~GBOUP BRSBIBQH STUDY

^Operations of staokolbergU Corps at Li*oyang

Submitted A. J. B&rnett, Captain, infantry.

The Command and Qantr&l 3taff School, iorX Laavenworthf K

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1 June

UBUOBANDUU FOB I The Direotor f Second Year C l a s s , The Coramand and General Staff School t Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

SUBJECT?

Group JBeaearoh.

I . PAPBBS AOCOliPAHYINGi 1* A Bibliography for thia study. Z. A aketch showing the dispoaitiona at iiaoyang.

I I . THB STUDY PRESENTED*Operations of Staokelberg's Corp* at Liaoyang.

HISTORICAL FACTS J^UTING TO THS SUBJfiCT.

The I Siberian Corpa of the fiussian was formed at Liaoyang, Manchuria during the early part o f the s u m e r of 1904 from troops newly arrived i n the theater of operations, and i t s command was e n trusted to Lieutenant General Baron Staokelberg. (1) At that time i t s composition u&s, i n general t as f o l l o w s : . ^Battalions: Squadrons: Guns 12 : : 32 1st Division : 8th;Di1ri*lan : 1 : : 32 Cavalry t : 20 i 6 Total 24 #> ^70 : : : t Machine..guna 6 6

The Infantry divisions had been formed early i n 1904 1 the 1st from four regiments of aat Siberian B i f l e s , and the 9th from troops of the standing army, one sapper battalion* (2) (1) aeioh 167. (2) Beioh 161f 167. in addition to the above the corps had

1.

prior Battle .Experience. Prior to the operations at Liaoyang the X Siberian Corps participated in the campaign of the lower Liaotung Peninsula, having been defeated by the Japanese at Telissu 15 June, 1904, and forced to retreat on Kaiping and Anshantien. (3) 27 August it was withdrawn on orders of the Ari^y Commander to the prepared advanced position just south of the city of liaoyang. (4)

Terrain at Liaoyang. Liaoyang l i e s in the Taitzu Elver valley f in Manchuria, where the river emerges from the h i l l s into the southern plains* nor'.h bank the h i l l s approach within a mile of the c i t y , on the AS the river,

which i s rapid and deep, approaches Liaoyang from the east i t bends to the northwest, touches the city wall, then runs due north for three miles when i t again changes i t s course to the northwest and west* The Chinese Eastern railroad, which crosses the Taitzu about a mile north of the c i t y , and the river divide the Liapyang terrain into four compartments. The northeast sector i s in general h i l l y , the

outstanding feature being the ridge line running northeast and southwest from ttanjuyaraft to west of Tanchutun. The northwest compartment The south-

i s generally flat and contains no features of importance* west compartment is also generally flat*

The southeast compartment,

with which this study i s primarily interested, varies from flat in the vicinity of the city to mountainous in the extreme southwestern part* Prominent features between these limits are the heights northThe dominating

east of ;*ayetun, Tatzuying and north of Hsinlitun.

observation of this group i s h i l l near Maya tun known as Shuahanpu. In general the drainage of this compartment i s from south to north* Boada converge on Liaoyang, the principal one being the Mandarin

(3) Belch 202,203. (4) Belch 05*

road from the Liatung Peninsula, through Liaoyang, to the northeast* (5) Organisation of the Ground* The defensive position at Liaoyang had been selected and organization of the ground accomplished in considerable detail prior to its occupation. (6) Bedoubts, trenches and artillery positions had been constructed along the heigus to be occupied by the 1st and 9th divisions; wire and obstacles had been installed, and efforts had been made to conceal the exact location of the position by sodding the parapets. Millet, which grew to a height of ten feet, in the vicinity of Liaoyang, (7) had been cut in front of the trenches to provide a field of fire for Infantry. The sector to be occupied by Stackelberg's Corps was probably better organized than the other Corps sectors. (6)

Hlaulon.
Ihe 1 Siberian corps was charged with the defense of the rigfct sector of the Liaoyang advanced position. General plans for

the defense were known to General Staoicelberg prior to the withdrawal from Anshantien, and he had made a reconnaissance of the (?) corps sector prior to i t s occupation* Extracts from KuropatkinJs

order for the operation, dated 16 August, 1:15 Aid, pertaining directly to the i Siberian Corps follow: "in case of a further advance of the enenay the amp will fight in the fortified position Mayetutt, 'iatzuying, Hsiaoyangtsu, Hftinlitunf Wij&kow, Kuchiatzu, yayuohi, HSiaopu, SanwtnUu, Tatzupu, Hsikuantun. Lieutenant: General Bar^a Stackelberg, I Siberian Corps,

(5) (6) (7) (6) (9)

Belch 206. Br Of 3 , 4. Qr. 210. Or Of 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , Br Of 5* B O B 234 t 235,36,237. Chas 149. Gr Of 6,7. Belch 210,211. Qr, Of 75. fieioh 210

1st jfiaat Siberian Biflea Division, 1st ttaat Siberian Biflea Artillery Brigade, 9th aat Siberian Biflea Division, 9th &aat Siberian Biflea Artillery Brigade, Uasuri cavalry Brigade, 1st East Siberian Sapper Battalion (24 battalions, 64 guns, 8 machine guns, 10 sotnias of Cavalry, 1 sapper battalion) will defend the position on the heights north of Mayetun, Tatsuylng, Haiaoyungtzu, Hslnlitun, guard the grounds on the left as far as the oree* flowing from Sanohiatau to Tasau, and maintain communication with the i l l Siberian corps. (10)

Dispositions* To carry out the above instructions General Stao&elberg disposed his corps in general as follows; The 1st Siberian Bifle* Division (Lieutenant-General Gerngro88) was on the right with the 1st Siberian Bifle Begiment occupying Shoushanpu heights and the villages of uayetun and Gutaiatay; the 3d ast Siberian Bifle Begiment he.td the heights south of Shoushanpu (village) with i t s left on the HstokoyangUu>Shoushanpu road* The 4th ast Siberian Bifle Begiment *e in local reserve north of Shoushanpu* machine guns seem to have been distributed over the front with son* of them being at the southern edge of the village* apparently for the protection of the right flank. (11) The 2d Siberian Bifle.Dlfiaion (Lieutenant-General Kondratovitah) was on the left of the corps with the 34thaat Siberian Bifle Begiment extending the line of the 3d Jdast Siberiand Bifle Begiment east to the H*iaoyangUu~Hsialitun road* The left flan* was drawn bacK to Hsinlitun, the h i l l Just to the northeast of that village being held by the 33d *st Siberian Bifle Begiment* (12) (10) Belch 211, 212* MID2 61* (11) Or Of 21* Br Of 65* J4ID2 61. ((12) Gr Of 21* Br Of 65* M X D 2 61*

The Artillery was divided into groups of two batteries and disposed in general as follows: Two batteries near Chuang-

chiatun, faoing west; two west of the uandarin road, north of the spur out by that road from the ridge north of H*iaoyangt2u; two in rear of the f i r s t di, and two in rear of \ i * seoond dip east of the Mandarin road; and two in saddle of pangohiatunKanpalichuang road* (13) The 2d, 35th and 3dth i&ast Siberian Bifle regiments, the 4th Batten of the 1st iiast Siberian A n i l l e r y Brigade, the 2d Trans-Baikal Cossack Battery, and the 1st tiaat Siberian sapper Battalion were i n i t i a l l y held in corps reserve east of the village of Shoushanpu. (14) Colonel Gurko, with eight squadrons of cavalry, was on the l e f t , in the vicinity of Nfcnpaliohuang, watching the valley of Taseu Brook and maintaining canmunicat ion with the m Corps. (15) The frontage of the corps in this position was about 5 1-2 miles*(16) Dispositions of the m Corps, on the left of Siberian

the I Corps (Siberian) and of the latter corps left a gap between the two corps, on both sides of Taasu i*rooK, of about 3ijniies (17)

Opposing Forceg. Following up the withdrawal from Anshantien the Japanese spent the &9th August in preparing for the attack of the advanced Liaoyang position. (16) Japanese forces opposed to Staokelberg's

(13) (14) (15) (16)

Beich 214, 215. UID? Or Of ZZ. r of 65. Br Of 66* M1D2 61. Bow 201 Br Of 74*

117) Bow 199. jfieioh 211. Gr Of 9. (16) UID2 62, 63. r. Of 14, 16, 16. Bow 199.

5.

consisted of the Seoond Arng ( l e s s the 4th piviaion held available for employment by General Headquarters)f and an additional division, the 5th, which attacked west of a'atsu Brook* (J&) Tho plan of a t -

tack on the front held by til* I Siberian Corps as announced by the Japanese Seoond Army the night of 29~30 August were in general as follows; The 3d Division (13th field Artillery attached) was to cross the Sha Ho AM, 30 August and advance between the TaerhHi-

niuchuang road and the railway, against the heights southeast of Shoushanpu. The 6th Division, crossing the & * #o at the same hour, was to advance along the road west of the i l # a y through the v i l lages of Tuntai, Tayaotim, Tajbungohi, Liohiehpu and Liuehiasaochiatiu. The 4th Division, subjeot to orders of General Headquarters, was to assemble at the southern edge of Hsinglungtai. The Artillor^ Brigade, less regiment attached to the 3d Division, was to f o l l o w e d 6th Division, was to proceed to Tutaitsu* The 11th Kobi Brl$p.te vas to march at 5:00 i j | t and f o l low the r&ilviay to Shaho villa.ge As has alreaty t e e n stated the 5th Division was to attach west of Ta9su Brook. (20) T^e foot artillery

Br Of 105. Or Of (20) Gr Of 23, 24. Br. Qf 65T 66*

Operations 30
Troops of the I Siberian Corps were alerted at the f i r s t signs of the Japanese advance before daylight on the morning of 30 August by General Staokelberg, who was himself on the soene at 4:00 AM. (21) Contact was f i r s t made in front of the positions held by &ven before the a t -

the 3d and 34th ast Siberian fiegiments* (22)

tack St&ckelberg had requested reinforcements from the arny commander and a second request had been made before reply had been received to the first* (23) Sarly in the day he shifted a regiment of the Corps rQ&erv*, the 35th ast Siberian, to JP&ngohiatun and at 9*00 A M placed two battalions of that regiment at the disposal of General Kondratovieh, of the left group. (24) fforts of the Japanese were directed at the gip between the I and III Siberian corps, and the 6th Division was attempting an envelopement of the right flank. As the terrain along 'lassu Brook was covered with the t a l l millet the enemy was able to move unforeseen up the valley of the brook.(26) The enveloping 6th Division was delayed by the muddy condition of the ground due to rains on the morning of the attack and was not able to establish i t s e l f between a'aohaoohiatai and paichialaokuowo until 9i30 A M and the entire division did not arrive until 11*00 A M * (26) The movement of this division had been under constant ob-

servation from a captive balloon ftndrc General staakelberg's advanced observation post on Shoushanpu h i l l . (27) AS no reserves had as yet

(21) Beioh 215. 0r Of 29. (22) Beioh (23) dr Of 67f 68. Gr Of 22. (24) Br Of 68. Gr Of 29* (25) Br 66* Gr Of 4. (26) Br 69. Gr Of 33. (27) Br Of 89. Gr Of 30.

7.

been made available to him by the army commander it was necessary for General Stackelberg to meet the envelopement from his own resources. But due to the delay caused by the soft going and General Mishtshenko's ftrnty Cavalry staokelberg \*as enabled to strengthen his right to meet the attack of the 6th Division* fie had succeeded in getting rein* forcements from the army reserve in response to a request made about noon. This force consisted of the 12th Siberian infantry fiegiment.

two battalions of the 19th East Siberian fiifle Regiment and one and a half batteries of artillery* (26) One battalion of the 36th East

Siberian fiifle regiment was sent from corps reserve to prolong the right near the village of Huangohiatun; another battalion of that regiment joined the 3d tst Siberian fiifle fltgiment on General Gerngro8sv left, while the remaining battalion was placed at the disposal of General Kondratovich* ?his reduced the original corps r**erv* to

one battalion of the 36th Sast Siberian fiifle fiegiaent and three battalions of the 19th ast Siberian fiifle Begiment. (29) The two

battalions of the 19th were used to reinforce the left division* (30) The 12th Siberian fiifle fiegiment marching to reinforce the 1 Corps from general reserve made a surprise attack against the Japanese left in the vicinity of YuohiachuangUu, at the request of the 1st East Siberian fiifle fiegiment with considerable success. The eneny

*aa driven from the village of Chouchiaputaut and the envelopeiftg , attack weakened for the time being, on that flank.

(26) Gr Of 32, 33* fir Of 69, 90, 91* (29) Br Of $0, 91* Gr Of 36* (30) Gr Of 36. Br Of

6*

The attack of the 6th Division against the west of Shoushanpu heights commenced shortly after noon with the right brigade9 which had developed ahead of the left brigade. This attack although

pressed with vigor later in the afternoon *as readily stopped by the reinforced right sector of the 1 Siberian corps. The attack: was imde

in a piece-meal nanner and in i t s initial stages jus lacking in artillery support* (31)

The attacks of the Japanese on this day were stopped along the entire front of the Corps. The well-placed Russian Artillery a^d

the switching of U* fire had been a great factor in n&intaining the defense, i*ny times during the day fire of the Artillery normally

supporting one sector had been switched to the support of another sector with the telling results possible by flanking fire. The

attackers, although possessing a,preponderance of artillery were unable to silence that of the defenders, and upon oooaslons even to obtain equal fire power. (32) 3o successfully had the Japanese attack been stopped on the front of the I Siberian Corps thai late in the afternoon General staokelberg was able to send the following report to his Com* mander in Chief: "Fighting proceeding a l l long the front, most

severely against center and right .ring. All Japanese efforts to capture Mayetun, Gutsiatsy and our center art in vain. 7,'e have not

yielded an inch of ground in the center and on our wings1!

(31) Gr Of 33, 34, 36. br Of 89, 90. (32) Gr Of 29, 30 26. br Of 87, 86. (33) Gr Of 36. br. Of 91.

9.

Believing the Russians were about to assume the offensive on the east the higher command at 4t35 ? M requested the Second Arny to push i t s attack on the west. But as the Artillery had been Anable

to properly support the attacks on that flank and to destroy the defensive obstacles division oonnanders advised the Amy Commander against any further determined attacks that afternoon. (34)

31 Expecting a renewal of the combat on 31 August General Staokelberg spent the night 30-31 Augus* in strengthening his two main defensive sectors, and in reorganizing reserves. (35) fieserves sent to reinforce the I Siberian Corps 30 Augustf from the 4th Siberian Corps9 were recalled by General Kuropatltln that night* To this Staokelberg strongly protested* (36) Morning of the 31 August found, as result of this reorganization, the following dispositions on the front of Staokelberg9* corpsi Sight Sector (Qerngroaa)-1st, 3d, 4th and 36th ^ast Siberian ifl* fiegLmsnts, and a battalion of the 2d jgifle egizsnt. The Artillery had been strengthened by two batteries of the 5th East Siberian fiifle Artillery Brigade9 which went into position at the north-east corner of Shoushanpu h i l l . Left Sector (Kondra-

tovioh)33d, 34th and 35th fiifle fiegiments, one battalion of the 2d Bifle ttegiment and two battalions of the 19th Bifle fiegiaant. in place of the 12th Siberian infantry tfegimwn, returned during the night as result of Kuropattin's order, the 7th Siberian In-

(34) Or Of 41. r Of 105. (35) Gr Of 40. (36) Gr Of 38, 39. Br Of 103.

10.

fan try flegiment, with the twelve guns attached to i t , took over the defense of the extreme right wing by ocoujjying the railway embankmont between Chuantsiatun and yutsiatachuantsy. Cavalry remained on the left flank, General Gurko's

in general reserve east of

Shoushanpu were the following: one battalion from eaoh of the 3d and 19th Rifle aegimenta; the 17th and 20th Hi fie fiegiments, one battalion of the 9th Siberian infantry fieglmant, the Bast Siberian Sapper Battalion and the 4th Battery, 1st East Siberian fiifle Artillery Brigade* Staoielberg had at his disposal this day 36 battalions of Infantry and 76 guns* Of these 9 battalions and 8 guns were held in reserve* All but 2 3-4 battalions of this reserve was spent during the day. (37)

Baron Oku, commanding the Japanese second which with the 5th Division opposed the I Siberian corps* initiated action the night of 30-31 August to get a l l available artillery into positions where i t could support the attack the following day* As & result the attack was now supported by 234 field, or mountain guns, and 12 heavy batteries, a l l within effective range of the position held by Staokelberg's Corps (3,000 to 4,000 meters) (36)

Prior to the artillery preparation and before daylight attacks were made against that salient portion of the corps front, held by the reinforced 34th East Siberian Hi fie regiment, by the Japanese 5th infantry Brigade and some units of the 5th Division on i t s left* Since these attacks were made prior to daylight

(37) Gr Of 40, 41* (36) Gr Of 41, 42* Br Of 105*

11*

they possessed the characteristics of night attacks, and are 90 referred to by some historians* The advancing troops were soon disoov

ered by the Russians and the attack stopped by artillery and r i f l e fire* Flanking fire from artillery near Sinlitun again aided in (39) An attack made at the sam hour by the

halting the assault.

Japanese 34th Infantry against the sector held by the 36 Siberian fiifle Begiment gained some i:Ht*al success, and withstood two local counter-attacks but the losses resulting were so great that this regiment was comparatively useless for the remainder of the day and was reverted to reserve that night* (40)

isolated and unsystematic attempts of the 3rd Japanese Division to storm the position on the left o the 1 Siberian Corps having failed everywhere in spite of 5one few initial successes Headquarters, second Array, fearing for the left wing, decided to send the 12th and 43d Kobi regiments in support of that wing. They deployed on the left of the 3d Division f i l l i n g the gap between that division and the 6th Division* (41) The experiences

of the 34th Begiment however* did not incite a repetition of the assault until the artillery had prepared the way* (42) There was a lull in '<ae fighting until 11*30, on this front* when the Japanese Artillery in front of the I corps began to quicken* The trenches of the 33d and 34th 4ast Siberian aiflc tfeglments were shelled with shrapnel and high explosive for thirty minutes* withdrawal of some of the defenders from the front line

position apparently encouraged the attackers* and the assault which

(39) (40) (41) (42)

Gr Of Gr Of Gr of Gr Of

42* 45* 47* 47.

43* Br Of 106. 106. 46. Br Of 107. Br Of 108, Br Of 108*

followed succeeded in carrying a portion of the front line trenches in this sector a t ' t h e expense of heavy lossea in killed and wounded. General Staokelberg reinforced the threatened aector with a battalion of the 3d aat Siberian flifle regiment and a battery of Artillery from the general reserve, (43) (The defenders succeeded in holding

the second line of trenches in this sector further attacks on the Heights held by the 3d Siberian Jtiegiment likewise produced indecisive results* As before stated the 34th Japanese jgegiment was too weakened for another assault and the Kobi Brigade was unable to advance. (44)

On the west front of the Corpa attacks of the Japanese 6th and 4th divisions had been equally unsuccessful* During the

early hours elements of the 6th Division, 13th and 48th regiments, had attempted to surprise the villages of uayetun and Kuchiatzu. The attacks were soon discovered and defeated. Another attempt to

capture these villages was launched about 4:00 A M by the 24th Brigade. Again the Huasians etopped the attacks and inflicted

heavy casualties upon the enenty* machine gun fire seems to have plyed an important role in stopping these attacks, (45) The of-

fensive power of the attackers at this point was thus used up early in the day and the defenders apparently experienced no great difficulty in holding throughout the remainder of the day, (46)

About 4:00 Ptf the 4th Japanese

Division, which had a s -

sisted in the attack with i t s Artillery and some infantry, seems to. have been released from i t s status as General Headquarters reserve. The Second Japanese Anqy then decided to use this division in ex(43) (44) (45) (46) Br Or Gr Gr of Of Of Of 1069 109. Or Of 48* 50. 52. Br Of 110, 53. Br Of 110.

13.

tending the envelopement of the Busaian right* (47)

Orders were

issued but a c t i v i t i e s of General idishohenko's Arn^/ cavalry on the fmssian right created u belief i n the minds of the Japanese that a russiun counter offensive was about to be i n i t i a t e d on that flank and the front of the 4th Division was changed to meet suoh an a t tack. This maneuver so delayed the division in i t s enveloping;; at-

tack that darkness prevented i t s engagement* (46)

M the a r t i l l e r y fire ceased on both s i d e s , and At 7%30 P soon thereafter the small a roe f i r e . Heavy rain set in* About that It

time Kuropatkinfs order arrived to carry out "Disposition No* 3"

arranged for the I Siberian Army Corps to cross to the right bank of Taitzu. (49) For this contingency Staokelberg. in the course of

the afternoon, had already given directions to his subordinate leaders for breaking off the action gradually and for the retreat* (50) Evacuation of the position was begun at 9;00 PM She trains;.had a l ih% infantry

ready been sent north, and the Artillery followed next*

very ably withdrew in echelon* from the left without being discovered by the enemy* the center. Gurkofs Cavalry covered the retreat on the left and in The 1st fiast Siberian flifle Regiment, acting as -ear

guard held Shoushanpu heights until 3:QQ AM, 1 September* withdrawing then along the Mandarin road on Idaoyang without being pressed. (51)

On the flight Bank of the Taltxu* Staokelberg 9 s Corps was to have played an important role in General Jturopatkin's plan for crushing the Japanese 1st Army on the right bank of the laitzu Biver. (52) The Corps concentrated on

(47) (46) (49) (50) (51) (52)

Gr Of Gr Of Gr Of Gr Of Gr Of Or.Of

56. flr Of 110. 55* br Of 111* 57. Br Q f i l l l , 57. br Of 111. 67. 58. 146. 149. br Of 126. 129.

14.

the north side of the river in accordance with the amp plan.

09

2 September i t advanced and contacted the enemy, bat after an advance guard aotion It withdrew at 6*30 P M to flslaotalienkou, and

sometime after midnight f e l l baok to Liulinkou. (59)

At 6.1OO AM,

3d September Kuropatkin Issued orders for the retreat of the whole fiussian Army to Jtudken. (54)

The operations of the I Siberian corps at U*oyang consisted primarily of a passive defense of what i s known as the ad* vanced position south of that c i t y , (55) The Corps was success*

ful in holding i t s position against the attacks of the Japanese 30-51 August, although opposed by the Japanese Second Aray and the 5th Division, supported by a preponderance of a r t i l l e r y . (56) Darkness on the 31 August found the Corps .undefeated; heavy loss* es had been inflicted on the enemy and only minor successes on negligible importance had been gained by the attackers. (57) Much of the assault power.had been removed Cfom:Ahe attacking troops by their maqr failures Accompanied by heavy losses. (58) ih*f

failures and losses had been caused by a combination of a r t i l lery, ri;?le and machine gun f i r e , often coming from another sector of the defense located on'a flank. (59)

She works constructed on the front of the 1 Siberian Corps prior to the attack on 30 August a l s o greatly a s s i s t e d the defenders. (60) obstacles placed in front of the trenches

1 ) (64) (55) (56) (57)

Br Of 136. Or 143, 150. Br.Of 153.Gr Of 167. Gr Of 56. Br Of 115* Gr. Of 23, t& Of 105. Gr Of 67. Br Of 115, 111.

(68)Gr Of 44 f 45 t 46. Br Of 111. (59)Gr 0f^33 f 34,45 f 46 t 47,4e,4 f 52 f 63,64. Br.Of 106 f 107,106 9

16.

apparently proved a great handicap to the attaokera. (61)

Except in a few instances where counter attacks were made to regain lost tranchest or ground, rea*rve% were used to reinforce the troops in line, or to extend the line to meet threat* ened envelopements* (62) Since he on 31 August that the bulk of

the Army would withdraw north of the Taitzu that night, and since counter attacks were not required to effect his withdrawal General Stack*lberg is hardly subject to criticism for not delivering determined counter attack* on that date.

Contrary to the co-operation displayed by the defenders in the placing of supporting and flanking fires, both as to artillery support of the infantry and among infantry units f cooperation aud co-ordination was lacking in iAe efforts of the attackers, infantry attacked before its supporting artillery was

in position, and evidence of a well-timed co-ordinated attach by the entire army is missing. Frontal attacks were made by the 5th,

and 3d Divisions before the enveloping 6 th pi vision had even reached i t s developing area. ven brigades, regiments and battalions

made separate attacks* The defenders were thus able to meet the attacks in detail, shift reserves and flanking fires.

(60) Gr Of 1,2,34,41,46,51,52 Br. Of 106,107. (61) Gr. Of 34,41,46,51,52. Br Of 106,107. (6Z) Gr Of 56. Br Of 110,111.

16.

IV.

CONCLUSIONS OF THE AUTHOR

The operations of Staakelberg's Corps at Liaoyang 11luF/rates from the beginning of operations 50 August to the beginning of the retreat to Mudkenf on both the offensive and defensive idee, the importance of co-operation in war* Although i t can not be said that a well co-ordinated attack by the forces opposing the I Siberian Corps would have been successful in driving the fiuseiana from the defensive position i t s chances of success would have been greater than those.of the:piece-meal methods employed. The

artillery with the attackers was given no opportunity to clear the way for the infantry prior to the i n i t i a l assaults upon the wellorganized position, the results were failure at a cost of great losses in k i l l e d and wounded* on the defensive side well-placed and concealed a r t i l l e r y was never silenced by h o s t i l e a r t i l l e r y and give good support throughout, least pressed sectors switched their fire to hard pressed sectors* Co-operation on the one side

and the lack of i t on the other was a decisive factor in the operations of Staokelberg's Corps at Li&oyang*