Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
PnRT I :
T h e Man
requires no e m b e l l i s h m e n t h e r e , n o r
is t h e r e o b v l o u s r e a s o n t o
i n t h e conduct of
11. H i s c o n d u c t of o p e r a t i o n s
I 1 C o r p s a f t e r K a s r e r i n e , a s cornrnander o f
on t h e c o n t i n e n t of E u r o p e a l l
t h e operational art.
practioner of
t h e s e c a m p a i g n s a n d P a t t o n ' s own w r i t l n g s s e r v e a s b a s e s o f
e v i d e n c e f r o m which a r e drawn c o n c l u s i o n s a b o u t t h e rnajor
i n h i s conduct of
In a f a s h i o n s i m i l a r t o t h a t e m l o y e d
in the preceding
command a n d c o n t r o l ,
is a r g u a b l e t h a t a
s e p a r a t e c a t e g o r y o n L o g i s t i c s o r S u s t a i n r n e n t is i n o r d e r , b u t
94
t h e f a c t i s , t h i s c h a p t e r is a n a n a l y s i s o f t h e manner
i n which
those
t e n e t s imply t h a t h e p l a c e d l i t t l e e m p h a s i s on l o g i s t i c a l
matter5 .
Knoun a s " O l d B l o o d a n d G u t s ' a long and i l l u s t r i o u s career
by h i s s o l d i e r s , Patton had flrmy,
i n t h e U.S.
only t h e
h i g h l i g h t s of
which a r e r e c o r d e d h e r e t o s e r u e as a s u i t a b l e
p o i n t of d e p a r t u r e f o r a d i s c u s s i o n o f P a t t o n ' s o p e r a t i o n a l a r t i n W o r l d War
11. Born
i n s o u t h e r n C a l i f o r n i a on I 1 November
P a t t o n grew up w i t h o u t w a n t i n g f o r
1855 t o w e a l t h y p a r e n t s ,
much. H i s a b i l i t y t o q u o t e l o n g p a s s a g e s f r o m c l a s s i c s s u c h a s Homer's
Iliad a t t e s t s
t o hi5 love o f
t o r e a d o r w r i t e a t t h e a g e o f t w e l v e s u g g e s t s h e was l e s s interested
i n more p r a c t i c a l a f f a i r s .
I t a l s o h e l p s e x p l a i n why f r o m West P o i n t , a
i t toOK P a t t o n f i v e y e a r s t o g r a d u a t e
West P o i n t !
In s p i t e of n u m e r o u s c h i l d h o o d i l l n e s s e s , P a t t o n grew
UP
t o b e p h y s i c a l l y s t r o n g a n d a g g r e s s i v e . Flfter g r a d u a t i n g f r o m
West P o i n t i n 1389, h e was p o s t e d t o F o r t S h e r i d a n , Wyoming,
t a K i n g w i t h h i m h i s new b r i d e B e a t r i c e f l y e r P a t t o n . fls
c a v a l r y o f f i c e r , h e h a d t o b e c o m f o r t a b l e on h o r s e b a c K , b u t P a t t o n was a n a c c o m p l i s h e d e q u e s t r i a n . In
1 9 1 2 , h e was t h e
f i r s t A m e r i c a n A r m y o f f i c e r t o c o m p e t e i n t h e O l y m p i c Games o n
35
t h e U.S.
Modern P e n t a t h l o n Team a n d f i n i s h e d a r e s p e c t a b l e
J. Persh ing
p u r s u i t of
'5
a i d e d u r i n s P e r s h i n g 's p u n i t i v e e x p e d i t i o n
in
Pancho V i l l a .
V i l l a ' s men,
including Villa';
I P a t t o n s e r v e d as P e r s h i n g ' s a i d e and H e a d q u a r t e r s
Commandant a n d t h e n j o i n e d t h e f l e d 9 1 i n s Flmer i c a n TanK C o r p s . He s u p e r v i s e d t h e t r a i n i n g o f t h e new Flmerican TanK C o r p s a n d l e d t h e 3 0 4 t h TanK B r i g a d e Meuse-Flrgonne into b a t t l e at Saint-Mihiel and t h e
o f f e n s i u e a n d was w o u n d e d s e v e r e l y by rnach i n e g u n
I as a
f i r e i n t h e l a t t e r a c t i o n . He e m e r g e d f r o m W o r l d War colonel
i n command o f a t a n K b r i g a d e , d e c o r a t e d w i t h t h e
D u r i n g t h e i n t e r w a r y e a r s P a t t o n a t t e n d e d a number of
s c h o o l s as e i t h e r instructor o r student at t h e Cavalry School,
I 1 b e g a n P a t t o n was s e r v i n g a t F o r t M y e r ,
i m m e d i a t e l y t o o r g a n i z e a n d command a
V i r g i n i a a n d was s e n t b r i g a d e i n one of
1 9 4 1 . 1911 o f
Patton's experience
i n W o r l d War
I,
in the
inter-war
y e a r s , a n d h i s armured command
96
i n t o W o r l d War
11 p r e p a r e d h i m
a g a i n s t Germany,
Patton served
I A r m o r e d C o r p s Commander f o r O p e r a t i o n
a short period, as t h e Commander o f
I1
(US) C o r p s
Pass.
i n the aftermath o f
invasion o f S i c i l y ,
<US) A P w d u r i n g t h e S i c i l y Campaign.
I n b o t h t h o s e campaigns
P a t t o n c l e a r l y d e m o n s t r a t e d h e c o u l d e f f e c t i v e l y Command l a r g e m i l i t a r y u n i t s and a c h i e v e d e c i s i v e r e s u l t s .
SP
Consequently, "slapping
in
ite of
r e s e r v a t i o n s because of on S i c i l y , Army o n c e
the
infarnous
incidents. Third
(US)
E i s e n h o w e r s e l e c t e d P a t t o n t o command
i t became o p e r a t i o n a l o n t h e c o n t i n e n t o f
commander and
o p e r a t i o n a l a r t r e s t s l a r g e l y on t h e r e p e a t e d T h i r d Army
i n i t s remarKable advance f r o m t h e
CzechoslouaKia.
5
Not
then,
o p e r a t i o n s w h i l e h e was
i n command o f
1945.
T h i r d Army
i n Europe f r o m
I August
1944 t o 9 May
Much h a s b e e n w r i t t e n a n d s a i d a b o u t P a t t o n ' s f l a i r showiness and g r a n d s t a n d i n g , uniforms, obscene language, focus ins e s p e c i a l l y and, a t times,
for
on h i s f l a s h y
i s t h e thought that
- 97 -
t h e r e was r e a l l y
l i t t l e tactical
t h a t p e r h a p s h e was n o t t h e c a p a b l e p r a c t i o n e r o f
a r t the surface evidence suggests. However,
in
a n d how t o f i g h t t h e w a r r i o r he
R e c o g n i z i n g h irn f o r
ight.
98
PART II :
Oparat i o n a l Tenets
There
is a certain
r i s e t o fame
as t h e p r e - e m i n e n t
i n W o r l d War
duty
11.
it uas P a t t o n
d u r i n g h i s t o u r of
in the Office o f
t h e C h i e f of
C a v a l r y between effectively
1928 a n d 1931, a r g u e d r r a s t o b s t i n a t e l y a n d
o r t h e m e c h a n i z e d arm.
"The V a l u e o f
Cavalry"
u n i v e r s a l a v a i l a b i l i t y . " < 2 > He w e n t o n t o s a y : The 1 i m i t a t i o n i n h e r e n t i n . . . u e h i c l e s , s u c h as t h e i r i n a b i l i t y t o operate a t night, t o l i v e o f f the c o u n t r y , or t o p e n e t r a t e wood a n d m o u n t a i n s i n d u b i t a b l y stamp t h e m as a u x i l i a r i e s and n o t as supplanters o f Caualry.<B>
I 1 c a v a l r y views t o h i s l o v e of
99
c a v a l r y t r a d i t i o n and h i s l o y a l t y t o t h e C h i e f o f whom h e w r o t e .
Cavalry f o r
Had n o t l e s s p a s s i o n a t e t h i n K e r s p r e v a i l e d ,
i n t h e way o f
c o m b i n e d arms b e t w e e n 1920
in the United
i n W o r l d War
XI.
As
i t was,
1935 o n l y t h i r t y - f i u e
1938 t h a t an A m e r i c a n d e s i g n e d t a n K
Moreover, the aPPl icable infantrymen i n the "tanKs are either
was a c c e p t e d a n d s t a n d a r d i z e d .
the stage f o r
c o n c e p t i o n o f combined arms o p e r a t i o n s ,
f o r i t i s c l e a r b y w h a t h e l a t e r w r o t e a n d b y t h e way h e f o u g h t
t h a t h e t h o u g h t c o m b i n e d arms o r g a n i z a t i o n s a n d t h e i r c o r r e c t employment were i m p o r t a n t t o t h e s u c c e s s of operational art,
i n f a n t r y a n d a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n s was
in part the
i n h e r i t e d a s a f i e l d commander.
it is
the
d i v i s i o n s c i r c a 1344. d i v i s i o n was a t r i a n g u l a r
infantry
100
d i u i s i o n , so c a l l e d b e c a u s e
i t was c o m p o s e d o f t h r e e i n f a n t r y
r e g i m e n t s , e a c h o f which c o n t a i n e d t h r e e b a t t a l i o n s , and so on
f i e l d art i l l e r y , organized
in t h r e e b a t t a l ions of
105-mm
(36 t u b e s ) a n d o n e b a t t a l i o n o f
155-mm ( 1 2 t u b e s ) i t s own
howitzers.
In a d d i t i o n , each i n f a n t r y r e g i m e n t h a d
arms e l e m e n t s o f t h e d i v i s i o n ,
r e c o n n a i s s a n c e company,
a d i v i s i o n by a t t a c h i n g e x t r a a r t i l l e r y , e n g i n e e r s , o r
t r U C K
q u a r t e r m a s t e r t r u c K s . S i x quartermaster
companies,
for
e x a m p l e , c o u l d maKe a n i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n c o m p l e t e l y m o b i l e .
Generally
, infantry d iv
is i o n s
Operations battalion
(ETO) c o n t r o l l e d o n a s e m i - p e r m a n e n t
commander c o u l d a l l o c a t e , e m p l o y i n g t h e p o o l i n s c o n c e p t , a s h e
saw f i t . W e n s u i t a b l y a u g m e n t e d w i t h c o m b a t s u p p o r t u n i t s , a
d i v i s i o n c o m m a n d e r c o u l d f o r m t h r e e f o r m i d a b l e r e g i m e n t a l tasK f o r c e s o r c o m b a t t e a m s e a c h w i t h t h e i r own f i e l d a r t i l l e r y cannon company. In t h e words o f R o b e r t Kent G r e e n f i e l d ,
T h e i n f a n t r y r e g i m e n t was v i r t u a l l y a s m a l l d i u i s i o n . I t s e r v e d i t s e l f : it had a r e c o n n a i s s a n c e p l a t o o n : it
101
101a
All
i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n w i t h which P a t t o n 14,000 s t r o n g t h a t
f o u g h t was a f l e x i b l e o r g a n i z a t i o n o v e r
c o u l d b e taSK o r g a n i z e d i n t o r e g i m e n t a l c o m b a t t e a m s f o r
spec i f ic m i s s i o n s .
Complementing t h i s basic i n f a n t r y b u i l d i n g b l o c K was a i t s e l f PacKed
11,000-man
o r g a n i z a t i o n w i t h 263 m e d i u m a n d l i g h t t a n K B as i t s p r i m a r y weapon
< S e e C h a r t 4 ) . f l r m o r e d d i v i s i o n s were o r g a n i z e d i n t o t h e
a n armored i n f a n t r y r e g i m e n t composed o f t h r e e
18s-mm
and a d i v i s i o n a r t i l l e r y composed o f t h r e e
( S P ) h o w i t z e r b a t t a l i o n s . < 7 > Combat s u p p o r t e l e m e n t s i n c l u d e d a reconnaissance b a t t a l ion, engineer battal ion, and s ignal
466 o f w h i c h were h a l f - t r a C K S
f r e q u e n t l y was--augmented
an independent tanK
b a t t a l i o n o r tanK d e s t r o y e r b a t t a l i o n .
F o r command a n d c o n t r o l
p u r p o s e s , by T a b l e o f O r g a n i z a t i o n , t h e a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n h a d t h r e e tasK f o r c e h e a d q u a r t e r s c a l l e d C o m b a t Commands A ,
B, a n d
102
Reserve.
T h e s e t h r e e h e a d q u a r t e r s made
it easy f o r t h e d i v i s i o n
s p e c i f i c missions,
The c o n c e p t o f infantry in
motorizing o r mechanizing a l l t h e
in standard
d i v i s i o n s was e n t e r t a i n e d b u t r e j e c t e d b y t h e War D e p a r t m e n t
1943 i n f a u o r o f
t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f some f i f t e e n
independent
armored i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n s , armored d i v i s i o n t o g i v e
it a d d i t i o n a l
War D e p a r t m e n t a l s o p r e s s e d f o r tanK b a t t a l i o n s f o r
the fielding of
independent
infantry infantry
disparity
in the
i n t h e armored d i u i s i o n s ,
w h i c h P a t t o n h a d h i s own s o l u t i o n .
Tactical
Employment
In a
r e v e a l e d h i s v i e w of
183
T h i r d Flrrny o n
i d e a s a b o u t how
infantry
d i v i s i o n s s h o u l d be employed t a c t i c a l l y
s u b o r d i n a t e commanders e i t h e r .
and
I Knew I t P a t t o n maKes c l e a r w h a t t h e
and infantryman is
in both
d iu i s ions.
He s a y s :
i n T h i r d Army t o employ
l e t t e r s of
i n t h e S p r i n g of
I n s t r u c t i o n No.3"he tearre.
WKeS c l e a r t h e t a c t i c a l
infantry-arrmr
on t h e o t h e r hand,
infantry
"<
12)
f o r he goes o n t o
a l l o w tanK b a t t a l i o n s t o m v e forward;
104
t h e armored
i n f a n t r y and a r t i l l e r y f o l l o w c l o s e b e h i n d .
Moreover, P a t t o n d i d n o t e n u is i o n a r m o r e d i n f a n t r y r e m a i n i n g
m o u n t e d when t h e y w e n t into action.
H i s t a c t i c a l c o n c e p t , which
he labeled
infantry
a s s a u l t was t o b e s u p p o r t e d b y e v e r y w e a p o n - - m a c h i n e g u n ,
mortar,
a r t i l l e r y , A T g u n . P a t t o n ' s o p i n i o n was t h a t
.Calny
gun
a r m o r e d i n f a n t r y is n o t h i n g b u t a f o r m o f cavalry--that is, i t u s e s its v e h i c l e s t o d e p l o y mounted, s a v i n g time, avoiding f a t i g u e . I t does n o t use its u e h i c l e s - - e x c e p t r a r e l y - - f o r a mounted charge.<14:
i n 1927 h e w r o t e :
TanKs a r e i n r e a l l t y a m o d e r n v e r s i o n o f h e a v y c a v a l r y . . .Wlen s a t i s f a c t o r y m a c h i n e s a r e a v a i l a b l e , t h e y s h o u l d be formed i n t o s e p a r a t e c o r p s and u s e d , when t e r r a i n p e r m i t s , f o r t h e d e l i v e r y o f t h e f i n a l ShoCK i n s o m e g r e a t b a t t l e > when s o u s e d t h e y must b e employed r u t h l e s s l y and i n masses.<IS>
Interestingly,
although t h i s
b e e n t h o u g h t o f b y some t o b e a n i n d i c a t i o n o f how h e w o u l d u s e
t a n K s i n W o r l d War I f , P a t t o n d i d n o t a t a l l e m p l o y t a n K S i n
t h e m a n n e r t h i s p a s s a g e s u g g e s t s , a p o i n t t o be a d d r e s s e d l a t e r o n . However, h i 5 p h r a s e h ighl ight ing because
'when
i t raises two
105
impact on h i s o p e r a t i o n a l
b e s t tanK c o u n t r y
is e n e m y t e r r i t o r y d e v o i d o f A T w e a p o n s . "
It
i l l u s t r a t e s , a5 we1 I , h i s t a c t i c a l a p p r e c i a t i o n f o r t e r r a i n a n d
s u g g e s t s c o r r e c t l y t h a t h e h a d t h e same a p p r e c i a t i o n f o r
t e r r a i n o p e r a t i o n a l l y . S e c o n d , h i s remarK a b o u t t e r r a i n h e l p s
e x p l a i n why P a t t o n t h o u g h t a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n a l reconnaissance
u n i t s were i m p o r t a n t . S i n c e t m K 5 c a n n o t g o e v e r y w h e r e , P a t t o n
thought
it v i t a l t o g e t armored reconnaissance u n i t s far o u t
in
a r e a s as w e l l a s t h e e n e m y .
Such
r e c o n n a i s s a n c e e l e m e n t s were v i t a l b u t , b e c a u s e of t h e f a s t
Pace o f
armored o p e r a t i o n s ,
were o f n o u s e
i f combat
tactical level
combat
in built
UP
a r e a s is a tasK f o r
infantry.
If
w h i l e e n v e l o p i n g o r b y p a s s i n g t o s t a y o u t of
range of f l a n K i n g
anti-tanK
I06
o b j e c t i v e of
armor
i s enemy
i n f a n t r y and a r t i l l e r y ,
and above
a l l his supply
c l e a r l y t h e way t o g e t t o s u c h o b j ~ c t i u e s i s t o a t t a c K t h e enemy's f l a n K s o r r e a r .
flanK
Whenever
o r r e a r a t t a c K met o p p o s i t i o n ,
p a r t o f t h e e n v e l o p i n g f o r c e s h o u l d be d e t a c h e d and c o n t i n u e
w i t h a w i d e r e n v e l o p m e n t a g a i n s t t h e enemy.
j u s t o n e company o f t a n K S
armored
He b e l i e v e d t h a t by
i n t h e enemy's r e a r - - s u p p o r t e d w i n an engagement.
i n f a n t r y a n d a r t il l e r y - - c a n
P a t t o n 's
q u a 1 ifi e r
the
was v u l n e r a b l e t o a n enemy t a n K a t t a c K ,
P a t t o n p r e s c r i b e d t h e f o l l o w i n g measures
fill o u t h i s t a n K - i n f a n t r y
i n t h e T h i r d firmy
in infantry
to
team concept
divisions.
First,
he d i r e c t e d t h a t each
infantry division
in the Third
A r m y w o u l d h a v e one s e p a r a t e t a n K b a t t a l i o n p e r m a n e n t l y
attached. stated:
R e f l e c t i n g b o t h h i s c o n c e r n and h i s c o n c e p t ,
Patton
I n t h i s Army we w i l l
t o Keep a t
tanK b a t t a l i o n p e r m a n e n t l y a t t a c h e d t o e a c h
TanKs,
then,
were t o e x p l o i t
when p o s s i b l e a n d Keep t h e
107
i n f a n t r y o u t of
t r o u b l e when n e c e s s a r y .
fllso, t h e
image t h a t
is o n e o f t a n K b a t t a l i o n s s p r e a d f a r
l e v e l as w e l l . S e c o n d , P a t t o n a t t a c h e d o u t f r o m
T h i r d f i r m y a s s e t s t a n K d e s t r o y e r b a t t a l i o n s w h e n t h e y were n e e d e d and d i r e c t e d t h a t t h e y b e p l a c e d f a r e n o u g h f o r w a r d so
t h a t they could prevent tanKs from overrunning
infantry.
F u r t h e r , h e d i r e c t e d t h a t tanK d e s t r o y e r u n i t s n o t b e h e l d
in
r e s e r v e b e c a u s e t h e y were n o t l i K e l Y t o g e t t o t h e f r o n t i n
t i m e t o a f f e c t t h e outcome of a b a t t l e . < l S >
F l r t i l l e r y a l s o was c l e a r l y p a r t o f
P a t t o n s c o m b i n e d arms
c o n c e p t . He t h o u g h t a t t a c K s r m s t b e f u l l y c o o r d i n a t e d t o b e
successful--tanKs,
P a t t 0n t h o u g h t t h a t
i n f a n t r y , a n d g u n s must
WOPK
as a u n i t .
w h e n e v e r P o s s i b l e , i t is d e s i r a b l e t h a t t h e g u n s o p e r a t e u n d e r d i v i s i o n a l c o n t r o l , and w i t h t h e i r f o r w a r d o b s e r v e r s i n t a n K S , i m m e d i a t e l y taKe u n d e r f i r e enemy a n t i - t a n K g u n s . . . . S u c c e s s d e p e n d s upGn t h e c o o r d i n a t e d u s e o f t h e g u n s and t h e t a n K s , w i t h t h e guns paying particular a t t e n t i o n t o h o s t i l e a r t i l l e r y , and above a l l t o anti-tanK guns and o b s e r v a t i o n
POSt5.<20>
i l l u s t r a t e s h i s view t h a t massing of
a r t i l l e r y f i r e s c a n b e s t b e a c h i e v e d by l e a v i n g g u n s u n d e r diu isional control. Penetration--this For static situat ions--defense and tactical
a p p r o a c h made g o o d s e n s e , b u t
i n more f l u i d
s i t u a t i o n s r e q u i r i n 9 c o m b a t comrnands o r r e g i m e n t a l c o m b a t t e a m s t o taKe w i d e l y s e p a r a t e d r o u t e s t o s e p a r a t e o b j e c t i v e s
108
WOPK
well.
I n f a c t , i t was common
p r a c t i c e t o a t t a c h o n e f i e l d a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n t o each combat
command o r r e g i m e n t f o r m o b i l e o p e r a t i o n s . < 2 1 > N e v e r t h e l e s s , Patton's belief
i n m a s s i n g a r t i l l e r y f i r e s was s u p p o r t e d i n
During Third Flrmy's c o u n t e r a t t a c K
108 b a t t a l i o n s o f
field artillery
35 b a t t a l i o n s a l o n e , f i r i n s 94,230
111 C o r p s '
in f i v e d a y s , supported
attacK t o r e l i e v e
staff s a i d
i n t h e B u l g e by s m a s h i n g
German a s s a u l t s a n d C l e a r i n g t h e way f o r a s t e a d y , a l b e i t s l o w ,
advance.
The t e r r a i n
i n t h e A r d e n n e s c a n a l i z e d German movements
long-range
PO
i n t e r d i c t i n g f i r e s o n t h o s e Key
i n t s . <23>
In t h e L o r r a i n e Campaign,
a r e l a t i v e l y s t a t i c p e r i o d of
1944, t h e a r t i l l e r y ' s
o p e r a t i o n s f r o m S e p t e m b e r t o November a b i l i t y t o mass
i t s f i r e s a t c r i t i c a l p o i n t s a n d t i m e s wa5
For X I 1 C o r p s '
attaCK
t a c t i c a l l y d e c i s i v e time a f t e r time.
on 8
Muember, and
for
I/E
battalions,
40 command p o s t s ,
14 assembly areas,
t h e t a c t i c a l e f f e c t of massed
109
artillery
is i l l u s t r a t e d b y 3 0 t h I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n ' s a s s a u l t
On 8
Infantry
an e l a b o r a t e d e c e p t i o n plan and t h e f a c t t h a t t h e
G e r m a n s were n o t e x p e c t i n g o f f e n s i u e o p e r a t i o n s
w e a t h e r . Severe German
COUnterattaCKS
i n s u c h bad
10 N o u e m b e r
on 9 and
e f f e c t s o f w h i c h were a m p l i f i e d b e c a u s e t h e M o s e l l e b e g a n t o
rile, cutting off committed infantry units from other
d i ~ J l S i o n a 1e l e m e n t s . S e u e n t e e n a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n s f i r i n g a r o u n d t h e c l o c K were u s e d t o b r e a K u p G e r m a n C o u n t e r a t t a c K s
until divisional
EmJentUal ly
, t h e 3 0 t h D i u is i o n s u c c e e d e d i n e s t a b l i s h i n g a
its tactical success r e s t e d
l a r g e l y on t h e
bridgehead, but
In b o t h of t h e s e impeded t h e
weather t h a t
u s e of
s u p p o r t i n g a i r power f o r c e d P a t t o n a n d h i s s u b o r d i n a t e
team. P a t t o n r e c o g n i z e d t h e v a l u e o f a i r
ii0
% I % T a c t i c a l A i r Command
i n s u p p o r t o f T h i r d Army t h r o u g h o u t o p e r a t i o n s
1i a i s o n o f f i c e r t o Patton's headquarters and P a t t o n d i d n o t h e s i t a t e
if h e n e e d e d a i r s u p p o r t .
i n Europe.
sat
Weyland's
i n on a l l o p e r a t i o n s b r i e f i n g s ,
t o c a l l G e n e r a l Weyland p e r s o n a l l y
X I X TAC o p e r a t i o n s i n c l u d e d a i r r e c o n n a i s s a n c e ,
interdiction, great use. and c l o s e a i r support,
deep
a l l o f w h i c h P a t t o n made
He was p a r t i c u l a r l y p l e a s e d w h e n e v e r X I X TAC p l a n e s On
14 flugust
worKed c l o s e l y w i t h g r o u n d u n i t s . after
1944,
t w o weeKs
P a t t o n observed
c o o p e r a t i o n and r e c o r d e d h i s
J u s t e a s t o f LeMans was o n e o f t h e b e s t e x a m p l e s o f armor and a i r c o - o p e r a t i o n 1 have e v e r seen. F o r about t w o m i l e s t h e r o a d was f u l l o f enemy m o t o r t r a n s p o r t a n d a r m o r , many o f w h i c h b o r e t h e U n m i s t a K a b l e c a l l i n g c a r d o f a P-47 f i g h t e r - b o m b e r - - n a m e l y , a group o f fifty-caliber holes....<26>
I n t h a t same p a s s a g e P a t t o n g o e s o n t o e x p l a i n w h a t t w o
ingredients a r e necessary f o r Intimate confidence successful air-ground teamworK: and
and f r l e n d s h i p
r u t h l e s s d r i v i n g o n t h e p a r t o f t h e g r o u n d commander. operations
i n d l c a t e t h a t P a t t o n was a d e p t a t m e e t i n g b o t h
o p e r a t i o n s w h i l e s e r v i n g as P a t t o n ' s d e p u t y 0-2.
In
LUCKY
111
in
1 3 4 4 , t h e G e r m a n s were h a v i n g g r e a t d i f f i c u l t y
allied airpower's
moving r e s e r v e s b e c a u s e of battlefield.
On 8 A u g u s t
i s o l a t i o n of t h e
137 f r e i g h t c a r s , 505 m o t o r
780 s o r t i e s w i t h s i m i l a r r e s u l t s .
I n h i s own m e m o i r s
important t o
is w h a t e f f e c t s u c h a i r attacKs h a d on G e r m a n a b i l i t y t o
o r , equally
moue r e s e r v e s o r r e a c t t o T h i r d A r m y ' s m o v e m e n t s ,
i m p o r t a n t , how s u c h a i r a t t a c K s e n a b l e d P a t t o n t o m a n e u v e r h i s
army t o a p o s i t i o n o f a d v a n t a g e .
In t h e l a t t e r r e s p e c t ,
it
is
p l a u s i b l e t o s u p p o s e t h a t XIX T A C ' s r e c o n n a i s s a n c e a n d d e e p i n t e r d i c t i o n o p e r a t i o n s 80 m i l e s o u t t o t h e L o i r e R i v e r were what a l l o w e d Patton t o leave h i s s o u t h e r n f l a n K s t r u n g o u t and e x p o s e d a l o n g t h e L o i r e f o r o v e r 300 m i l e s , c o v e r e d o n l y b y a n i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n a n d t w o c a v a l r y g r o u p s . XIX TAC p r o v i d e d h i m t h e eyes t o s @ e deeply and, consequently, t h e time needed t o
e v e r y d a y t h e w e a t h e r p e r m i t t e d . A t n i g h t a P-61 N i g h t F i g h t e r
112
S q u a d r o n attacKed German s u p p l y r o u t e s .
I n f i v e d a y s X I X TAC
1806
c l a i m e d 3200 u e h i c l e s , 293 t a n K s a n d a r m o r e d u e h i c l e s ,
is i n c a l c u l a b l e ,
c o n t i n u o u s d a y 1 i g h t a i r o p e r a t i o n s f o r c e d t h e G e r m a n s t o moue
a t n i g h t , m a K i n g t h e i r t a c t i c a l a n d s u ~ p l yo p e r a t i o n s m o r e
d i f f i c u l t a n d s l o w i n g t h e momentum o f t h e G e r m a n a t t a c K . T h e s e
few e x a m p l e s i l l u s t r a t e a m e t h o d o f o p e r a t i o n t h a t P a t t o n
adhered t o throughout h i s series o f campaigns d u r i n g t h e L o r r a i n e Campaign, in Europe. Even
when t h e w e a t h e r was p a r t i c u l a r l y
p o o r f o r a i r o p e r a t i o n s , X I X TAC m a n a g e d t o g e t a i r c r a f t
into
t h e air in s u p p o r t of P a t t o n s o p e r a t i o n s , a t t e s t i n g t o t h e e x c e l l e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p h i s command e n j o y e d w i t h h i s s u p p o r t i n g
air component.
P a t t o n s p u b l i s h e d l e t t e r s of i n s t r u c t i o n and t h e time he
s p e n t w i t h f r o n t l i n e u n i t s a n d c o m m a n d e r s i n d i c a t e h e was b o t h s e r i o u s a n d s i n c e r e i n i m p o s i n g h i s t a c t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s on h i s c o r p s a n d d i u is i o n c o r r m a n d e r s
c e r t a i n l y enough room f o r t a c t i c a l
w h i c h P a t t o n was a l w a y s q u i c K t o r e c o g n i z e a n d a p p r e c i a t e . B u t
t a c t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s a n d p r i n c i p l e s were o n l y b u i l d i n g b l o c K s
f o r P a t t o n l s c o n c e p t i o n o f o p e r a t i o n a l a r t . What n e e d s e l u c i d a t i o n now in combat. A c c o r d i n g t o U.S.
Army d o c t r i n e
is t h e way P a t t o n o r g a n i z e d a n d e m p l o y e d c o r p s
in
1939, d i v i s i o n s were t o
be l e a n and s i m p l e o r g a n i z a t i o n s , o f f s n s i u e l y o r i e n t e d ,
to
w h i c h a t t a c h m e n t s o f c o m b a t s u p p o r t e l e m e n t s c o u l d b e made a s
113
n e c e s s a r y I C o r p s were p u r e l y t a c t i c a l h e a d q u a r t e r s t h a t were
s t r u c t u r e d t o h a n d l e a n y mix o f
When o r g a n i z e d f o r c o m b a t ,
s u p p o r t elernents, a c o r p s a r t i l l e r y h e a d q u a r t e r s ,
i n f a n t r y and one o r two armored d i u i s i o n s , one o r two c a v a l r y g r o u p s of t w o s q u a d r o n s e a c h , and a c o r p s a r t i l l e r y g r o u p composed o f f o u r o r f i v e a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n s . The c o r p s F i r e Direction Center e i t h e r controlled o r allocated f i e l d artillery b a t t a l i o n s a n d was t i e d into divisional
a r t i l l e r y FDCs, maKing
it p o s s i b l e t o c o o r d i n a t e e v e r y f i e l d a r t i l l e r y t u b e in t h e
corps,
F i e l d armies h a d t h e t a S K o f
and ass i g n ing s u p p o r t i n 9 combat s u p p o r t and combat s e r u ice support u n i t s where needed. Patton
5
T h i r d Flrmy a l s o c o n t r o l l e d
tan^
six e n g i n e e r g r o u p s , o n e a n t i - a i r c r a f t b r i g a d e , a n d o n e
destroyer brigade,
i n a d d i t i o n t o i t s many l o g i s t i c a l s u p p o r t
l o g i s t i c s flowed from t h e
units.<ZIi> Doctrinally,
communications zone
involved
i n s o m e l o g i s t i c a l m a t t e r s . Fl
1 5 , 0 0 0 c o r p s a n d army t r o o p s ,
and
10,000
114
more i m p o r t a n t ,
why P a t t o n o r g a n i z e d T h i r d A r m y
f o r combat a r e for he
t o support,
factors
among m i s s i o n ,
terrain,
a n d f o r c e s a v a i l a b l e h e c o n s i d e r e d i n taSK One s a f e g e n e r a l i z a t i o n t h a t c a n
i s t h a t he t r i e d t o o r g a n i z e c o r p s so t h a t e a c h
l e a s t one arrrmred d i v i s i o n .
controlled at
I n War A s I Knew It
1345 G e n e r a l B r a d l e y a s K c d
13th Armored D i v i s i o n f o r an
A t the time,
the
t o XX C o r p s ,
a n d P a t t o n deemed i t e s s e n t i a l
A r m o r e d D i v i s i o n i n XX C o r p s w i t h a n o t h e r a r m o r e d d i u i s i o n . remarKS,
P a t t o n ' s comment
i m p l i e s he w a n t e d t o e n s u r e e a c h o f h i s c o r p s even
if t h e t e r r a i n
h a d an a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n , zone o f
in that corps'
a c t i o n was n o t s u i t a b l e f o r
is f u r t h e r
tanKs.
T h i s approach t o
tasK o r g a n i z i n g corps
t h a t u s u a l l y P a t t o n o r g a n i z e d c o r p s w i t h two
a n d o n e a r m o r e d d i u i s i o n . Ft c o u p l e o f e x a m p l e s point.
illustrate the
its
i n Europe,
corps,
nine divisions,
and t h r e e c a v a l r y g r o u p s ,
115
V I I I Corps
8 t h I n f Oiu 83rd I n f Diu 6 t h Armd O i u 4 t h Armd O i u X I 1 Corps (Not o p e r a t i o n a l u n t i l 4 hug) 8 0 t h I n f Oiu
A s shown,
effect
in
1 August
n e i t h e r X I 1 n o r XX C o r p s was 1944.
operational
So,
b u t became o p e r a t i o n a l on o r a b o u t 4 ' A u g u s t
on
t h e o t h e r w i t h one
diuisions.
14 A u g u s t X I 1 C o r p s and assigned d i u i s i o n s ,
XX C o r p s were f u l l y o p e r a t i o n a l w i t h t h e i r
r e f I e c t i n g t h e f o l l o w i n g t a s K o r g a n i z a t i o n . (35)
116
XV C o r p s 79th Inf
XX C o r p s
the The p o i n t
is t h a t P a t t o n n e v e r e m p l o y e d h i s a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n s
in one
a r m o r e d c o r p s as h e h a d s a i d
way h e a c t u a l l y
i n 1927 t h e y s h o u l d b e u s e d . T h e
l e a v e P a t t o n open
taSK o r g a n i z e d h i s a r m y may
in penny
XV C o r p s f o r t h a t c o r p s ' m i s s i o n t o c l o s e t h e XV C o r p s h a d t w o a r m o r e d and
F a l a i s e Gap m a y h a v e b e e n c o r r e c t . two
German p a n z e r a n d s u p p l y t r a i n s u n i t s a t t e m p t i n g t o escape t o
t h e e a s t . His i n s t r u c t i o n s t o M a j o r - G e n e r a l
Haislip,
XV C o r p s
c o m m a n d e r , were t o l e a d w i t h h i s a r m o r e d d i u i s i o n s a n d f o l l o w
w I t h h is i n f a n t r y d i u is i o n s .
Recogn i z in9 t h e o r g a n i c s h o r t a g e
of
infantry
in t h e armored d i v i s i o n s b u t a l s o t h e i r c a p a b l l i t y
t o d e l i v e r shocK a c t i o n , P a t t o n d i r e c t e d H a i s l i p t o
117
u t i l i z e a l l a v a i l a b l e t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , including tanKa, t o m a i n t a i n one i n f a n t r y combat team in t h e immediate rear o f e a c h armored d i u i s i o n : t h e r e m a i n i n g combat t e a m s o f t h e t w o i n f a n t r y d i u i s i o n s t o p r o c e e d by marching.<36>
Here
i s e v i d e n c e t h a t P a t t o n was t h o r o u g h l y
f l e x i b l e in h i s
is t h a t g i u e n h i s m a t u r e c o n c e p t i o n o f how
infantry
an armored d i u i s i o n
e x p l o i t a t i o n a t t h e corps level--maKes
s e n s e . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , w h a t i t u l t i m a t e l y l e d t o was f u r t h e r
" P e n n y pacKet i n g " by c o r p s c o m m a n d e r s .
t h e c o m b a t commands o f
For
i n s t e a d of Keeping
t h e armored d i u i s i o n s t o g e t h e r , c o r p s
manner u f u r g a n i z i n g and
e c o n o m i z e a n d mass h i s f o r c e s a p p r o p r i a t e l y .
mass was n o t t h e c r i t i c a l a s p e c t f o r s u c c e s s i n p u r s u i t
operat ions; s p e e d was !
118
in t h e Lorralne
I n November
1944 X X
yet
t h e s e c o r p s w h i l e t h e y were
e n g a g e d i n t h e A r m y 's d e c i s i v e o p e r a t i o n s . <37> I n L o r r a i n e T h i r d firm? fought dispersed because of Patton's tendency t o The real
a s s i g n m i s s i o n s beyond t h e c a p a b i l i t e s of h i s u n i t s .
f a i l i n g at t h e operational
level
Is t h a t s e p a r a t e c o r p s a n d
d i v i s i o n b a t t l e s were n o t l i n K e d t o g e t h e r u n i f i e d campaign p l a n .
in a c o h e r e n t and
The o n l y p l a n a p p e a r e d t o b e t o attacK
operationally.
it
is e a s y t o s e e w h a t P a t t o n h a d
1n"Letter
of
I n s t r u c t i o n bl0.2:'
he directed
h i s c o r p s and d i v i s i o n commanders t o h o l d t h e enemy f r o n t a l l y and maneuver fire i n t o h i s rear, pointing out t h a t f l m K o r rear
is t h r e e times m o r e e f f e c t i v e t h a n f r o n t a l f i r e . H e w e n t
on t o s a y ,
H i t h a r d s o o n , t h a t is w i t h t w o b a t t a l i o n s U P I n a r e g i m e n t , o r t w o d i v i s i o n s u p i n a c o r p s , o r two c o r p s up i n an army--the i d e a b e i n g t o d e v e l o p y o u r maximum f o r c e a t o n c e b e f o r e t h e e n e m y can d e v e l o p h i s . < 3 3 >
Patton's
i m a g i n a t i v e "two UP-and-one
b a c ~ 'advice f i t s n i c e l y
119
with t h e two
i n f a n t r y a n d o n e a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n s taSK The i n f a n t r y d i v is i o n s , h e t h o u g h t ,
were p a r t i c u l a r l y w e l l s u i t e d t o a t t a C K f r o n t a l l y , p e n e t r a t i n g
o r f i x i n g t h e enemy, so t h a t t h e
more m o b i l e a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n
artillery
, command
view
i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n as t h e
Patton's rsmarKs
o p e r a t i o n s on S i c i l y i l l u s t r a t e s h i s
in
is r e f e r r i n g t o 2 n d A r m o r e d D i v i s i o n ' s
i n f a n t r y p e n e t r a t i o n of t h e German-Ital ian
i n t h e s o u t h w e s t c o r n e r o f S i c i l y o n 22 J u l y 1943. U n d e r
Hugh G a f f e y , 2 n d f w m o r e d moved
t h e command o f Major-General
r a p i d l y u p t h e west c o a s t o f S i c i l y , c o n d u c t i n g c o n v e r g i n g t a n K
a t t a c K S a g a i n s t w h a t s l i g h t r e s i s t a n c e e n e m y u n i t s were a b l e t o
offer. In t h i s a c t i o n 2nd fwmored p a s s e d b e t w e e n elements o f
a c l a s s i c case of
in Third firmy's
128
o p e r a t i o n s on t h e c o n t i n e n t . after
I n one o f X V C o r p s ' a t t a c K s h o r t l y
t h e b r e a K o u t t h r o u g h Fluranches
i n e a r l y Flusust 1944, 5 t h
F o u g k r e s and
it did.
1945, a s c l a s s i c P a t t o n b r e a K t h r o u g h o p e r a t i o n s . He
P a t t o n ' s way o f
i s correct.
on
s o a word o r t w o
is
i n o r d e r on P a t t o n ' s The s h o r t
c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e employment o f and l o n g o f
corps defensively.
i t is t h a t P a t t o n d i d n o t v i e w d e f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s
at all. Even when he was f o r c e d t o g o o n t h e
very favorably
d e f e n s i v e a t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f September
1944, P a t t o n e x h o r t e d
spirit
'Letter
of
I n s t r u c t i o n No.3"Patton
d e v o t e s o n l y one s m a l l
armored d i u i s i o n s
in defensive
121
The
l i t t l e he s a y s
i n t h i s p a s s a g e i n d i c a t e s he t h o u g h t t h e
i n defensive p o s i t ions
i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s s h o u l d be f o r w a r d
P a t t o n was
involved in,
is 6 t h FIrmored D i u i s o n s C o u n t e r a t t a c K
Infantry Division
o n 29-30 September
b y e l e m e n t s o f t h e German
Divisions,
Corps u n i t s . unit,
t o CounterattacK
X I 1 C o r p s and 3 5 t h
D i v i s i o n a t once.
This story
i s memorable b e c a u s e Eddy g o t
d i r e c t e d 6 t h FIrmored t o C O U n t e r a t t a C K
in
w h i c h armored d i v i s i o n s w e r e employed d e f e n s i v e l y .
122
Because o f
the
i n h e r e n t command o r g a n i z a t i o n o f
the
armored d i v i s i o n - - t w o
c o m b a t a n d o n e r e s e r v e command--the
The m a n n e r
i n w h i c h 9th Armored
D i v i s i o n was d i s p e r s e d a t t h e o p e n i n g o f t h e B u l g e C a m p a i g n i s f u r t h e r evidence o f t h e tendency t h r o u g h o u t t h e Europ@an Theater o f Operat i o n s t o d i s p e r s e armored d i v i s i o n s s e p a r a t e l y e m p l o y e d c o m b a t commands. the clear focus not operational Consequently, into defensively level,
.
"two
b a c K " c o n c e p t a t t h e army l e v e l a s w e l l a s c o r p s a n d
i s revealed 1 Knew
i n h i s war d i a r y ,
published under t h e t i t l e
War Fls
o n 20 S e p t e m b e r
1944,
he says,
confirmed h i s b e l i e f
three corps
c o u l d have a t t a c K e d s t r a i g h t H i s c o n c e p t was t o
i n t o Germany t o w a r d s F r a n K f u r t .
p a r t i c u l a r o p e r a t i o n would have supported t h e o v e r a l l t h e a t e r strategy. Presumably, s e i z u r e o f a bridgehead over t h e Rhine i n d u s t r i a l r e g i o n around Germany t o s u r r e n d e r
FranKfurt-Kassel-Coblenz
would force
123
unconditionally.
B e 1 i e v i n g t h e R u h r was m o r e v i t a l ,
i t t h e way P a t t o n d i d ,
Eisenhower
which
in support
a p o i n t t o be d i s c u s s e d
The m o r e
I n Uar fls
1 Knew
It P a t t o n rnaKes a d i s t i n c t i o n He s a y s :
between s t r a t e g y and t a c t i c s .
"tactics"
i s not
is
What h e
implies
t h a t s t r a t e g y s e t s t h e end o r o b j e c t i v e , fixed,
which
is f a i r l y well
achieving
a n d t a c t i c s a r e t h e v e r y f l e x i b l e means f o r How o p e r a t i o n a l a r t ,
strategic goals. f i t s
is c l e a r is t h a t
concept
i s an o p e r a t i o n a l
This s t e a m r o l l e r approach
i s i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h P a t t o n ' s own
F o r example,
his turning
i n an e f f o r t
i n mid-flugust
a t t a c K i n g t h e enemy's weaKness--his
in the Palatinate
124
Campaign T h i r d Army e x e c u t e d an e n v e l o p m e n t a c r o s s t h e Palatinate region i n March 1945 t h a t smashed German A r m y Group Here i s o p e r a t i o n a l a r t a t its
0 a g a i n s t t h e Rhine R i v e r .
best--or
w o r s t c o n s i d e r i n g t h a t many o f t h e
18 d i v i s i o n s a t
F a l a i s e escaped f r o m t h e e n c i r c l e m e n t , t h e i r equipment.
a l b e i t w i t h o u t most o f
Patton's vocabulary,
t o a c h i e v e a d e c i s i v e a d v a n t a g e o v e r t h e ensmy as h e d i d a t
Falaise, t h e Bulge, and
i n t h e P a l a t i n a t e i n d i c a t e s he
art.
u n d e r s t o o d how t o c o n d u c t o p e r a t i o n a l
Conclusions
F r o m t h i s s e c t i o n on Combined Arms O p e r a t i o n s
it
is fair
t o draw t h r e e b r o a d c o n c l u s i o n s - - c a l l
P a t t o n ' s conduct of Patton believed operational a r t .
it i s quite clear
i n an i n t e g r a t e d c o m b i n e d arms c o n c e p t a t t h e
I n f a n t r y and a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n s were which suggest a f i r s t t e n e t :
d i v i s i o n and c o r p s l e v e l .
h i s c o m b i n e d arms b u i l d i n g b l o c K S ,
Second,
mix o f
the tenet:
12s
T h i s t e n e t may b e h a r d t o a c c e p t ,
o r g a n i z e an a r m o r e d c o r p s o r e v e n a n a r m o r e d h e a v y c o r p s a n d
his,
at
least,
t a c i t a c c e p t a n c e o f t h e d i s p e r s e d employment of
armored d i v i s i o n s
i n combat command-size
Third,
t e n e t a s one b y w h i c h h e o p e r a t e d . massed a r t i l l e r y
f i r e s under c e n t r a l i z e d c o n t r o l a r e an Hence, a
i n t e g r a l p a r t o f a c o m p l e t e c o m b i n e d arms c o n c e p t . t h i r d tenet:
i n W o r l d War
infantry
a l l h i s c a r e e r and
I saw t h e
i n f 1i c t .
There
i s no eu i d e n c e
P a t t o n e v e r t h o u g h t one a r m a l o n e c o u l d b e d e c i s i v e .
of
in s p i t e in the
even
Office
is of
interest--maybe
surprising--is
t h e manner
in which P a t t o n a c t u a l l y p u t t h e
various a r m together
i n h i s c o r p s a n d demanded t h e y b e u s e d .
far
instance, i s especial I y
H i s d i s p e r s i o n o f armor a s s e t s ,
In fast-moving
a r m r had no obu i o u s d e t r i m e n t a l
126
effects.
But
i n more s t a t i c s i t u a t i o n s , L o r r a i n e f o r i n s t a n c e , German
t h e d i s p e r s i o n o f a r m o r e u e n s u r p r i s e d soma h i g h - l e u e l commanders. In d e f e n s e o f P a t t o n ,
i t can b e a r g u e d t h a t s u c h
d i s p e r s i o n of
a r m o r e d u n i t s was t h e l o g i c a l o u t c o m e o f linear
all
E i s e n h o w e r ' s b r o a d f r o n t s t r a t e g y . FI f u n d a m e n t a l l y
b a t t l e f i e l d 956 K i l o m e t e r s l o n g a n d a l i m i t e d n u m b e r o f
t y p e s of
d i u is i o n s u i r t u a l l y d i c t a t e d t h a t a r m o r e d d i u is i o n s and h o l d l a r g e f r o n t a g e s , and c o u l d n o t ,
had t o
OCCUPY
s u g g e s t s a n o t h e r t o p i c of
O f f e n s i u e flct i o n .
127
OFFEWIVE flCTION
AttacK
e s p e c i a l l y t h e b a t t l e f i e l d a t F o r t Douamont.
11, e c h o e s P a t t o n ' s
i n one o f h i s prefaces in
I Knew I t :
He C P a t t o n l c o n d u c t e d A m e r i c a n t r o o p s t h r o u g h t h r e e y e a r s o f s u c c e s s f u l o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t t h e enemy. He n e v e r i s s u e d a d e f e n s i v e o r d e r . H i s theory--ATTACK, f l T T f l C K , ATTACK, and, when i n d o u b t , flTTflCK a g a i n - - s h o r t e n e d t h e war b y n e v e r g i v i n g t h e enemy a c h a n c e t o o r g a n i z e o r r e o r g a n i z e e n o u g h t o maKe a concerted attacK a g a i n s t him.<47>
HarKins t h e war
'
i s not debatable
is that
Patton
successful operational
his way, t h e r e n e v e r w o u l d
l e a s t P a t t o n would never and
or at
his conception o f t a c t i c a l
128
O p e r a t i o n a l a r t was c o n t i n u o u s o f f e n s i v e B e a t r i c e Flyer P a t t o n ,
action.
FIccnrding t o
h i s w i f e and most a r d e n t s u p p o r t e r .
Fllthough she does n o t m e n t i o n w h i c h t h r e e d e f e n s i v e a c t i o n s she had i n mind o r what t h e c r i t e r i a a r e f o r Beatrice Patton's point
i s c l e a r enough.
"successful" action,
P a t t o n was a g r e a t it, p r a c t i c e d h i s
s t u d e n t o f m i l i t a r y h i s t o r y who, hobby of
a s she p u t s
warf i g h t i n g b y s t u d y i n s "h i s t o r y s e a s o n e d w i t h
. ."<49>
in
w h a t h i s t o r y h a d l e d P a t t o n t o b e l i e v e was t h a t
i n offensive action,
a t P a t t o n ' s campaigns c o n f i r m s t h i s o p e r a t i o n a l t e n e t .
To b e g i n ,
P a t t o n h a d some b r o a d
i d e a o f w h a t was g o i n g t o
t h e lessons o f h i s t o r y , and S i c i l y ,
a n d rrmre
N o r t h flfrica
w e r e t h a t s u c c e s was
fldditionally,
coordinated--synchron ized?--attacKs
12s
w i l l be t r u e t o h i s p r i n c i p l e s and w i l l
attacK. S t o p p i n g h i s
Initial
a t t a c K w i l l t h e n p r o m p t t h e enemy t o C o u n t e r a t t a c K w i t h
i n an e f f o r t t o c r e a t e large s a l i e n t s i n
several d i v i s i o n s
The a n s u e r t o s u c h attacKs is t o attacK h i m o n t h e f l a n K o f h i s s a l i e n t . F o r s u c h o p e r a t i o n s armor a n d g u n s C a r t i l l e r y l a r e t h e s u r e s t a n s w e r . To m a K e s u c h attacKs a g a i n s t l a r g e c o u n t e r a t t a c K s , w e m u s t Know w h e r e we a r e g o i n g , a n d we m u s t a t t a C K w i t h v i o l e n c e , speed and precis ion. (51 >
Two a s p e c t s . o f of
t h i s p a s s a g e d e s e r v e comment.
First,
by t h e e n d
i d e a a b o u t how
a r t . H e was,
t h e n , w e l l S t u d i e d a n d Knew h i s e n e m y ' s o p e r a t i o n a l m e t h o d s .
Second, he had an idea--even
if
unref ined--about
how h e
t h a t o n e s h o u l d a l w a y s attacK. in August
1944 P a t t o n
went f o r w a r d t o u l s l t G e n e r a l Eddy a t h i s c o r p s h e a d q u a r t e r s
a n d f o u n d Eddy t o b e d i s p i r i t e d . Elements of the 35th Infantry
130
them t o f i r e
i n t o t h e town.
being h e a v i l y attacKed;
COPPS.
things were j u s t n o t g o i n g w e l l
P a t t o n t o l d E d d y t w o s t o r i e s d e s i g n e d t o h e l p h i m Keep
in perspective.
things
First,
h e r e m i n d e d Eddy o f
U.S.
Grant's
words
"In
h e r e c o u n t e d R o b e r t E.
Chancellorsuille:
so
i n and o p e r a t e d b y t h e p r i n c i p l e :
attacK
i s " N e u e r g i u e UP
ground.
In h is'letter
of
I n s t r u c t i o n No . 2 " t o
corps and
d i u i s i o n commanders P a t t o n f i r m l y e s t a b l i s h e s t h i s c o r o l l a r y ,
saying,
P a t t o n d i d n o t have a u e r y f i r m U n d e r s t a n d i n g o f d e f e n s i v e operational a r t .
If the true objectiue o f operational a r t
is
t h e d e s t r u c t i o n of
enemy f o r c e s ,
t h e n g i v i n g UP g r o u n d
in order
It i s n o t c l e a r t h a t P a t t o n u n d e r s t o o d ,
Manste in, a n d o t h e r German g e n e r a l s d i d ,
i n t h e way
that
131
c o u l d suggest he u n d e r s t o o d d e f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n a l
a b r i d g e h e a d as s o o n a s c o m i n g t o a r i v e r . at least three-fold s e i z u r e of
i n demanding t h i s o p e r a t i o n a l t e c h n i q u e .
i s o f f e n s i v e l y o r i e n t e d and,
as
First, such,
a bridgehead
s t o p p i n g and g o i n g o v e r on t o t h e d e f e n s i v e . d i s r u p t s t h e enemy's p l a n ,
it
initiative,
f a c i l i t a t e s future--offensive--operat
in the Lorraine
l o o K i n g a t war t h a t s h o u l d n o t e s c a p e
Fln o f f e n s i v e s p i r i t
i s c r u c i a l t o success
a n d P a t t o n s p e n t much o f
as w e l l a s o p e r a t i o n a l l y ,
h i s t i m e a s a commander
W i t h thi
i m b u i n g h i s commanders a n d s o l d i e r s To w h a t e x t e n t t h i s o f f e n s i v e
offensive
spirit.
132
s p i r i t made U P f o r t a c t i c a l of
o r o p e r a t i o n a l errors on t h e p a r t
P a t t o n o r h i s c o m n a n d e r s remains U n K n O w n . P a t t o n a l s o r e c o g n i z e d t h a t t h e t i m i n g o f a t t a c K s is
even i n t h e most o b s c u r e of s i t u a t i o n s . A t t h e b e g i n n i n g
instance, Eisenhower c a l l e d a
13 D e c e m b e r 1344 t o
of
t h e Bulge Campalgn, f o r
m e e t i n g o f s e n i o r commanders a t Verdun on
d i s c u s s what s h o u l d b e d o n e a b o u t t h e German c o u n t e r - o f f e n s i u e . M e n a s K e d w h e n h e c o u l d maKe a s t o n g a t t a C K w i t h s i x divisions, P a t t o n r e p l i e d t h a t h e c o u l d maKe a s t r o n g a t t a c K in t h r e e days, but t h a t he could not some d a y s l a t e r . In s p i t e of
a t t a C K w i t h more t h a n t h a t u n t i l
Eisenhower
' 5
Eisenhower t h a t a s t r o n g a t t a C K
d i v i s i o n s was b e t t e r t h a n w a i t i n g t o a t t a c K w i t h s i x b e c a u s e o f
t h e s u r p r i s e g a i n e d . <S4> P a t t o n ' s
PO
int
of
c o u r s e , was t h a t
t h e t i m i n g o f t h e attacK w o u l d s u r p r i s e t h e Germans a n d 1 i K e l Y upset their timetable. further revealed Patton's seriousness about t h i s point
K
is
i n h i s i n s i s t e n c e t h a t General M i l 1 i
in
'5
III
fls
C o r p s attacK a s s o o n as i t c o u l d d u r i n g t h e B u l g e C a m p a i g n .
it turned out,
wholly
ignorant of
i n f r o n t of
i t and o n e day a h e a d of
P a t t o n ' s p r e d i c t ion.
133
of
in the early r e l i e f of
Bastogne.<SS> L a t e r Middleton,
i n t h e B u l g e C a m p a i g n when G e n e r a l
asKed t o d e l a y h i s c o r p s ' Patton
commanding V I I I C o r p s ,
In t h e
German c o u n t e r - a t t a c K diuisions:<56>
Needless t o say,
s u c c e s s and c l a i m e d ,
probably correctly,
V I I I C o r p s ' C o u n t e r a t t a c K h e l p e d Keep o p e n t h e t e n u o u s c o r r i d o r
between f w l o n and Bastogne.
Speed o f O p e r a t i o n s
There
i s n o d o u b t t h a t a s e c o n d Key o p e r a t i o n a l t e n e t o f
P a t t o n ' s u n d e r t h e c a t e g o r y o f O f f e n s i v e A c t i o n was1
Speed o f o p e r a t i o n s
i s e s s e n t i a l t o success.
Patton's advice t o P a t t o n on
a t t h e e n d o f P a t t o n ' s r a p i d sweep a c r o s s He w r i t e s :
western France--is
revealing.
I have one p r i n c i p l e i n t h e s e o p e r a t i o n s . . . a n d
this
is
134
t o - - " F i l l t h e unforgiving minute with s i x t y seconds w o r t h o f d i s t a n c e r u n . " T h a t is t h e w h o l e a r t o f war, a n d when y o u g e t t o b e a g e n e r a l , r e m e m b e r i t . < S 6 >
I t r e q u i r e s no g r e a t powers of
a n a l y s i s t o s e e w h a t P a t t o n was
P r o c l a i m i n g i n t h i s passage, and it relates t o P a t t o n ' s thinKing about t i m e and t i m i n g d i s c u s s e d above. Because time
is
t i m e i s a v a i l a b l e . P a t t o n ' s o p i n i o n was t h a t
i n war
" I n s m a l l o p e r a t i o n s a s i n l a r g e , s p e e d is t h e
is b y MaKing t h e n e c e s s a r y r e c o n n a i s a n c e . H i s
c o n c e p t was t o g e t a r m o r e d r e c o n n a i s s a n c e u n i t s a u t
in f r o n t
f a r e n o u g h t o m a i n t a i n c o n t a c t w i t h enemy u n i t s a n d t o f i n d s u i t a b l e r o a d nets t h a t w i l l s u p p o r t armored o r mechanized columns. Reconnaissance elernents n o t o n l y can f i n d where t h e enemy not.
is, b u t ,
equally
is
When r e l a y e d
i n f o r m a t i o n can e n a b l e t a c t i c a l
e n v e l o p , o r s e n d enemy u n i t s i n t o h e a d l o n g f l i g h t .
135
prOperl!J
was e s s e n t i a l Many t i m e ;
at
as w e l l as t h e t a c t i c a l .
t h r a u g h o u t o p e r a t ions.
had t o r e i g n
i n E u r o p e G e n e r a l s B r a d l e y and E i s e n h o w e r
hacty or
i n h i s mouements,
logistical risK.
Patton,
on t h e o t h e r hand,
it alrnoit
because
attacKed faster
would r e t a i n t h e
i t and,
h e was n o t s a t i s f i e d w i t h
'5
E i s e n h o w e r I s , B r a d l e y ' 5 , o r Montgomery
COBRR.
t h i n K i n g on O p e r a t i o n
He 2 a y s :
I was a l s o c e r t a i n t h a t , b y p u z h i n g h a r d e r , we c o u l d advance f a s t e r . I s t a t e d a t t h e t i m e , snd s t i l l be1 i e v e , t h a t two armored d i v i s i o n s , preceded by a heavy a r t i l l e r y c o n c e n t r a t i o n u s i n g a i r b u r s t s , and f o l l o i i e d b y two i n f a n t r y dilJi%iOn%, c o u l d haue c u t s t r a i g h t down t h e w e s t c o a s t t o f l u r a n c h e s w i t h o u t t h e n e c e s s i t y o f w a i t i n g f o r an a i r b l i t z . < 5 9 \
It
i s notable t h a t Patton
i s a d v o c a t i n g n o t o n l y speed of
b u t t h e use o f c o n c e n t r a t i o n s o f s o m e t h i n g he n e v e r a c t u a l l y Patton believed that a did
operations armor
i n t h i s passage,
t o p e n e t r a t e and e x p l o i t ,
i n any o f h i 5 o p e r a t i o n s . . r a p i d c ingle-army
Similarl?,
t h r u s t t h r o u g h t h e Saar r e g i o n of
Germany
I3G -
i n t o the FranKfurt-Coblenz t h e c a p i t u l a t i o n of
a r e a of
Germany w o u l d p r e c i p i t a t e
Germany.
He b e l i e v e d t h a t h e c o u l d h a v e crossing the
t h e r e b y S h o r t e n i n g t h e war b y
i s some e v i d e n c e t h a t P a t t o n ' s
Paratroop O i u i s ion,
says t h i s o f P a t t o n '
operat ions:
W e a l w a y s c o n f i d e n t l y r e l i e d on A l l i e d h e s i t a n c y t o e x p l o i t s u c c e z s t o g i v e u s t i m e ' t o w i t h d r a w and r e g r o u p i n o r d e r t o s l o w UP t h e n e x t t h r u s t . B u t w i t h y o u r G e n e r a l P a t t o n i t was d i f f e r e n t . He was v e r y aggressive i n e x p l o i t i n g a penetration. His b r e a K t h r o u g h a t f l u r a n c h e s was a n o u t s t a n d i n s e x a m p l e o f t h i s . So was h i s p h e n o m e n a l c a m p a i g n i n t h e Palat inate. (60)
Schimpf
commanders,
K n O c K i n g t h e enemy o f f
balance by developing t a c t i c a l
t h a n t h e enemy c a n c o p e w i t h t h e m .
a n a l y s is on t h e s i n g l e - a r m y
t h r u s t Concept,
Schimpf goes on t o s a y t h a t
t t l h e r e i s n o q u e s t i o n t h a t if y o u r T h i r d Army h a d n o t been h a l t e d b e f o r e Metz i n September, it c o u l d have p e n e t r a t e d t h e S i e g f r i e d L i n e v e r y q U l C K l Y and b e e n on t h e R h i n e i n a s h o r t t i m e . A t t h a t t i m e we w e r e powerless t o cope w i t h t h e s i t u a t i o n i n t h a t p o r t i o n o f t h e F r o n t . B u t when Y o u r T h i r d Army was h a l t e d , we o b t a i n e d t h e t i m e t o r e g r o u p and ue used t h a t opportunity t o the utmost.<61>
137
Even
if
remarKs r i n g t r u e : s p e e d o f o p e r a t i o n s d e v e l o p s f a v o r a b l e
operational
s i t u a t i o n s w h i c h , t o b e o p e r a t i o n a l l y d e c is i u e ,
in a t i m e l y fashion. Patton had a g r e a t feel
must be e x p l o i t e d
conaiderations
i n war. W h a t , f o r e x a m p l e , w o u l d h a v e b e e n t h e
if Patton, Knife-liKe, had t h r u s t
e f f e c t on t h e a t e r s t r a t e g y
h i s army into the
industrial
Saar a s h e p r o p o s e d ? C h a p t e r 4
it h e r e t o s a y t h a t
is a b s o l u t e l y e s s e n t i a l f o r
l e v e l o f war.
E n v e l o p t h e Enemy
a t t a c K s a l o n e made 1 i t t l e s e n s e t a c t i c a l l y . H e f o r e s a w in meeting
t h a t f o r w a r d movement would p r o b a b l y r e s u l t
138
operations
d e s i g n e d t o e n v e l o p t h e enemy w e r e a l s o a p p r o p r i a t e level.
A few
a t the operational
examples f r o m h i s o p e r a t i o n s First,
in
E u r o p e show t h i s t o b e t h e c a s e .
XV C o r p s
i n a t u r n i n g movement
P a t t o n ' s employment o f
a g a i n s t F i f t h P a n z e r Army, illustrates
style
the fact--such
a n e n v e l o p m e n t m i g h t come a b o u t Haislip,
XV C o r p s
i n h i s remarK t o General
A f t e r s e t t i n g t h a t corps flanK
in motion i n t o t h e 80-mile
France, and t h e
a t Mortain,
P a t t o n t o l d H a i s l i p n o t t o be h e r e c e i v e d o r d e r s t o move Patton
if,i n s h o r t o r d e r ,
n o r t h e a s t or d u e n o r t h t o w a r d A r g e n t a n . < 6 2 > E u i d e n t a l l y ,
Patton's conception of
t h e Bulge c o u n t e r a t t a c K plan.
His
i n i t i a l reaction t o reports
V I 1 I C o r p s , was t h a t A11 i e d
t o allow the Then,
commanders s h o u l d h a v e t h e
intestinal fortitude
German a t t a c K t o d e v e l o p a n d r e a c h
i t s culminating point.
139
MILLS
rnt7-C
s i m i l a r . t h r u s t f r o m Montgomery
' 5
forces--would
t h e WeaKest e l e m e n t s o f t h e a t t a C K i n g German a r m i e s ,
t o w a r d B i t b u r g and course,
~ a r t i c u l a r l yh i s o f operations
in a
i n t o Germany.
Eisenhower, he t h o u g h t , plan,
risKY
Schimpf,
enemy f o r c e s
immediate a f t e r m a t h of
Germany t o w a r d C o b l e n z o n t h e R h i n e R i u e r . s e i z u r e of
i n a p o s i t i o n t o t a K e enemy f o r c e s
w e r e h o l d i n g up S e v e n t h Army.
F i r s t and S e v e n t h R r m i e s i n t h e r e a r
e n v e l o p e d a n d c r u s h e d Rrmy G r o u p G a g a i n s t t h e R h i n e R i v e r .
W i t h W a l t o n ' s XX C o r p s o n t h e r i g h t f l a n K ,
the center,
E d d y ' s X I 1 Corps
in
T h i r d Army
and f o r c e d t h e s u r r e n d e r of
140
(Feb-Mar 1945)
Nap 6
- 140a
o f Army
German s o l d i e r s
in droves,
German command a n d c o n t r o l e v a p o r a t e d
As P a t t o n
recognized,
bold--even
r isKy--rapid
envelopments,
can be o p e r a t i o n a l l y
at Argentan-Falaise
imply
t h a t he a t t e m p t e d t o adhere t o t h e P r i n c i p l e :
In fact,
t h a t e l e m e n t s of
Commanding G e n e r a l o f
i n w h i c h Gerow
o n e 0.F t h e m
" C o n g r a t u l a t i o n on e n v e l o p i n g t h r e e Armies,
o p e r a t i o n a l a r t as e s s e n t i a l l y a s e r i e s Of
actions.
To b e d e c i s i v e , s u c h o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s
incessant s e r i e s o f t a c t i c a l and
executed w i t h g r e a t speed,
i n an e n v e l o p m e n t o f
l a r g e enemy
f o r c e s t o ensure t h e i r
defeat.
141
COMMfWdl a n d CONTROL
I n e a r l y August i n T h i r d Flrmy,
1944,
General H a i s l i p ,
commanding XV C o r p s
and P a t t o n g o t
i t was T h i r d A r m y ' s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o m a i n t a i n
communications w i t h Finally,
i t s corps,
P a t t o n was n o t m o l l i f i e d .
Haislip said,
When H a i s l i p f i n i s h e d ,
H a i s l i p h a d s o m e t h ng t h e r e . because it is mild y
amusing--Patton it
g e t t i n g a dose of
h i s own
med i c i n e - - b u t
a l s o because art:
i l l u m i n a t e s a c e n t r a l t e n e t of
P a t t o n 's o p e r a t i o n a l
Command a n d l e a d a t t h e f r o n t .
In 'Letter
of
I n s t r u c t i o n No. 1 " t o
d i u i s i o n a n d c o r p s commanders
"Ce l a c h , i n h i s a p p r o p r i a t e s p h e r e ,
w ill
I n t h a t same d o c u m e n t h e made i t c l e a r
of
t h a t h e e x p e c t e d e i t h e r t h e commanding g e n e r a l o r h i s c h i e f
142
staff
a n d o n e member o f
each s t a f f
T h i s p o l i c y aPPl i e d t o s i g n a l ,
engineer,
u n i t s would be
t o r e p o r t o n any
in executing
officers,
s h o u l d go f o r w a r d t o s e e t h e j u n i o r
officers.
An e x c e p t i o n t o
i s necessary
and s e n i o r commanders.
t h e r e a s o n s P a t t o n was w i l l i n g t o e n d u r e t h e t e s t y G e n e r a l H a i s l i p was t h a t h e h a d n o p a t i e n c e f o r
is
On t h e h a z a r d s o f
comnanding t o o f a r t o t h e r e a r ,
P a t t o n says:
143
i n a d u i s a b i l i t y o f commanding
in Patton's
i n and a r o u n d Bastogne d u r i n g t h e B u l g e
a t b e s t was a m b i v a l e n t a b o u t w h a t issue contradictory orders.
consequently,
t o do and a t w o r s t p r o n e t o f a i r n e s s t o Eisenhower,
In
i t s h o u l d be p o i n t e d o u t t h a t
in the
a f t e r m a t h o f t h e German B u l g e o f f e n s i v e Staff
t h e Combined C h i e f s o f and
d i r e c t e d Eisenhower t o r e t a i n an o p e r a t i o n a l r e s e r u e ,
An
Eisenhower's order To
t o s e n d an a r m o r e d d i u i s i o n t o t h e c i t y o f L u x e m b o u r g . arrange f o r t h e r e l i e f and w i t h d r a w a l o f
4 t h Armored D i v i s i o n ,
P a t t o n went f o r w a r d
the affected
commanders o n l y r e c e i v e d t h e o r d e r t o r e l i e v e 4 t h 1030 h o u r s on
Armored D i u i s i o n a t a b o u t
10 J a n u a r y
1945,
before
d a r K t w o c o m b a t commands o f t h e 4 t h A r m o r e d D i v i s i o n s t a r t e d f o r Luxembourg u i a A r l o n . < 6 9 > B o t h t h i s a c t i o n and P a t t o n ' s remarKs about E i s e n h o w e r ' s f a i l u r e amount o f h i s t i m e w i t h f o r w a r d t o spend a s i g n i f i c a n t
a r m i e s and c o r p s s u g g e s t s an
144
o p e r a t i o n a l t e n e t b y w h i c h P a t t o n e x e r c i s e d command a n d control:
The o f t - r e p e a t e d
1944 P a t t o n
the officers
a n a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n 1 i n e d UP o n a r o a d .
f r o m d i v i s i o n h e a d q u a r t e r s w e r e s t u d y i n g a map f o r t h e p u r p o s e ,
so t h e y s a i d ,
Riuer.
of
RemarKing t h a t
there
r e c o n n a i s s a n c e b y commanders,
tactical
aperat ional
a s h i s comment a b o u t
w e r e u s u a l l y f o r w a r d w h e r e some c r u c i a l p h a s e o f
was o n g o i n g .
an o p e r a t i o n
F o r example,
r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t t h e p o t e n t i a l was
high for
t h i n g s t o go wrong
i n and a r o u n d Avranches w h i l e h i s
P a t t o n made
145
s u r e h e was t h e r e t o p r e v e n t o r r e d u c e f r i c t i o n .
His traffic
d i r e c t i n g i n A v r a n c h e s t o u n t a n g l e t r a f f i c j a m s seems l a u g h a b l e until it
is realized that
in
b o t h Ardennes o f f e n s i v e s ,
i t means
Another example,
w h i c h has a l r e a d y b e e n d e s c r i b e d ,
is
33th
CounterattacK
i n support of
the 35th
Infantry D i v i s i o n f r o m X I 1
C o r p s b e c a u s e t h e 3 5 t h D i v i s i o n was u n d e r t r e m e n d o u s p r e s s u r e from a t l e a s t t w o German d i v i s i o n s . Staff, visited When G e n e r a l G a f f e y , Corps t h e n e x t day t o see he discovered t h a t
P a t t o n ' s Chief of
XII
X I 1 C o r p s commander,
h a d o r d e r e d t h e 35th D i v i s i o n t o w i t h d r a w . and he
P a t t o n t o l d G a f f e y t o countermand t h e w i t h d r a w a l o r d e r ,
He f o u n d t h a t a l l t h r e e g e n e r a l o f f i c e r s w e r e f a t i g u e d a n d 5 h a K e n b y a n e a r m i s s f r o m German a r t i l l e r y e a r l i e r
i n t h e day.
As
it
a t t a c K went o f f w e l l
and p r o d u c e d a
success.
Here a g a i n P a t t o n e x e m p l i f i e s h i s b e 1 i e f t h a t
146
n o t h i n g c a n s e r v e as a n a d e q u a t e s u b s t i t u t e f o r t h e commander a t t h e c r i t i c a l p o i n t .
t h e p r e s e n c e of
And P a t t o n c l e a r l y as
a F o r w a r d E c h e l o n and an Advanced T a c t i c a l H e a d q u a r t e r s
i t was P a t t o n ' s p o l i c y
o f t h e Forward Echelon.<71> In f a c t ,
P a t t o n f u r t h e r s t i p u l a t e d t h a t t h e A d v a n c e d T a c t i c a l CP
a t army and c o r p s t h e
Chief
3 .
G-3,
Signal, and
Artillery,
cooperating a i r . Marshal,
I n add i t i o n ,
S p e c i a l Troops,
H e a d q u a r t e r s Commandant, Medical
o f f i c e r s f r o m 6-4,
Ordnance,
, Quartermaster,
and 0-5
T h i r d A r m y a l s o m a i n t a i n e d a R e a r CP w h e r e t h e G-4,
commanded b y t h e 0-4,
0-5,
Chemical Warfare,
147
Finance,
Medical,
Quartermaster,
Ordnance,
Signal,
Engineers,
Inspector General,
Judge Advocate G e n e r a l ,
and C h a p l a i n p e r f o r m e d t h e i r main
location for
a c o r p s CP was w i t h i n o n e - h a l f Such p r o x i m i t y
h o u r ' s d r i v e f r o m t h e f a r t h e s t d i v i s i o n CP.
In fact,
Patton never
In order o f
o r by
general-to-general
i t , and t h e n f o l l o w w i t h a w r i t t e n
P l a c i n g t o o much r e l i a n c e o n r a d i o s ,
a t t a c K s o n e s h o u l d maKe t h e maximum u s e o f
w i r e as t h e p r i m a r y
In
In
is d i f f i c u l t a t best.
1944,
Patton
148
Unfortunately, communication.
may h a v e b e e n P a r t o f
t h e p r o b l e m b e c a u s e he s a y s t h a t
r a d i o s s h o u l d n o t be Kept
i n t h e u i c i n c i t y o f a command p o s t .
i n highly f l u i d operations,
l a y wire a n d e s t a b l i s h e i t h e r r a d i o o r t e l e p h o n e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s
w i t h h i g h e r h e a d q u a r t e r s o r anyone e l s e f o r
that matter.
As
it
was.
T h i r d Army's
F o r w a r d E c h e l o n ( M a i n ) moved a n a u e r a g e o f
1 flugust
1944 a n d O c t o b e r
1944,
c o m m u n i c a t i o n s and h i s r e l u c t a n c e t o use r a d i o a t a l l ,
command and c o n t r o l p r o b l e m s b y m a K i n g e x t e n s i u e u s e o f plane t o trauel, the radio.<78> Another t e c h n i q u e t h a t P a t t o n used t o f a c i l i t a t e and c o n t r o l a l s o e m u l a t e d G u d e r i a n ' s approach. Patton l e f t Army, command o f one u n i t , s u c h as though, u n l i K e Guderian,
he d i d n o t r e l y on
command when
Inuar iably,
I 1 Corps o r Seventh
These
h e t o o K w i t h h i m some K e y m e h e r s o f h i s s t a f f .
149
Army
i n England,
for
instance,
h e toOK w i t h h i m s i x t e e n a T h i r d Army
s i x t e e n o f f i c e r s i s n o t many.
However, but,
w i t h few exception,
P a t t o n had a s m a l l c o r e o f b a t t l e w i s e s t a f f
a p e r i o d o f t i m e o p p o s i t e t h e i r army
l a t e r l e d t o smoother o p e r a t i o n s
in the corps.
u n i t s and
briefing to
ensure c o o r d i n a t i o n o f e f f o r t Army t h e d a i l y s t a f f
In T h i r d
d e s c r i b i n g t h e f r i e n d l y s i t u a t i o n on t h e
The G-3 a i r o f f i c e r t h e n g a v e t h e
a n d was f o l l o w e d b y t h e G - 2
operations
who g a v e a d e s c r i p t i o n o f strengths,
t h e enemy s i t u a t i o n , mouements,
pr
i s o n e r of
war
c a p a b i l i t i e s and t e r r a i n a n a l y s i s .
The 0 - 2 was
who h i g h l i g h t e d t h e
150
w o r l d news.
The C h i e f o f
Staff
over t o Patton,
usually
HOWe8Jer, P a t t o n n e u e r
b e made d u r i n g t h i s 0830 d a i l y b r i e f i n g b e c a u s e t h e
d e c i s i o n s c o n c e r n i n g f u t u r e o p e r a t i o n s a l r e a d y h a d b e e n made a t a m e e t i n g w h i c h d a i l y p r e c e d e d t h e f o r m a l 0830 s t a f f b r i e f i n g .
A t
deputy Chief of
X I X TfiC,
Staff, Patton.
a s s i s t a n t G-2, G - 3 ,
decisions about
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e 6-2 s e c t i o n interest
in i n t e l l i g e n c e rnattilrs
i n planning o p e r a t i o n s and
In planning,
C o l o n e l Oscar Koch,
t o great
c r e a t i o n of
Information Seruice.
organization, C o l o n e l E.M.
t h e 6th C a v a l r y Group,
m o n i t o r i n g t h e T h i r d firmy
151
radio traffic
it t o T h i r d Army Advanced T a c t i c a l
In a d d i t i o n t o monitoring f r i e n d l y r a d i o
r e p o r t i n g was a b s o l u t e l y c r u c i a l ,
he
" t e l e s c o p i c a l l y " e m p l o y e d 6 t h C a u a l r Y Group a s h i s e y e s and ears, b y p a s s i n g normal r e p o r t i n 9 channels.:S3> In a d d i t ion t o h i s i n c r e a s i n g use of "telescope" technique, P a t t o n made
a i r p h o t o g r a p h y a5 h e became rnore e x p e r i e n c e d
I n T u n i s i a w h i l e P p t t o n was
in
X I Corps o n l y t w o a i r p h o t o g r a p h y m i s s i o n s were
I 1 Corps d u r i n g t h e 30-day
period from
i n support o f
January-February
1943.
D u r i n g o p e r a t i o n s on S i c i l y , i n support of
140 a i r
S e v e n t h Army
I n September
can be e x p l a i n e d by o r g a n i c o r a t t a c h e d a i r firmy, of
capability.
for
example,
had a p h o t o g r a p h i c r e c o n n a i s s a n c e squadron
ten planes
i n d i r e c t s u p p o r t o n c e HUSKY b e g a n :
it
I 1 Corps had
i s also clear
t h a t P a t t o n and h i s
m r e a n d m o r e came t o r e l y o n t h e
a i r photography t o a i d
in operational planning.
152
claims t h a t
a i r photography, as he P u t s
t h e T h i r d Army s t a f f
"pegged."
i t , b e f o r e t h e a t t a c K and
inKling the
any o t h e r a l l i e d h e a d q u a r t e r s h a d a n
attacK
the
i m p e n d i n g German o f f e n s i v e for
was t h a t
i n T h i r d firmy
a r e a s o u t s i d e T h i r d firmy
boundaries.
had adequate
strength a
German b u i l d u p e a s t o f
Germans c o u l d l a u n c h a n o f f e n s i u e .
get
Hence,
least
his staff
t o b e t h i n K i n g a b o u t an o p e r a t i o n a l
concept t o is that
on t h e enemy's c a p a b i l i t i e s r a t h e r t h a n estimates.
i n t e n t i o n s when m a K i n g G - 2
I t was a p p a r e n t l y
in
t o P a t t o n t o j u d g e w h a t t h e enemy
i n t e n d e d t o do
p a r t i c u l a r cases. suggests
The o p e r a t i o n a l t e n e t t h a t t h i s d i s c u s s i o n
is:
Patton'r.
r e l i a n c e on h i s G-2
F i c K e t t ' s 6 t h C a v a l r y G r o u p h e l p e x p l a i n why,
153
P a t t o n ' s d e p u t y G-2,
it
was a l w a y s s m a s h i n g t h r o u g h v u l n e r a b l e s e c t o r s i n t h e e n e m y
1 i n e s . "':33> Although P a t t o n d i d h a v e access t o Ultra d u r i n g h i s European operat i o n s , there
is c o n f 1 i c t i n s e u i d e n c e
o n how
e x t e n s i v e l y h e u s e d t h i s s o u r c e of
information.
I t was
i n t e l l igence f r o m Ultra t h a t p r o m p t e d P a t t o n t o h a l t t h e 3 5 t h
Infantry, 30th
I n f a n t r y , a n d 2 n d F r e n c h A r m o r e d D i u is i o n s near
in early
hugust
an i m e n d i n g
German C o u n t e r a t t a c K t o c u t h i s a r m y
b l u f f . < Z S > In t h e e v e n t ,
i t was n o t a b l u f f
e l e m e n t s o f X I I , X V , a n d XX C o r p s t u r n e d o u t t o b e f o r t u i t o u s ,
f o r t h e y h e l p e d h a l t t h e German c o u n t e r a t t a c K s in and around
M o r t a i n , F r a n c e . B u t b e c a u s e of t h e d e s i r e t o s a f e g u a r d U l t r a
as a s o u r c e o f
intell igence,
i t s i n t e l l i g e n c e p r o d u c t s were
consequently,
d i s t r i b u t e d on a p u s h r a t h e r t h a n dernand b a s i s ;
it
heauily.
r e c i p i e n t on P a t t o n ' s s t a f f
c l a i m s t h a t a l t h o u g h P a t t o n i n i t i a l l y was S K e P t i c a l o f U l t r a ' s
ualue,
a5 i t p r o v e d
its r e l i a b i l i t y o v e r t i m e , P a t t o n came t o
p r e c i s e l y how m u c h
informal
154
staff
briefing.
ideas a f t e r present.
fis
it,
[ t l h i s e a r l y - h o u r b r i e f i n g l e d t o a most f r u i t f u l exchange o f i d e a s . B u t euen o f g r e a t e r i m p o r t a n c e , i t made e v e r y o n e t h e r e a w a r e o f w h a t t h e commander h a d i n m i n d , what h e w o u l d do u n d e r v a r i o u s c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h a t m l g h t a r I s e . The s t a f f was K e p t UP t o d a t e w i t h P a t t o n ' s t h i n K i n g on a d a i l y b a s i s . F u t u r e p l a n s were l a i d a n d made Known a n d a n i n t i m a c y o f t h i n K i n g developed. (91 >
K o c h ' s comment s u g g e s t s f o u r
First,
sessions w i t h c u r r e n t and
intentions f o r
b r i e f i n g t o d o some
'what-iffing"
t o s t a r t thinKing, plans f o r
if t h e y
about contingency
various
s u c h a5 t h e B u l g e
P a t t o n used these sessions t o plans, indeed whole points out that d e v e l o p and
t h i n K i n g on f u t u r e
c amp a i9 n I
maps c a n where t h e
In'ketter
of
I n s t r u c t I o n No. ? ' P a t t o n
perspect iue,
firmy a n d c o r p s commanders a r e n o t s o much i n t e r e s t e d i n how t o b e a t t h e enemy f r o m a t a c t i c a l s t a n d p o i n t a s i n w h e r e t o t e a t h i m . The w h e r e is l e a r n e d f r o m a c a r e f u l s t u d y o f r o a d , r a i l w a y , a n d r i v e r maps. The q u e s t i o n o f t h e t a c t i c a l means t o b e u s e d b y d i u i s i o n s in securing these p o i n t s is, o f necessity, studied
155
from large-scale
maps.(92>
u s e a s h e d i d o+ a 1:1,000,08D
M i c h e l i n t o u r i n g map.
I t was
J u s t s u c h a s m a l l - s c a l e map t h a t e n a b l e d P a t t o n t o d e t e r m i n e
where,
w o u l d p r o b a b l y taKe p l a c e d u r i n g a c a m p a i g n . T h i s is o n e w a y P a t t o n r a i s e d t h e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t h e would be a t t h e l o c a t i o n s
that critical
5ays
e v e n t s o r b a t t l e s w o u l d l i K e l y taKe p l a c e . Koch
1944 T h i r d A r m y e n g i n e e r s h a d
that
a5 e a r l y a s S e p t e m b e r
th@
riuers,
always i n P a t t o n s
a n a l y s i s of t h e t e r r a i n s s u i t a b i l i t y f o r
H i s t e c h n i q u e i n d i c a t e s t h a t h e was
linKage
in a
l i n K i n g CarWaignS
t h e a t e r s t r a t e g y , which s u g g e s t s
h e o p e r a t e d by t h e t e n e t :
156
Neuertheless,
well
it
i s a r g u a b l e t h a t P a t t o n d i d n o t do t h i s as
H i s h a n d l i n g of t a c t i c a l b a t t l e s during t h e Nancy
as h e z h o u l d .
L o r r a i n e Carnpaign
i n which he
1 2 t h HrmY O P O U p a c r o s s E u r o p e s u g g e s t s h e d i d n o t , s e e how h i s o p e r a t i o n s s u p p o r t e d
strategy. 1i g h t
is
i n t K o c h 's r e m a r K P a b o v e b r i n g t o
lnformal
staff
Patton's s t a f f .
i m p o r t a n t t h a t K e y members o f h i s s t a f f
s h a r e h i s v i e w o f how
6-3, C h i e f o f S t a f f ,
and C h i e f o f S t a f f o f X I X
TAC w e r e a l w a y s p r e s e n t a t t h e s e
informal sessions.
Consequently,
the fact
no d e p r e c a t i n g e f f e c t
a n d how P a t t o n t h o u g h t ,
d o what P a t t o n w a n t e d d o n e d u r i n g o b s c u r e
s i t u a t i o n s o r when P a t t o n was o u t o f t o u c h w i t h t h e m .
In theory,
P a t t o n t h o u g h t commanders s h o u l d n e v e r r o b
i n i t i a t i u e b y o u e r - c o n t o l l i n s thern.
subordinates of
He i n s i s t e d
t h a t s u b o r d i n a t e s b e t o l d w h a t t o d o b u t n o t how t o d o t h i n g s .
To g u a r d a g a i n s t o u e r - c o n t o l ,
he t h o u g h t
a n d Know t h e p o s i t i o n o f u n i t s t w o
- 157 -
e c h e l o n s down. " ( 9 4 )
an
a r m y g r o u p commander,
f o r example,
down t h e h i e r a r c h y o f c o m m a n d , a n d t h a t
i n t o t h e h a b i t of
cornrmnding t h o s e u n i t s
lose efficiency.
was n o t
e n t i r e l y a b l e t o a d h e r e t o h i s own p r i n c i p l e .
M a n y tirnes h e
d l r e c t e d d i u is i o n c o m m a n d e r s t o s e n d c o r n b a t c o m m a n d s o r r e g i m e n t s on s p e c i f i c m i s s i o n s .
H5
an example, t h e d e t a i l e d
T h i r d firmy f i f t e r A c t i o n R e p o r t r e c o r d s t h e f o l l o w i n g a c t i o n :
G i v e n P a t t o n ' s own p r i n c i p l e s f o r
control--mission orders--it
e x e r c i s i n g command a n d
is d i f f i c u l t t o j u s t i f y h i s t e l l i n g
Even s o , it is p o s s i b l e by P o i n t i n g
a c o r p s c o m m a n d e r t o move a b a t t a l i o n .
t o d e f e n d P a t t o n against t h e c h a r g e of out t h a t
over-control
i n t h e h i g h l y f l u i d and fast-mouins
m o b i l e warfare in
H i s cornrnent
15s
three enemies:
t h e Germans,
The l a s t of
these--time--is
u n f o r g i v i n g and
hence, h i s
c o n t i n u a l c o n c e r n t h a t v a l u a b l e time n o t b e w a s t e d o r t h a t f l e e t i n g o p p o r t u n i t i e s s h o u l d n o t go u n e x p l o i t e d .
Given h i s
a g g r e s s i u e p e r s o n s 1 i t y and h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e n a t u r e of combat o p e r a t i o n s ,
it
is n o t s u r p r i s i n g t h a t P a t t o n was u n a b l e
a t t i m e s t o a d h e r e t o h i s own g u i d a n c e c o n c e r n i n g o u e r - c o n t r o l
of subordinates.
159
RISK
I n h i s booK M e c h a n i z e d
I n f a n t r y R i c h a r d SimpKin s a y s t h a t in t h e
t h e broad f r o n t d o c t r i n e of
Eisenhower and
a n d t h e f u n d a m e n t a l American c o n c e p t s o f t h e v a l u e of
firepower
and t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f a f i r e b a s e . However,
SimpKin g o e s on t o s a y t h a t
As
i n t h e c a s e o f G u d e r i a n , a n a n a l y s i s of P a t t o n ' s c o n d u c t of high
o p e r a t i o n a l a r t r e v e a l s t h a t h e e l e c t e d t o a c c e p t risK--a
degree a c c o r d i n s t o Spe i d e l --in
o r d e r t o a c h ieue o p e r a t i o n a l
r i s K a c c e p t a n c e a n d r is.^ r e d u c t i o n
is a p p r o p r i a t e ,
and t h e
l o g i s t ical sustainment.
FlanKs
Patton's operations
i n Europe a l l
indicate t h a t he adhered
in h i % o p e r a t i o n s t o t h e f o l l o w i n g o p e r a t i o n a l t e n e t :
166
It i s
instructive,
first,
t o get a
R f t e r h i s morning s t a f f
d a y b e f o r e T h i r d Army became o p e r a t i o n a l
in Europe,
of
d e l i v e r e d t h e f o l l o w i n g remarlcs on t h e :ub.ject
flanKs:
F o r g e t t h i s goddamned b u s i n e s s o f w o r r y i n g a b o u t o u r flanKs. W e must guard o u r f l d n K S , b u t n o t t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t we d o n ' t do a n y t h i n g e l s e . Some goddamned f o o l once s a i d t h a t f l a n K s must be secured, and s i n c e t h e n s o n s - o f - b i t c h e s a l l o v e r t h e w o r l d haue been . F l a n ~ sa r e g o i n g c r a z y g u a r d i n g t h e i r f lanlcs.. s o m e t h i n g f o r t h e enemy t o w o r r y a b o u t . N o t u s . < 9 7 >
Beneath t h e e a s i l y - i m a g i n e d remarKS,
t h e a t r i c s t h a t accompanied P a t t o n ' s
t h e r e was u n d o u b t e d l y s e r i o u s n e s s o f t h e f i r s t o r d e r .
i s probable
b u t t o l e r a b l y expobed f l a n K s
in fact,
c i t e s o n l y two
hours:
leave h i s army's r i g h t f l a n K
open d u r i n g h i s sweep f r o m
e x p o 5 e d P a t t o n ' s army t o d e s t r u c t i o n f r o m t h e a i r
161
how P a t t o n r e d u c e d r i S K t o
breaKins o u t of unique of
in Patton's operations.
It i s a r g u a b l e t h a t d u r i n g r m s t
h i s operations and,
c o n v e r s e d a t t h e f+Jranches
a distance o f
if a
P a t t o n was w o r r i e d t h a t
infantry.
(2) do n o t taKe c o u n s e l of
i n Avranches t o e n s u r e t h e r e w o u l d be no
The p a s s a g e o f
V I I I a n d XV C o r p s w i t h i n
P a t t o n says,
twenty-four
h o u r s was o n e o f t h o s e t h i n g s , b u t was.
that
I t was s u c c e s s f u l
veteran 5taff
i n i t b y c o r p s and
p e r s o n a l IY directed
d i u i s i o n c o m m a n d e r s who,
182
traffic."C99? ingredient
Thus,
speed of
in reducing risK
and t h r o u g h t h e
c o u n t e r a t t a c ~t o w a r d M o r t a i n , T h i r d Rrmy f r o m t h e r e s t
w i t h t h e o b j e c t of
cutting off
of
e l l i e d forces
on t h e c o n t i n e n t r a i s e s t h e f u r t h e r q u e s t i o n and m e a s u r e s t a K e n t o r e d u c e t h a t
PiSK.
exposed f l a n K s . sufficient
I f c o r p s move f a s t e n o u g h a n d a c h i e v e enough,
depth quiCKly
i t i s t h e enemy who w i l l b e
P a t t o n t h o u g h t t h i s b e c a u s e h e saw the
o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s r o b t h e enemy o f
c a u s i n g h i m t o r e a c t t o a s e r i e s of
rapidly
He a l s o t h o u g h t t h a t when infantry
is l f t t l e
r i S K
from successful
enemy
c o u n t e r a t t a c K s on t h e division
infantry
f l a n K because t h e armored
i s t h e mo%t i d e a l ueapon f o r C o u n t e r a t t a c K i n g a
is s u g g e s t i n g t h a t d e p t h i n t h e
His
i s a n o t h e r way t o r e d u c e r i % K t o e x p o s s d f l a n K s .
i n t h i s v e i n a t t h e army
thinKing
level
is reflected
i n his
a one-army
thrust
i n t o the FranKfurt-Kassel
It w i l l
be r e c a l l e d t h a t h i s concept c a l l e d f o r two c o r p s
can b e r e d u c e d b y
advancing
in depth,
quicK1y.
R t Rvranches P a t t o n h e l d elements
163
Map 4
163a
of
XII,
XV,
and XX C o r p s
[one d i v i s i o n each) on h i s l e f t f l a n K
t o guard against
F i f t h P a n z e r A r m y ' s c o u n t e r a t t a c ~ . And
t o reduce r i s K t o T h i r d Army's
right
swept t o t h e
Meselle River
it is notable
a l t h o u g h h e was r e l u c t a n t t o d o s o , D i v i s i o n t o cover
Infantry
and C h a l o n s . German f o r c e s
France,
some 4 0 0 K i l o m e t e r s .
T h i r d Army's
southern f efforts
maKing use o f
Several
XlX
and r a i l
lines.
Of
more
importance,
r e c o n n a i s z a n c e and a i r
p h o t o g r a p h y m i s s i o n s X I X TAC f l e w
164
of
i n s u p p o r t o f T h i r d Army.
P a t t o n ' s G-2
t h e L o i r e was
S e v e n t h A r m y ' s a d v a n c e UP t h e Rhone V a l l e y a n d c o u l d n o t a f f e c t
Th i r d Arrny
' 5
f 1 anK
operat ional l y
. The
ev i d e n c e
then,
indicates
that
i n a d d i t i o n t o s p e e d o f o p e r a t i o n s and d e p t h ,
Patton
i n t e r d i c t i o n operat ions,
as
t e r r a i n o b s t a c l e s such as r i v e r l i n e s .
Reserves
P a t t o n ' s v i e w s on t h e a c c e p t a n c e o f r i s K
i n t h e employment
o f o p e r a t i o n a l r e s e r v e s is m o r e d i f f i c u l t
handling of flanKs. This
t o assess than h i s l i t t l e
i s so because he says v e r y
a b o u t how h e e n v i s i o n e d t h e e r n p l o y m e n t o f r e s e r u e s .
A
the
A c o u p l e o f examples
illustrate Patton's
r e c a l l s t h i s a c t i o n b e c a u z e he remembers n o t r e t a i n i n g a
165
r e z . e r u e a n d a g a i n h a d t o r e s i s t t h e u r g e t o taKe c o u n s e l o f h i s
fears.
A second example.
revealing
in
i t s own w a y ,
occurred j u s t
maKing a s t h e y d e b o u c h e d f r o m t h e f l v r a n c h e s a r e a , a l a r g e h o l e i n t h e FImerIcan l i n e s d e v e l o p e d b e t w e e n S t . H i l a i r e a n d
M a v e n n e , F r a n c e . T h e n a s e c o n d g a p o p e n e d U P west o f f l l e n c o n ,
a n d P a t t o n P e m a r K S t h a t a l l h e c o u l d d o was t o a s s e m b l e t h e 8 t h A r m o r e d D i u i s i o n a t F o u g \ e r e s t o f i l l t h i s s e c o n d g a p . < 1 8 4 > What
is s i g n i f i c a n t
d i v i s i o n , which c l e a r l y
an
i d e n t i f i e d r e s e r v e would h a v e
into t h e gap.
X I 1 C o r p s became
D u r i n g t h e B u l g e C a m p a i g n when MG Eddy o f
i n t o h i s f l a n K , P a t t o n s e n t Eddy h i s
company of
p i c t u r e t h a t e m e r g e s is o n e o f P a t t o n h a b i t u a l l y o p e r a t i n g w i t h
was:
everywhere w i t h e v e r y t h i n g " w i t h a l l a v a i l a b l e f o r c e s
166
would
l e a d t o s u c c e s s . < l 0 6 ~To K e e p h i g h e r h e a d q u a r t e r s f r o m
t a K i n g d i v i s i o n s f r o m h i m f o r an7 r e a s o n , P a t t o n and h i s s t a f f
e x h o r t e d c o r p s commander:
engaged.
HOWeUer
t h i s should not be s u r p r i s i n g
, f o r P a t t o n 's
' J e r 7 c o n c e p t i o n o f O p e r a t i o n a l a r t was t h a t
s e r i e s of balance.
i t consisted o f a
o f f e n s i v e a c t i o n s d e s i g n e d t o Keep t h e enemy o f f
In a
in t h e c o r p s f o r
and e x p l o i t i n g a t a c t i c a l s u c c e s s .
In order t o operate in t h a t
It
is p o s s i b l e t o s e e i n P a t t u n ' s d e c i s i o n n o t
t o r e t a i n a r e s e r v e a t a r m y l e v e l a w i l l i n g n e s s t o a c c e p t an
e l e v a t e d o p e r a t i o n a l risK w h i l e lowering t h e riSK a t t h e
p l a c i n g most of T h i r d Nrmy
'5
a r m o r e d combat power
forward and r e d u c i n g t a c t i c a l r i s K .
Patton compensated f o r t h e
I n c r e a s e d o p e r a t i o n a l risK b y e m p l o y i n g a i r and c a v a l r y a s s e t s
t o s u r v e y a n d g u a r d h i s a r m y ' s f l a n K S . H i s a p p r o a c h t o risK r e d u c t i o n p l a c e d h e a v y r e l l a n c e on h i s a b i l i t y t o f l e x i b l y a s s e m b l e a r e s e r v e or f l a n K p r o t e c t i o n e l e m e n t
air reconnaissance
if
long-range
i n d i c a t e d s u c h a u n i t were n e e d e d l h e
c o u n t e d on s u c h r e c o n n a i s s a n c e t o prov i d e him w i t h t h e c r i t i c a l
t i m e h e n e e d e d t o taKe d e f e n s i v e m e a s u r e s .
167
Logistical
Sustainment
G e o r g e P a t t o n d i d n o t s p e n d much o f
One would n e v e r
i n glowing
only
t e r m s a b o u t h i s own l o g i s t i c a l a r r a n g e m e n t s .
s y s t e m of
administration
He thought t h e
i n T h i r d A r m y , f o r e x a m p l e , was
e x c e l l e n t . The s y s t e r n t h a t a l l o w e d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e m a t t e r s t o
p a s s f r o m a r m y t o d i v i s i o n , b y p a s s i n g c o r p s , was t h e w a y t o d o
b u s i n e s s s i n c e t h e c o r p s was a t a c t i c a l unit.
He s a y s t h a t
in
We never had
in
t o r e g r o u p , w h i c h s e e m e d t o b e t h e c h i e f f o r m o f arnusernent
t h e B r i t i s h armies
."< 107)
Becau2.e l o g i s t i c s a n d r e p l a c e m e n t s
f l o w e d f r o m t h e Cummun i c a t i o n s Z o n e
(COFIMZ) t h r o u g h f i e l d
in
In f a c t , b y t h e time o f
the Lorraine
had two q u a r t e r m a s t e r g r o u p s t o t a l 1 i n g
s i x t y c o m p a n i e s a n d two o r d n a n c e g r o u p s w i t h e l e v e n b a t t a l i o n s
between t h e m t o c a r r y o u t
However,
i n s p i t e o f P a t t o n ' s s m u g PemarK a b o u t B r i t i s h
is 1 i t t l e ev i d e n c e t h a t s h o w s P a t t o n
regroupment, there
p e r s o n a l l y h a d a f irrn u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n
168
o r s p e n t much t i m e
The e v i d e n c e a v a i l a b l e i n T h i r d firmy
l o g i s t i c a l matters
" s u p p l y r e s t s on g i v e and t a K e
" s u p p l y u n i t s must a n t i c i p a t e t h r o u g h
r e c o n n a i s s a n c e t h e needs o f users and g e t s u p p l i e s u p b e f o r e t h e y a r e c a l l e d f o r . " < l 0 9 > H e r e P a t t o n i s d i s p l a y i n g a measure of s o p h i s t i c a t i o n because a l t h o u g h d o c t r i n a l l y t h e Flmerican s y s t e m i n W o r l d War suggesting a
logistical
is a l m o s t
"push" system.
in the
operations.
Fuel,
o f course,
was t h e c l a s s o f
i n g r e a t e s t demand as T h i r d firrw
swept toward t h e
Moselle River.
these fast-moving
trUCKS.
P a t t o n c l a i m s t h a t t h e s u c c e s s e s o f T h i r d Army r e s t e d equipment. He s a y s :
l a r g e l y on two p i e c e s o f
There
i s e v i d e n c e t h a t P a t t o n made g r e a t u s e o f
a n d t h e p l a n e t o Keep h i s a r m y s u p p l i e d . airplane
is.,
H i s use o f t h e illustrate
perhaps,
ouerstated,
b u t a few examples
169
r a t i o n s were f l o w n
w h i c h f l e w t h e C-47
missions
i n support of
P a t t o n ' s army,
made
it a practice t o
6:) 25 A u g u s t ,
supplies, flew
I n o n e d a y a l o n e TCC
vehicles
i n over
t o Keep P a t t o n ' s
i t s logistical
amounted t o emergency f u e l
r a t i o n s t o T h i r d Army.
i t n o t been f o r
a c t i o n P a t t o n says t h a t had
TCC
planes
60 a i r c r a f t a n h o u r - - e a c h cans--Third
115 f i u e - g a l l o n
Army w o u l d h a v e r u n o u t o f
gasoline.<ll2> Colonel
i n t h e European Theater of
Operations.
He c o n t e n d s in the
1 3 4 5 had i t n o t b e e n
for TCC's a i r r e s u p p l y e f f o r t s .
He s a y s t h a t t h e d a y a f t e r
t h e 4 t h Flrmored D i v i s i o n a t t a c K e d
for
example,
TCC c a r r i e r s
On 2 3
u n l o a d e d 435,000
t h r e e days flew
is
O n r e t u r n t r i p s C-47s
c a s u a l t i e s between
1-8 May
170
i s that
it appears that
Patton
a i r r e s u p p l y t h e f a r t h e r h i s army And t h i s
i s so b e c a u s e
f r o m t h e Norrnandy b e a c h h e a d .
Patton's tactical
logistical capabilities.
r i S K
ton trUCK.
S t o r i e s a b o u t t h e Red B a l l at
i t s peaK t h e Red
and
it i s t r u e that
B u t as P a t t o n l e a r n e d ,
i n t h e end to
Keep h i s a n d ' t h e o t h e r f i e l d r a t e of
advance a c r o s s Europe.
T h i r d Army c o n s u m e d 350,000
and t h e t r u c K s o f
t h e Red B a l l t h e m s e l u e s
g a l l o n s a day.
The p r o v i n c e o f L o r r a i n e l i e s a
a b o u t 800 K i l o m e t e r s o u e r l a n d f r o m t h e Normandy b e a c h h e a d ,
i n t h e Normandy b e a c h h e a d ,
1344 b e c a u s e o f
two
lacK o f f u e l ,
o n l y n i n e German i n f a n t r y
battalions,
artillery battalions,
171
BY t h e t i m e e n o u g h g a s o l i n e a r r i v e d t o c o n t i n u e h i s o f f e n s i v e
o n 5 S e p t e m b e r , G e r m a n u n i t s h a d r e i n f o r c e d L o r r a i n e a n d were prepared t o put up a stubborn defense.<ll5> P a t t o n ' s violation
of
l o g i ~ t i c a lp r i n c i p l e s c a u g h t U P w i t h h i m i n L o r r a i n e , f o r tactical p r i n c i p l e s , t h e e f f e c t of is c u m u l a t i u e
u n l i K e t h e v i o l a t i o n of
neglecting l o g i s t i c a l matters
in nature.
< 116:
In a n e f f o r t t o a l l e v i a t e h i s g a s o l i n e s h o r t a g e , P a t t o n a t v a r i o u s times used c a p t u r e d g a s o l i n e o r hiJacKed g a s o l i n e f r o m f gasoline, o t h e r a l l i e d armies, a n d r e l i e d o n a i r P ~ S U P P ~oY n o n e o f w h i c h u l t i m a t e l y s o l v e d t h e p r o b l e m . He a l s o s w i t c h e d more a n d more t r u c K s i n h i s army f r o m a m m u n i t i o n t r a n s p o r t a t i o n t o gasoline transportation. F l l t h o u g h t h i s move s o m e w h a t
improved t h e g a s o l i n e d e f i c i t
in t h e short run,
i t had o t h e r
Switching transportation
a s s e t s t o t h e tasK of
f u e l r e s u p p l y caused an acute s h o r t a g e of
h e a u v c a l i b e r a r t i l l e r y ammunition and p r e c l u d e d t h e b u i l d i n g
o f s t o c ~ so f C l a s s V a l t h o u g h t h e a m m u n i t i o n was
was so s h o r t o f
l a r g e c a l i b e r a r t i l l e r y ammunition t h a t tanKs In a d d i t i o n ,
a n d t a n K d e s t r o y e r s were s u r v e y e d i n a s a r t i l l e r y . T h i r d A r m y made u s e o f
c a p t u r e d G e r m a n a m m u n i t i o n . One X X C o r p s
TOT was f i r e d w i t h c a p t u r e d G e r m a n 1 0 5 - m m h o w i t z e r , R u s s i a n m a d e 7 6 . 2 mm g u n s , F r e n c h
155-mm
anti-tanK
Corps
guns;
88% o f
t h e a r t i l l e r y a m m u n i t i o n e x p e n d e d b y XX
1944 was G e r m a n . < l l B > T h e
i n t h e l a s t weeK o f O c t o b e r
clear p o i n t of
t h e s e f a c t s is t h a t P a t t o n s e e m e d t o b e o n l y
172
diml!)
a w a r e t h a t b u r n i n g UP g a s o l i n e r e s e r v e s t o Keep h i s a r m y
t o s h i f t t o railroads f o r transportation
a n d l o c a l r e q u i s i t i o n f o r r e s u p p l y b e c a u s e t h e Red B a l l E x p r e s s c o u l d n o t Keep UP w i t h h i s a r m y . < l l S j P a t t o n a l m o s t r e l i s h e s t e l l i n g t h e s t o r y a b o u t how h i s c o r p s commanders l o c a t ion of inuariably got i n t o heated arguments over t h e The s u b j e c t o f those
corps boundaries.
< 120)
i n g r e a t p a r t on t h e b a s i s o f m a j o r
r o a d a n d r a i l n e t s . < l 2 1 > The s p e e d w i t h w h i c h F r e n c h r a i l r o a d s w e r e r e p a i r e d a n d made o p e r a t i o n a l h e l p e d a l l a u i a t e T h i r d Army's logistical shortages. Fortunately f o r Patton, the
d u r i n g October
1944 T h i r d R r m y l o g i s t i c a l u n i t s w e r e a b l e t o
was t r a n s p o r t e d b y r a i l r o a d t a n K c a r s f r o m a c o n t i n e n t a l
p ipel ine ending a t
Th i o n u 11 l e , F r a n c e ,
t o Mainr, i n t o tanK
Germany,
trUCKS
where
i t was pumped a c r o s s t h e R h i n e R i v e r
and
t r a n s p o r t e d t o f o r w a r d tin i t s .
Rn examinat ion of
< 123>
173
D r i v i n g h i s tanKs u n t i l and
n e g l e c t i n g ammunition StocKs,
d i v e r t i n g t r a n s p o r t a t i o n a s s e t s a l l had t h e i r c u m u l a t i v e effects.
In defense
of Patton,
i t can be s a i d t h a t he t r i e d by p r e s s i n g
logistically
" f i l l t h e u n f o r g i u i n g m i n u t e w i t h s i x t y seconds w o r t h of
distance r u n " would reflection, of Lorraine,
it
i n t h e l o n g r u n save s o l d i e r s '
lives.
On
is a b i t t e r
m i l e s a n d c o s t 50,000
c a s u a l t i e s T h i r d Army s u f f e r e d OPerat i o n s .
< 124>
Conclusions
risK
Patton can r i g h t l y
b e a c c l a i m e d a n a b l e p r a c t i t i o n e r o f t h e o p e r a t i o n a l a r t . He
174
in o r d e r t o g e t maximum combat power level, thereby trading off tactical for s p e e d a n d t imel i n e s s o f o p e r a t i o n s f e a t u r e s of t h e s u c c e s s f u l is m e a s u r e d o n l y
forward at t h e t a c t i c a l operational
P
i5K.
For h i m ,
were t h e a b s o l u t e l y e s s e n t i a l o p e r a t i o n a l commander.
If succese
i n terms of
tactical
o r operational
outcomes, w i t h o u t c o n s i d e r a t ion of
was c l e a r l y a s u c c e s s . Y e t ,
conditional
it
t5 d o u b t f u l
t h a t t h e preceding
is t r u e , and an a c c u r a t e e v a l u a t i o n o f P a t t o n a s a o p e r a t i o n a l a r t must t u r n , a t l e a s t
i n waging war.
p r a c t i t i o n e r of
i n p a r t , on
t h e q u e s t ion of h i s means
175
ENDNOTES
Sons,
Warrior
(New 'YorK:
G.P.
Putnam's
2 M a r t i n B l u m e n s o n , The P a t t o n P a p e r s , V o l . 1 H o u g h t o n M i f f 1 i n Company, 1 9 7 2 ) , P P . 8 6 0 - 8 6 1 .
3 The P a t t o n P a p e r s ,
4 The P a t t o n P a p e r s ,
5 Jhe
(Boston:
Vol.1,
Vol.1,
P.
P.
861.
960. 953-960.
P a t t o n Papers,
Vol.1,
PP.
Greenfield,
The O r g a n i z a t i o n o f G r o u n d Combat T r o o p s .
321.
9 K. G r e e n f i e l d , 324-326.
The O r g a n i z a t i o n o f G r o u n d Combat T r o o p s ,
pp.
I 0 The P a t t o n P a p e r s ,
Vol.1,
P.
758.
It ( B o s t o n :
13 L O 1 No.3,
p.7.
14 L O 1 No.3,
p.3.
15 The P a t t o n P a p e r s , 16 L O 1 N o . 3 ,
17 L O 1 N o . 3 ,
p.2.
p.4.
Vol.1,
PP.
833-834.
I76
20 L O 1 No.3,
Fielj
22 R o b e r t A l l e n ,
Inc., 19471, p.238. Forward,
LUCKY Forward
(New
YOPK:
Vanguard
Press,
23 LUCK:,
p.263.
P . 167.
24 LUCKY Forward,
27 L U C K Y F o r w a r d ,
22 F a r As
I Knew I t , p . 9 6 .
pp.240-241. p.11. p.10. p.14.
29 L U C K Y F o r w a r d ,
30 The L o r r a i n e C a m p a i g n ,
3 1 The L o r r a i n e C a m p a i g n ,
32 The L o r r a i n e C a m p a i g n ,
33 War As
I Knew I t , p . 2 7 1 .
HQ, T h i r d U.S.Army,
34 A f t e r H c t i o n R e p o r t , 1 9 4 4 - 9 May 1 9 4 5 , P . 16.
1 flugust
35 p f t e r
Action Report,
HQ,
T h i r d U.S.Army,
P.31.
YOPK:
36 H a r r y H. Semrnes, Appleton-Century-Crofts,
37 The L o r r a i n e C a r w a i g n ,
38 L O 1 N o . 2 , p.3.
177
39 P o r t r a i t o f P a t t o n ,
p.163.
4 0 War A s
I Knew I t , p p . 5 8 - 6 0 .
P P .296-297.
I Knew
It, pp.136-140.
I Knew I t , p p . 1 2 9 - 1 3 0 .
I h e w
I t , p.5.
As
4 6 War As
47 War
As
I Knew I t , p . 1 2 7 . I Knew
It, p.232.
in
Reading,"
p.11.
50 P o r t r a i t o f P a t t o n ,
pp.170-17 pp.170-17
.
.
51 P o r t r a i t o f
52 W a r
Patton,
6s
I Knew
p.3.
I t , P . 123.
53 L O I
54 War
r.io.2,
As As
I Knew
It, P . 181.
55 War
I Knew I t , p . 3 6 4 . I Knew I t ,
P
56 War A s
.364.
V o l .2,
P .523.
57 The P a t t o n P a p e r s ,
58 War
59 W a r
As
As
I Knew I t , p . 3 2 3 .
I Knew
I t , P .93.
p.30.
60 L U C K ?
Forward,
6 1 LtlCKy F o r u a r d ,
63 C h a r l e s 8. M a c O o n a l d , A T i m e f o r T r u m p e t s W i l I i a r n M o r r o w a n d Company, I n c . , 1 9 8 5 ) , p .599.
(New
YorK:
17s
64 P a t t o n :
A Study
i n Command,
p.337.
p.208.
p.242.
65 L U C K Y F o r w a r d ,
66 P o r t r a i t o f
Patton,
67 L O 1
63 War
No.1, p . 1 .
As
I Knew
It, p.207.
69 War A s
70 War
I Knew I Knew
I t , p.207.
It, p.94.
As
7 1 L O 1 No.1,
p.2.
p.2.
7 2 LO1 No.1,
73 War A s
7 4 War As
I Knew
I t , p.339.
I Knew I t , p . 3 3 3 .
Vo1.2,
p.523.
75 The P a t t o n P a p e r s ,
76 War
As
I Knew
I t , P .327. p.218.
77 P o r t r a i t o f P a t t o n ,
78 War A s
I Knew
I t , p.98.
P .47.
79 L U C K Y F o r w a r d ,
30 War
As
I Knew
It, p.149.
p.68.
P .68.
81 LUCKY Forward, 32 L U C K Y F o r w a r d ,
Intelligence for
Patton,
85 G - 2 :
86 6-2: 37 G - 2 :
33 L U C K Y F o r w a r d ,
179
83 War As
I Knew
It, p.39.
90 WarraCK W a l l a c e , " R e p o r t o n f l s s i s n m e n t w i t h T h i r d U n i t e d S t a t e s Army, 15 A u g u s t - 1 8 S e p t e m b e r 1 9 4 4 , " NFlRS R e c o r d s (Washington, D.C.: National flrchiues G r o u p # Nb.13-457-81-12 R e c o r d S e c t i o n > , PP - 2 - 4 .
9 1 G-2: Intrllisence for As Patton, 7.148.
32 War
93 G - 2 : 34 War
I Knew
It, p.339.
Intelligence for As
Patton,
p.105.
I Knew I t ,
P . 141.
55 A f t e r
A c t i o n Report,
Vo1.2,
HQ, T h i r d U.S.f%-my,
p.22.
<N@wYOrK:
37 L U C K Y
98 War 93 War
Forward,
P .85.
Fls
As
I Knew
I Knew
P.5.
It, p.361.
It, p.36.
I 0 0 LO1 Fl0.3,
Vol.2,
P.523.
p p . 133-134.
I Knew I Knew
I t , P . 108.
I t , P . 100.
I Knew
I Knew I Knew
I t , p.205.
f3s
It, p.196,223.
Fls
I t , P . 104.
p.10.
p.4. p.363.
p p . 124-125;
Forward,
p . 126.
I Kneu I t , p.265.
180
113 L U C K Y F o r w a r d ,
pp.360-361.
p.6.
114 The L o r r a i n e C a m p a i g n ,
115
u.,
pp.7-3,
116
117
u.,
p.34.
m.,p . 7 .
p.22.
11s I U . ,
119
w . ,p . 3 6 .
I Knew
120 M a r As
It, p . 2 7 6 .
121
m.,p . 1 4 8 .
p.22.
P .375.
123 L U C K Y F o r w a r d ,
p.36.
131