definable, recognizable (al-
though perhaps limited) victory for the
defender. Enemy leaders must be made
to understand clearly that, if they choose
to move militarily, no 10l).ger will there
be a status quo ante-bellum-something
to be restored. Rather, the situation they
themselves have created is one which
will be resolved on new terms,
As the strategic nuclear balance
teeters, so grows the enemy's percep-
tion of his own freedom of action at
theater levels-conventional and nuclear.
Theater forces should not be considered
solely as a bridge to strategic nuclear
war. They are weapons which must be
considered in the context of a war-fighting
capability.
These considerations dictate that
NATO strategy must, from the outset,
be designed to cope with the Soviet con-
ventional-nuclear-chemical-combined
arms-integrated battlefield threat.
The growing threat of nuclear capabili-
ties elsewhere suggests this strategy to
be appropriate in other critical areas as
well.
The Warsaw Pact/Soviet-style strat-
egy embraces two fundamental con-
e p t s ~
In the first,. mass, momentum and
continuous combat are the operative
tactics Breakthrough (somewhere) is
sought as, the initiator of collapse in
the defender's system of defense.
In the alternative, surprise is sub
stituted for mass in the daring thrust
tactic. In NATO, this could involve a
n\lmber of BMP regiments in independent
attacks which, without warning, w01lld
seek to deny to defendJ.ng forces the op-
34
portunity to get set forward. Both tactics
are essentially maneuver-based schemes
whose purpose is to disrupt the opera-
tional tactics of the defender, albeit by
different methods.
The ileed for deep attack emerges
from the nature of our potential enemies-
their doctrine and their numerically
superior forces. Whether our enemy is
stylistically echeloned as shown in Fig-
ure 2 is not really critical. What is im-
portant is that superiority in numbers
permits him to keep a significant portion
of his force out of the fight with freedom
to commit it either to overwhelm or to
bypass the friendly force. The existence
of these follow-on echelons gives the
enemy a strong grip on the initiativl'
which we must wrest from him and then
retain in order to win.
NATO strategy (and defensive strat-
egies in other key areas of the world as
weI!) must be designed to' preserve the
territory, resources and facilities of the
defended area for' the defender. In none
of the critical areas of the world, those to
which US forces are likely to be commit-
ted, is there sufficient maneuver room to
accGmmodate a traditional defense-in-
depth strategy. The defense must,
therefore, begin well forward and proceed
aggressively from there to destroy enemy
assault echelons and at the same time to
slow, disrupt. break up, disperse or
destroy follow-on echelons in order to
quickly seize the initiative and go on the
offense.
The operative tactics by which US forces
seek to implement the operational con-
cept set forth above must provide for
qUick resolution of the battle. under cir-
cumstances that will allow political
authorities to negotiate with their ad-
versaries from a position of strength.
This is so because the enemy generally
enjoys a short-term advantage in ability
March
The
Second-Echelon
Threat
EXTENDING THE BATTLEFIELD
Figure 2
to mobilize addItional forces qUIckly.
Clearly, then, one purpose of the battle
concept must be to pre-empt the pos-
sibility of prolonged military operatIOns.
Further, these operatIve tactics should
seek simultaneously to:
Deny enemy access to the objectives
he seeks
Prevent enemy forces from loading
up the assault force fight with reinforc-
ing assault echelons and thus achIeving
by continuous combat what might be
denIed them by a stiff forward defense.
Find the opportunity to seize the
initiative-to attack to dostroy the
in.tegrity of the enemy operational
scneme, forcing him to break off the
attack or risk resounding defeat.
Because of the enemy's advantage in
numbers, attack of follow-on echelons
must always begin when those echelons
are relatively deep in enemy territory.
If an outnumbered defender waits until
1981
hIS numerIcally superior foe has pene-
trated the defender's territory to mount
a counterattack, it is always too late to
brIng effectIve forces and fires to bear
to defeat the incursion. This would espe-
cially be the case if theater nuclear
weapons are consIdered necessary to
defeat the penetration.
Therefore, on an integrated battle-
field, systems designed to defeat enemy
assault elements, to disrupt follow-on
forces and to seize the initiative by attack
must be able to deliver conventional
and/or nuclear fires throughout the spec-
trum of the battle-throughout the dopth
of the battlefield.
Key to a credible war-fighting capa-
bility on an integrated battlefield are:
Sensor/surveillance systems to pre-
vent surprise attack in peacetime and
provide necessary targeting/surveillance
information in wartime.
Delivery systems-dual capable,
35
MILITARY REVIEW
with suffIcient range, accuracy and
lethalIty to hoHenemy follow-on echelons
at risk in peacetime and to attack them
successfully in wartime.
Command control sufficient to mte-
grate all-source in near real
time in peacetime and in wartime and
to provide that intellIgence and target-
ing informatIOn to maneuver force em-
ployments in near real time as well.
The operative tactics which support
such an operational concept of an inte-
grated defense well forward are:
See deep and begin early to disrupt.
delay, destroy follow-on/reinforcmg
echelolls.
Move fast against the assault
echelons.
StrIke assault echelons quichly so
as to prevent them from achieving their
objectives.
Fmish the opening fight against
assault ana follow-on echelons rapidly
so as to go on the attack and finish the
battle against the assault armies before
follow-on armies can join the battle.
Areas of Interest and Influence
In the executiolO of such a set of opera-
tive tactics, there must be a division of
responsIbilities among commanders.
Just as the means with which com-
manders see and fight the battlefield
vary so should their primary areas of in-
terest vary.
As shown in Figure 3, each level of
command has a dual responsibihtv. Each
must attack one of the enemy's echelons
and must see, or determine the intentions'
of, a follow-on echelon Doctrinally, we
say that the enemy's first-echelon divi-
See and Attack in Depth
/ _____ 2d '''' ml"ll\ _?d __ }d ec'1elol"l
:0 -!'l t'lL''; ,0-48 'lou., 12
B'Eddt'
12
Figure 3
36 March
sions, the regiments in front of the assault
divisions, as well as the follow-on regi-
ments, are the responsibility of the
defending division.
In an attack, those same echelons would
also be the division commander's re-
sponsibilIty. The brigade commander
fights first-echelon assault regiments.
The .division commander fights the
first-echelon assault divisions. The
corps commander fights first-echelon
armies. It is the corps commander's reo
sponsibility to find and disrupt the ad-
vance of second-echelon divisIOns of
first-echelon armies before they be
come a part of the firstechelon problem.
At the same time, the corps commander
IS very Interested In whe:'e the second-
echelon army of the (ront IS deploYIng.
At corps level, he must tie mto natIOnal
target acquisition systems and other sur-
veillance means to get Information con-
cerning where that army IS and what It
is doing HIS primary responsibility In
battle fighting has to do with the follow-
on echelons.
Attacking the Follow-on Echelons
For such a division in areas of interest
and influence to be effective in war-
time, it must be frequently practiced duro
mg peacetime. It IS crItical for us to real
ize that, as the enemy achieves the
echelonment so necessary for his suc-
cess, he inherently creates vulnerabd
itlE:s-targets. These same vulnerabilItIes
provide us with the opportunity to put
threat second-echelon forces at great risk.
But only through repetitive exercise can
we capitalize on his vulnerabilities.
What we must do is practice acquiring
and targeting Warsaw Pact UnIts now-
during peacetime-so we will be pre-
1981
EXTENDING THE BATTLEFIELD
pared to attack them if need be. In ad-
dition, we can do careful intelligence
preparation of the battlefield and thus
be prepared to attack high-value targets.
Such targets incl ude fixed bridges and
mobIle sites that will cause threat foJlow-
on echelons to bunch up and present them-
selves as attractive targets. Additionally,
attacking other high-value targets such
as combat service support facilities,
which must exist to support r.olling
forces, or selected command posts, will
also generate delay Attacks directed m
this manner wIll provide friendly forces
time to finish the battle at the forward
lme of troops <FLaT)
Figure 4 shows the problem inherent in
fightmg against echelonment tactics.
If the battle IS fought With no directed
interdictIOn, enemy follow-on echelons
have a "free ride" until they enter the
closein battle. Figure 4 suggests what
happens when follow-on echelons are
Ignored and allowed to stack up behmd
assaultmg forces at the FLaT until a
breakthrough IS achieved. The enemy
retams flexlbihty, InItiative and mo-
mentum to apply hiS mass at a point and
time of his choice. As indicated by the
hachured lines, deep attacks seek to
depri ve him of thIS freedom There are
three primary tools for a deep attack:
Interdiction-air, artillery, special
operatIng forces.
OffenSive electronic warfare.
DeceptIOn.
In practical current terms, mterdic-
tion-prIncipally battlefIeld air mter-
dictIOn-IS the prImary tool of deep attack.
At present, the range of jammers pre-
cludes effective use against follow-on
echelons. However, jamming can be used
in the close-in battle as a nonlethal sub-
stitute for fires and battlefield air inter-
diction sorties which can then be freed for
deep attacks.
37
MILITARY REVIEW
The Problem
We would like deep attack to destroy
enemy forces before they enter the close-
in battle, but, in today's terms, and in all
probability tomorrow's as well, expense
and scarcity of assets will limit the prac-
tically achievable effects to delay and
disruption. Delay and disruption, how-
ever, must be aimed at more ambitious
goals than Just fractional attritIOn or
harassment.
The real goal of the deep attack is to
create opportunities for friendly action-
attack, counterattack or reconstitu-
tion of the defense-on favorable ground
well forward in the battle area, This can
be done 'by avoiding piecemeal employ-
ment of acquisition means and attack
resources. These resources must be con-
centrated on critical targets which have
the most payoff m upsetting enemy plans
and to create situations wherein the
friendly force can seize the initiative and
wm.
It IS important'to stress here that the
deep attack is not just a tool of the de-
fense. It is, if anything, even more critical
in the offense, It IS essential to winning
liecause it creates opportunities to seize
and retain the initiative. It is equally
38
important that corps and division com-
manders fight this deep battle at the same
time and in close coordination with the
close-in battles. It is true that these com-
manders already have their hands full
with the close-in battie, but the compel-
ling reason for active corps and division
commander involvement is because the
number of targets we would like to attack
and can acqUire far exceeds available
attack assets.
It is also essential, then, that attack
means not be apphed indiscriminately.
Limited strike and acquisition means
must be applied in a planned, well-
organized and conducted scheme to sup-
port the plan for winning. Piecemealing
long-range target acquisition and at-
tack resources is a luxury that cannot be
allowed.
The commander's choice of when to use
deep attack means must be taken in
such a way that It will create a wmdow
for offensive action some hours in the
future. That choice must be based on a
single unified scheme of maneuver and
a plim of fires for the whole of the ex-
tended battle. The expected window for
decisive action must be created in an area
March
where previous plans have assured the
availability of sufficient logistical sup-
port and fire support as well as maneu-
ver forces.
This demand for careful coordination
of present and future actIOn throughout
the depth of the battlefield dictates that
the plan stem from the concept of a single
commander. Separation ofthe close-In and
follow-on battles invites the fisk that
windows will not be generated or that,
if generated, units will be Ill-prepared
to identify and exploit them.
What from thIS requirement
for unity of command across the near
and far components of the fight is a view
of an extended battlefield, with well
defined depth and width in which the
commander is fightIng not several sep-
arate battles, but one well-integrated
battle with several parts highly Inter
related over tIme. The depth of thIS
battlefield beyond the FLOT IS really a
function of the commander's plannIng
EXTENDING THE BATILEFIELD
horizon expressed in hours.
The following scenario describes
an integrated battle situation in which
it would be greatly to the commander's
advantage to fight assault and follow-
on echelons simultaneously. From the
outset, it is acknowledged that, in this
scenario, it would be advantageous to use
tactical nuclear and chemical weapons
at an early stage and in enemy territory.
It is also fully realized, however, that
authorization to do this may not be
granted in timely fashion. And, that
being the case, the battle will have to be
fought With so-called conventional sys-
tems. Even though this somewhat reo
duces defensive combat power, the con-
cept described here maximizes the re-
maining conventIOnal power.
Figure 5 portrays the corps com-
mander's concerns in the deep battle-
those enemy forces that are within 72
hours of the close-in battle. The corps
commander needs to have a well-laid-out,
The I ntegrated Battle
The Deep Battle
1981
... Dela,!, destro\!
... Attacil command contrOl
senner support
sottertargets
... Air 'land battif'
39
MILITARY REVIEW
flexible plan and 72 hours into the future
in order to fight both close-in and ex-
tended battles, gain the initiative, win the
fight and do it quickly. What is the pur-
pose of looking out to 72 hours' depth?
There are many things a corps must do
in those hours. They should be used to
plan, order and execute those maneuver,
fire support and logistical preparations
necessary to seize on an opportunity for
offensi ve action.
The presence of any enemy formatIOn
m the corps commander's area ofmfluence
should trigger a re-evaluation of his
long-range plan and generate options for
defeating this force along with all others
in the area of influence. Several options
will probably be retamed at thIS pomt.
However, the range of options narrows as
the force approaches and closure time
decreases. Almost all optIOns will in-
clude attack of the force to inflict delay
and dIsruption. Although dIstances here
are great, the payoff can be considerable
since the critical targets include soft-
skmned and command control
elements value will be far less when
closer to the front-line battle.
As the force closes (Figure 6), its
impending Impact on the front-line battle
will become more apparent, and the
relative merits of the various attack op-
tIOns will begin to sharpen. Options at this
stage should include deep nuclear strikes
with LalIce or air-delivered weapons.
Targets at this stage 'are far more vul-
nerable to nuclear effects than 'it the
FLOT. They are still well beyond the
danger radius to friendly forces, and the
time until closure is realistic enough to
allow request release and execution to
occur.
Of course, the commander must have a
strong conventional optIOn in the event
nuclear release is not forthcoming, He
must identify the critical time at which
The Integrated Battle
The Corps Battle


.
.... Delay dIsrupt dE'')troy .
.,A,,'landbattie ;.' 'J"
" /
...... --< 4-+ 60 hours
/ ...... , +
:.t.f'. '- /
7'-tr.
Figure 6
40
March
EXTENDING THE BATILEFIELD
The I ntegrated Battle
.... DJsrupt delay
.... Real time target aCQUls1t1on
.... Attacking force has few
movement alternatives
.... Tactical nuclear weapons
now It they are
to be U'5ed
at all
.... Air/land
battle
Figure 7
he must finally commit himself to one
course of actIOn. In any event, he seeks
to hold the enemy formation out of the
diVision area of Influence long enough
for divIsion commanders to have suf
ficlent space and time to accomplish their
missions and prepare for the next echelon.
When the force enters thE' divIsIOn area
of influence (figure 7)-about 24 hours'
distance from the FLOT-the entire
process IS triggered agaIn on a lower
scale. Here, the importance of real-time
target acquIsitIOn dominates. Since,
at thiS point, the attacker IS committE!d
to specific attack avenues, he has few
movement alternatives left to him. The
defender can capitalize on that Again,
if tactical nuclear weapons are to be
used, they must be used now.
A review has been made of innumer-
able planning exercises In which as-
sumed enemy penetrations were drawn
with great care to reflect that pOint
"beyond which the integrity of the
1981
defense IS Jeopardized." It was found that,
If the penetratIOn was allowed to develop
as it was drawn in the defended territory,
It was "lways too late. If for no other
reason, therefore, it is of paramount im-
portance that the planmng process begm
whIle that follow-on echelon target is
still deep in enemy territory and that nu-
clear release be requested in sufficient
time to allow employment whIle the tar-
get IS still 24 to 60 hours from the FLOT.
As in the earlie, part of this battle, the
commander must integrate the full spec-
trum of air and land weapons systems. It
is, at this point, still an airiland battle,
perhaps more air than land, however.
By the time the following echelons
close to withm about 12 hours of the FLOT
(FIgure 8), they become the concern of the
brigade commander. At the 12-hour line,
actions must be taken that not only delay
and disrupt the following echelons, but
also help to defeat those in contact
at the FLOT. Given the right target, and
41
MILITARY REVIEW
The I"tegrated Battle
Destroy. dISrupt
.. Defeat echelon In contact
Figure 8
that the enemy has already used chemical
weapons, it is here that our use of them
can be integrated. They should be used to
isolate one part of the battlefield while an
attack is launched against another part of
the follow-on forces. It is here that the
land aspects of the battle predominate-
that IS, the battle is more land than air.
With a little luck, the outcome (FIgure
9) will find enemy assault forces de-
stroyed, freedom to maneuver rest'oreq
and the imtiative captured from the
enemy. In the end, this simultaneous at-
tacking of echelons becomes key to the
primary objective of the extended battle-
field-to win, not just to avert defeat.
Studies show c,learly that successful
interdiction does result in a degradation
of the enemy's massive firepower. It is
also clear that successful interdiction
results in a reduction of enemy momen-
tum brought on through loss of support
and that it provides the defender time to
42
secure nuclear release if required. Finally,
interdiction reduces the attacker's al-
ternatives by disrupting his ability to
execute his intended plan.
The conviction that well-planned
. Interdiction can provide these results is
based in part on the target value analysis
phase of a fire support mission area
analysis completed by the US Army Field
Artillery School. Part or'that analysis
was a simulation comparison of 1980
European corps battles, first without
interdiction and then with interdiction.
While the predicted availability of
lllterdlction means may have been
sanguine, some significant trends were,
nonetheless, observed.
Each of the interdiction effects in
Figure 10 is hIghly desirable. But their
exact significance is more apparent con-
sidering the simulation output over
time. Specifically, a look at the effect of
interdiction on enemy strength at the
March
1981
EXTENDING THE BATTLEFIELD
The I ntegrated Battle
THE OUTCOME
. ,,,.,".,",.,"" ... .,
Re,lored Ireedom 10 maneuver L-;
A
,
"', +-r

FIgure 9
Effect of Interdiction
Enemy is able to mount fewer regimental attacks
Enemy first echelons defeated earlier
Friendly reserves not needed so early
Enemy penetrations far less extensive
Figure 10
43
MILITARY REVIEW
Why Deep Attack?
Enemy
frontllne
strength
close-in battle shows the real value of
deep attack.
The top curve in Figure 11 shows that,
without interdiction, the enemy IS able
to maintam consistent supenonty at the
FLOT over time. During this period, the
Without
interdiction
With
interdictIOn
defender's strength dwindles, freedom
of actIOn detenorates and the enemy's
grip on the initiative decisively tightens.
What properly employed interdiction
can provide is shown in the lower curve in
Figure 12. Here, enemy follow-on echelons
Why Deep Attack?
44
Enemy
frontlme
strength
'Windows for action
Figure 12
Without
interdiction
March
\
are held out long enough to create periods
offnendly superiority in which the mitla-
tive can be seized with enough time to
act. The longer and more frequent these
windows can be made, the greater the
chance of winning, provldmg we are pre-
pared to identify them and act at the time
and in the place where they dpvelop.
We may not be capable of creating
wmdows of such frequency and duratIOn
across the entire corps front. However,
it is now possIble to create such oppor-
tunities, and, if aggressively exploIted,
they could lead to the generation of
longer, more extensIve opportunIties for
higher level decisIve action building
toward'a major offensive (Figure 13).
Interdiction Planning
Summarizing, it can be seen that inter-
dIction is key to battlefield success.
The enemy's momentum can be altered by
EXTENDING THE BAITLEFIELD
attacking highvalue, second-echelon
targets, reducing his ability to mass and
bUIld up momentum. Interdiction is the
method whereby we achIeve the leverage
necessary to slow hIm down and ul-
timately stop him from achieving his
objectives.
It is mterdlction that allows us to focus
our attacks on those enemy targets whose
damage, destructIOn or dIsruption would
help us fight the battle to our advantage.
InterdIctIOn has as its main objective
that portion of the enemy's force which
IS movmg toward the FLOT or is in staging
areas preparing to join that fight.
This mterdlction concept does, how-
ever, Imply some changes in current ways
of thinking, especially in command con-
trol. In order to execute the concept, we
must recognIze the need to learn how
to skillfully use resources far beyond those
organic to corps and division and to plan
theIr applIcation over a greatly expanded
battlefield. Of significance here is the
establIshment of timely and responsive
Why Deep Attack?
1981
Enemy
frontllne
strength
Figure 13
Without
interdiction
With
Interdiction
and attack
45
MILITARY REVIEW
working relationships with air forces
for both target acquisition and attack.
The interdiction battle will be fought
at the corps and division level. To do this
well, it must be practiced routinely. Inter-
dictIOn targets at division level are
directly linked to tactical objectives. At
corps, however, interdictIOn is a funotion
of controlling target presentation rates
and densities. As the enemy's second
echelon moves closer to the FLOT,
interdiction becomes more closely related
to the defenSIve scheme of maneuver.
Advanced planning is absolutely crit-
ical to a successful InterdictIon battle.
It is imperative that such planning be
conducted contInuously. This will en
sure that commanders are aware of
courses of action open to the enemy, and
the vulnerabilities of each, thus enabling
them to attack targets whIch present
the highest payoff at a particular time.
Prior to and during initial stages of the
battle, the diVISIOn Intelligence officer,
applying intelligence preparation of the
battlefield techniques, must forecast
enemy strength, progress and dISposItIOns
at selected tImes. By assessing these
developIng vulnerabilities, he can recom-
mend courses of action for interdiction
attacks. When blended with the scheme of
maneuver, t h ~ enemy vulnerabilities
can then be exploited.
FollOWIng such an interdIctIOn plannIng
process, the intelligence officer can de-
velop an enemy probable event sequence
which can be used to predict with some
high degree of accuracy which courses
of action the enemy is likely to follow.
That is, the intelIJgence officer should
be able to forecast what events must oc-
cur and in what order to produce the
desired disposition of enemy forces at any
critical moment. This probable event
sequence is simply a template against
which to assess the progress of events.
46
It identifies interdiction requirements
which will have to be met if friendly com-
manders are to influence the battle in a
desired direction.
Interdiction targeting can be a complex
and demanding staff process, particu-
larly at division level. Its effect is to create
time and space gaps, not to relieve
maneuver forces of having to face second
echelon elements. It is most effective when
it IS an integrated effort, one which ef-
fectively integrates fire support, elec-
trOniC warfare, deception and intelli-
gence with maneuver.
Current and Future Capabilities
Having made a case for effective, con-
tinuous interdiction, what is the Army
doing to achieve such a capability? Con-
sidering the weapons, sensors and auto-
mation capabilities which will be avail-
able through Army 86 efforts, we will
be able to do these things quickly and ef-
fiCIently on the battlefield of the mid-to-
late 1980s.
But what about now? The answer is
that there is, today, conSiderable poten-
tial to do Just what has thus far been
described. Since the penalty in terms of
battle outcome is too severe to wait to
adopt the extended battlefield concept
untIl 1986, our Army must set about see-
ing how we might get the most from cur-
rent capabilities.
Even using conservative planning fac-
tors, interdiction of critical enemy second-
echelon elements is possible within exist-
ing means. But, to make that a reality,
we must begin transitioning to those
concepts now and practice them daily. If
we begin that transition with the re-
sources at hand, we will thus be better
prepared to fight and win while simul-
March
taneously maturing the conceptual
notions in the day-to-day work of opera-
tional units. Such an approach will also
ensure that we have the right capabilities
included in the Army 86 force designs.
And, so, as in all aspects of our profes-
sion, we must practice now what we
intend to do in war. We must traIn as we
will fight. Management of sensor assets
in peacetime by those who will be expected
to usc them in war is the only prudent
approach.
The same applies to the correlatIOn of
data in determInIng hIgh-value targets.
We must get the data into the hands of
those who will be expected to use it in
the future. We must establish
targeting cells in all fire support elements
now. It is important that thIS capabilIty
be developed at corps and divisIons for
nuclear as well as ror conventional
and chemical targeting. It is Important
that it be done in all US Army UnIts
worldwide.
For the present. many of the acquiSItIOn
means and most of the attackIng means
will come from air forces This IS par-
ticularly true for corps interdIction re-
qUIrements. Regardless of who owns
them. these are the meanS we need to
gaIn the best battlefield return. Apply
Ing them accordIng to the conceptual no
tlOns described above IS the way to realIze
theIr greatest potentIal
Recent exercises have demonstrated
that the t.ype of targeting InformatIOn
deSCrIbed earlier IS avaIlable now-with
current means What next needs to be
done IS to design exercIses for corps and
diVISIons whIch will focus that Informa
tion at their level. To make the interdic-
tion battle occur properly, and In a tImely
manner. corps and dIVIsions must also
be able to manage the current famIly of
sensors.
We know the tendencIes and patterns
1981
EXTENDING THE BATILEFIELD
of threat units when they are deployed
as they would be in a second-echelon
formatIOn. The task IS to make this infor-
matIOn available to corps and division
commanders for their use in interdic-
tion targeting.
For tImely acquisition, we need to
ensure that corps have control of sensor
systems such as the OVID SIde-looking
aIrborne radar, Guardrall, QUlcklook
and the Integrated Test/EvaluatIOn Pro-
gram. Of equal importance is that there
be a dIrect down-lInk of this information
to dl VIsions. Data from a number of other
supportIng means must also be made
available. This category includes the
RF4C and other national and theater
systems. Among the most cha:llenging
problems IS to create the down-links
necessary to pass what is already avail-
able to corps and dIviSIOns In a timely
manner.
The Need for Training Target Cells
To begin an adequate effort at fusing
this data and developing InterdIctIOn
targetIng. cells must be establIshed In
all fire support elpments at levels from
brIgade through echelons above corps.
These cells must learn to exploit enemy
vulnerabIlitIes by hlending the informa-
tion and expertise available from all-
source intelligence centers and elec
tronic warfare support elements. HIS-
torically, we have focused all our training
efforts on WInnIng the fight in the main
battle area. However, we are now enter-
ing a new dimenSIOn of battle which per-
mits the SImultaneous engagement of
enemy forces throughout the corps and
dIviSIOn area of Influence. To accomplish
this, we must emphasize' training in four
baSIC areas:
47
MILITARY REVIEW
Friendly acquisition capabilities.
Threat tactical norms.
Friendly attack systems.
Specific techniques such as target
value analysis and intelligence prepara-
tion of the battlefield.
For this to be totally successful, both
Army and Air Force targeteers must be
trained to work together in these func-
tions. Microcomputers, which are cur-
rently avaIlable In an off-the-shelf
configuratIOn, can provide excellent as-
sistance. to this training effort. They can
store a multitude of data from terrain
features to fire plans, from friendly
weapons systems to likely threat courses
of actIOns. They can perform target
analyses and display them in alpha-
numerics and graphics. If such systems
were available in diVISIOn targeting cells
now, and we created the necessary down-
links for passing acqUIsItion data, tar-
geteers could train now at their wartime
tasks In a realistic manner.
Figure 14 shows a notional dIvision
fire support element. The operations
cell includes the target analysts. What
needs to be done, and we have embarked
on this course, is to estabhsh the targeting
cell and staff it with people who are cur-
rently performing SImIlar tasks else-
where. We must bring the operatIOns
types and the targeting types together.
For such a fire support element be
effectIve, its personnel must train to-
gether daily, as a team, using real-time
or near-real-time data supplied by an
Integrated sensor network such as that
described earlier. If actual real-tIme
data is not then simulated
acquisition informatIOn could be used,
so long as the data base was developed
from previously collected actual infor-
miltion.
Through continuous intelligence
preparation of the battlefield, a clearer
48
analysis of the area of operations can be ...
developed, one which will facilitate up-
dating interdiction plans and thereby
better support operations plans. Such a
training activity would contribute greatly
to developing confidence and proficiency.
By exchanging views and working to-
gether, Army and Air Force target cell
personnel could establish a credible
capability now to deal with any future
second-echelon threat.
Remaining Challenges
LIke most things of great worth, this
capab!lity w!ll not be easily gained.
There are many challenges, but, in the
end, it will be worth all the effort neces-
sary to make it happen. Foremost among
the challenges are those which inhibit
our abilIty to blend current operational
requIrements of sensor means with the
need to conduct real-time training at
divisions and corps. It will also be diffi-
cult, though essential, that appropriate
security clearances be acquired for all
personnel working in the target cells.
This is especially i)nportant, for they
must have access in peacetime to the
data they wIll be expected to process in
war.
Recognizing it is beyond our capability
to conduct actual exercises which simulate
threat second-echelon patterns so target
cells will have something to train against.
it is within the state of the art for com-
puter simulations to postulate and
portray scenarios which the enemy tradi-
tionally follows because they are based
on his known tendencies. This would
be a useful substitute for targeteers to
practice such analytical tasks as event
sequencing. Lastly, we must coutinue to
upgrade ouI' communication capability
March
EXTENDING THE BATTLEFIELD
Notional Fire Support Element
Target Cell
Assistant F Ire Support
Coordinator
- Jtra,M
-ArrniarCAnfc(p
PlanOlng ExecutIOn
fIgure 14
and take advantage of com-
mercial facilItIes. If we do all this, the
payoff will be more than worth the Invest
ment.
Summary
The challenges notwIthstandIng, the
message of all this is quite clear:
Attacking deep is essential to
winnIng.
AttackIng deep and the close-In
fight are Inseparable.
The extended battlefield concept
is the keystone of force modernIzatIOn.
We can begIn today to practIce, learn
and refine the extended battlefield con-
cept.
The Ideas of the extended battlefield
concept are. in fact, the very same Ideas
upon whIch the Army 86 concepts are
based-see and attack deep. And, as mIght
be expected, therefore, organIzations of
DiviSIon and Corps 86 correspond In
makeup and function to elements of the
extended battlefield team.
The question before the Army nOw IS
how to Implement the concept quickly.
1981
WhIle there are yet some questions, It
is not lIkely that man-years of study will
clear them up to the satisfaction of all
concerned. It IS, therefore, time to field
and learn to use the concept on the ground
with real troops, real equipment and the
real-world problems of field commanders.
The tIme for implementatIOn is now.
This is so because there is, first of all,
promise of a major Increase in combat ef-
fectiveness with current means. There
also exists an enhanced capabIlIty to ex-
plOIt new sensors, weapons and command
control systems as they are fielded. ThIs
enhanced capability IS even more eVIdent
In the field of mIcroprocessors and com-
puters. As a natIOn, we have a con-
siderable advantage over our potentIal
adversaries in thIs technological field.
If we stn ve to put that advantage to work
for us, it could become a signIficant
combat multiplier. And, finally, of
equal importance, there is an opportumty
to cause the enemy to wrestle rIght now
WIth a problem he has traditionally as-
sumed does not exist.
Army leadership is so convinced that a
real pOLential exists now, if current
assets are organized correctly, that a
four-phase program. has been developed.
49
MILITARY REVIEW
Phase one, already begun, includes con-
ferences at each major command designed
to lay down the basic ideas. This article
is part of that phase. In phase two, the US
Army Training and Doctrine Command
and the major Army 'commands will
jointly refine implementation proposals
to fit specific priorities and assets.
provided to corps and divisions in the field.
In phase four, Army service schools and
centers will conduct training in the con-
cept and implementing procedures to
ensure that officers and noncommis-
sioned officers leaving the training base
are ready for their respective roles on the
extended battlefield.
50
In phase three, the jomt product will be
General Donn A Starn IS commander of
the US Army Trammg and"Doctrrne Command,
Fort MOlin)'. VlrgwlO He recewed a B S {mm
the USJfA. all M S {YOom GeoY'ge Washlllg-
ton Unlterstly and IS a graduate of the
USACGSC. the Armed Forces Staff Collelie
and the Arm\! War College Asslgnments In
clude sen'l1ig as tommandl1lg oftker of the 11 th
Armored lat'alrv Reglment durzng one of
three tours ll1 Vletnam and as commander of
V Corp", US Army. EUY'ope lils aracle "Dedl-
catron of Abrams' Loop at the US Armv Com-
mand and General Staff College" appeared m
the September 1979 MIlitary Rpvlew
'"i..
r'!i'
-}.J> -
Jj
Logistics in a Changing World. The 1981 International Logistics
Congress, "Logistics in a Changing World," will be the third biennial
international gathering of logisticians, the first to be held in the United
States. The previous congresses were held in Japan and Germany. It
is expected to attract 600 to 800 individuals from industry, commerce,
academic institutions and government.
To be held 12 through 15 April 1981, the congress will feature tech-
nical papers on a wide variety of managerial and technical subjects in
the broad field of logistics. Panel discussions will bring tdgether rec-
ognized authorities from several countries to discuss problems of
international interest. Areas of interest to be covered at the
congress include: Logistics Systems, Physical Distribution Man-
agement, Transportation, Material Handling and Facilities
Operations.
The Society of Logistics Engineers (SOLEj'and the National Coun-
cil of Physical Distribution Management are co-sponsors of this con-
gress, The San Francisco Bay Area Chapter of SOLE Is host-
ing the event.
The congress fee is (US) $400. All correspondence should be ad-
dressed to: J. J. Addison, General Chairman, 1981 International Logis-
tics Congress, c/o Society of Logistics Engineers San Francisco Bay
Area Chapter, P.O. Box 61353, Sunnyvale, CA 94088.
March
Soviet Attack Helicopters:
Rethinking the Threat
1981
Captain Steven A. Frith, US Army
The Soviet Union's integration of attack helicopters into
its offensive doctrine has advanced to the point where the
West must give serious consideration to ways of countering
this new threat. The author examines capabilities of the
different attack helicopters now in the Soviet inveptory.
51
MILITARY REVIEW
F
OR every action, there must be an
equal and opposite reaction, and our
adoption of the active defense has sparked
a growing interest in the multiple axis
attack as a potentially devastating
countermeasure. To succeed, the active
defense demands that we identify the crit
ical breakthrough sector quickly and then
concentrate our power boldly at the deci
sive point.! If there is no single decisive
point, then the concentration of power, no
matter how boldly it is done, will leave the
defending forces vulnerable to envelop-
ment.
The doctrine of the multiple penetration
with its object of slashing through the
forward defenses on multiple axes and
linking up in the enemy's rear was honed
to a brilliant edge during the Red army's
drive to the Elbe. Recalling the Red army's
World War II experience, Colonel A. A.
Sidorenko noted that when a multiple
penetration attack was employed:
The attainment of surpnse was faclII'
tated, the enemy forces were tIed down on
a broad front, It was difficult for hIm to
determIne the main strzke, he was deprived
offreedom of maneuver, and he was forced
to scatter his reserves and use them In
detail.
Colonel Sidorenko goes on to observe
that attacks "on two or several directIOns,
achieved quick results and often created
the preconditions for 'the encirclement
of enemy forces.'''2
The employment of multiple axis
attacks rather than the massive single
axis breakthrough that Field Manual
(FM) 100-5, Operations, seems to envision
reduces the attacking forces' vulner-
ability to nuclear and conventional inter-
diction.' Even more importantly, it allows
the Soviet commander to reinforce success
by concentrating forces along the axis of
least enemy resistance. Highly responsive
artillery and close air support can be
.52
employed in the multiaxis attack as
combat power multipliers to compensate
for the relati ve reduction in mass over that
of the single axis breakthrough. Colonel
M. Belov, a Soviet military theoretician,
stated that the success of the offensive
would be doubtful unless massive use is
made of helicopters.'
Soviet doctrine has long emphasized the
importance of close coordination between
air and ground forces during the conduct
of the attack. Unfortunately, those good
intentions for responsive close air support
often fell victim to overcontrol of assets
by frontal aviation and an excessive de-
pendence on preplan ned strike- mis-
siems.' The Soviets are improving the
timeliness and effectiveness of their close
air support by assigning aviation repre-
sentatives to every echelon down to
division.
6
The aviation representatives at
division level are equipped with armored
vehicles and special communications
equipment that allows them to direct air
strikes from the first echelon of the
attacking forces.
7
A more responsive and flexible employ-
ment doctrine for attack helicopters has
evolved out of the Soviets' recognition of
the unique relationship shared by heli-
copters and ground forces. M. P. Odinstov,
a Soviet air force general, has observed
that the task of helicopters and artillery is
to strike on the forward edge of the battle
area (FEBA), thus releasing high-perform-
ance aircraft for deep interdiction.
s
There is growing evidence to suggest
that the control of attack helicopter
regiments would be decentralized to such
an extent that, during the attack, they
would be operating in direct support. Also,
in fluid situations such as a multi axis
attack, they could even be employed under
the operational control of the combined
arms command.
9
The last decade has witnessed a near
March
Soviet HlntfD attack helicopters and crews during a break in maneuvers
revolutIOn III SovIet attack helIcopter
doctrine and technology. The Soviets first
began to arm helicopters for active support
of gl'Ound forces m the mld1960s. These
first attack or combat helicopters were
provisionally armed transports such as
the MI6 Hook and the flJl8 Hlp.1O The
fIJI 24 Hind was the first Soviet helicopter
designed specifically for attack mIssions.
It has come to be known in Afghamstan as
the "flying tank" because of its combat"
effectIveness and heavy armor." There
are now five versIOns of the /lznd, with
the A, D and E being the progressIvely
more advanced operational versions
The Hznd is one of the most technically
advanced helicopters in the world and has
the ability to not only fight, but to survive
forward of the FEBA. It is heavily armored
with bulletproof windshields and exten
sive structural hardening. The Hznd's
armament package gives the crew con-
siderable flexibility in missiontailoring
weapon loads. Wing armament can in-
clude up to four 57mm rocket pods (a total
of 128 freefllght rockets) and four anti-
tank guided missiles. In addition, tlie crew
has the option of substituting general
and multipurpose bombs for the rocket
pods.
12
The most advanced version of the
1981
Hznd, the E model, is equipped wIth A T6
SpIral antitank guided mIssiles and is
currently bemg fielded in the Group of
Soviet Forces in Germany.13 In addition to
the wlllg armament, the HInd also mounts
a fnurbarrel 12.7mm Gatling gun in the
nose turret.
A technologically advanced all-weather
and low.light fire control system has been
integrated into the Hind-E's armament
system. The crew can identIfy and engage
targets through the use of electro-optical
sensors and a probable laser range finder
coupled to forward-looking infrared and!
or low-light-level television sensors posi-
tioned m the Hind's chin turret.
14
WIth
this advanced fire control system, the
HInd can continue to support the attack
durmg day, night or even in fog, a vital
capability for operations in Central
Europe.
AIr Force Magazine has stated that the
Soviets are now fielding new high-
performance helicopter designs that have
the capability to "fire launch and leave
weapons from standoffpositions."15 If the
Hind indeed has such a capability, it
would greatly enhance its survivability
during the vulnerable weapons launch
and guidance p h a s ~
53
MILITARY REVIEW
In addition to the Hind's attack and
close air support capabilities, it can also
perform in a utility role through the
transport of troops and supplies. While
supporting airmobile operations, the Hind
can transport eight armed troops with a
minimal degradation of its combat
capabilities.
The Mi-8 Hip E and F (the export ver-
sion) pose what could be an even more
serious threat than the H tnd because of
the tendency to laugh them off the stage
as blundering transports. Although the
Hip was designed as a transport or utility
aircraft, the Hip E and F have the dubious
distinction of being among the world's
heaviest armed helicopters.
The combat versions of the Hip cannot
only transport 24 armed troops, but can
also provide immediate close air support
for those troops. The HIp is equipped with
a 12.7mm flex-mounted machinegUil in
the nose and outboard weapons racks that
can mount up to six 57mm rocket pods (a
total of 192 rockets) and four antitank
guided missiles. The crew also has the
option of substituting general-purpose
bombs for the rocket pods. Although the
HIp's fire control system is not as sophis-
ticated as that of the Hind, it can still
provide effective close air and antltank
support to the ground forces.
16
The Soviets believe that attack heli-
copters can be used effect i ve ly in the
offense by operating under the covering
fire of artillery and ground troops. In
addition to the standard Western heli-
copter missions that call for attack heli-
copters to secure flanks, provide close air
support and act. as a mobile antitank
reserve, we can also 'expect to see Soviet
attack helicopters operating well forward
of the FEB A on hunting or search-and-
destroy missions.
17
Effective flank security is essential
for a successful attack, and
l
providing
54
it is a major mission of the attack heli-
copter regiments. The mobility of the
Hind and Hip and their ability to engage
armored targets at extended ranges
make them a highly effective and econom-
ical means for the Soviet commander to
screen his flanks. The attack helicopters
could be expected to employ either aggres-
sive strikes or, if time and the situation
permit, "wait and see" ambush tactics
against counterattacking armored forces.
Employing an active defense, the attack
helicopters would approach under cover
of terrain and then "pop up," engage their
target while running toward the enemy,
and then break away sharply either to the
left or right.
ls
At first glance, this maneu ver may seem
suicidal to those familiar with our own
nap-of-the-earth flying techniques. How-
ever, the Red Flag exercises of 1977
revealed that helicopters using the "pop-
up" attack were spotted only 39.5 percent
of the time.
19
The "pop-up" technique is
not only a highly effective but is also a
highly survivable means of delivering
ordnance. Another tactic that the Soviets
would likely employ against enemy
armored forces is the use of hide positions
with predesignated kill zones. Once the
target enters the kill zone, the attack heli-
copter unmasks, identifies and then en-
gages the target from a hover. The heli-
copter then moves on to another hide
position under cover of terrain.
20
Maintaining the momentum of the
attack by neutralizing strongpoints is
another crucial mission for the attack
helicopter. The attack helicopter's ability
to loiter in the vicinity of the hattIe area
greatly increases the responsiveness of its
close air support. Both the Htnd and the
HIp have an effective area saturation
capability through the employment of
57mm rockets and general and multipur-
pose bombs. In addition, the Hind is
March
equipped four-barrel 12.7mm
Gatlzng gun, d the Hip has a flex-
mounted 12.7 machinegun.
The emplo ment of attack helicopters
well forwar of the FEBA offers a poten-
tially large payoff if the helicopters
can reach our relatively vulnerable rear
area. The Soviets would probably employ
either two or four aircraft flights of Hznds
for these hunting missions?1 Hinds would
be released for hunting missions during
periods of limited visibility or during
extremely fluid operations when our
short-range air defense systems would be
least effective. These hunting missions
would be targeted agamst our nuclear
delivery systems and storage sites;
command, control and communications
facilities; armor and troop concentra-
tions; key bridges; and other potential
bottlenecks.
To win the first battle, we must confront
the threat squarely no matter how
SOVIET ATTACK HELICOPTERS
unpalatable it is. The last decade has
witnessed a revolution in Soviet attack
helicopter doctrine and technology that
has not yet been fully worked into our
concept of the threat opposing us in Cen-
tral Europe. The Defense Intelligence
Agency has stated that approximately
200 to 300 attack helicopters are deployed
in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany
alone.
22
The Soviets are well aware of their
past problems with overcentralized con-
trol of close air support and its lack of
responsiveness to on-call missions. They
have aggressively confronted these
problems by assigning aviation represen-
tatives down to division level and by
developmg a more flexible control doctrine
for their helicopter regiments. The con-
tinuously improving combat effectiveness
of the Soviet attack helicopter forces make
it a threat for which we must prepare now
rather than after the first battle.
NOTES
1 Major Donald K Gn!fl'l II I"'e Don t Mas!> MoMar}
Review, Febrl.lar.; 1979 pp 3 13 -
2 Ibid P 11
3 Manual on Soviet Army Ooeratlons US Army l'1le:,'98I1C8 dl"1d
Threat AnalYSIS Center Aep"rt N ... mber lAG 13 U 78 Department 01\111"
Army Washington DC Apnl1918 p 3 64
4 Capta'" A<cl1ard F RIC.cardell! and Captain Gar.; L Jackson SOviet
Close Air Support An Comrade In CO'11blned Arms Opera
lions, Millta", Review May 1979 p 14
5 SOVIet A!! Support to Ground TrOO(JS Defense Intelligence Agency
Report Number 008-1300 14779 Departme'" 01 Oe'en58 WaSr'19
Ion 0 C June 1979 p 14
6 Ibid P 16
7 Manual on SOVIet Army Operations, op Cit pp 5 33
8 SOlliet Aif Support to Ground Troops op Cit p 19
9 Ibid P 15
10 Soviet Transport Helicopters fnfernatlona/ Defense Review
VOlume 12 Number 8 1979 pI 313
I' AlgtlamSlan Brave Struggll" lor Survival Time 14 April 1980
p56
12 Captain Carl Daschke The Threat The HIND Myths and Facts
AViatIOn Digest December 1979 pp 424,)
13 Lieutenant General Har/)' Kinnard Airmotllllly RevISited Pari
Two AViation Olge<;t July 19BO P 1 I
14 ReVlel\' of Soviet Ground Forces. Oelense Intelligence Agency
Report NI.I'11ber RSGF 380 Department or Oelense WaSl1ng
'
on. DC
May 19BO p 2
15 Kinnard op Cit P 11
16 Captain Carl Daschl<.e Threal the HIP Bus Gunship or Bolh7
AViatIOn Digest July 1980 pp 4244
17 Soviet A,r SuPPOrT to Ground Troops op Cit p 20
18 Rlccardell! and Jackson op Cit p 15
19 Ibid
20 SOVIet Air Support to Ground Troops op Cit p 20
21 Ibid
22 Review of the SOVIet Ground Forces, op Cit p 21
Captam Steven A Frlth lb commander, Specral
Securllv Detachment, US Army AVlatwn Center
and Sc/wol, Fort Rucker, Alabama He recewed a
B A from the Unwerslfy of Colorado arzd IS
currently workwg toward an M.S from the Unl-
verslly of Southern Cahfornw Other assrgnments
mclude serUlce til Germany wlth the 1 sf Armored
DWlslOn and the 2d Armored DWlslOll Forward
1981
55
56
The name Clausewitz is familiar to most of us and belongs to
a man whose influence on military thought has been pro-
found. This article examines the relevance of his ideas in
light of today's world.
L
AST year marked the 200th anni-
versary of the birth of a man whose
work, like hardly any other, has occupIed
many a great mind and whose name IS
known today throughout the world: Karl
von Clausewitz,
istrative director of the General War Col
lege in Berlin, After serving in this posi-
tion for 12 years, he was appointed chief of
staff of the Prussian Observation Army in
Posen. Soon thereafter, in 1831, he died of
cholera.
Wit ...
Colonel Walter von Hobe, Federal Republic of Germany Army
Here IS '1 brief sketch of i ~ life and hIS
historical positIOn: ClausewItz, born In
1780, the son of a Prussian civil servant,
Joined the army at the age of 12 and first
encountered war as a 1.1-year-old dunng
the Rhine Campaign of the Prussian wars
As a staff captain, he witnessed the crush-
ing defeat of the Prussian army at Auer-
stedt. At the age of 30, he became an in-
structor at the General War College in
Berlin.
After the Franco-Prussian mIlItary al-
liance, he resIgned hIS commission and
fought in the Russian army against Napo-
leon, In 1815, he gained readmission to
the Prussian military service. Three years
later, at the age of 38, holding the rank of
major general, he was appointed admin-
1981
Clausewitz, a contemporary of other
well-known persons lIke Hegel, Marx and
Engels, lived In a perIod of revolutionary
changes, and his personal fate IS a small
reflection of the acting forces of hIS era.
During his early years, Frederick the
Great and Maria Theresa, the Austrian
queen, were stIll VIvidly present. Kant,
the famous philosopher. had published his
three "Critiques." There were also im-
pending changes in the field of technology;
the steam engine had already been in-
vented; and, still during hIS lifetime. the
first railway line was opened.
His span oflife comprises concepts such
as linear tactics and national uprising, ca-
tegorical imperative and social economics.
manual labor and mechanical work. In
57
MILITARY REVIEW
this era into which he was born, Clause-
witz felt destined for greater tasks than
those assigned to him.
This brief sketch is meant to bring home
to the readers the fact that Clausewitz-
just as we are today-was placed in the
middle of a rapidly changing environment
realizing that current problems cannot be
solved with the Instruments of an earlier
time. I would, therefore, like to attempt to
answer three questions:
Is knowing Clausewitz, his life and
hiS teachings still worthwhile today. and
can he still mean something to us?
Is his statement concerning the inter-
relation of politics and war still valid to-
day?
Is the science that the "defenslve IS a
stronger form of war than the offensive"
still true?1
During combat operations. Clausewitz
gained impressions and reflected by study-
ing more than 120 conflicts on subjects such
as "the effects of the moral factors" on the
conduct of war, on "man in war" and also on
the "integration and coalition With allied
troops."
With hiS literary lifework. he left to
posterity a military theory of war, the es
sential parts of which are combined in his
book. On War. Its teachings have become
common knowledge of all who seriously
study the phenomenon of war. The best
known topical statements are the
follOWing,
The science of organic connection be-
tween war and politics, culminating in the
often quoted sentence: "War is a mere con-
tinuation of policy by other means."2
The introduction of moral factors Into
the science of war.
The sc(lmce of the defense as "the
stronger p ~ t o n with the negative pur-
pose."
In particular, it is the first sentence
which has lately made Clausewitz and his
58
work the subject 'Of historical, political and
military publications and discussions. Any-
one leaving behind such a wide. diverse-
ly written heritage with such a wealth of
ideas is always prone to the danger that in-
dividual quotations will be used to prove
whatever is required without considering
the overall context of his train of thought.
Many hold that the thesis above is ob-
solete. They feel that it is incongruous with
today's Western strategy of preservation of
peace and the polIcy of containment of con-
flicts. Ina nuclear age, the tendency toward
the last resort. which according to Clause-
witz is inherent in war, is said to be incon-
sistent with any sensible political
objective.
Certainly. the Clausewitzian thesis de-
veloped from the realm of thought and the
political and technological situation of his
period. In view of the state of weapon tech-
nology of our age and the political and
moral conceptIOns ofihe Free World. it re-
quires a more differentiated and accurate
study.
It is true that we, today, can no longer
regard war as arbitrarily available to po-
litical calculus and thus a programmable
means of political intention. But that
does not abolish war which is proved
by the more than 120 armed conflicts which
have occurred on our planet since the end of
World War II.
In view of the geographical and political
situations in Western Europe. one cannot
rule out the possibility ofa war being forced
upon a nation, even with the nuclear
powers joining in. And it is at this very
point that the Clausewitzian thesis has
continued relevance-namely, that .war
must not be more than an instrument of
policymaking. Politics, however, not only
decides on the start and the purpose of a
war, but also on the type of means to be
used, in fact, in all its phases.
It is, therefore, governments and parlia-
March
ments which, by way of their policy, have
to decide on the preservation of peace, on
the individual steps of escalation in
times of tension and, finally, on the
necessity of defense through war. In this
process, the armed forces are no more than
one of the manifold instruments.
It is certainly beyond all doubt that
the moral factors which Clausewitz lists
as pertaining to war-namely, all
psychic forces such as courage, audac
ity, perseverance and strength of charac-
ter-are of decisive importance in all
wartime activIties. The same factors are
also pertinent in peacetime and, in addi-
tion to formation of character, educa-
tion, tolerance and nghteous thinking,
form part of the principles governing
leadership.
ClausewItz could not and would not
offer pat solutions for every conceivable
case. Therefore, many a conflictmg and
apparently contradictory idea is bound
to come up in the diversity of his thoughts.
One should not forget that his book was
written more than 150 years ago. And,
consequently, we did foresee the develop'
ment from wars waged by authoritarian
governments in the 17th and 18th cen-
tunes to the great wars of the times that
came after him. Even the principles of the
war of national liberation by partisans
and subversive elements taught and
encouraged today by the Soviets and
especially by Mao Zedong have already
been written down by Clausewitz.
3
In the light of this, it is of no importance
whatsoever that Clausewitz only knew
lan.d warfare and only distinguished be-
tween three arms. Broadly speaking,
all branches of service and types of
weapons are in the last resort in support
of the soldier at the front without whom
final decisions are inconceivable even in
an age of rockets and missiles.
In the sixth book of his main work,
1981
CLAUSEWITZ
Clausewitz deals with defense and evolved
the t h e s i ~ "Defense is the stronger form
of making war.'" It is quite worthwhile
studying the book on defense. Naturally,
defense is not automatically the strongest
type of combat, and this statement is
not meant to be absolute, but relative.
But, as a look at the history of wars will
show, it can boast the optimum chance of
success.
It was not only the Battle of the Marne
In 1914, but also the German Campaign
against Russia in 1917, and in the West
in 1918, whIch were won from a defensive
posture. Still more convincingly do the
events of World War II plead the de-
fense as the stronger type of combat. In
regard to the war in Russia, Clausewitz
said, as a result of the lessons learned
in 1812, that it is often in the midst of
one's own country where one is in the
strongest position.
Just consider what he says in his book
on defense:
If we await the enemy wlthzn our own
theater of war, however near the frontier
the deCISIOn may take place, this theater of
war will nevertheless always be entered by
the enemy force, whlch must entail some
sacrzfice on its part.
And he goes on:
If we Wish to fight a defenswe battle and
lfwe, therefore, leave tis determination and
the chOice of time for It to the enemy, it may
be that he remazns for some time in oc-
cL:pation of the piece of territory and the
time which . .. he allows us to gain IS In
that way paid for by us."
Dealing WIth offensive operations with-
in a defensive war, Clausewitz wrote:
We can, therefore, in a defensive cam-
paign fight offensively, in a defensive bat-
tle we may use some divlSlOns for offensive
purposes, and la.otly, while simply re-
maining in position awaiting the enemy's
onslaught, we still send offensive bullets
59
MILITARY REVIEW
(today rockets) into his ranks to meet him
6
This p*ssage will sound very familiar
to us, but it is also meant to give us food
for thought. Another thing to be learned
from this is to utilize terrain as a
"natural ally." One often has the impres-
sion that we, today, let ourselves be hyp-
notized in a highly technical army by
mechanical devices and weapon systems
and, consequently, lose our natural in-
stinct for utilization of terrain
A third aspect is that defense includes
the element of maneuver. By defense,
Clausewitz understands dvnamlc action,
only that It is deferred in time. "Defense
is composed of waiting and acting," he
states explicitly. It can be assumed that
this statement refers, rather, to strategIc
and political action than to tactical action.
The thesis of the "suspension of mili-
tary activity" has absolutely topIcal rele-
vance In NATO strategy. History teaches
time and time again, says Clausewitz, that
in war an Interruption of mutual military
actlvlty WIll occur and thus the opposing
sides are, in a way, inactIvely confronting
each other. Both opponents bide their time,
the one because he feels that an attack at a
later pOint of time would be more appro-
priate, the other in a feeling of inferIOrity.
SummarIzing the Clausewitzian aspect
on defense, he sees advantages on the
defender's side: the advantage of ground,
surprise-normally only expected WIth
the attacker-counterfire or even counter-
attack from several sides, the assistance
of the theater of war, the support of the
people and the utilization of great moral
forces"
How topical an.d relevant Clausewitz's
teachings still are today does, at thIs
stage, hardly require any further explana-
tion. In the beginning, some questions
have been raised as to whether we can
still profit today from Clausewitz and
his book and whether his statements have
60
continued relevance.
It should be clear by now that 'Clause-
\Vitz, in a manner more topical than any
other, has made statements which un-
reservedly apply to the officer capable of
independent thinking.
The voluminous book, On War, can-
not be studied and utilized as if it were a
service regulation. One very quickly
encounters basic questions of philosophy
and politics and social life in general.
Officers see themselves confronted to-
day with two challenges: to stand the test
as in peacetime and, like Clause-
witz, to be ready to continuously check
their own position.
This requires flexible thinking,
especially the arnval at logical conclu-
sions. In particular, it is this attitude
whIch must precede any experiment of
trying out something new, espeCIally in
rapidly changing times. Leadership IS of
undisputed importahce in war and in
times of peace. In both cases, however, dif-
ferent basic conditIOns prevail. The con-
flicts of OUr age have a confUSing multi-
tude of outward appearances. One must
be molded by the will to lead and by a
readiness to "grasp the moral forces
which are involved."
Clausewitz did not devise complicated
systems and patterns remote from every-
day life, but, based on lessons learned, he
reasoned out actIOn. Clear, sound think-
ing, not emotional vagueness, purpose-
ful Rcquiring of knowledge and experi-
ence, and determination are the qualities
demanded today. Life itself will provide
friction. It need not be artificially initiated
by complicated trains of thought and
oversubtle language intelligible to the
expert only.
Finally, and in conclusion, a thought-
provoking quote from Clausewitz, "It is
friction which makes that which appears
easy in reality difficult.""
March
CLAUSEWITZ
NOTES
1 Karl von Clausewltz O ..:r War tranSlated by 0 J
Jolies In1antry Journal Pre .. s, Washrngton DC 1950 80010,
Chapler III p 326
4 Ibid BOOk SIX Chapler I Section 2 p 319
5 Ibid BOOk SIX Ch'l.pler VIII p 345
6 Ibid Book SIX Chapter I. p 317
2 Ibid Book One Chapler t SectIOn 2<1 p 16
3 Ibid. Book SIX" Chapter XXVI
7 Ibid Booi'. SUI. Chapler III p 323
B IOld Book One Chapler VII p 55
1981
Colonel Walter von !lobe It> the German hO/-
son offlcer, USACGSC Ill' attended the
College In Bad Godesbcrg and 1S a graduate of
College, the German General Slaff
Colie{Ic and the US Arml!d Forcel> Staff Col
lelIl! He has sen'cd as clllef, G3 Plans and Opera
fLOllS. at Headqu.arters, Northern Army Grou.p,
as commandlng offlcer of ArtIllery Batta/ton
155, and as cxecutWf? officer to the commandIng
offIcer of the General Army Offlcc
Army Extends Basic Training. Longer and tougher basic training
(BT) will soon face individuals coming into the Army. Plans for a
tougher eight-week program instead of the current seven weeks have
been announced by the US Army Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC).
The plans call for more demanding physical conditioning, train-
ing in additional soldier skills and the raising of standards for courses
at all training installations. The new program will go into effect at
some traming Installations in Fiscal Year (FY) 1981 and will inc!ude
all training installations by the end of FY 1982.
The revamped BT program' leans heavily on the belief that a
physically fit Army begins with tough, demanding standards estab-
lished in BT and continues through all phases of a soldier's profes-
sional growth. Increased emphasis will be placed on basic soldier
skills. New technical subject materials include map reading and
communications.
The changes are aimed at developing better trained and more
disciplined soldiers who, after assignment to their new Units, can
contribute more quickly to Army unit effectiveness.
There are 308 hours in the current BT program of instruction
(POI). The new POI will contain 405 hours, an increase of 97 hours.
The 97 hours contain new subjects, subjects taught in the past but
not formally documented, and additional hours on subjects now
taught.
The increased training will include physical training, weapons
familiarization and qualification, individual tactical training, march-
es and bivouac and basic rifle marksmanship. New subjects in the
POI will be communications, map reading, identification of opposing
forces and obstacle courses for confidence and conditioning.
Plans also call for the combat arms oriented One Station Unit
Training courses to be expanded by one week in FY 1982.
61
No longer is it possible to group various countries and fac-
tions into neat categories as was once done. Events have
produced new associations that could not have been pre-
dicted beforehand. The author now sees a "triangle of pow-
er" emerging on the world scene that could affect US stra-
tegic interests.
The views expressed in this article are
those of the author and do not purport to
renect the position of the Department of the
Army, the Department of Defense or any
other government office or agency.-Editor.
T
HE world power structure is in the
process of major adjustment,
perhaps the most fundamental and far-
reaching in history. Major change is
bemg compressed into very short pas-
sages of time. When the United States
withdrew its forces from Vietnam, it
would have been rather inconceivable to
forecast an invasion of Vietnam by China
in 1979. Who would have predicted the
demise of Iran as a pillar of stability or
the entry of Mexico on the world stage as
a major oil producer?
Major changes underway are of pro-
found import for those who must attempt
to decipher the tidal motions of history.
They are of particular significance in
crafting American strategy and politico-
military thought. .
Events of the last lO years clearly indi-
Colonel Robert L_ Dilworth, US Army
cate that world trends cannot be inter-
preted in terms of bipolarity-such as
East versus West, Communist versus
non-Communist or other convenient gen-
eralized dichotomies. While multipolarity
is somewhat closer to the mark, it, too,
often leads to a carving up of the world
into a supposed variety of camps. It has
become fashIOnable to talk of not only a
third world, but fourth and fifth worlds as
well. Such categorization can be of value
in diagraming economic differences, but
it is of limited use m evaluating power
relationships.
Power ebbs and flows on the fulcrum of
self-interest. Countries such as SaudI
Arabia can wield great power influence in
deciding critical international issues.
Power is probably best vIewed as a mosa-
ic, given the ever increasing velocIty of
world change. Power relationships are
kaleidoscopic in character, each issue,
confrontation or national interest re-
shaping the Image
Overlaying current world change IS the
Soviet Union and its growing mIlitary
power at a time when US power and influ
ence is becommg uncertam. There are
perhaps two ways of manifesting power,
to use the language of fencing, parry and
thrust In the European area, the United
States and its allies can at best parry the
Soviet might. Despite its considerable
military capabilities, the Soviet Union
finds itself in a similar stance. ThIS IS
true in part because of the rise of nation-
alism at the expense of Ideology. The So-
viet Union can no longer view its East
European satellites as vassels, nations
that unhesitatingly move to the strmgs of
Soviet orchestration.
Politics does indeed make strange bed
fellows For example, certain Warsaw
Pact nations have reason to view recent
events m Iran wIth concern. They could
presage a growing dependence on Soviet
energy sources, a dependency that was at
least partially amelIorated by an Iran
under the shah that would sell oil to al
most any natIOn willing to pay, such as Is-
rael, East European Communist nations
and Japan.
The Impasse in Europe in terms of abil-
ity to project decisive power seems to have
led the Soviet Union into a state of adven
tUrIsm and opportunism elsewhere in the
world. At times, It appears as if the Soviet
Umon has been given almost an un-
limited opening in conjunction wIth its
surrogates to project power at will-Af-
rIca and Southeast ASia bemg two note-
worthy examples.
While current power relationships do
not gIve the SovIets the ability to move
with impunity-the Middle East being
one example-they currently have con-
siderable latItude m mfluencing events to
their advantage. A growing number ofre-
gimes owe their power position, even eco-
COPYright :g 1981 by Colonel Robert L Dilworth. US Army
63
nomIC survival, to the Soviet Union-
Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Cuba, Syria, An-
gola and VIetnam to name only a few.
There appears to be a major oppor-
tunity open to the United States in par-
rying the Soviet surge and mounting a
counterthrust. It represents a trIangle of
power just now emerging. The countries
involved are the Umted States, the Peo-
ple's RepublIc of China and Japan. It is by
no means a comfortable association at
this stage. However, the complementary
and mutual interests Involved suggest
that this trIangle of power will un-
doubtedly grow in importance, especially
if US strategIc interests are to be protec-
ted and a VIable counterforce to the Soviet
Union realized
Japan is a gro'wing military power. Re-
birth of this power has gone largely un-
noticed. Japan now ranks fifth in the
world in terms of military expenditures
and has an awesome Industrial base on
which to further build its military capabil-
64
ities.* The United States continues to
have a potent military capability and an
industrial strength second to none. The
Chinese sector of the triad represents
strength of numbers, a will to greatness
and an mherent national dynamism,
when harnessed, that promises an ulti-
mate elevation to great-power status.
Collectively, this triangle of power can
represent a decisive force in countering
Soviet alms and in restoring a stable pat-
tern of international relationships. This
tnad may hold the key to world peace, at
least over the next 20 years, if that power
can be harmonized.
The creation of a strong power base
WIthin the triad is anything but pre-
ordained or simple. Japan and China
have never been ready associates. China
can be expected to pursue its own self-in-
terests and wIll associate itself with US
objectives as long as the affiliation is In
consonance \\ ith those interests.
However, it Lakes no elaborate anal-
ysis to identify bases for a growing sense
of common purpose among these three
countries. Each can profit from closer as-
sociatlOn. China represents a growing
trade market for both the United States
and Japan. In turn, China can draw from
these two countries what it needs most to
advance itself economically and politi-
cally-technology and infusion of mIl-
itary hardware.
The best gambit for the United States
appears to center on closer ties with these
two Asian' powers as partners. If history
teaches anything, this triad may not be a
lastIng marriage. As the pendulum of his-
tory swings and the power of China
grows, the relationship may need to be re-
assessed. But, in the short run, best mea-
sured in terms of a generation, this
emerging triad to be the only vi-
'Henry Scotl-Stokes, Irs A.n RighI to Talk Defense Again In Japan,
The New York Times Magazme, 11 February 1979, p 18

able alternative for the United States if it
is to stem Soviet adventurism.
US interests seem well-served at this
time by a growing affiliation with Japan
and. in particular. with China. In some
quarters. this will be viewed as a recklesR
and dangerous national pohcy to pursue
and a major breach of faith-closely al
lying ourselves with a Communist state
and the military rebirth of Ja
pan. The mere act of recognizing mam-
land China and moving to establish
diplomatic relations has already tng-
gered a ground swell among Interest
groups that view this initiative as dIsen-
franchisement of TaIwan. The facts behe
this oversimplistic interpretation of
events.
While formal diplomatIc relations with
Taiwan have been severed. a ,trong infor-
mal relatIOnship with Taiwan will un
doubtedly contInue for the foreseeable
future. It would have been a defiance of
history to continue to recogmze Taiwan
as emblematIc of the ChInese people
Some opponents of a full Chmese-Amen-
can rapprochement will also assert that it
causes the Umted States to build re-
lations with some of the more xenophobIC
compatrIots of the ChInese. such as North
Korea. This would appear to have some
element of truth. but the marriage of self
interebt that increasmgly JOInS Chma and
the Umterl States does not necessarily
herald recognitIOn of the Chinese inlawR
as well.
1981
It IR lIme to place US interests ahead
of ideology and emotIOnal mental sets. It
is also time to accept the forces of world
change for what they are and articulate a
strategy that can stabilize existing con-
flIcts and produce at least a modicum of
peace. US surVIval and well-being must
head the list In determining national
priontIes.
Colonel Robert L Dtlu'orth 18 chIef orthe Arm ...
Comptroller Dll;ltJWIl. ,:vatlOnal Guard Bureau.
Washzngton, DC He r('celled a B S {rom the
Unwersllv ofFlonda, all MP A {rom the UUller-
slty of Oldahoma, an M MAS (rom the
USACGSC and lS a graduate of the lndustrml
College a/the Armpd Forces, the Pro{esslOrlUl Me/
ltury Comptroller School at the Air U1I1ucrsll)
and the Instltute {or Jfunagement at North
western Unwersllv He serl'ed wah the 4th in-
fantry D1VrSWll in Vu:tnam. til(' 2d Infantry
DWISlOll m Korea. and wIth the afflct', Chief or
Staff. US Army. Washlngtoll. D C
65
With daily advances being made in the field of electronics. it
can be assumed that the role of electronic warfare will con
tinue to grow in importance and playa larger part in future
conflicts. This article examines Soviet use of electronic war
fare in World War II and speculates about future employ
ment.
T
ACTICAL electronic warfare (EW)
has come of age on the modern
battlefield. The expanding role of commu-
nications electronics for effectIve com-
mand and control of forces in rapidly
changing combat envIronments has as-
sured that EW will remain a permanent
fixture in the field commander's percep-
tions, plans and course of actIOn In any fu-
tUre combat environment.
Any possible military confrontation
with Soviet forces, whether In Europe, the
Middle East or other parts of the world,
will see high.intensity EW technIques
employed by both sides. Concerning thIs
topic, the primary responsibility of the
field commander is to expand his knowl-
edge of the Soviet EW threat. Part of this
responsibility may be accomplished by ex-
amining the Soviet military's view of the
historical role of radio-electronic combat
tREC) in their ground forces operations
during World War II.
For the Soviet commander, the World
War II expel-ience of Soviet forces offers
specific lessons which are readily adapted
in a more complex form to modern combat
conditions. Accounts of their REC experi-
ence on the Eastern Front present in-
structive accounts of how Soviet
Soviet Radio-Electronic
Combat in World War II
David R. Beachley
commanders may apply REC forces under
modern conditions against large armored
and mechanized units.
The Early War Years
Soviet authors describe World War II
as a perIod of "intensive radIO-electronic
combat" with German forces. They out-
line the "wide application" of radio recon-
naissance, radio-electronic Jamming and
radio disInformatlOn by SOVIet forces 1
The Soviet army was clearly taken off
guard by the massive German EW effort
at the beginning of the war, especially
theIr voice intercept operations. SovIet
authors cite how some commanders
"groundlessly" took "sharp measures"
and completely forbade the use of radios.
They were fearful of detection by German
vOIce intercept and radIo dIrection finding
and the subsequent pOSSIbIlIty of artIllery
or aIr strikes on their positions More
over, some commanders placed their com-
municatIOns equipment a conSIderable
distance from command points which "im
peded" Its general use.
These cases of "so-called radio fear"
were criticized due to inaccurate German
direction finding and artillery's inabIlity
to "accurately hit radio stations and com
mand points."" Soviet forces were III-pre
pared for the formidable German EW
effort. The war was well underway before
the Soviets would redress their problems
and turn the tide of the REC battle
against the German forces.
First Offensive Capabilities
During 1942, the Soviet Command
began development of its offensive REC
RADIO-ELECTRONIC COMBAT
capabilities. Radio voice Intercept was in-
troduced to perform three vital missions
agaInst German forces. It was employed
to:
Create disinformation.
Create jamming to interrupt the
"most Important" radio transmissions.
Aid the destruction of artillery and
aviatIOn command POInts along with com-
mUnications centers.
"Special attentIOn" was given to the in-
tercept of tank and aviation units where
radIO was the primary means of commu-
nIcatIOn. JammIng operations were
geared to disrupt hIgh level command
structures. According to Soviet sources,
jamming, which was created "in the
course of combat operations," disrupted
radio communications of the commands
of German army groups, field and tank
armies, tank and motorized corps and
divisions and also theIr combined opera-
tions with aviation units.
3
The Battle of Stalingrad in late 1942
witnessed "the first complex in history of
all three types of radIO-electrOnic combat"
(Intercept, Jamming and disinformationl
employed by Soviet forces. Heavy radio
reconnaissance was Initiated against Ger-
man Units.
After the encirclement of the 6th Field
Army of FrIedrich von Paulus located
west of Stalingrad, the 394th Sectional
Radio Battalion was employed to conduct
intercept and jamming operations against
the German forces. Utilizing the call
signs of Erich von Manstein's reliefforce,
Army Group "Don," Soviet radio oper-
ators entered into communications with
the beleaguered 6th Army and accepted
messages addressed to headquarters of
Army Group "Don" and the German High
Command. "Eighty-six operational radio-
grams" were received from the 6th Army
during these operations. Soviet offensive
REC capabilities were well underway.'
Copyright 1981 by DaVid R Beachley.
67
MILITARY REVIEW
Special REC Battalions
In late 1942 and 1943, Stavka, the
headquarters of the Soviet Supreme High
Command, activated five special radio
battalIons specifically designed to con-
duct REC operatIOns-especially jam-
ming'-agaInst German forces. The 129th,
130th, 131st, 132d and 226th "Special
RadIO Battalions" are cited as the "first
units of radio-electronIc Jamming." Their
deployment IS described as a "qualitatIve
Jump In the development of radioelec
tronic combat In the Soviet Army."
After actIvatIOn, each battalion was as
signed to various front (army group I
-level commands. Each of these special
UnIts was equipped for radio intercept,
Jamming and direction-findIng operations
WIth eIght to 10 vehIcle-mounted Jam
mers, 18 to 20 rad,o Intercept receivers
and four direction.findIng sets. Captured
German radIOs were used for more effec
tlve d,slnformatlOn operatIOns'
Primary targets of these special
units were "operational-tactIcal links" of
army, corps and diVIsion-level commu
nicatlOns systems. OperatIOns were de-
signed to expose main and reserve
frequencies of radio stations, theIr lo-
cations and also the equipment and activo
Ity of enemy forces. Jamming operations
against key radio riets employed two jam-
mers to cover both main and reserve fre-
quencIes. ThIS provided "uninterrupted
interference" against the targeted enemy
communicatIOns system."
Kursk: The Baptism of Fire
The operations of the special radIo
battalions at the Battle of Kursk in July
68
1943 offer. a unique opportunity to ob-
serve Soviet REC operations in highly
mobile defensive and offensive combat.
Initially, radio intercept helped to un-
cover "completely" the composition of op-
posing German forces. According to
Soviet sources, much of this data was pro-
vided by radIO reconnaissance up to two
weeks before the battle began.
Durl ng the defensi ve stage of the bat-
tle, the 130th Radio Battalion conducted
Jamming against corps and division head-
quarters of German units attacking to-
ward Kursk. Soviet sources maintain that
"the primary miSSIOn of the first order
was to inhibIt or exclude the reception of
ciphered radiograms of the enemy."
After Soviet forces went over to the
counterattack and general offensive, the
130th and 132d Radio Battahons jammed
headquarters of the 4th Tank Army, 8th
Army, 48th Tank and 52d Army Corps,
Army Corps "Raus" and their subordinate
divisions along with aviation commu-
nications. Especially interesting is that:
.. durzng the course of the offensive the
130th continued tojam the formatzons and
major field forces of the enemy retreating
under the fzre of the Soviet Army.
Radio operators practiced imitative
operations against German forces, re-
laying false and misleading ciphered mes-
sages. This practice "loaded down"
German communication lines. Soviet au-
thorities maintain that, during the course
of the Battle of Kursk and the follOWIng
offensive operations, the 132d Radio Bat-
talion jammed up to 3,500 enemy radio
messages. Under jammIng conditions, the
Germans were capable of transmitting
less than 30 percent of their "operational
radiograms." The two radio battalions
'Jammed the main commUnIcations of the
enemy, hindered control, and promoted
the utter defeat of German-Fascist
forces,"?
March
Operations Against Encircled Forces
Soviet mIlitary wrItmgs outlIne nu-
merous examples of REC operations by
the radIO battalions agamst enCircled
German forces. In fact, they claim that
"the greatest results" of REC operatIOns
"were reached in the suppressIOn of radIO
communicatIOns of command pomts in
thp course of enCirclement and destruc-
tion of large groupings of the enemy."
Jamming was "especlally effective" m
operations agamst surrounded Units since
it was designed to conduct "a complete
radio blockade of enemy forces.""
Operations during the Belorussian
offenSive of 1944 prOVide numerous exam-
ples of successful Jammmg miSSIOns
against enCircled German forces. The
130th and 131st RadIO Battalions played
an "active part" In the Belorusslan Cam-
paign. Both units conducted Jamming
operatIOns against German units sur-
rounded In the area of Vitebsk and south-
eastern Minsk. "Special attentIOn" was
glVen to Jamming the communicatIOns of
the 9th Army "which was known from in-
tercepted radiograms" to be preparing a
breakthrough out of the encirclement
In additIOn, the 131st Radio Battahon
conducted jamming operatIOns against
headquarters of the 3d Tank and 4th Ar-
mies attempting to communicate With sis-
ter forces surrounded east of Minsk.
Jamming In 70 radIO nets, the battalion
disrupted more than 3,700 radIO mes-
sages or up to 90 percent of all radio traf-
fiC. Soviet sources maintam that 30
"highly important operational radIO-
grams" of forces surrounded east ofMmsk
were jammed."
Other examples illustrate the Soviet
military's employment of REC forces
against isolated and surrounded units.
1981
RADIO-ELECTRONIC COMBAT
From January through February 1945,
the operations of the 130th and 132d
RadIO Battalions aided in the destruction
of encircled German units In Glog6w,
Breslau and Posen.
The operations of the 132d are conSid-
ered "especially instructive" since the
battalion successfully jammed commu-
nications between the encircled units and
between these Units and relief forces out-
Side of the encirclement. "SpeCial atten-
tion" was given to jamming the
communicatIOns of air transports
bringing in supp!Jes to the encircled
~
e s causing crews to lose their bear-
s and miSS deSignated drop zones.
mmentmg on the effectiveness of
REC ope};.atlOns against the encircled
forces, s o v ~ authoritieS maintain that
the radIO battalions "significantly" inter-
rupted the command and control of Ger-
man forces and the combined operatIOns
between the encircled groupings in
Breslau, Glog6w and Posen."This pro-
moted their rapid destructlOn."1<J
Similar results are reported on the
operations of the 226th and 131 st Radio
Battalions In the eastern Prussia oper-
atIOn of early 1945. These units jammed
"practically all" radIO communications of
enemy groups of forces, consisting of 175
radio statIOns in 30 radIO nets on 300 var-
IOUS frequencies. Once again, REC IS
credited With a significant contribution to
successful operations. "Radio-j&mming
... in a great degree promoted the success
of Soviet forces In the Eastern Prussia
operation.""
The Lessons of Berlin
Soviet sources maintain that REC
"reached perfection" during the offensive
operations against Berlin. In the prepara-
69
MILITARY REVIEW
tory operation, "frontal radio recon-
naissance" uncovered enemy radio
communications ~ y s t m s and located
headquarters of armies, corps and di-
visions "in spite of limited radio use and
fraudulent operations.," The special radio
battalions played a major role in the of-
fensive. "Utilizing the data collected by
radio reconnaisslmce and their great ac-
cumulation of battle experience," the spe-
, cial radio battalions "were completely
successful in jamming radio commu-
nications of the enemy in the course of all
operations. "
70
Participating in the final assault on
Berlin were the 130th and 132d Radio
Battalions. The jamming operations of
the 130th against Army Group "Vistula,"
the 3d and 9th Tank Armies and their
subordinate and neighboring units are
especially instructive about the obJec-
tives of offensive Soviet REC:
Not able to establish communicatIOns,
the army headquarters did not know the
situation, was not able to lead its subordi-
nate formations and coord mate its actions
with actions of its forces attemptmg to help
the surrounded groups. As a result, enemy
March
divisions were thrown in various direc-
tions, were not able to organizationally
conduct combat operatlOns In order to pull
out of the encirclement and were liq-
uidated with Sovwt forces.
l
"
Lower Echelon REC Operations
Although the specml radio battalions
provided essential REC support to frontal
combat operations, a more widespread
application of offensive capabIlities
was necessary, especially in army-level
operations and in the operations of
smaller echelons. With the "increase in
the sweep of front and army offensive
operations" and the "shortenmg of the
time of their preparation," It was neces-
sary to develop "new ways to receive sup
plementary mtelligence and to mcrease
the effectiveness of reconnazssance."t:l
Soviet mIlitary writings outlzne at
least one example of the formation and
operation of a speCial REC unit deSigned
to expand intelligence collectIOn in arn)y-
level and lower echelon operations. In
July 1944, a group for conductmg oper-
ational radio reconnazssance was formed
in the 61st Army of the 1st Belorussian
Front and attached to the I06th Commu-
nications Regiment. This platoonsize for-
mation was called the "group of close
reconnaissance with commumcatlons
means" or, as abbreviated by Soviet wnt-
ings, the GBRSS.
According to Soviet authorities, the
operations of the GBRSS and the or-
ganization of reconnaissance in the 61st
Army "offer special interest" under mod
ern conditions. The GBRSS paId "special
attention" to the monitoring of German
artillery communications in order to de-
termine Soviet forces targeted for fire.
The timely receipt of this information
1981
RADIO-ELECTRONIC COMBAT
permitted Soviet troops to withdraw from
targeted areas and avoid unnecessary
losses. Moreover, the unit's operations es-
tablished order-of-battle intelligence on
opposing forces. Radio station accessories"
names of commanders and locations of
enemy subunits in the defense were de-
termined "without great difficulty.""
DUrIng the Vistula-Oder offensive,
the GBRSS intercepted regimental, bat-
talion and company-level commumca
tlOns and uncovered at least five planned
counterattacks by company and bat-
talion-level forces. In addItion, the
GBRSS intercepted units of the 10th
SS Tank Division which were trans
mitting their locatIOns and planned cutoff
points, mcludmg the schedule for their oc-
cupation. Soviet military sources com-
ment on the impact ofGBRSS operatIOns
m the 61st Army:
... the presence zn the Army of the
group of close reconnaissance with com-
m UlllcatlOns means for conduction of oper-
atlOl1al reCOl1nalSSanCe .. proVided the
r e ~ l p t of Important alld relwble llltel-
izgel1cc on the enemy. even by the utiliza-
tIOn of usual radiO commUlllcatlOns and In
the absence of speCial directIOn findzng
systems,l'i
Conclusion
Soviet offensive REC operations in
World War II are credited with expanding
the role of artillery and air support
through effectIve radio intercept and di-
rection finding on command points, com-
munications centers and radar posts.
SOVIet authorIties claIm that:
... the greatest results [of REC oper-
atIOns/ were reached in the suppressIOn
of radio commUlllcatlOns of command
pOlllts In the course of enCirclement and
71
MILITARY REVIEW
destructzon of large groupzngs of the
enemy.
In addition, radio dlsinformation oper-
ations deluded the enemy and "at t.he
same time, promoted tbe achievement of
surprIse."l!l I
The preponderance of radio Jammmg
durmg REC operations certainly indi-
cates that Its application was the primary
means of offensive electronIc leombat
against command and control commu-
nIcations systems throughout the Eastern
Front operations. Although radlO mter-
cept and dIrection finding receive less at-
tention by Soviet authors, this certainly
does not minimize their contrIbutlOn to
successful combat operatIOns. The wIde
applIcation of radIO reconnaissance prior
to offensive operations establIsbed an ex-
tensIve order of battle data base agamst
German forces not employing proper
radio camouflage and protective meas
ures.
NOTES
1 Major Ge'1eral A Palll Radio-ElectrOniC Combat In t"e Cour&e Of
the Waf MlilraryH,sloflcaJ Journal Nu'T1be' 5 1977 P 10
21b,d P 1t
3 lOla pp 1112
4 Ib,d P 13 Malor General V and ColorE'! V lmll?v<;kll
From the Hislor, of Radlo ElectroniC Combat HIs/of/cal Jour
nal Number 3 1975 P 84
5 Palll 00 ot P 12 ana Grank,., ana ZrnlevSl<1I 00 elf D BIl
The radiO battalions were deSignated sechonal radiO battalions 01 spe
clal des.gnatlon or as abbrevlateo by Soviet aul'lonlles orCIn S'oelsnaz
units
6 Palll op CII
7 Ib,(1 DD 1314 and V Grank.n ES!lma!ion olthe RadiO Eledromc
SituatIon Ml/!lary Herald Number 4 1976 DD 113 14
SovIet military writings on REC oper-
ations on the Eastern Front are certainly
not the definitive source on the or-'
ganization and operations of offensive So-
viet REC units and tactics. Nevertheless,
they do provide us with a unique oppor-
tUnIty to view the historical role of offen-
sIve REC units and their operations
through the eyes of the Soviet com-
mander. Under modern conditions, a
more perfected and elaborate REC or-
ganization can pose a formidable arm of
SovIet ground forces operatIOns against
an opposing force not properly utllIzmg
authOrIzed radlO procedures and SIgnal
securIty measures.
Our operatlOnal commanders should
never forget what Soviet mIlitary WrIters
clearly state:
... not one operatIOn of any type of
armed forces does not beglll with or IS not
conducted Without the wide use of fo,ces
and means of radzo-electrolllc combot.17
8 Palll, 00 CIt 0 19 and GranKln ana Zmlevskll op Cit P 85
9 Palll, 00 Cit P 15 and Gram<.ln and lmleVSI\II, op crt, 0 85
10 Palll Op Cit DO 1617
" Ibid. and Grankln and lm'8vskll op Cit. P 85
12 Pall' op Cit DP 1718
13 Reserve Colonel V Chlkln. Reconnal&&ance With Communlca
lions Means. Military Historical Journal Number 6. 1978. P 87
14 Ibid. DD 87 and 89 and Reserve Colone) V Clw\fn Recon
nalssance In the OperatIons of the 61 sl Army Military HistOrical Journal
Nu<Tlber 10 1979 PO 53,54
15 Ch,k,'l ReconnaIssance W,It} Communications Means MIlitary
Hlstoncal Journal op Clf DD 88 89
16 Palll, op Cit 019
17 Granl.an and Zmlevskll. <JP clf, D 88
Daud R Bearhley u, a graduate student w
RUSSIan area Georgetown Unwer,'>lly,
Washzngton, DC He has ::,erved u'uh the .522d
Combat, ElectronIc Warfare and Intelligence Bat-
lalLOn, 2d Armored DltlSLOn, as senLDr VOlee Inter-
cept operalor and lnstructor on Sot'let milltarv
tOplCS and tactlcal electrOnIc warfare procedlo'es.
72
March
o ~ V I W S
The Evolution of Soviet Strategy in the
Middle East
By Alvin Z. Rubinstein
Orb/s, Volume 24, Number 2, Summer 1980
Soviet strategy In the Middle East has
become one of increasing concern to the
United States. ThiS has become especially
true Since the IslamiC RevolutIon In Irall,
the SOVle[ Invasion of Afghanistan and,
most recently, the lI'anIan-iraql confliCt.
What are the goals and objectives of
Soviet strategy. and what facts should
the United States be aware of? Dr AlVin
Z Rubinstein, professor of polItIcal
sCience at the UniverSity of Pennsylvania,
senes editor for Praeger PublIshers'
"Studies of influence In internatIOnal
Relations" and author of Red Star on the
Nile: The Souze(Er:;yptwn In(luence Re
latlonshlp Sln('(' the Su-Day IVaI', traces
the changes In SOVIL't foreign polIcy rela
tIve to the :Vhddle East and postulates
certain generalIzations to be deduced
from Soviet hphaVIOr In thiS region.
First, Moscow has followed:
... a dlfferentzated polzcy that has been
sensitwe to conMralllts and opportunities.
The chOice of tarRets, the pro/Talllr:; of aid
packaRes, the wIlllnRness to subordinate
Soviet deSires to a courted country's
preferences and the busmesslzlze man ncr
m which most agreements have been car
I'led out, Irrespectll'e of penodlc diS'
sonances, bespeak a baSIC soundness of ap
proach and outlook.
Second, Soviet diplomacy has been
guided by strategic com ,'erations rather
than by ideology. Third, the USSR has
beE!ll a "reliable patron-protector" to its
clients which has enhanced Its credibility.
1981
Fourth, the Soviet Union has utilized
arms sales to stimulate the arms race in
the area. These sales for hard currency
have not brought direct influence on the
natIOns. but have aSSIsted in bUIlding
anti-US sentiment. Finally. the USSR has
consistently endeavored to undermine
the position of the United States in
the region. given the assumptIOn that the
United States is its principal adversary.
Dr Rubinstein feels that this<strategy
of Influence expanSIOn is directly related
to the revolution In military technology
and the enormous growth of Soviet milI-
tary capabilIties. Consequently, the USSR
has subverted US containment polIcy
In the Near East. threatens the Western
oil supplIes from Saudi Arabia and has
stretched its Influence as far south as
Yemen and as far west as Algeria in the
Arab world.
According to Professor Rubinstein. the
results of thIS strategy are eVIdent In the
fact that the Ul1Ited States no longer
controls any "bastion" In the area and
Its leadership IS increasingly seen as inde-
cisive and weak Given these pOSitive reo
suits, the Soviets are currently pUl'SUlng
a more venturesome polIcy than hereto-
fore. Part of the explanation for thiS l'lsk-
taking may be related to the estimated
mld-1980s oil shortages In the USSR
and ItS satellites. On the other hand.
the more the United States acquiesces to
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries' conditions and dictates on oil
prices. the weaker the United States ap-
pears and the more the Soviet connection
assumes importance for the Arab states.
Professor Rubinstein closes his artIcle
by suggesting that the Soviets are the
ultimate benefactors of the rapid mod
ernization occurring in the region. lie
73
MILITARY REVIEW
quotes Walt Rostow in stating that com-
munism is the "scavenger of moderniza-
tion." Islamic fundamentalism is only a
transition stage which will give way to
more disunity and discord and, eventu-
ally, communism. As far as solutions to
the demise of US influence in the area,
Dr. Rubinstein leaves the reader with
little except a profound appreciation for
the s'uccess of Soviet Mideastern strat-
egy.-DEN.
The Soviet Officer
by Captain Jon G. Coil avo. USAF
Alrltft Operations Review. October 1980
AccordIng to Captain Jon G. Collavo, a
phenomenon known as ethnocentrIsm,
defined as an attitude that one's own
group IS supenor, causes us to believe that
a Soviet will react to a situation or
stimulus simIlarly to the way a lJS
citizen would. This attitude can prove
self-defeatIng if It prevails in the decision-
making process. In other words, If an
AmerIcan declsIOnmaker on any level
expects a Soviet to react Just as he would
and respond In the same manner, he could
be very wrong.
Dunng Captain Collavo's service from
,January 197R to 1979 as a Umted Nations
MIlitary Observer t UNMO I with the
United Nations Truce Supervisory Or
ganlzation, headquartered in Jerusalem,
he worked closely with Soviet officers both
as a co-worker and as operational com-
mander. Dunng the first five months of
his tour, he was,a "common UNMO,"
and, for the last seven months of hiS tour,
he was the assistant operations officer,
Observation Group SInaiCairo. His com-
mandmg officer was Lieutenant Colonel
V: Skharov of the Soviet army.
The duty ofUNMOs in Cairo was to ob-
serve that the prOVISIOns of the Smai II
74
Agreement were honored. To do this, they
manned observation posts, patrolled
disengagement lines and conducted
periodic inspections of the Limited Forces'
Areas and Missile-Restricted Zones.
To perform these tasks, they were formed
into two-man teams com-
posed of two officers, never of the same
nationalIty.
Because of this arrangement and owing
to the large US and USSR contingents in
Cairo, many times a US officer would be
teamed with a Soviet officer. In the case
of observatIOn post duty, these officers
spent seven full days alone together at
a remote location in the Sinai. This
situatIOn lent itself to very close observa-
tIOn, not only of the desert, but also of
your fellow officer. Captain Collavo's im-
pressiol).s of Soviet officers were based
primarily on his observation of them dur-
Ing hiS assignment as a UNMO.
The Soviet offIcers Collavo became
acquaInted WIth saw the world in terms of
right and wrong-the Soviet way was
nght; if others disagreed m any particu-
lar, then they were He found that,
'fhen the Soviet way of thmking was
brought to questIOn, a stone wall was en-
countered. The Soviet perception of the
world was governed by a filtration sys-
tem baspd on the SocialIst/Communist
teachIn?s.
In contrast to American officers, the
Soviet officers recei ved their advanced
educatIOn tcollege eqUivalent! in military
or technical schools. The education they
received was narrow in scope and limIted
in breadth. The end result was that they
had a rather limited view of the world
as a whole
This lImited view affected the Soviets'
personal perception of the US/USSR re-
lationship. The Soviet officers seemed (0
believe, without question, that the United
States is the enemy. When asked why,
their normal response was, "This is simply
so." They beheve the United States is
aggressive, adventuristic and unbeliev-
ably destructive while the Soviets are the
March
defenders of peace. When asked about the
Soviet invasions of Czechoslovakia. and so
forth, they would simply respond that
those were necessary for peace.
They truly 'Ijlelieve that the Soviet way
of lIfe is best and that communism is the
wave of the future.
According to the author. the Soviet
officer is a very capable adversary.
Given an objective and an established
plan to achieve this objective. he would
do well. Otherwise. the officers were
inflexible. indecIsive and "lockstep."
Nationalistic feeling among the Soviet
officers was very strong. Captam Collavo
qUIckly learned never to call a Soviet of-
ficer a Russian as he would reply, "I
am not a Russian: I am Uzbec. Ukraim-
an. Tajik." or some other natIOnality.
The author believes the SovIets still have
great respect for the UnIted States'
militarily but are aghast at our lack of
resolve.-SIK.
Eastern Mediterranean: Sea of Troubles
Staff Report, Defense & Foreign Affalfs,
October 1980
The situatIOn todav in the Eastern
Mediterranean. with the Soviet
UnIOn nor the United States m a pOSItIOn
to declare the area safe for one side or
the other. could best be described as
unsure. The Eastern Mediterranean
remains a collectIOn of indiVIdual prob-
lems. rIvalrIes and Issues whose only
unifying framework. vague as it IS. is the
US-Soviet strategic struggle
'One important issue whIch seems to
transcend even the East-West tension
in the area is the Greco-Turkish strug-
gle. This is a contmumg problem with a
long historical baSIS. and not one easily
resolved. In addition. a closer look at
Turkey is also necessary.
Turkey is a country which has seen
1981
REVIEWS
the development of a kind of double crisis.
On the economIC side. it has been unable
to modernize ItS economy. Within a past
year, inflation has reached 100 percent
per year. On the political side. it has had
a successIOn of weak coalition govern-
ments. alternately left and right of center.
As these governments were unable to
solve national problems. the Turkish
mJlitary. as m the past, took over the
government. promising a return to
CIvilian rule when practical. but not
before the end of 1981. Turkey's military
leadership probably means what it says.
and it should return to civilian rule.
The third important Mediterranean
power in the Balkan area, Yugoslavia.
has also recently undergone a wrenching
change of power with the recent death
of Marshal Josip Tito. Thus far. how-
ever. Yugoslavia seems to have taken
his death m strIde. The two greatest con-
cerns attending TIto's death were fears
that the old natIOnalities problem would
arIse agam and that the SOVIet Union
would decide to mvade. NeIther fear. at
least for the present. has materialized.
The most serious tensions in the East-
ern Mediterranean remain as they havt:
been for decades. in connection WIth
Israel. What is surprismg IS the lack of
movement over the last two years since
the original Camp David Accords be-
tween Israel and Egypt. One of the major
obstacles has been the continued estab-
lishment of new Israeli settlements on the
occupied Arab West Bank and the move
by Israel to incorporate Arab East Jeru-
salem into Israel. With the other Arab
states never having accepted the Camp
David Accords. and with the Israeli-
Egyptian-US negotiations regarding
Arab "self-rule" at a virtual standstill.
the level of frustration is growing among
the various partIes. There is little likeli-
hood of an outbreak of war over this is-
sue in the near future. however.
One of the more interesting responses
to the ArabIsraeli impasse was the recent
Libyan proposal, accepted by Syria. of a
75
MILITARY REVIEW
constitutional union between the two
countries. How successful this unificatIOn
movement will be is open to question,
especially considering both countries'
unions with Egypt and similar failures in
other proposed international unions.
Syria may at least derive some badly
needed Libyan funds from the effort, how-
ever.
Finally, there is the overall strategic
Issue of the SovietUS rE'latlOnshlp In
the area which is open and undeCIded. The
US 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean reo
mains stronger than the SovIet fleet,
but the Soviet role is more politlca I than
milItary
The SovIets have not been terribly suc-
cessful there politically, haVing been
thrown out of Egypt and not partIcularly
welcomed in any other part of the Eastern
Mediterranean However anti-American
Libya and Syria "ften appear, the SovIets
do not yet seem to have any great oppor-
tumties in these countrIes. Although the
SovIets may soon .sign a treaty of fnend-
shIp and cooperation with Syria, thIS
seems to be more of an outgrowth of
Syria's money needs than any kind of
extensIve political or ideologIcal coopera-
tion. LIbya's leader, Muhamed Qadhaafl,
a devout Muslim, distrusts atheists of
all kinds, including SovIets.
The Soviet prospects in the regIOn In
many ways are a functIOn of the US at
titude there In the past, the United
States and NATO's othE'r leading mem-
bers have tended to be more concerned
with Front in Europe than
with in the north and
the southeast. And, at times, rather one-
sided US involvement in the Greco
Turkish dispute has also weakened NATO
and the US posltioq in the Eastern Medi
terranean. Although the Carter adminis-
tration moved to end the disrupti ve
partial US embargo on arms to Turkey,
the overall policymaking of his adminis-
tration was so erratic that AmerIca's
friends, to include those in the Eastern
Mediterranean, had made some, If only
76
slIght: movement toward their own
private detente with the Soviet Union.
Nevertheless, in the Eastern Mediter-
ranean, the signs at present are at least
reasonably good for the United States if
it begins to exert firmer and steadier
leadershIp. With only a reasonable
amount of finesse, the United States
should be able to preserve and enhance its
position in this region.-SIK.
The Development of:
Soviet Motorised Infantry
Born m Battle Magazme,
Number 12, 1980 (i?rael)
Anyone well-versed in large-scale
movements of modern forces could not
help but be impressed by the rapidity of
the SovIet Invasion of Afghanistan. Th,s
operation must evoke admIration when
VIewed against the backdrop of the rough
tf'fraln and the near-arctic weather con-
dItions of the ice and snow-covered.Afghan
mountains. Much of the cred,t, accord
Ing to the author, belongs to the motorIzed
rifle troops. TheIr development and the
histoncal changes in Soviet tactics are the
subjects of thIS tImely article.
The Soviets have always been fascinat-
ed with mechanized mobile warfare. This
is perhaps due to the milItary explOIts of
the Tartars and, later, the Cossacks In
any case, by the Russian CivIl War, the
Soviets already possessed 138 armored
cars diVIded among 38 sectIOns.
So intrigued by the tactical possibIl-
ItIes of this type of warfare, gIven the
geography of the Soviet Union, the mili-
tary under the leadership of Marshal
MikhaIl N. Tukhachevski developed new
doctrines envolvlng combined arms coop-
eration. The prime role of the tank was to
support the infantry, and swift motorIzed
columns were to be organized to conduct
enveloping attacks on the rear and flanks
March
of the enemy. Much of this doctrme was
conceived in cooperation and consultation
with the German Relchswehr which later
implemented many of these concepts in
the various blitzkrIegs of World War II.
The 1930s saw the actual emplacement
of the motorized brigade-consisting of
two tank battalIons, two motOrIzed infan-
try battalIons, one reconnaIssance bat
talIon and one artillery battalIon-in
the SovIet forces. With a mechanized corps
of 500 tanks and 200 armored cani, the
battle plan was one of having the motor-
ized infantry follow the tanks for support
and further explOIt the situation m the
enemy's rear following a breakthrough.
Unfortunately, these Ideas, along WIth
theIr ongmator, Tukhachevskl. were
destroyed durmg the StalinIst purges of
1937. Armored cars and tanks wpre agam
reduced to mfantry support misslOns
However, thIS change of doctrme did not
alter the Soviet fascination with armor.
By 1940, they possessPd 24,000 tanks
Durmg World War II, there existed ht-
tIe transport for SovIet mfantry and no
armored personnel carriers I APCs)
Consequently, Soviet mfantry was
obliged to ride on tanks when closing m on
the enemy The early 1950s wltncssed the
mtroduction on a grand scale of wheeled
APCs in the SOVIet forces. Later models
were totally enclosed to survive the
reality of the nuclear battlefield How-
ever, they were not totally successful since
the troops were unable to fight mounted
and dlsmountmg was hazardous due to the
lack of rear exits
Parallel to the mtroduction of these
new vehicles was the creatlOn of a new
servIce br?'1ch, the motOrIzed rifle arm.
All existinl mfantry dIVIsions were con-
verted mto motorized nfle diVIsions.
REVIEWS
The final evolutionary phase was the
development of the 8MP 1, an armored
troop transport, which possessed enough
firepower to enable it to fight on the move
as well as to engage targets hitherto ac-
cessible only by tanks. The latter was
accomplIshed hy an mgenious overlappmg
weapons system comprising a long-dis-
tance antitank guided weapon, a medIUm-
range 73mm smoothbore antitank gun
and a short-range RPG7 grenade
launcher These attrIhutes, combined with
a low silhouette and excellent cross-
country capabilIty, gave new life to the old
Tukhachevskl mobIlIty and all-arms of-
fenSIve doctrIne and restored the doctrine
of mounted mfantry.
Subsequent to the less-than-adequate
performance of the 8MP durmg the 1973
Middle East War, and recent Western
antItank defense improvements, the
Soviets rethought theIr offenSIve doc-
tnne. Thev now advocate a more fluid,
qUIckly sh'iftmg and mobile attack WIth
force, spread over WIde areas This doc-
tnne utIlIzes the concepts of "daring
thrust" and "deep penetration" with
separate tank and motOrIzed rifle ap-
proaches
As an aSIde, the author feels that such
a doctrIne of maneuver demands capabil-
ItIes of fleXIbIlIty and deciSIon making
from .JUnIor commanders These traIts are
foreign to totahtanan SOCIeties. Com-
puter SImulators might provide a pOSSIble
solutIOn m that they could furnIsh the
JUnIor officer with "best" options.
However. the author feels that maneuver
as the "soul 01 combat" could cause the
SovIets real headaches on the battle-
field. On the other hand, it wIll demand
much greater creatIvIty from the

The5e are published as a service to reader!:> EvPI'Y eflort 1<; mad!:' tn em.,Ul"e accurate
translatIOn and summanzatIOn However, for mOH' dC'lnIied account:'>. readers should refer to
the ongmal artIclps No officwl e-ndorsement oftl1l:" View,,>, opiniOns or fartual htutf'mpnts m the",e
Items IS mtended or should be mferred -Editor
1981
77

Then What? Still the Tank
In his article, "After the Tank, Then
What?" (Military Review, October 1980),
Major Orville T. Stokes Jr. asserts that in
the near future the tank will fall easy
prey to antitank precision guided muni
tions <PGMsl. He forms a scenario in
which Warsaw Pact tank assaults are
stopped by these weapons. This scenario
and the assumptions upon which they are
based are invalid.
Armor kill probabilities of 80 to 90 per-
cent for PGMs cited by Major Stokes re-
flect test range performances and have no
bearing on their true battlefield worth.
In the 1973 October War, used as an ex-
ample throughout the article, tank kills
made by Soviet-built PGMs accounted for
only 10 to 13 percent of all Israeli tank
casualties. Israeli-operated TOW mis-
siles were employed only III sniping oper-
ations and never saw use III high-inten-
sity battle.
TOW has half the flight time of Sagger
and is automatically guided to its target.
Nonetheless, in Western Europe, TOW
will face a much harsher test than Sagger
met in the Middle East, for it will have to
in 'poorer weather and terrain
conditions and against an adversary ca-
pable of creating a dangerous anti-TOW
environment. Unlike Egyptian soldiers
who practiced daily for more than three
ye'ars before the October War, NATO
troops are ill-trained in the use of anti-
tank missiles. In fact, many NATO TOW
gunners have neVer fired a round of live
ammunition.
Likewise, the 80 to 90 percent kill
probability of cannon-launched guided
projectiles (CLGPs) does not account for
battlefield conditions. In battle, com-
munication breakdown and overload
78
occurs, and artillery comes under in-
tense counterbattery fires. More im-
portantly, the high-power laser desig-
nators relied on by the CLGPs become
vulnerable to detection when deployed
in battle and can be countered by tanks,
artillery and _moke.
There do not exist today mass deployed
all-weather sights for PGMs that are ca-
pable of penetrating heavy smoke and
fog-nor does the probability exist that
they will be available in the near future.
The high cost of these sights will un-
doubtedly limit their presence on the
battlefield. Soviet strategy calls for oper-
ations in adverse weather conditIOns. The
Soviets would employ smoke to protect
their forces and, more importantly, would
attempt to envelop NATO defensive
forces in smoke as well. This tactic,
stressed throughout Soviet military man-
uals, was used to great advantage by
Egyptian forces during their attack on
the Bar-Lev line.
In the 1973 Middle East War, most of
the 130 Israeli tanks killed in the first few
days were destroyed by PGMs. During
this time, Arab armies operated under
conditions of tactical and technical sur-
prise, from good geographic positions
(ramps behind the can a\) and in a near
perfect meteorological and topographic
environment. If, under these favorable
conditions, PGMs accounted for only
10 to 13 percent of Israeli tank losses,
how, then, can PGMs be relied upon for the
defense of Western Europe where weather
will limit their range and where the
enemy will come better prepared? CLGPs,
FA SCAM (family of scatterable mines)
and the like are unproven systems and
are no substitute for strong tank forces.
The tank still enjoys the attributes of a
major weapons system, for it combines
March
firepower and maneuverability with
good protection.
As for the rol.! for artIllery in the ac-
tive, combined arms defense, Stokes is
correct in assigning it an important po-
sition. In fact, at times, he underestimates
its value. Using 1973 as an example once
again, the number of tanks disabled by
artillery was far greater than that dis-
abled by PGMs. It should be remembered,
however, that under Soviet doctrine,
NATO artillery will be one of the first tar-
gets to be hit. Much NATO artillery is of
the towed varIety and is thus vulnerable.
It is too early to WrIte off the tank as a
major offensive and defensive weapon.
Many tanks may be lost in an assault, but
the Warsaw Pact has large reserves.
NATO does need more artillery, but it also
needs more tanks. Above all, it needs the
elements necessary for the successful
executIOn of the active defense: trammg,
dedication and battlefield leadershIp.
Without these, even the most sophis-
tIcated weapons will be worthless.
Edward T. Schorr, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
OERS Is Not MBO
I find no fault with what Captam John
E. Stevens had to say III his article,
"OERS: Management by ObjectIves"
(Military Revlew, November 1980), except
to pomt out that the current officer evalu-
ation reportmg system IOERS) is not man-
agement by objectives IMBO). Paragraph
4-5f of Army Regulation 623-105, Of-
ficer EvaluatIOn Reportzng System, states,
"the process does not attempt to force
any specific type ofleadership style on the
rating chain." He also errs when he states
the results of the conversation "are re-
corded on the support form"; recording
is optional inItially.
Captain Stevens is not the only officer
who has made these hasty errors, but
his mistakes point out the three problems
1981
LETTERS
we have always had with the OERS
regardless of the form. Officers have:
Failed to read the regulation.
Failed to understand it.
Failed to follow it.
The primary function of the officer
evaluation report is not to measure a
command's MBO program but, rather,
to evaluate how one officer performed one
duty under one rater. Department of the
Army's purpose in the current system
is to ensure that there WIll be commUnI-
cation and that the rater will have some-
thing to put down in between "Sit down"
and "Dismissed."
D. G. Sandstrom, Indianapolis, Indiana
Basic Training
I was quite surprised with the Mlhtary
ReVIew, and not a little disappomted,
when I read Captain Samuel J. Barlot-
ta's artIcle, "BaSIC Training: The Verge
of Destruction," in the November 1980
issue. I have always regarded the ReVIew
as something of a profeSSIOnal journal,
characterIzed by temperate, scholarly and
generally constructive presentations.
How Captain Barlotta's polemic found
its way mto that otherwise good company
has me wondering.
If the object of the article was to spur
legitimate debate on the merits of our
current initial entry training (JET)
philosophy, I would submit that you
have done your readers a disserVIce
Real and rational concern for the basic
training program is swept away by the
author's rhetorical excess, and defensive-
ness is provoked rather than dialogue.
If the article was published simply to
permit the airing of an extremist view
to contrast the more enlightened Army
position, then I think a painfully naive
and inexperienced young officer has had
those qualities needlessly exposed in the
pages of MR.
79
MILITARY REVIEW
1)1 my view, the philosophy behind the
Army's lET program is quite capable
of standing on its own merit without hav-
ing to prove itself in the public display
of an ill-advised and intemperate critic.
If no one else was willing to do it, your
staff should have saved the author from
himself by returning his manuscript
as "not suited to present needs."
Lt Col Miguel E. Monteverde Jr., USA, Fort Sill, Oklahoma
(One part of the mtsston of MIlItary ReVIew IS to
prOl.nde a {orum to thought and ldca (,.1-
change on mllztary affairs For thiS reason, WI!
are able to prrnt opposlIIg l'leUpOlnts, an el.Ccllcnt
e:wmple of which prompted vour A
forum cannot eXlst, however, zf only one !:lull' of all
argument IS allowed to be mred - -Editor)
Have They Changed That Much?
It is wLth great interest that I have fol
lowed the recent articles in Milztarv Re-
Vlew that dealt with the Soviet ariny in
Worlu War II. I had the honor of fighting
against that "glorious" army from 1942 to
1945 and commanding a German artillery
unit from May 1943 through the end of
the war. Neither I nor millions of other
soldiers on the other side wer.e particu-
larly impressed by the tactics or special
abilities of the Soviet army.
As an individual, the Russian soldier
is brave and will fight to the death,
especially when the political commissars
drive him forward. He is not, however,
and never was, superior to any other
soldier in Europe. Also, it is well known
that the Soviet army is not a homogeneous
one and that it consists of many nation-
alities who do not get along. For this
reason, and also because of poor leader-
ship in the Soviet army, the Germans
were able to penetrate deep into Russia
and capture more than four million'
Soviet soldiers. Without the massive aid
provided by the United States, the Soviet
army would never have managed to come
back.
Despite the German High Command's
awareness of the intense hatred among
the various nationalities in the Soviet
army, German generals were too obedi-
ent to Hitler and did not have the guts to
resist his idiotic policies and the inhuman
treatment of Russian civilians by special
units-units that should not be confused
with the Wehrmacht as a whole.
It is now time for Western analysts to
study ways of splitting the Soviet army
from the inside, an opportunity which the
Germans had but missed entirely. Should
another war occur, special attention
should be given to.oensuring the proper
treatment of captured Soviet soldiers.
They could determine the outcome of the
war, as it is known that two million
Soviet soldiers fought against Stalin in
World War II despite poor treatment by
the Germans Stalin was a shrewd and
cunning man who understood that a war
agamst Mother Russia was far different
from a war against his brutal system.
Because he understood this difference,
he managed to convince millions of young
Russian patriots to fight against the in-
vaders who turned out to be occupiers
instead of liberators.
Lt Col Zvonimir I. Maras, USA, APO New York 09178
Letters IS a feature deSigned expressly to afford our readers an opportumty to air thelf Opinions
and Ideas on mlhtary tOPICS. It IS not restrIcted to comments or rebuttals on previously pubhshed
materIal but IS open to any variety of whIch may stImulate or Improve the value of
thought In the mIlItary commUnity
80
The rIght to edIt IS reserved by the staff of the magaZine and exercised pnmanly In deference
to avaIlable space -EdItor
March
.
1981
UNITED STATES
LIGHT ARMORED VEHICLE UPDATE
Five foreign countries and at least
three US corporations have indicated
an interest in the Marine Corps' new
I1ght armored vehicle (LAV) program
-a program that might finally bring
Wheeled combat vehicles to the US
military. The LAV program will use
eXisting off-the-shelf vehicle deSigns
as a cheap and qUick means of in-
creasing the mobility and firepower of
Marine Corps combat to be used in the
Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) (MR,
Jul 1980, p 86, and Nov 1980, p 75)
Although tracked vehicles will not be
excluded. from the competition, LAV
speed and nOise speCificatIOns appear.
heavily weighted In favor of a wheeled
vehicle.
US firms will face stiff competition
from firms in England. Canada, France.
Brazil and Germany, all of which have
wheeled combat vehiCles in produc-
tion throughout the world Of the an-
nounced partiCipants In the LAV pro-
gram, only AAI Inc. plans to enter a
tracked vehicle In the competition. That
particular company developed the
experimental High-SurVIVability 'rest
Vehicle-Lightweight (HSTV-L) (MR, Jul
1980, P 84) for the US Army.
ApproXimately 250 to 300 LAVs are
planned to be bought for the Marine
Corps. When deployed in mld-1983.
the vehicles will fill the Marine nearterm
reqUIrement for a light, highly mobile
combat vehicle for the RDF until they
are replaced in the late-1980s by the
now developmental mobile protected
weapons system
According to Manne Corps specifica-
tions, the LAV will have 10 variants. Its
near-term variations will Include Infantry
support, assault gunireconnalssance,
command control, mortar carrier and
maintenance/recovery. Other follow-on
variations Will include air defense, elec-
tronic warfare, engineer, logiStiCS and
ambulance. In performance, the LAV
must be diesel-powered, be capable
of 50 miles per hour on a level paved
road, be no more than 29,000 pounds
at full combat weight and be able to
travel 400 miles at 30 to 40 miles per
hour on a tank of fueL-OMS Aero-
space IntellIgence, 1980.
The MIlitary ReView. the Department of the Army and the US Army Command and General Staff College
assume no for accuracy of Information contained In the NEWS section of thiS publication
Items are pnnted as a service to the readers No offiCial endorsement of the views. opinions or factual
statements IS Intended -Editor
81
MILITARY REVIEW
RADAR GUIDES MISSILES THROUGH SMOKE
82
A still largely unexploited form of
radar has demonstrated ItS ability to
track targets and gUide missiles accu-
rately through smoke and n;lin as part
of a technology experimen.t program
aimed at enhancing the Army's ability
to fight in adverse combat environ-
ments.
The radar used operates in the milli-
meter wave region of the electro-
magnetic region of the spectrum. This
lies betw(;en the lower frequency con-
ventional microwave radar and the
higher frequency Infrared. For pur-
poses of the expenments. a millimeter
wave radar unit was used to guide the
Hughes Aircraft Company-built Army
TOW to stationary targets. In three of
the successful launches. the target
was obscured by heavy smoke and
aerosols. In one of these. the final shot
in a series. the TOW antitank missile
was guided to the target even though
the smoke-shrouded visibility was fur-
ther detenorated by light rain.
Millimeter wave radar is of interest
to defense planners because it is su-
perior to conventional radar in angular
resolution and is better than infrared in
penetrating adverse weather and
other battlefield obscurants such as
smoke and dust. Microwave radar and
infrared are currently the most com-
monly used means of tracking targets
and guiding missiles in conditions of
poor visibility.
March
1981
NEWS
AUTONOMOUS MISSILE DEMONSTRATED
The first flight of what IS believed to
be the world's first totally autonomous
missile has successfully been com-
pleted by Ford Aerospace and Com-
munications Corporation. This latest
test of the Self-Initiated Antiaircraft
MIssile (SIAM) demonstrated the fea-
sibility of what could become a new
family of small tactical missiles.
The SIAM requires no launch sup-
port or fire control equipment, and it
provides the user a substantially im-
proved capability through the use of
an advanced dual-mode (radarlln-
frared) seeker.
This SIAM flight test was a com-
plete success, producing a lethal pass
on a QH50 drone helicopter instru-
mented to appear as a moving full-
size helicopter. The target helicopter,
remotely controlled from the ground,
was at an altitude of 1,500 feet and 2
miles downrange. The launch motor
ejected the missile vertically from its
launch tube to a peak height of about
500 feet. The missile, through jet reac-
tion control, was spun to search an en-
tire hemisphere for a target Since the
SIAM is given no target information
before launch.
Upon finding the helicopter, the spin
was automatically stopped and pitch-
over toward the target initiated.
When the radar-tracking antennas
locked onto the target, the pitchover
stopped and the main flight motor ig-
nited, accelerating the SIAM toward
the target. As the SIAM approached
the helicopter, guidance was auto-
matically transferred from radar to the
infrared seeker to perform the ex-
tremely accurate terminal homing.
Since its Incepllon In 1977, the
SIAM program has been sponsored
by the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency and administered by
the US Army MIssile Command. The
purpose of the program is to develop"
dual-mode seeker to provide autono-
mous search, lock on and track and to
develop and demonstrate the tech-
nology for a small tactical missile to
defend against aircraft and helicop-
ters.-Electronic Warfare Digest, All
Rights Reserved
83
~
MILITARY REVIEW
CH47 MODERNIZATION BEGINS
84
The US Army's Aviation Re-
search and Development Command
(AVRADCOM) awarded Boeing Vertol
Company the first CH47 Modernization
Program production contract. Under
this contract, Chinook helicopters will
be remanufactured to the new CH470
configuration (MR, Mar 1980, p 83).
The remanufacturing of older
Chinooks was decided by the Army to
be the most cost-effective way to in-
crease the flexibility of Its medlum-
lift helicopter fleet's operational
capabilities, lower operating costs and
extend fleet life.
The signing of the productIOn con- .
tract marks a significant milestone in
the modernization program. After four
years of development and testing, it IS
entering production. The CH470, with
its improved operational capabilities,
reliability and maintainability charac-
teristics, will extend the life of the CH47
fleet through the end of the century.
Flexibility is a hallmark of the
CH470. The aircraft, which has a
maximum gross weight of 50,000
pounds, can carry 33 troops outfitted in
full combat gear, or, with its external
cargo hooks, a variety of important
battlefield equipment can be lifted
without being dismantled, Including:
An M198 howitzer complete with
32 rounds of ammUnition and an 11-
man operating crew weighing 21,800
pounds.
An M113 armored personnel car-
rier weighing 20,000 pounds.
A Caterpillar 05 tractor (bulldozer)
weighing 24,750 pounds.
Six fuel bladders filled with JP4
Jet fuel weighing 21,000 pounds.
A rough terrain forklift weighing
23,500 pounds.
Initial deliveries are expected to be-
gin in May 1982.
M ~ r c h
1981
NEWS
SPAIN
VAP AMPHIBIOUS LOGISTIC-SUPPORT VEHICLE
The Spanish navy IS currently pro-
cunng the VAP amphibious 10g1St1C-
support vehicle designed to carry
stores and eqUipment from transport
ShipS, standing some distance off-
shore, to the beach and cross country
The vehicle was developed by
Empresa Nacional de Autocamlones
(ENASA) to meet Spanish navy re-
qUirements for a vehicle suitable for
participating In amphibious-assault
operatIOns.
The 4X4 VAP has a hull made of
steel plate 6 millimeters thick and
divided Into several watertight com-
partments. The vehicle IS propelled
through water by two't-slngle-stage
hydrOJets dnven by a hydraUliC pump
linked directly to the rear-mounted
main engine. The vehicle IS also
equipped with semlelliptical leaf-
spring suspension and a dual-brake
system. The mechanical assemblies
are almost Identical to those found on
the Spanish army's Pegaso 3045 and
3050 ail-terrain trucks, but modified
for a marine environment
The VAP's cargo-carrying capacity
is 3 tons. Its maximum road speed is
90 kilometers per hour, while its
range is approximately 80 kilometers.
The hull's angle of approach IS 33
degrees, and ItS angle of departure
IS 27 degrees.
The vehicle IS said to be capable of
operating even In high waves The
water-Jets are designed to enable the
vehicle to turn on its aXIs and travel
astern. Its fuel consumpllon IS esti-
mated at 15 miles per gallon.-Inter-
nattonal Defense Review, :0; 1980.
85
MILITARY REVIEW
PEfVPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
86
FIELD
ARTILLERY
COMPUTERS
The People's Republic 01 China
(PRC) has reportedly slgl'led a con
tract with Marconi Space and Defence
Systems for the purchase of electronic
fire control systems for Its Field Artil-
lery Computer Equipment (FACE)
batteries.
According to Its manufacturer, FACE
can Increase the effectiveness of every
known type of field artillery (including
unguided rockets) by automating the
preparalion of gun-firing and surveying
data. In addition, it allegedly reduces
manpower requirements, shortens
training time and eliminates human
error under battle conditions. All the
informalion required to fire the shell
qUickly and accurately IS calculated
and displayed by a mobile computer.
At the touch of a button, correct firing
data is displayed at each individual
gun.
The system apparently is intended to
reinforce and enhance the effective-
ness of the Chinese artillery Units. This
IS part of a modernization program
that seems more and more to be based
essentially on Western technology.
For the time being, It is Europe to
whom the PRC is turning in the mili-
tary implementation of ItS "four mod-
ernizations. "-Ground Defence
International, 1980.
March
I
1981
NEWS
AUSTRALIA
NEW FIRE SUPPORT VEHICLE (FSV)
The end of the Vietnam conflict also
signaled the end for the Australia-de-
Signed fire support vehic1e-a US
M113 modified to accept the turret of a
Saladin armored car The 76mm gun
mounted on the turret was no longer
considered ballistically adequate.
'"
\/..!b/-
. ~ ~ f r
, ,
"
-;. ...
r' "r!
~ - ~ ~
1 -
After studying several alternative
proposals for a substitute vehicle that
could assume the mission of the older
modified M113s, the Australian army
decided to fit the turret of the British
Scorpion light armored vehicle to the
hull of the MI13A:. The outcome IS
the new FSV which combines the fire
capacity of the ScorpIOn with the Uni-
versally recognized virtues of the
M113Al.
The new FSV IS primarily Intended
for Australian reconnaissance unit
training tasks. Two FSVs are normally
teamed with two scouting vehicles and
a personnel carner to form a recon-
naissance unit. As all three vehicles
are M113A 1 s, the result IS a highly ho-
mogeneous group in which mainte-
nance and the supply of spare parts
are greatly simplified.-Ground De-
fence International, 1980.
87
MILITARY REVIEW
88
FINLAND
COUNTERMASS ANTITANK ROCKET LAUNCHERS
Shown for the first time outside
Finland at the Asian Defense Expo' In
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, was the
Raikka family of recoilless anti-
tank weapons developed on the
countermass principle. The excep-
tionally simple and low-cost Ralkka
weapons have now been developed
and tested in a variety of calibers
from shoulder-fired 41mm (see photo)
and 55mm up to field a1'ld vehlcle-
mounted 120mm. A 150mm vanant IS
also available.
Using smoothbore or rifled pressure
tubes (bought from England) which are
open at both ends, the Ralkka weapons
have no breech mechanism and elimi-
nate recoil by uSing a countermass (of
water, fine steel gnt or sand) placed In
the rear of the tube behind the propel-
lant charge.
The shoulder-fired weapons fire
HEAT (high-explosive antitank), time-
fuzed HE (high explosive) and 11-
IlJminating projectiles. The heavier
81mm to 150mm caliber types can al-
so fire APDS (armor-piercing discard-
ing-sabot) and fin-stabilized, hyper
velocity APDS (HVAPDS-FS). The
120mm version, for example, can fire
the tungsten alloy kinetic energy pene-
trator of a 6-kllogram HVAPDS-FS
round at a muzzle velocity of more
than 1,500 meters per second. This
gives a flat trajectory and effective
penetration of up to 400mm of armor
at ranges up to 1,500 meters.
In all verSions. the trigger acts on a
spnng-Ioaded exterior rod running back
to the rear of the launch tube. The rod
has a rear-facing flnng pin which fires a
.22-caliber cap projecting from the
rimmed base of the combined pro-
pellant charge/countermass cartridge
loaded Into the rear of the tube behind
the projectile. The cap ignites a pyro-
technic train running forward through
the countermass to the propellant
charge, thus firing the round.-Inter-
national Defense Review, 1980.
March
O ~ O O S "
BABES IN ARMS: Youth in the Army by David Goltlteb 173
Pages Sage Publtcallons. Beverly Hills. Calli 1980 $1495
In June 1978, Professor David Gottlieb
and a team of assistants from the Univer-
sity of Houston interviewed 115 first-
term enlisted men and women at Fort
Sill, Oklahoma. The soldiers were asked
why they enlisted, what theIr ex-
pectations of the Army were, about their
experiences with and Impressions of
Army recruiters, about Army life and
work, and how they felt about the Army
and themselves as soldiers.
For the most part, these soldiers Jomed
the Army to better theIr education, ac-
quire a vocatIOnal skIll or simply to get a
job. Most belIeved that recruiters misrep-
resented the opportunities the Army of-
fered, and a majority expressed feelings of
boredom and Job dissatIsfactIOn. Never-
theless, almost to a person, these soldIers
felt that they had benefited from theIr
Army experience.
On another note, most of the inter-
viewees felt personally challenged by
basic trainIng but doubted their own
readiness to fight. Few had thought about
war or what war would require of them.
Some said they would not fight. One
white 18-year-old declared that he would
only fight If the war were "here in the
U.S. 'Cause I Just joined for the money, I
didn't join to go to war and get killed or
nothing.' "
Gottlieb claIms he is not out to prove
anything with this book. He offers no the-
sis and lays no claim to comprehen-
siveness. This IS simply a report. But
there is little reason to suspect that the
soldiers Gottlieb and his colleagues inter-
viewed at Fort Sill are unique. On that
basis, he makes several recommenda-
tions.
t'irst, the Army needs to make a better
1981
effort to ensure that its recruiting rhet-
oric matches the reality of the soldier's
life. For example, if the Army insists on
continuing to stress educational and voca-
tional training opportunities, it must ex-
pand both programs. In fact, Gottlieb
believes that the Army ought to de-em-
phasize vocational skill traming and
stress its "abIlity to enhance maturity,
leadership skIlls, phYSIcal conditioning,
and a sense of independence and self-
relIance."
lie also proposes an elimination of re-
cruiter quotas and argues that recruiters
be measured on the "staying power of
their recruits and less on the number of
youths recruited." Finally, the author
suggests that the Army conSIder estab-
lishmg a system that would assist former
soldiers in getting postservice educatIOn,
training or employment.
Two significant shortcomings of
Gottlieb's book are the absence of de-
tailed demographic data on the inter-
viewees and a list of the questIOns they
were asked. In the introduction, Gottlieb
makes reference to some appendixes that
were apparently left out by the publisher.
This is unfortunate, for it would be help-
l'ul to know more than the soldiers' age,
race and gender. SpecIfically, the reader
should know the interviewees' education,
previous employment and socioeconomic
level.
Nevertheless, this is an Important lit-
tle book. It can be r,-,ad in one or two sit-
tings. All officers and noncommissioned
officers who think they understand en-
listed soldiers or who want to get a better
understanding of the attitudes and opin-
ions of today's soldiers toward the Army
and theIr place in it should read this book.
Mal Robert K. Griffith Jr .. USA.
Combat Studies Inslilute. USACGSC
89
MILITARY REVIEW
THE ARMED FORCES OF THE USSR by Hamat F Scott and
William F Scott 439 Pages Westview Press. Boulder. Colo
1979 $2750 clolhbound $1250 paperbound '
The affordable paperback edition of
this valuable reference work is very wel-
come; it should be read by every Ameri-
can concerned with the Soviet threat.
Eleven of its 12 chapters deal comprehen-
sively with three maJor topics: funda-
mentals of Soviet milItary doctrine and
strategy, a military force for the nuclear
age and a nation in arms. The book is
based on voluminous translations from
the Soviet military press and on the au-
thors' firsthand observations I they served
at the US Embassy in Moscow for four
years-1962-64 and 1970-72),
In addition to concrete data on or-
ganizational structure and key personnel,
there are many revealing msights into
the Soviet military mind land Western
mismterpretations of the same) For ex-
ample, our confidence m the deterrent ef-
fect of mutual assured destructIOn "is
irrelevant in the Soviet context." In real-
ity, the major emphasIs and sizable re-
sources devoted to civilian defense since
the 1960s "may ... have upset the strate-
gic balance." To take another example,
Marshal Ustinov's appointment as de-
fense minister in 1976 was seen by many
in the West as a rejection of the military
and a reaffirmation of civilian control,
"concepts that represent Western mirror-
imaging and are without any factual
basis."
Some strIking points emerge from this
scholarly study: Soviet leaders expect to
survive and win a nuclear war. Accord-
ingly, their true goal is not parity, but
military superiority. In contrast to their
"peace-loving" pronouncements, they
have been deliberately militarizing their
youth for more than a decade-a fact
largely ignored in the West. "The military
indottrination of the presclfool child did
not begin until the mid-1960s, after the
ouster of Nikita Khrushchev." !Emphasis
added.) The authors provide detailed docu-
mentation for such disturbing conclu-
90
sions and other controversial points.
Keeping current on the complexities of
the Soviet military establishment is a
full-time job, and it is understandable
that the authors may lack depth in Rus-
sian history. Nevertheless, it is un-
fortunate that they did not consult a
historian on their first chapter-an over-
view of the Red army from 1918 through
1945-whlch contains most of the errors
in this otherwise reliable work. Examples
of the errors are: The infamous Munich
Agreement was arranged in 1938 not
1937, and the Soviet Union did not de-
clare war when it attacked Finland on 30
November 1939. Also, Trotsky did not ne-
gotiate the Treaty' of Brest Litovsk.
Trotsky initially used the Brest Litovsk
meetings as a propaganda platform and
then disrupted them by his quixotic for-
mula "no war, no peace." The treaty was
ij signed (not "negotiated") by Sokolnikov,
and Trotsky was not even present at the
final meetings.
Despite such histoncal errors, I
strongly recommend this book for its com-
prehensive presentation and keen ap-
praisal of the contemporary Soviet armed
forces.
Allen F. Chew. Combat Sludies Inslilule, USACGSC
THE WESTERN ALLIANCE: European-American Relations
Since 1945 by Allred Grosser Translated by MlChae! Shaw 375
Pages Conllnuum Publishing Corp. NY 1980 $1950
To see one's self through the eyes of a
friend is nearly always enlightening
though not always comfortable. The same
point can be made for seeing a nation
through the eyes of a friend. In this cajle,
the nation is the United States. The
friend is Alfred Grosser, a French citizen
who is a polItIcal scientist, columnist,
teleVision commentator and a prolific au-
thor on public affairs. In The Western AL-
liance: European-American Relations
Since 1945, he examines the postwar
transatlantic relationship from the Euro-
pean perspective.
March
Dr. Grosser begins his discussion with
a look at the prewar and wartime founda-
tions of the postwar world. Also included
is an interesting section on the uneven
course of relations between Charles de
Gaulle and his Anglo-American Allies,
the fallout from which has lasted to the
present.
From there, The Western Allzance takes
a basically chronological course through
the major transatlantic Issues of the post-
war world These include the struggle to
reconstruct Europe after the war, the cre-
ation of NATO and the major economic
and polItical 'controversles which have
disrupted the alliance from time to time.
One theme running throughout the book
IS the rise of the European Economic
Community from a concept m the minds
of Jean Monnet and a few other vision-
aries to a financIal and commercial real-
ity and titan.
This book provides the reader With an
excellent presentation of the major trends
of postwar transatlantic relatIOns. It IS
highly recommended
Maj David L. Walkins. USA,
Counterintelligence Department,
Fifth US Army Area Inlelligence School
A CONTINENT ASTRAY: Europe, 1970-1978 by Waller Laquour
293 Pages Oxford University Press, N Y 1979 $15 00
Walter Laqueur is the director of the
Institute of Contemporary History and
Wiener Library, London, and is a recog-
nized authority on international affairs.
He offers a wide-rangi ng analysis of the
major problems that face contemporary
Europe. These problems are of such com-
plexity that he says, "Europe of the 1970's
presents a melancholic picture of frag-
mentation, internal squabbles, and
aimlessness. "
The easy answer IS to blame it all on
the state of the European economy during
this period. But Laqueur considers the
economic considerations to be only one ev-
1981
BOOKS
idence of the crisis and not the decisive
one at that. Equal consideration must be
given to the mental state of individual
Europeans and the resulting behavior of
their nations. The author uses the 19th-
century psychiatric term of "abulia" to de-
scribe Europe as a whole. Its meaning and
use, when it was used as a term, related to
a lack of will. The 1970s have shown that
groups of people or nations can suffer
from mental disorders in a similar man-
ner as individual people.
The book IS orgamzed into nine chap-
ters with each describIng a facet of the
European economic and political spec-
trums The chapter titles in order are:
"AbulIa or the State of Europe"; "Euro-
Economics"; "European Politics, 1970-
1978"; "Eurocommunism"; "Euro-
socialism"; "EuronatlOnalism"; "Detente
In Europe"; "Finlandization"; and "Euro-
pean Perspectives."
The last two chapters present the core
of Laqueur's theme of abulIa. He de-
SCrIbes the basis of the term Fin-
landlzation and what it means to
Westerners and to the Finns. He argues
that the threat of Fmlandization to the
whole of Europe is a basic factor m the de-
velopment of the state of abulia. The term
essentially descrIbes a "process or state of
affairs in which under the cloak of
friendly and good neighborly relations
the sovereignty of a nation IS reduced."
Over a perIod of time, the country con-
cerned (Finland m the historical in-
stancel adapts its government personnel
and ItS foreign policy to accommodate the
wishes of the stronger power.
Laqueur brings out, however, that
there are opposing views on this defini-
tion. The official Finnish interpretation is
that the word is an invention of those who
have a misunderstanding or lack the will
to understand the position of Finland and
its foreign policy.
Opposing views or not, the author's
final chapter states that the danger of
Finlandization applies to Europe's posi-
tion with respect to the Soviet Union, the
91
'MILITARY REVIEW
United States and the oil-producing
countries. His contention early in the
book was that a malaise occupies Europe
to such an extent that no dynamism ex-
ists in national life. He considers it a' dis-
tinct possibility that Europe will simply
evolve into an accommodation with the
two superpowers and the oil producers.
This accommodation, in itself, will be a
version of Finlandization. The author
hopes, however, that other factors in Eu-
rope can work toward the offsetting of any
such accommodation.
The book ends on a faintly optimistic
note with Laqueur stating:
The posslblirties for a recovery of Eu-
rope certainly eXIst and WIth them the hope
for a new beginning out of the Inertla and
the present confUSIOn. The next chapter of
European hIstory WIll probably not be a
pleasant one, but nor wIll II be the last.
John L. Griftin,
Combined Arms Combat Development Activity
BOMBER COMMAND: The Myths and Reality of the Strategic
Bombing Offensive, 193945 by Max Hasllngs 399 Pages D,al
Press. NY 1979 $12.95
Max Hastings can be forgiven for the
misleading title which conveys the im
pression of a complete examination of the
United States-United Kingdom strategic
bombing offensive against ..Nazi Ger-
many. Hastings' current offering, Bomber
Command, recounts the British air offen-
sive only-but what a superb effort re-
sults. Anyone interested in dIscovering
"the way it was" in the air over Germany
must read this stirring of men at
war.
Bomber Command tells the history of
that remarkable campaign on two levels:
from the air headquarters view and from
the view of the aIr crews. Each succeeds
admirably.
The impossible doctrine that "the
bomber will always get through"
launched Britain into World War II with
inadequate aircraft that could not hit tar-
92
gets at night and could not break through
the German defenses during daylight.
Without fighter protection, the efforts of
deep daylight penetrations were hopeless.
Hastings describes the air crew environ-
ment through the chapters devoted to six
live bomber squadrons at various stages
in the war. ThIS technique dramatically
captures the tedium and the terror in
their lives.
On a larger scale, the bomber strategy
was always questIOnable. The British in-
ability to conduct precision bombing led
to the strategy in late 1941 to switch to
area bombing-an approach for whIch
they were internally criticized on moral
grounds. Some believed that it con-
tributed to the "terrible moral collapse"
in the war. Whatever the case, the
Bomber Command did keep alive British
hopes untt! the Allied combat power took
the war back onto the Continent in mid-
1944. It also pern,itted BritaIn to respond
offensively against its enemy with the
only powerful weapon available, particu
larly dUrIng those dark days from 1939-
42 when England VIrtually stood alone.
High-level strategIes and high-level
heroics blend together with telling effect
In this excellent addition to the history of
World War II.
Col John G. Fowler Jr., USA,
Combined Arms Combat Development Activity
THE UNITED STATES IN THE 19805. Ed,led by Peler DUignan
and AlVin Rabushk.a 868 Pages Hoover Inslttullon Press, Stan-
lord. Calif 1980 $2000
As stated In the preface, this book is "a
review and analYSIS of major domestic
and International issues that will face the
United States in the 1980s." It is not an
exhaustive study, but it is, nevertheless,
a scholarly work on the perplexing prob-
lems that all confront today.
Prominent talent from the disciplines
of economics, political science and history
is aligned for concise exposition of vari'ous
March
optimistic and pessimistIc vIews as to how
to deal effectively with both problems and
opportunities in the domestic and foreign
policies of this nation. The list of con-
tributors is impressive and includes such
familiar scholars as Robert A. Scalapino,
Milton Friedman, P. T. Bauer and 29
other renowned and widely respected
specialists.
There IS a foreword by W. Glenn
Campbell who is director of the Hoover
Institution. He says that the United
States is entering the 1980s in a mood of
peSSImism but agrees with the speciahsts'
arguments that we have an alternative
There is also an introductIOn by co-edItors
Peter Duignan and Alvin Rabushka, both
senior fellows ofthe Hoover Institution It
is a concise summary of the essays that
wdl follow. The co-editors hope that theIr
work will stimulate discussion and debate
and, therefore, contribute to the resolu
tion of our current problems
The book is divided into two parts. In
Pa,rt I, "Domestic Issues," edIted by Alvin
Rabushka, 14 domestIc pohcy Issues (in-
cluding economy, tax, welfare reform,
social security, bureaucracy, energy,
environment, health, hOUSing, education
and public opmlOn) are examined. Diffi-
culties and possible alternatives are also
assessed.
In Part II, "Foreign Affairs," edIted by
Peter Duignan, the authors examine nine
foreign policy issues (arms control, Soviet
nuclear pohcy, foreIgn intellIgence, tech-
nology, world energy, foreIgn aId, foreIgn
or international economy and inter-
national business I and six areas' prob-
lems (Asia, West Europe, East Europe,
Middle East, Latin America and Africa!.
In all tnese, the authors analyze the cen-
tral issues, describe the policy choices
open to the nation and recommend spe
cific courses of action to deal WIth the
problems.
For policymakers-military or civilian
-scholars, journalists, businessmen, po-
litical scientists, economists, hIstOrians,
politicians and common citizens alike,
this book will prove to be faSCinating and
1981
BOOKS
thought-provoking. Most of all, the au-
thors convincingly demonstrate that
there are realistic limits to America's
ability to solve all the difficulties, domes-
tic or international. They also stress that
we Americans should make a bold begin-
ning on facing the new reality. They un-
derline the fact that America's
predicament is not going to be alleviated
unless every American's cooperative ef-
fort with our nation is launched.
II Ro Suh, Baker University
THE CENTRALIST TRADITION OF LATIN AMERICA by ClaudiO
VeliZ 355 Pages Pnnceton UnIVersity Press. Pnnceton. N J
1980 $22 50 clothbound $9 75 paperbound
BolIvia's elected democratic govern
ment, In office less than two months, is
overthrown in a military coup and re-
turned to a dIctatorship. Does a similar
fate lie in store for the continent's re-
maining l1edgling democracies: Ven-
ezuela, Peru and Ecuador? In his latest
book, Claudio Veliz offers a penetrating
analysis of the Latin American proclIvity
for stable central authority at the expense
of mdivldual freedom.
Latin America IS portrayed as a con-
tment apart-observing, participating vi-
cariously, but seldom contributing to the
social and economic revolutIOns which
produced contemporary Western order.
The absence of religIOUS dissent allowed
the ReformatIOn to pass almost un-
noticed. The French Revolution caught
the imagination of a vocal but isolated in-
telligentsia, but failed to sway a con-
servative, vested bureaucracy. The
industrial revolution passed as a dust
storm WIth VIrtually no proletariat or
sympathetIC mercantile class in which to
take root.
Veliz attributes this firm resistance to
change to the strength and rigidIty of the
early Spanish colonial administration.
Three centuries of bureaucratization cre-
ated a powerful constituency wedded to
the status quo. .
93
MILITARY REVIEW
Veliz argues convincingly that this
middle. class with its strong sense of order
and direction has long dominated Latm
American politics. The traditional aris-
tocracy has by and large refrained from
involvement in the political arena. Th,e
caudplos-Peron, Stroessner and eVen
Castro-rose to power at the behest of
these conservative elements. Veliz sees
the military as an extension of this bu
reaucratic elite, an 'elite which has re-
duced the region's three revolutIOnary
movements to single-party systems.
This theme, the Latm's overriding pref
erence fol' order and routine, has domi-
nated the writmgs of Professor Veliz
over the last two decades. In this book, he
restates this thesis with a force that IS at
once convmcmg and less than reassurmg
for democratic prospects m the region.
Veliz should be read by all those charged
with creating and executing our polIcies
toward Latm AmerIca-particularly
those who see human rights as ultimately
preferred and transcending order and
stability.
Col John W. Messer, USAR
WORLD ARMIES by John Keegan 843 Pages Facts on F,le. N Y
1979 $4000
Considering the recent u r ~ of books by
and about things military, It is startling
that no one has thought before nuw to
put together such a reference work as this,
in any language. Since 1945, the num-
ber of armies in the world has doubled.
At the end of World War II, for instance,
there were only four independent armies
on the African continent, whereas now
there are'more than 30. This record has
been matched elsewhere, mainly in
other developing nations,
Under the direction of John Keegan,
senior lecturer in war studies at the Royal
Mil.itary Academy, Sandhurst, and author
of the well-known study, The Face of
Battle, a team of historians, political
scientists, sociologists and specialists in
94
international relations and area studies
has examined every standing army in
the world. Their aim has been to "provide
a portrait of each army in its domestic
context; historical, social and political as
well as military."
Each of tbe more than 150 entries fol-
lows a particular scheme, 'detailing the
army's history, its strength and budget,
its command and constitutional status,
role, commitment, deployment and re-
cent operations, organization, recruit-
ment, training and reserves, equipment
and arms industry, regalia, and current
developments. The sum of these
compendia makes a volume which is ap-
pealing in its coverage and detail-some of
it probably impossible to obtain else-
where-on the military establishments of
all the world's nation-states, and thus
a volume which is the dream of serious
observers of the international mIlItary
scene.
The volume will serve well both oc-
casional and constant researchers in-
terested in the details ofa particular coun-
try's army. The work also stands as a
kind of collective biography. The por-
traits of these armies show us military
establishments whIch thrive despite
the absence of any reahstic threat from
withm or without, and there are many.
As Professor Michael Howard reminds us
in his introduction, only older armies are
so bound by such reasons for existence.
The maintenance of newer armies
depends upon justifications much more
tenuous: as emblems of national develup-
ment, as proofs of legitimacy to both the
citizenry and the world at large and for
a congeries of other reasons decidedly
nonmilitary. But, whatever the country,
these armies are inextricably bound to the
nations they sometimes serve and some-
times control.
World Armies should acquire a large
readership, including professional of-
ficers of any nationality. It is a welcomed
book,
Roger J. Spiller, Combat Studies Institute, USACGSC
March
..
EIN STOCK VON UNS by Roll Vogel Hase & Koehler, Main"
GE. OM 32
The place of Jews in the German armies
hetween 1813 and 1976 is detailed in this
little-known and researched piece of Ger-
man military history by Rolf Vogel. Who
would have realized that 12,000 Jews gave
their lives for the Vaterland in World War
I-a number greater than the losses
incurred by the Israeli forces in all four
PalestInian conflicts?
This book of four chapters begins
with the military and social environment
of 19th-century Germany In whIch even
then anti-Semitic tendencies are noted,
Even though Kaiser WIlhelm II asserted
at the beginningofWorId War lthat he did
not recognize ethnic or racial differences,
there were many cases of discrimInation
Yet 100,000 served in the armed forces of
Imperial Germany and received both ac-
colades and decorations, That these
citizens were proud to serve is IndIcated
by a quote from the diary of LIeutenant
Zuerndorfer, killed in action as a pIlot In
1915: "As a German I serve to help my
oppressed fatherland, But also as a Jew to
fight for the equalIty of my brothers,"
The most depressing chapter deals with
the "Third Reich," In that era, highly
BOOKS
decorated ,Jewish officers were physically
abused aml even murdered. But there
were Wehrmacht officers who stood up for
the persecuted-truly a beacon of hope in
Germany's darkest hour,
In the final chapter, Vogel discusses the
situation of Jews in the postwar Bundes-
wehr, Although Jews are fully integrated
into all branches and barracks bear the
names of Jewish war heroes of World War
I, many times their backgrounds and
families are unknown to their fellow
soldiers, Consequently, it would appear
that there exists yet some Angst (anxiety)
felt by the Jewish servicemen in the
Bundeswehr, The author himself was
recruited into the army and rose to the
rank of first lieutenant before he began
this book which, incidently, has been
awarded many prizes,
In essence, this is a tragic volume
deserving the full attention of the younger,
as well as the older, generation, not only
of Germans, but of all peoples, This book
demonstrates conclusively that these
German Jews were as German as any
BavarIan, Swablan or Saxon,
Col Wolfgang Gerhardl, GE Army,
Direclor of Ihe Exercise Division (Bundeswehrj, G/adbach, GE
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March