Preferred Citation: Caws, Peter. Yorick's World: Science and the Knowing Subject.

Berkeley: University of California Press, c1993 1993. http://ark.cdlib.or /ark:/13!3!/ft!d"n99#!/

Yorick's World
Science and the Knowing Subject Peter Caws
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS

Berkeley Los Angeles Oxford

!!" T#e Re$e%ts o& t#e U%i'ersit( o& Cali&or%ia

$or %ancy and &lisabeth

Preferred Citation: Caws, Peter. Yorick's World: Science and the Knowing Subject. Berkeley: University of California Press, c1993 1993. http://ark.cdlib.or /ark:/13!3!/ft!d"n99#!/

$or %ancy and &lisabeth

PREFACE
'orick appears in the title of this book beca(se of his head)or #ore e*actly, his sk(ll. +e stands, however, #ore for the #ateriality of h(#ans than for their #ortality. ,he point is that he had a world, once, and he had it by virt(e of what was in his sk(ll. +a#let was no ne(rolo ist b(t he ot the #ateriality ri ht: -.hy #ay not i#a ination trace the noble d(st of /le*ander, till he find it stoppin a b(n hole0- 1 have #ore to say abo(t 'orick later on 2and in chapter 345. $or the #o#ent he serves tr(th in advertisin : the reader #ay know fro# the start that in #y view if 1 have a world, and if 1 have science)which is a second6order aspect of that world)it is thanks to #y individ(al e#bodi#ent as part of a #aterial (niverse, a part that en7oys the stat(s of s(b7ect in relation to its world as ob7ect. 8cience is not in the #aterial (niverse e*cept by way of the e#bodi#ent of the knowin s(b7ect. 8cience is the s(b7ect9s way of havin the str(ct(re of its world)the theoretical part of that world) #atch what it takes to be the str(ct(re of the (niverse. 2-:atch- covers a #(ltit(de of possibilities; it is not necessarily an e*act f(nction.5 ,he reality of the (niverse is hypothetical, b(t that obvio(sly does not #ean that the hypothesi<ed (niverse is to be re arded as less than real. ,hese elliptical re#arks will, 1 hope, be ill(#inated by what follows, b(t #y partic(lar brand of #aterialis# is developed in an

earlier work, Structuralism: The Art of the Intelligible 219==5, especially chapter 13, and the interested reader #ay p(rs(e it f(rther there. ,his book asse#bles in one place #ost of the #ore or less finished prod(cts of that part of #y professional activity over the last three > *ii > decades which has been devoted to the philosophy of science, e*cl(din however 2with one e*ception5 #aterial already p(blished in book for# in The hiloso!h" of Science: A S"stematic Account 2194"5 and Science and the Theor" of #alue 2194?5. /s the dates of those works s( est, #y #ain concentration on this field was early in #y career; and as is clear fro# the title of the second, #y attention soon wandered fro# #ainstrea# philosophy of science to the relevance of scientific practice to other parts of philosophy and c(lt(re. 1 say -#ainstrea#- beca(se this is how part of the discipline has re arded itself, tho( h the ter# is relative. /s will beco#e clear, it has not always see#ed to #e a strea# (sef(lly navi able for car oes of the reatest philosophical i#port. ,his is beca(se it has syste#atically failed to pay s(fficiently serio(s attention to a precondition of its own possibility, na#ely 2as s( ested above5, the dependence of science itself, and a fortiori of any reflective analysis of science, on the en a e#ent of a knowin s(b7ect)and in every case an idiosyncratic one at that. ,his @(estion of the s(b7ect is one that 1 have p(rs(ed in other do#ains. B(t #y ori inal attach#ent to science and the philosophy of science, if te#porarily bracketed, has re#ained)to borrow an e*pression of +(sserl9s)-as the bracketed in the bracket,- e#er in fro# ti#e to ti#e as occasions, proble#atic or professional, have de#anded. ,here is a sense in which, even when en a ed in so6 called continental philosophy, or in the philosophical aspects of literat(re or psychoanalysis or politics, 1 have never abandoned the realist and e#piricist stance bred into #e by physics and the philosophy of science. B(t instead of declinin to entertain possible ob7ects of e*perience o(tside the scientific, or ref(sin the# a place in the realist sche#e of thin s)as #any of #y collea (es in those do#ains tend to do)1 have taken it as a philosophical challen e to distin (ish between different ob7ects of e*perience, and to show how those that lie o(tside the p(rview of nat(ral science have their own clai# to reality. 1n the end these lines of in@(iry have conver ed. 1 do take it to be possible to draw a radical distinction between the nat(ral sciences on the one hand and the social, or as 1 now prefer to say the h(#an, sciences on the other. :y way of doin this is to assi n as ob7ects to the h(#an sciences 2(nder a coverin realist hypothesis5 7(st those events and processes that have, a#on their ca(sal antecedents, episodes of conscio(s h(#an intentionality, and to assi n as ob7ects to the nat(ral sciences events and processes that have no s(ch episode a#on their ca(sal antecedents. ,his has in the first instance nothin to do with the #ethodolo ies of the respective sciences. 1t is an ontolo ical #ove: it has the effect of dividin the world of #y attention into a > *iii > nat(ral part and a h(#an part. ,he division is a h(#an, not a nat(ral, one)there is a sense in which we and all o(r works are a part of nat(re. B(t it is pla(sible and effective: a si#ple b(t ill(#inatin e*ercise is to classify fa#iliar ob7ects in its ter#s 2assi nin as ob7ects of in@(iry, to ive a @(ick e*a#ple, the #echanis#s of into*ication and the principles of the prod(ction of into*icants to the nat(ral sciences, b(t the desire for these s(bstances, their distrib(tion and cons(#ption, and what is done or #ade (nder their infl(ence, to the h(#an sciences5.

1n principle it looks as tho( h the h(#an #i ht be red(cible to the nat(ral. B(t the very idea of a nat(ral6scientific e*planation of h(#an action involves a circ(larity, beca(se the e*planation of nat(re, even in its own ter#s, is already a h(#an enterprise. 1f therefore we consider the# in the#selves, apart fro# any distinction in ter#s of their ob7ects, the nat(ral sciences and the h(#an sciences are entirely the prod(cts of conscio(s h(#an intentionality; the theories that constit(te the# are 2as their na#e s( ests5 o(tlooks on the worlds of their practitioners, e*planatory stances adopted for the p(rpose of brin in the co#ple*ity of e*perience into intelli ible order. /nd the relations that hold between the sciences and their ob7ects, nat(ral or h(#an, #(st the#selves be ani#ated and s(stained by knowin s(b7ects. ,hese s(b7ects have the additional property of bein free 2a point 1 clai# here witho(t ar (#ent, tho( h 1 have provided plenty of that elsewhere5, and as s(ch en7oy reat latit(de in the choice and for#(lation of proble#s. ,he idiosyncrasy of one s(ch s(b7ect and of his choices is reflected practically in the hetero eneity of the work collected here. B(t the (nderlyin the#e)the pri#acy of the knowin s(b7ect)is rec(rrent, if so#eti#es only i#plicit. ,he tone and level are variable, fro# the pop(lar to the scholarly, and 1 have #ade no atte#pt to i#pose (nifor#ity in these respects. ,he previo(sly p(blished chapters are essentially (nchan ed e*cept in one si nificant way, na#ely, that 1 have conscio(sly so( ht o(t and corrected the se*ist (se of prono(ns, which was once transparent to everyone b(t sho(ld now, iven the fe#inist !rise de conscience$ be (nacceptable to anyone. 1n the case of #aterial presented orally b(t not previo(sly p(blished 1 have allowed #yself reater freedo# to adapt, b(t even here the individ(al chapters 2tho( h not arran ed chronolo ically5 bear the #arks of their contin ent ori ins and have not been #ade to speak in one voice. / s#all b(t tellin point: as a theoretician preocc(pied with the e#bodi#ent of the s(b7ect, 1 have tended to stress fro# ti#e to ti#e the obvio(s b(t cr(cial i#portance of brains, and partic(larly of their co#ple*ity, one pri#itive #eas(re of which is the n(#ber of ne(rons they contain. 1n the co(rse of #y professional career ne(rolo ists have contin(o(sly revised (pward their esti#ates of this n(#ber, > *iv > so that in different chapters the reader #ay find cas(al all(sion to anythin fro# five billion to a h(ndred billion ne(rons. B(t 1 have not one back to chan e the earlier n(#bers; it is instr(ctive, 1 think, to leave the# where they lie, as testi#ony)if any be needed)to the always provisional character of scientific knowled e. ,he arran e#ent of the #aterial is ro( hly the#atic, which helps clarify what proble#s are bein dealt with b(t has the disadvanta e that chapters of varyin technical diffic(lty are l(#ped to ether. 1t #ay be helpf(l, therefore, to identify a few chapters, written in a #ore collo@(ial style and ori inally intended for a wider a(dience than so#e of the others, as ro(tes of access for nonprofessionals. $or readers whose #ain interests are historical and social a ood startin point wo(ld be chapters 3 and A. ,hose with interests in practice and technolo y #i ht first try chapters 13, 13, and 14. Chapters 1= and 19 deal with iss(es in the theory of knowled e, and chapters 3" and 34 with #etaphysical iss(es, in #ore or less self6contained and, 1 hope, approachable ways. B(t 1 do not #ean that these chapters contain nothin of interest to the professional, nor that the others are o(t of reach to everyone else. ,here is, no do(bt, so#ethin arbitrary and whi#sical in havin p(t all this (nder the si n of 'orick )-alas, poor 'orickB- as +a#let says)and it certainly isn9t the #ort(ary aspect of his sk(ll that 1 want to invoke, tho( h 8hakespeare won9t allow that to beco#e too depressin : his ravedi er is, after all, a clown. /bo(t 'orick when alive the play doesn9t tell (s a reat deal: he was the kin 9s 7ester; he (sed to carry the child +a#let on his back; he once po(red a fla on of Chenish on the ravedi er9s head; he

died when +a#let was abo(t seven. B(t +a#let says of hi# that he was -a fellow of infinite 7est, of #ost e*cellent fancy,- whose -flashes of #erri#ent . . . were wont to set the table on a roar-)an a reeable chap, in short, and not at all a bad patron for a book, even a serio(s book. %ot that 1 want to invoke the 7est or the #erri#ent either 2tho( h 1 wo(ld certainly ali n #yself on the side of De#ocrit(s as a ainst +eraclit(s, the la( hin philosopher a ainst the weepin one5, b(t there is so#ethin s( estive in the fancy. $or -fancy- has its ori ins in -fantasy- 2or -phantasy-5, which p(ts it in the sa#e lin (istic fa#ily as -pheno#enolo y-)it is a #atter of appearances, which constit(te the life6world of the knowin s(b7ect. 8cience is creative, it is i#a inative, and as &d#(nd +(sserl points o(t it is 7(st one of the thin s that occ(py the life6world;E1F if that world is in the end 2and 8hakespeare wo(ld certainly be of this opinion5 a play of fancies, science wo(ld s(rely co(nt a#on the #ost e*cellent. > *v >

AC)NOWLE*+,ENTS
,he body of work collected here owes so #(ch to so #any people)fro# teachers to fellow6st(dents to friends and professional collea (es, not o#ittin readers for 7o(rnals, lect(re a(diences, and #y own st(dents over decades of (niversity teachin )that even constr(ctin an e*ha(stive list, let alone specifyin what was d(e to the individ(als na#ed in it, wo(ld ta* #e#ory and self6knowled e beyond their present reso(rces. 1 #ention so#e na#es fro# the earlier sta es of #y intellect(al develop#ent in the 1ntrod(ction; later on, as n(#bers row, specific infl(ences beco#e harder to isolate. ,he (s(al acknowled #ents are in order to editors and p(blishers who have allowed #e to reprint what appeared in their books or 7o(rnals, a listin of which will be fo(nd on pa e 3=1. Cedo(bled thanks are d(e in those cases where the contrib(tion in @(estion was solicited by the#, rather than s(b#itted by #e, since that often ind(ced #e to attend to iss(es 1 #i ht otherwise never have tackled. 1 think in this connection especially of Gon :oreno, whose lon 6standin invitation to write abo(t @(ality and @(antity inspired the e*c(rsion into the philosophy of #athe#atics that appears as chapter 19. 1n a so#ewhat si#ilar vein 1 sho(ld perhaps record #y ratit(de)not that 1 felt it at the ti#e)to the a(thorities of ,rinity Colle e, +artford, who after 1 had accepted it withdrew, on b(d etary ro(nds, the position the philosophy depart#ent had offered #e for #y first year o(t of rad(ate school, th(s ens(rin that 1 sho(ld be in #y career not by teachin philosophy in the &ast b(t by teachin science in the :iddle .est. ,he one year 1 spent lect(rin (nder rad(ates on basic science > *vi > forced #e to et (p to speed in the biolo ical and earth sciences, an inval(able co#ple#ent to the physics in which 1 had spent #y (nder rad(ate years. ,o this day 1 re#ain ratef(l to :ichi an 8tate for resc(in #e fro# (ne#ploy#ent, and to the University of Hansas for callin #e back to philosophy the followin year. ,o collea (es and instit(tions who have entr(sted #e with lect(reships and with offices that re@(ired the deliverin of addresses 1 also owe debts of ratit(de: :a* .ilson for chapter A, C(ss +anson for chapter 4, Irover :a*well for chapter 9 2and posth(#o(sly for chapter ?5, and Ieor e B( liarello for chapter 13. 1n other cases the connection is less direct; 1 owe to :el Hran<ber , for e*a#ple, the invitation to be a national lect(rer for 8i #a Ji, which helped keep (p #y activity in the philosophy of science even tho( h none of the lect(res fo(nd their way into this book. / ain, readers and

co##entators have been #any; 1 a# especially indebted to :ar* .artofsky and an anony#o(s reader for the University of California Press for reactions to the book as a whole, and #ost recently to 8teve $(ller for a helpf(l critical readin of the final chapter. .itho(t the enterprise and enco(ra e#ent of &d Di#endber at the Press, #(ch of this work #i ht never have appeared in book for#. Kisa Chishol#9s reso(rcef(l and nonintr(sive copyeditin #ade the last sta es of prod(ction a pleas(re instead of the ordeal they often can be. :y secretary, Haren Ireis#an, cheerf(lly perfor#ed prodi ies of retypin , and #y rad(ate assistant, Keslie Ba*ter, helped i##ensely at every sta e, asse#blin the constit(ent #aterials and brin in her sharp eye and #ind to bear on co(ntless details. :y wife, Dr. %ancy Breslin, and #y da( hter, &lisabeth Breslin Caws, to who# this book is dedicated, filled and contin(e to fill the life6world of this partic(lar knowin s(b7ect with a happiness no less pri<ed for its havin beco#e habit(al. &lisabeth also tried to eat the #an(script; 1 think this was an e*pression of approval, tho( h 1 have to ad#it that, if so, it is one she confers so#ewhat indiscri#inately at this sta e of her life on readin #atter that happens to co#e her way. P&,&C C/.8 ./8+1%I,L%, D.C. >1>

I%trod-ctio%.
Fro/ P#(sics to t#e 0-/a% Scie%ces1T#e Iti%erar( o& a% Attit-de
,aken in itself, each of the chapters that follow #akes a #ore or less circ(#scribed point in its own way. ,hey were not ori inally conceived in relation to one another, b(t their p(blication to ether offers an opport(nity to rethink the# as a coherent body of work, or at least as one facet of s(ch a body of work. ,he best way of doin this is to say so#ethin of the pro7ect, in the 8artrean sense, o(t of which they arose.

Scie%ti&ic Roots
:y en a e#ent with the philosophy of science oes back to readin s of 8ir Ga#es Geans, 8ir /rth(r &ddin ton, and /lfred %orth .hitehead while 1 was still in school. ,he Geans and &ddin ton were #y father9s; he wanted to (nderstand the #ysterio(s (niverse beca(se it lorified Iod)or rather, 1 s(spect 2he was a h(#ble #an5, he 7(st wanted to feel how #ysterio(s it was, th(s savorin at once Iod9s reatness and his own insi nificance. +e was i#pressionable, and contin(ally awed by the di#ensions of the ato# 2the n(cle(s as a pea in 8t. Pa(l9s Cathedral5 or the distance of the ala*ies. ,he effect of his sharin all this was that it beca#e fa#iliar to #e and not very #ysterio(s at all. 1 took physics in school, bein initiated 2which is, after all, the old sense of #ystery5 at the hands of a cr(sty and acerbic teacher whose na#e was 8. M. 8hin ler. ,wo #e#ories of :r. 8hin ler stand o(t: first, his daily tirades in class abo(t the hopeless st(pidity of his p(pils, and second, a #ore personal reb(ke. 1n workin

>3> (p so#e notes on fl(id press(re)one of the very first assi n#ents in the fo(rth for# perhaps 21 #(st have been abo(t thirteen5)1 ended with a flo(rish, writin the basic for#(la -p N f/a- in lar e letters in the #iddle of the notebook pa e and drawin a little bo* aro(nd it. 1t was a neat bit of work and 1 was pro(d of it. :r. 8hin ler str(ck the for#(la thro( h with his red pencil and #ade #e redo the pa e. %o physical e*pression, he said, was #ore or less i#portant than any other; 1 wo(ld please #ake the# all the sa#e si<e. +is tone as he ad#inistered this lesson was one of witherin scorn #i*ed with en(ine affection. ,hanks to the pec(liarities of the British ed(cational syste# 1 st(died nothin for#ally e*cept physics, #athe#atics, and a bit of che#istry between the a es of fifteen and twenty6one. ,his coincided) so#eti#es to the detri#ent of acade#ic work)with a period of personal str( le a ainst a set of beliefs into which 1 had been indoctrinated since infancy by #y parents, who belon ed to a s#all and fanatical sect known as the &*cl(sive Brethren. ,he Brethren were always #etaphorically writin thin s in lar e letters in the #iddles of pa es: they h(n reat fra#ed Biblical te*ts everywhere, #akin insistent clai#s on belief or action, and cond(cted their lives in an at#osphere of e*a erated fear and piety. Physics see#ed obvio(s fro# the be innin ; reli ion beca#e #ore and #ore d(bio(s. O(estions abo(t belief, what it was and (nder what conditions it was 7(stified, arose on both sides. 8o#e of the clai#s of cos#olo ists and @(ant(# theorists were every bit as i#pla(sible as those of theolo ians. B(t scientists were tentative where preachers were do #atic, and it helped to re#e#ber that thin s didn9t beco#e tr(er beca(se they were written lar e, or)as 1 was to p(t it #any years later, in a review of a fellow philosopher of science)that -hypotheticals do not t(rn into cate oricals 7(st beca(se one sho(ts the# at the top of one9s l(n s.-E1F %othin in science had the canonical and sacrosanct stat(s of reli io(s belief; everythin was provisional. Kocal observations, s(itably specified, and r(le6 overned derivations fro# stated ivens)like the for#(la for fl(id press(re)had what 1 wo(ld now call apodictic certainty 2which, Hant to the contrary notwithstandin , is not the sa#e thin as necessary tr(th5, b(t beyond that every step had to be ar (ed. &*trapolations and hypotheses were all ri ht, b(t only as lon as one re#e#bered that that was what they were. 8cience, therefore, never had for #e the #e alo#aniacal pretensions so #any people clai# for or attrib(te to it. 1t was certainly not a s(bstit(te for reli ion)on the contrary, it was an antidote. ,he idea that science is 7(st another kind of faith overlooks an essential difference between science and reli ion: as a scientist 1 #i ht share with believers a kind of practical confidence in the stability of the everyday world, >3> b(t 1 re7ected not #erely as (nnecessary b(t also as (nworthy any co##it#ent to an e*planatory acco(nt of the ori in or #eanin of that world #ade si#ply for the sake of havin so#ethin to believe, or for that #atter any (nwarranted e*trapolation of the scientific acco(nt itself. /s 1 ca#e to see it, %ewton9s reco##endation in his third C(le of Ceasonin in Philosophy that locally enco(ntered @(alities sho(ld -be esteemed Ee#phasis addedF the (niversal @(alities of all bodies whatsoever,s(b7ect always to the @(alification in the fo(rth C(le 2-till s(ch ti#e as other phaeno#ena occ(r-5,E3F only #ade sense, while on the other hand Kaplace9s post(lation of -an intelli ence . . . able to e#brace in a sin le for#(la the #ove#ents of the lar est bodies in the (niverse and those of the li htest ato#-E3F was 7(st a bit of (nwarranted #elodra#a. /t the sa#e ti#e science didn9t see#, locally, to be #ore than a part of the story; it coe*isted happily

with the rest of life. &ven if everythin t(rned o(t to be e*plainable, that wo(ld not necessarily spoil its @(ality as e*perience. &ddin ton had been @(ite ood on this point; 1 @(ote one of the relevant passa es in chapter 33. 8o a ain, one of the thin s fre@(ently held a ainst science, one of the thin s that .hitehead hi#self had held a ainst it)that it red(ces reality to the #ere h(rryin of #aterial, endlessly and #eanin lessly, or words to that effect)str(ck #e as based on a #is(nderstandin . ,o do .hitehead 7(stice, what he was critici<in was the -scientific world6view- that e#er ed in the si*teenth and seventeenth cent(ries, b(t he see#ed to think, as #any people still think, that scientific work led #ore or less inevitably to this view, and that si#ply was not #y e*perience.EAF Lne other attit(de to science that dates fro# this early period is that it has always see#ed to #e a reat play ro(nd of ideas. 1 read science fiction #ore or less avidly, b(t even in everyday life there were all sorts of ways in which scientific knowled e co(ld transfor# or defor# the ordinary, th(s renderin it #ore interestin . Lne 7(venile e*a#ple of this is fro# ro( hly the period of #y apprenticeship with :r. 8hin ler, tho( h it belon ed in the che#istry laboratory ne*t door, which was presided over by Dr. 8t(bbs. ,he str(ct(ral ele ance of or anic che#istry ca#e 7(st too late in the c(rric(l(# to convert #e to the s(b7ect 2che#istry (p to that point had been rather a cookbook affair5, b(t it fed a certain spec(lative bent. +ydrocarbons co#e in series of ascendin co#ple*ity; for e*a#ple, the series of acids oes fro# for#ic 2+.CLL+5 to acetic 2C+3 .CLL+5, then to propionic 2C3 +" .CLL+5, and so on. ,he alcohol series however be ins with #ethyl 2C+3 .L+5 and contin(es with ethyl 2C3 +" .L+5, and so on. 1t is obvio(s on co#parison that there is a #issin first #e#ber in the alcohol series, na#ely the analo (e of for#ic acid, with its sin le hydro en rather than a hy6 >A> drocarbon ro(p. 1n the case of the alcohols this wo(ld clearly be +.L+. B(t that is water)so a case co(ld be #ade for re ardin water as an alcohol. ,his was s(rely not ori inal with #e, tho( h it was #y own at the ti#e. /lso the ar (#ent had a fatal flaw: as Dr. 8t(bbs patiently pointed o(t, yo( can9t have an or anic co#po(nd witho(t carbon. 1t a#(sed #e anyway, b(t 1 #(st 1 think have been after provocation as well)for e*a#ple, people wo(ld have to redefine te#perance. .ith #y fa#ily 1 ac@(ired a rep(tation for frivolity. ,his was no la( hin #atter, b(t then they took al#ost everythin with deadly serio(sness, whereas 1 tho( ht 2and still do5 that there were very few thin s in life, with the possible e*ceptions of love and 7(stice, worth takin alto ether serio(sly. ,races of this perverse rethinkin of the fa#iliar are to be fo(nd here and there in this book.

S(ste/atic P#iloso2#( o& Scie%ce

,o a first de ree in physics 1 added, after a transatlantic fli ht fro# reli io(s s(ffocation, a doctorate in philosophy, for which it was nat(ral to write a dissertation in the philosophy of science. ,he task of this discipline 1 took to be the (nderstandin of what science was doin conce!tuall"$ not historically or anecdotally, which e*plains a lack of sy#pathy for s(bse@(ent efforts to #ake it -a #ore acc(rate reflection of act(al scientific practice,- as so#e revisionist philosophers of science p(t it. ,he str(ct(re of science as 1 envisa ed it at this ti#e involved a lowest level of conce!ts that corresponded to reco ni<able co#ple*es in the percept(al do#ain, a ne*t hi her level of constructs which were @(alitatively si#ilar to concepts b(t had (nder one a process of refine#ent 2definition, @(antification, etc.5, and a hi hest level of isolates that had no direct or obvio(s correspondences in e*perience b(t were invoked beca(se of their theoretical power. ,he isolates were hypothetical and for the #ost part invented, tho( h it see#ed possible that so#e of the# #i ht be called into bein by str(ct(ral

considerations, as a #atter of inference or of Iestalt co#pletion. ,his ter#inolo y, lar ely adapted fro# that of #y sponsor +enry :ar ena(, was not destined for wide acceptance, tho( h 1 still think it lends itself to an interestin variant treat#ent of the observational6theoretical dichoto#y 2abo(t which 1 shall have #ore to say5. 1 had already abandoned it)at least the part abo(t the isolates)by the ti#e of #y atte#pt at a syste#atic acco(nt of the philosophy of science in 194". B(t 1 did not abandon then or later the realist concl(sion of the dissertation nor #y >"> reasons for reachin it; they are dealt with briefly in chapter 31 of the present book, which was ori inally written as a contrib(tion to a %estschrift for :ar ena(. :y realis# was what wo(ld now be called a str(ct(ral realis#, in that 1 did not necessarily e*pect the separateness and identity of -thin s- in the percept(al world to be faithf(lly #irrored in the real one, even tho( h all their properties corresponded to something in the real, (nderstandin by this ter# a (niverse independent of and ontolo ically prior to #y knowled e of it. Lne co(ld reasonably post(late an iso#orphis#, (nder so#e transfor#ation, between the percept(al/concept(al and the real, b(t to ask what so#ethin is like when we aren9t attendin to it was to ask a silly @(estion, since thin s are only -like- anythin when we are attendin to the#. ,his did not #ean a fall into idealis#: attendin to the# didn9t constit(te the world in which the thin s were ro(nded, it only fi*ed how they wo(ld appear in #y world. / ain, #y realis# itself was hypothetical, and entertained by individ(als, whose concept(al sche#es were idiosyncratic and only partially iso#orphic to one another. 1t #ade no sense to ob7ect that beca(se so#ethin was hypothetical, it co(ldn9t be real)that #issed the whole point of #akin the hypothesis in the first place. ,hat it was real was the hypothesis. 1 had not yet enco(ntered pheno#enolo y)one co(ld et a doctorate in philosophy at 'ale witho(t ever hearin of it, an astonishin testi#ony to parochialis# when one thinks of it, and a devastatin indict#ent of places where it #ay still be tr(e)and co(ld therefore not see the hypothetical str(ct(re of the real as intentional. 21t #ay be worth re#arkin that concept(al sche#es as 1 constr(ed the#, #eanin the concept(al f(rnit(re of individ(al thinkers, do not fall (nder Donald Davidson9s later strict(res in -,he Mery 1dea of a Concept(al 8che#e.-5E"F The hiloso!h" of Science: A S"stematic Account ,E4F written after a n(#ber of years of teachin in this area, set o(t to or ani<e, for didactic p(rposes, the content of what was at that ti#e still an e#er in discipline a#on the #a7or s(bdivisions of philosophy as ta( ht in (niversities. 1 did not consider that it had itself to be scientific or to #i#ic the technicalities of science. $or he(ristic p(rposes 1 #ade (se of so#e dia ra#s and si#ple for#(lae, especially when dealin with lo ic and probability theory, b(t #y #ain concern was to convey a sense of concept(al str(ct(re)always re#e#berin that the s(b7ects who were to entertain it were e#bodied #acroscopically in place and ti#e 2in what 1 wo(ld later call the -flat re ion-5 and wo(ld stay that way, no #atter how the ob7ects of their interest #i ht be p(shed in the direction of the s#all or the fast or the distant. 1t was #y first book and in it 1 #ade a deliberate atte#pt to be >4> approachable. /s so#e sharp6eyed reviewers pointed o(t, it was flawed by errors of scholarship, not e*c(sable)as 1 a# @(ite ready to ad#it)even on the ro(nds that 1 was paintin in broad strokes on a lar e canvas. B(t as 1 look back 1 a# str(ck by so#ethin that, now that it occ(rs to #e, #ay be relevant to so#e of the #aterial in the present book. ,he reviewers9 co#plaints were not at all that 1 had

ot it wron abo(t science, nor indeed that any of #y #ain clai#s were off tar et, b(t rather that 1 had #isrepresented so#e details abo(t the work of other philosophers of science)that 1 had attrib(ted to Carnap a view he had once e*plicitly disavowed, that 1 had i#plicitly conflated the positions of PoincarP and D(he# on a point where they had in fact diver ed. 1 think the tro(ble was that for #e scholarship wasn9t the #ain point, that 1 lacked the appetite for detail and the talent for perseverance that #arked #any of #y collea (es. 2Perhaps this plays o(t yet f(rther the re7ection of the kind of reverence for the .ord 1 was s(rfeited with in yo(th.5 /t all events #y attit(de has always been that the fact that J said ' isn9t really i#portant, philosophically speakin , even if J is Plato or Hant; what #atters is what reasons he or she ave for sayin ' and whether they sho(ld co#pel o(r assent. Lf co(rse if J didn9t say ' nothin e*c(ses the #isattrib(tion, which is why #y !ost facto contrition is en(ine, and why 1 apolo i<e in advance for s(ch lapses as #ay have escaped #y now #ore critical eye in what follows. B(t in cases like this history, not philosophy, is the offended party. 1n a si#ilar way, when #y st(dents tell #e what they think, 1 so#eti#es say)takin care to te#per the point 2perhaps 1 learned so#ethin fro# :r. 8hin ler5)that it doesn9t #atter what they think; their opinions will beco#e interestin to #e only when they can tell #e why they hold the#. :ore er#ane to the philosophy of science proper was the entle reproach of a for#er st(dent of #ine, hi#self on the way to beco#in a distin (ished philosopher of science, who wrote to say how it worried hi# that while -P(tna#, $eyerabend, +anson, H(hn et al. see#EedF to have pretty effectively destroyed the tenability of the theory6observation dichoto#y,- 1 on the other hand see#ed to clin to it in #y book. B(t 1 tho( ht they had done no s(ch thin , and think now that 1 concede too #(ch in chapter 1 of this book in callin the stron dichoto#y (ntenable. 1n a s(bse@(ent paper 2which, b(ckin s(ch a trend, was never p(blished and is now lost, or 1 sho(ld have incl(ded it here5 1 prod(ced, as a test case, the Chinese observation of a - (est6star- in the year 1!"A. ,hanks to astrophysics we now know, fro# the celestial ho(se in which it appeared, that this was the s(pernova whose re#ains were recorded by Charles :essier in 1?=A as :1 2the first ite# in his catalo (e of neb(lae5 and were later na#ed the Crab %eb(la by >?> the &arl of Cosse, who tho( ht the# very like a crab. &ven if the observations of :essier and the &arl of Cosse were colored by astrophysical theory, which 1 do(bt to have been the case in any developed sense, those of the Chinese certainly weren9t)and yet, beca(se they fit the retrodicted li ht c(rve of the s(pernova, they co(nt as confir#in evidence of the theory. Lf co(rse if what is #eant by the re7ection of the observational6theoretical dichoto#y is that all raspin of an"thing in perception involves 7(d #ent, or, in Colerid e9s words, -the #eanest of #en has his theory, and to think at all is to theori<e,-E?F that ets rid easily eno( h of theory6free observations. +owever, on the one hand it triviali<es theory and on the other it #akes roo# for the ree#er ence of the dichoto#y at a hi her level. $or it will fre@(ently be tr(e that the back ro(nd theory that is tho( ht to conta#inate the observations will also be a back ro(nd theory for the theory that is invoked to e*plain the#)b(t that the e*planatory theory will be @(ite distinct fro# the back ro(nd theory and will share no ter#s with it. 8o once a ain there will be a sharp distinction, a ainst that back ro(nd, between observation state#ents and theoretical state#ents.

3ra%c#i%$ O-t
/ nor#al career in the philosophy of science wo(ld no do(bt have involved pl(n in into the professional fray with these and other ar (#ents, b(t even while en a ed on the syste#atic pro7ect #y

interests were be innin to t(rn away fro# the definin proble#s of the field. ,hose proble#s, so#e of which are noticed occasionally in what follows, ca#e to incl(de paradi #s, research pro ra#s, the realis#6pra #atis# debate, anthropic spec(lations, and eli#inative #aterialis#. /s will beco#e clear in the later parts of this book, a kind of reconver ence has taken place, especially in the do#ain of artificial intelli ence 2see for e*a#ple chapter 3A5, now that the hardwired loc(s of the knowin s(b7ect is be innin to be taken #ore serio(sly. / decisive event at the ti#e of which 1 a# speakin was a re@(est fro# so#e bri ht and insistent st(dents at the University of Hansas, who wanted to read e*istentialis# with #e. 1 was the yo(n est #e#ber of the depart#ent and the others had already ref(sed. :y 7ob was to teach lo ic and the philosophy of science, b(t on the one hand 1 was c(rio(s abo(t Hierke aard, who# 1 had enco(ntered in a backhanded way at 'ale 2where he had been introd(ced as a prel(de to an e*e#plary dis#issal5, and on the other 1 liked the st(dents. .e read Hierke aard, Gaspers, +eide er, and 8artre; later 1 added +(sserl on #y own. 1t >=> a#a<ed #e that this rich #aterial was held in s(ch low estee# in the trade. 1t #ade no internal difference to the technical proble#s of the philosophy of science b(t it p(t, as it were, a #odal prefi* in front of the whole enterprise, the absence of which constit(ted, as 1 saw and still see it, a c(lpable fail(re of self6knowled e. /nd it did #ake an e*ternal difference 2see for e*a#ple chapter 3! of the present book5. /lso 1 had be (n even earlier to have so#e c(riosity abo(t the possibility of e*trapolatin res(lts in the philosophy of science to theories in other conte*ts, notably at first that of val(e, an in@(iry that res(lted in Science and the Theor" of #alue .E=F /ttendin to these and other eccentric spec(lations #ade all the #ore sense beca(se of a rowin feelin that #(ch technical philosophy of science was in so#e @(ite deep way beside the point. 1t was f(ll of what 1 tho( ht sp(rio(s for#alis#s and ai#ed for what 1 s(spected to be a sp(rio(s e*actit(de)sp(rio(s beca(se the for#alis#s were often decorative and not (sed for any essential p(rpose 2like provin theore#s, as in #athe#atics5 and beca(se no adverse conse@(ences followed 2as they s(rely wo(ld have in the e#pirical sciences5 fro# drawin concl(sions with less than perfect e*actness, or as /ristotle p(ts it in the &icomachean 'thics , -ro( hly and in o(tline.-E9F /ristotle oes on in the sa#e passa e to say that -it is the #ark of an ed(cated #an to look for precision in each class of thin s 7(st so far as the nat(re of the s(b7ect ad#its,- and it see#ed to #e that philosophers of science who tho( ht that what they did sho(ld be for#al and e*act were ettin conf(sed abo(t their s(b7ect. Philosophy is not a nat(ral science, nor an e*act science, and tryin to #ake the philosophy of science i#itate the hard sciences by the refine#ent of its technical for#(lae 2as 1 once re#arked at a conference, to the indi nation of the advocate of -e*act philosophy- on whose paper 1 was co##entin 5 #ade abo(t as #(ch sense as #y #ovin to Boston fro# %ew 'ork, where 1 was then livin , beca(se 1 really wanted to live in Kondon. ,he difference is stark and si#ple b(t often not rasped. ,he nat(ral sciences look for their ob7ects in the nat(ral world, and what happens in that world selects, in the final analysis, what the science in @(estion can pla(sibly say. ,he ob7ect of the philosophy of science is science, but science is not in the natural world . Lne aphoristic way of p(ttin this is to say -the stars are indifferent to astrono#y-: they did whatever it is that they do lon before astrono#y was tho( ht of, and news of what #ost of the# are doin now #ay well arrive in these parts lon after astrono#y has been for otten. /strono#y is so#ethin that h(#an bein s have #ade (p) allowin the#selves to be instr(cted by evidence fro# the stars, b(t decidin a#on the#selves how to interpret that evidence and what con7ect(res to float in order to acco(nt for it.

1 find #yself hed in here, however, by takin care to say -nat(ral >9> science,- -e*act science,- and so on. ,he philosophy of science is the philosophy of what, e*actly0 /nd how can 1 (se -e*actly- in this challen in way when 1 have 7(st been #akin e*c(ses for ine*actit(de0 1n the period of #y professional for#ation -science- nearly always #eant -physical science- and -e*actit(de- nearly always #eant -for#al 2or @(antitative5 e*actit(de.- ,here were of co(rse the biolo ical and the social sciences, b(t these, when they were #entioned at all, tended to be co#pared to the physical sciences as ideals; their special proble#s were probabilistic or statistical b(t wo(ld beco#e strai htforwardly ca(sal if only we knew eno( h. 1t was possible to e*po(nd the philosophy of the social sciences witho(t once #entionin the feedback effect of knowled e of a theory on the pop(lation whose behavior it set o(t to e*plain. /s to e*actit(de, the ori ins of the ter# certainly s( ested so#ethin de#andin )in the special and rather sinister case of -e*action- often eno( h a @(antitative de#and: the (tter#ost farthin , the po(nd of flesh. B(t e(actus is the past participle of e(igo$ and it see#ed possible to be e*i ent philosophically, to re@(ire reflective thinkin 6 thro( h, witho(t insistin on a*io#atic for#ali<ation. /nd -science- itself had only relatively recently, and only in the &n lish6speakin world, co#e to have the narrow connotations of the @(antitative 2a ter# not itself always clearly (nderstood)see for e*a#ple chapter 19 of this book5. &ven in the &n lish6speakin world, at Ca#brid e, older (ses were preserved in the desi nation of science as nat(ral philosophy, and of philosophy as #oral science. ,he idea of a thoro( h and de#andin theoretical acco(nt is, in this li ht, the idea of a science, even an e*actin science. 1n Science and the Theor" of #alue -science- still has the old #eanin and there is no s( estion that there #i ht be s(ch a thin as a #oral science. B(t a twenty6year deto(r thro( h Continental philosophy)which be an 2as a #ain foc(s of professional work, rather than as a side interest5 with the str(ct(ralists and only later, as a deto(r within a deto(r, involved concentration on the sin le fi (re of Gean6Pa(l 8artreE1!F )#ade #e thoro( hly co#fortable with the &(ropean notion of the )eisteswissenschaften or the sciences humaines$ in@(iry into which #ade it clear that they were the lineal descendants of Gohn 8t(art :ill9s version of the #oral sciences.

T#e 0-/a% Scie%ces

1 said 7(st now that nat(ral science looks for its ob7ects in the nat(ral world; in a si#ilar way one #i ht say that a h(#an science wo(ld look for its ob7ects in the h(#an world. %ow philosophy, and the philosophy of science, are -ob7ects- a#on others in the h(#an world; the -nat(6 > 1! > ral world- itself is, parado*ically eno( h, also an ob7ect in the h(#an world. %obody has ever dealt with this sit(ation better than +(sserl 2in The *risis of 'uro!ean Sciences and Transcendental henomenolog" 5. +(sserl9s key idea is that of the +ebenswelt , the -life6world,- so#ethin that belon s in the first instance to the individ(al s(b7ect, altho( h +(sserl #oves on 2#istakenly, 1 think5 to a collective for# of it.E11F ,his world, this intentional do#ain of te#porality and spatial e*tension, which is not an abstraction fro# anythin b(t is the totality of lived e*perience at every #o#ent, incl(des the nat(ral and the h(#an parts spoken of in the Preface)b(t as re#arked there this very distinction is a h(#an constr(ction. ,he -nat(ral world- co#ponent of the life6world enco#passes everythin 1 enco(nter or

that happens, within #y e*perience or within the reach of #y learnin , that wo(ld have happened even if there had been no h(#an intentions 2or intentionalities5. Decidin 7(st which thin s fall (nder that description is easy to a first appro*i#ation b(t beco#es harder, as is (s(ally the case at concept(al bo(ndaries, the #ore -h(#an- the nat(ral beco#es: .hat abo(t lan (a e0 .hat abo(t the incest prohibition0 B(t these contested cases do not vitiate the basic distinction. ,he life6world incl(des tho( ht, and the distinction between nat(ral and h(#an is partic(larly interestin here: tho( hts that occ(r to people (nwanted, especially those that occ(r when they are very #(ch not wanted, have to be treated as nat(ral patholo ies. 1 do not wish to develop these ideas at #(ch reater len th here, since they for# the ob7ect of several chapters in part M1 of the book, b(t a co(ple of s(pple#entary points #ay be in order. $irst)to ret(rn to a controversial iss(e)what 1 #ay call #y scientific world is itself a co#ple* do#ain in the life6 world, by no #eans coter#ino(s with the nat(ral world; it will incl(de parts of the nat(ral world that fall (nder scientific e*planation, and parts of the tho( ht world that are involved in the e*planatory activity. ,his bein the case, however, it can readily be divided into an observational part and a theoretical part, once a ain no do(bt with a#bi (ities at the bo(ndary that, once a ain, do not vitiate the distinction itself. 8econd, all this talk of -worlds- invites a distinction, hinted at above, between -world- and -(niverse.- ,ni-erse wo(ld stand for the totality of what there is, incl(din (s b(t also incl(din the vastly reater sphere of what (nderlies and s(rro(nds and precedes and will follow (s; world wo(ld stand, in effect, for the reach of the h(#an)which the very ter# see#s ori inally to have #eant, a wer.ald or -a e of #an,- -a e- bein (nderstood as an epoch or a life. %ote once a ain however that the idea of the (niverse will be an ite# in #y world. Philosophers of science all too readily hypostati<e the entities of > 11 > which they speak)the propositions, the proble#s, the laws, the theories, the research pro ra#s, the revol(tions, the sciences the#selves)as if there were a do#ain in which they e*isted independently, waitin to be tho( ht abo(t, a do#ain whose internal str(ct(re wo(ld perhaps e#body so#e tr(th abo(t the# all, and provide a ro(nd for the settlin of disp(tes. Harl Popper even invented s(ch a do#ain, which he called the ,hird .orld, or 2in order to avoid conf(sion with eopolitics5 .orld 111. E13F 1n this he see#ed to be echoin Iaston Bachelard9s call for a -biblio#enon- to s(pple#ent no(#ena and pheno#ena,E13F tho( h when 1 s( ested this to hi# privately he re7ected the idea indi nantly, clai#in ori inality for all his ideas. /t all events .orld 111 see#s to #e a perfect candidate for Lckha#9s ra<or, since it is wholly (nnecessary)everythin it does can be acco##odated in the life6worlds of individ(al s(b7ects 2always re#e#berin that representations of other s(b7ects, #ediated by their e#bodi#ents, are incl(ded as ele#ents in those life6worlds5. .hen a s(b7ect intends a proble# or an ar (#ent, as 1 a# doin now 2and as 1 can ass(#e the reader to be doin in his or her -now-5, the proble# and the ar (#ent, and what they are abo(t, and their referents, and their histories, are all called into bein , as it were, are invoked, are ani#ated, by the s(b7ect in the #o#ent of their bein intended. ,here is no reachin o(t to so#e other do#ain: all that is happenin has to be drawn, in the #o#ent, fro# reso(rces locally available: #e#ory, incl(din lan (a e, perception, concept(al apparat(s, te*ts perhaps. 1t is as a thinkin and knowin s(b7ect that 1 en a e in scientific or philosophical p(rs(its, and s(ch p(rs(its happen nowhere, as far as we have any #eans of knowin , e*cept in life6worlds like o(rs. %or of co(rse do any other p(rs(its, in the sense of activities directed towards ends. ,he h(#an sciences deal with life6worlds and their prod(cts; they are the#selves inscribed in s(ch life6

worlds, na#ely, those of their practitioners. ,he last chapter of this book is devoted to the#. .hat 1 hope to have shown here is how a conception of science that 1 learned as a yo(n physicist, a#on the -hard sciences,- has evolved thro( h a lon practice of philosophical reflection into so#ethin #ore incl(sive, to which the hard sciences are inte ral b(t which they do not be in to e*ha(st. ,he hard sciences take their data fro# e*peri#entation and their str(ct(re fro# #athe#atics)b(t e*peri#entation and #athe#atics are the#selves only h(#an strate ies for findin intelli ibility in, or lendin it to, an otherwise (nintelli ible world, and as s(ch take their place in t(rn a#on the ob7ects of the h(#an sciences. > 13 >

PART I1 E4PLANATION
> 1" >

Pre&ace to Part I. E52la%atio%

,he the#atic (nity of this so#ewhat hetero eneo(s first part co(ld be e*pressed ro( hly as: what science can do)and what it can9t be e*pected to do. ,he first chapter is a est(re, in two senses. 1 was fort(nate to find #yself at 'ale d(rin Peter +e#pel9s last year there; in #y first year he was at +arvard visitin and in #y third he went to Princeton for ood, b(t in that cr(cial second year 2as thin s o in /#erican rad(ate ed(cation5 there he was, and 1 took both his co(rses in the philosophy of science. +e was an e*e#plary teacher, fro# who# 1 learned #ore, perhaps, than fro# any other sin le person, and #y p(ttin his chapter first is an acknowled #ent of that fact. B(t it also #akes an i#plicit clai# abo(t the book as a whole. +e#pel was and is a philosopher of science9s philosopher of science, and 1 wo(ld like what 1 have to say to be re arded as belon in to the conversation that he has ani#ated over his lon career. ,he first chapter defends +e#pel9s view of the central task of science as e*planation and of the philosophy of science as the analysis of the str(ct(re of e*planation. ,he second chapter, however, places so#e li#itations on how that str(ct(re is to be instantiated. 1n the late fifties 1 had beco#e interested in the eneral syste#s theory of von Bertalanffy, which see#ed to pro#ise a syste#atic e*tension of the network of e*planation fro# physics to biolo y witho(t co#pro#isin the specificity of the latter)and to do so (nder the r(bric of cybernetics and infor#ation theory, so#ethin of a(to#atic interest to an e*physicist beca(se of its affinity with ther#odyna#ics, the #ost philosophically intri (in branch of physics (ntil the arrival of relativity and @(an6 > 14 > t(# theory. 1n 1944 1 fo(nd #yself in the presidency of the 8ociety for Ieneral 8yste#s Cesearch and (nder the necessity of addressin the ann(al #eetin . /#on so#e of #y collea (es in the 8ociety 1 had detected a ra#pant tendency to s(ppose, so#ewhat after the #anner of +e el, that ontolo y co(ld

be read off fro# lo ic)that if one co(ld b(ild hierarchically layered theoretical syste#s the world #(st contain, so#ewhere, their real co(nterparts. ,he ar (#ent of the chapter serves as a entle reb(ke to these pansyste#atists. Chapter 3 is a chan e of pace and has an earlier ori in, b(t it fits in beca(se it de#onstrates in a dra#atic conte*t so#e li#its of theoretical e*planation. ,he conte*t was of partic(lar interest to #e beca(se Philip +enry Iosse had been a #e#ber of the sect to which #y parents belon ed and in which 1 rew (p. +e provides a splendid test case of the scientist who wants to believe an acco(nt that is at odds with the best c(rrent hypotheses in his or her field: it t(rns o(t to be possible, beca(se of the fallacy of affir#in the conse@(ent, to re7ect any set of hypotheses and replace the# with a #a ical acco(nt, and nothin in the philosophy of science can stand definitively in the way. 2,he fallacy of affir#in the conse@(ent occ(rs when so#eone tries to infer the tr(th of the antecedent, ! , of a conditional -if ! then / - fro# the tr(th of the conse@(ent, / .5 ,he hypotheses of a theory have no stat(s)e*cept a hypothetical one. .hat needs to be added, however, is that the #a ical alternative has, si#ilarly, only a #a ical stat(s, and the fact that scientists are #odest eno( h not to 7(#p to a pla(sible concl(sion is no e*c(se for other people to 7(#p to i#pla(sible ones. Iosse no do(bt believed he had ood reasons for his reli io(s belief, b(t it is not clear that he had e*a#ined the# responsibly)tho( h none of (s is in a position to render a final 7(d #ent on that point. ,he fo(rth chapter co#es fro# very #(ch later, and takes (p the sa#e iss(e in a #ore didactic way. ,he distinction between event and process that 1 draw in contrastin creationis# to evol(tion overlooks the possibility that creation itself #i ht be an on oin process 2indeed one scientific theory, celebrated in its ti#e, #aintained that it is)1 #ean $red +oyle9s cos#olo ical theory of contin(o(s creation5. B(t #y point in the chapter is to e*a#ine the reli io(s position that Iosse and others have held, and in that position creation is an event by #y definition. > 1? >

1 As2ects o& 0e/2el's P#iloso2#( o& Scie%ce

E%ote: $or the p(rpose of readin this chapter the reader is asked to #ake an effort of te#poral translocation)to adopt, in i#a ination, the standpoint of the late si*ties rather than that of the nineties. ,he year is 194?: the philosophy of science is by now an established acade#ic discipline, whose c(rrent e*cite#ent centers on new concepts like paradi #s and research pro ra#s. 1 have been asked by Cichard Bernstein, editor of the 0e-iew of 1eta!h"sics , to assess the work of one of the pioneers, a teacher we had in co##on a decade a o, whose collected essays have 7(st been p(blished.F

I
,he eneration which separates +e#pel9s latest #a7or p(blication 2 hiloso!h" of &atural Science , 19445E1F fro# his first 22er T"!usbegriff im +ichte der &euen +ogik , 1934, written 7ointly with Pa(l Lppenhei#5E3F has seen the philosophy of science co#e into its own as one of the chief s(bdivisions of philosophy, with a reco ni<able and coherent set of proble#s yieldin 2or, as in the case of ind(ction, ref(sin to yield5 to a reco ni<able and coherent set of strate ies for sol(tion. %ot, of co(rse, that in 1934 the philosophy of science was a new discipline)far fro# it: if anybody deserves credit for ettin the field started it is probably De#ocrit(s. %or that the p(blication of 2er T"!usbegriff #arked a new era in the develop#ent of the s(b7ect, the recent literat(re of which incl(ded, after all, The +ogic

of 1odern h"sics ,E3F2er > 1= > +ogische Aufbau der Welt ,EAF and +ogik der %orschung .E"F ,he point which these facts ill(strate is si#ply that +e#pel9s professional career spans a period of intense activity 2a ood deal of it sti#(lated by the three books 7(st #entioned5 d(rin which the philosophical discipline to which he has #ade his reatest contrib(tion arrived at an evident #at(rity and a(tono#y. ,he ai# of this essay is to e*a#ine his contrib(tion to that activity, and to deal with so#e recent ar (#ents to the effect that the process of develop#ent has carried the philosophy of science away fro# science itself, on which in so#e sense or other it clearly depends for its intellect(al relevance and honesty. 1f a newco#er to philosophy were to ask what sin le concept characteristically preocc(pies philosophers of science 2as the concept of being , for e*a#ple, preocc(pies #etaphysicians5 the appropriate answer co(ld only be e(!lanation . 1f we look for a leadin motif in the work of +e#pel, we et the sa#e answer. %ow it is a re#arkable fact that the book which, at the be innin of +e#pel9s career, s(##ed (p the peda o ical content of the philosophy of science)1 #ean of co(rse Cohen and %a el9s An Introduction to +ogic and Scientific 1ethod 2193A5E4F )contains no reference to e*planation in the table of contents, and has no entry for it in the inde*. .hether or not the concept of the philosophy of science as the analysis of scientific e*planations is an ade@(ate one 2which need not be insisted on for the p(rpose at hand5, there can be no do(bt that the central i#portance of s(ch analyses at the present ti#e is d(e in no s#all de ree to +e#pel9s own work. +e has now provided (s, in hiloso!h" of &atural Science 2referred to here as 3&S 5, with his own peda o ical introd(ction to the s(b7ect, which is, as #i ht have been e*pected, a l(cid distillation of the #a7or the#es to which he has rec(rred a ain and a ain in other writin s. Be innin with a concrete ill(stration of scientific in@(iry)the classic investi ations of 8e##elweis into the ca(ses of childbed fever) 3&S leads the st(dent thro( h a disc(ssion of the testin of hypotheses to a set of criteria for confir#ation and acceptability. ,here follows a standard acco(nt of ded(ctive6no#olo ical e*planation 2that it can be called -standard- is d(e entirely to the fact that there is a standard, na#ely the one set earlier by +e#pel hi#self5,E?F an analysis of the difference between this and e*planation by statistical laws, and finally three chapters on theories, concept for#ation, and theoretical red(ction respectively. 1 ive this o(tline not only in order to reco##end the book for instr(ctional p(rposes, which it serves ad#irably and with rare a(thority, b(t also beca(se 3&S presents with (na#bi (o(s clarity a n(#ber of characteristic theses which see# fre@(ently to be #is(nderstood by +e#pel9s critics. ,hese theses have also, as we shall see, been presented clearly eno( h elsewhere, b(t the settin > 19 > in 3&S is si#ple and didactic and brin s the# into relief. $or the p(rposes of the present disc(ssion two of the# are worth statin , one havin to do with the nat(re of e*planation and the other with the lan (a e of scientific theory. &*planation, for +e#pel, is a lo ical relation between sentences. ,he pre#ises to ether constit(te the e(!lanans , the concl(sion is the e(!lanandum . 8trictly speakin , of co(rse, we sho(ld say e(!lanans sentences and e(!lanandum sentence 2p. "!5, b(t the fa#iliar shortened for#s o( ht not to lead to diffic(lty. .hat the e*planand(# sentence refers to is the e(!lanandum !henomenon . ,he point to be drawn attention to here is that what is to be e*plained is in the first instance a !articular occurrence ,

not a class of occ(rrences or a law overnin s(ch a class, altho( h by e*tension the e*planation of laws can at once be s(bs(#ed (nder the sa#e pattern. +e#pel indeed says 2p. 15 that the e#pirical sciences -seek to e*plore, to describe, to e*plain, and to predict the occurrences in the world we live in- 2e#phasis added5. / clear (nderstandin of this point wo(ld have averted a n(#ber of diffic(lties sprin in fro# the belief that the e*planand(# is typically a theory. $eyerabend, to ive only one e*a#ple, is able to dis#iss the e#piricist theory of e*planation 2whose chief e*ponents have been +e#pel and %a el5 as -an elaboration of so#e si#ple and very pla(sible ideas first proposed by Popper,-E=F which however concern the ded(ctive relations between different theories; he then oes on to i#p(te to the e#piricist theory all sorts of repressive infl(ences on the pro ress of science which co(ld not possibly be e*erted by the analysis of e*planation p(t forward by +e#pel. 1 a# not concerned at this 7(nct(re to defend the ade@(acy of that analysis, b(t in order to co##ent on its ade@(acy one #(st at least be clear abo(t what it says. 21 shall have #ore to say later abo(t the analysis itself and abo(t $eyerabend9s criticis# of it.5 ,he second the#e 1 wish to to(ch on in this preli#inary review of 3&S is that of the distinction between the lan (a e in which a theory is co(ched and the lan (a e which describes what the theory sets o(t to e*plain. 8ince a ood part of what follows will deal with this distinction 1 will save the pole#ics for later, and li#it #y re#arks here to an e*position of +e#pel9s point of view. /s a #atter of fact the acco(nt in 3&S represents a rather #(ted stand as co#pared with so#e earlier treat#ents of the sa#e topic; 1 do not think that +e#pel has chan ed his #ind, b(t he see#s to have fo(nd a less v(lnerable way of sayin what was in it. ,he pro ress of science consists, a#on other thin s, in an enrich#ent of the vocab(lary by #eans of which scientists describe the world as they (nderstand it. Pheno#ena described in fa#iliar ter#s 2e. ., alternate rin s of bri htness and darkness between a lens > 3! > and a lass plate5 are e*plained by the post(lation of (nfa#iliar properties 2fits of easy trans#ission and easy reflection, to (se a classical b(t now abandoned for#(la5.E9F ,he pheno#ena to be e*plained are by definition obser-able , and they are described in obser-ation terms 2-rin s,- -darkness,- -lens,etc.5; the e*planation involves unobser-able , i.e., p(rely theoretical, entities or processes, and these are indicated by theoretical terms 2-fits-5. ,he connection between the observable and the theoretical is provided by so6called brid e laws or r(les of correspondence. ,his is the standard version of the observational6theoretical distinction, and it has recently been (nder heavy fire fro# the antifor#alist ri ht. 1n 3&S +e#pel #akes the point as follows: .hile the internal principles of a theory are co(ched in its characteristic theoretical terms 29n(cle(s,9 9orbital electron,9 9ener y level,9 9electron 7(#p95, the test i#plications #(st be for#(lated in ter#s 2s(ch as 9hydro en vapor,9 9e#ission spectr(#,9 9wavelen th associated with a spectral line95 which are -antecedently (nderstood,- as we #i ht say, ter#s which have been introd(ced prior to the theory and can be (sed independently of it. Ket (s refer to the# as antecedentl" a-ailable or !retheoretical terms . 2p. ?"5 1n this way the observational6theoretical distinction is e*plicitly relativi<ed to the e#er ence of a partic(lar theory. 8(ch a relativi<ation has been i#plicit in #ost earlier for#(lations, at least since the pro ra# of fo(ndin science on an i##(table observation lan (a e was iven (p, if indeed anybody ever really adhered to s(ch a pro ra#.

II
3&S is only the latest in a lon series of p(blications which 2to speak only of those in &n lish5 have

been appearin steadily since the early 19A!s. /nd it is of co(rse on these p(blications that +e#pel9s philosophical rep(tation rests. .ith the e*ception of the #ono raph %undamentals of *once!t %ormation in 'm!irical Science 219"35E1!F they have all been papers in learned 7o(rnals or other collections of articles by vario(s a(thors. ,he #a7or ones have beco#e land#arks in the literat(re of the philosophy of science: -,he $(nction of Ieneral Kaws in +istory- 219A35, -8t(dies in the Ko ic of Confir#ation- 219A"5, -8t(dies in the Ko ic of &*planation- 219A=5, -Proble#s and Chan es in the &#piricist Criterion of :eanin - 219"!5, -/ Ko ical /ppraisal of Lperationis#- 219"A5, -,he ,heoretician9s Dile##a- 219"=5, -1n6 > 31 > d(ctive 1nconsistencies- 2194!5. /ll seven of these papers, and a few #ore, have now been reprinted in the collection As!ects of Scientific '(!lanation 2194"5,E11F in which is also printed for the first ti#e a lon essay which ives its title to the book. 1t is this book, rather than 3&S , which occasions the present review, and 1 now t(rn to it. ,he reprinted papers are ro(ped into fo(r cate ories, dealin respectively with proble#s of confir#ation, proble#s of co nitive si nificance, proble#s of the str(ct(re and f(nction of theories, and proble#s of e*planation, the last occ(pyin #ore than half of the book. ,o ether they constit(te a doc(#entary reso(rce of the first i#portance, brin in to ether in one place the focal ar (#ents of #ost of the #a7or post6war develop#ents in the philosophy of science. ,he articles are reprinted -with so#e chan es- 21 have not (ndertaken the task of locatin the#5, so that history #ay have been ta#pered with in #inor respects. 1t wo(ld have been of reat interest to be told #ore abo(t the circ(#stances (nder which they ca#e to be written, especially since so#e of the# have appeared in several places on different occasions and in sli htly different versions. +e#pel refers in the preface to -the /ppendi* on their ori ins,- b(t at least in #y copy of the book no s(ch appendi* is to be fo(nd. 1n spite of the diversity of their ori ins the papers as a whole display a re#arkable consistency. ,hey are characteri<ed by intellect(al ri or, painstakin attention to detail, a kind of i#pert(rbability which is +e#pel9s trade#ark. ,he style is #atter6of6fact; the i#pression of +e#pel which e#er es fro# a s(stained readin of the book is that of a crafts#an of ideas, b(ildin with a d(e sense of responsibility a str(ct(re which will be e*pected to bear a certain intellect(al wei ht. ,here is not #(ch to da<<le or e*cite, b(t there is virt(ally no hesitation either. 1n the title essay +e#pel has taken the opport(nity to deal with so#e of the criticis#s which have been provoked by his work, notably those of 8criven, and he #akes it ab(ndantly clear that the #ain ele#ents of the str(ct(re are not to be shaken easily. Beca(se of this e*tre#e solidity in its contents, As!ects does not #ake easy readin , at least not if it is read all at once. ,he papers appeared, as has been indicated, at intervals of a few years, and since each was self6contained when it was written, and yet represented a facet of a sin le coherent philosophical position 2there have been chan es, of co(rse, b(t 1 think no #a7or or radical ones5, there are fre@(ent recapit(lations of conti (o(s points)the difference between ded(ctive6no#olo ical and ind(ctive6 statistical e*planation #(st be spelled o(t half a do<en ti#es. /fter a while the dict(# of /na*a oras co#es forcibly to #ind: in everythin there is a portion of everythin . /nd +e#pel9s concern to be l(cid and clear 2which #akes hi#, for those of > 33 > (s fort(nate eno( h to have been his st(dents, one of the best teachers of philosophy i#a inable5 leads hi# to the (se of down6to6earth e*a#ples which #ay ive the i#pression that the whole analysis is

si#plistic. ,he case of little Gohnny and the #easles 2p. 1??5, as an ill(stration of statistical e*planation, is followed by the case of little ,o##y and the #easles 2p. 33?5, so that one is ratef(l for the variety provided 2p. 3!15 by little +enry and the #(#ps. 21n 3&S it is little Gi# and the #easles a ain, p. "=.5 1t wo(ld nevertheless, 1 think, be a reat #istake to ar (e fro# si#plicity in e*a#ples to si#plicity in (nderstandin , altho( h the te#ptation to do so is certainly e*c(sable. ,o(l#in, in his review of As!ects ,E13F says, +e#pel9s for#al sche#ati<ations s#ooth o(t these differences Ebetween #odes of scientific disco(rseF witho(t co##ent or apolo y. +e introd(ces variety into his e*a#ples si#ply by switchin between -all ravens are black- on pa e 13, -all storks are red6le ed- on pa e 1!" and -all robins9 e s are reenish6bl(e- on pa e 344. ,hese are the kinds of sentences he calls -laws of nat(re-B O(ite apart fro# the fact that +e#pel can and does on occasion (se #ore sophisticated e*a#ples, this point is not as trivial as it appears. ,he @(estion)and with it 1 approach the #ain part of this essay)is, what is +e#pel9s philosophy of science o(t to achieve, and wo(ld this end be better served by constant sensitivity to the -varied and historically developin activities of workaday science- 2to @(ote ,o(l#in a ain5 than by the patient atte#pt to constr(ct a si#ple b(t ade@(ate lo ical #odel of scientific theory0 1t can be said at once that any acco(nt of theory which is not applicable to red6le ed storks and children with #easles is a fortiori not applicable to #ore co#ple* cases, a re#ark 1 offer as a ca(tion to the antifor#alists. ,he advanta e of a st(rdy b(t si#ple #odel is that, as lon as it does not contradict the facts of scientific practice, it #ay perhaps be adapted to those facts and yet retain its essential si#plicity. ,he essential si#plicity of the +e#pelian #odel is no ar (#ent for its replace#ent; the ai# of the philosophy of science, like the ai# of science itself, is after all the si#plest for#(lation of the tr(th. $eyerabend, a#on others, appears to think science so co#plicated that a si#ple acco(nt of it co(ld not possibly be tr(e; he says, for e*a#ple, of -%a el9s theory of red(ction and the theory of e*planation associated with +e#pel and Lppenhei#-:E13F 1t is to be ad#itted that these two -orthodo*- acco(nts fairly ade@(ately represent the relation between sentences of the 9/ll6ravens6are6black9 type, which abo(nd in the #ore pedestrian parts of the scientific enter6 > 33 > prise. B(t if the atte#pt is #ade to e*tend these acco(nts Eto certain co#prehensive theories, e. ., :a*well9s electrodyna#ics and the theory of relativityF . . . then co#plete fail(re is the res(lt. 1f this #eans a co#plete fail(re to acco(nt for the way in which :a*well9s theory e*plains electrodyna#ic pheno#ena, then it is false; if it #eans a co#plete fail(re to acco(nt for :a*well9s theory, then it e*hibits the conf(sion abo(t the nat(re of the e*planand(# referred to above in connection with 3&S , with which +e#pel hi#self has dealt in As!ects 2p. 3A?, fn. 1?5. ,he sol(tion offered by $eyerabend)which is to entertain #any theories, not 7(st the best available oneE1AF )does not entail the re7ection of the +e#pelian #odel, for each of the alternatives #i ht t(rn o(t to satisfy +e#pel9s criteria. +e#pel has never, as far as 1 know, #aintained that there co(ld not be two or #ore theories of e@(al probability 2or -syste#atic power,- As!ects , pp. 3?= if.5, altho( h the history of science does not offer #any e*a#ples of this. B(t then $eyerabend9s co#plaint is at botto# not so #(ch a ainst +e#pel9s position as a ainst a #is(se of orthodo*y in the philosophy of science, in partic(lar beca(se of the orthodo* choice of the Copenha en interpretation of @(ant(# theory in preference to the deter#inist interpretation of Boh# and Mi ier, with which $eyerabend has associated

hi#self. Ln this point one is bo(nd to sy#pathi<e with hi#; b(t in fact the do#inance of the Copenha en view is not the fr(it of a conspiracy on the part of orthodo* philosophers of science)it appears at the #o#ent to be a free choice on the part of scientists, #ost of who# are very little infl(enced by the philosophy of science. 1t wo(ld be too bad to seek to overthrow a philosophically val(able syste# on the ro(nds that it inhibits a partic(lar develop#ent, when in fact it has nothin to say abo(t that develop#ent and indeed never intended to have anythin to say abo(t it. ,o do $eyerabend 7(stice, there is one point in the ori inal +e#pel6Lppenhei# acco(nt of e*planation which does lead to diffic(lty, and which #i ht be constr(ed as a s(bscription to the -principle of consistency- which is held to be responsible for the reactionary infl(ence of the e#piricist theory. ,his is the -e#pirical condition of ade@(acy- for an e*planation, iven as: 2CA5 ,he sentences constit(tin the e*planans #(st be tr(e. 2As!ects , p. 3A=5 ,he diffic(lty is that if this re@(ire#ent is adhered to s(ccessf(lly no f(t(re observation, and therefore no f(t(re tr(e theory, co(ld contradict the e*planans. Lnce established, a theory is established forever, so that f(rther pro ress, at least of a revol(tionary sort, is r(led o(t > 3A > a !riori . /n analo o(s diffic(lty occ(rs, however, with the fa#iliar definition of e#pirical law as tr(e enerali<ation, and the e#piricist theory has had no partic(lar diffic(lty in circ(#ventin it. &verybody knows by now that (niversal propositions cannot be concl(sively verified, b(t that does not #ean that every ti#e we en(nciate one we have to attach to it so#e #odal prefi* e*pressin the tentative nat(re of o(r confidence in it. / lawlike state#ent #ay be accepted as tr(e within so#e theoretical fra#ework, b(t we #ay still be prepared to ad#it that f(t(re observations will re@(ire revision of the fra#ework and abandon#ent of the state#ent in @(estion. +e#pel9s own view of this #atter at the ti#e of his early work on e*planation re@(ired that laws be tr(e, tout court , so that a enerali<ation which was probably tr(e was probably a law, rather than bein a en(ine law with hi h probability. +e has not, as far as 1 can tell, #odified this stand)in As!ects he speaks of -pres(#ptive laws,- 2p. A==5 in s(ch a way as to s( est that s(ch laws are the only ones we can have, as indeed is the case if laws, in order to be properly so called, #(st be known to be tr(e. /nd pres(#ably the best e*planans we can have is also a pres(#ptive e*planans, which wo(ld leave the way open for its re7ection in the li ht of new knowled e.

III
.hile one is bo(nd to resist the ob7ections dealt with above, insofar as they seek to dis#iss +e#pel9s acco(nt on the ro(nds that it is too si#ple in its lo ical str(ct(re, or too ri id in its insistence on tr(th in the e*planans, still it #(st be ad#itted that they raise le iti#ate @(estions with which any proponent of a position like +e#pel9s #(st be prepared to deal. ,he best strate y for dealin with the# see#s to #e to consist in settin o(t the ob7ectives of the position, as they can be reconstr(cted fro# +e#pel9s writin s and fro# the recent history of the philosophy of science. 1f it is clearly (nderstood what a philosopher is tryin to do there is then less e*c(se for criticis# to the effect that he or she is not doin so#ethin else. ,he proble#atic of +e#pel9s philosophy co#es directly fro# lo ical positivis#, with which he was associated as a #e#ber of the 8ociety for &#pirical Philosophy in Berlin in the 193!s. 1n spite of differences in the interpretation of its philosophical #ission, the vario(s adherents of the positivist #ove#ent at that ti#e reacted to a co##on sti#(l(s, na#ely the dra#atic s(ccess of the physical

sciences in handlin so#e kinds of knowled e of the world, and the attendant proble# as to the > 3" > stat(s of that knowled e, especially in the li ht of twentieth cent(ry develop#ents s(ch as relativity and @(ant(# theory. ,o anybody trained in physics, as +e#pel hi#self was, one of the #ost strikin thin s abo(t it is its heavy reliance on for#al #ethods, #ostly of co(rse #athe#atical ones. Physics is an e#pirical science, b(t its best res(lts are obtained by switchin over as rapidly as possible to a for#al #ode of proced(re, ret(rnin to the e#pirical only at the last #in(te in order to confront observation with a prediction, for e*a#ple. %ot that e#pirical relevance is really iven (p at any sta e of the proceedin s; the point is that the e#pirical ob7ectives served by physics, and the e#pirical control to which its concl(sions are s(b7ected, provide a fra#ework within which physicists are free to e#ploy whatever #ethods they like, and the #ethods which lend the reatest clarity and econo#y to their work t(rn o(t to be for#al ones. ,his looks like a lesson for the p(rs(it of knowled e in eneral, and it was taken as s(ch by the lo ical positivists. &verybody now a rees that they went too far in tryin to e*cl(de as nonsensical state#ents whose e#pirical warrant was less clear than that of state#ents in the physical sciences, b(t that does not #ean that their insistence on the paradi #atic virt(es of the physical sciences was #istaken. 2/s a #atter of fact +e#pel never, as far as 1 know, contrib(ted #(ch to the anti#etaphysical pole#ic, whose chief spokes#an was always Carnap.5 :ost of +e#pel9s work, however, was done after lo ical positivis#, as a #ove#ent, had ceased to e*ist. 1n so#e respects he contin(ed to derive inspiration fro# its s(rvivors, notably Carnap; a ood deal of his work on confir#ation, for e*a#ple, takes the for# of an el(cidation or elaboration or correction of so#ethin of Carnap9s. B(t for the #ost part he has followed an independent line, never abandonin the old proble#s set by positivis#, b(t arrivin rad(ally at fir# and often ori inal concl(sions abo(t the#. ,he ori inality is not sweepin )that co(ld hardly be e*pected in a disciplined in@(iry of restricted scope. B(t by co#parison with so#e sweepin ly ori inal hypotheses which have recently co##anded attention in the field, +e#pel9s (npretentio(s b(t solid achieve#ents have a reass(rin a(thenticity. /nd his contrib(tion has not been witho(t its own dra#a, the best e*a#ple of which is his parado* of confir#ation, a startlin res(lt whose p(blication in 19A" introd(ced a thorn into the side of confir#ation theorists 2incl(din +e#pel hi#self5 which has still not lost its power to irritate. ,he parado* is, of co(rse, that by the s(bstit(tion of the contrapositive for# -/ll non6black ob7ects are non6ravens,- -any red pencil, any reen leaf, any yellow cow, etc., beco#es confir#in evidence for the hypothesis that all ravens are black- 2As!ects , p. 1"5. 1t is this parado* > 34 > with which, for #any people, +e#pel9s na#e is principally associated, altho( h in itself it is a #inor by6prod(ct of the philosophical pro ra# to which he has devoted hi#self. ,hat pro ra# has been devoted to clarifyin o(r (nderstandin of the way in which science constit(tes knowled e of its ob7ects. +e#pel is not (ninterested in the develop#ent and the practical (sef(lness of science, b(t these have not been at the foc(s of his attention. 8cience has developed, and it is (sef(l; the interestin philosophical @(estions concern its str(ct(re and its validation. ,he sa#e @(estions #i ht have arisen, and the sa#e answers been iven the#, if the develop#ent had followed different lines and if the (sef(lness had been #(ch less obvio(s, altho( h as pointed o(t above the contin ent sti#(l(s for the #ove#ent of in@(iry to which +e#pel belon s was, a#on other thin s, the i#pact of a partic(lar develop#ent. /t the be innin of the title essay of As!ects +e#pel rephrases his often reiterated concerns as follows: -.hat is the nat(re of the e*planations e#pirical science can provide0

.hat (nderstandin of e#pirical pheno#ena do they convey0- 2p. 3335. ,he rest of the enterprise follows fro# these @(estions. .hat is wanted of an e*planation0 .hat kind of @(estion is it an answer to0 +e#pel distin (ishes between -e*planation6seekin - and -reason6seekin - @(estions, the f(nction of the for#er bein to render e#pirical state#ents intelligible , that of the latter to render the# credible 2p. A==5. +e is #ainly preocc(pied with intelli ibility. / c(rsory inspection of what scientists act(ally say shows that, at least for the nonprofessional 2a cate ory that, for any partic(lar science, incl(des #ost scientists, since any one of the# only professes his or her own speciality5 the intelli ibility of science is not to be fo(nd on its s(rface. 1n order to render it intelli ible a pro ra# of -for#al reconstr(ction of the lan (a e of e#pirical science- 2p. 1315 is e#barked (pon. By this so#ethin different fro# the for#ali<ation fo(nd (sef(l in the practice of science is intended)in that respect the lan (a e is @(ite for#al eno( h already. ,he pro ra# of for#al reconstr(ction seeks to identify cate ories of scientific state#ent)those which describe partic(lar e#pirical facts, those which e*press constant relations between s(ch facts, those whose post(lation helps to acco(nt for s(ch relations, etc.)and to fit the# into a lo ically coherent sche#e which is to be the for#al paradi # of a science. 8tate#ents in the vario(s cate ories will have their own characteristics and their own special links to state#ents in other cate ories. &ach developed science will be seen to have so#e state#ents whose for# @(alifies the# for #e#bership in each cate ory; these act(al state#ents will 7ointly e*e#plify the lo ical relations recovered by the for#al reconstr(ction, and their role in the science in @(estion will th(s be clarified. 1 say -recovered> 3? > beca(se as science is practiced the relations between its state#ents are often concealed by for#(lations developed historically for p(rposes of efficiency rather than intelli ibility. ,he for#ally reconstr(cted science #ay be no #ore efficient than the (nreconstr(cted one, in fact it will probably be less so. B(t, as +e#pel p(ts it in another connection, -the p(rpose of those who s( est this conception is not, of co(rse, to facilitate the work of the scientist b(t rather to clarify the i#port of his for#(lations- 2p. 3315. ,he si#plest reconstr(cted science wo(ld have two cate ories of state#ent, na#ely, reports of observations and e*pressions of lawlike relations between entities. ,he nonlo ical ter#s occ(rrin in these state#ents wo(ld be either observational 2pretheoretical, in the lan (a e of 3&S 5 or theoretical. /nd there wo(ld be two lo ical relations: a ded(ctive one oin fro# lawlike state#ents to observation reports and carryin the b(rden of e*planation, and an ind(ctive one oin in the other direction and carryin the b(rden of confir#ation. ,his is the basic #odel, and while it #ay be e@(ipped with optional e*tras for special p(rposes, it rec(rs essentially in all lo ical reconstr(ctions of scientific theory. ,he reports of observation are clearly of critical i#portance, since they constit(te the e#pirical basis of the science and the startin 6point for its confir#ation. ,he lo ical positivists were at first rather naive abo(t the stat(s of observation state#ents; they believed it possible to capt(re in lan (a e the data of an (npre7(diced awareness, and th(s to place science on a co#pletely veridical fo(ndation. 1t is now clear that no perception is (ncolored by theoretical (nderstandin , and that no p(re lan (a e of description wo(ld be available even if it were. ,here is th(s no possibility of attachin the lo ical str(ct(re directly to the world, as it were; and in his analysis of confir#ation +e#pel has allowed for this by s(rro(ndin the p(rely lo ical activities for which he takes responsibility with a pen(#bral area in which he ad#its that pra #atic 7(d #ents are necessary. Pra #atic considerations enter the pict(re before lo ical concerns take over, at the point where the theory confronts e*perience; and they re#ain after lo ic has done its work, at the point where the theory had to be acce!ted or rejected . B(t a ain that does not #ean that the @(ality of the lo ical analysis which oes on in between has to be #odified

by the pra #atic concerns which precede and follow it. /nother respect in which the positivists set o(t with revol(tionary <eal, only to discover as ti#e went on that their oal was (nattainable, concerned the co nitive si nificance of the ter#s and state#ents of science. ,hey wished at first to define all theoretical ter#s by #eans of observation ter#s, a re@(ire#ent which soon had to be #odified, in the li ht of Carnap9s work on dispositions, to acco##odate red(ctions as > 3= > well. Ced(ction sentences define theoretical ter#s only partially, b(t they preserve a f(nctional separation of s(ch ter#s fro# observation ones. ,he tro(ble is that the (se of theoretical ter#s often depends inti#ately on their association with observation ones, since -as a r(le, the presence of a hypothetical entity 4 . . . will have observable sy#pto#s only if certain observational conditions, 31 , are satisfied- 2p. 3!=5. +e#pel therefore abandons the f(nctional separation of observation and theoretical ter#s, and takes the (nit of si nificance to be a syste# of state#ents in which both types occ(r. 8(ch a syste# he calls an -interpretative syste#.- 1ts si nificance still depends on the prior si nificance of the ter#s of a ro( hly observational vocab(lary, b(t +e#pel no lon er insists that these ter#s sho(ld refer to percept(al contents directly)he will even accept disposition ter#s into the basic vocab(lary if they are -well (nderstood in the sense that they are (sed with a hi h de ree of a ree#ent by co#petent observers- 2p. 3!95. /ltho( h, however, the interpretative syste# contains observation ter#s and theoretical ter#s to ether, it is not s( ested that the distinction between the# sho(ld be iven (p; this point will be dealt with at reater len th in the ne*t section. 1t is not one of the f(nctions of this essay to e*hibit the pro ra# of for#al reconstr(ction in detail for any partic(lar science, which in any b(t the #ost trivial case wo(ld be a lon and technically intricate task. ,hat wo(ld be best done, in any case, by so#eone professionally concerned with the science in @(estion, or perhaps by collaboration between s(ch a person and a professional philosopher of science. 8(ch collaboration is all too infre@(ent. ,he point 1 wish to reiterate at the end of this sketchy presentation of the for#alist pro ra# is that the intention of the pro ra# is not to help science to be done, it is to help it to be (nderstood; it is not itself a scientific pro ra# b(t a #etascientific one. &le#ents of the #etascientific str(ct(re do not have to resemble the ele#ents of the scientific str(ct(re to which they correspond, any #ore than people have to rese#ble their addresses or social sec(rity n(#bers, so that so#e of the co#ple*ities of the daily b(siness of science are strictly irrelevant to the @(estion of the ade@(acy or inade@(acy of the for#al #odel. 1n one of the earlier papers +e#pel points this o(t e*plicitly: -for the sake of theoretical co#prehensiveness and syste#ati<ation,- he says, -the abstract #odel will have to contain certain ideali<ed ele#ents which cannot possibly be deter#ined in detail by a st(dy of how scientists act(ally work- 2p. AA5. ,his does not #ean that s(ch a st(dy o( ht to be ne lected by the philosophy of science, only that it belon s to a part of the field which for#alists, in their for#alist #o#ents, do not happen to be c(ltivatin . > 39 >

IV
,he two respects in which +e#pel9s acco(nt has e*cited the liveliest controversy have already been all(ded to. Lne is e*ternal to the syste#, and challen es its relevance to the activity of which it p(rports to be at least a partial philosophical analysis. ,he other is internal to it, and challen es a

distinction on which part of the analysis rests. ,he latter is the #ore serio(s, and 1 shall deal with it first. ,he observational6theoretical distinction as it e*isted a#on the early positivists was, as pointed o(t above, (ntenable. ,he challen e to +e#pel and his collea (es, in essence, is: .hy preserve the distinction at all0 Powerf(l ar (#ents have been #arshalled to show that whenever it is insisted (pon in concrete cases it can be rendered virt(ally insi nificant 2the best presentation of this view is probably that of /chinstein5.E1"F ,he position 1 shall advocate here is that the distinction is i#portant and (sef(l, that recent attacks on it have overlooked one of its principal (ses, and that it o( ht not to be abandoned. Distinctions of whatever kind are intended to distin (ish between classes which for so#e p(rpose or other are conveniently kept distinct. 1t #ay be, however, that between so#ethin that obvio(sly belon s to one class and so#ethin that obvio(sly belon s to another there occ(rs a series of inter#ediate radations, and that with respect to so#ethin fallin ro( hly between the two a decision abo(t its classification #ay be so diffic(lt that the distinction cannot be (sef(lly applied to it. .hat 1 wish to e#phasi<e is that this fail(re does not affect the (sef(lness of the distinction as it applies to the ori inal case. /n analo y #ay #ake the point clearer. Chelsea and Ireenwich Milla e are conti (o(s areas of %ew 'ork City. ,he Chelsea +otel is clearly in Chelsea; the CafP $i aro is e@(ally clearly in Ireenwich Milla e, 1f 1 walk fro# one to the other 1 #ay reach a point at which 1 a# hard p(t to it to say whether 1 a# in Chelsea or the Milla e, b(t that does not #ean that there is no lon er any point in havin two na#es for the two areas. 2,he weakness of the analo y is that in the eo raphical case the @(estion can be resolved by drawin a line on a #ap, while in the philosophical case the proble# is not neatly two6di#ensional.5 ,he fact that in a iven case a ter# cannot be called (na#bi (o(sly observational or theoretical, or that in one case it shows (p as observational and in another as theoretical, does not invalidate the distinction, it only shows that it has its li#itations. Lf co(rse if the li#itations were so severe that none of the p(rposes for which the distinction was wanted co(ld be served, there wo(ld be every reason to discard it. ,he ori inal p(rpose for which the positivists > 3! > wanted it was to show which ter#s were si nificant directly, as ele#ents of an observation lan (a e, and which were si nificant indirectly, accordin to a criterion which showed their dependence on or relevance to ele#ents of the observation lan (a e. ,his p(rpose is thwarted beca(se there is so#e conf(sion abo(t the #eanin of -direct- and beca(se even when that see#s clear, ter#s keep shiftin abo(t, appearin directly si nificant in so#e conte*ts and indirectly si nificant in others, B(t there are other p(rposes to be served than the establish#ent of #eanin criteria. ,he present interest of the distinction is one not enerally reco ni<ed, altho( h +e#pel hi#self ad(#brates it in the passa e fro# 3&S @(oted at the end of the first section of this essay. 1t has to do with the wa" in which ter#s shift abo(t, and especially with their careers before they beco#e infected with theory. 1n science as a whole there are not #any ter#s left of which this can be said, altho( h in the for#ation of scientists it is a sta e which is often repeated. /nd every now and then the advance#ent of science itself t(rns (p a (se for a ter#, either fro# its own vocab(lary or fro# that of ordinary lan (a e, as an observational prec(rsor of so#e theory which is in the process of establishin itself and which has not as yet infected anythin . 1t is in the historical develop#ent of science that the observational6theoretical distinction shows (p #ost clearly. ,he classes obvio(sly overlap; b(t at the leadin ed e of the historical process the observational is always sli htly ahead. %o theory was ever constr(cted in order to account for

obser-ations which had not "et been made . /t this point the co##onplace that every scientific observation is #ade with the establish#ent or ref(tation of so#e theory in #ind will be raised as an ob7ection, b(t the inconsistency between that and the clai# 7(st advanced is only apparent. %ow, at the advanced sta e in which science finds itself, it is of co(rse (nthinkable to spend e*peri#ental ti#e and #oney on any other p(rs(it than the confir#ation or ref(tation of theories, e*cept as it is spent 2and this acco(nts for #ost of it5 on followin o(t in detail the conse@(ences of a theory which is already taken to be confir#ed. ,his was not always the case. / lot of observation was in hand before the first really testable theory was for#(lated. 2+e#pel, in As!ects Ep. 139F, refers to %orthrop9s -nat(ral history- sta e of in@(iry, and speaks of -the shift toward theoretical syste#ati<ation- as so#ethin that takes place in ti#e.5 /nd it is still the case that in p(rs(it of evidence for already6for#(lated theories the observer so#eti#es co#es (pon an observation which does not obvio(sly connect with the# at all, and which has to be written down as ano#alo(s or at least (ne*pected. 1t is #ost co##only in s(ch episodes that new theories have their ori in, and with respect to the new theory s(ch observa6 > 31 > tions are at first #erely observational. Lnce the new theory is for#(lated f(rther observations fall into the old pattern, that is to say the lan (a e in which they are reported is colored by the new theory. B(t in the period between the detection of the ano#aly and the e#er ence of the theory which acco(nts for it the observational6theoretical distinction is f(lly operative. /nd since scientific ed(cation in a nontheoretical world is a kind of onto enetic recapit(lation of the phylo enetic advance#ent of science, the distinction re#ains fa#iliar even in periods when f(nda#ental discoveries are infre@(ent. ,he observational6theoretical distinction, then, not only plays a part in clarifyin , for the individ(al, the relation between theory and the observation which s(pports it, it also plays a part in clarifyin the historical sit(ation attendant on the e#er ence of new theories. B(t it is precisely on this second point that the other principal criticis# of the for#alist pro ra# hin es. $or#al reconstr(ction, it is said, falsities the character of science, which in its real develop#ent does not follow a tidy dialectic of observation and theory b(t is to be (nderstood only thro( h intricate historical and sociolo ical analysis. %obody wo(ld deny that historical and sociolo ical analyses are of reat i#portance in their own ri ht, b(t there is a dan er of conf(sion in settin the# over a ainst philosophical analyses of the reconstr(ctionist variety. Lne of the recent historical theses which has drawn #ost attention to itself is that of H(hn,E14F accordin to which the develop#ent of science is fro# paradi # to paradi #, each paradi # controllin a period of nor#al science, by a series of crises and revol(tions. ,his see#s to #e a hi hly pla(sible view, and H(hn #akes an i#pressive case for it. +e s( ests, however, that he ca#e to it partly o(t of dissatisfaction with conte#porary philosophy of science, which represented science as bein so#ethin which, in his own practical e*perience of it, it clearly was not. ,he earlier disc(ssion in this essay sho(ld #ake it clear eno( h how s(ch a #is(nderstandin of the intentions of the philosophy of science #i ht arise. 21t #ay be added parenthetically that if every #is(nderstandin led to a contrib(tion of s(ch ori inality, #is(nderstandin #i ht well beco#e one of the oals of in@(iry.5 ,here is, as far as 1 can see, no inco#patibility whatever between H(hn9s view of science and +e#pel9s, since each new paradi # 2in H(hn9s sense of the ter#5 #i ht t(rn o(t to satisfy +e#pel9s criteria for a developed science, 7(st as it was s( ested that all $eyerabend9s alternatives #i ht. H(hn, in fact, has had so#e diffic(lty in characteri<in the notion of -paradi #- even to his own satisfaction, which leaves open the possibility that when it shows its tr(e colors the paradi # #ay t(rn o(t to look like an e*e#plification of +e#pel9s for#ally reconstr(cted science. ,he reat advanta e of for#alis#s is that they adapt the#selves readily to new

> 33 > content; the pro ress of science #i ht therefore be reinterpreted in ter#s of the distance fro# the paradi # 2in +e#pel9s sense5 at which the science of a iven epoch finds itself, crises occ(rrin whenever the distance beco#es too reat, and revol(tions restorin the acceptable for# with new observational and theoretical content. 1 do not wish to saddle +e#pel with the views p(t forward in this section of the essay; they owe their inspiration to hi#, b(t he #i ht wish to disown the#. +e does not, at least in As!ects$ take the historical si nificance of the for#al #odel as far as 1 have done, and indeed he reco ni<es that the #odel #i ht be (sed as an a ency of conservatis# rather than of revol(tion. :y s( estion here has been, not that the revol(tion derives fro# the #odel, b(t that the #odel #ay be (sed as a to(chstone for the conditions (nder which the revol(tion #i ht co#e abo(t. 1n practice, of co(rse, ano#alo(s observations #ay not ive rise to a new theory at all, they #ay si#ply be thrown o(t beca(se they are at variance with the old one. 1n the little known essay -8cience and +(#an Mal(e- 2As!ects , pp. =1Q 945 +e#pel s( ests that, in the case of a -previo(sly well6s(bstantiated theory,- this is entirely proper, altho( h he adds that it -re@(ires considerable ca(tion; otherwise, a theory, once accepted, co(ld be (sed to re7ect all adverse evidence that #i ht s(bse@(ently be fo(nd)a do #atic proced(re entirely irreconcilable with the ob7ectives and the spirit of scientific in@(iry- 2p. 9"5. 1n the li ht of this and other passa es 1 do not think that the char e leveled a ainst the for#alist position by $eyerabend, H(hn, and others, to the effect that it disco(nts and even stifles scientific pro ress, can be #ade to hold water, altho( h it #(st be ad#itted that this is a side of the pict(re to which +e#pel hi#self has paid very little attention. 1t has been #y p(rpose to show that this was not c(lpable ne lect; he happened to be payin attention to another, and at least e@(ally i#portant, aspect of the philosophy of science, @(ite eno( h in itself to absorb the ener ies of a sin le philosopher.

V
/ ood deal of the reaction to +e#pel9s work)and 1 have tried to ive a sa#plin of that reaction in the fore oin pa es)can be s(##ed (p by askin whether it was really necessary. 1f science can be (nderstood in all its concreteness and co#ple*ity by attention to the n(ances of its lan (a e and the convol(tions of its history, why bother to provide a si#ple sche#a whose intelli ibility is bo(nd to be inversely proportional to its tr(th0 Ln a #etascientific level this proble# is stran ely re#iniscent of a proble# which occ(rs at the scientific level, and which > 33 > +e#pel hi#self has called -the theoretician9s dile##a.- 1f a theory is an acc(rate acco(nt of the world of observation, then it is a ood theory; b(t if that world is 2as by definition it #(st be5 directly accessible to observation, then the theory is s(perfl(o(s. 1f it is not an acc(rate acco(nt of the world of observation, then it is a bad theory, and o( ht to be discarded. &ither it is or it is not an acc(rate acco(nt, and either way, it see#s, we have no real (se for it. ,he p(<<le involved here has so#ethin in co##on with another p(<<le fa#iliar to st(dents of lo ic. Ded(ctive lo ic never yields #ore tr(th in its concl(sions than was s(pplied in its pre#ises. ,he pre#ises for any a*io#atic develop#ent are the a*io#s the#selves; what then is the point of provin any theore#s, if everythin they say is already present in the a*io#s0 C(rio(sly eno( h, +e#pel hi#self #akes an analo y between his concept of e*planation and #eta#athe#atical proof theory 2p. A135; the conte*t is a defense of the coverin 6law #odel 2a na#e which has co#e to be attached to the for#al reconstr(ction of science as +e#pel has practiced it5 a ainst char es by 8criven that it is not

applicable to all sorts of everyday sit(ations in which we ordinarily and naively (se the ter# -e*planation.- ,he analo y see#s to #e appropriate on two co(nts. $or#al #ethods in lo ic and #athe#atics are principally of interest to lo icians and #athe#aticians; for Iod they are (seless, beca(se Iod sees the concl(sions in the pre#ises; the avera e #an or wo#an in the street, who does not (nderstand the pre#ises and does not need the concl(sions, find the# (seless also. 8i#ilarly for scientific theories and their for#al reconstr(ction. Iod #ay be pres(#ed to (nderstand the world and science too; the avera e person takes little interest in either. $or those, however, whose intellect(al powers are less than Iod9s b(t whose intellect(al c(riosity is #ore active than the avera e, the #iddle re ion between o#niscience and ordinary lan (a e has its attractions. 1t is with no intention of disrespect to philosophers who c(ltivate a sensitivity to the ordinary lan (a e of science that 1 s( est a ree*a#ination of the virt(es of for#al reconstr(ction, childishly si#ple as the enterprise #ay appear. 8i#plicity, after all, is not necessarily achieved si#ply. -,he central the#e of this essay,- says +e#pel, referrin to the title essay of As!ects 2p. A==5, -has been, briefly, that all scientific e*planation involves, e*plicitly or by i#plication, a s(bs(#ption of its s(b7ect #atter (nder eneral re (larities; that it seeks to provide a syste#atic (nderstandin of e#pirical pheno#ena by showin that they fit into a no#ic ne*(s.- 8o#e people are te#pted to say, well, if that is all there is to it, we knew it all alon . B(t the point is we did not know it all alon ; it see#s fa#iliar now only beca(se the work of the last thirty years has #ade it so. ,hat this view of e*planation is now an obvio(s point of > 3A > depart(re for f(rther work in the philosophy of science is in lar e #eas(re d(e to +e#pel. ,here is a reat deal #ore to be done, and #(ch of it inevitably will consist in a#plifyin , correctin , and contradictin prono(nce#ents of +e#pel9s. B(t the self6i#posed li#itations on the scope of his achieve#ent, and the e*traordinarily close way in which it has been ar (ed to, s( est that it will be an ele#ent to be reckoned with for a lon ti#e to co#e. > 3" >

61 Scie%ce a%d S(ste/. O% t#e U%it( a%d *i'ersit( o& Scie%ti&ic T#eor(
,heories are ways of lookin at thin s. A theoros in ancient Ireece was -a spectator, an observer, one who travels to see #en and thin s; an a#bassador sent by the state to cons(lt an oracle, or to observe the a#es.- B(t that ety#olo y #akes it clear that theories cannot be 7(st cas(al ways of lookin ; there is so#ethin cere#onial, al#ost official, abo(t any view of the world which @(alifies as a theory. .itho(t pressin the point abo(t oracles 2or a#es5 we can reco ni<e in the present or ani<ation of science a rel(ctance to di nify with the title -theory- any #ere workin hypothesis. 1t was so#e s(ch rel(ctance, perhaps, that led the fo(nders of the 8ociety for Ieneral 8yste#s ,heory to chan e its na#e, soon after its establish#ent, to the 8ociety for Ieneral 8yste#s Cesearch. 2,his #odesty did not last)the 8ociety chan ed its na#e a ain, a few decades later, to the 1nternational 8ociety for 8yste#s 8cience.5 1t is nevertheless abo(t eneral syste#s theory that 1 wish to speak, in spite of this tacit ad#ission that it re#ains as yet lar ely pro ra##atical. 8yste#s theory is pres(#ably a s(itably @(alified way of

lookin at syste#s. Sustema , a ain, #eans si#ply -that which is p(t to ether, a co#posite whole,- so that there is at first nothin partic(larly ill(#inatin abo(t its ety#olo y. B(t -syste#,- also, has ac@(ired connotations. 1n this case, (nfort(nately, there are two sets of connotations which p(ll in opposite directions. Ln the one hand, syste# has for #any people)especially philosophers b(t often scientists too)represented the hi hest for# of knowled e, a perfect vision of the or ani<ation of the world. Ln the other, syste# has often been an e*c(se for > 34 > the drawin of pre#at(re concl(sions and even for the s(ppression of evidence. ,he str( le which acco#panied the overthrow of the /ristotelian6,ho#istic syste# in the Cenaissance has never @(ite been for otten by #odern science. 'et that syste#, considered in relation to its proper s(b7ect6#atter, had been the so(rce of enli hten#ent and even pro ress. /s .hitehead p(ts it, -1n its pri#e each syste# is a tri(#phant s(ccess; in its decay it is an obstr(ctive n(isance.-E1F 1t has been the #isfort(ne of syste#s, especially philosophical ones, to be re#e#bered for the n(isance rather than the s(ccess: the s(ccess ratifies the conte#poraries of the syste#, b(t the n(isance #ay live on for cent(ries. Before oin f(rther, a serio(s a#bi (ity which has already crept into the disc(ssion #(st be dealt with. 8yste#s theory is a way of lookin at syste#s, b(t theories the#selves are also syste#s. ,hey are co#posite wholes whose parts are propositions, related to one another in co#ple* and dyna#ic ways. ,he chief difference between a theory and a physical syste# is that the parts of a theory are concept(al, and therefore in principle #ore fle*ible than the parts of a physical syste#. ,heories are si#pler to constr(ct and, in principle, si#pler to discard, and this versatility is the secret of their (sef(lness and their i#portance. / theory 2a ain in principle5 can do anythin a physical syste# can do, #ore @(ickly, #ore efficiently, and with less fear of the conse@(ences. ,he chief f(nction of theories, therefore, is to anticipate the behavior of physical syste#s. 1f in theory the device blows (p, in practice it had better not be b(ilt that way. &ach theoretical syste# confronts the physical syste# of which it is the theory, and this confrontation is not a bad i#a e of the h(#an activity we call science. /s a paradi # we #ay take the classical investi ation of Ialileo. +ere the physical syste# consists of a ball, an inclined plane, a ti#in device, and a ravitational field. ,he inp(t to the syste# is the release of the ball fro# the top of the plane, with the ti#in device in so#e prearran ed state; the o(tp(ts are a series of inter#ediate positions of the ball and a correspondin series of states of the ti#in device, endin with the ball at the botto#. ,he theoretical syste# confrontin it consists of an al ebraic f(nction, i.e., of a set of relations between n(#bers. ,he inp(t to this syste# is a set of initial conditions, and the o(tp(t is a set of sol(tions for the ball at vario(s sta es of its descent. Physical syste#s of one sort and another have, of co(rse, always been with (s, and ele#entary theoretical syste#s had been developed by earlier thinkers than Ialileo. .hat is novel in this develop#ent is that the two syste#s have the sa#e for#)they are isomor!hic with one another and therefore behave in the sa#e way > 3? > within the li#its of the iso#orphis#. .e now take this condition for ranted, b(t Ialileo tho( ht it worth #akin e*plicit: 1t see#s desirable to find and e*plain a definition Eof nat(rally accelerated #otionF best fittin nat(ral pheno#ena. $or anyone #ay invent an arbitrary type of #otion and disc(ss its properties . . . b(t we have decided to consider the pheno#ena of bodies fallin with an

acceleration s(ch as act(ally occ(rs in nat(re and to #ake this definition of accelerated #otion e*hibit the essential feat(res of observed accelerated #otions. /nd this, at last, after repeated efforts we tr(st we have s(cceeded in doin .E3F ,he -repeated efforts- s( est that ettin the iso#orphis# is not a partic(larly easy task, a point to which 1 shall have occasion to refer a ain later on. %ow, iso#orphis# is not so#ethin that belon s to the theoretical syste# and the physical syste# separately; it appears only when they are taken to ether, and this has to be done fro# a vanta e6point o(tside the# both. 1t is not the f(nction of theory to reflect on its ade@(acy to the world; its f(nction is to be ade@(ate to the world. O(estions abo(t the ade@(acy of scientific theories, like @(estions abo(t their lo ical str(ct(re, their ori ins, their (sef(lness, etc., are metascientific @(estions; and a n(#ber of #etascientific disciplines)the philosophy of science, the history of science, the sociolo y of science) have rown (p to deal with the#. ,hese disciplines, however, are not si#ply descriptive, they are theoretical too, or better metatheoretical )ways of lookin at scientific theory, or ways of lookin at ways of lookin at thin s. /nd this #eans that they also incorporate syste#s, #etascientific syste#s, which confront the scientific syste#s 2now incl(din theories and physical syste#s and the interactions between the#5 of which they are the respective #etatheories. 1t be ins to look as if there are syste#s everywhere, and as if everythin co(ld be re arded as a syste#. ,hat this is in fact so is one of the alle ations #ost fre@(ently #ade by the critics of syste#s theory. $or of co(rse if it were so, callin so#ethin a syste# wo(ld ive no (sef(l infor#ation abo(t it; the ter# by itself wo(ld cease to #ake any distinction between one state of affairs and another. $ort(nately, everythin is not a syste#, and the ter# is by no #eans an e#pty one. /t the very least, to say of a n(#ber of ele#ents, whether physical or theoretical, that they constit(te a syste# is to deny that they a#o(nt #erely to a pile of ob7ects or a list of words. 8ince there are piles of ob7ects and lists of words, that is an i#portant distinction. /nd since a pile of ob7ects, even when the ob7ects are caref(lly stacked 2and even if they are fastened to ether5 re#ains a pile of ob7ects > 3= > 2albeit a sophisticated one5, and a list of words, even if arran ed accordin to the r(les of ra##ar and synta*, re#ains a 2si#ilarly sophisticated5 list of words, the ideas of dyna#ic interrelation and/or of coherent f(nctionin are also i#plicit in the concept of syste#. Dyna#ic interrelation entails chan es of state; coherent f(nctionin entails inp(ts and o(tp(ts. 1t is easy to see how these properties #ay be reflected in physical syste#s, theoretical syste#s, and #etatheoretical syste#s, and yet take radically different for#s in the three cases. ,he conf(sions that often arise are lar ely d(e to carelessness in distin (ishin levels)to #i*in (p ob7ects and the descriptions of ob7ects, theories and the conditions of theoretical ade@(acy. ,his kind of conf(sion is especially likely to occ(r in disc(ssion between people whose (s(al preocc(pations are on different levels. $or the @(estion can be asked 2on a #etatheoretical level5 whether the vario(s theoretical syste#s, which have been devised to cope with the reat variety of physical syste#s to be fo(nd in the world, the#selves constit(te a hi her6order syste# 2a eneral syste#, perhaps5)whether the sciences taken to ether are like a list of words or like a theory, whether there can be not #erely a philosophy of science b(t also a science of science. $ro# the be innin the attraction of eneral syste#s theory was that it see#ed to offer a new basis for the (nification of science. :y @(estion then is, how are the sciences one, and how are they #any0 Can there be a eneral theoretical syste#, or only a eneral #etatheory of partic(lar theoretical syste#s, i.e., a eneral #etatheoretical syste#0 1f there is a eneral theoretical syste#, what are its ele#ents and the principles

of its artic(lation0 1t #(st be ad#itted fro# the start that in the develop#ent of science every s(ccessf(l step has so far consisted in the establish#ent of a partic(lar theoretical syste# applicable to a partic(lar physical syste#, as in the Ialilean case disc(ssed earlier. &very proble# presents itself in a partic(lar connection, at a partic(lar 7(nct(re of space and ti#e; every law is bo(nded in its reference and the conditions of its application; every e*planation is relevant to so#e restricted 2even if infinite5 set of possible observations. ,he syste#s in @(estion #ay have been #ore or less ra#ified, b(t even in its #ost ra#ified for# no sin le syste# has yet e*tended so far as to cover even one of the conventional fields of science 2altho( h so#e have crossed the bo(ndaries of these conventional fields5. ,he conventional divisions a#on the sciences have been established on the ro(nds of si#ilarity a#on observations and e*planatory concepts which s( ested the possibility of (nification into a sin le ded(ctively or ani<ed syste#, ideally in a*io#atic for#; b(t the relations between the parts of physics, for e*a#ple, are #(ch looser than this ideal of syste# wo(ld indicate. Physics, in fact, re#ains > 39 > in #any ways #ore like a list of words 2each -word-5 representin , it is tr(e, a s(bstantial bit of theory5 than like a (nified theoretical syste#; and physics has done better than any of the other sciences. 1 wish to stress this point beca(se #any people see# to think that the (nity of science has to contend only with divisions between the sciences, overlookin the e@(ally serio(s divisions within the#. .e #i ht nevertheless ad#it that (nity is a reali<able oal, at least in principle, for the partic(lar sciences. ,he @(estion is whether this is also tr(e of science in eneral, or, if it is not tr(e, whether nonetheless an effort towards it #ay not yield benefits to the scientific co##(nity. 21t is not a condition of h(#an a#bition that its reali<ation sho(ld be possible.5 ,he answer to the @(estion depends in part on what is (nderstood by the (nity of science, and on what ood it is tho( ht (nification #i ht do. Ln these points there has been widespread disa ree#ent. 1f we are not to li#it o(r collective attention to partic(lar kinds of syste#, whether in en ineerin or biolo y, #athe#atics or philosophy)then an atte#pt to resolve s(ch disa ree#ents will be of so#e service. 1 therefore wish to disc(ss a n(#ber of different interpretations that have been placed on the pro ra# of the (nification of science, and to ive #y opinion, for what it is worth, of their relevance to the interests of eneral syste#s theorists. ,he three #ost fa#iliar conceptions of the (nity of science are, in the order in which 1 shall deal with the#, 1. (nity as red(ction to a co##on basis 3. (nity as synthesis into a total syste# 3. (nity as the constr(ction of an encyclopedia.

1 Red-ctio%
1f we co(ld devise a sin le descriptive lan (a e in which all the ter#s of all the sciences co(ld be defined or to which they co(ld be red(ced, and if we co(ld discover a sin le set of laws fro# which all the laws of all the sciences co(ld be derived or to which they co(ld be red(ced, then we wo(ld have a sin le science. ,his version of the pro ra# of (nification occ(rs in different for#s, dependin on the vocab(lary of the basic lan (a e. ,he lo ical positivists wished to fo(nd science on a sense datum language or, when that failed, on a !h"sical thing language ; the basic predicates, in other words, were to be descriptive of #acroscopic states of the world, s(ch as #eas(rin 6rods, #eters, clocks, etc. :ore

recent writers have chosen instead predicates de6 > A! > scriptive of the #ost ele#entary physical (nits to be fo(nd in the world, na#ely the predicates of ele#entary particle theory. 1t is in the latter case that we speak of the -red(ction of all sciences to physics.- 1n the for#er, all sciences 2incl(din physics5 are red(ced to a co##on observation basis, altho( h since this observation basis is !h"sicalistic and the na#e for the view that this kind of red(ction is possible is physicalis#,E3F the two are easily conf(sed. Lnce the lan (a e is settled, the red(ction of laws follows the sa#e pattern in both cases. ,he conditions of red(ction are clear: the re (larities described by the ter#s and e*plained by the laws which are red(ced #(st be describable by the ter#s and e*plainable by the laws to which they are red(ced, the for#er ter#s and laws thereby bein eli#inated fro# the description and e*planation. 1t #ay also be the case that the science which is red(ced nor#ally deals with ob7ects whose parts are nor#ally dealt with by the science to which it is red(ced, altho( h this is not essential; in this connection the ter# -#icrored(ction- has been s( ested. %either of these versions of red(ctionis# can be said to have s(cceeded, b(t it wo(ld be rash to say that they never co(ld s(cceed. Lppenhei# and P(tna#, on the basis of the ass(#ption of #icrored(ction down to particle physics, are prepared to speak of the (nity of science as a -workin hypothesis.-EAF 8ince all s(ch pro ra#s of red(ction involve one reat inconvenience, na#ely, that the laws of the red(ced science look very co#plicated when they are e*pressed in the lan (a e of the f(nda#ental science 2i#a ine tryin to e*press the laws of econo#ics in the lan (a e of @(ant(# #echanics5, Lppenhei# and P(tna# list si* reducti-e le-els , as follows: 4 8ocial ro(ps " 2:(lticell(lar5 livin thin s A Cells 3 :olec(les 3 /to#s 1 &le#entary particles and content the#selves with red(ction between ad7acent levels. Ced(ction is obvio(sly transitive, b(t it wo(ld be silly to try to de#onstrate that in partic(lar cases. ,his is (nity in principle rather than in practice, and it is hi hly pla(sible, as so #any thin s are in principle. Ced(ction to a physical thin lan (a e is even #ore pla(sible for a very obvio(s reason, na#ely, that all the data on which we base o(r concl(sions, in sciences as diverse as cos#olo y and #icrobiolo y, have to be rendered in #acroscopic for# 2spectral lines, chro#ato ra#s5 before we > A1 > can take the# in; o(r biolo ical co##(nity forces a kind of episte#olo ical (nity on o(r knowled e. ,he thesis of physicalis# is stron er than this, of co(rse, since it will not accept 7(st any #acroscopic observation as part of the basis 2e. ., -it9s alive,- -she9s an ry-5, b(t Carnap at least considered it to be established in its essentials: while he says that -there is at present no unit" of laws ,- he contin(es, Ln the other hand, there is a unit" of language in science, vi<., a co##on red(ction basis for the ter#s of all branches of science, this basis consistin of a very narrow and ho#o eneo(s class of ter#s of the physical thin 6lan (a e.E"F

,he possibility of red(ction is philosophically interestin , b(t the tro(ble with it as a workin basis for the (nity of science is that nobody really wants to do it. ,here are cases, of co(rse, in which red(ction really works and everybody is ratef(l for it, as when the theory of certain diseases, which had for#erly been st(died only at the ross level of sy#pto#s, was red(ced to a theory abo(t #icroor anis#s and cells. 'et there is a li#it to the co#ple*ity that one discipline can handle, and physicists do not at the #o#ent want to b(rden the#selves with or anic che#istry, let alone political science. ,he world #ay be a sin le very co#ple* physical syste#, b(t that does not #ean that a sin le very co#ple* theoretical syste# is the best way of representin it.

61 S(%t#esis
,he red(ction of one science to another #akes no ass(#ptions abo(t a si#ilarity of for#al str(ct(re on the two levels in @(estion. 1t is only necessary that the ter#s and laws on the hi her level sho(ld be eli#inable in favor of ter#s and laws on the lower level. 1 wish now to #ove on to a stron er conception of the (nity of science in which s(ch a for#al si#ilarity appears either instead of or in addition to the thesis of red(ction. ,here is said to e*ist a #odel or pattern of scientific theory, of which each partic(lar theory is an instantiation, so that hi her level sciences recapit(late, altho( h with #ore co#ple* ele#ents, the str(ct(re of lower level sciences. ,his clai# is clearly independent of the red(ctionist clai#, and #any of its proponents re7ect the latter on the ro(nds that en(ine novelty e#er es at the different levels, altho( h the basic pattern is reprod(ced on each. /ltho( h red(ction is not a necessary part of this synthetic view, the sciences are nearly always arran ed in a hierarchy very si#ilar to > A3 > the red(ctionist one iven above; a part6whole relationship of so#e sort is held to obtain between levels, altho( h the wholes #ay not be e*plainable witho(t resid(e in ter#s of their parts. ,he sciences th(s for# a totality, the (nit of which is provided by the archetypal str(ct(re that reappears at each sta e, like a si#ilar arran e#ent of roo#s on the different floors of a tall ho(se. Lne of the #ost thoro( h workin s o(t of this idea is to be fo(nd in the syste# of 8ynoptic %at(ralis# developed by Ieor e Perri o Con er. ,he -/r (#ent- of this work p(ts the view (nder disc(ssion so clearly that it is worth @(otin . ,he (niverse, st(died (nder the li#itations which beset h(#an thinkin , presents itself as a vast syste# of syste#s which are strikin ly si#ilar in the eneral principles of their str(ct(res and processes. /#on the #a7or syste#s, or real#s, are those co##only referred to as :atter, Kife, :ind. &ach of these real#s develops thro( h a series of levels, and st(died in e#pirical detail, fro# level to level and fro# real# to real#, the str(ct(res and processes of #atter, or the physical world, are seen to rese#ble those of life, or the or anis#s, and both the physical world and the or anis#s rese#ble a nervo(s syste# f(nctionin as a #ind. ,he rese#blances of str(ct(res and processes thro( ho(t the levels and real#s indicate that the (niverse is not #erely a series of evol(tions, b(t also of -epito#i<ations- and -c(#(lative coordinations.- $(rther st(dy indicates that prior to the physical world there are three other #a7or syste#s, which, beca(se of the detailed rese#blances of their str(ct(res and processes to those 7(st considered, are also identifiable as real#s. ,hese are the real#s of Ko ic, %(#ber, 8pace6,i#e or Chrono eo#etry. .ith these incl(ded, the (niverse is said to develop in s(ccessive epito#i<ations and

coordinations, fro# str(ct(res and processes which are lo ical to str(ct(res and processes which are personal and societal. / st(dy of #an9s ad7(st#ents of his str(ct(res and processes to those of the s(rro(ndin (niverse which he epito#i<es and coordinates provides so#e applications to proble#s of ethics and opens so#e new nat(ralistic reso(rces for philosophies of reli ion.E4F ,he re#arkable and in a way sad thin abo(t this work is that no p(blisher wo(ld p(blish it 2it was printed by the University of :innesota Kibrary5 and hardly anybody has read it. ,he #ore basic reasons for this ne lect are to be dealt with later; for the #o#ent, however, 1 #(st say that, in spite of the enor#o(s a#o(nt of painstakin work p(t into this pro7ect by Con er, and into si#ilar pro7ects by #any other si#ilarly dedicated workers, the evidence for s(ch a periodic hypothesis see#s to #e e*tre#ely sli#. 1t is tr(e)and this is one of the pheno#ena which has been of reatest i#portance in the develop#ent of eneral syste#s theory)that si#ilarities of str(ct(re are fo(nd between parts of scientific theory widely separated fro# one another in > A3 > the syste# of levels. ,hese cases of iso#orphis# between theories, each iso#orphic with a very different physical syste#, have led so#e people to the e*pectation that if only we look hard eno( h we #(st find the# everywhere. E-,he h(#an (nderstandin ,- says $rancis Bacon, -is of its own nat(re prone to s(ppose the e*istence of #ore order and re (larity in the world than it finds. /nd tho( h there be #any thin s in nat(re which are sin (lar and (n#atched, yet it devises for the# parallels and con7( ates and relatives which do not e*ist.-E?F F ,hat there sho(ld be cases of s(ch iso#orphis# between theories, which #akes it possible to (se one theory as a #odel for another and s( ests lines of investi ation which #i ht otherwise be overlooked, see#s to #e a nat(ral conse@(ence of the fact that the li#ited n(#ber of de rees of freedo# in the physical world restricts the n(#ber of possibilities of str(ct(re; that the n(#ber of possibilities is still f(rther red(ced if to the str(ct(re in @(estion is added a f(nction 2s(ch as rowth, ho#eostasis, replication, etc.5, since this has the effect of eli#inatin all b(t a few of the de rees of freedo# available to the str(ct(re in its nonf(nctional state; and that the nat(ral li#itations of o(r intellect keep down the n(#ber of types of theoretical syste#s we are capable of constr(ctin . B(t it is one thin not to be s(rprised by e*ceptions, another to #istake the# for the r(le. ,here is, of co(rse, a sense in which all possible sciences do confor# to a rather narrowly defined set of r(les, na#ely those of lo ic and its vario(s associated disciplines 2set theory, #athe#atics in eneral5. 1n a finite world containin a finite n(#ber of kinds of thin s reactin with one another in a finite n(#ber of ways, there is a finite n(#ber of possibilities, and all of these are anticipated in principle by so#e branch or other of #athe#atics. ,he n(#ber of branches of #athe#atics which has been worked o(t to any de ree of co#ple*ity is severely li#ited, altho( h for the reasons iven above it is not entirely s(rprisin that already so#e branches sho(ld t(rn o(t to be applicable to #ore than one set of e#pirical conditions. ,o be lo ical, however, only #eans not to be inconsistent; it does not #ean to confor# to any partic(lar pattern in detail, and in eneral we find the e#pirical tr(ths of partic(lar sciences fillin o(t the skeleton of lo ic and #athe#atics in @(ite different ways and at @(ite different points.

"1 E%c(clo2edia
,he thesis of red(ction ass(#es that there is a basic science in ter#s of which the tr(ths of all the

others can be e*pressed; the synthetic view o(tlined above ass(#es that there is a s(perscience in whose > AA > i#a e all the partic(lar sciences are #ade. %either view can be entirely #istaken. Partial red(ctions between ad7acent levels have been carried o(t with reat s(ccess; and iso#orphis#s do e*ist between ele#ents of theories on different levels, so that their lo ical for# #i ht pla(sibly be tho( ht of as an ele#ent of a s(per theory. B(t both are clearly pro ra##atic rather than de#onstrable, and each enco(nters serio(s philosophical diffic(lties: red(ction faces the proble# of e#er ence, the hierarchical synthesis faces the dan er of Platonis#. 2&ach of the iso#orphis#s between theories #(st be tested e#pirically on both sides before it can be accepted, and by the ti#e this is done its predictive )as apart fro# its s( estive)power has already been rendered s(perfl(o(s.5 / weaker position, which reflects ele#ents of both these stron ones, can be fo(nd in the works of people like 8pencer in the nineteenth cent(ry and Ltto %e(rath in the twentieth. +ere the (nity of science is a social rather than a lo ical #atter; science, as a cooperative enterprise, involves investi ations of different parts of the world by different people, whose findin s can then be asse#bled in a classification witho(t hierarchy, a syste# of cooperation witho(t precedence. %o one will deny that che#istry deals with a re ates whose parts are dealt with by physics, b(t this does not #ean that physics has to be done first, nor that che#istry #ay not throw so#e li ht on the proble#s of physics. -,he division of labor in science,- says +erbert 8pencer, has been not only a speciali<ation of f(nctions, b(t a contin(al helpin of each division by all the others, and of all by each. &very partic(lar class of in@(irers has, as it were, secreted its own partic(lar order of tr(ths fro# the eneral #ass of #aterial which observation acc(#(lates; and all other classes of in@(irers have #ade (se of these tr(ths as fast as they were elaborated, with the effect of enablin the# the better to elaborate each its own order of tr(ths. $ro# o(r present point of view, then, it beco#es obvio(s that the conception of a serial arran e#ent of the sciences is a vicio(s one. 1t is not si#ply that the sche#es we have e*a#ined Ethe sche#es of Lken, +e el, and Co#teF are (ntenable; b(t it is that the sciences cannot be ri htly placed in any linear order whatever. . . . /ny ro(pin of the sciences in a s(ccession ives a radically erroneo(s idea of their enesis and their dependencies. ,here is no one -rational - order a#on a host of possible syste#s. ,here is no -true filiation - of the sciences. ,he whole hypothesis is f(nda#entally false.E=F ,he critical insi ht in this passa e is contained, 1 think, in 8pencer9s reference to the secretion of partic(lar orders of tr(ths fro# -the eneral #ass of #aterial which observation acc(#(lates.Lbservation can be in anywhere within reach of o(r senses 2or within reach of o(r > A" > instr(#ents5, b(t of all the re (larities we act(ally take note of, so#e on this level and so#e on that, only a few will serve as the startin point for interestin scientific develop#ents. %e(rath, for his part, stresses the (nrealistic character of other pro ra#s for the (nification of science, #ost of the# 2like that of Keibni<, for e*a#ple5 havin been based on @(estionable a !riori ass(#ptions. -,he historical tendency of the (nity of science #ove#ent,- he says, is toward a (nified science, depart#entali<ed into special sciences, and not toward a spec(lative 7(*taposition of an a(tono#o(s philosophy and a ro(p of scientific disciplines.

1f one re7ects the idea of s(ch a s(per science and also the idea of a pse(dorationalistic anticipation of the syste# of science, what is the #a*i#(# of scientific coordination which re#ains possible0 ,he answer iven by the (nity of science #ove#ent is: an encyclopedia of (nified science. . . . Lne cannot co#pare the historically iven with -the real science.- . . . /n encyclopedia and not a syste# is the en(ine #odel of science as a whole. /n encyclopedic inte ration of scientific state#ents, with all the discrepancies and diffic(lties which appear, is the #a*i#(# of inte ration which we can achieve. . . . 1t is a ainst the principle of encyclopedis# to i#a ine that one -co(ld- eli#inate all s(ch diffic(lties. ,o believe this is to entertain a variation of Kaplace9s fa#o(s de#on. . . . 8(ch is the idea of the s"stem in contrast to the idea of an enc"clo!edia ; the anticipated co#pleteness of the syste# as opposed to the stressed inco#pleteness of an encyclopedia. E9F %ow, this talk of encyclopedias will see# like pretty pale st(ff to diehard (nitarians, and it #ay appear that by now 1 have for otten all abo(t eneral syste#s theory. B(t #y (nderlyin @(estion is, what is the relevance of eneral syste#s theory to the (nity of science 2and vice versa50 8o far 1 have si#ply tried to show what so#e people have (nderstood by the (nity of science. 1 want now to ask a s(pple#entary @(estion, na#ely, what is the point of havin a (nified science0 /fter dealin with that, 1 shall ret(rn to eneral syste#s theory #ore specifically. :ost efforts at the (nification of science, 1 think, have been (ndertaken fro# either of two #otives, one perfectly so(nd, the other involvin serio(s dan ers. Ket #e deal with the dan ero(s one first. 1t is a co##on co#plaint that h(#an life and h(#an knowled e are re rettably (nsyste#atic and fra #ented, and there appears to be a very powerf(l psycholo ical desire to et it all tied to ether into so#e coherent whole. 8cience see#ed for a lon ti#e the ideal a ent of s(ch a total inte ration. / passa e attrib(ted so#ewhere to +( o :(nsterber s(#s (p this feelin ad#irably: -L(r ti#e lon s for a new synthesis)it > A4 > waits for science to satisfy o(r hi her needs for a view of the world that shall ive (nity to o(r scattered e*perience.- Ln an ele#entary level this desire for wholeness shows (p in Iestalt pheno#ena of -clos(re,- in which the #ind #oves fro# an al#ost co#plete representation to a co#plete one, or even in #ore advanced sta es fro# a #ere indication to a co#plete representation. ,his t(rns o(t to be very (sef(l in perception, altho( h even there it has its risks. 1n a search for the (nity of science it is, 1 believe, pernicio(s if taken by itself; if, that is, all that is desired is kind of #ental clos(re, a tidyin 6(p of the scientific conception of the world. ,he presentation of separate tho( h apparently related ele#ents is no ar (#ent for the independent e*istence of a whole of which they are the parts, altho( h that is what the need for clos(re see#s to drive #any people to when it co#es to the conte#plation of scientific theories. 21t #(st be (nderstood a ain that 1 a# not sayin that the world is not a (nified syste#; 1 a# sayin that we have no ro(nds as yet for clai#in that theor" is.5 /ccordin to C. I. Collin wood, scientists si#ply cannot help tryin to (nify science, altho( h he thinks that their atte#pts are doo#ed to fail(re: 8cience always believes that it has 7(st discovered the (lti#ate tr(th and that all past a es have been s(nk in a fo of i norance and s(perstition. 1t has no sense of its solidarity with and debt to its own past and other for#s of conscio(sness. /nd f(rther, it is as i#possible to classify sciences and red(ce the# to a sin le ordered cos#os of tho( ht as it is to do the sa#e with works of art.

,he atte#pt has been #ade over and over a ain to red(ce all the sciences to s(ch an ordered whole. 1t see#s obvio(s that there #(st be a table or hierarchy of sciences in which each has its proper place and so there wo(ld, if science were the rational activity it believes itself to be. 1f there really were a Platonic world of p(re concepts, in which every concept was dovetailed into the rest, each havin a science to e*po(nd its nat(re, then there wo(ld be a correspondin world of sciences. B(t, as Plato hi#self saw to his dis#ay, there are concepts of #(d and filth and anythin one likes to na#e, and these can never fit into a place in the world of absol(te bein . ,he concepts of science are abstract and therefore arbitrary, and beca(se anyone #ay #ake any abstraction he likes, there cannot possibly be a syste# or world of science.E1!F Collin wood repeats the point taken above fro# +erbert 8pencer, and it is on this point, 1 think, that the principal criticis# of incl(sive atte#pts at (nification hin es. &very theoretical syste#, as was re#arked above, applies to so#e partic(lar physical syste# or set of syste#s. ,hese physical syste#s in t(rn are chosen fro# a lar e n(#ber of physical syste#s enco(ntered every day by the observer. 8o#e e*trascientific i#p(lse leads to the > A? > choice of one of these for st(dy rather than another, and the present diversity of science is d(e to the fort(nate circ(#stance that different people have taken an interest in different bits of the world. %o theory can et started witho(t so#e s(ch selection)not #erely a selection of a s(itable ob7ect of in@(iry, b(t also a ri oro(s selection of the kinds of observation #ade 2e. ., by the insistence on standard conditions, repeatability, a s(fficient n(#ber of instances, etc.5. 8cience does not e*plain the world, it e*plains only very hi hly selected aspects of certain s#all parts of it; and for every theory it is 7(st as i#portant that it sho(ld leave the rest of the world o(t of acco(nt as that it sho(ld take into acco(nt the partic(lar aspects of the partic(lar part with which it is i##ediately concerned. ,heories have often been co#pared to #aps in which can be observed a si#ilar selectivity. Cailway #aps, for e*a#ple, show only railways, road #aps only roads, relief #aps only hei hts above sea level, etc. &ach #ap is (sef(l pri#arily for the speciali<ed infor#ation it conveys. &ach #ap contains also, it is tr(e, hints abo(t the co(ntry in @(estion not directly related to its pri#ary f(nction. $ro# c(rves in the track, and the positions of ter#ini, brid es, and t(nnels, it is possible to et a ood deal of topo raphical infor#ation o(t of a railway #ap, altho( h it is not the b(siness of railways to describe the territory they traverse. ,hey have, however, to confor# to it #ore or less narrowly accordin to the available reso(rces of civil en ineerin , and that necessity b(ilds infor#ation abo(t it into the#. 8i#ilarly, airline #aps ive a ood deal of infor#ation abo(t pop(lation density, altho( h here there is a dan er that a ref(elin stop in the #iddle of an ocean #ay look like a lar e city. 'et, even if all the speciali<ed #aps are s(peri#posed, there re#ain indefinitely #any tr(ths abo(t the co(ntry which can be fo(nd on none of the#. 8o#e of these tr(ths, if interestin eno( h, #ay 7(stify the creation of a new #ap, for e*a#ple, a #ap showin the fre@(ency of fatal accidents at rade crossin s. B(t a #ap which showed everythin wo(ld have to be as co#plicated as the co(ntry itself. Lne of the conditions for the (sef(lness of a theoretical syste# is that it sho(ld in certain critical ways be si#pler than the physical syste# which it represents. ,he ideal of (nified science as the e*planation of everythin wo(ld be like the #ap which showed everythin 2incl(din incidentally a #(ch red(ced version of itself Eon which wo(ld appear a #(ch red(ced version of itselfF, and so on5; and this wo(ld #iss the whole point of its bein a #ap. 1t is d(e, 1 think, to a s(pposition that the f(nction of theory is to e*plain the world that a conviction of

(nity in the world 2a very pla(sible bit of #etaphysics5 has see#ed to #any scientists to call for a > A= > parallel (nity in theory; b(t 7(st as the point of a #ap is that it sho(ld be in so#e ways different fro# the co(ntry it represents, so the point of a theoretical syste# is that it sho(ld be different fro# the physical syste# it represents. /nd 7(st as #aps record only a very few of the feat(res of the landscape, even when the" are all taken to ether, so theoretical syste#s, even when they are all taken to ether, represent only a very few of the physical syste#s to be fo(nd in the world. 1t #ay be ar (ed that one of the weak points of the #ap analo y is the fact that while there are only very arbitrary relationships between roads, railways, pop(lation density, etc., in the sense that roads are not parts of railways nor railways parts of roads, the traditional divisions of the sciences do have a lo ical relationship, based on the part6whole relationship referred to earlier. 1 do not wish to deny this, altho( h it see#s to #e 7(st another e*a#ple of borrowin the (nity of science fro# the (nity of the world. ,he physical world, as nearly as we can tell, is 2in the words of +erbert 8i#on5 a -nearly6 deco#posable hierarchic syste#,-E11F characteri<ed by a series of levels each linked by a part6whole relation, b(t so arran ed that the forces which bind the parts to ether are always stron er than the forces which bind the wholes, of which they are parts, to ether as parts of so#e reater whole. ,his arran e#ent clearly involves no pres(#ption that the forces on one level will be in any way like the forces on another)indeed @(ite the contrary; b(t it does s( est a kind of nat(ral classification of pheno#ena and the (s(al correspondin s(bdivision of the sciences. ,he lack of any pres(#ptive si#ilarity of forces on different levels also #eans the lack of pres(#ptive si#ilarity of the sciences dealin with those levels, which can be #ore or less co#plicated @(ite independently of one another. %or does this arran e#ent ass(#e that there can be only one science on any level, or that there can be no sciences which straddle levels. 1f we re#e#ber the si#ple definition of science as the confrontation of so#e theoretical syste# with so#e physical syste# to which it is ade@(ate, we can see that an" physical syste# 2e. ., a solar syste#, a s(bway syste#, a hospital, a herd of elephants, an elephant, a sy#biotic plant syste#, an ant6hill, a l(#inescent bacteri(#, a fatty acid #olec(le, a (rani(# ato#5 invites the constr(ction of a science, and any re (larity in its behavior will serve as a ro(nd for enerali<ation. /ll that is re@(ired is that the nat(re of the ele#ents and of their interrelationships sho(ld be clear, and that the settin of the syste# in relation to other syste#s which affect it sho(ld be taken acco(nt of. ,he latter point is i#portant. ,he traditional concept of scientific investi ation)and the case of Ialileo confor#s to this)involved the e*a#ination of so#e pheno#enon in isolation . 1t is of the essence of the syste#s approach to reali<e that we not only can b(t #(st st(dy > A9 > so#e pheno#ena in -i-o , as it were, while all sorts of bo(ndary effects 2both inp(ts and o(tp(ts5 are act(ally in operation. ,he sciences th(s enerated #ay t(rn o(t to cl(ster, and they #ay t(rn o(t to have s(rprisin iso#orphis#s, b(t these are to be discovered only after the fact. 2,he traditional sciences rew by s(ch cl(sterin ; %ewton, when he (nited Ialileo9s #echanics with Hepler9s astrono#y, was actin like a ood eneral syste#s theorist.5 /lso the str(ct(re of the theoretical syste# in @(estion has nothin whatever to do with the place of the physical syste# with which it deals in the order of nat(re 2we do not have to write the e@(ations of cos#olo y in very lar e letters and the e@(ations of n(clear physics in very s#all ones5, and the relations between the sciences have nothin to do with the physical relations between the thin s with which they deal. 1t is tr(e that physical ob7ects

are parts of biolo ical ob7ects, b(t it does not follow fro# this that descriptions of physical ob7ects are parts of descriptions of biolo ical ob7ects, or that laws overnin the behavior of physical ob7ects are parts of laws overnin the behavior of biolo ical ob7ects. ,here is a relation between physics and biolo y, b(t it oes thro( h the world, not thro( h so#e s(perior science (nitin physics and biolo y. ,he tro(ble with e*ercises in panscientific (nification is that there is very little real (se for the#, and therefore very little real need e*cept of a psycholo ical sort. &very now and then a really (sef(l bit of eneral syste#ati<ation has been sti#(lated by so#e #ore or less prosaic proble#)the arran e#ent of books in libraries, for e*a#ple, or the efficient or ani<ation of the ed(cational process. &ven here, however, the tendency is to beco#e Procr(stean whenever so#e science proves intractable with respect to the rest of the syste#, or to introd(ce ad hoc co#plications which spoil the virt(es, s(ch as they are, of this kind of inte ration. /s a eneral r(le, the fantastic @(antities of ener y e*pended on one Utopian spec(lation after another s( est a #otivation @(ite different fro# that of the research scientist who tackles one diffic(lt piece of research at a ti#e. /nd this #otivation)the insistence on co#pleteness in the spec(lative syste# for its own sake, apart fro# an e#pirical de#onstration of it, si#ply beca(se inco#pleteness is felt as (nsatisfactory)see#s to #e to constit(te a dan er of which eneral syste#s theorists need to be especially aware. ,o co#e back in concl(sion to the #ain point of this e*c(rsion, recall as said earlier that there are two senses in which the (nity of science can be (nderstood fro# the #otivational point of view, one dan ero(s and the other beneficial. Ket #e now t(rn to the beneficial one. ,he #ost (sef(l conception of the (nity of science see#s to #e to lie so#ewhere in the #iddle of the trian le defined by the red(ctive, > "! > synthetic, and encyclopedic conceptions o(tlined above. .here red(ction can be done (sef(lly, it sho(ld be done; where iso#orphis#s can be fo(nd, they sho(ld be fo(nd; and where disciplinary barriers to co##(nication can be broken down, they sho(ld be broken down. .hat 1 have been chiefly critici<in here is an a !riori approach to this proble#, the ass(#ption that there #(st be iso#orphis#s, the ass(#ption that every science #(st fit into so#e rational order of the sciences. .hat 1 sho(ld wish to s(bstit(te for this is an e#pirical approach)not the clai# that iso#orphis#s are necessary, b(t the reco nition that they are possible, and the resolve to search for the# wherever they occ(r. 1f a direct brid e is th(s b(ilt between physics and biolo y, or between crystal rowth and pop(lation #ove#ent, it is not beca(se there had to be a brid e b(t beca(se there ha!!ens to be one which so#ebody had the sense to e*ploit. 1t #i ht indeed t(rn o(t after a s(fficient period of ti#e that there e#er ed a #ore syste#atic (nity of science in one of the senses disc(ssed previo(sly, altho( h 1 do(bt it. 1n any case, if that happened, we wo(ld have arrived at o(r (nity honestly and not by a rationalistic and Utopian shortc(t. Henneth Bo(ldin has p(t this point ele antly in an article in the very first iss(e of )eneral S"stems 219"45: Ieneral syste#s theory is a na#e which has co#e into (se to describe a level of theoretical #odel b(ildin which lies so#ewhere between the hi hly enerali<ed constr(ctions of p(re #athe#atics and the specific theories of the speciali<ed disciplines. ,he ob7ectives of eneral syste#s theory can be set o(t with varyin de rees of a#bition and confidence. /t a low level of a#bition b(t with a hi h de ree of confidence it ai#s to point o(t si#ilarities in the theoretical constr(ctions of different disciplines, where these e*ist, and to develop theoretical #odels havin application to at least two different fields of st(dy. /t a hi her level of a#bition, b(t with perhaps a lower de ree of confidence it hopes to develop

so#ethin like a -spectr(#- of theories)a syste# of syste#s which #ay perfor# the f(nction of a - estalt- in the theoretical constr(ction. 8(ch - estalts- in special fields have been of reat val(e in directin research towards the aps which they reveal.E13F ,he chief point here a ain is that this spectr(# of theories is so#ethin to be developed, not ass(#ed )to be worked o(t fro# cases, not fro# principles. ,he difference in approach reflects the difference in interpretation of the ter# - eneral.- $or the cos#ic syste#ati<er, nothin is eneral (nless it s(bs(#es everythin ; for the h(#bler syste#s theorist, anythin is eneral, in a way, if it s(bs(#es #ore than one thin . ,he f(nction of eneral syste#s theory, then, is like the f(nction of any other theory, na#ely to constr(ct a theoretical syste# ade@(ate to > "1 > its own s(b7ect #atter)in this case the eneralities 2in the weaker of the two senses 7(st #entioned5 that are fo(nd as a #atter of fact, not of principle, to (nite different scientific theories. Ieneral syste#s theory is in fact a #etatheory, to (se the lan (a e of the earlier part of this paper, altho( h it is in the c(rio(s and fort(nate sit(ation of bein convertible into a strai htforward theory for certain physical syste#s, #ostly fallin in the interstices of the conventional disciplines. ,he iso#orphis# with the str(ct(re of theories 2and hence with so#e ele#ents of the str(ct(re of the world5 which eneral syste#s theory seeks to establish is no easier to arrive at than Ialileo9s res(lts were, b(t reat pro ress is bein #ade with certain syste#s of a #iddle level of co#ple*ity. ,he need for s(ch a theory, and for a society s(ch as this one, is reater now than it has ever been. 8pencer, at another place in the work @(oted before, says that the sciences affect each other not only directly b(t indirectly; -where there is no dependence, there is yet analo y)e/ualit" of relation ; and the discovery of relations s(bsistin a#on one set of pheno#ena constantly s( ests a search for the sa#e relations a#on another set.-E13F .e #i ht say now that the discovery of the for#er relations would constantly s( est a search for the latter if only anybody reali<ed that they had been discovered. ,he chances are, (nfort(nately, that nobody will reali<e that they have been discovered, or that they constit(te a (sef(l iso#orphis# with another field, (nless he or she is precisely on the looko(t for new relations and their possible iso#orphis#s. .hat a co##it#ent to eneral syste#s stands for, if nothin else, is a co##on resolve not to lose a certain interdisciplinary interest, an openness to develop#ents in other fields and to their possible relevance for o(r own. /t the rate of proliferation which science has now achieved, this post(re is an increasin ly diffic(lt one in which we need all the #(t(al reinforce#ent we can et. 1t wo(ld nevertheless be a #istake to re ret the present state of activity in science, even tho( h it leads to professional #eetin s as i antic as the one we are now attendin E///8 ann(al #eetin , 1944F. ,he constant develop#ent of science #(st, it is tr(e, be a so(rce of considerable irritation to the cos#ic syste#ati<er, who #(st often be te#pted to feel that if only everythin wo(ld stop for a little while the syste# co(ld be finished. 1t #i ht indeed be tr(e that if we co(ld halt pro ress we co(ld et the definitive syste#; b(t 1 a# afraid that the corollary of that proposition is also tr(e, na#ely, that if we ot the definitive syste# we sho(ld find we had halted pro ress. 1t is easy for (s to for et it, b(t the world is always #ore co#ple* than o(r best theory abo(t it. /nd we sho(ld not for et, either, the e*tre#ely parochial nat(re of o(r own scientific enterprise, and how its concl(sions are lar ely deter#ined by the fact that we happen to be a partic(lar > "3 >

si<e, and to have partic(lar sensory capacities, and to be located at a certain epoch and on a certain planet. By this 1 do not #ean to belittle the achieve#ents of science; @(ite the contrary. ,hat we have any theoretical syste#s ade@(ate to any physical ones see#s to #e one of the reat tri(#phs of the h(#an intellect. 1 #ean #erely to e#phasi<e that we have st(#bled into this world (nder a set of fairly ti ht constraints that #ake it hi hly i#pla(sible that we sho(ld have arrived at any very reat #eas(re of tr(th abo(t the whole. 8o#e of what we know we know pretty well, perhaps as well as it can be known; b(t we do not know #(ch. /s the little we know proliferates)and in relative ter#s it is doin so very rapidly)science contin(ally str( les to brin vario(s bits of it into co#paratively si#ple and therefore tractable for#. &very si#plification is a distortion, b(t si#plification is a condition of the (sef(lness of scientific theory, and witho(t it we co(ld not keep any sort of rip on the co#ple*ity of the world. ,he advance#ent of science is in fact a contin(o(s dialectical interplay between co#ple*ity and si#plicity: co#ple*ity in the world as we contin(ally probe #ore deeply into it, si#plicity in o(r theories as we achieve new for#(lations and #odest (nifications. ,his dyna#ic process was described very bea(tif(lly by PoincarP in an address to the 1nternational Con ress of Physics in Paris in 19!!: 1n the history of the develop#ent of physics, two contrary tendencies #ay be distin (ished. Ln the one hand, new connections are constantly bein discovered between ob7ects which see#ed destined to perpet(al separation; scattered facts cease to be irrelevant to one another, and tend to order the#selves into an i#pressive synthesis. 8cience #oves towards (nity and si#plicity. Ln the other hand, observation (ncovers new pheno#ena every day; they have to work for their place Ein scienceF, and so#eti#es it is necessary, in order to find a place for the#, to destroy a corner of the edifice. 1n well6known pheno#ena, de#onstrably (nifor# at a ross level of observation, we perceive rad(ally variations of detail; what we had tho( ht si#ple beco#es co#ple* a ain, and science see#s to #ove towards variety and co#plication.E1AF ,he proble# is to keep a balance)not to et lost in the co#plications, b(t not to fly off to a sp(rio(s (nity. ,he ori inal sti#(l(s for the fo(ndin of the 8ociety for Ieneral 8yste#s Cesearch was a reali<ation that co#plications will en (lf (s if we do not take defensive action, and the for# that the defensive action took in this case was a search for syste#atic (nities. 1 #i ht s(# (p #y re#arks by insistin on this pl(ral. ,here are #any ways, not a sin le way, in which science is (nified, and at the present state of o(r knowled e there are inescapable > "3 > ways in which it is diverse. ,he workin conception of science re#ains the confrontation of a partic(lar theoretical syste# with a partic(lar physical one, and any syste#ati<ation which does not rest in the end (pon a reco nition of this fact is in dan er of losin any e#pirical relevance whatever. Ln what level of abstraction one chooses to work, and with what enerality of e#pirical reference, are #atters to be deter#ined by the proble# in hand and the inclination of the worker. ,he dialo (e between the theoretical and the practical, between the eneral and the partic(lar, between the co#ple* and the si#ple, between (nity and diversity, re@(ires the different contrib(tions provided by s(ch different perspectives. 1 take it that it is one of the f(nctions of eneral syste#s theory to #onitor this dialo (e and keep it alive. > "A >

"1 +osse's O/2#alos T#eor( a%d t#e Ecce%tricit( o& 3elie&

&ccentricity has always abo(nded when and where stren th of character has abo(nded; and the a#o(nt of eccentricity in a society has enerally been proportional to the a#o(nt of eni(s, #ental vi o(r, and #oral co(ra e it contained. Gohn 8t(art :ill, Ln Kiberty

I
&ccentricity took #any for#s in Mictorian &n land, b(t in keepin with the at#osphere of the ti#es there were two especially noticeable varieties. ,here were reli io(s eccentrics, like Gohn %elson Darby, a passionate nonconfor#ist who solved the ancient proble# as to the nat(re of the sin a ainst the +oly Ihost by identifyin it with the takin of +oly Lrders; and there were scientific eccentrics, like /ndrew Crosse, who in the co(rse of electrical e*peri#ents at his co(ntry estate created a new species of beetle 2Acarus crossii 5 and bro( ht down on hi#self a torrent of totally (ndeserved ab(se on the ro(nds that he was tryin to be Iod. $ro# ti#e to ti#e these tendencies were co#bined in a sin le individ(al, with invariably interestin res(lts. Celi ion and science have never really been co#fortable in each other9s presence, and the antics to which people are driven who try to #ake the# so have not ceased yet. Conte#porary atte#pts, however, see# ane#ic in co#parison with the fierce controversies of the nineteenth cent(ry. .hat now is done weakly, even pathetically, was then a #atter for - eni(s, #ental vi o(r, and #oral co(ra e-; and while the res(lt #i ht have been to #ake people look ridic(lo(s, it did not #ake the# look p(erile. ,he s(b7ect of this essay see#s often co#ic, so#eti#es tra ic, b(t always a #an of stron character and fir# will. Philip +enry Iosse is best known, if at all, as the overbearin $ather in &d#(nd Iosse9s a(tobio raphical sketch %ather and Son , altho( h the sy#pathies of the reader of that book are likely to lie, as they were intended to lie, with the son. ,he story is the fa#iliar one: a sickly > "" > child, bro( ht (p (nder the stern and repressive eye of a Mictorian father, event(ally throws off the b(rden and sets o(t to live his own life. +e was, of co(rse, @(ite ri ht to do so, and 1 do not wish to s( est otherwise. :y p(rpose is to draw attention to what &d#(nd Iosse hi#self calls -the (ni@(e and noble fi (re of the father-E1F )a distin (ished nat(ralist, a(thor of one of the #ost brilliant fail(res in the history of scientific theories, and in his own ri ht a #ore colorf(l fi (re than the son as whose father he hi#self s(spected he wo(ld one day be known. +e was born in 1=1!, the son of an itinerant #iniat(re painter, and died in 1=== a $ellow of the Coyal 8ociety and the a(thor of #ore than thirty books and of inn(#erable scientific papers. 1t is perhaps best to be in with an acco(nt of his scientific develop#ent. /t first lance there is nothin eccentric in the professional life of Philip Iosse. Bro( ht (p in a s#all seaport town where the principal for# of recreation was e*plorin the shore or the s(rro(ndin co(ntry, and spendin a reat part of his early life in co#paratively re#ote and wild places)first %ewfo(ndland, then Canada, and finally /laba#a)it was not s(rprisin that his innate powers of keen observation sho(ld have led hi# into a career as a nat(ralist. 1n %ewfo(ndland, where he was e#ployed as a clerk in a whalin office at Carbonear, he bo( ht Ha(#acher9s edition of /da#s9s 'ssa"s on the 1icrosco!e , an act which he re arded, in his characteristically self6critical way, as a

for#al dedication to a life of science. By the ti#e he left %ewfo(ndland for an abortive atte#pt at far#in in Lntario he had already be (n an e*tensive collection of insects which occ(pied the fore ro(nd of his attention; his last #e#ento of %ewfo(ndland was a rare cockroach, and the sole co##ent in his diary when he first reached Canada was the followin : -G(ly 1".)/s 1 this day arrived in O(ebec, 1 proc(red so#e lett(ce for #y caterpillars, which they ate reedily.-E3F ,his sin le6 #indedness in #atters of biolo y re#ained with hi# for the rest of his life; the birth of his only child appears in the diary with the entry: -&. delivered of a son. Ceceived reen swallow fro# Ga#aica.-E3F Lf co(rse s(ch thin s #i ht be interpreted, not (n7(stly, as indicatin a certain stolidity of character, and there is plenty of other evidence to show that Iosse, as a yo(n #an, took thin s very serio(sly indeed, hi#self #ost serio(sly of all. ,he Canadian vent(re provin a fail(re, Iosse traveled to Philadelphia 2observin en ro(te the r(deness of the natives of Mer#ont5 and there #et a n(#ber of the leadin /#erican nat(ralists of the period, incl(din #e#bers of the re#arkable Peale fa#ily.EAF $ro# Philadelphia he proceeded, #ainly by ship, to :obile, and thence to Hin 9s Kandin and Dallas, /laba#a, where for nine #onths he was a school#aster. ,he natives of /laba#a were also r(de, and they were still e*tre#ely > "4 > anti6&n lish 2it was barely si*ty years since the Cevol(tion5; and altho( h Philip Iosse en7oyed #any thin s abo(t his stay in the 8o(th, incl(din the -woffles- which were served for breakfast, the fre@(ent violence, especially towards the %e roes, and the al#ost tan ible #oral strain of slavery, #ade hi# lad to leave and ret(rn to &n land after twelve years in the /#ericas.E"F 1t was not easy to find s(itable work in &n land, and for the first year after his ret(rn Iosse lived in so#ethin close to pen(ry. +e spent so#e ti#e, however, in workin the notes of his Canadian period into a #an(script entitled The *anadian &aturalist , a series of i#a inary conversations, so#ewhat stiff in tone, between a father and son, on the flora and fa(na of the re ion in which he had stayed. /t first he #et with no s(ccess in findin a p(blisher, b(t finally, when he was at -the e*tre#ity of de7ection and dis (st,- he was sent for by :r. Gohn Man Moorst of Paternoster Cow. &d#(nd Iosse describes the interview: ,he p(blisher be an slowly: -1 like yo(r book; 1 shall be pleased to p(blish it; 1 will ive yo( one h(ndred (ineas for it.- Lne h(ndred (ineasB 1t was Per( and half the 1ndiesB ,he reaction was so violent that the de#(re and #inisterial lookin yo(th, closely b(ttoned (p in his worn broadcloth, broke down (tterly into hysterical sob (pon sob, while :r. Man Moorst, #(r#(rin , -:y dear yo(n #anB :y dear yo(n #anB- hastened o(t to fetch wine and #inister to wants which it was beyond the power of pride to conceal any lon er.E4F ,his was the be innin of a lon association between a(thor and p(blisher. The *anadian &aturalist showed what he co(ld do in a literary direction, and as ti#e went on he learned to do it brilliantly. +e co(ld be er(dite and fa#iliar at the sa#e ti#e, interspersin caref(l <oolo ical and botanical observations with a#(sin anecdotes, providin his own ill(strations in line or watercolor, and t(rnin o(t, over the ne*t thirty6five years, a do<en or #ore enor#o(sly s(ccessf(l books of pop(lar nat(ral history. +e ac@(ired a lar e and faithf(l p(blic, which enth(siastically bo( ht his books and took the# to the seaside, despoilin in the process 2#(ch to his cha rin5 the shore which was his favorite collectin 6 ro(nd. Iosse9s relation to his readers is perfectly foreshadowed in the relation between the father and the son in The *anadian &aturalist . ,he father, in the openin chapter of that book, proposes a series of e*c(rsions into the nei hbo(rin co(ntryside: -Charles.)$ew thin s wo(ld ive #e reater pleas(re. 1 have often felt the want of a co#panion in #y walks, who, by his s(perior

7(d e#ent, infor#ation, and e*perience, #i ht re#ove #y do(bts, ratify #y c(riosity, and direct #y attention to those s(b7ects which are instr(ctive as well as a#(sin ; for 1 anticipate both instr(ction and > "? > a#(se#ent fro# o(r in@(iries, and enter into yo(r proposal with deli ht.-E?F ,he enteel sections of the Mictorian #iddle classes were e@(ally deli hted, and were instr(cted and a#(sed in the tho(sands not only by Iosse9s books b(t also by his invention of the a@(ari(#, which bro( ht the seashore into drawin 6roo#s all over the co(ntry. 8cientific work of a #ore serio(s nat(re was not, however, ne lected. Iosse crossed the /tlantic once #ore for a two6year st(dy of the birds of Ga#aica, which prod(ced one of the i#portant early works on the ornitholo y of the .est 1ndies. +is infle*ible (pri htness of character is ill(strated by an incident in connection with the p(blication of a s(pple#ent to that work, the Illustrations of the 5irds of 6amaica , a rare and e*ceedin ly bea(tif(l set of colored plates each bearin the inscription -P.+.I. del. et lith.,hese were p(blished by s(bscription, and in the co(rse of printin it beca#e apparent that the cost of prod(ction wo(ld e*ceed the total a#o(nt s(bscribed; b(t rather than chan e the price of the work once anno(nced, Iosse absorbed the e*tra cost o(t of his own pocket, act(ally p(blishin the set at a loss. 8(bse@(ent st(dies, especially of s#all and #icroscopic for#s of #arine life, led to his election to the Coyal 8ociety in 1="4. Darwin corresponded with hi#, askin for infor#ation in connection with his own painstakin work on variation, and he was honored by bein taken into the confidence of the biolo ical revol(tionaries of the 1="!s: 1t was the notion of Kyell . . . that before the doctrine of nat(ral selection was iven to a world which wo(ld be s(re to lift (p at it a howl of e*ecration, a certain body6 (ard of so(nd and e*perienced nat(ralists, e*pert in the description of species, sho(ld be privately #ade aware of its teno(r. /#on those who were th(s initiated, or approached with a view towards possible ill(#ination, was #y $ather. +e was spoken to by +ooker, and later on by Darwin, after #eetin s of the Coyal 8ociety in the s(##er of 1="?.E=F Irad(ally his interest beca#e concentrated in a few hi hly speciali<ed areas, partic(larly the Cotifera, and he wrote one classic of nineteenth6cent(ry <oolo y, the Actinologia 5ritannica , which re#ained the standard reference work for #any years. +e was an indefati able observer, and cannot really be said to have retired at all: at the a e of seventy6five he was still b(sily occ(pied, p(blishin in 1==" a #ono raph on The rehensile Armature of the a!illonidae . Iosse9s reat #erit as a scientist lay in a capacity, rarely enco(ntered, for precision and #in(teness in observation, which called for e*traordinary reso(rces of patience and eyesi ht, neither of which see#s ever to have failed hi# in connection with his scientific work. 1n The 5irds of 6amaica he en(nciates a principle to which he always > "= > adhered and which is of s(pre#e i#portance in the descriptive branches of science: Perhaps a word of apolo y #ay be tho( ht needf(l for the #in(teness with which the a(thor has so#eti#es recorded dates, and other apparently trivial circ(#stances, in his observations. 1t is beca(se of his conviction, that an observer is hardly co#petent to deter#ine what circ(#stance is trivial, and what is i#portant: #any a recorded fact in science has lost half its val(e fro# the o#ission of so#e attendant circ(#stance, which the observer either did not notice or tho( ht irrelevant. 1t is better to err on the side of

#in(teness than of va (eness.E9F .hen, at rare intervals, he allowed hi#self to wander fro# this close attention to the facts, the res(lts were, fro# a scientific point of view, less happy. +is spec(lations, lar ely on the @(estion of the creation and e*tinction of species 2altho( h he also p(t forward the theory that so#e fre@(ently reported sea serpents were really prehistoric #onsters5 were enerally naRve, while his taste, left to its own devices, ran in the direction of the Iothic novel. ,he s(btitles of that #ost ro#antic work, The 0omance of &atural 4istor" , show the scientist in an entirely different li ht. Chapter 1!, entitled -,he ,errible- 2other chapters are called -,he Mast,- -,he .ild,- -,he Unknown-5, deals with the followin s(rprisin collection of incidents: -+orrible Death of ,hackwray)+ottentot9s /dvent(re with a Chinoceros)8i#ilar /dvent(re of :r. Lswell),errific Peril of Captain :eth(en)%early $atal Co#bat with a Han aroo)+orrid Moracity of 8harks)Coolness of an 1ndian Lfficer)U liness of Mipers)8hockin /dvent(re in I(iana)/nother in Mene<(ela)$atal &nco(nter with Bees in 1ndia.,he last of these episodes has, for this st(dy, a special interest. 1t concerns two &n lish entle#en, :essrs. /r#stron and Boddin ton; the victi#, inevitably, was -alasB :r. Boddin ton,- who, -(nable any lon er to resist the co(ntless hordes of his inf(riated win ed foes, threw hi#self into the depths of the water, never to rise a ain.- Iosse is not act(ally s(re that the assailants were bees, and covers his ad#ission of i norance with this re#arkable state#ent: -.hatever the tr(e nat(re of the insect, it affords an apt ill(stration of s(ch passa es of +oly 8cript(re as the followin :)9,he Kord shall hiss for . . . the bee that is the land of /ssyria,9 21sa. vii. 1=.5 9,he Kord thy Iod will send the hornet a#on the#, (ntil they that are left, and hide the#selves fro# thee, be destroyed.9 2De(t. vii. 3!.5-E1!F Lverlookin for the #o#ent the clai# to aptness 2fro# who# was :r. Boddin ton hidin 0 and why /ssyria05, here is a stran e insertion into the work of a $ellow of the Coyal 8ociety. B(t by this ti#e, after twenty years, anybody fa#iliar with Iosse9s writin s wo(ld have taken > "9 > it in stride. .herever one looks one finds passin confessions of faith, references to the Bible, e*hortations to the yo(n , and while these #i ht at first be taken for c(sto#ary piety, the wei ht of the evidence, and the recondite nat(re of so#e of the all(sions 2s(ch as those in the case of :r. Boddin ton5 soon s( est a different hypothesis. 1t is i#possible to do 7(stice to the life and work of Philip Iosse witho(t payin close attention to this other side of his character.

II
.hen Philip Iosse ret(rned to &n land fro# /#erica in 1=39, (r ently in need of e#ploy#ent, he was offered a post in a provincial #(se(#. +e was hardly in a position to be partic(lar abo(t conditions of work, and the offer was really an act of charity on the part of an interested friend, b(t he t(rned it down. 1 sho(ld fear Ehe wroteF that 1 sho(ld be thrown into sit(ations in which 1 #i ht find it diffic(lt to keep that p(rity of intention which 1 val(e #ore than life; and likewise, that #y opport(nities of bein (sef(l to #y fellow#en, especially to their so(ls, wo(ld be #(ch c(rtailed. 1 view this transient state as a dressin 6roo# to a theatre; a brief, al#ost #o#entary visit, d(rin which preparation is to be #ade for the real b(siness and end of e*istence. &ternity is o(r theatre: ti#e o(r dressin 6roo#. 8o that 1 must #ake every arran e#ent with a view to its bearin on this one point.E11F /pparently he was entertainin , at this ti#e, the idea of enterin the #inistry of one of the evan elical sects. B(t he co(ld hardly be said to have been bro( ht (p in a reli io(s at#osphere. $or the ori in of

this pio(s tendency it is necessary to o back to %ewfo(ndland, and to the ti#e, al#ost e*actly, of his p(rchase of /da#s on the #icroscope)a ti#e at which he -beca#e, s(ddenly and conscio(sly, a nat(ralist and a Christian.-E13F ,he sti#(l(s for his conversion, if it can be called that, was an illness of his sister &li<abeth, far away in &n land, to who# he was closely attached. -:y pro#inent tho( ht in this crisis was le al. 1 wanted the /l#i hty to be #y friend; to o to +i# in #y need. 1 knew +e re@(ired #e to be holy. +e had said, 9:y son, ive :e thy heart.9 1 closed with +i#, not hypocritically, b(t sincerely; intendin henceforth to live a new, a holy life; to please and serve Iod.-E13F 1t was as if he had si ned a contract with Iod; and it did not occ(r to hi# to do(bt, since he knew hi#self to be stron eno( h in character to keep his part of the bar ain, that Iod wo(ld in t(rn do what was e*pected of +i#. ,his contract of faith he interpreted as re@(irin the acceptance, > 4! > word for word, of the literal and sy#bolic tr(th of the Bible. ,he do(ble sense is i#portant. .hile the plain #eanin of the te*t was to be <ealo(sly defended, there was #ore to be discovered beneath the s(rface. Iosse applied hi#self to the investi ation of this hidden tr(th with an ener y #atched only by that which he devoted to his researches in nat(ral history. /t first these st(dies were carried on in co#parative isolation, b(t after his ret(rn to &n land two circ(#stances #iti ated this spirit(al loneliness. +e fo(nd, in the s(b(rb of Kondon where he was for a short ti#e a school#aster, a ro(p of Christians, followers of G. %. Darby, called by the o(tside world -Ply#o(th Brethren- b(t by the#selves si#ply -the Brethren,- or, #odestly, -the 8aints.- Darby, as was re#arked earlier, disapproved of the #inistry, so that Iosse was no lon er te#pted in that direction; b(t he fo(nd a#on these people a kind of intellect(al interest in salvation and prophecy perfectly in sy#pathy with his own convictions. +e was, thro( ho(t his life, evan elical, b(t never in the passionate sense (s(ally attached to the word. +is concern for the so(ls of #en spran less fro# sy#pathy than fro# d(ty, and the d(ty was not necessarily pleasant)it was part of the a ree#ent with Iod, a service de#anded in e*chan e for the ri ht to enter into the #ysteries of the interpretation of 8cript(re. 1ndependently of this connection he #et, and later #arried, &#ily Bowes, the da( hter of a Bostonian co(ple, her principal attraction bein an e@(ally fervid, e@(ally ri id, and e@(ally eccentric for# of Christianity with his own. ,o ether they read the prophets and co##entaries on the prophets, treadin ea erly, in the words of &d#(nd Iosse, -the c(rio(s path which they had hewn for the#selves thro( h this 7(n le of sy#bols.-E1AF ,he death of his first wife after only nine years of #arria e left hi#, if anythin , #ore isolated than before 2the 8aints provin too ta#e and (ni#a inative for his fierce sy#bolic tastes5, and drove his already rather stern and h(#orless character into a #elancholia fro# which he never co#pletely recovered. 1t was inevitable that s(ch e*cl(sive and fanatic attention to the details of biblical e*e esis sho(ld before lon prod(ce a distortin effect on Iosse9s attit(de to the conte#porary world and, event(ally, to science itself. ,he co##entators were, if anythin , #ore prophetic than the prophets, and led the in@(isitive co(ple -to reco nise in wild Lriental visions direct state#ents re ardin %apoleon 111 and Pope Pi(s 1J and the Hin of Pied#ont, historic fi (res which they conceived as foreshadowed, in lan (a e which ad#itted of plain interpretation, (nder the na#es of deni<ens of Babylon and co#panions of the .ild Beast.-E1"F ,he Ch(rch of Co#e in partic(lar fi (red lar ely in the decipherin of the Book of Cevelation, and it was deno(nced and hated with a special passion. -.e welco#ed any social disorder in any part

> 41 > of 1taly, as likely to be annoyin to the Papacy. 1f there was a c(sto#ho(se officer stabbed in a fracas at 8assari, we ave lo(d thanks that liberty and li ht were breakin in (pon 8ardinia.-E14F ,he effects of all this were felt in the #ost (nlikely @(arters. ,here was, for instance, a #an who (sed to pass down the street where the Iosses lived sellin onions, with a cry of +ere9s yo(r rope ,o han the Pope /nd a penn9orth of cheese to choke hi#. ,he cheese Ewrites &d#(nd IosseF appeared to be le endary; he sold only onions. :y $ather did not eat onions, b(t he enco(ra ed this terrible fellow, with his wild eyes and lon strips of hair, beca(se of his - odly attit(de towards the Papacy.-E1?F 8(ch pec(liarities #i ht have been #erely a#(sin , had they confined the#selves to international affairs. B(t script(ral theory fo(nd other applications closer to ho#e, and Philip Iosse developed, o(t of a nat(rally stron #oral sense and a tendency to introspection, a #orbid sensitivity of conscience and a practice of hypercritical self6vi ilance which he did not hesitate to e*tend to his fa#ily 2principally &d#(nd5 and to the con re ation of which, after the death of his wife and his re#oval to Devonshire, he beca#e infor#ally the pastor. ,his side of his character is so well known fro# %ather and Son that there is no need to dwell on it here. ,he introd(ction of reli io(s conviction into daily life prod(ced, however, another effect of #ore direct interest, na#ely a relation between the scientist and his field of st(dy perhaps (ni@(e in the history of science a#on workers of co#parable distinction. %at(re was the work of Iod, and as s(ch was to be taken serio(sly. 1t #(st, as the work of Iod, be perfect. /ccordin ly, for Iosse, the s( estion that anythin in %at(re #i ht have been better arran ed, or the sli htest hint of levity in connection with it, were al#ost co#parable to blasphe#y, and he was ready to #eet either with indi nation on Iod9s behalf. 1n The 3cean , for e*a#ple, he scornf(lly re7ects a tentative version of the theory of develop#ent: -Iolds#ith flippantly asserts, that the 8hri#p and the Prawn 9see# to be the first atte#pts which %at(re #ade when she #editated the for#ation of the Kobster.9 8(ch e*pressions as these, however, are no less (nphilosophical than they are dero atory to Iod9s hono(r; these ani#als bein in an e@(al de ree perfect in their kind, e@(ally for#ed by cons(##ate wisdo#, incapable of i#prove#ent.-E1=F B(t there was a dan er in th(s <ealo(sly > 43 > (ardin Iod9s ri hts in %at(re)the dan er that he #i ht, as ti#e went on, co#e to take a certain proprietary attit(de towards it hi#self; and to this te#ptation he soon s(cc(#bed. +e felt f(lly 7(stified in doin so, and wo(ld have been s(rprised and indi nant, as reli io(s people tend to be, if anybody had pointed o(t to hi# that to pres(#e on Iod9s favor was a for# of spirit(al pride. B(t there is no do(bt that Philip Iosse was both pro(d and pres(#pt(o(s, and in the 2e-onshire *oast there is a re#arkable 7(*taposition of passa es which for# s(ch a clear basis for this indict#ent that 1 shall, at the risk of tedi(#, @(ote the# e*tensively. +e is disc(ssin the aesthetic @(alities of nat(ral ob7ects: B(t there is another point of view fro# which a Christian . . . looks at the e*cellent and the bea(tif(l in %at(re. +e has a personal interest in it all; it is a !art of his own inheritance . /s a child roa#s over his father9s estate, and is ever findin so#e @(iet nook, or clear pool, or foa#in waterfall, so#e lofty aven(e, so#e bank of sweet flowers, so#e pict(res@(e or fr(itf(l tree, so#e noble and widespread prospect,)how is the pleas(re hei htened by the tho( ht ever rec(rrin ,)/ll this will be mine by and byB . . . 8o with the Christian. . . .

/nd th(s 1 have a ri ht to e*a#ine, with as reat #in(teness as 1 can brin to the pleasant task, consistently with other clai#s, what are called the works of nat(re. 1 have the very best ri ht possible, the ri ht that flows fro# the fact of their bein all #ine,)#ine not indeed in possession, b(t in s(re reversion. /nd if anyone despise the research as #ean and little, 1 reply that 1 a# scannin the plan of #y inheritance. /nd when 1 find any tiny ob7ect rooted to the rock, or swi##in in the sea, in which 1 trace with #ore than co##on #eas(re the race and delicacy of the :aster +and, 1 #ay not only ive +i# praise for his skill and wisdo#, b(t thanks also, for that +e hath taken the pains to contrive, to fashion, to adorn this, for me . /nd then there follows i##ediately this state#ent: ,+& CC'8,/KK1%& GL+%8,L%&KK/ 1 have the pleas(re of anno(ncin a new ani#al of #(ch ele ance, which 1 believe to be of a hitherto (nreco nised for#. 1 shall describe it (nder the appellation of 6ohnstonella *atharina . . . . ,he ele ant for#, the crystal clearness, and the spri htly, racef(l #ove#ents of this little swi##er in the deep sea, render it a not alto ether (nfit vehicle for the co##e#oration of an hono(red na#e in #arine <oolo y. . . . 1 vent(re respectf(lly to appropriate to this #arine ani#al, the s(rna#e and Christian na#e of :rs. Catharine Gohnston, as a personal trib(te of ratit(de for the reat aid which 1 have derived fro# her en ravin s in the st(dy of <oophytolo y.E19F > 43 > Lf co(rse it is, in a sense, (nfair to p(t the #atter in this way, and to s( est a patroni<in flo(rish in this innocent piece of no#enclat(re; b(t there is so#e 7(stice in it. &ver since that day when, in %ewfo(ndland, he had co#e to ter#s with Iod, Philip Iosse had, conscio(sly or not, felt hi#self in a position of privile e. %othin ill(strates this attit(de #ore clearly than the nat(re of his prayers. &d#(nd Iosse has vividly described how his father, with clenched fists and crackin fin ers, knelt ni htly and wrestled with Iod, his s(pplications occasionally t(rnin into o(tri ht de#ands. $ro# other so(rces we can ather what the ob7ects of those de#ands were. ,here were three thin s d(rin his life that Philip Iosse wanted very badly indeed, and to which he e*pressly devoted a reat deal of his spirit(al ener y in prayer; and in the end, to all appearances, Iod failed to live (p to his co##it#ents, for none of the three re@(ests was ranted. ,he first, and #ost persistent, was inspired by his readin , as a yo(n #an, +abershon9s 2issertation on the ro!hetic Scri!tures , in which the 8econd Co#in of Christ was vividly anticipated; in his own words: -1 i##ediately be an a practice, which 1 have p(rs(ed (ninterr(ptedly for forty6si* years, of constantly prayin that 1 #ay be one of the favo(red saints who shall never taste of death, b(t be alive and re#ain (ntil the co#in of the Kord, to be 9clothed (pon with #y ho(se which is fro# heaven.9-E3!F ,his is not an infre@(ent prayer a#on evan elical Christians, who in eneral, however, see# content to die witho(t a feelin of havin been cheated. %ot so Philip Iosse. &ven in life his confidence was s(ch that he lived in #o#entary e*pectation of this apotheosis, and wo(ld be cha rined when it did not occ(r: -+e wo(ld calc(late, by reference to prophecies in the Lld and %ew ,esta#ent, the e*act date of this event; the date wo(ld pass, witho(t the e*pected /dvent, and he wo(ld be #ore than disappointed,)he wo(ld be incensed. ,hen he wo(ld (nderstand that he #(st have #ade so#e sli ht error in calc(lation, and the pleas(res of anticipation wo(ld reco##ence.-E31F B(t at death it was not a @(estion of #iscalc(lation. +is second wife, &li<a Iosse 2nPe Bri htwen5, wrote in a short #e#oir that -this hope of bein ca( ht (p before

death contin(ed to the last, and its non6f(lfil#ent was an ac(te disappoint#ent to hi#. 1t (ndo(btedly was connected with the deep de7ection of his latest ho(rs on earth.-E33F ,he second prayer concerned his son, &d#(nd, and was of especial i#portance to hi# as incorporatin the last wish of his first wife. Philip and &#ily Iosse had, fro# the be innin , dedicated their child, like 8a#(el, to the service of the Kord; and &#ily, dyin of cancer in 1="?, reiterated that dedication in the #ost sole#n and saintly #anner possible, so that Iod hi#self, it see#ed, #(st be bo(nd to accept it and ens(re its cons(##ation. $or #any years all was well, and when &d6 > 4A > #(nd was p(blicly bapti<ed and ad#itted to the co##(nion of the Brethren at the a e of twelve Philip Iosse felt the sacred responsibility to be al#ost dischar ed. B(t in tr(th &d#(nd had hardly known what he was doin , or that any other life than that a#on the Brethren was conceivable, and when he went to Kondon as a yo(n #an to work in the British :(se(# he discovered that his tastes and talents lay in other directions. Irad(ally severin his links with the &van elical :ove#ent, he entered (pon a career as a #an of letters. Philip Iosse wrote an rily to his son and prayed an rily to his :aker, b(t in vain. ,here re#ains one episode o(t of the three in Philip Iosse9s life of prayer. 1t was of shorter d(ration, b(t its i#plications were of vastly reater scope, and its historical interest is s(ch that it will be dealt with in a section by itself.

III
Protestant Christianity, as :artinea( so#ewhere re#arks, is b(ilt (pon the a(thority of the Bible, as Catholicis# is b(ilt (pon that of the Ch(rch. ,he v(lnerability of the first position, as co#pared with the fle*ibility of the second, is obvio(s, for the Ch(rch can discreetly chan e its #ind, while the Bible, as a historical doc(#ent, is by definition incapable of adaptin to novelty. Catholicis# s(rvived the nineteenth cent(ry #(ch better, in its own sphere of infl(ence, than Protestantis# did, for this very reason; for in that cent(ry #ore than in any other the intellect(al sy#pathies of the world were alienated fro# the Bible by the e*pos(re of #any apparently strai htforward state#ents of fact in it as i norant le ends. ,he blow was not, of co(rse, #ortal. 1 norant people contin(ed to believe the le ends, and the intellect(als be an to treat the# as #ythical ad(#brations of profo(nd tr(ths. B(t those few really serio(s thinkers to who# the Bible had been en(inely and directly a(thoritative e*perienced a #ost dist(rbin conflict of loyalties. Philip Iosse is a perfect e*a#ple of the type. ,he reatest proble# before 1="=, when Darwin and .allace bro( ht o(t into the open the @(estion of the ori in of species, was eolo ical. /ccordin to /rchbishop Ussher9s readin of Ienesis there co(ld not, in 1="? 2the year in which Iosse p(blished his own work on the s(b7ect5, be anythin in the world #ore than ",=41 years old, accordin to rapidly acc(#(latin strati raphical and paleontolo ical evidence there was scarcely anythin of interest in the world whose history was not #(ch lon er than that by h(ndreds of tho(sands, even #illions, of years. ,he strati raphy #i ht be acco##odated, at a stretch, by introd(cin that fa#o(s ap of aeons between the first and second > 4" > verses of Ienesis 1, b(t this did not help the paleontolo y, especially that of species closely related to livin ones, even identical with the#. ,he -days- of creation #i ht be e*tended to cover eolo ical a es, b(t there were diffic(lties there abo(t the order of appearance of fossils in the strati raphical

record, and besides, to the p(rists, this see#ed already to be takin hardly per#issible liberties with the #anifest declarations of the +oly 8pirit. ,hese were rave perple*ities for those -to who#,- in Iosse9s own words, the veracity of Iod is as dear as life. ,hey cannot bear to see it i#p( ned; they know that it cannot be overthrown; they are ass(red that +e who ave the .ord, and +e who #ade the worlds, is Lne Gehovah, who cannot be inconsistent with +i#self. B(t they cannot sh(t their eyes to the startlin fact, that the records which seem le ibly written on +is created works do flatly contradict the state#ents which seem to be plainly e*pressed in +is word. +ere is a dile##a. / #ost painf(l one to the reverent #indB /nd #any reverent #inds have labo(red lon and hard to escape fro# it.E33F :ost of the# ave (p the str( le, either closin their eyes to the evidence, or abandonin the literal interpretation of the Bible, or in #any cases 7(st learnin to live with the dile##a as so#ethin too reat for the li#ited intelli ence of #an. ,his last was at least a h(#ble, if not a co#fortable, position. B(t none of this wo(ld do for Philip Iosse; he wo(ld be content with nothin less than a co#plete sol(tion of the riddle. ,he incredible thin is that he s(cceeded in findin one so perfect that it was, and re#ains, proof a ainst all ref(tation. /nd altho( h he called the book in which he presented it to the world -an atte#pt to (ntie the eolo ical knot,- his #ethod has all the a(dacity of /le*ander at Iordi(#. 1t was this book, 3m!halos ,E3AF whose acceptance by the world of science for#ed the ob7ect of Iosse9s third petition to Iod. +is own attit(de towards it is #ade e*plicit in the preface: 1 wo(ld not be considered an opponent of eolo ists; b(t rather as a cosearcher with the# after that which they val(e as hi hly as 1 do, ,CU,+. ,he path which 1 have p(rs(ed has led #e to a concl(sion at variance with theirs. 1 have a ri ht to e*pect that it be wei hed; let it not be i#p(ted to vanity if 1 hope that it #ay be accepted. B(t what 1 #(ch #ore ardently desire is, that the tho(sands of thinkin persons, who are scarcely satisfied with the e*tant reconciliations of 8cript(ral state#ents and Ieolo ical ded(ctions,)who are silenced b(t not convinced,)#ay find, in the principle set forth in this vol(#e, a stable restin 6place. 1 have written it in the constant prayer that the Iod of ,r(th will dei n so to (se it; and if +e do, to +i# be all the loryBE3"F > 44 > ,hat Iod would dei n to (se it, iven the irresistible force of the ar (#ent, see#ed beyond all do(bt. %ever was a book cast (pon the waters Ewrites &d#(nd IosseF with reater anticipation of s(ccess than was this c(rio(s, this obstinate, this fanatical vol(#e. :y $ather lived in a fever of s(spense, waitin for the tre#endo(s iss(e. . . . :y $ather, and #y $ather alone, possessed the secret of the eni #a; he alone held the key which co(ld s#oothly open the lock of eolo ical #ystery. +e offered it, with a lowin est(re, to atheists and Christians alike. ,his was to be the (niversal panacea; this the syste# of intellect(al therape(tics which co(ld not b(t heal all the #aladies of the a e. B(t, alasB atheists and Christians alike looked at it and la( hed, and threw it away.E34F 1n this the Christians, at least, were ill6advised; b(t at all events the reception of the book #eant that here too Iosse9s prayers had failed to find a response. +ad he known at the ti#e, as he did not, of the two other reat disappoint#ents that were in store for hi#, it #i ht well have broken his spirit; as it was, co#in soon after the death of his wife, the fail(re of 3m!halos had a s(fficiently dist(rbin

effect. B(t it is ti#e to e*a#ine the theory itself. Iillispie says that it was -far fro# ori inal,- and Iosse hi#self ad#its that he ot the er# of the idea, partly fro# an anony#o(s tract, and partly fro# Iranville Penn9s The 1ineral and 1osaic )eologies of 1=33. %evertheless its workin o(t in 3m!halos and the detail with which its application is followed thro( h bear Iosse9s individ(al #ark. ,he book is an acco(nt of an i#a inary co(rt in@(iry, with witnesses. Lne c(rio(s thin abo(t it is that, e*cept at the very end, there is no appeal to the Bible; and as for /rchbishop Ussher, he is not once #entioned. ,he whole tone of the book, in fact, is #odern, and with one or two critical e*ceptions there is nothin in it which co(ld not have been accepted by the #ost hardened atheistic eolo ist of the ti#e. ,he case for the eolo ical a es is presented f(lly, even sy#pathetically, as the testi#ony of -,he .itness for the :acro6Chronolo y-; strata, fossils of plants and ani#als, erosion)all the available evidence is bro( ht o(t. ,here are two e*a#ples chosen for special attention: the pterodactyl 2ill(strated by an (nintentionally h(#oro(s woodc(t of a bat with b(l in eyes and apin fan s5 and the G(rassic tree +e!idodendron . B(t when all the data have been #arshalled, Iosse p(ts his fin er skilf(lly on the /chilles heel of the whole ar (#ent: -,here is nothin here b(t circumstantial evidence; there is no direct testi#ony. . . . 'o( will say, 91t is the sa#e thin ; we have seen the skeleton of the one, and the cr(shed tr(nk of the other, and therefore we are as s(re of their past e*istence as if we had been there at the > 4? > ti#e.9 %o, it is not the sa#e thin ; it is not /uite the sa#e thin ; %L, OU1,&. . . . 1t is only by a process of reasonin that yo( infer they lived at all.-E3?F Lf co(rse he is @(ite ri ht; the inference of ca(ses fro# effects co##its a lo ical fallacy. 8ciences which deal with the past, or with the (nobservable of any kind, constantly co##it it)they have no alternative. ,his fact is tacitly ad#itted, and then @(ite properly for otten, as far as the daily work of the scientist is concerned. B(t when so#ebody like Iosse leef(lly draws attention to it there is absol(tely nothin that can be bro( ht forward in its defense)the only reco(rse is a challen e to the critic to prod(ce an alternative, and e@(ally pla(sible, e*planation of the effects as they appear. 8(ch a challen e Iosse was @(ite prepared to #eet. +is own theory invokes two post(lates, the creation of #atter and the persistence of species. -1 ass(#e that at so#e period or other in past eternity there e*isted nothin b(t the &ternal Iod, and that +e called the (niverse into bein o(t of nothin . 1 de#and also, in opposition to the develop#ent hypothesis, the perpet(ity of specific characters, fro# the #o#ent when the respective creat(res were called into bein , till they cease to be.-E3=F /s a #atter of fact the second post(late is s(perfl(o(s) Iosse9s theory, while it certainly re#oves the necessity for a theory of develop#ent 2or of variation and nat(ral selection5, is not inco#patible with s(ch a theory. /nd as for the first, altho( h he ref(ses to disc(ss it, nobody was in a position to #aintain that there was any better acco(nt available of the ori in of the (niverse, ass(#in that it had an ori in. /t least the Christians co(ld accept the point witho(t diffic(lty. %ow creation is enerally taken to be a be innin of history, and thereby also of nat(ral history)the first verse of Ienesis #akes the idea e*plicit. 1t certainly is a be innin in so#e sense, b(t Iosse9s reflections led hi# to see that it co(ld not be so in the way in which, for e*a#ple, birth is. Birth is the be innin of a phase, b(t it depends on an earlier phase, na#ely prenatal develop#ent, whereas creation #(st be an absol(te be innin de no-o , dependin (pon no antecedents whatever e*cept the will of the Creator. 8(ppose a creator settin abo(t the creation of so#e nat(ral ob7ect, a fern, a b(tterfly, a cow; at what sta e of its e*istence sho(ld he choose to call it into bein 0 .e #i ht (nthinkin ly choose the #at(re for#; b(t is there any reason why this sho(ld be preferred to an i##at(re or e#bryonic for#0 1s any sta e f(nda#entally #ore s(itable than any other as a startin 6

point of nat(ral history0 Iosse concl(ded not)indeed that there is no s(ch thin as a nat(ral be innin of this necessarily (lti#ate sort, the co(rse of nat(re bein , in fact, circ(lar. -1t is evident that there is no one point in the history of any sin le creat(re, which is a le iti#ate be innin of e*istence. . . . ,he cow is as inevitable a se@(ence of the e#bryo, as > 4= > the e#bryo is of the cow.-E39F 8(ch a be innin #(st, therefore, be s(pernat(ral. -Creation, the soverei n fiat of /l#i hty Power, ives (s the co##encin point, which we in vain seek in nat(re. B(t what is creation0 1t is the sudden bursting into a circle .-E3!F /nd 7(st as the life6cycle of the individ(al is closed (pon itself, so the cycle of species, of life itself, of the planet and the solar and stellar syste#s, #ay in principle be ever repeatin , fro# eternity to eternity, only to be co##enced or ter#inated by an irr(ption fro# witho(t. Iosse9s stroke of eni(s th(s lay in separatin the @(estion of creation fro# the @(estion of history alto ether. ,he older view has its classical e*pression in Donne: -,hat then this Be innin was , is #atter of faith, and so, infallible. When it was, is #atter of reason , and therefore vario(s and perple*9t.-E31F Iosse bro( ht it all into the province of faith by s( estin the possibility that nat(ral ob7ects #i ht be created with a histor" , or at least with the appearance of one. /nd this s( estion, once #ade, ceased to be a s( estion and beca#e an indispensable necessity: a nat(ral ob7ect co(ld not be a nat(ral ob7ect witho(t an apparent history. / tree wo(ld not be a tree witho(t rin s, which indicate its a e, and even a newly created tree #(st have rin s. / #an wo(ld not be a #an witho(t a navel, 8ir ,ho#as Browne to the contrary notwithstandin . ,he whole or anisation of the creat(re th(s newly called into e*istence, looks back to the co(rse of an endless circle in the past. 1ts whole str(ct(re displays a series of develop#ents, which as distinctly witness to for#er conditions as do those which are presented in the cow, the b(tterfly, and the fern, of the present day. B(t what for#er conditions0 ,he conditions th(s witnessed (nto, as bein necessarily i#plied in the present or anisation, were non6 e*istent; the history was a perfect blank till the #o#ent of creation. ,he past conditions or sta es of e*istence in @(estion, can indeed be as tri(#phantly inferred by le iti#ate ded(cti<on fro# the present, as can those of o(r cow or b(tterfly; they rest on the very sa#e evidences; they are identically the sa#e in every respect, e*cept in this one, that they were unreal . ,hey e*ist only in their res(lts; they are effects which never had ca(ses. Perhaps it #ay help to clear #y ar (#ent if 1 divide the past develop#ents of or anic life, which are necessarily, or at least le iti#ately, inferrible fro# present pheno#ena, into two cate ories, separated by the violent act of creation. ,hose (nreal develop#ents whose apparent res(lts are seen in the or anis# at the #o#ent of its creation, 1 will call !rochronic , beca(se ti#e was not an ele#ent in the#; while those which have s(bsisted since creation, and have had act(al e*istence, 1 will distin (ish as diachronic , as occ(rrin d(rin ti#e. %ow, a ain 1 repeat, there is no i#a inable difference to sense between the prochronic and diachronic develop#ent.E33F > 49 > %at(ral history th(s appears as an (nbroken pro ression, fro# so#e (ni#a inable be innin in the #ind of Iod to the state of the world at present; so#ewhere in between an e*trinsic act of creation

occ(rred, and as prochronic events ceased, diachronic ones)identical in every essential point)be an. .hen did this take place0 1s there any way of ded(cin it fro# the evidence0 Lbvio(sly not: -,he co##ence#ent, as a fact, 1 #(st learn fro# testi#ony; 1 have no #eans whatever of inferrin it fro# pheno#ena.-E33F $ort(nately the testi#ony is available. Iod need not have told (s when the Creation occ(rred, b(t as a #atter of fact he has done so, in Ienesis, and it wo(ld be (n ratef(l)not to say foolish or even i#pio(s)in #en of science to overlook the fact. 8o far they have -not allowed for the Kaw of Prochronis# in Creation,-E3AF b(t witho(t it all calc(lation is (seless; -the a#o(nt of error th(s prod(ced we have no #eans of knowin ; #(ch less of eli#inatin it.-E3"F /ccordin ly every scrap of evidence for the :acro6Chronolo y contains a fatal flaw; and, as Iosse tri(#phantly concl(des: -,he field is left clear and (ndisp(ted for the one .itness on the opposite side, whose testi#ony is as follows:) -91% 81J D/'8 G&+LM/+ :/D& +&/M&% /%D &/C,+, ,+& 8&/, /%D /KK ,+/, 1% ,+&: 18.9-E34F B(t what, after all, did this victory a#o(nt to0 ,o be in with, it showed that there had never really been a str( le: -1 do not know that a sin le concl(sion, now accepted, wo(ld need to be iven (p, e*cept that of act(al chronolo y. /nd even in respect of this, it wo(ld be rather a #odification than a relin@(ish#ent of what is at present held; we #i ht still speak of the inconceivably lon d(ration of the processes in @(estion, provided we (nderstand ideal instead of act(al ti#e;)that the d(ration was pro7ected in the #ind of Iod, and not really e*istent.-E3?F Ced(ced to this, the concl(sion is #erely #etaphysical, that is to say e#pirically e#pty; to assert that the world was created is rather like assertin that overni ht everythin in it has do(bled in si<e, incl(din r(lers and retinae)nobody can tell the difference. Lne #i ht as well retort that really everythin has halved in si<e, or that everythin has been (ncreated, the for#er e*istence bein real and the present ideal, for all that any e*peri#ent can possibly indicate to the contrary. P(t in another way, Iosse9s clai# co#es to the sa#e thin as #aintainin that, before creation, Berkeley9s philosophical position was the correct one, while after it Kocke9s was. Unfort(nately #ost people persisted in seein #ore in it than that, contin(in to believe that there was a en(ine difference of opinion between the eolo ists and the +oly Ihost, that it was i#possible to a ree with both b(t that it #attered which one a reed with. Iosse was s(rely ri ht)it did not #atter, at least not in the way that #ost people s(pposed, since 2apart fro# the > ?! > e*trascientific point of faith5 one could a ree with both; b(t few co(ld follow his intellect(al #ane(vers, perfectly rational tho( h they were. /nd then any victory, even the #ost concl(sive, beco#es hollow when nobody takes the sli htest notice of it, or when the few who do #isinterpret it co#pletely. +avin instr(cted the printers to prepare an (n(s(ally lar e edition of his book a ainst what he was certain wo(ld be a (niversal de#and, Iosse fo(nd hi#self in possession of #ost of it, while the few copies that went o(t prod(ced a critical reaction of a totally (ne*pected sort. ,he theory of 3m!halos , after s(itable distortion)not only by the #alicio(s)beca#e #onstro(s, assertin nothin less than that Iod had placed fossils in the rocks for the e*press p(rpose of deceivin scientists into thinkin that the earth was older than it really was. Perhaps the cr(elest blows were str(ck by that perpet(ally well6#eanin , infallibly cl(#sy Mictorian, Charles Hin sley. .e have reason to be ratef(l for Hin sley9s bl(nt insensitivity, which prod(ced, like the irritatin specks of sand in oysters, responses of reat bea(ty in diverse @(arters)the two #ost fa#o(s cases are, of co(rse, %ew#an9s A!ologia !ro #ita sua and +(*ley9s celebrated letter on the death of his son.

,here is no record of a si#ilar reaction on Iosse9s part, b(t the sti#(l(s was certainly no less painf(l. ,he theory itself, it is tr(e, was perfectly acceptable to Hin sley: -'o(r distinction between diachronis# and prochronis# Ehe wrote to IosseF, instead of bein nonsense, as it is in the eyes of the Kocke6beridden %o#inalist p(blic, is to #e, as a Platonist and realist, an ind(bitable and venerable tr(th.-E3=F B(t Iosse9s (se of the theory to 7(stify the eolo ists in the for#, if not the s(bstance, of their concl(sions, while at the sa#e ti#e preservin the literal tr(th of 8cript(re, was too #(ch for hi#. -'o(r book tends to prove this)that if we accept the fact of absol(te creation, Iod beco#es a 2eus /uidam dece!tor . . . . 'o( #ake Iod tell a lie. 1t is not #y reason, b(t #y conscience which revolts here.-E39F 8(ch obt(seness was bad eno( h)for Iosse9s whole point had been to show that Iod had not lied at all, that indeed he had been scr(p(lo(sly honest 2as Iosse hi#self wo(ld have been in si#ilar circ(#stances5, correctin in one #ode of co##(nication, na#ely Biblical revelation, a possible #isconception which #i ht arise in the interpretation of a #essa e in another #ode, na#ely eolo ical evidence)b(t there was worse to co#e. Hin sley, self6confident as ever, went on: 1 cannot ive (p the painf(l and slow concl(sion of five and twenty years9 st(dy of eolo y, and believe that Iod has written on the rocks one enor#o(s and s(perfl(o(s lie for all #ankind. ,o this painf(l dile##a yo( have bro( ht #e, and will, 1 fear, brin > ?1 > h(ndreds. 1t will not #ake #e throw away #y Bible. 1 tr(st and hope. 1 know in who# 1 have believed, and can tr(st +i# to brin #y faith safe thro( h this p(<<le, as +e has thro( h others; b(t for the yo(n 1 do fear. 1 wo(ld not for a tho(sand po(nds p(t yo(r book into #y children9s hands. . . . 'o(r de#and on i#plicit faith is 7(st as reat as that re@(ired for trans(bstantiation, and, believe #e, #any of yo(r ar (#ents, especially in the openin chapter, are stran ely like those of the old Ges(its, and those one (sed to hear fro# Gohn +enry %ew#an fifteen years a o, when he, copyin the Ges(its, was tryin to (nder#ine the ro(nds of all rational belief and h(#an science, in order that, havin #ade his victi#s 2a#on who# were so#e of #y dearest friends5 believe nothin , he #i ht et the# by a -%e#esis of faith- to believe anythin , and r(sh blindfold into s(perstition. Poor wretch, he was ca( ht in his own snare.EA!F Bitter words for a s(pporter of the onion #anB /nd especially bitter the re#ark abo(t children, for whose #ental and #oral i#prove#ent Iosse, in his pop(lar writin s, had been so solicito(s. B(t then Hin sley and Iosse were f(nda#entally at cross p(rposes in this #atter. Hin sley9s aversion for Co#e was intellect(al, Iosse9s e#otional; Iosse9s interest in reli ion and science was intellect(al, Hin sley9s senti#ental. ,he co#parison of Iosse and %ew#an, hastly and inconceivable as it wo(ld have see#ed to the# both, was not in fact entirely (n7(st, for %ew#an, in the A!ologia , says: -$ro# the a e of fifteen, do #a has been the f(nda#ental principle of #y reli ion: 1 know no other reli ion; 1 cannot enter into the idea of any other sort of reli ion; reli ion, as a #ere senti#ent, is to #e a drea# and a #ockery-EA1F )in which s(bstit(tin for -do #a- -the infallibility of the 8cript(res- renders Iosse9s belief e*actly. Both %ew#an and Iosse had seen that the defense of tr(th on the hi hest level leads so#eti#es to an appearance of deception on a lower, and both had been repri#anded for it by Hin sley, to who# tr(th was a si#ple, strai htforward, rather typically &n lish sort of thin . %ew#an, however, was the better off; for the Ch(rch provides an environ#ent friendly to s(ch s(btleties, let infidels protest as they #ay; b(t what is a lonely Protestant to do, when Iod ref(ses to look after his own interests, and allows his shortsi hted and enth(siastic servants to spoil the work of

those who are #ore perceptive and a(stere0 %othin co(ld shake Iosse9s faith in the Bible, b(t its a(thor, en a ed as he was in (idin the Hin sleys of the world safely thro( h their p(<<les, #i ht perhaps be (ilty of ne li ence. 1n his reaction to the fail(re of 3m!halos Iosse al#ost s(spected as #(ch. -1 think there was added to his cha rin with all his fellow #ortals a first tinct(re of that heresy which was to attack hi# later on. 1t was now that, 1 fancy, he be an, in his depression, to be an ry with Iod.-EA3F B(t this was not the > ?3 > pet(lant an er of a disappointed scholar. 1t is e*actly here that Iosse9s enor#o(s intellect(al stren th shows to its best advanta e)the stren th, in fact, not only of his intellect b(t also of his will. +e knew he was ri ht, even if Iod did not. /nd he was not broken; fo(r years later he is at it a ain, in a second series of The 0omance of &atural 4istor" , incorporatin #ore and #ore of the conte#porary advances of science into his own sche#e, never yieldin an inch in his fidelity to the inspired word. Hin sley had also acc(sed hi# of the apostasy of evol(tion: -1 don9t see how yo(rs Ei.e., Iosse9s prochronis#F differs fro# the trans#(tation of species theory, which yo(r ar (#ent, if filled o(t fairly, wo(ld, 1 think, be.-EA3F 1ndeed there was a s(perficial si#ilarity, b(t Iosse was caref(l to #ake the distinction for those who cared to look for it. 8pecies #ay, witho(t violatin the sanctity of 8cript(re, succeed one another; they #ay not e-ol-e fro# one another. .e know that the rate of #ortality a#on indi-iduals of a species, speakin enerally, is e@(alled by the rate of birth, and we #ay s(ppose this balance of life to be paralleled when the (nit is a species, and not an individ(al. 1f the .ord of Iod contained anythin either in state#ent or principle contrary to s(ch a s(pposition, 1 wo(ld not entertain it for a #o#ent, b(t 1 do not know that it does. 1 do not know that it is anywhere i#plied that Iod created no #ore after the si* days9 work was done. +is 8abbath6rest havin been broken by the inco#in of sin, we know fro# Gohn v. 1?, that +e contin(ed to work witho(t interr(ption; and we #ay fairly concl(de that pro ressive creation was incl(ded as a part of that (nceasin work.EAAF Iosse9s devotion and in en(ity in the service of science and reli ion were (nli#ited; and in the end even the total indifference of both parties was not eno( h to stop his heroic rear (ard action in defense of their divinely appointed (nity.

IV
&d#(nd Iosse9s char e a ainst his father is that of inh(#anity. -+e re arded #an rather as a blot (pon the face of nat(re, than as its hi hest and #ost di nified develop#ent. . . . /#on the five tho(sand ill(strations which he painted, 1 do not think there is one to be fo(nd in which an atte#pt is #ade to depict the h(#an for#. :an was the ani#al he st(died less than any other, (nderstood #ost i#perfectly, and, on the whole, was least interested in.-EA"F ,here is, in fact, at least one ill(stration containin h(#an fi (res, b(t it only serves to reinforce the char e: the preface to The 3cean is acco#panied by a woodc(t of -,he .hale > ?3 > $ishery,- showin two #en bein tossed o(t of a boat into the 7aws of a i antic cetacean. /s to the other assertions, &d#(nd #ay have been ri ht)certainly his own e*perience led to no other concl(sion. /nd yet it is perhaps too easy a 7(d #ent. Lne of the tra edies of an overintellect(al faith

is that it #ay conceal, effectively and per#anently, #ore nat(ral feelin s. /braha#, with his sons in his boso#, is a #odel of paternal affection, b(t it is a ri# reflection that, had there been no ra# in the thicket, nothin wo(ld have prevented hi# fro# #(rderin 1saac. Hierke aard #akes of /braha# a hero of faith, and the heroes of faith are enerally those for who#, in the end, everythin works o(t ri ht, either in #artyrdo# or in earthly felicity. $or Iosse, in a sense, nothin worked o(t ri ht, yet his life, altho( h it ended in de7ection, did not end in defeat. /s in :r. Man Moorst9s office, years before, his self6possession co(ld be overco#e only in e(tremis . +e was, to (se another favorite ter# of Hierke aard9s)a ter# of the hi hest approbation)an indi-idual ; and if his behavior as an individ(al was eccentric 2as it (ndo(btedly was5 that very fact #ade it, in spite of his fre@(ently e*pressed wish to ive all the credit to Iod, a trib(te to the h(#an stren th of his own character. > ?A >

71 Creatio%is/ a%d E'ol-tio%

,he asy##etry of #y title is intentional. 1t #i ht have been Creation and &vol(tion, or Creationis# and &vol(tionis#, or even Creation and &vol(tionis#, b(t none of these e*presses the contrast 1 want to e#phasi<e now. ,o #ake this point clear, so#e preli#inary work is needed. Ket #e first distin (ish between events and processes. /n event is so#ethin that co#es to be 2the ter# #eans this5, #ore or less briefly is, and then has been. .hat co(nts as -briefly- depends on the sort of event it is and its distance fro# (s. / lect(re is an event lastin an ho(r or so; an election is an event that lasts abo(t a day b(t e*tends itself into the ca#pai n and the co(ntin and the victory speeches and concessions. / war #i ht co(nt as an event in historical perspective, b(t to the people in it it wo(ld see# to be #ade (p of #any events. /nd so on. %ow creation, accordin to #ost reli io(s acco(nts, is an event, altho( h in Ienesis it lasts si* days and incorporates s(bevents: the co#in into bein of the s(n and #oon, for e*a#ple. 1t is taken to have happened at a definite point in ti#e. $or the p(rposes of this paper 1 shall ass(#e this to be an accepted view. / process, on the other hand, is so#ethin that oes on over a #ore or less prolon ed period of ti#e; indeed, it can o on indefinitely. $inite processes, havin ends in view and res(ltin in prod(cts or conse@(ences, #ay look fro# a distance like events, so the bo(ndary is not sharp. $or its week, creation #i ht be tho( ht of as havin been a process, and in ordinary speech we speak of the process of creation, of a work of art for instance, altho( h partic(lar acts of creation on Iod9s > ?" > part are not (s(ally s(pposed to have the internal se@(ence of sta es that this i#plies 2-+e spake and it was done-5. B(t processes that o on indefinitely cannot be conf(sed with events, altho( h they #ay fro# ti#e to ti#e prod(ce events as conse@(ences. ,idal dra is a contin(o(s process, d(e to the #oon9s orbitin the earth, b(t a partic(lar hi h tide in a partic(lar harbor is an event. &vol(tion, as it is (nderstood by scientists, is this kind of process: as lon as the conditions for it hold, it oes on. /n event in the evol(tionary process #i ht be the e*tinction of a species, say, the death of the last dinosa(r. 1 shall take this also to be a reed (pon. 1 t(rn now to the s(ffi* -6is#.- ,his is an old device for prod(cin no(ns o(t of verbs, ad7ectives, proper na#es, etc. ,he Ireeks introd(ced it in the for# -6is#os- for 7(st that p(rpose. ,he paradi #

case is that of baptis#: -baptein- #eant to dip or dye, so -bapti<ein- #eant to treat by dippin and -baptis#os- ca#e to #ean the doin of this in a rit(al way, a baptis#. .e have the sa#e se@(ence in &n lish, thro( h -6i<e- to -is#.- .hat is referred to by the ter# th(s for#ed #ay be so#ethin relatively abstract, b(t we #ay co#e to (se it as if it had a fa#iliar, even concrete, #eanin . /nd in the special case in which an ideolo ical force is attached to it the no(n #ay co#e to stand for so#ethin apparently portento(s, alto ether o(t of proportion to the related ter# fro# which it spran . 8o altho( h -is#s- #ay be innocent eno( h it is always a ood idea to look at the# closely, to see whether they are bein (sed as a front for concept(al inflation. /s #(st be obvio(s, 1 a# not too fond of these is#s; one of the proble#s with the# is that they beco#e catchwords and as s(ch can conceal a lot of i norance. 8o#e fa#iliar e*a#ples are :ar*is# and co##(nis#. ,here was a #an called :ar*, a brilliant altho( h so#ewhat (nreliable philosopher who wrote #any serio(s works in addition to his 2and &n els9s5 occasional and deliberately infla##atory :anifesto, and it is certainly a ood thin to read what he wrote, diffic(lt as #ost of it is, in order to (nderstand and critici<e it. B(t :ar*is# as an inflated concept(al or ideolo ical packa e #ay be bo( ht, and often has been, witho(t any very caref(l st(dy of :ar*. 8i#ilarly there are co##on oods, co##(nities, etc., and to reflect on the val(es of co##(nity and the ways in which it #i ht be i#ple#ented is certainly worthwhile. B(t co##(nis# beca#e a battle cry that s(ppressed reflection in favor of a 7ealo(s and infle*ible doctrine. $inally, by way of preli#inaries, a re#ark on the notion of belief, especially on the distinction between believin in and believin that . ,he latter is the #ore recent, since in its ori ins believin was less a #atter of acceptin propositions as tr(e than of relatin to persons as tr(stworthy. ,o believe in so#ethin is to find it satisfyin , co#fortin , > ?4 > reass(rin ; -believed- co#es fro# the sa#e ety#olo ical so(rce as -beloved.- B(t as we all know, bein satisfied, co#forted, or reass(red need have very little to do with the tr(th of the #atter, (nless indeed tr(th co#es to be defined in ter#s of faith rather than reason. ,he later (se of -believe,- to believe that s(ch6and6s(ch is the case, is a co##it#ent to tr(th independent of o(r s(b7ective approval of it, and as .. H. Clifford (sed to re#ark it carries a far hi her b(rden of #oral responsibility: to say -1 believe that . . . - was, he said, the #ost serio(s thin a h(#an bein co(ld do. %ow of co(rse there co(ld be s(ch a thin as -evol(tionis#,- and people #i ht o aro(nd sayin that they believed in it. B(t s(ch people wo(ld not deserve o(r respect. $or apart fro# the personal cases already all(ded to 2believin as tr(stin , especially in people we love or at least have ad#iration for5 -believin in- see#s to #e an inappropriate stance for an ed(cated person. .e want to know what is the case, and to believe what co#es closest to that. 1t is 1 think wron to believe what does not have the warrant of the best test of knowled e available at the ti#e, (nless there is so#e pressin reason to do so )so#e need, for e*a#ple, for a co##it#ent to action. .e do not in #y view have a pressin reason to co#e to a concl(sion abo(t the ori in of species or life or even of the (niverse; we are nat(rally c(rio(s abo(t s(ch thin s b(t can et alon @(ite well fro# day to day witho(t the last word on the s(b7ect. .e can afford to be patient. 8o 1 wo(ld not reco##end that anyone be an evol(tionist or believe in evol(tion. B(t of co(rse the sa#e oes for creation and creationis#, and here 1 en a e the #ain iss(e in this paper. .e have an event)creation)that #ay have happened, and a process)evol(tion)that #ay be oin on. 1t wo(ld be possible to believe in the event, which wo(ld #ake one a creationist, or to believe in the process, which wo(ld #ake one an evol(tionist, b(t these #oves are not reco##ended. B(t we #i ht have reasons to believe that evol(tion is oin on, or that creation occ(rred, and this wo(ld not involve (s in is#s at all. 1s there a way of 7(stifyin one or the other 2or both5 of these

beliefs, in s(ch a way that it co(ld be shown to satisfy the best presently available criteria for scientific knowled e0 &vol(tion is an innocent eno( h word: strictly speakin it #eans -t(rnin o(t- or -(nrollin - 2as revol(tion #eans t(rnin or rollin aro(nd5. Books (sed to be (nrolled when they were #ade in scrolls, and Katin e-olutio #eant that. &vol(tion as a process is thin s t(rnin o(t one way or another, the (nrollin or (nfoldin of events i#plicit in earlier events, as opposed to the breakin in of so#ethin totally new. ,he doctrine that has beco#e known as -the theory of evol(tion- is a special case of this eneral concept, and is perhaps better called the > ?? > theory of nat(ral selection. ,he basic #echanis# of this special version of the eneral (nfoldin of events has fo(r #ain co#ponents, which 1 will call proliferation, variation, co#petition, and eli#ination. 2.hat is not eli#inated is ass(#ed to s(rvive; accordin to so#e pop(lar views this is s(pposed to show that it was -fit- to do so, b(t that is an essentially e#pty attrib(tion; it is eno( h for o(r p(rposes that it 7(st does s(rvive.5 %ow evol(tion in this sense obvio(sly oes on all the ti#e in al#ost all do#ains of h(#an activity. /s a trivial e*a#ple take the b(siness of ettin dressed in the #ornin . 'o( have bo( ht a n(#ber of different ite#s of clothin , let (s s(ppose; that satisfies the re@(ire#ent of proliferation. ,hey are not all alike; that satisfies the re@(ire#ent of variation. 'o( try one and another 2ass(#in so#e concern with appearance5 and ask yo(rself whether, iven the kind of day it is, yo(r #ood, the people yo( e*pect to see, and so on, one o(tfit looks better than another; that satisfies the re@(ire#ent of co#petition. /nd finally yo( ret(rn to the closet everythin yo( tried, e*cept what yo( have chosen to wear; that satisfies the re@(ire#ent of eli#ination. 8o yo( have evolved fro# (ndressed to dressed, and the cool person who rolls o(t into the world is the o(tco#e of that evol(tion. &*a#ples co(ld of co(rse be #(ltiplied indefinitely. B(t the @(estion of interest here is whether a process of this sort is now oin on, or has in the past one on, in the case of livin thin s. Charles Darwin 2and at 7(st abo(t the sa#e ti#e /lfred C(ssel .allace5 concl(ded that it probably had one on. ,he re@(ire#ent of proliferation is satisfied easily eno( h, beca(se plants and ani#als are prolific by nat(re, and far #ore are born than can s(rvive. 2,hose that are born are already s(rvivors of an earlier eli#ination, and the sa#e is obvio(sly tr(e of h(#ans: only one ov(# in h(ndreds, and one sper#ato<oon in billions, act(ally rows (p into an e#bryo.5 ,he re@(ire#ent of variation is satisfied by the differences between individ(als, so#e bein stron er than others, so#e taller, so#e #ore intelli ent, and so on. /nd the re@(ire#ent of eli#ination is #et easily eno( h by the fact that plants and ani#als die witho(t reprod(cin if rather strin ent conditions of s(rvival are not #et. .hat st(#ped both Darwin and .allace te#porarily was the re@(ire#ent of co#petition; both of the# fo(nd the cl(e to that in ,ho#as :alth(s9s 'ssa" on the rinci!le of o!ulation , which pointed o(t that a nor#al pop(lation, left alone, wo(ld increase eo#etrically (nless li#ited by starvation, and that there wo(ld inevitably be a str( le for scarce reso(rces, in which only the winners wo(ld s(rvive. Lne of the thin s that intri (ed Darwin was the breedin of do#estic ani#als, in which it is obvio(sly possible to speed (p -evol(tion- by selective interference, so that in a few h(ndred years the line of do s > ?= > has been #ade to prod(ce Chih(ah(as on the one hand and Ireat Danes on the other. B(t of co(rse

they are all do s, and the bi @(estion is whether new species co#e into bein . Lld species die o(t, we know that. 1n fact, we are losin the# at the rate of tho(sands a year beca(se of the destr(ction of the environ#ent that co#es with ind(stry and the e*pansion of h(#an pop(lations. B(t co(ld variation o so far as to prod(ce a species that did not e*ist before0 Darwin tho( ht that this was the only hypothesis that co(ld acco(nt for distinct species of finches on nei hborin islands in the Ialapa os archipela o, and he e*tended it to acco(nt for the ori in of species in eneral. ,his is the weak point in any atte#pt to #ake a concl(sive case for evol(tion, beca(se evol(tionary ti#e is very lon and new species cannot be e*pected to co#e into bein every day or even every cent(ry. /nd (ntil Darwin called attention to the possibility, a h(ndred years or so a o, nobody was lookin . ,here is one well6 attested case in the literat(re, the flowerin plant rimula kewensis , and by now there #ay be #any others for all 1 know. 8cientists in any case do not (se the sa#e criteria for definin species as they did in Darwin9s ti#e, and certainly eno( h is now known of enetics to #ake the principle (nproble#atic. &vol(tion is therefore easy eno( h to (nderstand abstractly, and there is no reason to think that the processes of proliferation, variation, co#petition, and eli#ination are not now oin on and have not always one on. ,he hostility of the environ#ent and the s(perfertility of #ost species 2incl(din h(#ans5 #ake that a very nat(ral concl(sion. B(t it is hard to credit concretely, which is why creationis# re#ains so attractive. +ow can so#ethin as co#ple* as the h(#an eye, for e*a#ple, have co#e into bein by a series of variations and eli#inations witho(t so#e intelli ent plannin 0 ,his is a serio(s challen e and needs to be considered. 1 do not think it is possible to deal with it concl(sively, b(t 1 wo(ld like to offer a co(nterar (#ent that see#s to #e at least as diffic(lt to ref(te. ,he so6called ar (#ent fro# desi n ass(#es intelli ent plannin , and a reat #any people attrib(te to the Creator the really s(perior, the practically infinite intelli ence that wo(ld be needed to prod(ce the #arvels that we find on all sides in the nat(ral world. B(t consider where we et the idea of intelli ence: the only cases of it we know, in f(ll6fled ed for#, occ(r a#on h(#an bein s with f(nctionin brains, and there is plenty of evidence that the intelli ence really is linked to the brain, to its co#binatorial powers, its reso(rces of #e#ory, its capacity for lin (istic processin , and the like. %ow the brain is the sin le #ost co#ple* entity in the known world, and its f(nctionin in h(#ans re@(ires that it be e#bodied, co#pact, inte ral, and capable of learnin . 1t #(st have co#e into bein alon with the rest of the world, > ?9 > and the ar (#ent wo(ld re@(ire that it too be the res(lt of intelli ent plannin . B(t the fact 7(st ad#itted, that intelli ence depends on the e*istence of s(ch a co#ple* entity, hardly enco(ra es (s to concl(de that the e#er ence of the co#ple* entity in @(estion depended on intelli ence. Ln what co#ple* entity did that intelli ence in t(rn depend0 .as it also e#bodied, co#pact, and inte ral0 /nd how did it learn0 %ow of co(rse we are free to answer these @(estions as we like, (nless we care abo(t evidence. .e co(ld say, for e*a#ple, that there was a 8(pre#e Bein , s(pre#ely intelli ent, the workin s of whose #ind are @(ite beyond (s, who bro( ht (s and everythin else into the world by an act of creation, intelli ence 2s(ch as it is5 and all. .e co(ld deny that the intelli ence of s(ch a Bein needed e#bodi#ent in its t(rn. /nd of co(rse 1 wo(ld have no way of disprovin any of this, nor, if it ave co#fort to anyone, wo(ld 1 wish to do so 2(nless that person persec(ted others for not believin it5. B(t if we do care abo(t evidence or abo(t consistency we sho(ld at least ask: Does this have anythin to do with intelli ence as we (nderstand it0 /nd what is the evidence for either hypothesis, that of a creator or that of creation0

.e have seen that the evidence for the hypothesis of evol(tion is that processes like it are co##on, that the conditions for it e*ist, that so#e instances of #inor speciation are known; we #i ht add that cos#olo y s( ests an a e for the (niverse that wo(ld have iven a#ple ti#e for the kind of develop#ent that evol(tion represents, considerin that #icroevents in or anis#s happen in fractions of a second, while life has been aro(nd for billions of years. 1t #ay be worth dwellin on this for a #o#ent beca(se of another diffic(lty that so#eti#es occ(rs to people. 1f we were to co#p(te the probability that any partic(lar o(tco#e sho(ld occ(r as a res(lt of evol(tion, even over vast aeons of ti#e, we #i ht find it vanishin ly s#all, and this #i ht be taken as an ar (#ent a ainst its havin happened in this way. B(t it wo(ld not be a ood or a concl(sive ar (#ent, beca(se events with very low probability do in fact happen. Consider what is so#eti#es called the lottery parado*: if five #illion tickets are sold, then before the drawin the chance that any partic(lar individ(al will win is one in five #illion, which certainly see#s vanishin ly s#all; b(t after the drawin a partic(lar individ(al has nevertheless won. .e are already winners in a tre#endo(s lottery, a#on the sper#ato<oa 1 referred to earlier, with odds on the order of a billion to one, and yet here we all are. /nd so is the ani#al kin do#, and in it the h(#an race. Ce#e#ber that creation is an event b(t evol(tion a process. ,he @(estion of evidence arises in a different for# in the two cases. / process can be ca( ht in the act, as it were: if we see thin s happenin 2for e*a#ple, #(ltiple litters, the eli#ination of weaklin s in a str( le > =! > for no(rish#ent5 that for# an essential part of the process, and if we can easily see how the other parts #i ht happen too, then the hypothesis that the process occ(rs beco#es at least pla(sible. B(t with events thin s are @(ite different: the event, as 1 re#arked earlier, co#es to be, is, and then has been; we refer to a co#pleted event in the past tense. +ow can we know abo(t past events at all, then0 Lnly by inferrin the# fro# evidence that is available now)conse@(ences, traces, re#ains, records. ,he sorts of past event that we have co#e to know abo(t in this way incl(de lar e #eteorite i#pacts, ice a es, volcanic er(ptions, and also 2especially since the advent of written records5 wars, revol(tions, inventions, and so on. 8o#e of the evidence for evol(tion is in the for# of past events, na#ely, the lives of speci#ens of now e*tinct ani#al and plant species, which have left traces in the for# of fossils. ,he @(estion is, is there any evidence of this sort for creation0 .ell, there does see# to be evidence, in the for# of back ro(nd radiation, spectral shifts in stars, etc., for a relatively s(dden ori in of the physical (niverse as we know it, an ori in which has co#e to be called the Bi Ban . 1nterpretin that evidence #eans acceptin a lot of hi h6level physical theory, b(t there is a consens(s a#on cos#olo ists, with only occasional challen es 2tho( h so#e of the# have been radical, fro# contin(o(s creation to lar e6scale electrodyna#ics5, that so#ethin of the sort #(st have happened. ,his however does not help #(ch when it co#es to confrontin creation with evol(tion, since the Bi Ban was five billion years before the s(n, let alone the earth, ca#e into bein , and (nless there contin(ed to be interventions 2which are not s( ested by that evidence5 we wo(ld still need a lon evol(tionary process to et to where we are now. ,he event called Creation, in #ost theolo ical acco(nts, wo(ld have to be a ood deal #ore recent than that. /rchbishop Ussher tho( ht, on the basis of Lld ,esta#ent chronolo ies, that it #(st have taken place in abo(t A!!A B.C. /s far as 1 know there is no evidence whatever for this. :ost of what re#ains fro# earlier periods of the earth9s history is older than that by h(ndreds of tho(sands of years. 1n fact, there isn9t #(ch evidence for anythin in the biblical acco(nt of the ori ins of thin s. ,here were certainly floods, and pio(s archaeolo ists are still lookin for %oah9s /rk on :o(nt /rarat; for that #atter they #ay well find it, since a lot of the Lld ,esta#ent is no do(bt historical, and a widespread

2tho( h still relatively locali<ed5 flood #i ht well have see#ed like the end of the known world and provoked sche#es of resc(e. B(t that won9t help with Creation either. Lf co(rse all this #ay be beside the point. ,he evidence, yo( #ay say, lies precisely in the biblical acco(nt itself. +ere it is worth #akin an i#portant distinction, well known in the law, between evidence and > =1 > testi#ony. &vidence #eans so#ethin we can act(ally see , like &*hibit / in a trial; testi#ony #eans what so#ebody sa"s . ,his introd(ces a different kind of proble#, havin to do with the reliability of the witness. 1f the witness was in a position to see what happened, and tells the tr(th, then testi#ony is al#ost as ood as evidence for the occ(rrence of a past event, like a bank hold(p or an a(to#obile accident 2tho( h the #ost honest people can honestly #isperceive and #isre#e#ber5. 1f testi#ony is not reliable then in the absence of evidence we can only s(spend 7(d #ent. %ow, no te*t(al acco(nt can be evidence; it can at best be testi#ony abo(t evidence, like a deposition in a co(rt case, and that red(ces to 7(st testi#ony. Lf co(rse we are obli ed #ost of the ti#e to rely on testi#ony of this sort 2of 7o(rnalists, e*plorers, scientific researchers5, tr(stin the# to have seen and interpreted the evidence correctly, on pain of bein red(ced to total skepticis#. ,here is nothin wron with skepticis#, which only #eans lookin o(t, bein wary)b(t bein wary all the ti#e tends to inhibit freedo# of action. ,he biblical acco(nt of creation is not testi#ony abo(t evidence; it is 7(st testi#ony. ,his can be all ri ht too in certain circ(#stances, na#ely, those in which we are reportin o(r own actions: we don9t say what doin the# wo(ld have looked like to an observer; we 7(st report that we did the#. 1f Iod says, -1 created the world- 2and that is what the biblical acco(nt a#o(nts to, if we accept the idea of the inspiration of 8cript(re5 then all we have to decide is 2a 5 whether it is really Iod speakin , and 2b 5 whether his report is tr(stworthy. Iiven that 2b 5 wo(ld enerally be considered a blasphe#o(s @(estion, the re#ainin proble# is 2a 5. /ct(ally, addressin that proble# is not #y #ain concern here. 1f the answer is that it is really Iod speakin , and if we believe in Iod, then we believe in creation. %ote that this is pri#arily a -belief in- and that the correspondin -belief that- follows fro# it and fro# nothin else. .hat we will then have is -creationis#- all ri ht, b(t it will be a branch of theolo y. 1t will certainly not be a -creation science,- a ter# that has been introd(ced to ive theolo y a kind of respectability it does not need, and which has serio(sly clo(ded the iss(e. Cather, the @(estion now is, can science be based on testi#ony, or only on evidence 2or on testi#ony abo(t evidence fro# known, reliable witnesses50 /nd 1 answer: no concl(sion drawn fro# testi#ony alone can be a scientific concl(sion, altho( h it can be an answer to a @(estion that science is powerless to answer. +ere is a si#ple e*a#ple that will be (sef(l in what follows: Consider a cyclic process, s(ch as a #odel train r(nnin ro(nd a track. / scientist co#es into the roo# when the train is already r(nnin ; the child who p(t it on the track is standin by. > =3 > ,he challen e to science is to deter#ine, fro# the available evidence, at what point on the track the child started the train. .e will ass(#e that the track has been (sed at rando# over a lon period, that even if records of s(r es in ho(se c(rrent are available the s#all s(r e ca(sed by startin the train 2locatin which wo(ld enable the scientist to e*trapolate backwards fro# the present position of the train once its speed has been #eas(red, ass(#in the child not to have been #essin abo(t with the controls in the #eanti#e5 have been #asked by other people9s startin ,M sets, dishwashers, ra<ors

etc., and that the floor is spotless, so that the child has left no #arks of f(#blin in the d(st. 1n the end the scientist is totally baffled; the only thin to do is to ask the child, who points and says, -,hereB- 1f the child is tellin the tr(th, that is the answer to the @(estion, and it is the only answer. .hat wo(ld a scientific acco(nt of creation be like0 ,hat is a really interestin @(estion, and it was posed in the nineteenth cent(ry by one of the few real scientists who have also been creationists, Philip +enry Iosse. .hat distin (ishes Iosse is that he did not think that in bein a creationist he was at the sa#e ti#e bein a scientist; on the contrary, he was bein a f(nda#entalist, and readily acknowled ed that it was only his belief in Iod, and in the Bible as Iod9s word, that #ade hi# believe in Creation at all. B(t as a scientist he did see that if creation had taken place, scientists wo(ld have been in a position to #ake so#e very interestin observations. .hat #akes the observations interestin is that they wo(ld have been 7(st the observations that wo(ld have been #ade if creation had not taken place. Ket #e e*plain. Lbvio(sly no scientist can be present before the creation, b(t let (s s(ppose that we9ve been created as f(ll6fled ed scientists and can et to work i##ediately after it. .e wake (p and r(b o(r eyes; the world is f(ll of trees and ani#als, and, bein scientists and an*io(s to advance o(r careers, we start #akin observations. .e notice that there are so#e yo(n ani#als, so#e old ones, so#e pre nant ones; so#e reat trees, so#e saplin s. .e c(t down one of the trees: what is it #ade of0 :arsh#allow0 %o, it is #ade of wood, arran ed in rin s: seventy, let (s say, a ood #at(re tree. 8o the tree is seventy years old. B(t it can9t be)it ca#e into e*istence, alon with (s, only #in(tes a o. Iosse9s point was that it is i#possible, fro# evidence, to infer the fact of creation; we have to rely on testi#ony. /nd that co#es down to a @(estion of the credibility of the witness. ,he only cases in which the credibility of witnesses will be the last word are those in which evidence is (navailable. 8ince for Iosse creation is s(ch a case he ri htly 2fro# his point of view5 t(rns his attention to the Bible, which he takes precisely to be the re@(ired acco(nt of a witness, and a witness of i#peccable credibility, since it is none other than Iod +i#self. ,his > =3 > is a switch fro# science to belief. B(t the belief syste# to which he switches is entirely independent of the syste#atic scientific treat#ent of the sa#e ob7ect. 1t wo(ld not be i#possible to take Iosse9s position today)indeed 1 a# s(rprised that #ore f(nda#entalists do not do so. B(t where does this leave (s in relation to o(r in@(iry0 ,he (pshot of the ar (#ent is this: there is a lot of evidence that the process called evol(tion is oin on, or at least that all the parts of it are oin on that we can be e*pected to have observed in the blink of ti#e 2speakin in evol(tionary ter#s5 since anyone tho( ht of lookin for the#. 8o evol(tion is a pla(sible hypothesis, as well confir#ed as #any hypotheses we have co#e to rely on, and we do not need to decorate it with an -is#.- .hereas creation is a hypothesis with no scientific conse@(ences, and if we want to believe in it we shall have to do so on other ro(nds. B(t that, we can be happy to say 2tho( h we o( ht also to be a little awed by it5, is a #atter on which we en7oy co#plete freedo# of choice. > =" >

PART II1 0U,E'S PRO3LE,

> =? >

Pre&ace to Part II. 0-/e's Pro8le/

,he fallacy of affir#in the conse@(ent, as we saw in the case of Philip +enry Iosse, provides anyone at any ti#e with an e*c(se for re7ectin o(t of hand the entire theoretical edifice of science. 1n practice people (s(ally only do this when, like Iosse, they have so#e overridin a enda of another order, for the ood reason that the antecedent is very likely to be tr(e after all, the fallacy of inferrin it to the contrary notwithstandin . ,he fallacy hin es on the one6way character of ded(ctive inference, and stands at the threshold of a set of central episte#olo ical proble#s havin to do with e*tension of knowled e beyond the i##ediate e#pirical base. ,he philosopher who #ore than anyone else is responsible for havin identified and posed these proble#s is David +(#e. ,his part of the book deals with vario(s aspects of what 1 call -+(#e9s proble#,- tho( h it #i ht #ore acc(rately be entitled -one of +(#e9s proble#s and a proble# of Peirce9s.- 2Lne of +(#e9s other proble#s co#es in part 111.5 1t has always see#ed to #e that +(#e was ri ht abo(t ind(ction 2and abo(t ca(sality too, b(t that is for later5. +owever, that does not invalidate the whole scientific enterprise; rather it shifts the e#phasis fro# @(estions of p(re lo ic to @(estions of theoretical strate y. Lne strate y is to invert the direction of ar (#ent, pointin o(t that the falsehood of the antecedent can be inferred by den"ing the conse@(ent. B(t falsification, in spite of its celebrity at Popper9s hands, never see#ed to #e to be of #(ch help, for the rather si#ple reason that what people really want, after all, is true theories. Chapter " was ori inally iven in 8panish to the philosophical fac(lty > == > at the University of Costa Cica, as a dry r(n for its presentation at the first 1nternational Con ress of Ko ic, :ethodolo y, and Philosophy of 8cience at 8tanford in 194!. /t the con ress a philosopher in the a(dience appeared to be ivin ani#ated si ns of approval; at the end of #y talk he r(shed (p, and 1 e*pected con rat(lations or at the very least so#e intelli ent @(estion. .hat he said, and had evidently been waitin to say all that ti#e, was -19ve read +(#e on ca(se b(t 1 never e*pected to hear Caws on +(#eB- +e then fled, with peals of la( hter. 2,his chapter represents the one place in the book where 1 have allowed #yself to incl(de so#e passa es for#erly reprinted in The hiloso!h" of Science: A S"stematic Account EPrinceton, %.G.: Man %ostrand, 194"F, 3"=Q34".5 -,he 8tr(ct(re of Discovery- was dedicated, when 1 delivered it to section K of the ///8, to the #e#ory of %orwood C(ssell +anson, a friend who had been killed in the crash of his Ir(##an Bearcat a few #onths before. C(ss +anson had #ade central contrib(tions to the el(cidation of the proble# of scientific discovery; #y tho( ht in this paper was that a still (ne*plored an le of the @(estion concerned the nat(re of the s(pposedly effective proced(res that ded(ctive lo icians had at their disposal, which were lackin to their ind(ctive brethren. 1t see#ed to #e that the effective proced(res weren9t effective (nless ani#ated by so#e lo ician, that the inferences didn9t the#selves -follow- (nless so#eone was aro(nd to follow alon with the#. ,his led to a kind of nat(ralis# abo(t lo ic and hence abo(t discovery, which see#ed less #ysterio(s when it was reali<ed that so#ethin like it was happenin all the ti#e. 1n this chapter there are so#e ad(#brations of the str(ct(ralis# on which 1 was be innin to work at the ti#e of writin it. Chapter ? was written, so#ewhat later, in #e#ory of another friend, Irover :a*well; it p(rs(es the

nat(ralistic the#e of the previo(s chapter to the point of s( estin that the e#er ence of knowled e is as si#ple as any other evol(tionary process)and @(icker, iven that the #odel is Ka#arckian rather than Darwinian. ,he recipe -say anythin yo( like; repeat only what is tr(e,- while re@(irin an evol(tionary ti#e scale, with a bit of the l(ck of the lottery thrown in, will event(ally prod(ce a respectable body of knowled e)has prod(ced it, since that is clearly the way in which h(#an knowled e has rown. > =9 >

91 T#e Parado5 o& I%d-ctio% a%d t#e I%d-cti'e Wa$er

Proble#s of self6reference in philosophy have been at the botto# of #any of the now classical parado*es, and this paper will atte#pt to show that parado*ical concl(sions follow fro# an analysis of the self6reference of ind(ction. ,he conditions necessary for the eneration of parado*es always incl(de a ne ation; for e*a#ple, in Irellin 9s parado* of heterolo ical ter#s, it is only when a ter# is not descriptive of itself that diffic(lties arise. 8i#ilarly, in this case the parado* rests on the ass(#ption that the principle of ind(ction has not been s(ccessf(lly proven. 1t has often been re#arked that ind(ction cannot be relied (pon for a proof of itself; b(t if other proofs had been s(ccessf(l, the contin(ed reliability of ind(ctive inferences wo(ld only serve to confir# the principle #ore f(lly. 1f other proofs are not s(ccessf(l, the contin(ed reliability of ind(ctive inferences is, in a sense, an e#barrass#ent. 1 shall ass(#e that the latter is the case, and shall try first to for#(late the so(rce of e#barrass#ent and second to show that, altho( h so#e a(thors have one to e*traordinary len ths to avoid a confession of defeat with respect to ind(ction, capit(lation is not as dishonorable as it #i ht see#. Before be innin , however, it is necessary to state which proble# of ind(ction is in #ind, since one proble# has proliferated into #any by a process, so#eti#es referred to as -transfor#ation,- in which a closely related b(t sol(ble proble# is s(bstit(ted for the ori inal insol(ble one. ,he proble#s that have been solved incl(de the develop#ent of a lo ical theory of probability, the (se of the statistical syllo is#, and so on; the ori inal proble#, and the one with which 1 shall be > 9! > concerned, is that of inferences as to f(t(re events drawn fro# past observations. /s (sed here the ter# -f(t(re events- covers also the f(t(re discovery of infor#ation abo(t past or distant or concealed events. ,he diffic(lty is e*pressed in the followin passa e fro# +(#e, whose -state#ent of the case a ainst ind(ction,- as Heynes says, -has never been i#proved (pon.-E1F ,hese two propositions are far fro# bein the sa#e, I ha-e found that such an object has alwa"s been attended with such an effect , and I foresee$ that other objects$ which are$ in a!!earance$ similar$ will be attended with similar effects . 1 shall allow, if yo( please, that the one proposition #ay 7(stly be inferred fro# the other; 1 know, in fact, that it always is inferred. B(t if yo( insist that the inference is #ade by a chain of reasonin , 1 desire yo( to prod(ce that reasonin .E3F /nd a ain: Ket the co(rse of thin s be allowed hitherto ever so re (lar; that alone, witho(t so#e new

ar (#ent or inference, proves not that, for the f(t(re, it will contin(e so. 1n vain do yo( pretend to have learned the nat(re of bodies fro# yo(r past e*perience. ,heir secret nat(re, and conse@(ently all their effects and infl(ence, #ay chan e, witho(t any chan e in their sensible @(alities. ,his happens so#eti#es, and with re ard to so#e ob7ects: .hy #ay it not happen always, and with re ard to all ob7ects0 .hat lo ic, what process of ar (#ent sec(res yo( a ainst this s(pposition0E3F ,o this challen e +(#e fo(nd no answer, and this fact is responsible for his rep(tation as the worst pessi#ist in the history of ind(ction. %evertheless, he hi#self had the reatest confidence in the principle. ,here is an interestin passa e in the 'n/uir" where he act(ally does apply an ind(ctive proced(re to the proble# of ind(ction: -,his ne ative ar (#ent,- he says, #(st certainly, in process of ti#e, beco#e alto ether convincin , if #any penetratin and able philosophers shall t(rn their en@(iries this way and no one be ever able to discover any connectin proposition or inter#ediate step, which s(pports the (nderstandin in this concl(sion.EAF B(t there are obvio(sly two sides to this @(estion, and a little later he appears to have chan ed to the other: 1 #(st confess that a #an is (ilty of (npardonable arro ance who concl(des, beca(se an ar (#ent has escaped his own investi ation, that therefore it does not really e*ist. 1 #(st also confess that, tho( h all the learned, for several a es, sho(ld have e#ployed the#selves in fr(itless > 91 > search on any s(b7ect, it #ay still, perhaps, be rash to concl(de positively that the s(b7ect #(st, therefore, pass all h(#an co#prehension.E"F ,his is e*actly the sit(ation in which we find o(rselves. -:any penetratin and able philosophers,- at least, if not -all the learned,- have atte#pted to discover lo ical ro(nds on which a de#onstration of the certainty of ind(ctive inferences co(ld rest; #any #ore, since the abandon#ent of the search for certainty, have tried to do the sa#e for its probability. %o proposal for a sol(tion, so far p(t forward, can clai# to have been s(ccessf(l. ,hat the o(tlines of an ind(ctive lo ic, based on the theory of probability, now e*ist, cannot be denied; b(t this does no #ore to solve +(#e9s proble# than the fact that there e*ists a &(clidean eo#etry helps to #ake the (niverse &(clidean. 1t has p(<<led #any thinkers that s(ch a (lf sho(ld e*ist between ded(ctive inferences, which everybody a rees to be bindin in all circ(#stances where the pre#ises are tr(e, and ind(ctive inferences, which appear so (ncertain; the atte#pt has therefore been #ade to locate both kinds of inference on a contin((#, so that ind(ctive inferences wo(ld be 7(st like ded(ctive ones, only less so. B(t one circ(#stance renders all s(ch atte#pts abortive. 1f the concl(sion of a ded(ctive ar (#ent is false, this at the sa#e ti#e renders the pre#ise false, and this #ay be known i##ediately; if, for e*a#ple, it is asserted that all 8 is P and hence that this 8 is P, the observation that this 8 is not P #akes it false, accordin to the (s(al #eanin of -all,- to assert that all 8 is P. %o s(ch relation of necessity is available for ind(ction, and if the inference is rephrased to #ake one appear, it beco#es a ded(ctive inference. 1t see#s to #e that +(#e was ri ht in locatin the cr(* of the ar (#ent in necessary connection, and that he was also ri ht in the ass(#ption that the only relation which #i ht provide s(ch a necessary connection wo(ld be a ca(sal one. ,he latter point will be referred to a ain. Ket it be conceded, then, at least for the p(rposes of ar (#ent, that all atte#pts to solve the proble# of ind(ction have so far been (ns(ccessf(l.

Ket the i th atte#pt at sol(tion be called /i ; then 2overlookin the considerable diffic(lties involved in identifyin the /9s5 we #i ht e*hibit a series /1 , /3 , . . . /n to which the #ethods of ind(ction co(ld be applied. 1f we let U stand for the predicate -(ns(ccessf(l,the state of affairs #ay be described by the sentence, -/ll /9s so far observed are U.- ,his can clearly serve as the pre#ise of an ind(ctive inference, the concl(sion of which > 93 > will be -/ll /9s are U,- or -Probably all /9s are U,- or -/t least 99S 2or so#e other fi (re, dependin on the theory adhered to5 of /9s are U.- ,he #akin of s(ch an inference depends, of co(rse, on the reliability of the principle of ind(ction. ,he ass(#ption of the reliability of the principle leads, therefore, to the concl(sion that it is probably inde#onstrable. Conversely, if so#ebody were at last to prod(ce a convincin ar (#ent for its validity, that wo(ld in effect 7(stify (s in sayin that this very res(lt was i#possible, or at least hi hly i#probable, since it provided a co(ntere*a#ple of a enerali<ation of a type whose so(ndness had 7(st been de#onstrated. ,he lon er we o on (sin the principle of ind(ction, then, the less likely we are to find a 7(stification for it. ,his is what 1 have called the -parado* of ind(ction.- 1t is not a ri idly for#ali<ed parado*)the introd(ction of probability prevents that)b(t whatever variety of ind(ctive theory is e#ployed, concl(sions which are, at least to a de ree, parado*ical res(lt. $or e*a#ple, if one (ses 8ir Coy +arrod9s in enio(s for#(lation,E4F the hopes for s(ccess of a new sol(tion can be da#pened by pointin o(t that one is always likely not to be on the ver e of a reat philosophical discovery. Lne ob7ection sprin s to #ind i##ediately. %obody considers it parado*ical, for instance, that after years of research a sol(tion sho(ld be fo(nd to so#e scientific proble#, altho( h it had el(ded previo(s enerations; why then sho(ld it be so for a philosophical proble#0 ,he answer to this is, of co(rse, that the scientific proble# yields to new evidence, b(t that in the philosophical case no new evidence is available. 1n principle, the fact that different ani#als re@(ire different ro(ps of proteins is 7(st as #ysterio(s as the fact, which intri (ed +(#e so, that bread is no(rishin for #en b(t not for lions and ti ers. ,he ca(sal relation, ob7ectively speakin , is as ineffable as it ever was. 1t is not inconceivable, 1 s(ppose, that new evidence #i ht be forthco#in , and this wo(ld be the only way in which a theory of ind(ction co(ld escape the parado*; b(t it is diffic(lt to i#a ine what #i ht constit(te new evidence in this sense. .illia#s re#arks that the sol(tion of the proble# of ind(ction #(st be at botto# as banal and #onolithic as the process of ind(ction itself. Philosophers and lo icians have walked aro(nd and over o(r principle for cent(ries,E?F and it is to be s(pposed that they have seen #ost of what there is to be seen. .hat really convinced +(#e of the hopelessness of the sit(ation with re ard to ind(ction was the inaccessibility of f(t(re data. 1n his disc(ssion of ca(sality he s( ests that there are three ele#ents in a > 93 > prediction)an observed event, a predicted event, and a ca(sal #echanis#, correspondin on the lo ical side to a pre#ise, a concl(sion, and an ind(ctive principle respectively)two of which are needed for the deter#ination of the third, as two sides of a trian le are needed for the deter#ination of

the third. 1f the observed and predicted events are both available they #ay be taken as definin the ca(sal relation, and this is the way in which the word -ca(se- is enerally (sed. 1n the lo ical case, if pre#ise and concl(sion are both known, so#e probability relation #ay be established between the#, and this #ay serve as the paradi # of an ind(ctive inference. B(t where the predicted event has not yet been observed, where the concl(sion is not known, the sit(ation is like that of tryin to (ess where the rest of a trian le lies, if one is iven one side. .itho(t f(rther infor#ation the task is i#possible, and the only way to et f(rther infor#ation is to wait. 1n the absence of any other principle we (se, of co(rse, the relation defined by previo(s se@(ences of observations; b(t that the new case will confor# to the pattern cannot be known (ntil it has already done so. 8cience constr(cts theories which are desi ned to fit as closely as possible evidence that is already in, and relies on the#, as it is bo(nd to do, when it is necessary to spec(late as to f(t(re states of affairs. ,he theories present a #ore or less finished appearance, and as concept(al str(ct(res #ay be e*plored a ain and a ain witho(t revealin any flaws; they #ay even be ri oro(sly a*io#ati<ed and e*hibited as lo ical syste#s. ,his in itself does not co#pel the world to behave as they say it will, and if it behaves differently chan es are #ade in the theories. 1f physicists had resolved to clin tenacio(sly to apparently reasonable principles)principles of sy##etry or of conservation, for instance)to the e*tent of de#onstratin their lo ical necessity, there wo(ld have been #ore diffic(lty than in fact there has been in ad7(stin to recent develop#ents. ,he sa#e considerations apply to the principle of ind(ction, which is si#ply the #ost eneral and incl(sive theory we possess. 1 a# not s( estin that a disproof of the ind(ctive principle is likely)if it is not verifiable it wo(ld not see# to be falsifiable either. Merifiability and falsifiability, as #ethodolo ical tools, are not as different as they are so#eti#es tho( ht to be; whenever a cr(cial test arises, the principle of do(ble ne ation t(rns the one into the other. B(t the principle of ind(ction needs lo ical fo(ndations as little as the conservation principles needed the#; and if they are not needed it hardly see#s worth a reat deal of effort to s(pply the#. 1t is clai#ed, however, that lo ical fo(ndations are needed)that their absence is a -scandal- which is likely to have dire conse@(ences for civili<ation.E=F ,his kind of lan (a e betrays a concern which is #ore > 9A > than philosophical. .e do in fact rely on the principle; it has in fact worked, (p to this point; we are shocked at o(r inability to 7(stify o(r actions lo ically. .e are in the position of people who, as Pascal says, have been actin on an (ncertainty witho(t knowin why. 0em -iderunt$ causam non -iderunt :E9F -they have seen how thin s are, the ca(ses they have not seen.Pascal was the first to (se a #athe#atical theory of probability as a 7(stification for action on (ncertainties, altho( h in a rather (nlikely conte*t: 1f we #(st not act save on a certainty, we o( ht not to act on reli ion, for it is not certain. B(t how #any thin s we do on an (ncertainty, sea voya es, battlesB . . . %ow when we work for to#orrow, and do so on an (ncertainty, we act reasonably; for we o( ht to work for an (ncertainty accordin to the doctrine of chance. . . . 8t. /( (stine has seen that we work for an (ncertainty, on sea, in battle, etc. B(t he has not seen the doctrine of chance which proves that we sho(ld do so.E1!F 1t is @(ite possible to a ree with hi# that actin on chances is actin -reasonably- in the broad sense of the ter# 2which does not #ean -lo ically-5 witho(t followin to the concl(sion of his ar (#ent, which is the e*istence of Iod)for this passa e is taken, of co(rse, fro# the section of the ens7es entitled -,he %ecessity of the .a er.- 8i#ilarly, it is @(ite possible to a ree with writers on ind(ction who say,

as .illia#s does, 1t re#ains none the less reasonable to wa er o(r lives and fort(nes where o(r chances are best,E11F witho(t followin to the concl(sion, reached by so#e in a #anner strikin ly si#ilar to Pascal9s, that a wa er can 7(stify ind(ction as a #etaphysical principle. ,his, however, see#s to be the lo ical o(tco#e of so#e recent proposals. ,he two writers in whose treat#ents of ind(ction the parallel with Pascal is #ost strikin are Ceichenbach and G. L. .isdo#. Both a(thors a ree that the proble# does not ad#it of a strai htforward sol(tion, either affir#ative or ne ative, 7(st as Pascal ad#itted that neither of the two propositions, -Iod is, or +e is not,- co(ld be defended accordin to reason. /nd 7(st as Pascal presented two alternative #odes of action)to believe or not to believe)so in the case of ind(ction there is a choice)to tr(st ind(ctively6confir#ed state#ents, or not to tr(st the#. %at(re #ay or #ay not be s(ch as to vindicate o(r tr(st)in Ceichenbach9s lan (a e the world #ay or #ay not be -predictable,-E13F in .isdo#9s the (niverse #ay be -favorable- or -(n6 > 9" > favorable.-E13F .e are, in effect, invited to wa er on the for#er possibility, since the odds are heaviest on that side. /ltho( h neither of these a(thors believes hi#self to have solved the proble# e*actly as +(#e set it)both, in fact, a ree with +(#e9s #ain criticis#s)nevertheless each clai#s to have re#oved the proble#atic ele#ents fro# it. Ceichenbach speaks strai htforwardly of -the 7(stification of ind(ction which +(#e tho( ht i#possible,-E1AF while .isdo# solves the proble# only after -transfor#ation.-E1"F 1n both cases their concl(sions penetrate beneath i##ediate strate ic necessity to a #ore f(nda#ental level. ,here is a distinction to be #ade here between reco##endations as to strate y)the #a*i#i<in of the chances, ass(#in a re (lar (niverse in which we know less than we wo(ld like, as practiced in the theory of a#es)and concl(sions as to principle. :any a(thors stand behind the theory of probability as the best tool we have for (idin o(r practical decisions, and in this case the wa er re#ains (nchallen ed)it is what we act(ally (se. B(t this is not the point at iss(e. /s far as practical affairs were concerned, as was pointed o(t earlier, +(#e too knew and (sed the principle of ind(ction, and wo(ld no do(bt have been happy to learn and (se also #odern #ethods of probability. +e was aware that this fact #i ht be held a ainst hi#)a kind of ad hominem ar (#ent based on s(ch a discrepancy between belief and practice appears in nearly all treat#ents of the s(b7ect)and in the followin i#portant passa e fro# the 'n/uir" took preca(tions accordin ly: :y practice, yo( say, ref(tes #y do(bts. B(t yo( #istake the p(rport of #y @(estion. /s an a ent, 1 a# @(ite satisfied in the point; b(t as a philosopher, who has so#e share of c(riosity, 1 will not say scepticis#, 1 want to learn the fo(ndation of this inference.E14F ,he fo(ndation has been taken to lie in a #etaphysical principle)the Principle of the Unifor#ity of %at(re, of the Principle of 8(fficient Ceason, or the like. 8(ch principles can be (sed to 7(stify anythin ; happily, this kind of #etaphysics is increasin ly in disrep(te. ,he principle needed is #etaphysical, however, in Collin wood9s sense,E1?F in that it is an absol(te pres(pposition of scientific activity. 1t appears to #e (nfort(nate to s(ppose that a wa er can be properly (sed to 7(stify s(ch a principle. 1f we ask o(rselves what is the stat(s of a concept which is #ade the s(b7ect of an intellect(al wa er)what, for instance, the e*istence of Iod #eant to Pascal)we have to answer that it is that of so#ethin to which there is passionate attach#ent. Pascal already believed in Iod; the wa er was a rationali<ation of his belief for the benefit of his worldly friends. 8i#ilarly, when Ceichenbach says,

> 94 > 1t is better to try even in (ncertainty than not to try and be certain of ettin nothin ,E1=F or .isdo#, .e #(st not, however, sl(r over . . . the possibility that the (niverse is favo(rable,E19F one is not i#pressed with a conviction of en(ine (ncertainty, of en(ine do(bt as to the nat(re of thin s; these devices are #erely the best that can be done to provide visible s(pport for a belief which is already stron er than any s(ch devices co(ld possibly #ake it. ,oday we are not, #ost of (s, #oved by Pascal9s ar (#ent. 1f the ar (#ents of Ceichenbach and .isdo# appear #ore co#pellin , that is beca(se of o(r historical perspective. ,he conflict between reli ion and the world is #ore or less @(iescent; science, to ether with the philosophy of science, occ(pies an area of active concern. 1nd(ction has an i#portance to (s now that the e*istence of Iod has not; we are therefore #ore sy#pathetic to proposals for providin it with a lo ical fo(ndation. B(t the tr(th or falsity of the principle of ind(ction is not affected by o(r efforts, any #ore than the tr(th or falsity of the e*istence of Iod is. &lectin one side or the other, as a result of logical calculation , is in any case f(tile. / re (lar world, viewed sub s!ecie aeternitatis , is a fantastic i#probability; an irre (lar world, viewed fro# o(r te#poral standpoint, is e@(ally a fantastic i#probability. -1t is inco#prehensible,- says Pascal, -that Iod sho(ld e*ist, and it is inco#prehensible that +e sho(ld not e*ist.-E3!F 1n o(r niche of space and ti#e it see#s foolish not to tr(st the principle of ind(ction; in Pascal9s, it see#ed foolish to @(estion Iod9s e*istence. 1 do not do(bt that in his circ(#stances he was ri ht, and 1 do not do(bt that in o(r circ(#stances we are ri ht, b(t that ives (s no reason for clai#in the philosophical i##(tability of the principles to which we s(bscribe. .a ers are appropriate to li#ited ob7ectives, not to (lti#ate #etaphysical co##it#ents. %either Ceichenbach nor .isdo#, perhaps, intends to ive the i#pression that an (lti#ate #etaphysical co##it#ent is in #ind, b(t by brin in in the notion of the world in which series conver e to li#its coincident with -best posits,-E31F the (niverse in which re (larly (nfalsified hypotheses re#ain (nfalsified,E33F they have #oved into #etaphysical territory, where a#blin is o(t of place. ,he principle of ind(ction is left, therefore, (nverified, (nfalsified, and apparently e#pty and (seless. 8o#e critics #i ht be te#pted to say that this end co(ld have been reached #(ch #ore @(ickly by the > 9? > e#ploy#ent of a #eanin criterion, or so#ethin of that sort, which wo(ld have shown fro# the be innin that the principle co(ld say nothin . B(t that wo(ld have been appealin to one #ore (nnecessary ass(#ption. 1 have preferred to show the i#possibility of its lo ical proof in another way, by locatin it a#on the parado*es, and to show that so#e atte#pts at s(ch a proof, in fact, appeal to so#ethin @(ite apart fro# reason. ,his is far fro# sayin , of co(rse, that the principle is (ninterestin or (ni#portant. .hile it need not always do so, the discovery of a parado* #ay indicate a profo(nd tr(th. 1t was this, perhaps, that Una#(no had in #ind when he defined a parado* as -a proposition which is at least as evident as the syllo is#, only not as borin .> 9= >

:1 T#e Str-ct-re o& *isco'er(

1t has been widely held that, while lo ical analysis is appropriate to the 7(stification of clai#s to scientific knowled e, s(ch knowled e bein e*pressed in hypotheses havin e#pirical conse@(ences, it is not appropriate to an in@(iry into the way in which s(ch clai#s ori inate. O(estions abo(t ori ins are said to belon to the -conte*t of discovery- rather than to the -conte*t of 7(stification,- and to re@(ire a different kind of lo ic. ,he devisin of hypotheses is ascribed to eni(s, int(ition, i#a ination, chance, or any n(#ber of other e*tralo ical processes; it co#es to be re arded as a paradi # case of science in its a(thentic nat(ral state, inaccessible to lo ical reconstr(ction by philosophers who do not really know what it is like to be a scientist. Lne of the tactics #ost often (sed by proponents of the #ysti@(e of eni(s, who are always bandyin abo(t ter#s like creati-it"$ insight$ ri!eness , and so on, is the reco(ntin of tales abo(t #o#ents of enli hten#ent in the lives of the reat scientists. &verybody has heard of Hek(lP9s drea# abo(t the snakes bitin one another9s tails, and of PoincarP9s lon bo(t with the $(chsian f(nctions on his eolo ical b(s trip thro( h %or#andy. 8(ch stories no do(bt ive an acc(rate acco(nt of what -really happened-; they are s(itably sensitive to the -act(al develop#ent- of scientific theories. B(t to draw attention to the# at all in connection with an analysis of the process of discovery see#s to #e a radical #istake. ,he #istake involved shows (p clearly in a passa e fro# Popper9s The +ogic of Scientific 2isco-er" , where he says, -,he initial sta e, the act of conceivin or inventin a theory, see#s to #e neither to call for lo ical analysis nor to be s(sceptible of it. ,he ,his article is dedicated to the #e#ory of %orwood C(ssell +anson, vice6president of ///8 section K in 1941Q1943 and for #any years secretary of the section. > 99 > @(estion how it happens that a new idea occ(rs to a #an)whether it is a #(sical the#e, a dra#atic conflict, or a scientific theory)#ay be of reat interest to e#pirical psycholo y; b(t it is irrelevant to the lo ical analysis of scientific knowled e.-E1F Popper th(s dis#isses the possibility of a lo ical analysis of the conception or invention of a theory beca(se he thinks of these thin s in ter#s of -how it happens.- B(t in the case of ded(ctive ar (#ent nobody wo(ld think of askin how it happens; it wo(ld be the str(ct(re of the process, not its partic(lar e#bodi#ent in a partic(lar individ(al, that wo(ld be seen by everybody to be the cr(cial iss(e. 1n fact, in de#onstrative ar (#ent 7(st as in the process of discovery, there wo(ld be nothin stran e in its not happenin at all)the actual mo-ement fro# the pre#ises to a concl(sion is 7(st as int(itive, creative, and so on as the act(al havin of a new idea, and very st(pid or very st(bborn people, like the tortoise in Kewis Carroll9s fable, #ay @(ite well decline, or be (nable, to #ake it)b(t the fact that it failed to happen wo(ld not alter in any way the lo ical str(ct(re of the relationship between pre#ises and concl(sion. &ven if one wished to #aintain that, in the case of discovery, there are not any identifiable pre#ises 2or even any pre#ises at all)a strate y 1 have e*plored elsewhereE3F 5 one co(ld still choose to re ard the process as in principle intelli ible rather than (nintelli ible; what is dist(rbin abo(t the passa e fro# Popper is that he see#s to opt for the latter. 1n fact he says e*plicitly, -:y view #ay be e*pressed by sayin that every discovery contains 9an irrational ele#ent,9 or a 9creative int(ition,9 in Ber son9s sense.-E3F :y point is that if this is to be said of the process of discovery it #ay 7(st as well be said of the process of strict lo ical ded(ction, so we #i ht add to the canon e*citin tales abo(t that activity too. 1 hope 1

#ay be for iven an a(tobio raphical e*a#ple to try o(t this parallel. 1 re#e#ber very clearly the #o#ent when, as a schoolboy, 1 first (nderstood the principle of linear si#(ltaneo(s e@(ations. ,he circ(#stances are en raved in #y #e#ory 7(st as clearly as PoincarP9s foot on the step of the b(s beca#e en raved in his; it was in the yard of #y school, and 1 re#e#ber the red brick wall, the bicycle racks, and so on, in proper Pro(stian fashion. 1 saw, in a flash of int(ition, why two e@(ations were needed for two (nknowns, and how the s(bstit(tion fro# one e@(ation into the other proceeded. %ow, as 1 need hardly say, there was no @(estion of ori inality here; 1 had had all the infor#ation for a n(#ber of weeks, d(rin which #y #athe#atics teacher had been tryin to po(nd the principle into #y head. /s far as that oes, it wasn9t that 1 couldn't do si#(lataneo(s e@(ations)1 co(ld follow all the r(les and et the ri ht answer; it was 7(st that 1 hadn't seen the (nderlyin rationality of the process. .hen 1 finally saw it 1 ot the -&(reka > 1!! > feelin ,- of which Hoestler speaks,EAF 7(st as s(rely as if 1 had invented si#(ltaneo(s e@(ations #yself, b(t 1 didn9t s(ppose that that had anythin to do with the logic of the sit(ation. ,he tro(ble with -&(rekaB- is that the te#ptation to sho(t it is a very poor inde* of s(ccess in the enterprise at hand. 8(ch a feelin can onl" be a by6prod(ct of the process)a not (ni#portant one, perhaps, fro# so#e evol(tionary point of view, b(t certainly a dispensable one. / discovery wo(ld still be a discovery if it were #ade in cold blood witho(t any s(ch affective conco#itant, and if it t(rned o(t to be #istaken it wo(ld still be #istaken even tho( h the heavens had opened (pon the l(cky discoverer at the #o#ent of enli hten#ent. 1t is perhaps conceivable that so#ebody #i ht beco#e addicted to the &(reka feelin and, in order to have it as often as possible, try very hard to #ake #any discoveries, so#e of which #i ht be valid. B(t scientists have to learn to be wary of e#otional co##it#ents to their hypotheses. Darwin says, -1 have steadily endeavored to keep #y #ind free so as to ive (p any hypothesis, however #(ch beloved 2and 1 cannot resist for#in one on every s(b7ect5 as soon as facts are seen to be opposed to it. 1ndeed, 1 have had no choice b(t to act in this #anner, for with the e*ception of the Coral Ceefs, 1 cannot re#e#ber a sin le first6for#ed hypothesis which had not after a ti#e to be iven (p or reatly #odified.- /nd he contin(es, -,his has nat(rally led #e to distr(st reatly ded(ctive reasonin in the #i*ed sciences.-E"F /nother distinction fre@(ently drawn between the lo ic of 7(stification and the lo ic of discovery is that in the for#er case r(les can be iven. ,his is only apparently tr(e; on the one hand, altho( h in principle all ded(ctions can be carried o(t by a r(le6followin techni@(e, in practice ood lo icians and #athe#aticians are constantly #akin wild leaps only later 7(stified by r(les, if at all, while on the other hand certain workers)notably PolyaE4F )have #ade si nificant steps in the direction of for#(latin r(les for -pla(sible inference.- $re e was a#on the first to try to carry o(t lo ical ded(ctions strictly accordin to r(le, and he fo(nd it e*traordinarily diffic(lt, as he testifies in the preface to the 5egriffschrift .E?F 1f there were no r(les of pla(sible inference, nobody co(ld learn techni@(es of research, nor co(ld the a encies responsible for f(ndin it have any confidence whatever that the tasks (ndertaken by researchers wo(ld bear fr(it. 'et people do learn, and s(itably financed ca#pai ns of research 2like the :anhattan pro7ect5 do re (larly prod(ce res(lts. ,he task is then to find o(t what is oin on, not dis#iss it all as ineffable or #ysterio(s. 8cientists, as %orwood C(ssell +anson points o(t, -do not start fro# hypotheses; they start fro# data.-E=F ,he @(estion, then, is what happens between the data and the hypotheses, taken in that order )not

> 1!1 > whether a ded(ctive r(le can be written to et fro# the for#er to the latter, b(t whether so#e intelli ible str(ct(re can be discerned in the transition. 1 take -intelli ible- in this conte*t to be e@(ivalent to -lo ical-)a proced(re which certainly has ety#olo ical sanction, even if it #eans abandonin the narrower sense of -lo ical,- which re@(ires the specification of r(les. 1n fact it need not #ean this, if we re#e#ber that the (se of -lo ic- in the e*pression -ind(ctive lo ic- is a perfectly orthodo* one, and that it sanctions a (se of -r(le- in the e*pression -ind(ctive r(le- which differs considerably in its connotations fro# the correspondin (se in the ded(ctive case. .e have co#e to think of ded(ctive r(les as effecti-e !rocedures , leadin with certainty to the ri ht res(lt. 1n the ind(ctive case, however, we have to et acc(sto#ed to r(les which lead, with finite probability, to the wron res(lt. .hen people say -there co(ld be no r(le for #akin discoveries,- they enerally have the first sense of the ter# in #ind: there co(ld be no way of being sure of #akin discoveries. B(t there #i ht still be sets of r(les, which, if faithf(lly followed, wo(ld increase the chances of #akin the#. ,hese, as ind(ctive lo icians have be (n to reali<e, #ay incl(de r(les of acceptance as well as r(les of inference. ,he #anner of their i#ple#entation 2their relation to r(les of practice5 needs f(rther st(dy, b(t it is not #y p(rpose to p(rs(e the @(estion f(rther here.

A ,odel &or *isco'er(

+ow do hypotheses arise0 ,he answer 1 wish to s( est is that, strictly speakin , they arise naturall" ; hypotheses are to be acco(nted for in the sa#e #anner as the events they seek to e*plain)indeed the hypothesis that this is so has arisen in this way. ,he evidence for this hypothesis is of co(rse far fro# concl(sive; while 1 think it preferable to any alternative which calls (pon nonnat(ral occ(rrences, it wo(ld ad#ittedly be diffic(lt to show that no s(ch occ(rrences were involved in the process 27(st as it wo(ld be diffic(lt to show this for ded(ctive ar (#ents5. B(t if a #odel can be constr(cted within which the e#er ence of hypotheses follows obvio(sly fro# other properties of the #odel, the nonnat(ral ele#ent will be shown to be dispensable, 7(st as it #i ht be shown to be dispensable in ded(ctive ar (#ents by re#arkin that anybody can follow the r(les. 8(ch a #odel can, 1 think, be p(t to ether fro# a n(#ber of disparate so(rces. 1t shows that, iven certain facts abo(t h(#an bein s and h(#an c(lt(res, there is nothin odd abo(t the e#er ence of science or abo(t the rate of its develop#ent, or abo(t the fact that so#e of those who have contrib(ted to this develop#ent have been eni(ses. > 1!3 > ,he #odel, it is tr(e, ives the #ain part of its acco(nt in collective rather than in individ(al ter#s) b(t that has now beco#e co##onplace, since the analysis of individ(al discoveries has shown that, in practically every case, the individ(al acted as the catalyst for a co#ple* process in which #any other individ(als played a role. ,his need not be taken to #ean that no credit is d(e the individ(al for havin advanced a partic(lar science in a partic(lar way at a partic(lar ti#e, b(t it does #ean that 2probably5 no individ(al has been indispensable to the advance of science in eneral. -Mery si#ple6#inded people think that if %ewton had died pre#at(rely we wo(ld still be at o(r wits9 end to acco(nt for the fall of apples,- says :edawar.E9F .e #(st be able to find a way of reconcilin o(r ad#iration for %ewton with the avoidance of this #istake. 1 #ake no apolo y for be innin #y e*position of this theory of discovery with Bacon, whose #ethod has, 1 believe, been #is(nderstood in i#portant respects. ,he feat(re of the #ethod which has always str(ck #e #ost forcibly occ(rs in book 3 of the &o-um 3rganum ,E1!F where, after the constr(ction of

the ind(ctive ,ables, Bacon says 2aphoris# **5, /nd yet since tr(th will sooner co#e fro# error than fro# conf(sion 1 think it e*pedient that the (nderstandin sho(ld have per#ission, after the three ,ables of $irst Presentation 2s(ch as 1 have e*hibited5 have been #ade and wei hed, to #ake an essay of the 1nterpretation of %at(re in the affir#ative way; on the stren th both of the instances iven in the ,ables, and of any others it #ay #eet with elsewhere. .hich kind of essay 1 call the Indulgence of the ,nderstanding or the *ommencement of Inter!retation or the %irst #intage . ,his is strikin ly si#ilar to Darwin9s re#ark in the introd(ction to The 3rigin of S!ecies , where he says, -1t occ(rred to #e, in 1=3?, that so#ethin #i ht perhaps be #ade o(t on this @(estion by patiently acc(#(latin and reflectin on all sorts of facts which co(ld possibly have any bearin on it. /fter five years9 work 1 allowed #yself to spec(late on the s(b7ect.-E11F +e re#arks elsewhereE13F that he worked on -tr(e Baconian principles,- a clai# which is denied by a n(#ber of co##entators who have not read Bacon as closely as Darwin hi#self evidently did. ,here is a hint of the sa#e kind of thin in $re e9s concern not to 7(#p to concl(sions in the co(rse of his lo ical work. ,he tr(th to which 1 think these and other citations point is that the practical proble# is often one not so #(ch of findin hypotheses as of holdin the# in check. Bacon9s (se of a word like -ind(l ence,- and Darwin9s of the phrase -1 allowed #yself,- s( est that, once the evidence is in, there is si#ply no need of a r(le for ettin the hypothe6 > 1!3 > sis)it has lon since for#ed and is only waitin to be reco ni<ed. 2Ce#e#ber Darwin9s co##ent: -1 cannot resist for#in one on every s(b7ect.-5 B(t two @(estions i##ediately present the#selves: By what #echanis# of tho( ht did the hypothesis co#e into bein 0 /nd, if it is a nat(ral process, why isn9t everybody a eni(s0 21t was Bacon9s fail(re to reco ni<e that everybody is not a eni(s which constit(ted the chief weakness in his pro ra# for #akin the #ethods of science available to the pop(lation at lar e.5 /s for everybody9s not bein a eni(s, the answer #ay be that everybody above a certain level of nat(ral intelli ence in principle is, (ntil inhibitin factors s(pervene)which al#ost always happens. 1t #ay be worth #akin a #ore eneral point here abo(t a habit of tho( ht into which philosophers of science so#eti#es fall)a habit d(e lar ely, 1 s(spect, to the infl(ence of +(#e9s analysis of ca(sality. .e think of events as in eneral bein made to happen 2and ask what antecedent events !roduced the#5, rather than as 7(st ha!!ening 2in which case the relevant @(estion wo(ld be what antecedent events, by failin to happen, failed to prevent the#5. 1t is noticeable however that, when scientists perfor# delicate e*peri#ents, they e*pend their ener y not on #akin s(re that the desired o(tco#e occ(rs b(t on tryin to #ake s(re that so#e (ndesirable o(tco#e does not occ(r; they take e*peri#ental preca(tions a ainst %at(re, rather than ivin e*peri#ental enco(ra e#ent to %at(re. 8i#ilarly, when en a ed in lo ical ar (#ent we don9t really need a r(le to tell (s how to proceed; what we chiefly need is a kind of sin le6#inded concentration that keeps o(t irrelevant tho( hts, and a facility for spottin wron #oves. ,he #otive power of the enterprise doesn9t co#e fro# the r(les) they 7(st keep it on the rails. C(les, it is tr(e, can play a leadin rather than a (idin part when the #otive power is co#paratively (nintelli ent, as in co#p(ters, b(t the critical thin see#s to be to let the #achinery r(n. ,his view is f(lly in keepin with the fact, fre@(ently re#arked (pon, that the process of discovery #ay be (nconscio(s: the scientist wakes (p the ne*t #ornin )or, in st(bborn cases like PoincarP9s, a week or so later)with the re@(ired sol(tion. .hether or not all the steps are

conscio(s is irrelevant to the @(estion of whether or not they are lo ical. 1f we are to ad#it bio raphical evidence, the point abo(t inhibitin factors 2and, on the other side of the coin, sti#(latin ones5 #ay be ill(strated by the fact that #any eni(ses have been characteri<ed by a stron resistance to a(thority 2that is, resistance to havin their concl(sions drawn for the#5 and, at the sa#e ti#e, by an openness to rando# s( estion a#o(ntin al#ost to cred(lity. &rnest GonesE13F observes this with respect to $re(d, and DarwinE1AF observes it with respect to hi#self. Lrdinary social e*perience, and especially ed(cation, work, > 1!A > of co(rse, in precisely the opposite sense, i#posin , even in the #ost well6#eanin of de#ocracies, an e*traordinarily a(thoritarian view of the world and, at the sa#e ti#e, enco(ra in the belief that people sho(ld be selective abo(t what they take in, and skeptical abo(t all evidence fro# nona(thoritarian so(rces. ,hese tendencies alone wo(ld be eno( h to acco(nt for the inhibition of discoveries in all b(t a handf(l of the pop(lation at any iven ti#e. ,he hypothesis e#er es nat(rally only when all the evidence is in)the concl(sion follows only fro# a co#plete or al#ost co#plete set of pre#ises. 1 add -al#ost co#plete- beca(se there is a powerf(l )estalt pheno#enon to be observed here: clos(re is so#eti#es proc(red by the addition of a pre#ise which is the obvio(sly #issin one, the only one which fits in with the rest of the pattern. Lften, however, not even this #(ch is re@(ired. All the pre#ises for the hypothesis of the ori in of species thro( h nat(ral selection were present both for Darwin and for .allace, and, once they had the# all 2incl(din the indispensable contrib(tion fro# :alth(s5, they both ot the point at once. %ow there is of co(rse no effective way of ever bein s(re that one has all the pre#ises. B(t in this respect, also, the lo ic of discovery is in precisely the sa#e boat as ded(ctive lo ic: the r(les there do not yield the pre#ises either, they only yield the concl(sion once the pre#ises have been provided. .hat are the pre#ises which lead to a scientific discovery0 .here do they co#e fro#0 /t this point, in the literat(re, the search for a lo ic of discovery fre@(ently ets thrown off the scent by the insertion of a reat deal of irrelevant talk abo(t #otivation, perple*ity, or crisis; it is tho( ht necessary to point o(t that discoveries do not happen if there is not so#e proble# with the science we already have. ,his kind of thin is not only conf(sin b(t downri ht #isleadin . 1t s( ests, a ain, a sp(rio(s difference between ded(ctive lo ic and the lo ic of discovery. 1n fact, of co(rse, nobody wo(ld carry o(t ded(ctions either if there were not so#e reason to do so)and if that reason often a#o(nts to nothin #ore than a passion for #athe#atics, havin no direct relevance to the sol(tion of any practical proble#, a si#ilar passion for investi ation into nat(re has acco(nted for a reat deal of ind(ctive pro ress too. ,he pre#ises in @(estion are of two principal kinds: on the one hand there are theories and observations #ade and confir#ed by previo(s workers, and, on the other, observations not ade@(ately covered by earlier theories, #ade by or co##(nicated to the discoverer. ,he discovery consists, of co(rse, in the provision of an ade@(ate theory to cover these new observations. Pre#ises of the for#er kind are part of the inheritance of the scientist, tho( h findin the# #ay involve a > 1!" > search of the literat(re. ,hose of the latter kind #ay co#e fro# plain observation or fro# e*peri#ent; they #ay co#e into the possession of the scientist @(ite by accident, in a dis (ised for#, and so on. 1t is at this sta e)in the provision of the pre#ises, rather than in the str(ct(re of the ar (#ent)that the

notorio(s (ncertainty of the process of discovery arises, that serendipity plays a part, and so on. By far the #ost i#portant contrib(tion, however, is #ade by what 1 have spoken of as the scientist9s -inheritance,- altho( h it #i ht be better to (se the enetic ter# rather than the le al one and speak instead of -heredity.- %ewton9s celebrated re#ark abo(t -standin on the sho(lders of iants-E1"F re#inds (s that the develop#ent of science is a stepwise process; nobody starts fro# scratch, and nobody ets very far ahead of the rest. /t any point in history there is a ran e of possible discovery; the trailin ed e of the ran e is defined by everythin known at the ti#e 21 overlook here the fact that people are constantly -discoverin - what is already known, which bl(rs this ed e so#ewhat5, and the leadin ed e is a f(nction of what is already known, to ether with variables representin available instr(#entation, the capacity of h(#an brains, and so on. B(t, within the ran e, all #ove#ent is not forward)@(ite the contrary. .hile the #ind #oves with a kind of s(b7ective conviction and 2as it pers(ades itself5 (nerrin ly to its ind(ctive concl(sion, that concl(sion is not always the discovery it is tho( ht to be. ,here #ay be several reasons for this: the -discovery,- if it fits the facts, #ay have been #ade before; if it does not fit the#, that #ay be beca(se there are still, witho(t the scientist9s knowin it, so#e #issin pre#ises 2so#e fact not known, so#e previo(sly established theory not taken into acco(nt5, or it #ay be 7(st beca(se so#eone has #ade a #istake. 1n order to et a clear pict(re of scientific discovery the acco(nt has to be broadened so#ewhat to take into consideration the pop(lation of scientific workers at the ti#e, to ether with the nat(re of the develop#ent of science. ,he best analo y for this develop#ent is a ain a enetic one: G(st as #(tations arise nat(rally b(t are not all beneficial, so hypotheses e#er e nat(rally b(t are not all correct. 1f pro ress is to occ(r, therefore, we re@(ire a s(perfl(ity of hypotheses and also a #echanis# of selection. /t any iven epoch in the develop#ent of science)to deal with the first re@(ire#ent first)hypotheses are in fact e#er in at a #(ch hi her rate than one #i ht s(spect fro# readin s(bse@(ent historical acco(nts. .e all know abo(t Darwin and .allace, for e*a#ple; b(t how #any of the h(ndreds of other well6#eanin nat(ralists of the #iddle nineteenth cent(ry, all tacklin the proble# of the persistence or #(tability of species, are now re#e#bered0 1t #ay be (sef(l in this connection to draw attention to a well6known > 1!4 > pheno#enon which is #ore relevant to the develop#ent of science than #ost of (s perceive it to be) na#ely, the pheno#enon of the crackpot. .e are acc(sto#ed to thinkin of the advance#ent of science in ter#s of the half do<en reat na#es in a iven field; on reflection we #ay see that these half do<en are s(pple#ented by a tho(sand or so workin in #ore obsc(re laboratories. B(t we sho(ld also re#e#ber that there are #yriads of people spec(latin , enerally in a half6infor#ed way, abo(t the sa#e topics fro# #yriads of private vanta e points; the occasional wild #anifestos we all receive, showin how #is (ided Darwin and &instein were, represent a #ere fraction of their o(tp(t. 1n every epoch so#ethin like this has one on, and the (nrecorded history of (ns(ccessf(l spec(lation wo(ld swa#p co#pletely the history of science as we know it if it co(ld ever be added to the literat(re. Uns(ccessf(l hypotheses are weeded o(t, of co(rse, by their fail(re to s@(are with the facts, or if they can be #ade to do that, by their fail(re to be predictive. B(t in this connection certain social factors tend to interfere with the evol(tionary pattern, 7(st as they do in the biolo ical case. G(st as the children of rich fa#ilies #ay, (nder a less than e@(itable social syste#, be co#paratively better protected a ainst the hostility of the environ#ent than the children of poor ones, so so#e theories prod(ced (nder powerf(l sponsorship #ay have a lon er r(n than they deserve. Despite the fact that parallels present the#selves so readily, there are a co(ple of p(<<lin thin s abo(t the develop#ent of science that #ake this evol(tionary analo y s(spect. $irst of all, there is the

fantastic rate of its rowth in the last three or fo(r cent(ries, @(ite (nlike the leis(rely pace at which biolo ical adaptation (s(ally proceeds. 8econd, there is the re#arkable fact, doc(#ented in the work of Cobert :erton and others,E14F that virt(ally all valid discoveries 2let alone incorrect hypotheses5 have been #ade by #ore than one worker, so#eti#es by #any, while so#e reat scientists appear to have #ade far #ore than their fair share of s(ch discoveries. Clearly a rando#6#(tation, :endelian evol(tionary #odel will not do.

T#e E'ol-tio% o& Scie%ce

/t this point it wo(ld be convenient to introd(ce so#e statistical analysis 2already hinted at by the reference to :erton9s work on #(ltiple discoveries5 to show how a iven fre@(ency of theoretical interest in a pop(lation, pres(#ed to yield a rather s#aller fre@(ency of correct con7ect(res)these to be selected by the hostility of the e*peri#ental environ#ent towards false theories)wo(ld acco(nt for the develop6 > 1!? > #ent of science. Unfort(nately the necessary statistical apparat(s has not been worked o(t, since statisticians have concentrated their attention on :endelian enetics, whereas the for# of enetic theory re@(ired for this p(rpose is clearly Ka#arckian. ,he acc(#(lated e#pirical and theoretical knowled e passed on fro# one eneration of scientists to another co(nts as an ac@(ired characteristic, the fr(it of direct adaptation rather than of #(tation. ,o #ake #atters worse, the pattern of reprod(ction is @(ite evidently not se*(al. 1 can offer one or two f(rther enetic analo ies)for e*a#ple, it is easy to find parts of theory behavin like do#inant characteristics, in that they e*cl(de or s(bs(#e alternative views, and others behavin like recessive ones, in that they are passed on with the rest of the inherited #aterial b(t do not beco#e i#portant (ntil they are con7oined with so#e other factor)b(t 1 have not been able to work o(t the details of the appropriate #odel. 8till 1 think the eneral evol(tionary point holds. Discoveries represent a kind of adaptation which is al#ost bo(nd to occ(r in a n(#ber of individ(als if they are s(b7ected to ro( hly si#ilar environ#ental press(res, the environ#ent in this case bein an intellect(al one. :edawar, in an e*chan e with /rth(r Hoestler abo(t the latter9s book, The Act of *reation , re#arks, 8cientists on the sa#e road #ay be e*pected to arrive at the sa#e destination, often not far apart. Co#antics like Hoestler don9t like to ad#it this, beca(se it see#s to the# to dero ate fro# the a(thority of eni(s. ,h(s of %ewton and Keibni<, e@(al first with the differential calc(l(s, Hoestler says -the reatness of this acco#plish#ent is hardly di#inished by the fact that two a#on #illions, instead of one a#on #illions, had the e*ceptional eni(s to do it.- B(t #illions weren9t tr"ing for the calc(l(s. 1f they had been, h(ndreds wo(ld have ot it.E1?F ,hat is as close to backin on the statistical point as 1 a# likely to co#e for the #o#ent. 1t is notorio(sly diffic(lt to confir# co(nterfact(als of this sort, b(t there does see# to be a practical sense in what :edawar says, borne o(t by the tendency of vario(s a encies to bo#bard scientists with research rants in an e*pectation of res(lts at least co#parable to that of eneticists bo#bardin 2roso!hila with a##a rays. 1 have now sketched the #ain o(tlines of a possible #odel for scientific discovery. B(t there are two i#portant co#ponents still #issin )na#ely, so#e e*planation, on the one hand, of the tendency of the h(#an #ind to prod(ce hypotheses at all and, on the other, of the tendency of so#e reat #inds to prod(ce #any correct ones. Iiven that hypotheses are in fact prod(ced, in a s(fficiently prodi al

fashion to provide the ro(nds for nat(ral selection and conse@(ently for the ori in of new theories, how are we to acco(nt for the pheno#enon0 1t > 1!= > is not enli htenin in this connection to talk abo(t eni(s. ,o talk abo(t i#a ination is a little better, altho( h, as Peirce re#arks in an essay on Hepler,- 91#a ination9 is an ocean6broad ter#, al#ost #eanin less, so #any and so diverse are its species.-E1=F 1 have already #ade reference to stresses fro# the intellect(al environ#ent, s( estin a theory of -necessity as the #other of invention,- b(t that certainly cannot be carried thro( h for a lar e)perhaps the reater)proportion of scientific discoveries. Ket #e deal first with the special point abo(t the disproportionate n(#ber of discoveries #ade by reat scientists, and then o on to the #ore eneral, and concl(din , point abo(t the basic #echanis#. Lbvio(sly no acco(nt which i nored -the distinctive role of scientific eni(s,- as :erton calls it, can be considered satisfactory; b(t the ter# genius , #eanin ori inally the spirit assi ned at birth to (ide a child9s destiny, can now be ad#itted, if at all, only to describe people who have already proved the#selves in the b(siness of #akin discoveries, not to describe so#e potentiality they had before they started. ,here are clearly enetic deter#inants involved, havin to do with brain capacity and other characteristics nor#ally distrib(ted in the pop(lation, with respect to which the eni(s will be fo(nd to lie (nder the ri ht6hand sho(lder of the bell6shaped c(rve, b(t none of the#, nor any co#bination, can be e@(ated with scientific eni(s, since a lot of si#ilarly endowed people will be fo(nd livin nor#al lives as stockbrokers, lawyers, and so on. Lnce a ain, what #akes people eni(ses has nothin whatever to do with the lo ic they e#ploy; and the point 1 wish to stress is that the discoverer needs no special lo ical endow#ent, no ba of creative tricks, in order to rise to the little e#inence which, in the lon historical view, he or she occ(pies for s(ch a short ti#e. 1 say -little e#inence- not to #ini#i<e the respect we owe to eni(s)fro# close (p, after all, we can properly refer to &instein as a -towerin eni(s-)b(t to reinforce the point #ade earlier abo(t the co#paratively narrow ran e within which at any ti#e scientific discoveries can be #ade. ,he for#ation of a scientific eni(s, in fact, is co#parable to the for#ation of an Lly#pic r(nner, or a tennis or chess cha#pion. ,he chess analo y is a (sef(l one; chess is, after all, a strictly ded(ctive a#e, and all it takes to win every ti#e is the ability to do a few billion calc(lations in the head within the period le ally allowed for a #ove. 1#a ine a chess a#e in which there are so#e concealed pieces, #oved by a third player, which infl(ence the possible #oves of the pieces on the board, and i#a ine that, instead of si*teen pieces to a side, there are several #illion, so#e overned by r(les of play not yet known to the players. 1n s(ch a a#e a player who, after a lon apprenticeship with the e*6 > 1!9 > perts, #ade three or fo(r ood #oves d(rin a lifeti#e career wo(ld have ained a place in history. ,he kind of inference reat scientists e#ploy in their creative #o#ents is co#parable to the kind of inference the #aster at chess e#ploys; it involves an ability to keep a lot of variables in #ind at once, to be sensitive to feedback fro# tentative calc(lations 2or e*peri#ents5, to assess strate ies for the deploy#ent of ti#e and reso(rces, to perceive the relevance of one fact to another, or of a hypothesis to facts. ,he difference between their lo ic and o(rs is one of de ree, not of kind; we e#ploy precisely the sa#e #ethods, b(t #ore cl(#sily and on #ore ho#ely tasks. 1 wish to concl(de by considerin

so#e cr(cial properties of the co##on lo ical #echanis# with which we are all e@(ipped, which e*plain, 1 think, the nat(ral tendency for hypotheses to e#er e, and in this connection to call on two diverse kinds of evidence, one fro# psycholo y and one fro# anthropolo y.

Ps(c#olo$( a%d Str-ct-ralis/

Ln the psycholo ical side, Berlyne has recently drawn attention to a for# of behavior a#on hi her ani#als which he calls -e*ploration.- Under this headin , he says, #ay be ro(ped activities describable as -c(riosity- and -play,- or, in a h(#an settin , as -recreation,- -entertain#ent,- -art,- or even -science.- ,his kind of activity is not ind(l ed in beca(se of its (tilitarian val(e, altho( h it so#eti#es has (sef(l by6prod(cts. -/n ani#al lookin and sniffin aro(nd #ay st(#ble (pon a cl(e to the whereabo(ts of food. / scientist9s discovery #ay contrib(te to p(blic a#enity and his own enrich#ent or fa#e. :(ch of the ti#e, however, or anis#s do nothin in partic(lar abo(t the sti#(l(s patterns that they p(rs(e with s(ch avidity. ,hey appear to seek the# 9for their own sake.9-E19F Berlyne offers two lines of e*planation for this e*ploratory activity. Lne of the# is the conventional one of response to necessity, leadin to -specific- e*ploration. ,he second, and #ore interestin , at least fro# the point of view of the proble# of discovery, deals with what Berlyne calls -diversive- e*ploration. 1t see#s that the central nervo(s syste# of a hi her ani#al is desi ned to cope with environ#ents that prod(ce a certain rate of infl(* of sti#(lation, infor#ation, and challen e to its capacities. 1t will nat(rally not perfor# at its best in an environ#ent that overstresses or overloads it, b(t we also have evidence that prolon ed s(b7ection to an inordinately #onotono(s or (nsti#(latin environ#ent is detri#ental to a variety of psycholo ical f(nctions. .e can (nderstand why or anis#s #ay seek > 11! > o(t sti#(lation that ta*es the nervo(s syste# to the ri ht e*tent, when nat(rally occ(rrin sti#(li are either too easy or too diffic(lt to assi#ilate. 1t looks, therefore, as if a certain kind of nondirected e*ploratory behavior is to be e*pected, both when the e*terior world is too e*citin 2the intellect(al withdraws into the ivory tower5 and when it is not e*citin eno( h 2the e*plorer sets off to con@(er new territories5. %ow science is #anifestly not the only possible kind of h(#an e*ploration, even on the intellect(al level, and this 1 think has to be reco ni<ed if scientific discovery is to be p(t in its proper conte*t. ,he notion that tr(e hypotheses e#er e fro# the welter of spec(lation by a process of nat(ral selection 2the condition of s(rvival bein a ree#ent with e#pirical evidence5 can be e*tended by analo y to the e#er ence of science itself fro# a welter of nat(ral #ental activity. ,he final co#ponent of #y #odel owes its inspiration to the work of the str(ct(ralists, notably Cla(de KPvi68tra(ss, altho( h it is an e*tension rather than a si#ple invocation of their views. KPvi68tra(ss observes, fro# the anthropolo ist9s point of view, a pheno#enon e*actly analo o(s to that observed by Berlyne fro# the psycholo ist9s. Pri#itive people, alon with their tote#s and their #yths, t(rn o(t to have an e*traordinarily rich lore of a kind that can only be called scientific, since it represents a body of hypotheses abo(t the nat(ral world linked in so#e pri#itively acceptable way to a body of observations. ,his -science of the concrete,- as KPvi68tra(ss calls it, is not, in his words, -of #(ch practical effect.- B(t then -its #ain p(rpose is not a practical one. 1t #eets intellect(al re@(ire#ents rather than or instead of satisfyin needs. ,he real @(estion is not whether the to(ch of a woodpecker9s beak does in fact c(re toothache. 1t is rather whether there is a point of view fro# which a woodpecker9s beak and a #an9s tooth can be seen as 9 oin to ether9 . . . and whether so#e initial

order can be introd(ced into the (niverse by #eans of these ro(pin s.-E3!F ,his line of work is one which 1 think is at the #o#ent of reat interest and pro#ise. .hat e#er es fro# it is a view of #ind as a str(ct(rin a ent, which p(ts to ether a world of tho( ht co#parable in its co#ple*ity to the world of e*perience, th(s satisfyin the opti#(# conditions of #ental activity described by Berlyne. ,he chief a ency of str(ct(re is, of co(rse, lan (a e. Lf the vario(s constr(ctions #ade possible by lan (a e, science co(nts as only one, and initially en7oys no special advanta e over #yth. B(t so#eti#es what it says t(rns o(t to be tr(e 2the herb really does c(re the disease5, and altho( h it is a lon step fro# the tr(th of a report of practice to a en(inely theoretical > 111 > tr(th, this reali<ation is the startin point of the process of scientific develop#ent. / story told for no other initial p(rpose than to keep #ind in a kind of dyna#ic balance with the world, to assert it over a ainst the world, t(rns o(t to hold the cl(e to control of the world. Lther people contin(e to tell stories for other p(rposes, and the acc(#(lation of speciali<ed lin (istic habits, speciali<ed techni@(es, and so on, #ay soon pers(ade scientists that they are no lon er like the others b(t en a ed on a different @(est with its own creative character. 1t is tr(e that scientists, on the whole, care #ore than other people do that the stories they tell sho(ld be tr(e; b(t then tr(th itself is a co#parative lateco#er on the lin (istic scene, and it is certainly a #istake to s(ppose that lan (a e was invented for the p(rpose of tellin it. 8cientific theories are no lon er created e( nihilo ; the stories scientists tell are not free inventions. 1f the creative process starts fro# a very lar e set of pre#ises already de#onstrated to be tr(e, its concl(sion has a reater chance of bein tr(e than it wo(ld have if the process had started, like the con7ect(re of the pri#itive, fro# a rando# assort#ent of propositions indifferently tr(e and false. .hen the concl(sion is shown to be tr(e by co#parison with the evidence, we call the invention a discovery. 2-$or#(las are invented,- as B(n e p(ts it, -b(t laws are discovered.-E31F 5 ,he #a7or point 1 have wished to #ake can be s(##ed (p in this way: 1n the creative process, as in the process of de#onstration, science has no special lo ic b(t shares the str(ct(re of h(#an tho( ht in eneral, and tho( ht proceeds, in creation as in de#onstration, accordin to perfectly intelli ible principles. $or#al lo ic, whose history as a ri oro(s syste# started with $re e and ended with ITdel, represents a refine#ent and speciali<ation of the principles of everyday ar (#ent; the lo ic of scientific discovery, whose ri oro(s for#(lation is yet to be achieved 2not that it holds o(t the hope of co#pleteness once entertained by ded(ctive lo ic5, will si#ilarly prove to be a refine#ent and speciali<ation of the lo ic of everyday invention. ,he i#portant thin to reali<e is that invention is, in its strictest sense, as fa#iliar a process as ar (#ent, no #ore and no less #ysterio(s. Lnce we et this into o(r heads, scientific creativity will have been won back fro# the #ystery6#on ers. > 113 >

;1 I%d-ctio% a%d t#e )i%d%ess o& Nat-re

1n his essay entitled -1nd(ction and &#piricis#,-E1F Irover :a*well proposes a radical sol(tion to what he calls -this notorio(s proble#, the proble# of ind(ction, or the proble# of nonded(ctive inference, or the proble# of confir#ation or corroboration)ter# it however we #ay.-E3F ,he character of the sol(tion is presented in the openin sentences of the paper: -,he theory of confir#ation sketched herein is s(b7ectivist in a #anner that will be e*plained. /ccordin to it,

however, the degree of confirmation of a hypothesis is an ob7ectively e*istin relati-e fre/uenc" 2or a !ro!ensit" , if one prefers5. ,he resol(tion of this apparent parado* is si#ple, b(t its i#plications are, 1 believe, profo(nd.-E3F ,he si#ple resol(tion of which :a*well speaks consists of havin the reference classes over which relative fre@(ency is to be specified be the#selves classes of hypotheses which are -like- a iven hypothesis, or classes of occasions when events -like- certain other events occ(r. ,he deli#itation of these classes involves inescapably s(b7ective factors havin to do with the 7(d #ent of likeness b(t also with the reco nition of the pattern hypothesis in the first place and the assi n#ent to it of a prior probability. B(t once these thin s are in place the relative fre@(ency is a #atter of co(ntin and is not s(b7ective at all. ,he strate y of e*tendin relative fre@(ency deter#inations to events in the do#ain of the philosophy of science 2involvin hypotheses and other tho( ht ob7ects5, rather than li#itin the# as #i ht nor#ally be e*pected to the do#ains of the partic(lar sciences the#selves 2involvin physical ob7ects and their properties5, as a #eans of tacklin > 113 > @(estions abo(t ind(ction has always had a stron appeal for #e. 1t once occ(rred to #e, for e*a#ple, to ar (e for what 1 called the -parado* of ind(ction- alon the followin lines: let / be an atte#pt to 7(stify the principle of ind(ction and let U be the predicate -(ns(ccessf(l-; then all /9s so far observed have been U; therefore 2by the principle of ind(ction5 the ne*t and all s(bse@(ent /9s will probably be U; therefore the principle of ind(ction will probably re#ain (n7(stified.EAF :a*well9s ar (#ent, however, is not only #ore profo(nd b(t also 1 s(spect #ore serio(s than this. .hat he is dealin with is not the #eta#etaproble# of atte#pts to 7(stify the principle of ind(ction b(t the #etaproble# of findin hypotheses to whose confir#ation to apply it. ,his is not 7(st the old lo ic of discovery ar (#ent, altho( h :a*well does #ake a est(re in the direction of the ineffability of retrod(ction by citin &instein9s -free, creative leap of the #ind.-E"F +ow we co#e by the hypotheses in the reference class is not the point at iss(e; it is rather a @(estion of what sorts of hypothesis they are when we have ot the#. ,he f(nction of a hypothesis is to for# the startin point for inferences 2not all of which need be ded(ctive, so that :a*well prefers the e*pression -hypothetico6inferential- to the #ore fa#iliar -hypothetico6ded(ctive-5. / scientifically (sef(l hypothesis will be one that has testable conse@(ences and is therefore falsifiable. B(t this is only a necessary and not a s(fficient condition, since indefinitely #any falsifiable b(t irrelevant hypotheses can be enerated at will. 1t is also re@(ired that the testable conse@(ences be s(ch that if they are not in fact false they have so#e sort of episte#ic (tility, throwin li ht on the behavior and interrelations of thin s in the world. ,he ood hypothesis is one that is falsifiable b(t has not in spite of o(r best efforts act(ally been falsified. /nd it #(st have been worth o(r best efforts. %ow iven the restlessness and fec(ndity of the h(#an #ind when the inventive #ood is (pon it, hypotheses wo(ld see# to proliferate contin(ally and endlessly, for#in an indefinitely lar e class 2and potentially an infinitely lar e one5 of which, with respect to a iven e*planand(#, only one #e#ber can be tr(e, ass(#in so#e #(t(al e*cl(sivity in for#(lation. Do we have any chance of findin that one0 Ket #e @(ote :a*well at len th, beca(se this is the central point in his ar (#ent: Ket (s not #ake the #istake of 2tacitly5 applyin a principle of indifference and assi nin e@(al probabilities to each of these bewilderin possibilities and, th(s, concl(din that we have <ero probability of hittin (pon the theory that is tr(e. . . . $or all we know, we ma" hit (pon the tr(e theory 2or one -close to the tr(th-5 after a few falsifications 2or even after none5 in a si<able portion of o(r atte#pts to e*pand o(r knowled e. P(t in this way, this

(ne*ceptionable state#ent #i ht see# a(stere > 11A > eno( h to avoid offendin even the #ost rabid anti67(stificationist. B(t reflection soon forces (pon (s the central$ most crucial , and no do(bt for #any, the most awful fact of the entire e!istemological enter!rise: if we are to ha-e an a!!reciable amount of nontri-ial knowledge 2or$ e-en$ of true beliefs 5, we 1,ST hit u!on fairl" often the true theor" or h"!othesis 2or one reasonably close to the tr(th5 after a relati-el" tin" number of trials . . . . Time is too short for us to sift through 2(sin falsifications to eli#inate the chaff5 more than an insignificantl" small number of the infinite number of !ossibilities alwa"s sanctioned b" the data we ha!!en to ha-e . . . . ,his state#ent of this -awf(l- fact 2s(rely it is, rather, a wonderf(l one5 is e@(ivalent to sayin that, if si nificant knowled e is possible, the relati-e fre/uenc" of s(ccesses a#on h(#an atte#pts at knowled e accretion #(st be very hi h indeed, iven the possibilities of fail(re.E4F Lne thin to be noticed here before conf(sion sets in is that we are already talkin abo(t two classes of hypotheses, not 7(st one: the class of alternative hypotheses in a iven case, only one of which can be tr(e, which is not a reference class for relative fre@(ency p(rposes, and the class of hypotheses like the pattern hypothesis, #any of which #ay be tr(e 2beca(se each applies to a different case5, which is s(ch a reference class. 1t is the hi h fre@(ency of tr(e hypotheses in this latter class that constit(tes the awf(l or wonderf(l fact referred to in the citation above. :a*well9s clai# is that beca(se the class of hypotheses like the pattern hypothesis is a reference class for relative fre@(ency p(rposes we can apply Bayes9s theore# in order to esti#ate the likelihood that a hypothesis in the class will be tr(e if it passes a test of a iven de ree of severity. B(t in order to apply Bayes9s theore# we #(st be able to esti#ate the prior probability that it will be tr(e if it 7(st belon s to the class. +ow do we do this0 +ere :a*well invokes a -contin ent ass(#ption- 2the theory of confir#ation developed in the paper is called a -contin ent theory-5 which is stated and restated in vario(s for#s. Lf the esti#ation of prior probabilities he says, /ltho( h s(ch esti#ation is virt(ally never done e(!licitl" in everyday and in scientific conte*ts, it s(rely occ(rs tacitl" fairly often. .hen we s(ddenly feel @(ite s(re that the theory or hypothesis that has 7(st occ(rred to (s #(st be the correct e*planation of so#e hitherto p(<<lin set of circ(#stances, whether we be detectives faced with stran e, apparently (nrelated cl(es or scientists tryin to acco(nt for whatever data there are at hand, we are tacitly esti#atin a fairly hi h val(e for the prior probability of o(r proposed hypothesis or theory. .e #ay 2or #ay not5 si nal this by tellin o(rselves or others that this hypothesis -7(st so(nds ri ht- or that we -7(st feel it in o(r bones that it #(st be the ri ht one.-E?F > 11" > ,his is certainly s(b7ectivity with a ven eance)b(t we still don9t know how we do it. ,he answer to that is that we 7(st can, which is why the ass(#ption is contin ent. I contend f(rther that we ha-e the innate abilit" , or, perhaps better, the innate ca!acit" to de-elo! , iven appropriate environ#ental history, the abilit" to make estimates of !rior !robabilities that , in a si nificant proportion of trials, are not ho!elessl" at -ariance with the true -alues. This too is , of co(rse, contingent , especially if one holds, as 1 do, that

abilities and capacities are always d(e to intrinsic, str(ct(ral characteristics of the individ(al.E=F +owever it is not 7(st the contin ent properties of the individ(al that are in play; iven that the hypotheses in @(estion are abo(t nat(re, there has to be a corollary ass(#ption abo(t its properties) two s(ch ass(#ptions, in fact. ,he first is really the ass(#ption abo(t the individ(al in a new (ise. 8peakin of -the distrib(tion re@(ire#ents i#posed by o(r definition of 9probability9,- :a*well says, %at(re is, of co(rse, by no #eans necessarily bo(nd to be so obli in as to f(lfill s(ch re@(ire#ents. B(t one pri#e res(lt to which we have ret(rned a ain and a ain is that, (nless nat(re is kind in some vital respects, knowled e is i#possible. ,he vital respect that 1 have stressed and in which 1 have ass(#ed s(ch kindness to obtain has been the e*istence in (s 2a !art of nat(re5 of constit(tional abilities to cope with the episte#ic predica#ent.E9F ,he second ass(#ption abo(t nat(re is 7(st that there is eno( h si#plicity in it to ens(re that the -distrib(tion re@(ire#ents- do in fact hold, since otherwise, while o(r constit(tional ability to cope #i ht et (s knowled e by a so#ewhat #ore ro(ndabo(t #ethod)via second6order knowled e of what the operative distrib(tion f(nction act(ally is, if not a si#ple one, for e*a#ple)this wo(ld co#plicate thin s eno( h to #ake the -awf(l or wonderf(l fact- i#pla(sible a ain. 8o :a*well ro(nds o(t his post(lates by ad#ittin that, in addition to o(r contin ent ass(#ptions about o(r constit(tional capacities, we also, in effect, are ass(#in that the co#paratively li#ited a#o(nt of evidence that we are able to acc(#(late is not hopelessly (nrepresentative.E1!F %ow 1 happen to think that :a*well9s int(itions in all this 2and 1 think they #(st be called int(itions5 are so(nd, and that the acco(nt he > 114 > ives is at least close to a correct acco(nt. :y @(estion is, how does it stand in relation to the traditional body of ar (#ent abo(t the proble# of ind(ction0 .hat does it contrib(te to that body of ar (#ent0 ,o take the post(lates in reverse order: to ass(#e that -the li#ited a#o(nt of evidence that we are able to acc(#(late is not hopelessly (nrepresentative- is s(rely :ill9s Unifor#ity of %at(re ar (#ent in a sli htly different for#. ,he difference between :ill and :a*well is that :ill happily ar (ed in a circle: fro# repetitions in nat(re by ind(ction to re (larities; fro# repeated re (larities a ain by ind(ction to re (larities in re (larities, which constit(te nat(re9s (nifor#ity; and thence to the warrantability of the principle of ind(ction on the basis of which this ascent was #ade in the first place. :a*well on the other hand 7(st ass(#es the re (larities as one of the warrants of the principle. /nd indeed if one wishes to avoid circ(larity there see#s to be no alternative to so#e s(ch ass(#ption. ,he other #a7or post(late, of nat(re9s kindness in arran in that we 2bein part of nat(re5 sho(ld have a capacity for hittin on correct hypotheses, see#s to be a refor#(lation of an insi ht of Peirce9s, if not of the abori inal psycholo i<in of ind(ction by +(#e hi#self. Peirce, in -/ %e lected /r (#ent for the Ceality of Iod,- describes the relation between ind(ction and retrod(ction in the followin so#ewhat #elodra#atic ter#s: Lver the chas# that yawns between the (lti#ate oal of science and s(ch ideas of :an9s environ#ent as, co#in over hi# d(rin his pri#eval wanderin s in the forest, while yet his very notion of error was of the va (est, he #ana ed to co##(nicate to so#e fellow, we are b(ildin a cantilever brid e of ind(ction, held to ether by scientific str(ts and ties. 'et

every plank of its advance is first laid by Cetrod(ction alone, that is to say, by the spontaneo(s con7ect(res of instinctive reason.E11F .hat instinctive reason is able to do, accordin to Peirce, is to reco ni<e nat(re9s own si#plicity and th(s to choose, a#on hypotheses, the ones #ore likely to be correct, e*actly in accord with :a*well9s re@(ire#ent. +owever the notion of si#plicity itself is s(sceptible of different interpretations. :odern science has been b(ilded after the #odel of Ialileo, who fo(nded it, on il lume naturale . ,hat tr(ly inspired prophet had said that, of two hypotheses, the sim!ler is to be preferred; b(t 1 was for#erly one of those who, in o(r d(ll self6conceit fancyin o(rselves #ore sly than he, twisted the #a*i# to #ean the logicall" si#pler, the one that adds the least to what has been observed. . . . 1t was not (ntil lon e*perience forced #e to reali<e that s(bse@(ent discoveries were every ti#e showin > 11? > 1 had been wron , while those who (nderstood the #a*i# as Ialileo had done, early (nlocked the secret, that the scales fell fro# #y eyes and #y #ind awoke to the broad and fla#in dayli ht that it is the si#pler +ypothesis, in the sense of the #ore facile and nat(ral, the one that instinct s( ests, that #(st be preferred; for the reason that, (nless #an have a nat(ral bent in accordance with nat(re9s, he has no chance of (nderstandin nat(re at all.E13F ,his -nat(ral bent in accordance with nat(re9s- re@(ires a closer analysis. $or a ain, in that for#, it is #erely a contin ent ass(#ption, and adds nothin to what +(#e had already insisted (pon in even #ore forthri ht lan (a e. &veryone knows that +(#e despaired of findin any ar (#ent that co(ld carry the #ind fro# past e*periences to f(t(re ones, b(t that he had every confidence in the inference of the latter fro# the for#er 7(st the sa#e: -as an a ent,- he says, -1 a# @(ite satisfied in the point.-E13F .hat co#pels the inference)tho( h nothin can 7(stify it)is c(sto# or habit. +avin fo(nd, in #any instances, that any two kinds of ob7ects, fla#e and heat, snow and cold, have always been con7oined to ether: if fla#e or snow be presented anew to the senses, the #ind is carried by c(sto# to e*pect heat or cold, and to belie-e that s(ch a @(ality does e*ist and will discover itself (pon a nearer approach. ,his belief is the necessary res(lt of placin the #ind in s(ch circ(#stances. 1t is an operation of the so(l, when we are so sit(ated, as (navoidable as to feel the passion of love, when we receive benefits; or hatred, when we #eet with in7(ries. /ll these operations are a species of nat(ral instincts, which no reasonin or process of the tho( ht and (nderstandin is able either to prod(ce or to prevent.E1AF .hat is not always re#e#bered is that +(#e e*plains the workin of these operations by a hypothesis 7(st like Peirce9s or :a*well9s, and f(rther#ore ives an al#ost evol(tionary e*planation of it. ,here is a difference, it is tr(e, na#ely that +(#e9s p(rpose is #ore li#ited than theirs, in that he is dealin only with ind(ctive enerali<ation and not with the eneration or selection of hypotheses. B(t the lan (a e he (ses is 7(st what he #i ht have (sed to #ake that point too, had that been his intention: +ere, then, is a kind of pre6established har#ony between the co(rse of nat(re and the s(ccession of o(r ideas; and tho( h the powers and forces by which the for#er is overned be wholly (nknown to (s, yet o(r tho( hts and conceptions have still, we find, one on in the sa#e train with the other works of nat(re. . . .

> 11= > /s this operation of the #ind, by which we infer like effects fro# like ca(ses, and -ice -ersa , is so essential to the s(bsistence of all h(#an creat(res, it is not probable that it co(ld be tr(sted to the fallacio(s ded(ctions of o(r reason, which is slow in its operations, appears not, in any de ree, d(rin the first years of infancy, and, at best, is in every a e and period of h(#an life e*tre#ely liable to error and #istake. 1t is #ore confor#able to the ordinary wisdo# of nat(re to sec(re so necessary an act of the #ind by so#e instinct or #echanical tendency which #ay be infallible in its operations, #ay discover itself at the first appearance of life and tho( ht, and #ay be independent of all the labored ded(ctions of the (nderstandin .E1"F 8o far, so ood; :a*well is in distin (ished co#pany, and see#s to have a ood chance of bein ri ht. B(t two @(estions re#ain: .hy #ake these points a ain0 /nd is there nothin f(rther to be said than that o(r instincts have been pro ra##ed by a kindly nat(re)can no additional li ht be thrown on these powers of o(rs fro# so#e other vanta e point0 ,he first of these @(estions 1 will answer as :a*well #i ht have done; the second will take #e into so#e con7ect(res of #y own. :a*well9s intentions in stressin the necessity for contin ent post(lates in any theory of confir#ation were in fact, on the one hand, to draw attention afresh not #erely to +(#e9s proble# b(t to the seriousness of that proble#, and on the other to insist on the inade@(acy of e#piricis# as a philosophical doctrine. .ith respect to the first of these points, #any writers, he #aintains, pay lip service to +(#e and -then proceed to for et, i nore or repress- his insi hts even as they propose sol(tions to his proble#. B(t s(ch repression is (nderstandable beca(se stron ly #otivated: -it is the very life of e#piricis# that is at stake.-E14F /nd this leads to the second point. &#piricis# asserts that knowled e clai#s can be 7(stified in ter#s of observations pl(s lo ic, the observations bein contin ent and the lo ic necessary; :a*well insists that contin ent ele#ents other than i##ediate observation enter (navoidably into every s(ch 7(stification. ,he alternative is to t(rn every scientific proble# into a pse(doproble#, precisely beca(se the lack of a de#onstrative rationale for ind(ction prevents the establish#ent of any eneral proposition on the basis of evidence and noncontin ent lo ical principles alone. B(t he t(rns this constraint to ood acco(nt, beca(se there #ay be #ore or less nonobservational contin ency in the 7(stification of partic(lar clai#s, and ro( hly speakin he concl(des that the less of it, the #ore scientific the clai#, and the #ore, the #ore philosophical.E1?F Iiven that he is co##itted to a contin(ity between these two classes, this see#s a reasonable way to or ani<e the spectr(#. > 119 > 8o #(ch for preli#inaries)for it is only now that 1 approach the real proble# of this paper, na#ely: .hat sense can we attach to +(#e9s -pre6established har#ony between the co(rse of nat(re and the s(ccession of o(r ideas,- to Peirce9s -nat(ral bent in accordance with nat(re9s- on the part of #an, and to :a*well9s -e*istence in (s 2a part of nat(re5 of constit(tional abilities to cope with the episte#ic predica#ent-0 ,wo hints are contained in te*ts cited earlier, one of which has already been fla ed in the re#ark that +(#e provides an -al#ost evol(tionary e*planation- of the reliability of c(sto# in ind(ctive inference. ,he other lies in :a*well9s re#ark that -abilities and capacities are always d(e to intrinsic, str(ct(ral characteristics of the individ(al.- ,he e*planation of this contin ent fact abo(t h(#an knowers is in other words to be so( ht alon str(ct(ral6evol(tionary lines.

%ow in #y own contrib(tion to the sy#posi(# in which :a*well9s paper appearedE1=F 1 took a sli htly different line fro# his on the relation between the two co#ponents of the e#piricist9s arsenal. 1 said, in effect)and 1 will not repeat the ar (#ents here)that all the lo ical principles were contin ent, reflectin as 1 took the# to do what #i ht be called lobal feat(res of the (niverse in which we find o(rselves. /nd 1 clai#ed that those principles, even the ded(ctive ones, #anifested the#selves as abilities of o(rs, partic(larly as a basic ability 1 called -apposition.- 1 s( ested that this ability was not a(to#atically e#ployed in a ded(ctively ri oro(s way, since this re@(ires in addition special care in the followin of r(les. ,he chief talent that lo ic re@(ires is an ability to stick to these r(les; the looseness and red(ndancy, the ellipses and shortc(ts of ordinary lan (a e ive way to a #ore or less ri oro(s for#alis#. . . . ,his talent is rarer than #i ht be s(pposed, which acco(nts for the fact that lo ic . . . is too sim!le for #any people who look for s(btlety in its ele#ents. 1t rapidly ets co#ple*, of co(rse, b(t its co#ple*ities always break down into si#ple ele#ents as the f(<<y co#ple*ities of everyday life do not. People are always p(ttin #ore or less co#plicated ob7ects and e*pressions in apposition with each other and one another; this activity is overned by no principles other than i##ediate (tility or intelli ibility and the conventions of ordinary lan (a e and behavior, and conse@(ently the coherence and even relevance of any ele#ent of the res(ltin str(ct(re with or to any other ele#ent are not (aranteed, indeed it is nor#al for this str(ct(re to be incoherent and fra #ented.E19F 1t follows fro# this that the ordinary e#ploy#ent of reason is not ded(ctive in any lo ically ri oro(s sense; even ded(ctive abilities have to be learned. Cecall now that :a*well, in introd(cin the ind(ctive or retrod(ctive ability re@(ired by his theory of confir#ation, spoke > 13! > so#ewhat caref(lly of -the innate ability, or, perhaps better, the innate capacity to develop, iven appropriate environ#ental history, the ability . . . ,- etc. ,he point we were both tryin to #ake, in o(r different ways, was 1 think that the b(siness of ac@(irin and #anip(latin tr(e propositions 2i.e., knowled e, ass(#in appropriate ancillary beliefs5 involves an adaptation of #ind to the world, a selection of learned ar (#entative strate ies (nder evol(tionary press(re. 1t wo(ld of co(rse not be possible for these strate ies to be selected if the apparat(s for carryin the# o(t were not part of the f(rnit(re of the neonate #ind 2or brain5. ,he apparat(s in @(estion is certainly, on the side of the brain, ne(ral, and we know that it has, a#on other feat(res, those re@(ired for the #odelin of ar (#ents in ded(ctive lo ic: binary states, feedback loops, etc. Part of the ar (#ent of #y paper was i#plicitly that the apparat(s itself has been selected in evol(tionary develop#ent 7(st beca(se these feat(res are necessary if we are to #ake o(r way in a world where thin s cannot be in two places at once, are either there or not, etc. +ad the world been different, different #ental str(ct(res wo(ld have evolved. 2,hat we can9t i#a ine how it #i ht be different in these respects)that all o(r possible worlds belon to the sa#e lo ical (niverse as this one)is, 1 ar (ed, to be e*pected, iven that we have the #ental str(ct(res we have.5 .hat is re@(ired for the #odelin of ar (#ents in ind(ctive lo ic0 1n the ded(ctive case the apparat(s is, as it were, indefinitely re(sable; the circ(its 2savin certain conse@(ences of (nidirectionality of branchin , which place the (s(al restrictions on operations like conversion5 can be followed in either direction, and when the e*ercise is co#pleted the whole thin can be erased and readied for a new set of data. B(t in the ind(ctive case it wo(ld see# that in the first instance at least so#ethin irreversible wo(ld be re@(ired, so#ethin to i#pose a direction 2correspondin to the direction of ti#e in the flow

of events in the world5 and to preserve for f(t(re reference the -bent- of thin s and processes. /nd of co(rse that happens too; we call it learnin , and it consists of the layin down of traces, of -facilitations,- as $re(d called the#, which ens(re that the ne*t ti#e a iven confi (ration is enco(ntered the necessary ne(ral connections are #ade #ore easily. ,hat this sho(ld be the case is a ain to be e*plained, in evol(tionary ter#s, by the fact that the world does in fact repeat itself. ,hat wo(ld be eno( h for ind(ctive enerali<ation of the kind that +(#e incl(ded, tho( h not (nder that na#e, a#on the instincts or #echanical tendencies of the #ind. B(t the final and apparently #ost diffic(lt @(estion re#ains: what in addition is re@(ired to acco(nt for the ability to choose correct hypotheses0 2%ote that this is not a @(estion of eneratin hypotheses, which see#s to #e in the first instance at least > 131 > less of a proble#.E3!F 5 +ere 1 a# inclined to take a so#ewhat different approach, and to @(estion the pre#ises that lead :a*well to stand in awe and wonder of the episte#olo ical fact that we do hit on the# as often as we do. .hat 1 want to s( est is that after all it does not happen that often, and that the proportionality he invokes between the -infinite n(#ber of possibilities always sanctioned by the data we happen to have- on the one hand and the -relatively tiny n(#ber of trials- we have ti#e for on the other lends an (nwarranted air of #elodra#a to the proble#. ,he sit(ation is not, after all, that we enerate infinitely #any hypotheses and then start oin thro( h the# seriatim for the correct one; it is rather that, in the e*ploratory way that is characteristic of the ani#al we are 2and which 1 have described elsewhereE31F 5, we try o(t each hypothesis as soon as it is tho( ht of, and (s(ally discard it, for the si#ple reason that it is (s(ally wron . 1f necessity presses, or o(r attention lasts for so#e other reason, and if inventiveness does not fla , we then think of another hypothesis and try that. .e do not even try irrelevant hypotheses; that #i ht be said to be beca(se of a -bent in accordance with nat(re9s,- altho( h a -nat(ral- one only in a cas(al sense, in that it is borrowed fro# nat(re at the ti#e, as it were, 7(st fro# an apprehension of what the sit(ation is that re@(ires e*planation. ,he @(estion is, how #(ch ti#e is there for the siftin process with respect to which :a*well alle es that ti#e is too short0 1 answer: the ti#e of h(#an evol(tionary history. 1t has taken as lon as it has for science to e#er e precisely beca(se correct con7ect(res at the hypothetical level are so few and far between. 1nd(ctive enerali<ations are necessary for s(rvival, scientific hypotheses are not, or at least not (ntil society beco#es irreversibly dependent on science, which happened only recently. +(#an c(lt(res #(st have end(red for #illennia)and so#e still end(re)witho(t anythin like reco ni<ably scientific hypotheses, let alone tr(e ones. B(t it is a feat(re of scientific hypotheses, once for#(lated and recorded, that they end(re and are co##(nicable. .hen :a*well says, -we #(st hit (pon fairly often the tr(e theory or hypothesis,- there is an a#bi (ity in the -we-; if it is #eant as it were editorially, so that each of (s applies it in his or her own case, then indeed the fact is #irac(lo(s, b(t if it is #eant collectively, over the whole history of in@(iry, then the i#perative is overstated. .e #i ht say instead: we need hardly ever hit (pon the tr(e theory or hypothesis, as lon as, every ti#e we do, we re#e#ber it and trans#it it to posterity. 1f eno( h of (s keep tryin eno( h of the ti#e)and 1 need not rehearse here the known facts abo(t the de#o raphy of scientific research)then after a s(fficient while we will have a respectable acc(#(lation of known tr(ths. /nd that is what we have. > 133 >

,his view, it is tr(e, does not address directly one of the #a7or points at iss(e, na#ely how we know that the hypothesis in @(estion, rather than some com!etitor , is tr(e or close to the tr(th. B(t notice that :a*well effectively skirts this too, beca(se he ass(#es that we do have nontrivial knowled e, and he ass(#es that we can -sift thro( h 2(sin falsifications to eli#inate the chaff5- the possibilities available to (s, or co(ld if we had the ti#e. ,he co#petitors in other words et eli#inated in the (s(al way by f(rther observations, if they are oin to be eli#inated at all, and that is what takes the ti#e. 8o there is nothin special to be said on this point; the only proble# that co(ld arise wo(ld be the eneration of alternative hypotheses by lo ical devices, and in that 2(s(ally tendentio(s5 case we #i ht accept as one tr(e hypothesis a whole e@(ivalence6class of s(ch artificially enerated hypotheses. 1 concl(de, then, that ind(ctive enerali<ation does represent a -nat(ral bent in accordance with nat(re9s,- and f(rther 2altho( h the ar (#ents for this are not in this paper5 that hypothesis generating is a -nat(ral bent,- altho( h not necessarily -in accordance with nat(re9s,- since the overwhel#in #a7ority of hypotheses enerated are false. B(t hypothesis choosing is a learned and often tedio(s process. 1n so#e si#ple cases there are 7(st not that #any alternatives)either the b(tler did it, or he didn9t)so it is not s(rprisin that we can so#eti#es #ana e to hit on the ri ht answer by o(rselves. B(t in the scientific case it has always been, as it still is, a #atter of lon 6ran e and ra#ified cooperation a#on very #any workers, #any of whose res(lts, painstakin ly acc(#(lated, still for# the basis of new develop#ents even tho( h they the#selves have lon since vanished fro# si ht. ,hat, once the ri ht hypothesis is presented, it #ay at once be seen to be s(ch, and with 7(st the kind of conviction :a*well describes, is not so #(ch a #atter of int(itive reco nition as of rapid calc(lation, rather like the assess#ent of #oves in chess. 1n all this we still co(nt on the world to vindicate o(r tr(st that the f(t(re will in relevant ways contin(e to be like the past)that is, we rely on the kindness of nat(re. 1f in this respect we have #ade no advance (pon +(#e, that is no do(bt, as Irover :a*well wo(ld certainly have a reed, beca(se +(#e was ri ht. /nd 1 wo(ld add, ri ht not only in what he clai#ed b(t in what he had the wisdo# not to clai#. > 133 >

PART III1 LO+IC AN* CAUSALITY

> 13" >

Pre&ace to Part III. Lo$ic a%d Ca-salit(

/s the realist sees it, an (nderlyin ass(#ption in all scientific e*planation is that there e*ists some order of thin s havin reliable patterns of occ(rrence. ,heory will be the #atchin of this, (nder so#e constr(ction of the ter# -#atchin ,- in the do#ain of tho( ht. ,he stron est constr(ction wo(ld be identity, which wo(ld yield the +e elian position accordin to which lo ic and ontolo y are e@(ivalent. ,he very idea of s(ch certainty now see#s arro ant. 8till there is a close connection between the lo ic we (se and the kind of world it is possible for (s to envisa e. 8ince Hant the @(estion of the a !riori

str(ct(re of the world, the availability of necessary tr(th, has been a proble#atic iss(e, and this part of the book takes (p a n(#ber of aspects of this proble#. Lne paper that #i ht well have been incl(ded, which deals e*plicitly with Hant and the possibility 2which he hi#self vehe#ently re7ected5 of a hypothetical #etaphysics, was to have been iven at an 1ntera#erican Con ress in B(enos /ires in 19"9, b(t an abortive #ilitary co(p interr(pted the con ress. ,he paper was event(ally p(blished in 8panish in 19?3, b(t the &n lish version see#s to have been lost. 1t see#ed to #e that the only way to have a #etaphysics at all was to ad#it its hypothetical stat(s; even if the definin topic of #etaphysics is, as 1 have so#eti#es ar (ed, -the way the world #(st be in order to be as it is- 2the parallel for#(la for science bein -the way the world #ay well be, and therefore be as it is-5, still the way to p(t the @(estion is: what wo(ld a world be like, in which s(ch6and6s(ch had to be the case0 Chapter = raises the spec(lative @(estion as to what #i ht follow if > 134 > the (s(al constr(ction placed on probabilities of ! and 1)na#ely that the events to which the probabilities are attached are respectively i#possible and necessary)were #odified so as to reflect this #etaphysical #odesty. 1n partic(lar, do we need to s(ppose that so#ethin act(ally !re-ents an event with <ero probability fro# happenin 0 1n the title of the chapter 1 speak of the -possibility of the i#probable,- b(t 1 obvio(sly #ean this to follow the probability all the way down to <ero)to insist that probabilities of 1 and ! are still probabilities, that they need not be s(pposed to t(rn into so#ethin else. ,his chapter introd(ces a r(n of the #ost spec(lative ar (#ents in the book, with respect to which 1 can only say that so#e of the playf(lness to which 1 refer in the 1ntrod(ction was certainly at work, altho( h 1 #eant, and #ean, the con7ect(res to sink in and to challen e so#e of the bo(ndary ass(#ptions of the field. Chapter 9 poses 7(st s(ch a challen e to the none#pirical character of lo ic; it ar (es that even the possible worlds so pop(lar with so#e philosophers at the ti#e are all versions of this world, and that radically other worlds are not conceivable by (s precisely beca(se o(r conceptions are tied to this one. Chapters 1! and 11 challen e so#e basic and rarely e*a#ined beliefs abo(t ca(sality. ,he @(ant(# theory of chapter 1! is so called beca(se 1 i#a ine ca(sal #oves to be discrete and discontin(o(s, and try to follow o(t what this i#a inary sit(ation wo(ld lead to if allowed to e*tend fro# local states and f(nctions 2desi nated with lowercase s and f 5 to (niversal ones 2in (ppercase letters5. ,he latter of co(rse r(ns into abs(rdities, or so one wo(ld have to s(ppose, when relativistic ti#e effects co#e into play. B(t then 2to anticipate chapter 3!, another spec(lative essay that #i ht well have been ro(ped with these5 relativistic effects are o(t of the s(b7ect9s reach, while ca(sality)if we are to follow Hant) is so#ethin that or ani<es 7(st what is within reach. Chapter 11 #akes what 1 take to be one of the #ost radical, and at the sa#e ti#e one of the #ost serio(s, s( estions in the book: it @(estions the (nderlyin and lar ely (nacknowled ed -drive- in ca(sality. Perhaps this is not o(tco#e6specific, as is (s(ally if i#plicitly s(pposed)perhaps it is nothin #ore than the passa e of ti#e itself, (nder the principle of plenit(de that says, in effect, that if anythin can happen it will. 1 have since co#e to see that altho( h 1 treat +eide er in this essay with so#e flippancy, which 1 still think he often richly deserves, the concepts of -lettin 6appear- and of -lettin 6learn- in his later work link (p very s( estively with the concept of action as -lettin 6happento which this ne ative view of ca(sality lends itself.

> 13? >

<1 T#ree Lo$ics= or t#e Possi8ilit( o& t#e I/2ro8a8le

,o do philosophy by threes, as Peirce reali<ed, is to invite i##ediate criticis# on the ro(nds of oversi#plification and distortion. 1n the *ollected a!ers there is an (nfinished essay called -,riado#any, the a(thor9s response to the anticipated s(spicion that he attaches a s(perstitio(s or fancif(l i#portance to the n(#ber three, and forces divisions to a Procr(stean bed of trichoto#y,-E1F in which he defends hi#self a ainst the char e by co(ntin (p e*a#ples; in twenty6nine cases of division there are, he says, -eleven dichoto#ies, five trichoto#ies, and thirteen divisions into #ore than three parts.- B(t it was not a rando# sa#ple, since he ad#its to havin e*cl(ded fro# consideration so#e -s(b7ects in which trichoto#ies abo(nd,- where in fact they cannot be helped. Unfort(nately the #an(script breaks off before disclosin which those s(b7ects are. B(t in spite of this statistical disclai#er Peirce did so characteristically work in threes that the dan er of doin so now is that of pla iaris#. 1 #(st ad#it, therefore, at the o(tset that what follows does owe a reat deal to hi#; #y three lo ics will look very #(ch like abd(ction, ded(ction, and ind(ction, and the later disc(ssion will be colored by the cate ories of firstness, secondness, and thirdness. B(t it wo(ld be a #istake to ive the i#pression that it is all #erely e*e esis or criticis# of Peirce)in fact this aspect is secondary and @(ite accidental. ,he point of depart(re of the paper lies in a p(<<le which arises in the c(sto#ary interpretation of a lo ical for#alis#, and its #ain concern is with the e#pirical relevance of for#al syste#s. By -lo ic- 1 shall (nderstand the discipline which st(dies the for#al > 13= > str(ct(re of ar (#ent, where -for#al- indicates that the str(ct(re in @(estion can be abstracted fro# the content of the ar (#ents which e*hibit it. /n -ar (#ent- 1 take to be an arrival at a concl(sion, (s(ally, altho( h not always, by the followin of so#e #ethod after depart(re fro# a pre#ise or pre#ises. 2,his sli htly (northodo* definition is re@(ired in order to et the third kind of lo ic in witho(t s(bterf( e.5 %ow in this st(dy the str(ct(re ma" be taken as a p(re for#alis#, witho(t re ard to any possible application, sy#bolic constants and variables bein related as e#pirically #eanin f(l e*pressions might be related if there happened to be any whose relation in this way #ade any sense, altho( h it wo(ld #ake no difference if there were not. ,he only restrictions on this kind of activity are those i#posed by the de#and for consistency, and it is clear that indefinitely #any for#al syste#s havin no apparent relations to anythin act(al co(ld be constr(cted, iven ti#e and in en(ity. B(t the principles on which s(ch syste#s are in fact constr(cted, or closely related principles, are al#ost invariably to be fo(nd in fa#iliar relationships bindin ele#ents of co##on e*perience. %o #atter how hard #athe#aticians #ay try to create p(re #athe#atics as +ardy (nderstood it,E3F science repeatedly catches (p with the# and shows that so#e e#pirically discovered enerali<ation calls for 7(st s(ch f(nctions)even +ardy hi#self co(ld not escape the fate of havin a principle of enetics na#ed after hi#. ,he position taken here is that in so#e sense all the abstract for#alities of any lo ic we are capable of constr(ctin are ro(nded in concrete act(alities. ,his in t(rn #akes it possible to throw li ht on the classification of lo ics by an e*a#ination of the kinds of fa#iliar relation in which they are ro(nded. ,he #ost fre@(ent relation e*hibited in lo ic is the relation of entail#ent, the strict followin of a

concl(sion fro# iven pre#ises where those pre#ises wo(ld be inconsistent with the denial of that concl(sion. 1ts co(nterpart in the e#pirical sphere is strict ca(sal deter#ination, the lawlike relation of antecedents to conse@(ences which is often said to constit(te the chief ob7ect of scientific en@(iry. 1 shall call the lo ic ro(nded in s(ch lawlike relations the logic of ine-itable e-ents , since if it is to apply there #(st always be, iven the act(al state of affairs correspondin to a set of pre#ises, an inescapable necessity in the s(bse@(ent occ(rrence of the event correspondin to the concl(sion. /t any rate the interest of this kind of lo ic resides in e*a#ples of this sort. /s is @(ite obvio(s, however, we al#ost never enco(nter lawlike relations which work with s(ch e*actit(de as to r(le o(t all possible alternative res(lts, so that the 7(stification, and especially the teachin , of this lo ic draws heavily on the nonte#poral relationships of wholes to their parts, ob7ects to their properties, and classes to their #e#bers, > 139 > which are #(ch less interestin . 1f a centa(r has fo(r le s, it is inevitable that it sho(ld have at least one, b(t few people wo(ld have cared very #(ch abo(t the lo ic of s(ch ar (#ents if it had not see#ed possible in principle to e*tend it to the inevitable followin of eclipses fro# the co(rses of the planets, or death fro# loss of blood. 8(ch invol(tional ar (#ents)i.e., ar (#ents which (nravel in their concl(sions so#ethin already involved in the pre#ises)are held by so#e, the Hneales for e*a#ple,E3F to e*ha(st the s(b7ect #atter of lo ic; and if they do then the application of lo ic to science re@(ires the belief that the f(t(re is only an (nravellin of what was i#plicit all alon in the past. ,his of co(rse is the position whose classical e*pression is to be fo(nd in Kaplace.EAF Kittle #ore need be said abo(t this lo ic)it rests on ele#ents of e*perience which are either rare or (ninterestin . 2:y insistence on the e#pirical connection is not, of co(rse, to be constr(ed as #eanin that e#pirical #atters have anythin whatever to do with the -alidit" of lo ical ar (#ents, in any of the three cases)they have to do only with the distinction between kinds of sit(ation.5 By far the reater part of o(r e*perience consists of events linked to one another, as far as we can tell, in #(ch less definite ways. Ce (larities per#it of e*ceptions, and a cas(al view does not enco(nter #any re (larities, e*cept of a ross sort, (nless it happens to take in a ood proportion of #an(fact(red devices in workin order. 1t #ay perhaps be i norance and nat(ral ineptit(de #erely, as Kaplace tho( ht, which prevent (s fro# seein directly the (nderlyin #echanis# of the world, b(t that is far fro# bein established. /n active debate is still proceedin on the @(estion as it co#es (p in f(nda#ental areas of physics. ,he relation between pre#ises and concl(sion in the lo ic s(itable to this kind of e*perience is one of !robabilit" ; and the second lo ic will therefore be called the logic of more or less likel" e-ents . +ere the pre#ises cannot be said with confidence to be inconsistent with any concl(sion whatever, and altho( h so#e concl(sions are less probable than others every concl(sion, with the e*ception of totally irrelevant ones, has some probability. ,hese vario(s probabilities can be #ade the s(b7ect of a calc(l(s, i.e., a lo ic of the previo(s kind which serves as a #etalo ic for the kind now (nder dic(sssion. 1n the lo ic of #ore or less likely events we have relations like -if a, then probably b, less probably c, etc.- 1n the #etalo ic we have instead -p2a 8 b5 N *,- -p2a 8 c5 N y,- etc., #ore (s(ally written -p2b/a5 N *,-p2c/a5 N y.- 1t is in the for#ali<ation of this #etalo lc, and the interpretation of that for#ali<ation, that the p(<<le arises fro# which this whole disc(ssion sprin s. ,he first ele#ent to be introd(ced in e*positions of the calc(l(s of > 13! >

probability is the @(antity p2a/b5, the probability of a, iven b, which ran es over the real n(#bers fro# ! to 1:

,he standard ne*t step is to show (nder what circ(#stances p reaches these li#its:

,here follow con7(nctive and dis7(nctive a*io#s, etc., b(t we are not concerned with those here. ,he p(<<le lies in the (s(al interpretation of the val(es ! and 1 for p. 1n order for the calc(l(s to work the i#plications 215 and 235 #(st of co(rse hold, and their interpretation see#s strai htforward eno( h: if b 8 a, then if b happens a must happen, i.e., it is necessar" ; if b 8 U a, then if b happens a cannot happen, i.e., it is im!ossible . /nd this interpretation preserves the for#al sy##etry of the whole thin , since s(bstit(tion in 215 ives very si#ply

fro# which, with 235, it see#s at first lance to follow that

Lf co(rse this does not follow for#ally, since the conditionals 215 and 235 o only in one direction; it wo(ld have followed if they had been biconditionals, tho( h, and probably nobody wo(ld have ob7ected if 1 had p(t the# in that way. .hat 1 want to do now, however, is to e*plore the conse@(ences of denyin the converse conditional, at least in the second case:

1n other words 1 want to take serio(sly the possibility that an event which en(inely had a probability of <ero #i ht nevertheless happen, and in@(ire what kind of lo ic wo(ld be s(itable to such events. ,his third kind of lo ic #i ht be called, with one eye on s(b7ective interpretations of probability, the logic of incredible e-ents . ,he three lo ics #i ht then be e*hibited in a table: 1 11 111 pN1 !VpV1 pN! inevitable events #ore or less likely events incredible events

/t first si ht this sche#a looks rather silly, and that i#pression #ay contin(e. B(t 1 think there is a reason why it looks silly, and that when > 131 > that is taken acco(nt of the way is opened for so#e rather interestin possibilities. ,he reason is of

co(rse e*actly an indoctrination with the #etaphysical notion of ca(sality which we have all (nder one in one way or another, and which #akes (s incred(lo(s or scornf(l if anyone ar (es for the possibility of (nca(sed events. /s 1 have indicated above 1 think that this doctrine established itself when ded(ctive lo ic, which had been abstracted fro# a eneral and appro*i#ate re (larity in the world of e*perience, was forced back on e*perience as re@(irin a detailed and e*act re (larity, in the hope that the world wo(ld thereby be rendered f(lly intelli ible. ,he intelli ibility that was bein so( ht was, however, of a special kind, whose philosophical he e#ony is co#paratively recent, na#ely the intelli ibility which oes with scientific e*planation in +e#pel and Lppenhei#9s sense.E"F ,hat is certainly an ideal worth strivin for; b(t a resolve to contin(e to seek e*planations of this stron ly ded(ctive variety is very different fro# the ass(#ption that they e*ist, into which it often passes. ,he latter attit(de closes off possibilities which the for#er leaves open, a#on the# the possibility that totally i#probable events #i ht occ(r. ,here #(st s(rely, nevertheless, be en(inely im!ossible events, s(ch as the ro(nd s@(are and the si#(ltaneo(s whiteness and non6whiteness of snow0 1t was this kind of reflection that led Peirce to his distinction between the li#its of probability on the one hand, and i#possibility and certainty on the other. +e introd(ced the notion of moral certainty: By -#orally certain,- 1 #ean that the probability of that event is 1. Lf co(rse, there is a difference between probability 1 and absol(te certainty. 1n like #anner, -bare possibilitysho(ld #ean the possibility of that whose probability is <ero. 1t is barely possible that a well #ade pair of dice sho(ld t(rn (p do(blets every ti#e they were thrown: it is a conceivable chance, tho( h #orally certain not to happen. B(t that a pair of dice will not t(rn (p se-ens is absol(tely certain; it is not possible.E4F B(t the #oral certainty of not ettin an (nbroken se@(ence of do(blets does not correspond to a probability of <ero, at least not for a finite series of throws. 8(ch an event has a s#all b(t definite probability, and a rational a#bler wo(ld be prepared to bet on it if the odds were ood eno( h) so#ethin like a penny to a billion dollars for a series of fifty throws. Peirce9s #oral certainty is therefore arrived at by 7(#pin to a concl(sion, whereas what 1 envisa e is the possibility of an event on which no rational a#bler wo(ld bet at whatever odds)an event which wo(ld shake his faith in the order of nat(re, if he held it in the #etaphysical for# sketched above. B(t a do(blet of sevens is a different #atter a ain even fro# s(ch an event. / do(blet of sevens, like the ro(nd > 133 > s@(are and white nonwhite snow, is ad#ittedly i#possible, b(t it is not an i#possible e-ent. It is not an e-ent at all . / certain asy##etry be ins to be apparent between the #eanin s of the e*tre#es of probability. / probability of 1 does indeed #ean certainty or necessity; if p2a/b5 N 1 then if b happens a will s(rely follow, and if p2Ua/b5 N 1 then it will 7(st as s(rely not follow)so#ethin else will. 1n the latter case a is i#possible, conditionally on b9s happenin ; a does not specify an event, since there cannot be an event which is merel" the denial of another event, b(t it leaves roo# for an event c or d, etc., which is other than a. 1f a is specified by a false state#ent, either an e#pirically false one abo(t dice t(rnin (p sevens or an analytically false one abo(t white and nonwhite snow, then denial of this state#ent will be tr(e and #aterially i#plied by any specification of b, th(s satisfyin 235. Ln the other hand a probability of <ero does not #ean i#possibility. 1t #eans i#probability in the strict sense)s(ch an event is not to be e*pected; b(t that does not #ean that it will not happen. ,he nat(ral reaction at this point is to resort to the notion of ca(sality as a #ethodolo ical principle,

and say that if s(ch an event happened we wo(ld ref(se to believe that it was (nca(sed, b(t instead wo(ld look for ca(sal deter#inations which when fo(nd wo(ld show that its probability had been so#ethin other than <ero all alon . /nd this is a perfectly proper reaction, witho(t which science wo(ld never have risen o(t of s(perstition. 1n a world where events are constantly ca(sin other events in one way or another it wo(ld be foolish to abandon the search for ca(sal e*planations. B(t ca(sal e*planations tend to for# chains reachin back towards the infinite past, which soon beco#e e#barrassin ly co#ple*; like the snakes on :ed(sa9s head, each ite# disposed of prod(ces a crop of others, (ntil one wishes to c(t the whole thin off, b(t doesn9t know how. ,he (s(al (nsatisfactory resol(tion leaves the #atter poised between a s(pernat(ral be innin , which is (nacceptable, and no be innin at all, which is al#ost e@(ally so, b(t (s(ally settled for to avoid the alternative. ,he only thin that prevents the acceptance of a plain, strai htforward be innin , at least (ntil f(rther in@(iry discloses actual antecedents 2not #erely (nspecified ones dra ed in to re#ove disco#fort at the tho( ht of floatin , te#porally, on nothin 5, is a ain the #etaphysical doctrine. ,he idea that ca(sal lines #i ht be in and end elsewhere than at creation and doo#sday is not new; once a ain Peirce entertained it.E?F 1 wish not to revert, however, to the logic of the #atter, which after all is the s(b7ect of this paper, and take (p a ain the parallel between the for#al and e#pirical. 1t has already been re#arked that pre#ises and concl(sions on the for#al side correspond to antecedents and conse6 > 133 > @(ences on the e#pirical side. 1t has also been pointed o(t that the ti ht lo ical connection between pre#ises and concl(sions in ded(ctive lo ic is #atched by a ti ht ca(sal connection between antecedents and conse@(ences in the lawlike behavior of ob7ects, and that the #ore or less fle*ible lo ical connection between pre#ises and concl(sions in ind(ctive lo ic 2which 1 take to cover not #erely inferences fro# partic(lar state#ents to eneral ones, b(t also nonde#onstrative inferences of other kinds5 is #atched by a #ore or less fle*ible ca(sal connection between antecedents and conse@(ences in the statistical behavior of other ob7ects. B(t it is not yet clear what the connection between pre#ises and concl(sions in the new lo ic is like. 1t will reflect, of co(rse, the connection between antecedents and conse@(ences in the events with which the new lo ic is to deal. ,his connection, however, t(rns o(t to be none*istent. ,he events covered are, in fact, conse@(ences witho(t antecedents)conse@(ences of nothing . /nd the new lo ic is therefore seen to be a lo ic in which ar (#ents have no pre#ises, b(t consist of bare concl(sions. ,he reader will by now feel, no do(bt, that this is a l(nacy which has one far eno( h. .hat after all is the (se of a lo ic in which no way of arrivin at concl(sions can be specified, in which in fact there is no criterion for knowin if one has even got a concl(sion0 ,o this 1 reply that it is of no (se at all. B(t lo ic does not necessarily have to prove its (tility as a tool for calc(lation before it can for# a basis for disc(ssion. ,he point is that s(ch a lo ic offers to brin into the sphere of rational consideration 2altho( h not necessarily of e*planation5 certain kinds of event which other lo ics si#ply have to leave aside. Ko ic is the @(intessence of rationality, and too narrow a conception of it #akes a #ystery of so#e thin s which need not be #ysterio(s at all. 1 believe that there are three areas at least of conte#porary interest in which s(ch #ystification oes on and in which therefore this new approach #i ht be of val(e. ,he first of these areas #ay be ro( hly characteri<ed as the -lo ic of discovery.- ,his of co(rse was the point at which Peirce9s abd(ction or retrod(ction was called into play; it #ade the initial 7(#p to hypotheses, while ded(ction #erely drew o(t their conse@(ences and ind(ction 7(d ed whether s(ch conse@(ences as were act(ally observed s(fficed to render the# pla(sible. Cetrod(ction is the lo ic of

novelty, and in a florid passa e fro# the late article -/ %e lected /r (#ent for the Ceality of Iod,Peirce defines it in a very s( estive way: Lver the chas# that yawns between the (lti#ate oal of science and s(ch ideas of #an9s environ#ent as, co#in over hi# d(rin his pri#eval wanderin s in the forest, while yet his very notion of error was of the > 13A > va (est, he #ana ed to co##(nicate to so#e fellow, we are b(ildin a cantilever brid e of ind(ction, held to ether by scientific str(ts and ties. 'et every plank of its advance is first laid by retrod(ction alone, that is to say, by the spontaneo(s con7ect(res of instinctive reason.E=F ,he key ter# here is -spontaneo(s.- /ristotle (sed to speak of -p(re spontaneo(s chance,- and considered it a reasonable cata ory of description; it was only in the late seventeenth cent(ry that Cedi challen ed serio(sly the concept of spontaneo(s eneration, which was not enerally abandoned (ntil the #iddle of the nineteenth. 1 do not s( est that we sho(ld revert to s(ch naWve beliefs 2altho( h the history of the theory of li ht since %ewton shows that naWve ideas so#eti#es reappear in a #ore sophisticated for#5; the e*a#ples are #entioned #erely to indicate that there is nothin inherentl" (nsatisfactory in the notion of spontaneity)it becomes (nsatisfactory only in the li ht of certain #etaphysical pres(ppositions already referred to. Discovery is rendered #ost intelli ible, 1 think, when hypotheses are not considered to arise fro# any partic(lar concatenation of specific ideas in the #ind of their inventor, b(t when they are re arded as concl(sions witho(t pre#ises, which present the#selves to the eni(s 2and to society at lar e5 in s(fficient n(#bers to for# a pop(lation a#on the #e#bers of which nat(ral selection can take place. B(t that is the s(b7ect of another paper. 1t need only be added that to look for antecedents to acts of invention without crossing categor" lines 2i.e., witho(t resortin to ne(rolo y, etc.5 is sooner or later bo(nd to t(rn (p a candidate for the new lo ic. ,he second proble# on which these considerations #i ht throw so#e li ht is that of @(ant(# 7(#ps. ,he conflict between Copenha en and the #icro6#icrophysicists is well known; it is a ain a conflict between a do #atis# and an infinite re ress. ,he proble# is on the one hand concealed by statistics, on the other postponed (ntil a new level is reached. B(t a ain 1 do not see why, when confronted 2for instance5 with a single radioactive ato# abstracted fro# any #ass to which half6life calc(lations #i ht be applied, one sho(ld not say that its disinte ration is an event witho(t any ca(sal antecedent, and yet say this witho(t la#entations over the de#ise of ca(sality. ,he event falls (nder the cate ory, b(t its coefficient is <ero. Lf co(rse here, in a sense, the instability of the ato# is the ca(se of its e#ittin a radioactive prod(ct. B(t why did it happen then0 / ca(sal relation between antecedents and conse@(ences #akes sense only in a te#poral fra#ework, and it #ay be that (nca(sed events are necessary to define the fra#ework. ,his possibility co#es (p a ain in the third area of interest, na#ely, cos#olo y. ,his has been tacitly #entioned already in a disc(ssion of > 13" > chains of ca(sal e*planation; the (pshot of that disc(ssion, if p(shed a little f(rther, wo(ld be that there is no e*planation of the (niverse as a whole, which then beco#es 2if infinite re ress is to be re7ected5 one reat (nca(sed cos#ic event, definin a spatio6te#poral fra#ework within which other events can follow patterns of ca(se and effect. ,here are two views, however, as to the #echanis# of this cos#ic

event: one view holds that it was, as it were, (nca(sed all at once at a point to be deter#ined by backward e*trapolation of processes of e*pansion; the other holds that it is contin(o(sly bein (nca(sed bit by bit in interstellar space, so that it re#ains in a steady state. Both so(nd pretty #ysterio(s to people who are (sed to de#andin antecedent ca(ses. / ain 1 do not wish to s( est that antecedent ca(ses o( ht not to be looked for)they o( ht. B(t 1 think it re rettable that the idea of contin(o(s creation sho(ld have see#ed prepostero(s to so #any people. Perhaps it see#ed all too pla(sible to its proponents)+oyle at least has iven the i#pression at ti#es that his espo(sal of the theory rests on ro(nds 7(st as e#otional as those on which reli io(s ar (#ents for creation rest.E9F B(t there is nothin i#proper in a hydro en ato#9s co#in into bein e( nihilo , or for that #atter in an elephant9s doin so. ,he latter certainly is not an event we e*pect)it wo(ld be an incredible event; in a world f(ll of antecedents the ca(sal space, as it were, is lar ely taken (p with their le iti#ate conse@(ences, so that there is not #(ch opport(nity for s(ch dist(rbances. B(t the view that this space is so ti htly packed as to leave no roo# for new be innin s is e*actly what this paper is intended to deny. ,here is an even #ore f(nda#ental level on which this whole @(estion can be taken (p, @(ite apart fro# all these @(estions of ca(sality, which #ay perhaps have served to conf(se the iss(e. Ln this new level the triad of lo ics is associated with the basic te#poral triad of present, past, and f(t(re. 1t is a rewardin intellect(al e*ercise 2which has so#ethin in co##on with pheno#enolo ical red(ction5 to confront e*perience as presented in the #o#ent, witho(t #e#ory and witho(t anticipation. Kike all e*ercises this is hard when first tried, b(t if properly done the world #ay take on those aspects of -freshness, life, and freedo#- which for Peirce are a #ark of $irstness.E1!F 8(ch a slice of present e*istence, abstracted fro# past and f(t(re, is an incredible event; what it conveys to (s is neither the concl(sion of a ded(ctive ar (#ent, nor the pre#ise of an ind(ctive one)rather a concl(sion witho(t pre#ises, or a pre#ise witho(t a concl(sion. 1t is this view of thin s which pro#pts a @(estion like +eide er9s: why sho(ld there be anythin at all0 .hy not #(ch rather nothin 0E11F 1n s(ch a li ht the @(eer lo ic of novelty and creation appears as the abori inal variety fro# which the others are derivative. Lnce we have a world, we can be in to reflect > 134 > on the re (larity of o(r e*perience of it as this acc(#(lates in #e#ory; the dyadic relation of ca(se and effect, the -predo#inant character of what has been done,- or 8econdness,E13F for which the lo ic of inevitable events is appropriate. 21n retrospect everythin is inevitable, which is why ar (#ents for deter#inis# are so sed(ctive.5 /nd we can entertain p(rposes and hopes, based on the e*trapolation of that re (larity into a proble#atic f(t(re for so#e #eanin f(l end, a process which has the character of ,hirdness, with all the opport(nity for #is(nderstandin and (ncertainty of o(tco#e that i#plies.E13F +ere the best that can be done lies within the ran e of a lo ic of #ore or less likely events. Present e*perience is the pri#ordial gi-en which cannot be e*plained, b(t it is not irrational)it for#s indeed the basis for all rationality. ,he final ar (#ent has its point of depart(re in this confrontation with the present, b(t oes off in a new direction. 1t is in the irred(cible firstness of every #o#ent that the roots of freedo# and creativity lie, and the stron est case for (nca(sed events, havin no probability whatever and lackin antecedents co#pletely, is to be fo(nd in o(r instinctive conviction that we o(rselves participate in s(ch events whenever we act freely. Lf co(rse we co(ld ar (e o(rselves o(t of that conviction and co#e to believe that we never do act freely, b(t that wo(ld be a pity. 8artre is ri ht, 1 think, when he clai#s that free action arises o(t of a center of conscio(sness which is em!t" , a %othin ness which can define itself only by #eans of what it denies in the world of br(te e*istence.E1AF ,his is only to say that whatever

kind of bein conscio(sness has is of a different order fro# the bein of thin s, in which it can participate only ne atively. 8artre does not accept other orders, and his conscio(sness is then mere %othin ness; other philosophers #ay resort to devices like Hant9s real# of freedo# or the vertical di#ension of the Christian e*istentialists. ,his is obvio(sly not the ti#e at which to brin (p all the old disp(tes between freedo# and deter#inis#. ,he conviction referred to above #ay of co(rse be ill(sory, altho( h even if it were 1 do not see how we co(ld help contin(in to behave as if it were not. B(t if we co(ld rid o(rselves of the idea that ca(sality applies to e-er"thing and restrict it to s(ccessive ele#ents of a #ore or less co#ple* ca(sal chain, havin a be innin or be innin s and an end or ends, there wo(ld be no diffic(lty abo(t the #atter. 2,he end of the chain is not re@(ired for the present ar (#ent, b(t it is an obvio(s corollary.5 .e are conditioned to feel that a world #ade (p of s(ch chains wo(ld be in so#e way (npredictable and chaotic. 1t wo(ld certainly be (npredictable, b(t 7(st in the ways in which this world is. Prediction involves catchin a ca(sal chain and p(ttin it in an ins(latin sheath, so that other ca(sal chains cannot et at it witho(t bein deliberately allowed to, in which case their effects > 13? > can be taken acco(nt of. B(t s(ch ins(lation is not always possible, and this li#its o(r ability to see into the f(t(re. ,he ad#ission of (nca(sed events #akes that a li#itation in principle and not #erely a conse@(ence of inade@(ate present knowled e, b(t it does not chan e the practical sit(ation. /nd the world is no #ore chaotic than before. ,he ideal of intelli ibility held o(t by for#al lo ic of the old kind was a #isleadin ideal, attainable only in the restricted conte*t of isolated syste#s. ,he fact is that, e*cept in astrono#y, science has never s(cceeded in findin an" ca(sal chain #ore than a few years lon witho(t loose ends, and even in astrono#y the clean si#plicity of the syste# is #ore apparent than real. ,he old lo ic has i#posed on (s a view of the world whose analo y is a tan le of infinite wires 2which science (ndertakes to disentan le5, each contin(o(s, fro# infinity to infinity, with occasional branchin s which represent probability. / tr(er analo y is to be fo(nd, 1 think, in a si#ilar str(ct(re #ade of nat(ral fibers, each individ(al strand of which is of finite len th. 8(ch strands, altho( h they are lon it(dinally disconnected, are laterally bo(nd; and this s( ests f(rther work on a ne lected topic, na#ely the nat(re of the @(asi6ca(sal relation between contem!orar" events. ,o concl(de: .e #ay decide, of co(rse, to re7ect this whole analysis as fancif(l, and ret(rn to a co#fortin belief in the ti ht, syste#atic order of nat(re, (ndist(rbed by the protests of people like Hierke aard who clai# that syste# so (nderstood cannot be lived and that we are in dan er of for ettin what it #eans to be an e*istin individ(al. 1f on the other hand the hypothetical possibility of (nca(sed events is allowed there #ay still be so#e protest at the conception of lo ic applied to the# here. $or#al syste#s have lives of their own, so in one sense there can be no ob7ection to the introd(ction of a new one in which the probability of the concl(sion is always <ero, altho( h its potentialities for develop#ent are ad#ittedly li#ited. B(t if the e#pirical ancestry of s(ch syste#s is taken serio(sly then we can deal with (nca(sed events either by sayin that they are illo ical, i.e., that no syste# applies to the#, or by #akin so#e atte#pt to find a syste# which does apply. 1 have chosen the latter alternative. > 13= >

!1 ,ac#'s Pri%ci2le a%d t#e Laws o& Lo$ic

1n this paper 1 wish to raise a philosophical @(estion abo(t lo ic, na#ely, the @(estion whether its laws can consistently be tho( ht of as analo o(s to those of the e#pirical sciences, i.e., as s(b7ect in so#e sense or other to test and confir#ation, or whether, as is #ore often #aintained, they #(st be tho( ht of as analytic and a !riori if not as conventional. 1n order to float the @(estion, so#e eneral idea of what kind of activity lo ic is #(st be pres(pposed. ,he !roblem of lo ic 1 take to be as follows: Iiven the tr(th 2or probability5 of sentences X Y, what can we say 2with what de ree of confidence, etc.5 abo(t the tr(th 2or probability5 of sentences X9 Y0 ,he method of lo ic 1 take to consist in perfor#in operations on the sentences X Y or on s(pple#entary sentences introd(ced for the p(rpose and in perfor#in f(rther operations on the sentences so enerated, and so on (ntil the sentences X9 Y or so#e obvio(sly related sentences are enerated. /ccordin to the r(les e#ployed in these operations we #ay then say that the sentences X9 Y are tr(e or have a certain de ree of probability in relation to the sentences X Y. .e th(s arrive at a de ree of confidence in the sentences X9 Y. B(t what of o(r confidence in the whole proced(re by which this de ree of confidence is arrived at0 .ell, we can constr(ct a second6order sche#e for that and talk about the sentences X Y and the r(les by which we operated on the#. .e th(s arrive at a de ree of confidence in the proced(re. B(t what of o(r confidence in this second6order sche#e0 /nd so on. 1t is tacitly a reed by al#ost everyone e*cept O(ine that this re res6 > 139 > sive proble# presents itself in two distinct cases. ,he first covers ded(ctive inference and ives (s absol(te confidence in the concl(sion on the ob7ect level as well as in the r(les at all s(bse@(ent levels. ,he second covers everythin else; we can9t even think of p(rs(in the re ression #ore than one or two levels, and even there we have to c(t off debate by shiftin attention fro# tr(th, probability, etc., to acceptability, episte#ic (tility, and the like. .henever bits of the proble# (nder its second aspect can be so arran ed as to yield to the techni@(es proper to its first, this is instantly done; we th(s have ded(ctive theories of probability, (tility, acceptance, and so on)a veritable ded(ctivi<in of all tractable parts of ind(ctive lo ic. 1t see#s reass(rin to be able to say with ded(ctive certainty that the concl(sion follows ind(ctively, even if we can9t assert the concl(sion itself with anythin #ore than ind(ctive probability. ,his activity takes place #ainly on the first #etalevel, and represents a kind of sidesteppin of second6 and hi her6order ind(ctive iss(es. :y ad#iration for the people who do it is reat and sincere, b(t 1 have no contrib(tion to #ake alon these lines. 1nstead 1 wish to confront one of the iss(es they sidestep and to s( est in a sli htly different way fro# O(ine9s that the separation of cases will not stand (p (nder scr(tiny. 1 start with +(#e and in partic(lar with the distinction between #atters of fact and relations of ideas. .e tend on the whole to ive +(#e too #(ch credit as a conte#porary and to #ake too little allowance for his belon in to the ei hteenth cent(ry. Iiven the tenor of i##ediately precedin disc(ssions, especially Berkeley9s, +(#e #ay certainly be e*c(sed for believin in -ideas,- b(t that does not e*c(se (s for followin hi# in this aberration, whether or not we call thin s by the sa#e na#e. ,he #ain contention of this paper is that #atters of fact are eno( h)are, indeed, all we have)and that the co#ple* #atters of fact which we call -relations of ideas- 2or which we call -lo ic,- ded(ctive or ind(ctive5 are reflections of the incl(sive #atter of fact which we call -the world- and are as contin ent

2or as necessary5 as it is. ,his contention can be looked (pon as a philosophical analo (e of the enerali<ed for# of :ach9s principle. .hat &instein called :ach9s principle was of co(rse the restricted clai# that the inertia of a iven body is deter#ined by the distrib(tion of #atter in the physical (niverse. ,he enerali<ed clai# is that the laws of nat(re are so deter#ined, and the philosophical analo (e is that the laws of lo ic are deter#ined, not to be s(re by the distrib(tion of #atter, b(t by so#e feat(re or feat(res of the world as a whole, so that they wo(ld be different if it were different. ,his #eans a#on other thin s at least a reinterpretation of what we can #ean by the e*pression -possible world,- since > 1A! > as presently (nderstood the li#itations on possible worlds are precisely lo ical li#itations, whereas if the world deter#ines the lo ic 2rather than the other way aro(nd5 it wo(ld see# diffic(lt to r(le o(t a !riori any world whatever, by any other ar (#ent, at least, than follows fro# the fact that this world already e*ists. )i-en lo ical r(les 2and the distinction between r(les and laws is an i#portant one in this conte*t5 we can of co(rse e*plore the set of worlds in which they hold and the relative possibilities within this set; for that #atter, we can devise syste#s with any r(les we like, the only li#itations bein the scope of o(r i#a ination. 2B(t that li#itation is far fro# trivial.5 ,his, however, is r(nnin ahead so#ewhat. :y proposal is really a do(ble one, of which the analo ical for# of :ach9s principle is only one ele#ent, the other ele#ent bein the reconstr(ction of lo ic and all other relations of ideas as #atters of fact. /nd even if both these ele#ents were (pheld, there wo(ld still re#ain the @(estion of what li ht, if any, they threw on ind(ctive lo ic and confir#ation theory. ,he last @(estion is the easiest. /s 1 have already said, 1 clai# to #ake no contrib(tion to the technical discipline, b(t it #ay be that s(ccess in the philosophical enterprise wo(ld lead to a different view of what the technical discipline is all abo(t and what can reasonably be e*pected of it. 1n partic(lar it #i ht help alon the de#ystification of deducti-e lo ic, which as the (nattainable paradi # has been responsible for drivin so #any ind(ctive lo icians to despair. -Celations of ideas- are represented by +(#e 2for e*a#ple, in the passa e abo(t consi nin books to the fla#es5 as the kinds of thin that for# the ob7ect of reasonin abo(t @(antity or n(#ber. :atters of fact, on the other hand, are the kinds of thin that enter into causal relations. .e can know so#e relations of ideas certainly, beca(se 2to (se post6+(#ean lan (a e5 they are analytic, definitional, and so on, and hence, as later ca#e to be tho( ht, e#pty of fact(al content. .e can never know any #atters of fact certainly, beca(se in order to do so we wo(ld need certainty in ca(sal relations, and these r(n into the notorio(s diffic(lty that f(t(re e*ceptions are always possible. 21 incl(de here of co(rse f(t(re knowledge as well as f(t(re e-ents .5 1 do not wish to rehearse all this, b(t to co##ent on the insertion of te#poral considerations into the ind(ctive case when they are absent fro# the ded(ctive case. 8(ppose we were to ask. +ow do yo( know the ded(ctive relations will hold in the f(t(re any #ore than the ind(ctive ones0 /fter a bit of spl(tterin , and ass(#in that the @(estion is taken serio(sly 2as 1 #ean it to be5, the reply to this is likely to be a challen e: +ow co(ld the ded(ctive relations be different, since they are r(les of proced(re and not laws of nat(re0 .hat wo(ld it be like for the# to be different0 .hat conceivable test co(ld be proposed that wo(ld reveal > 1A1 > e*ceptions to the#0 ,o which 1 readily answer that 1 have no idea, 1 can9t i#a ine an e*ception, it

doesn9t even #ake sense to #e)b(t nor do 1 concl(de, fro# these li#itations on #y powers of fantasy, that the thin is i#possible. 1 can readily think of e*ceptions in the case of ind(ction; 1 can9t conceive of the# in the case of ded(ction)b(t there #(st s(rely be #ore to it than that, or if there isn9t, then the debate is shiftin to #y territory. $or i#a inin , conceivin , and the like aren9t lo ical cate ories at all, b(t rather psycholo ical and th(s e#pirical ones. B(t for co(nterinstances to arise in the ded(ctive case wo(ld s(rely involve a self6contradiction. +ere the ded(ctive lo ician is likely to start writin thin s down, showin that the very r(les of the lan (a e + entail the analyticity of this proposition or that. %ow, however, 1 can afford to be enero(s. 1 have no ob7ection whatever to analyticity within lan (a es)for incorporatin the law of contradiction as a r(le in s(ch lan (a es; indeed, iven the world we live in, it see#s a so(nd #ove. B(t 1 can @(ite easily i#a ine a lan (a e in which the law of contradiction was not a r(le, in which 2let (s say5 tr(th6val(es were assi ned at rando#; it #i ht be spoken by so#e latter6day &pi#enides, who wo(ld e*plain that Cretans aren9t really liars, it9s 7(st that they don9t care one way or the other, and if they contradict the#selves then they contradict the#selves and that9s all there is to it. .e care abo(t tr(th)and that is a fact, not a principle of lo ic. /nd it is o(r carin abo(t tr(th, not 7(st abo(t the r(les of the lan (a e, that #akes (s choose the r(les we do. 1f d(rin the ar (#ent the lo ician has written so#ethin down, that is partic(larly ratifyin . $or inscriptions have a fact(al presence, and as lon as we han on to the# we can keep ideas 2and propositions and a lot of other #etaphysical ba a e5 at ar#9s len th. ,he c(rio(s dependence of lo icians on fact(al thin s like inscriptions 2not to #ention brains5 o( ht to tip (s off to a discrepancy between theory and practice. 1n theory lo ic reaches for i##(table tr(th 2#ost lo icians are at heart Platonists5; in practice the lo ician writes so#ethin down on paper or a blackboard, thinks for a bit, i#a ines, conceives, and so forth, and then writes so#ethin else down. B(t, yo( say, these are #ere tokens)tokens stand for types, and the types refer to all those lo ical cate ories, tr(ths, relations, and the like. ,hat #ay be, b(t all 1 see are the inscriptions, the f(rrowed brow, the p(<<led look. 1f 1 co(ld ive an ade@(ate acco(nt of lo ic in ter#s of them , wo(ld we need the rest of the apparat(s0 ,he kinds of #atter of fact re@(ired for this reconstr(ction are two: first, obvio(s thin s like inscriptions and (tterances, which can be located in the world easily eno( h alon side chairs and tables; second, a > 1A3 > rather speciali<ed kind of ani#al behavior 2in this case the behavior of lo icians5 which can be located alon side eatin and sittin , and so on. 1 a# prepared in the latter case to talk dispositionally abo(t -abilities- provided it is (nderstood that the possession of the ability in @(estion is a fact(al #atter to be 7(d ed in ter#s of behavior. .hat abilities do lo icians need in order to ply their trade0 ,hey are not 1 think especially e*otic abilities. ,he f(nda#ental operation of lo ic is one that every f(nctionin h(#an bein is capable of perfor#in , indeed one that we all do perfor# all the ti#e; 1 call it, borrowin fro# the classical &n lish ra##arians, -apposition,- and it consists of takin two thin s) any two thin s)and p(ttin 2and holdin 5 the# to ether. 1 say -takin - and -p(ttin - #etaphorically; knowin a person9s na#e is a case of apposition, so is knowin the $rench for an &n lish word, so is (sin a #etaphor, and so on. /pposition is a perfectly eneral binary operation, (nconstrained by cate ory considerations, and by #eans of it we b(ild o(r world. ,he special behavior of lo icians lies in the invention and followin of special r(les of apposition, which i#pose constraints (nder which we do not ordinarily work. 2,he laws of lo ic are not the laws of tho( ht, any #ore than the laws of chess are the laws of #ovin ob7ects on checkered s(rfaces. 1f /yer or Berlin or Popper have black6and6white tiled bathroo#s, that does not co#pel the# to walk one s@(are forward and one dia onally.5

,he special r(les of lo ic are for#ation6r(les that preserve or at least safe (ard type ho#o eneity and transfor#ation6r(les that preserve or at least keep track of tr(th. ,he chief talent that lo ic re@(ires is an ability to stick to these r(les; the looseness and red(ndancy, the ellipses and shortc(ts of ordinary lan (a e ive way to a #ore or less ri oro(s for#alis# 2which has nothin to do with notation5. ,his talent is rarer than #i ht be s(pposed, which acco(nts for the fact that lo ic 2as 1 have pointed o(t elsewhere5E1F is too sim!le for #any people who look for s(btlety in its ele#ents. 1t rapidly ets co#ple*, of co(rse, b(t its co#ple*ities always break down into si#ple ele#ents as the f(<<y co#ple*ities of everyday life do not. People are always p(ttin #ore or less co#plicated ob7ects and e*pressions in apposition with each other and one another; this activity is overned by no principles other than i##ediate (tility or intelli ibility and the conventions of ordinary lan (a e and behavior, and conse@(ently the coherence and even relevance of any ele#ent of the res(ltin str(ct(re with or to any other ele#ent are not (aranteed, indeed it is nor#al for this str(ct(re to be incoherent and fra #ented. ,hese defects do not often appear beca(se different parts of the str(ct(re are (s(ally bro( ht into play in fairly specific conte*ts which do not overlap; when inco#patible parts of it are activated at the sa#e ti#e the vario(s psycholo ical pheno#ena of > 1A3 > dissonance are observed, and there are also conte*ts which activate no parts beca(se they are 7(st not co#prehended. 2%ote that these str(ct(res are specific to individ(als.5 +ogical str(ct(res on the other hand are s(ch that e*cept (nder C(ssellian or ITdelian stress all their parts are #(t(ally consistent and no parts are lackin . ,he very idea of s(ch co#prehensive a(sterity is well6ni h inconceivable to the ordinary talker or thinker in daily life. B(t what the lo ician does is different only in de ree fro# what ordinary people do, and it too is overned in the end by (tility and intelli ibility and convention. .hat the additional constraints of lo ic #ake possible are 7(st those lo ical properties that we think of as characteristic, na#ely, analytic precision and synthetic open6endedness. &veryday tho( ht is at once rosser and #ore li#ited than lo ical inference: rosser beca(se it works with (nanaly<ed co#ple* wholes, #ore li#ited beca(se these cohere i#perfectly with one another and relate for the #ost part intransitively, so that inferential se@(ences are always short. 8till it is ade@(ate to the conditions of its world and s(rvives beca(se of this ade@(acy. 1ts world is an aspect of the world; the te#ptation we have to resist is that of s(pposin that beca(se lo ical refine#ents enable (s to transcend the li#itations of everyday tho( ht they also enable (s to transcend the act(ality of the world. ,he lo ical operations we are capable of perfor#in are 7(st so#e of the thin s that o(r evol(tionary develop#ent has e@(ipped (s to do, and like other feat(res of o(r heredity they can be ass(#ed to reflect a close ad7(st#ent to the facts of o(r environ#ent. 1f these facts are contin ent, then lo ical laws are also contin ent, while if they are necessary the necessity of those laws is still e*trinsic to lo ic and depends on an e#pirical relationship between it and the world. 1n this li ht we need to look a ain at the doctrine that ta(tolo ies are e#pirically e#pty, perhaps to abandon it in favor of the doctrine that on the contrary they are e#pirically f(ll, if 1 #ay so p(t it.E3F 1dentity and contradiction aren9t 7(st lo ical r(les 2altho( h they are that5, nor are they laws of tho( ht; they are laws of nat(re, reflectin 7(st those properties of the world which, accordin to the analo o(s for# of :ach9s principle, deter#ine the lo ic we are bo(nd to (se in dealin with it. ,hey aren9t obvio(sly falsifiable 2as re#arked earlier, o(r i#a inations aren9t (p to envisa in co(nterinstances, and by now it sho(ld be obvio(s why not5, b(t their nonfalsifiability is clearly of a different kind fro# the nonfalsifiability of pse(doscientific or #etaphysical clai#s. $or that #atter, in an i#portant sense the other ind(ctively established laws of nat(re aren9t falsifiable either. 1t is one thin to know 2to be

able to i#a ine, etc.5 what a co(nterinstance wo(ld be like , another to be able to prod(ce one. .e can of co(rse constr(ct > 1AA > interestin b(t as yet (seless syste#s incorporatin alternative r(les, b(t we can do that for lo ic too. Physical laws, like lo ical ones, f(nction as r(les within the theoretical syste#s to which they belon and ac@(ire the stat(s of laws only on the s(ccessf(l application of those syste#s to e#pirical proble#s. .hat holds for the laws of ded(ctive lo ic holds e@(ally and (nder precisely the sa#e conditions for the laws of ind(ctive lo ic. 1n neither case are we really (aranteed s(ccess in advance; if in the ded(ctive case it is clai#ed that consistency itself re@(ires the o(tco#e, it #(st be reco ni<ed that consistency in lan (a e is one thin , consistency in the world another, and that the for#er, a ain, reflects the latter. .e co(nt heavily on the world9s consistency and are perpet(ally vindicated in doin so. .e co(nt heavily also on the world9s contin(ity, on its re (larity, and so on, and are vindicated in this too. ,he really serio(s difference between the cases lies in the infor#ation available in the pre#ises, and fro# this point of view the c(rrent tendency to ded(ctivi<e ind(ctive proble#s see#s to #e entirely appropriate. B(t here a different distinction e#er es, a for# of the old distinction between theory confir#ation and instance confir#ation. 1n its traditional for# the proble# of ind(ction foc(sed #ainly on scientific laws, which as concl(sions of ind(ctive inferences are re (larly detached without #odal @(alifications and (sed as assertoric pre#ises in #akin predictions. 1t wo(ld be abs(rd to say, every ti#e we wanted to calc(late @(antities of che#ical rea ents or stresses in airfra#es, for e*a#ple, -.ell, the law is only confir#ed to s(ch and s(ch a de ree, so we can9t really be s(re how #(ch we need,- 7(st as it wo(ld be abs(rd to place bets on the tr(th of special relativity theory. Ln the other hand in Bayesian esti#ation proble#s, statistical co#p(tations, etc., there isn9t the sa#e need for detach#ent; we can always o back to the ori inal probabilities or the ori inal fi (res and start a ain, and the probability esti#ate in the concl(sion is of co(rse the essential part of it. ,his difference in the use of ind(ctive inference see#s to #e cr(cial. 1t is only in the for#er case that #y version of :ach9s principle can be tho( ht of as applyin , since in the latter o(r proble# isn9t with the behavior of the world e*actly, b(t with the chan in scope of o(r knowled e of it. ,he reason why the ne*t raven sho(ld be black is /uite different fro# the reason why the ne*t ball drawn fro# the (rn sho(ld be black. 1 concl(de by reiteratin one or two points. Ko ic, like science, is a r(le6 overned h(#an activity which consists in p(ttin thin s 2inscriptions, acts of 7(d #ent5 in apposition with one another, in spatial 7(*taposition, or in te#poral se@(ence. %obody can co#pel (s to accept its concl(sions, as the tortoise ta( ht /chilles, b(t acceptin 2and de6 > 1A" > tachin 5 the# is one of the thin s it is (sef(l to do in o(r dealin s with the world. 2Doin lo ic for no (lterior p(rpose is a for# of havin dealin s with the world.5 .ithin the syste#s we constr(ct we can be as for#al, as analytic, etc., as we like, b(t the choice a#on syste#s for (se in dealin with the world rests, in the ded(ctive as in the ind(ctive case, on e#pirical 2and in the lon r(n on pra #atic5 ro(nds. /nd there are li#itations on the kinds of syste# we can constr(ct, i#posed by the finite scope of o(r intellect and its prior adaptation to the special circ(#stances in which we find o(rselves. 8(ccess in theory, lo ical or scientific, consists in brin in it into parallel with the world so that it reflects essential feat(res of the world. 8o#e parallels are lon 6established and practically (n@(estioned, others

are #ore recent and tentative. /lso we can constr(ct syste#s independently of @(estions of relevance, b(t their r(les re#ain #erely r(les and are not to be conf(sed with lo ical or e#pirical laws. > 1A4 >

>1 A ?-a%t-/ T#eor( o& Ca-salit(

I
,he state#ent -( is the ca(se of " - is (s(ally taken to #ean one of two thin s)either, in co##onsense conte*ts, that the occ(rrence of ( is a -7ointly s(fficient condition-E1F for the occ(rrence of " , where ( and " are distinct events 2e. ., the throwin of a stone and the breakin of a window5, or, in scientific conte*ts, that ( and " both belon to a -ca(sal line-E3F and ( is antecedent to " , where ( and " are states of so#e syste# (nder oin contin(o(s variation 2e. ., the position of the #oon yesterday and its position today5. ,here is, it is tr(e, so#ethin odd abo(t sayin -the #oon9s bein where it was yesterday is the ca(se of its bein where it is today,- b(t this way of p(ttin it is enerally avoided by sayin instead that the #oon obeys a -ca(sal law.- Disc(ssions of the philosophy of physics tend to take the latter #eanin as paradi #atic: after all, the for# of e*pression of #ost physical laws is

where st is the state of so#e physical syste# at ti#e t and f is a 2preferably contin(o(s5 f(nction of ti#e. ,i#e here is the independent variable. which #eans that its passa e is taken as concept(ally prior to the variations in state described by the law. ,his point of view, enerali<ed to an S t which represents the state of the (niverse at ti#e t and an % which represents the totality of ca(sal laws overnin all physical processes whatever, leads to the -sin le for#(la-

> 1A? > referred to by Kaplace in his classical state#ent of #echanistic deter#inis#: -.e #(st th(s envisa e the present state of the (niverse as the effect of its previo(s state, and as the ca(se of that which will follow. /n intelli ence that co(ld know, at a iven instant, all the forces overnin the nat(ral world, and the respective positions of the entities which co#pose it, if in addition it was reat eno( h to analy<e all this infor#ation, wo(ld be able to e#brace in a sin le for#(la the #ove#ents of the lar est bodies in the (niverse and those of the li htest ato#: nothin wo(ld be (ncertain for it, and the f(t(re, like the past, wo(ld be directly present to its observation.-E3F .hether or not one wishes to assert the possibility, in principle, of carryin o(t the deter#inist pro ra#, there re#ains so#ethin p(<<lin abo(t the (se of the word -ca(se- in this connection. Kaplace9s state#ent, in fact, see#s to fall into two clearly separable parts)the first sentence, which is a co#paratively #odest re#ark abo(t ca(sality, and the rest, which is an e*trava ant drea# abo(t deter#inis#, (s(ally associated by (s with the idea of -ca(sal law.- ,his latter part does not really have

#(ch to do with ca(sality, altho( h it does have so#ethin to do with law, and C(ssell9s re#ark that -the whole conception of 9ca(se9 is resolved into that of law9-EAF is, in these circ(#stances, very apt. 1 do not a ree that the whole conception of -ca(se- can be resolved into that of -law,- b(t at least this conception of it can. .hat Kaplace9s de#on needs for its predictions is a set of lawlike state#ents abo(t the way in which certain syste#s behave when they are left alone. 1t does not #ake #(ch sense to ask whether or not this behavio(r is -ca(sal- as lon as it is contin(o(s, periodic, etc. 1t is clear that this is the sort of thin Kaplace was thinkin of beca(se he oes on to say, i##ediately after the passa e @(oted above, -,he h(#an #ind, in the perfection that it has been able to ive to the science of /strono#y, presents a faint o(tline of s(ch an intelli ence.-E"F ,akin the first sentence by itself, however, leads to so#e interestin reflections. -.e #(st envisa e the !resent state of the (niverse as the effect of its !re-ious state .- 1t wo(ld be (nfair to b(rden Kaplace with the conse@(ences of this innocent re#ark, and 1 do not wish to pretend that he is responsible for what follows. B(t, s(pposin o(rselves able to take instantaneo(s readin s of all variables and th(s to characteri<e the present state of the (niverse, what is -its previo(s state-0 1f we were to take serio(sly +(#e9s state#ent that -every effect is a distinct event fro# its ca(se,-E4F and to (se as the paradi # of a ca(sality state#ent not e@(ation 215 b(t instead the e@(ation

where n ass(#es discrete val(es, what wo(ld be the conse@(ences for > 1A= > the philosophy of science0 ,his is the @(estion 1 wish to disc(ss here. 1 shall start by considerin cases in which it is obvio(sly possible to identify -the previo(s state,- and then o on to deal with apparently contin(o(s variations where this possibility is not so obvio(s.

II
,his new paradi #, which 1 shall call, for obvio(s reasons, the -@(ant(# paradi #,- is rather closer to the co##onsense 7ointly s(fficient condition #eanin of -ca(se- than it is to the ca(sal6line #eanin . Consider the e*a#ple of the co##onsense #eanin iven at the be innin )the breakin of a window by a stone. /t first we #i ht think of the throwin of the stone as the ca(se, and the breakin of the window as the effect, b(t this has several disadvanta es. $irst, it leads to awkward @(estions abo(t whether the throwin of the stone was really the ca(se)whether it was not really the delin@(ency of the st(dent who threw it, or the fail(re of his parents to show hi# proper affection, and so on into an infinite dis7(nction. 8econd, it overlooks an essential part of the sit(ation, na#ely, the availability in the first place of an (nbroken window. ,hird, it foc(ses attention on so#ethin which is very hard to observe or describe, the breaking of the window. 1t is tr(e that we have a preference for the dra#atic rather than the prosaic, for e-ents rather than states . B(t the breakin of the window is over in a #o#ent, and when the flyin lass has settled the si nificant thin is that it is broken . Lne #i ht say that it had (nder one a state6transfor#ation; before, it was whole 2sn61 5; now it is broken 2sn 5. Clearly, however, the stone had so#ethin to do with it; one #i ht say of it that it provided the condition (nder which the state6transfor#ation co(ld take place. Perhaps e@(ation 235 o( ht to be rewritten to take acco(nt of this, so that o(r paradi # for ca(sality6state#ents wo(ld beco#e

where c stands for the condition. ,his will take care of the #a7ority of cases. Ln the other hand, the e*tra ter# co(ld be avoided by takin s to refer to the state of the whole syste# 2stone Z window5. .hat kind of f(nction is f 0 1t see#s likely that, whatever else #ay be tr(e of it, it will contain ele#ents of probability. 8tones do not always break windows, and altho( h one co(ld certainly specify states and conditions 2weak lass, stones of certain shapes and si<es thrown at an les and speeds above iven val(es5 (nder which the window wo(ld definitely break, and others (nder which it wo(ld definitely not break, still there wo(ld be a finite ran e within which one co(ld only (ess > 1A9 > whether it wo(ld break or not. Lne #i ht even place bets. $or the p(rposes of ins(rance a ainst da#a e to property this probability for the individ(al event wo(ld be concealed (nder a statistical ratio, b(t on the level of partic(lar state6transfor#ations s(ch probabilities have beco#e a fa#iliar feat(re of the world. 1n itself this disc(ssion of stones and windows is of little interest to the philosophy of science, b(t the pattern of ca(sal relation bro( ht o(t in it is seen to carry over into recent develop#ents in physics. ,here is a well6known tho( ht e*peri#ent d(e to KandP,E?F in which particles in a state 5 arrive at a state6filter which passes only particles in another state A . 1f A and 5 are (nlike all the particles will be re7ected, and if they are like all will be passed, b(t if they are fractionally like so#e will be passed and so#e re7ected. Lnce a particle has passed the A 6filter, however, it will always pass any /6filter it arrives at; si#ilarly, if it is re7ected, it will always be re7ected. ,his state of affairs is e*plained by sayin that a particle in state 5 7(#ps to state A 2or to state

5 on arrival at the filter: s(ch a state6transfor#ation is of co(rse a /uantum jum! . 1f the fractional likeness between A and 5 is !.3", say, one6fo(rth of all 5 6particles will pass the /6filter, b(t fro# the point of view of an individ(al particle this #eans that there is a probability of !.3" that it will 7(#p fro# state 5 to state A . ,his case is clearly analo o(s to the #acroscopic one already disc(ssed. ,he filter is the analo (e of the stone, i.e., it provides the occasion for the state6transfor#ation of the particle; and there is an irred(cible probability6relation between state 5 2sn61 5 and state A 2sn 5. 1n neither case is it necessary to talk abo(t the ti#e at which the transfor#ation occ(rs, since the states between which it takes place are relatively stable and obvio(sly @(alify as s(ccessive in the histories of the particle and the window. B(t if one asks for a ca(sal e*planation of the present state of the syste#, the answer can only be that previo(sly it was in another state, b(t that the s(pervention of a certain condition occasioned)in fact de#anded)a @(ant(# 7(#p. 2,he previo(s state is an indispensable part of the ca(se; nothin is de#anded by the filter of a particle already in state /, and stones pass freely thro( h windows already broken.5 Ket (s now consider another fa#iliar case of state6transfor#ation, na#ely that between the e*cited state of an ato# in a so(rce of radiation and its ro(nd state. +ere 1 sho(ld like to di ress for a #o#ent in order to deal with an a#bi (ity of #eanin of the word -state.- ,he Bohr ato# 2lon o(t of date, it is tr(e, b(t ood eno( h for the p(rposes of this disc(ssion5 is so#eti#es said to be like a solar syste#; the electrons o ro(nd and ro(nd in their orbits, acco#panied by probability6waves or whatever the latest theory de#ands, and all this activity contin(es (nabated even tho( h, as far as radiation is concerned, the ato# has

> 1"! > not chan ed its state at all. Ln the other hand the state of the real solar syste# is re arded as chan in contin(o(sly as, and in fact beca(se, the planets o ro(nd and ro(nd in their orbits. ,he two #eanin s of -state- are @(ite apparent; in the first case it #eans -bein characteri<ed by a certain set of e@(ations- 2the wave6e@(ations for the (ne*cited ato#5, and in the second case it #eans -havin parts disposed instantaneo(sly in certain ways with respect to one another.- ,he first represents a 7(d #ent e*ternal to the syste#, the second one internal to it. /nd yet one can certainly say that the solar syste# is characteri<ed by a set of e@(ations, na#ely Hepler9s laws and their s(bse@(ent refine#ents, and accordin to so#e physicists it even #akes sense to talk abo(t the instantaneo(s disposition of the parts of ato#s with respect to one another. ,he latter is the #ore diffic(lt, however, and at this point in the disc(ssion it is not re@(ired. Under the @(ant(# hypothesis we wo(ld want to #aintain that apparently contin(o(s chan es in the relative distrib(tion of parts of a syste#, s(ch chan es bein internal to the syste#, do not constit(te chan es in the state of the syste#. ,his #eans that the solar syste# has not (nder one any state6transfor#ations for a lon ti#e. ,he fact that the e@(ations do not chan e with ti#e #ay be taken as an indication of the stability of the syste#, altho( h as (s(al the introd(ction of ti#e brin s its own co#plications. 1f the e@(ations were chan in rad(ally with ti#e 2for e*a#ple if the syste# were -r(nnin down-5 it wo(ld always be possible, by the introd(ction of e*tra factors, to obtain a set of e@(ations which did not chan e in this way. ,o ret(rn to the e*cited ato#: in this case the ca(sal relation see#s to revert to the for# iven in 235, since, altho( h there is the re@(ired probability6relation between the e*cited state and the ro(nd state, no known condition has to obtain before the transfor#ation takes place. ,hese transfor#ations are @(ant(# 7(#ps in the p(rest sense 2we #i ht call what happens at the state6filter an -ind(ced- @(ant(# 7(#p5. / si#ilar case is enco(ntered in radioactive decay, when the e#ission of a particle fro# a iven n(cle(s does not depend on the satisfyin of conditions, altho( h the half6life of the isotope in @(estion #ay be known with reat acc(racy. Lne wo(ld nevertheless wish to say, 1 think, that the e#ission of a photon fro# a hydro en ato# was ca(sally dependent on its bein in an e*cited state, and that the e#ission of an alpha particle fro# a radi(# n(cle(s was ca(sally dependent on the instability of the n(cle(s. 1t is tr(e that this is e*actly what so#e physicists have ref(sed to say, #aintainin that @(ant(# transitions are in so#e way aca(sal; b(t if the alternatives are to have (nca(sed events or a new interpretation of the ca(sal relation, it wo(ld see# wise to e*plore the possibilities of the latter before settlin for the for#er. > 1"1 > Hant9s re#ark that -everythin that happens has its ca(se-E=F #ay not be apodictically certain, b(t it is not so#ethin one wishes to abandon cas(ally. ,he only stran e thin abo(t @(ant(# 7(#ps is why they sho(ld happen when they do, and this @(estion can only be asked fro# a point of view which #akes ti#e prior to the events that happen in it. ,he principal reason for the re7ection of the second #eanin of -state- at this level of analysis was that it appealed to the notion of ti#e 2-instantaneo(s dispositions-5, and in the @(ant(# paradi # there is no reference to ti#e. &verythin that happens has its ca(se, b(t in the solar syste# viewed as a whole 2to revert to an earlier topic of disc(ssion5 nothin happens. $ro# o(r li#ited perspective 2which takes acco(nt of only part of the syste#, e. ., the ali n#ent of the s(n and the #oon in eclipses5 we observe chan es, it is tr(e, b(t that is only a ainst a back ro(nd of local state6transfor#ations which provide (s with a ti#e scale. %ow 1 a# o(tside #y ho(se, now 1 a# inside; now it is ni ht, now it is day. 1n the li ht of transfor#ations s(ch as these 2and they are #(ch #ore basic to o(r notion of ti#e than the s#ooth passa e of hands ro(nd clock faces5 1 #ay be te#pted to say that the solar syste# is in a new

state, b(t it is 1 who a# in a new state. 1n fact it #ay be taken as f(nda#ental to the position advocated in this paper that in the last analysis state6transfor#ations deter#ine the passa e of ti#e, and not the other way ro(nd. ,i#e does not pass for a syste# which is not (nder oin transfor#ation, e*cept fro# the point of view of another syste# which is, and conse@(ently it #akes no sense to ask why @(ant(# 7(#ps take place when they do. ,here wo(ld be no #eanin to -when- if there were no 7(#ps.

III
.hat then beco#es of the notion of -law- into which the second of o(r #eanin s of -ca(se- was to be resolved0 &@(ation 215 now appears to e*press #erely the correlation of the states of one syste# with the state6transfor#ations of another taken as standard. B(t the appearance of contin(ity re#ains, and the states which are correlated with the standard are still states in the (nsatisfactory sense re7ected a short while a o. %obody can deny, however, that s(ch internal rearran e#ents do take place in otherwise (ndist(rbed syste#s, and it #ay be (sef(l to know how they occ(r. Perhaps the @(ant(# paradi # can be shown to apply to the# too. ,here is really not s(ch a reat difference between a chan e re arded as contin(o(s and a chan e re arded as proceedin by discrete steps; /shby re#arks that -in nat(ral pheno#ena the ob6 > 1"3 > servations are al#ost invariably #ade at discrete intervals; the 9contin(ity9 ascribed to nat(ral events has often been p(t there by the observer9s i#a ination, not by act(al observation at each of an infinite n(#ber of points.-E9F /nd we are beco#in increasin ly fa#iliar with processes in which an apparent contin(ity is known to be the prod(ct of very #any individ(al stepwise transfor#ations, in ther#odyna#ics, for e*a#ple. / -ca(sal law- #ay therefore be nothin b(t the s#oothin over on the #acroscopic level of a lar e n(#ber of ca(sal transfor#ations on the #icroscopic level. ,he @(ant(# paradi #, then, appears to be ade@(ate for all the standard cases of ca(sal relation, and to cover also cases in #odern physics which (nder other interpretations see#ed to involve aca(sal relations. 1t #ay be asked what difference its adoption wo(ld #ake in o(r o(tlook on the world and on science. 1ts reatest advanta e is to be fo(nd, 1 think, in a directin of attention away fro# notions like ti#e, law, and so on, which see# to be transcendent with respect to o(r i##ediate e*perience and which have always been s(b7ects of controversy, and a directin of attention towards the present state of the world and its possible #odifications. Lne #i ht envisa e the (niverse as so#ethin like a rather lar e pointillist paintin ; there are so #any spots of bl(e, so #any spots of red, and so on, and what the paintin looks like at any #o#ent depends on their distrib(tion on the canvas. ,he spots are to be re arded as #ovable, however, and the scene is therefore constantly chan in . ,he old e#phasis corresponds to a search for re (larities in the #ove#ent of so#e spots with respect to each other and the canvas, s(ch #ove#ent bein tho( ht of as contin(o(s and takin place in a ti#e thro( h which the canvas itself end(res. 1t wo(ld #ake sense, accordin to this view, to think of so#e scene as re#ainin (nchan ed for a period of ti#e, which of co(rse is to (s the nor#al behavio(r of paintin s. B(t it is not the nor#al behavio(r of the (niverse. .hat wo(ld it #ean for all chan e to cease0 1t wo(ld entail the cessation of the passa e of ti#e; as #aintained above, ti#e does not pass (nless so#e chan e takes place. &ven if, to revert to the paintin , one were to see the abs(rdity of the notion of its e*istin (nchan ed thro( h ti#e 2or even of its needin a canvas5, one #i ht still look for contin(o(s f(nctions 2-ca(sal laws-5 relatin the #ove#ents of the spots to so#e re (lar #ove#ent)say an oscillation of one spot in a corner)which was taken as establishin a ti#e scale, and this wo(ld be all ri ht as far as it went.

B(t s(ppose on closer inspection it was fo(nd that at least so#e spots 2and possibly the ti#e6 deter#inin spot itself5 did not #ove contin(o(sly, b(t 7(#ped fro# place to place. ,his wo(ld not si nal eneral chaos, since one wo(ld not e*pect to find any partic(lar spot 7(#pin very far, b(t it > 1"3 > #i ht occ(r to so#ebody that instead of lookin for lon 6ter# re (larities of an absol(te sort we #i ht 7(st as well ask the #ore li#ited @(estion abo(t state6transfor#ations: where can this partic(lar spot 7(#p ne*t, and with what probabilities0 1n order to find answers to these @(estions we wo(ld have to #ake very #in(te observations, b(t instead of takin readin s at lon intervals 2as 7(d ed by what the observer does in between5 and plottin -best c(rves- to fit the#, it wo(ld be necessary to concentrate on 7(st three states, the last state, the present state, and the ne*t state, as ele#ents of a :arkov chain. Lne advanta e of doin thin s in this way is that the process is contin(ally self6correctin )the ref(sal to #ake lon 6ran e co##it#ents prevents e*tre#es of error. 1ts reat disadvanta e is that it is so #yopic; in s@(intin at details it is in dan er of failin to rasp what is happenin to the whole. 1t #ay be said that, for the whole, there is no #eanin to -the last state, the present state, and the ne*t state-; that in fact the co(nterpart to e@(ation 235 with the @(ant(# paradi #,

is prepostero(s and abs(rd. ,o this it #i ht be replied that it is no #ore so than e@(ation 235 itself, that any ca(sal law)and therefore e@(ation 235)can be e*pressed in ter#s of discrete state6 transfor#ations by takin readin s at stated intervals 2i.e., whenever so#e ti#e6deter#inin transfor#ation lakes place5, and that even the differential calc(l(s does not need the -infinitesi#als- of which Berkeley #ade so #(ch f(n, b(t can cond(ct all its b(siness in ter#s of s#all b(t finite differences. / literal interpretation of e@(ation 2"5 wo(ld, of co(rse, be stretchin #atters so#ewhat; there is no reason for all the spots to 7(#p to ether. &ven for #edi(#6si<ed a re ates e@(ations like 215 #i ht be practically #ore (sef(l than e@(ations like 235, so that there is no dan er of the de#ise of -law.- B(t what a @(ant(# view of ca(sality wo(ld insist (pon wo(ld be the reco nition that s(ch e@(ations rested (lti#ately on e@(ations like 235. ,he whole is b(ilt (p o(t of its details, and if the principles accordin to which the whole operates can be satisfactorily acco(nted for in ter#s of those accordin to which the details operate then there is no need for transcendent principles. 1t is the contention of this paper that ti#e can be acco(nted for in ter#s of the behavio(r of the (lti#ate constit(ents of #atter, that contin(ity can be acco(nted for in ter#s of discrete stepwise transfor#ations, and that these acco(nts re#ove so#e of the traditional #ystification fro# the proble# of ca(sality. > 1"A >

1 A Ne$ati'e I%ter2retatio% o& t#e Ca-sal Pri%ci2le

,he re#arks that follow are to be re arded as a #odest atte#pt at spec(lative therapy. ,he condition a ainst which they are directed is #etaphysical; it is the co#p(lsion to e*trapolate li#ited analytic s(ccesses into eneral synthetic principles. ,he partic(lar for# of it that 1 have in #ind is the elevation of the concept of ca(sal connection, established in brief episodes or in isolated se@(ences, into a

principle accordin to which past states of the world prod(ce and deter#ine f(t(re ones. 1n this for# it afflicts #any scientists, and also #any philosophers of science who consider the#selves liberated fro# #etaphysics. 1t is chronic and vir(lent, as can be discovered by en a in s(ch people in conversation abo(t free action, (nca(sed events, and so on. ,he prescription is ho#eopathic, in that it consists of a #ini#al dose of #etaphysics. Lne of the #ost f(nda#ental characteristics of o(r e*perience of the world is that one state of it is always s(cceeded by another. ,aken in their totality these states are (ni@(e and nonrec(rrin . .ithin the#, however, stable ele#ents can be identified which do rec(r, and so#e of these for# repeatable se@(ences within the nonrepeatin se@(ence of states as a whole. 1f s(ch a se@(ence can be isolated fro# the rest of the world, and if its ele#ents are co#ple* eno( h so that they re#ain constant in so#e respect b(t chan e in another, the chan es #ay be s(##ed (p in a scientific law, valid (nder iven conditions 2i.e., provided the constant back ro(nd re#ains constant5. 1t is c(sto#ary to describe s(ch laws as -ca(sal,- since each state ele#ent #ay be tho( ht of as in so#e way prod(cin or necessitatin the ne*t. ,his, as > 1"" > +(#e showed, can properly be no #ore than a s(b7ective i#pression, b(t as a #anner of speakin it is har#less as lon as it is not taken too serio(sly. 1 say -as a #anner of speakin - beca(se the proble# of ca(sality arises less on the ontolo ical level 2where a sol(tion to it wo(ld involve an answer to the @(estion why ti#e passes and indeed why anythin . happens at all5 than on the lo ical and episte#olo ical levels. 1f it is tho( ht that one state prod(ces another, it will obvio(sly #ake sense to try to represent the first by a state6description which will si#ilarly -prod(ce- the state6description of the second. -Prod(ction- on the lo ical side is represented by entailment , a relation between lo ical antecedent and conse@(ent which enables the latter to be deduced from the for#er. 1f a for#alis# based on entail#ent can be fo(nd which is a s(itable representation, when interpreted, of so#e physical relation, the lo ical antecedent and conse@(ent can be taken to #irror a te#poral before and after. ,he s(ccess of the physical sciences in findin for#alis#s of this kind is well known. ,he #odel of the ca(sal relation s( ested by the sciences 1 shall call the deter#inis#6entail#ent #odel; it is a positive interpretation of the principle of ca(sality, which #aintains that past events positively deter#ine present and f(t(re ones. 1ts for#(lation depended on the possibility of isolatin repeatable se@(ences of state6ele#ents, and it can be applied with 7(stification only to s(ch isolated and repeatable se@(ences. /n isolated ele#ent in the se@(ence can be said to be deter#ined by an" previo(s ele#ent as lon as the isolation is ri oro(sly preserved; b(t as soon as the se@(ence is considered open to other parts of the world the concept of deter#ination within it ceases to be applicable. 8(ch an openin 6(p is reflected on the practical side as a fail(re of certainty in prediction: events can be predicted only if they are caref(lly screened fro# all infl(ences e*cept those of the prior events of the se@(ence in @(estion. ,he conse@(ences of the s(ccess of science in establishin ca(sal chains have not been (nifor#ly beneficial to philosophy. 8ince the ei hteenth cent(ry there has been a tendency to e*trapolate the notion of ca(sal deter#ination fro# the li#ited se@(ences of isolated state ele#ents for which representative for#alis#s have in fact been fo(nd to the s(ccession of states as a whole. 8ince, as was pointed o(t above, each of these states occ(rs only once, this e*trapolation is clearly ille iti#ate. 1 do not wish to assert that states of the world as a whole do not ca(se, or even deter#ine, s(bse@(ent states )only that, the concepts of ca(sality and deter#ination bein what they are, their application to states as a whole is #eanin less. ,his applies also, by e*tension, to ele#ents of s(ch states which are

essentiall" nonisolable , i.e., > 1"4 > whose character wo(ld be altered by any restriction on the potential relevance of any other ele#ent 2of the present or of any previo(s state5. ,he #ost i#portant a#on these essentially nonisolable ele#ents are h(#an conscio(sness and h(#an action, which do not have to be e*cl(ded fro# the world in order to be e*cl(ded fro# the field of the ca(sal relation. Conscio(sness is conscio(sness of the world as a whole, within the li#its of the available syste# of si nals 2and of si ns5; action #odifies the world as a whole, s(b7ect to si#ilar li#itations 2the availability of ener y, the absence of restraint, etc.5. /nd of co(rse it is not necessary to identify this -world as a whole- with the e*tent of the physical (niverse; the analysis applies as lon as the content of conscio(sness and the ob7ect of action, taken in their entirety, satisfy the condition of nonrec(rrence. 8ince philosophers have an apparently inc(rable (r e to e*tend the ran e of application of their concepts, #etaphorically if not strai htforwardly, it #i ht be well to e*plore the possibility of refor#(latin the concept of ca(sal connection in s(ch a way that its e*tension wo(ld not lead to (ndesirable conse@(ences. 8o#e indication as to how this #i ht be done #ay be ained fro# an e*a#ination of the lo ical for#alis#s which #ay be (sed to e*press vario(s propositions abo(t ca(sal relatedness. 1n order to keep clear the difference between states of affairs related physically and sentences related lo ically we adopt the convention of referrin to the for#er by capital letters 2P, O, . . . 5, and to the latter by s#all ones 2p, @, . . . 5, the sentence p bein (nderstood to describe the state of affairs P, and to be tr(e if and only if P is the case. 8(ppose P and O to be individ(al events or states of affairs between which the ca(sal relation is s(pposed to hold. 1t is not necessary for the present p(rpose to specify whether either of the# has yet occ(rred, altho( h if there is to be a lawlike sentence e*pressin this relation si#ilar events #(st have occ(rred and been described before. ,he entail#ent6deter#ination #odel wo(ld re@(ire that -P is the ca(se of O- sho(ld be represented by

where : is the si n for strict i#plication or entail#ent. ,his e*pression is iven deliberately in non@(antified for#, to avoid for the #o#ent a co##it#ent to (niversality or partic(larity. 8ince we be in fro# individ(al events, p and @ are to be taken at first as sin (lar sentences; as the disc(ssion shifts to the possibility of establishin lawlike connections between events the (niversal @(antifier #(st be i#plicitly prefi*ed. B(t in a sense it is i#plicit in every clai# to causal connection, since the #ini#al ca(sal principal wo(ld see# to re@(ire that if the > 1"? > sa#e sit(ation were to rec(r in e*act detail the sa#e proposition wo(ld be tr(e of it. &@(ation 215 is of co(rse e@(ivalent to

-it is not possible that p and 2at the sa#e ti#e5 that not @,- or -P cannot occ(r witho(t O occ(rrin .,his already brin s to li ht a weakness in the lo ical representation of ca(sality, since P #ay very well occ(r witho(t O occ(rrin (ntil later, it #ay never be the case that p and that @ at the sa#e ti#e. ,he

indispensable tem!oral nat(re of the relationship cannot be capt(red in a ti#eless lo ic. 2,he fact that ti#e enters the e@(ations of physics as 7(st another variable has enco(ra ed the ass(#ption that the #any6di#ensional world of space6ti#e and other properties can be considered to e*ist ate#porally and as it were all at once, a fiction which is (sef(l for scientific p(rposes b(t cannot be allowed (ncritical ad#ission to philosophical ar (#ent.5 B(t leavin that proble# aside, the #odal clai# 2-it is not possible . . . -5 is obvio(sly #(ch too stron , and @(ite inco#patible with ind(ctive #odesty. ,he contin ent stat(s of act(al scientific laws is better reflected by the si#ple conditional

which is e@(ivalent to

,his brin s (s down to the level of +(#e9s e#piricis#, and #erely asserts the de facto constant con7(nction of P and O. B(t it shares with the stron er for# a serio(s drawback, havin to do with the fact that even in isolated se@(ences there is rarely a one6to6one relation between ca(ses and effects, and even when there is the relation #ay not e*cl(de the possibility of interference. 1t follows fro# p 8 @ that U@ 8 Up, whereas it #i ht well be the case that p b(t that, beca(se of so#e inhibitin factor 2an (ne*pected #eteorite fro# o(ter space which shatters the e*peri#ental apparat(s at the critical #o#ent5, not @. 8(ch possibilities can be (arded a ainst by the insertion of a ceteris !aribus cla(se, b(t in a world as vario(s as this one that really #akes it too easy. +ow diffic(lt the proble# is in fact can be a( ed fro# the elaborate physical preca(tions which have to be taken by e*peri#ental scientists in order to be s(re that the se@(ence of events they wish to st(dy is s(fficiently isolated fro# e*traneo(s infl(ences, and fro# the diffic(lties even then of ettin sensitive e*peri#ents to work, 1t has been pointed o(t 2by 8criven5 that what we #ean by the ca(se of so#ethin is often only a -7ointly s(fficient condition- for it, not by itself a f(lly s(fficient one, and it see#s wise to #ake provision for this. /nd since > 1"= > also p 8 @ is f(lly co#patible with r 8 @, s 8 @, etc., it is evident that a 7ointly s(fficient condition #ay not be necessary or even 7ointly necessary, which a ain throws do(bt on its ade@(acy as an e*pression of what we ordinarily #ean by a ca(sal relation. 1n order to take care of these shortco#in s we #i ht try co#plicatin the sit(ation as follows: 8(ppose O to have a n(#ber of alternative ca(ses, P1 , P3 , P3 , and so on; we #ay then replace p by p1; p3 ; P3; . . . 8(ppose f(rther that each of these is co#ple*, so that P1 can be broken down into a set of 7ointly s(fficient conditions XPi1 ; p1 in t(rn can then be replaced by the con7(nction of the #e#bers of a set Xpi1. /s s( ested above, however, a#on the less obvio(s conditions in each case #(st be the absence of certain potential inhibitors P[ , in the case of P1 XP[1i Y, and si#ilarly for P3 , P3 , and so on, with their appropriate lowercase descriptions. ,he final for#(lation will then be

8(pposin the alternatives to be e*ha(stive, and the lists of 7ointly s(fficient conditions to be co#plete,

this #ay fairly be said to s(# (p the facts abo(t the ca(se of O. in the process of co#plication, (nfort(nately, the whole enterprise has lost any (sef(lness it #i ht have pro#ised at first. $or, fro# the point of view of e*planation, what we (s(ally want to know is not what wo(ld or #i ht ca(se O (nder appropriate conditions, b(t what did ca(se it; while fro# the point of view of prediction what we (s(ally want to know is not all the possible ways of ca(sin O, b(t only whether the state of affairs P which act(ally obtains is likely to ca(se it, or, even better, what P is likely to ca(se, whether O or so#ethin else. 1f o(r P appears a#on the list P1 , P3 , etc., then we #ay ass(#e that it will ca(se O)provided it is specified in eno( h detail to ens(re that all the XPi Y are present, and none of the XP[i Y. ,he for#er condition can perhaps be #et in so#e cases, altho( h in #ost cases, and in detail, it wo(ld be diffic(lt eno( h; the latter see#s co#pletely (nattainable, since a list of all the thin s that wo(ld prevent O if they happened, incl(din bi<arre possibilities like #eteorites, wo(ld be prohibitively lon even if it co(ld be constr(cted in principle. ,he only way of #akin s(re that all the conditions, positive and ne ative, for the occ(rrence of O have been #et is to have O occ(r. ,he ideal for#ali<ation of the relation between P and O, if only the order of the ter#s did not have to reflect the order of the events, wo(ld in fact be

,he stron for# can be (sed beca(se if O happens, and P is the ca(se > 1"9 > of O, P 2whatever it is5 must have happened. B(t this is if anythin #ore (seless than 2"5. %evertheless 245 presents (s with a kind of hint, for it yields by contraposition

in which the order of the ter#s is ri ht, altho( h its eneral appearance is ad#ittedly ne ative. /nd this hint, taken to ether with the observation above that when scientists are an*io(s to have so#ethin happen, they spend #ost of their ener y on #akin s(re that other thin s do not happen, leads to the reflections which occ(py the re#ainder of this paper. /s re#arked earlier, the preocc(pation of ca(sal analysis has traditionally been with the way in which events brin other events abo(t. ,he conviction that events #(st be bro( ht abo(t, somehow , is 1 think a piece of p(re anthropo#orphis#, restin on o(r e*perience of -#akin thin s happen-; it (sed to be tho( ht that an anthropo#orphic Iod #ade nat(ral events happen, and when Iod was no lon er appealed to as a principle of e*planation 2e*cept for events o(tside the accepted order of thin s, s(ch as those still called -acts of Iod-5, ca(sal efficacy was invented to take his place. ,his conviction has en endered a ood deal of spec(lation abo(t the ori in of the (niverse, as well as +eide er9s celebrated @(estion: -.hy sho(ld there be anythin at all0 .hy not #(ch rather %othin 0- ,his has always see#ed to #e an interestin b(t f(tile @(estion. ,hat there sho(ld now be, or sho(ld ever have been, %othin , iven that there is now so#ethin , strikes #e not as i#possible b(t as (nintelli ible, altho( h if events have to be bro( ht abo(t one can at least see how so#ebody with #etaphysical inclinations #i ht raise s(ch a @(estion. B(t s(ppose they 7(st co#e abo(t0 .e #ay invoke here a ti#e6honored principle, to be fo(nd in vario(s for#s in Plato, %icolas of C(sa, and others 2incl(din 8pino<a and Keibni<5. and called by Kove7oy the -Principle of Plenit(de,- accordin to which all possibilities strive to co#e into bein , since their fail(re to do so wo(ld leave the (niverse i#perfect.

,his is at least as pla(sible as the #etaphysical principle of ca(sality. Bearin it in #ind we #i ht refor#(late +eide er9s @(estion as follows: -.hy sho(ld there be only so#ethin 0 .hy not #(ch rather &verythin 0Unlike +eide er9s, this @(estion per#its a ready answer. ,here is not everythin beca(se so#e thin s are inco#patible with other thin s, so that their co#in into bein e*cl(des these others fro# the possibility of co#in into bein , and e*cl(des also all the possible conse@(ences 2in the traditional sense5 of the e*cl(ded thin s. /n e*a#ple #ay help. 1f so#ebody says to #e today, -.hy sho(ldn9t yo( be in > 14! > Kondon to#orrow ni ht0- 1 #ay answer that it is @(ite possible for #e to be in Kondon to#orrow ni ht, and if so#e reason for oin presents itself 1 #ay indeed o. B(t if he says to #e to#orrow ni ht, -.hy aren9t yo( havin dinner in Kondon toni ht0- 1 #ay answer -Beca(se 19# in .ashin ton, and it9s too late to et to Kondon toni ht.- Between today and to#orrow is a point beyond which, if 1 haven9t yet left for Kondon, 1 won9t #ake it by to#orrow ni ht; fro# that point on, the (niverse which has as an ele#ent #y bein in Kondon to#orrow ni ht is eternally i#possible. Lne #i ht say that #y not havin left .ashin ton ca(ses #y not bein in Kondon. Lf co(rse as the point of decision with respect to Kondon passes, the possibility re#ains open that 1 #i ht dine in Chica o, when it is no lon er possible to et to Chica o by so#e specified ti#e, say nine o9clock, the possibility re#ains open that 1 #ay o to Balti#ore; when Balti#ore is o(t 1 #ay still o to /rlin ton; at one #in(te to nine 1 co(ld #ake a dash for the resta(rant on the corner. B(t at nine 1 a# here , wherever that is, and every other possibility has been eli#inated. ,he e*a#ple has been co(ched in h(#an ter#s and in ter#s of technolo ical possibility 2the availability of transportation, etc.5, b(t it is easy to see how the idea of the pro ressive closin off of possibilities co(ld be taken as a #odel for the behavior of the physical world. ,he ne ative interpretation of the ca(sal principle consists in the view, not that past events determine present and f(t(re actualities , b(t that they e(clude present and f(t(re !ossibilities . 1f P is the ca(se of O 2in the old sense5, and if C is inco#patible with P, so that

and hence

we have fro# 2?5 and 295

which restores the ori inal entail#ent6deter#ination relation, only now with ne ative rather than positive force. /ltho( h in so#e cases the two interpretations #ay t(rn o(t to be e@(ivalent 2e. ., if we are able to catch and isolate a -ca(sal chain- in an e*peri#ent, which a#o(nts to e*cl(din all the alternatives e*cept one, so that the sit(ation is f(lly predictive5, the ne ative view is far preferable for #ost p(rposes, and especially for eneral philosophical p(rposes s(ch as the analysis of free action, where the positive view leads all too easily to a constricted deter#inis#. $or a start, all the criticis#s of process philosophers like Ber son and .hitehead are taken care of at once, since it is no lon er of pri#e i#portance to have

> 141 > events crystalli<ed into any partic(lar pattern before they can be said to be ca(sally related. / cross6 section taken at any arbitrary ti#e allows (s to eli#inate a whole fa#ily of f(t(re cross6sections, b(t at every #o#ent the (niverse faces precisely as #(ch possibility as before. ,he lawlike behavior of the world has to be taken as a dat(# in either case, b(t the ne ative interpretation is not in conflict with it )indeed it allows (s to acco(nt pla(sibly for a whole set of laws, na#ely statistical ones, which have defied ca(sal analysis in the traditional sense and have led to #(ch bewilder#ent and debate. $or (nder the ne ative interpretation one can @(ite easily envisa e a sit(ation in which an event is not e*cl(ded by any !re-ious event b(t is e*cl(ded, at the last #o#ent 2to (se a loose way of speakin 5, by a contem!orar" event. 1f the pattern of s(ch e*cl(sions 2the statistical ratio5 has to be acco(nted for it can be done by so#ethin like Popper9s propensity theory. Part of the relief fro# #etaphysical pain afforded by the ne ative interpretation consists in the reali<ation that obvio(sly i#portant in redients of the physical or h(#an world, s(ch as chance, freedo#, etc., no lon er have to be i#ported apolo etically b(t are fo(nd to be nat(rally present (p to the last #o#ent before the passa e of ti#e fi*es the state of affairs irrevocably. Lne #i ht indeed take the position that it is 7(st its bein fi*ed irrevocably that constit(tes the passa e of ti#e, that the way we tell the difference between past and f(t(re is by observin what is still open to possibility and what is not. ,his is clearly no #ore than a preli#inary treat#ent of a very lar e topic. ,he #ain point 1 have wished to #ake so far can be s(##ed (p as follows: 1f o(r #odel of the ca(sal relation is -,hat past, therefore this f(t(re,- not only is it very diffic(lt to arrive at ti ht lo ical for#(lations 2beca(se of needin to know everythin , etc.5, b(t also certain eneral philosophical perple*ities ens(e, s(ch as the denial of the possibility of free action and the #ysterio(s cond(ct of statistical processes. 1f on the other hand we say, -,hat past, therefore not those f(t(res,- we si#plify the lo ical sit(ation, since we can for#ali<e what infor#ation we have and let the rest lie in obsc(rity, and leave the sense of possibility alive (ntil the act(al occ(rrence of the event in @(estion 2or of so#e other event5 provides the only concl(sive test of the tr(th of the prediction that it will occ(r. /nd this interpretation applies e@(ally to isolated se@(ences and to the world as a whole. &very state of the world as a whole e*cl(des entire classes of f(t(re states; no state of the world as a whole deter#ines any partic(lar f(t(re state. ,he ne ative interpretation th(s provides a de ree of philosophical coherence to which the old, positive interpretation co(ld not attain. > 143 >

PART IV1 ,AC0INES AN* PRACTICES

> 14" >

Pre&ace to Part IV. ,ac#i%es a%d Practices

8cience #ay be the #atchin of str(ct(ral feat(res of the (niverse in the do#ain of #ind, b(t it is necessary to acknowled e that the capacities of #ind are li#ited. $ro# #y early days a#on the Ieneral 8yste#s theorists it see#ed clear that co#p(ters were oin to be of central e!istemological i#portance, since while their co#p(tational powers pro#ised to s(pple#ent the li#ited powers of #ind, those li#itations the#selves wo(ld prevent the person whose #ind it was fro# (nderstandin f(lly 7(st how its powers had been s(pple#ented. ,hese reflections on the inade@(acy of the knower led to others, on the different e#bodi#ents of knowled e)in parts of the nervo(s syste# other than the central or co nitive 2in #(sc(lar habits, in practices5, in #achines perhaps. ,hey also led to the @(estion of what the s(b7ect as a ent is doin when (sin #achines, whether to s(pple#ent the powers of the #ind or a#plify the powers of the body. ,his part of the book is bracketed by two chapters on the eneral iss(e of the ade@(acy of the relations of #ind to its world and the ways in which #achines #ay #odify those relations. Between the# are fo(r chapters on proble#s in the philosophy of technolo y. Chapter 13, which is the earliest paper in the book 2its ori inal version dates fro# 19"9, when it was read at a #eetin of the :isso(ri 8tate Philosophical /ssociation in Hansas City5, introd(ces for the first ti#e a principle that 1 was to (se later in #y work on str(ct(ralis#, the -opti#(# co#ple*ity principle.- ,his s( ested that well6adapted or anis#s will nat(rally ad7(st the#selves or their environ#ent (ntil the e@(ilibri(# of the syste#s of perception and tho( ht 2whose #atchin is the intelli6 > 144 > ibility of the world5 falls at a point where they are both within an acceptable ran e of co#ple*ity, to #ove o(tside of which, whether towards too little or too #(ch co#ple*ity, wo(ld s(b7ect the or anis#s to stress. 1t is, 1 ad#it, a va (ely for#(lated principle, tho( h not #(ch va (er than the /ristotelian principle of the #ean, which 2now that 1 think of it5 the opti#(# co#ple*ity principle stran ely rese#bles. Chapter 13 was written in Paris for delivery in Chica o, d(rin a sabbatical spent #ostly in the Biblioth\@(e %ationale. Lne c(rio(s episode of its prod(ction was the cere#ony with which, after d(e consideration and e*a#ination, 1 was allowed to cons(lt 2(nder a librarian9s watchf(l and faintly disapprovin eye, in the part of the B.%. known as &nfer5 the rather #odest :an(al of Classical &rotolo y in which the 2p(rely verbal5 i#a e of the prostit(te as a #echanis# was to be fo(nd, when far wilder e*a#ples of porno raphy, or for that #atter conte#porary e#bodi#ents of the #echanis# in @(estion, were freely available on the open #arket a few blocks away. Chapters 1A and 1" #i ht well have been conflated)they are so#ewhat repetitive, altho( h they deal with rather different aspects of the sa#e eneral proble#. ,hey #i ht for that #atter have been worked into a #ore syste#atic version of chapter 14. 1n this #atter of pra*is 1 see# to depend heavily on an i#a e d(e to 8pino<a, who# 1 @(ote twice 2tho( h 1 see# to have been (sin different translations, one of which 1 recall 1 tracked down in the 1owa 8tate library and copied 7(st before deliverin the paper in which 1 (sed it5. /lso 1 a# rather (nfriendly to Hotarbinski, whose work on pra*iolo y 1 keep callin anecdotal; this is beca(se 1 was hopin fro# it #ore in the way of theory and less in the way of e*a#ples, s(ch bein #y own bias in these #atters. 1 did not know at this ti#e the i#portant work of Pierre Bo(rdie(, tho( h #y interest in relatively s#all6scale individ(al practices overned by conscio(s ends overlaps only partly his interest in rit(al and other social practices.

> 14? >

61 Scie%ce= Co/2-ters= a%d t#e Co/2le5it( o& Nat-re

,he search for si#plicity in %at(re has at all ti#es been an i#portant part of the activity of science, and the faith that all events #i ht (lti#ately be e*plicable in ter#s of a few si#ple laws an i#portant part of the #otivation of scientists. %ewton, for e*a#ple, was a fir# believer: -%at(re does nothin in vain,- he says, -and #ore is in vain when less will serve; for nat(re is pleased with si#plicity, and affects not the po#p of s(perfl(o(s ca(ses.-E1F Certainly %at(re, in the %ewtonian period, did nothin to disco(ra e this view, and a#on other thin s the discovery of #ini#al principles by $er#at, :a(pert(is, +a#ilton, and Ia(ss reinforced the concl(sion that the world had been desi ned accordin to the #ost econo#ical standards. :a(pert(is9s own state#ent affir#s the reasonableness of s(ch a conviction. -+ere then is this principle, so wise, so worthy of the 8(pre#e Bein : .henever any chan e takes place in %at(re, the a#o(nt of action e*pended in this chan e is always the s#allest possible.-E3F 1n recent years the faith in si#plicity has, however, been badly shaken; fro# that hi h point in the 193!s when, for a short ti#e, there see#ed to be only two kinds of particle 2the electron and the proton5 in the (niverse, even physics, traditionally #ore s(ccessf(l than any other science in e*tractin sy##etries and si#ple re (larities fro# events, has s(nk into so#ethin approachin chaos in its fo(ndations)and as for the less -e*act- sciences, en(ine theoretical si#plicity there see#s farther away than ever. %ew approaches are therefore bein tried, partic(larly by workers in infor#ation theory, the theory of a#es, cybernetics, eneral syste#s > 14= > theory, etc. /shby, a brilliant pioneer in this field, says, in his Introduction to *"bernetics , 8cience stands today on so#ethin of a divide. $or two cent(ries it has been e*plorin syste#s that are either intrinsically si#ple or that are capable of bein analysed into si#ple co#ponents. ,he fact that s(ch a do #a as -vary the factors one at a ti#e- co(ld be accepted for a cent(ry, shows that scientists were lar ely concerned in investi atin s(ch syste#s as allowed this #ethod: for this #ethod is often f(nda#entally i#possible in the co#ple* syste#s. . . . Until recently, science tended to evade the st(dy of s(ch syste#s, foc(sin its attention on those that were si#ple and, especially, red(cible. . . . 8o today we see psychoses (ntreated, societies declinin , and econo#ic syste#s falterin , the scientist bein able to do little #ore than to appreciate the f(ll co#ple*ity of the s(b7ect he is st(dyin . B(t science today is also takin the first steps towards st(dyin -co#ple*ity- as a s(b7ect in its own ri ht.E3F 1n the philosophy of science there has been, of late, a ood deal of disc(ssion of -si#plicity,associated with the na#es of Popper, .isdo#, Geffreys, Iood#an, and others.EAF 1t #i ht be tho( ht that the st(dy of -co#ple*ity- wo(ld si#ply be the #irror6i#a e of this, and that once one of this pair of ter#s had been defined, f(rther consideration of the other wo(ld be s(perfl(o(s. ,his wo(ld certainly be the case if by -co#ple*- we #eant only -not si#ple,- b(t, as 1 hope to show, the relation between the# is not as strai htforward as this. ,he scale fro# si#ple to co#ple* does not follow the pattern of probabilities, with si#plicity at ! and co#ple*ity at 1; we wo(ld rather have to p(t si#plicity

at 1 and allow co#ple*ity to o to infinity. %evertheless it #ay be helpf(l to pay so#e attention to si#plicity as a preli#inary. Credit for havin introd(ced the #ethodolo ical criterion of si#plicity (s(ally oes to .illia# of Lckha#, the fa#iliar for# of whose ra<or is -entia non 2s(nt5 #(ltiplicanda praeter necessitate#.,here see#s to be so#e do(bt whether he act(ally said this, altho( h he wo(ld certainly have reco ni<ed and sy#pathi<ed with the principle, which he applied with reat effect. B(t it is not accidental that it sho(ld have been attrib(ted to hi# and not to so#e other #ediaeval philosopher. ,he word -entia- is perhaps #isleadin , s( estin as it does an econo#y of things . Lckha# wo(ld not have #inded #(ltiplication of things in the least, and it certainly wo(ld not have #ade his world any #ore co#ple*. $or hi# the world is neither si#ple nor co#ple*, consistin as it does of (nrelated individ(als, contin ently dependent on Iod, who is not to be li#ited by #ethodolo ical conventions) in fact Lckha#, > 149 > like Keibni<, wo(ld probably have tho( ht the #ore thin s the better. .hat is to co#e (nder the scr(tiny of the principle is the description or e*planation of the world. Lckha# is enerally re arded as the fo(nder of the no#inalist or concept(alist #ove#ent, holdin that (niversal ter#s in propositions do not stand for anythin apart fro# individ(als, that relational ter#s have no reference apart fro# the individ(als related. &cono#y is to be effected in o(r tho( ht abo(t %at(re)there is no need to invent the relation -father of- if the world contains fathers and sons already)b(t there is no s( estion that %at(re is si#ple. 1t is not, therefore, to be laid to Lckha#9s acco(nt that later philosophers ca#e to re ard the world in this way, and the char e co(ld not even have been i#p(ted if there had not been conf(sion between the associated notions of econo#y and si#plicity. Lckha#9s ra<or is a principle of econo#y, which #ay or #ay not lead to si#plicity. 1t will al#ost certainly lead to an a!!earance of si#plicity)after all, ,hales9s acco(nt of the world see#s to be as si#ple as possible, and e*hibits the #ost ri id econo#y of entities, b(t it does nothin to relieve the co#ple*ity of events, whereas the ninety6two ele#ents of the pren(clear periodic table lead to an enor#o(s si#plification by co#parison. 1t is tr(e that Lckha# says -praeter necessitate#,- b(t this only #eans that in addition to the principle of econo#y one re@(ires a state#ent of the ob7ectives of the theory 2and, if one of these is si#plicity, a separate acco(nt of the fatter5 in order to deter#ine what co(nts as necessary. 8till it is le iti#ate to en@(ire how the notion of a basically si#ple world arose. /ll that is needed to plant the er# of s(ch a view is the reali<ation that, altho( h thin s and events do not repeat the#selves, it is very easy to e*tract fro# the# constant attrib(tes which are repeated. ,his leads nat(rally to a theory of (niversals, and to a lan (a e of si#ple predicates. ,he (se of a s#all n(#ber of si#ple attrib(tes as a ro(nd of e*planation of all events at a #aterial level appears in /ristotle with his pairs of sensed opposites, hot and cold, wet and dry. Properly speakin , of co(rse, the sim!le predicate is to be opposed to the com!ound , not the com!le( . B(t there is an easy transference of #eanin when, in an episte#olo y like that of Kocke, si#ple predicates are associated with si#ple ideas, and these are ass(#ed to correspond to si#ple @(alities in the world. / si#ple predicate #ay be si#ple only with respect to the lo ical syste# in which it occ(rs, and this si#plicity does not precl(de the possibility of its havin a co#ple* referent, b(t a si#ple @(ality s( ests the i#possibility of f(rther analysis by any #eans. .e now know, of co(rse, not only how e*tre#ely co#plicated a si#ple dat(# 2s(ch as a #onochro#atic color5 can be on the physical side, b(t also what hi hly6developed or ans are needed

for its recep6 > 1?! > tion, and what intricate behavior it sti#(lates in the corte*; it is evident that a hi h de ree of co#ple*ity (nderlies the prod(ction of even one of Kocke9s -si#ple ideas.- ,his s( ests a sol(tion to the proble# of the apparent si#plicity of the world. ,he co#ple*ity of the sti#(l(s is in so#e sense #atched by the co#ple*ity of the response, and in this way both are concealed. %at(re e*e#plifies the #a*i# -/rs est celare arte#-; the workin s on both sides cancel o(t, and we are left with an e*perience which is pheno#enolo ically si#ple. /t this point there are to be distin (ished two senses of si#plicity and two different senses of co#ple*ity. .e have on one hand a si#ple idea prod(ced by a si#ple e*perience 2or, what a#o(nts to the sa#e thin , a si#ple predicate describin a si#ple e*perience5, and on the other a co#ple* nat(ral event, #atched by a co#ple*ity in the apparat(s which we (se to detect the event. 1n accordance with the principle en(nciated above 1 shall speak of all these as kinds of co#ple*ity. 1n the case of ideas or predicates we have logical co#ple*ity; the lo ical co#ple*ity of theory is the kind of thin that has received #ost attention in previo(s st(dies of si#plicity. 1n e*perience, we have !henomenological co#ple*ity, and for nat(re, !h"sical co#ple*ity; these re@(ire no f(rther clarification. $inally #y ter#inolo y for the co#ple*ity of the sensory ne(ral receptor #ay need so#e e*planation; 1 shall call it mechanical co#ple*ity, partly in view of recent work on the analo ies between brains and #achines, partly beca(se o(r ran e of perception #ay be e*tended by #eans of instr(#ents witho(t alterin the nat(re of the proble#, and it is convenient to have a na#e which is obvio(sly applicable to this wider case. :echanical co#ple*ity is 7(st the co#ple*ity re@(ired in the sensory and cerebral apparat(s if infor#ation abo(t an event is to be received at all. $or the ne(rophysiolo ist it is clearly a kind of physical co#ple*ity, when observed in other people, and in fact this is how we co#e to know abo(t it; b(t even in the ne(rophysiolo ical case the physical co#ple*ity of the patient9s brain has to be #atched by a #echanical co#ple*ity in the physician9s. %ow science is, in one sense, only an e*tension of a nor#al h(#an activity)that which receives sti#(li, or ani<es the# into concepts, stores infor#ation for f(t(re reference, and in eneral enables (s to #ake o(r way thro( h the intricacies of the world of sense. 1n the case of science the variety of sti#(li is increased and an ele#ent of precision introd(ced; concepts are deliberately recast and caref(lly defined 2so that they are #ore appropriately called -constr(cts-5; infor#ation is codified and p(blished in tables of constants and for#(lae so that it #ay be (sed for acc(rate prediction and, event(ally, control of events. G(st as a si#ple perception was seen to depend on a #atchin of #echanical co#ple*ity on the part of the or anis# with the physical co#6 > 1?1 > ple*ity of the event ivin rise to the perception, so in scientific observation and calc(lation there will be a need for so#e parity of co#ple*ity between the event (nder consideration and its representation in theory. ,he sit(ations are not @(ite parallel; in the case of perception, learnin is a(to#atic, and if awareness enters the pict(re it is only as an addition which can re#ain si#ple and is eli#inable in the #anner of Ka :ettrie, ,. +. +(*ley, and the behaviorists, whereas #ost of (s wo(ld feel that science is #ore conscio(s of itself, and that the lo ical co#ple*ity of the scientists9 concepts beco#es an i#portant factor. 1n neither case do we have direct access to physical co#ple*ity, b(t learn only indirectly whether we have been s(ccessf(l in #atchin the co#ple*ity of o(r responses to that of the world; as lon as the or anis# s(rvives its reactions #(st, (p to a point, be s(cceedin in this task,

while in the case of the scientist it is a #atter of checkin predictions. 1n the latter case a f(rther co#plication appears: not only #(st the theory be co#ple* eno( h to handle the events, b(t it #(st also per#it calc(lations to be #ade and predictions stated in less ti#e than it takes the physical state of affairs to #ove fro# the event perceived to the event predicted. 1t is here that the principle of econo#y enters once #ore. 1t #ay t(rn o(t to be a waste of ti#e to do a calc(lation in the si#plest ter#s. ,here wo(ld therefore appear to be an o!timum level of co#ple*ity in scientific theory if it is to be s(ccessf(l. ,here are at least two senses in which the theory #ay be said to be s(ccessf(l: it #ay si#ply prod(ce the re@(ired predictions and enable (s to anticipate and control nat(re 2and this #i ht, in e*tre#e cases, be done entirely a(to#atically5 or it #ay lead (s to so#e kind of (nderstandin , by which 1 #ean the ability to ive a rational acco(nt of the process by which the prediction is arrived at )an ability which, apart fro# bein desirable in itself, is psycholo ically satisfyin and practically (sef(l. 1t see#s to #e that these oals are often conf(sed; certainly the opti#(# #ay co#e at different levels accordin to which is in #ind, and this #ay lead to ar (#ent abo(t the -better- theory. B(t in either case the @(estion arises as to how we #ay reco ni<e this opti#(#. ,he develop#ent of science #ay be re arded as pro ressin in two ways: on one hand there is an increase in lo ical co#ple*ity, and on the other hand there is a decrease in the co#ple*ity of the world which the theory is tryin to e*plain. Ket #e clarify this point. ,he world of naWve e*perience is co#ple* in the hi hest de ree; we are confronted with a crowded, constantly chan in real# of pheno#ena in which, even when so#e kind of order has been introd(ced by the (nconscio(s for#ation of concepts, no event repeats itself and re (larities are obvio(s only in the loosest sense. 1t is the b(siness of science to find (nits in ter#s of which this welter of activity, or at least a part of it, #ay be > 1?3 > rationally e*plained. 1n so doin it red(ces the co#ple*ity of the world as (nderstood by (s 2which is different fro# the world as e*perienced by (s, and different a ain fro# the theory in ter#s of which we (nderstand it5. /t the sa#e ti#e the theoretician is workin on the co#bination of si#ple, not necessarily observed, ele#ents into lo ically #ore co#ple* calc(li containin defined ter#s, #any6 placed predicates, and so on. ,he opti#(# will occ(r when these two processes)the increase in co#ple*ity of theory, and the decrease in co#ple*ity of the world)#eet each other, and the lo ical co#ple*ity is of the sa#e order as the physical co#ple*ity it is to e*plain. ,his physical co#ple*ity is, of co(rse, relative to the (nits into which the world is analy<ed; a forest re arded as co#posed of trees is a far less co#ple* event than the sa#e forest re arded as co#posed of plant cells, and the theoretical co#ple*ity of plant ecolo y need not therefore be as reat, to deal with the forest ade@(ately, as the theoretical co#ple*ity of cytolo y wo(ld have to be. 1n practice of co(rse the latter wo(ld be prohibitive, so that cytolo ists do not deal with forests, any #ore than physicists deal with international relations. ,he @(estion whether it wo(ld be possible in principle for the laws of social chan e to be -red(ced- to the laws of physics, and the associated proble#s of e#er ence, holis#, and estalt theory, will not be one into here. &ven if this red(ction co(ld be done it wo(ld certainly be very tedio(s. Lnce the opti#(# level of co#ple*ity is reco ni<ed, there re#ains the @(estion of how it can be achieved. ,here are several ways of oin abo(t this, the #ost obvio(s bein the develop#ent of ever #ore co#ple* theories, with #ore pri#itives, #ore variables, and e@(ations of hi her order and de ree, (ntil one co#es alon which is s(ccessf(l. B(t theory rests on a protocol, a report of observations, and another possibility is to raise the pheno#enolo ical co#ple*ity of the (nits which can be reco ni<ed in e*perience. 8o#e sciences depend #ore on this than others; it is not #(ch (se in physics, where observations are (s(ally e*tre#ely si#ple, consistin as they do of p(re space6ti#e coincidences)needles on dials, etc.)b(t in eolo y, say, an i#portant part of the scientist9s ed(cation

consists in learnin to reco ni<e feldspar, diorite, and the like as pheno#enolo ical (nits, to avoid the necessity of #ineral analysis. ,he approach fro# this side also involves the isolation of s#aller and s#aller areas of observation, (ntil a level is reached where interrelations are si#ple eno( h to be taken care of by the theoretical tools available. B(t of co(rse the dan er is that the opti#(# #ay be overshot. .e #ay analy<e the world into (nits that are too si#ple for o(r p(rpose, and find that we cannot reco#bine the# to the re@(ired de ree of co#ple*ity witho(t sacrificin econo#y, if indeed it can be done at all. 8(ch a case wo(ld occ(r, for e*a#ple, if > 1?3 > at this sta e of the develop#ent of biolo y its analyses were to be cond(cted in ter#s of s(bato#ic (nits. Lr we #ay increase theoretical co#ple*ity beyond what is needed, (sin #ore variables than are necessary, beca(se of so#e fail(re in concept(al attit(de. $or practical p(rposes, however, the opti#(# is not as critical as 1 have #ade it see#. 8o far the ele#ent of ti#e has been i nored: and a si#ple theory #ay be able to deal with a co#ple* sit(ation, if the scientist has the leis(re to tackle the proble# one step at a ti#e. /shby has pointed o(t that a syste# with, for e*a#ple, twenty de rees of freedo# can be handled with only five variables if one takes fo(r readin s of each.E"F ,reat#ent at this si#ple level involves a sacrifice of econo#y, b(t that #ay not be serio(s. 8i#ilarly a syste# with only five de rees of freedo# co(ld, a ain with a loss of econo#y, be analy<ed by a theory with twenty variables; in this case several co(ld be red(ced to one, b(t the scientist #i ht not reali<e this, and, a ain, iven ti#e, it wo(ld not #atter. Proble#s wo(ld arise only when the calc(lations took so lon that predictions co(ld not anticipate the events to which they referred, and this, (ntil recently, never see#ed to happen, or, if it did, not #(ch was lost by it. %ow, however, there fre@(ently arise cases in which calc(lations are too c(#berso#e to prod(ce (sef(l predictions, if indeed they can reach any concl(sion at all in the ti#e at o(r disposal. ,his is where co#p(ters co#e in, brin in (s back to the @(otation fro# /shby at the be innin of this paper. ,here are three reasons why calc(lations #ay take too lon )first, beca(se the theory is not co#ple* eno( h 2that is, se@(ential operations with few variables have to take the place of sin le operations with #any5; second, beca(se altho( h there is the ri ht n(#ber of variables, the relations between the# are so involved that the calc(lation takes too #(ch paper and ink; and third, beca(se the theory is too co#ple* 2that is, the proble# is presented as one in #any variables, when in fact it co(ld be solved with fewer) the classical case bein , of co(rse, the astrono#ical syste# of Ptole#y5. %ow in all these cases co#p(ters can help; in the first by speedin (p the se@(ential operations, in the second and third by handlin #ore variables at once. 1n the first two cases the blessin is (n#i*ed, and this represents the en(ine sense in which cybernetics helps (s to cope with co#ple*ities which before see#ed hopeless. B(t the third presents a dan er. 1f we have not reali<ed that the theory is too co#ple* it is certainly better than nothin to et a sol(tion with the help of a #achine, b(t at the sa#e ti#e the fact that we have got a sol(tion #ay re#ove the necessity of si#plifyin the theory. 8(ppose so#eone had been able to offer the (se of a co#p(ter to a pre6Copernican astrono#er, deep in calc(lation. ,he need for a Coper6 > 1?A > nican revol(tion wo(ld have been re#oved at once; ei hty6three epicycles are as nothin to a ood #achine, and the na(tical al#anac for the ne*t tho(sand years co(ld have been co#pleted in a few ho(rs. 1t wo(ld have contained #istakes, it is tr(e, b(t they wo(ld not have been i##ediately apparent,

and co(ld have been taken care of by the addition of a few e*tra para#eters as need arose. .ith a reserve of circ(its in the co#p(ter it wo(ld be easier, in fact, to co#plicate the theory than to si#plify it. Lne #i ht be te#pted to say that this was all ri ht: the predictions work, everythin co#es o(t 7(st as it sho(ld, and this is the criterion of scientific s(ccess. B(t this wo(ld not have satisfied Copernic(s )not only, one likes to think, beca(se of his #ystical attach#ent to circles, b(t beca(se s(ch an answer sacrifices (nderstandin to prediction and control. $or the latter all we need is to #atch #echanical co#ple*ity a ainst physical co#ple*ity, b(t for (nderstandin we have to #atch the lo ical co#ple*ity of o(r concepts a ainst physical co#ple*ity, and this #ay be #(ch harder. .e #ay have to settle for prediction and control apart fro# (nderstandin , in view of the fact that there is an (pper li#it to the co#ple*ity of ideas that can be rasped by individ(als, and an (pper li#it to the co#ple*ity of the pheno#enolo ical (nit which can be intelli ently apprehended, so that we si#ply #ay not be able to reach the opti#(# which wo(ld represent s(ccess of a theory fro# the point of view of (nderstandin . B(t this is a concl(sion that #(st not be arrived at too soon, and perhaps never finally arrived at. 1t wo(ld be hard for scientists to keep at their research, e*cept for p(rely practical ends, witho(t so#e conviction s(ch as that e*pressed by &instein in the re#ark, -Iod #ay be s(btle, b(t he is not #ean,or by 8antayana when he says, -the world 1 find #yself in is irrational, b(t it is not #ad.1n the li ht of these considerations we #ay s(# (p the relationship of the scientist to co#p(tin #achines as follows: 1f (nderstandin #eans anythin apart fro# prediction and control 2and 1 take the view that it does, as s( ested earlier5, then wherever possible scientists #(st atte#pt to #atch the co#ple*ity of their concepts to the co#ple*ity of the world, of which the machine is regarded as a !art . .hen this is not possible 2and so#eti#es when it is, for reasons of econo#y of ti#e, etc.5 they #ay still achieve prediction, apart fro# (nderstandin , by #atchin the #echanical co#ple*ity of the syste# scientist6pl(s6#achine to the co#ple*ity of the rest of the world. 1n no case can they s(ppose the #achine to be thinkin for the#)only econo#i<in their tho( ht. ,his leaves open the @(estion whether the #achine #i ht think for itself, and atte#pt to #atch its co#ple*ity a ainst that of a world of which the scientists #i ht be re arded as a part; b(t that falls o(tside the scope of this disc(ssion. > 1?" > .hat does ive ca(se for concern is the possibility that the #ethods of arrivin at predictions and the #ethods of achievin (nderstandin #ay be in to diver e radically. 1t has always been the fashion for proponents of so6called pheno#enolo ical theories in science)and for that #atter positivists in eneral)to stress prediction at the e*pense of (nderstandin , b(t in a sense that was an e*c(sable e#phasis, in view of the fact that words like -(nderstandin - are often (sed (ncritically, and also beca(se (nderstandin and prediction were #(ch #ore nearly the sa#e thin when the sa#e data co(ld be (sed to achieve both, the #ethods of atherin data havin been desi ned with a partic(lar conception of the world in #ind. %ow however very eneral #ethods of handlin e*peri#ental res(lts with a view only to prediction are e#er in . ,he -black bo*- techni@(e of eneral syste#s theory depends, not on workin (pwards fro# the si#plest state of affairs, which is inevitably the way of the (nderstandin , b(t in workin downwards fro# the #ost co#ple*, in the sense that only co#plete chaos is (n#ana eable, and if any constraint whatever shows (p in the protocol it can be i##ediately detected. 1f before one #i ht have said, -,he reason why the world is not easy to deal with is that it behaves in co#ple* ways,- the new for#(la wo(ld be, -,he reason why the world is not i#possible to deal with is that it does not behave in all the ways in which it #i ht.- %ow it is e*tre#ely i#portant that s(ch #ethods sho(ld be devised, for the proble#s which they solve are (r ent. B(t it does not co(nt as (nderstandin the world to be able to press a b(tton, and (nderstandin #(st at all costs be kept alive independently. P(rs(ed to its e*tre#e, this division of interest #i ht lead to a sit(ation where science carried o(t by h(#an bein s thro( h the #edi(# of ideas stood in relation to science carried

o(t by #achines where philosophy stands today in relation to science. 1t #i ht even be re arded with the sa#e apparent indifference. B(t its task wo(ld be 7(st as essential. > 1?4 >

"1 Pra5is a%d Tec#%e

1n spite of the fact that #any people think it was invented at abo(t the ti#e of the 1nd(strial Cevol(tion, technolo y has a #(ch lon er history than either science or philosophy, and the philosophy of technolo y can be traced back to the earliest philosophers. /ristotle, in the arts of Animals , reco(nts that when so#e visitors s(rprised +eraclit(s in the kitchen he invited the# to co#e in with the re#ark -for here too are ods.-E1F .here #odern philosophers wo(ld nat(rally appeal to scientific e*a#ples, Plato habit(ally chooses technolo ical ones; his dialo (es are f(ll of references to a ric(lt(re, #edicine, shipb(ildin and navi ation, and the trainin of ani#als)technolo ies whose ori ins o back to neolithic c(lt(re. .e #ay speak of the# as technolo ies and not #ere techni@(es beca(se there was a lore that went with the techni@(es; they were passed on)and no do(bt also ori inated)not only thro( h trial and error and i#itation b(t also thro( h disc(ssion and instr(ction. .e have a tendency to think of civili<ation before the invention of writin as silent, b(t it was not. %or was it irrational. -/s for #e,- says 8ocrates in the )orgias , -1 do not ive the na#e techne to so#ethin lackin in reason.-E3F ,echnolo y, after all, is not #erely the theory of the practical arts; it is the practical arts the#selves, re arded as an activity of reason)the logos in the techne , rather than the logos of the techne .E3F %evertheless, technolo y has contin(ed for the #ost part to be rele ated to the kitchen, and even philosophers who are be innin to pay attention to it do not always #ana e to avoid the patroni<in tone of those who, to their s(rprise, have fo(nd hidden talent below stairs. ,he ass(#ption, > 1?? > all too readily #ade and accepted, that technolo y is to be defined as the practical application of scientific theory is sy#pto#atic of this. ,he opposition of theory and practice, and the scorn of the latter, also has ancient roots, b(t we have perhaps not (nderstood the#. 1t was certainly not, as is so#eti#es s(pposed, a si#ple @(estion of slavery and nobility; rather it was perceived that there are two different and independent #anners of relatin to the world. ,h(s /ristotle in the &icomachean 'thics says, -$or a carpenter and a eo#eter investi ate the ri ht an le in different ways; the for#er does so in so far as the ri ht an le is (sef(l for his work, while the latter in@(ires what it is or what sort of thin it is; for he is a spectator of the tr(th.-EAF ,here is no evidence that the Ireeks despised carpenters. ,here is plenty of evidence that they ad#ired eo#eters and indeed #athe#aticians in eneral, b(t the reason for this can easily be traced back to reli io(s #otives. P(re conte#plation in /ristotle is a f(nction of the divine; Iod is the archspectator, the theoros of hi#self and the world, not #erely)like ordinary theoroi )of li#ited events like the a#es or the cons(ltation of oracles. ,he essential distinction is between the perishin and the (nchan in , between the transient and the eternal. :athe#atics, the paradi # of theory, ives access to another world, where the so(l is released fro# the body, the eo#etrical ri ht an le fro# the wooden one, a world which in Plato al#ost certainly derives indirectly fro# an older philosophical tradition in 1ndia. 1t is si nificant for o(r p(rposes that when Plato9s Iod t(rns his attention to o(r world he does so

in the (ise of a crafts#an. 21t #ay also be si nificant that so#e connotations both of techne and of its #ore co##onplace relation !ra(is were e*tre#ely down to earth. Lne of the #eanin s of !ra(is iven in the standard le*icons is -se*(al relations,- and there e*isted a #inor branch of learnin known as erotike techne , e*e#plified in a work of Pa*a#(s called 2odecatechnon beca(se it dealt with -obscene positions to the n(#ber of twelve.-5E"F 1 #ention all this not 7(st in order to observe the (s(al philosophical pieties towards the Ireeks, b(t in order to stress that the concepts invoked by the philosophy of technolo y are e#bedded in a lin (istic tradition that we i nore at the risk of talkin nonsense. L(r proble#s are not nearly as new as we think. / f(rther develop#ent of the lin (istic tradition, and one to which we o( ht to be sensitive, has taken place in the last h(ndred years or so. 1f the theoretician often tends to look down (pon the #erely practical, there has rown (p since :ar* an opposite tendency to look down, in a #oral sense at least, on the #erely theoretical. ,he fact that the widespread (se of the ter# !ra(is in an e*cl(sively political sense rests (pon an ety#olo ical #istake 2since it was the pl(ral for# !ragmata that chiefly carried this connotation in > 1?= > Ireek5 does not bl(nt the force of the ar (#ent that a balance #ay need to be str(ck between the l(*(ry of theoretical detach#ent and the (tility of practical involve#ent. ,his is not to say that practical involve#ent can ever be a criterion for the tr(th or ade@(acy of theory in its own do#ain. B(t h(#an society has other val(es besides tr(th, val(es which in the end tr(th #ay ri htly be e*pected to serve witho(t co#pro#isin its stat(s as tr(th: it is rather a @(estion of choosin how #(ch of one9s life to devote to the p(rs(it of tr(th, and which tr(ths to p(rs(e. :ao ,se6t(n , whose works it wo(ld be @(ite wron , 1 believe, to dis#iss as #erely de#a o ical 2they are @(ite as #(ch peda o ical, presentin s(rprisin ly orthodo* philosophical views in a si#plified for# accessible to the yo(n or i noranth offers in his essay 3n ractice a typically :ar*ist inversion of the theory/pra*is relationship, re#iniscent of :ar*9s own treat#ent of the #oney/co##odity relationship in *a!ital . :oney, :ar* #aintains, be an its career @(ite reasonably as a for# of #ediation between co##odities 2C6:6C5, b(t in the capitalist econo#y it beco#es an end in itself, while co##odities are red(ced to #ediatin between its #anifestations 2:6C6:5.E4F 8i#ilarly, for :ao the proper role of theory is as a for# of #ediation between pra*es 2which #i ht be represented analo o(sly as P6,6P5, whereas the overintellect(al and overtheoretical habits of the .est elevate theory to the do#inant place and p(t 2e*peri#ental5 pra*is at its service 2,6P6,5.E?F :y own conviction, which is of lon standin , is that the atte#pt to establish concept(al priority between theory and pra*is is f(tile; the relation between the# is dialectical in the strict sense, in that both historically and concept(ally they alternate in the develop#ent of knowled e and of its applications. B(t if we are to (nderstand this dialectic, its ele#ents need to be sharply distin (ished, not r(n to ether with one another. ,herefore, 1 sho(ld now like to e*plore the senses in which theory and pra*is can be tho( ht of as parallel and a(tono#o(s. /n incidental b(t strikin trib(te to this parallelis# is provided by an ill(strative analo y (sed by 8pino<a in his essay 3n the Im!ro-ement of the ,nderstanding: 1n the sa#e way as #en in the be innin were able with reat labo(r and i#perfection to #ake the #ost si#ple thin s fro# the instr(#ents already s(pplied by nat(re, and when these were co#pleted with their aid, #ade harder and #ore co#ple* thin s with #ore facility and perfection, and th(s rad(ally proceedin fro# the #ost si#ple works to instr(#ents, and fro# instr(#ents to other harder pieces of work, they at last s(cceeded in

constr(ctin and perfectin so #any and s(ch diffic(lt instr(#ents with very little labo(r, so also the (nderstandin by its native > 1?9 > stren th #akes for itself its intellect(al instr(#ents wherewith it ac@(ires f(rther stren th for other intellect(al works, and with these #akes others a ain and the power of investi atin still f(rther, and so rad(ally proceeds (ntil it attains the s(##it of wisdo#. E=F ,his citation serves #y p(rpose in another way beca(se it stresses the slow and co#ple* character of the evol(tion of h(#an knowled e and co#petence, which 1 believe to be a constant characteristic, altho( h it has been concealed in recent history by @(antitative increases in the capacity and facility of (se of e*ternal stora e syste#s and effectors, the speed and capacity of co##(nication and its channels, the absol(te n(#bers of h(#an bein s, and the proportionate n(#bers of the# en a ed in prod(ction and research. 1t is necessary to re#e#ber that if, as so#e anthropolo ists and lin (ists #aintain, the co#ple*ity of the h(#an #ind is relatively constant over all known c(lt(res and hence over a very lon period of c(lt(ral develop#ent, h(#an bein s have since early prehistory confronted the world on ro( hly e@(al ter#s. ,he difference between (s and prehistoric #en and wo#en is that we find in o(r world a reat #any thin s)b(ildin s, clothes, books, and instr(#ents)left in it by o(r predecessors, and that o(r i##ediate ancestors)parents, teachers, and the like)take pains to introd(ce (s to the (se and so#eti#es to the #eanin of these thin s, as well as to the (se and #eanin of vario(s activities, like speakin a lan (a e, that they learned fro# their i##ediate ancestors. .e also find in the world, of co(rse, #any other people already versed in all this, with beliefs, pre7(dices, and the rest. L(r basic relation to the world, 1 repeat, is constant. 1n order to #ake this clear, it is necessary to co#plicate #atters sli htly. Ln the practical side as well as on the theoretical side, we need to distin (ish between a #ode of i##ediate interaction of s(b7ects as knowers or a ents with the world, and another #ode of activity that is independent of s(ch i##ediate interaction and which in both cases 1 wo(ld call intellect(al. Ln the practical side, 1 associate !ra(is as i##ediate with technolog" as #ediated by the intellect. 1n parallel on the theoretical side, the notion of the em!irical 2fro# em!eiria , #eanin , ro( hly, an e*peri#ental ac@(aintance with thin s5 provides the i##ediate basis for the intellect(ally #ediated activity of theor" . ,here is no point in tryin to #ake all this too perfect and sy##etrical. 'm!eiria , for e*a#ple, is not wholly passive; a case #i ht be #ade for appealin to e!isteme rather than theoria , and so on. :y point is only to stress that co#in (p a ainst the world physically, on the one hand, and lookin at and talkin abo(t it, on the other, represent two co#ple#entary and to so#e de ree separable kinds of involve#ent with it, and that each > 1=! > leads to its own variety of #ental activity, which e#er es a ain on a hi her level in a #ore co#ple* for#, in the first case technolo ical and in the second case scientific. ,he parallel can be, and has been, drawn o(t to considerable len ths. /n e*plicit version of it is to be fo(nd in the late6nineteenth6cent(ry work of /lfred &spinas, +es origines de la technologie , in which the se@(ence sensation6perception6knowled e6science is #atched with the se@(ence refle*6habit6 c(sto#6art or techni@(e.E9F Philosophy has concentrated al#ost e*cl(sively on the theoretical side, of co(rse, as the relative states of develop#ent of the philosophy of science and the philosophy of

technolo y clearly show. ,he philosophy of science wo(ld never have reached its present level, however, witho(t the basis laid down by the analysis of e#pirical knowled e carried o(t by episte#olo ists since the seventeenth cent(ry. 1t is #y belief that a developed pra*iolo y is 7(st as essential to the philosophy of technolo y as episte#olo y has proved to be to the philosophy of science. Pra*iolo y, however, is in its infancy. /part fro# the works of :ar*ists, who interpret the concept in an arbitrarily narrow way, and of pra #atists, who #istakenly s(ppose that the proble# is really after all an episte#olo ical one, hardly anythin has been written e*cept the disappointin ly anecdotal treat#ent by Hotarbinski.E1!F ,hat is why the philosophy of technolo y can scarcely as yet be said to e*ist; what passes for it (s(ally a#o(nts to no #ore than insertin technolo y, taken strai htforwardly as the application of scientific theory, the proliferation of #achines, and the like, as a bo(ndary condition into so#e other branch of philosophy, s(ch as val(e theory or political philosophy. 8o#e philosophical disciplines, like lo ic and a(to#ata theory, have been reatly sti#(lated by technolo y, b(t to re ard the# as its philosophy is, in #y opinion at least, to (nderesti#ate the philosophical interest of technolo y. Ket #e then e*plore the parallel between the practical/technolo ical and the e#pirical/theoretical at its #ost h(#ble level, the level at which the episte#olo ist wo(ld be talkin abo(t si#ple perceptions or basic observation state#ents. / proble# arises for the pra*iolo ist which is analo o(s to that of decidin a#on pheno#enolo y, sensationalis#, and physicalis#, and 1 shall s(ppose it resolved #(ch as standard e#piricis# resolved it on the episte#olo ical side. ,hat is, 1 shall ass(#e a capacity to reco ni<e things and shall not insist on be innin with p(re sensory ele#ents s(ch as resistance to to(ch and the like. ,his, however, pres(#es a prior learnin . G(st as physicalis# in episte#olo y involves the learnin of a descriptive lan (a e, an insertion into a c(lt(re of na#es, so physicalis# in pra*iolo y involves the learnin of habits of #anip(lation, an insertion into a c(lt(re of ob7ects. 1t re@(ires > 1=1 > a certain effort to see past the transparency of o(r habit(al pra*es, b(t if we reflect for a #o#ent on the vast repertoire of ele#entary c(lt(ral pra*es we have all ac@(ired)thin s as banal as b(ttonin b(ttons, tyin shoelaces, (sin knives and forks, openin and closin drawers or doors or bo*es, br(shin teeth, shavin , and the like)and on the way in which we ac@(ired it, the parallel with lan (a e learnin sho(ld be obvio(s eno( h. 8pecial technolo ical pra*es, like special scientific ter#inolo ies, are ac@(ired s(bse@(ently in the conte*t of special trainin . /n ele#entary pra*is, like an ele#entary observation, picks o(t a bit of the world and operates on it. ,he reat difference, of co(rse, is that while the observation leaves the world as it is, the pra*is alters it. 2/t @(ant(# levels, therefore, the distinction ets bl(rred, b(t that does not #ean that it is not a perfectly ood distinction.5 / si#ple b(t often ne lected corollary is that the world #(st be in a @(ite specific state before pra*is beco#es operative. People will not be fo(nd b(ttonin b(ttons (nless they are confronted with (nb(ttoned b(ttons and with b(ttonholes to b(tton the# into; they will not be fo(nd doin it if b(ttons have not yet been invented, or if they are wearin clothes that do (p with <ippers, or if their b(ttons are already b(ttoned. /lso, even if all the conditions are ri ht, they will not be fo(nd b(ttonin b(ttons (nless they want the# b(ttoned. ,his inevitable inc(rsion of -alue into @(estions of pra*is)and a fortiori of technolo y)is fa#iliar eno( h. 1t does not, however, chan e the character of the pra*is; it only decides whether or not it will be practiced. &very pra*is, in other words, has a do#ain, a do#ain of ordinary, reco ni<able #acroscopic ob7ects that can be altered, arran ed, connected (p, stored and the like. ,hin s beco#e interestin fro# the

point of view of o(r present disc(ssion when the ob7ects in the do#ain of the pra*is are not nat(ral ob7ects or si#ple c(lt(ral ob7ects b(t thin s like li ht switches, air6conditioner b(ttons, earshifts, or tri ers. 8(ch pra*es obvio(sly depend on a prior technolo y, where by -a technolo y- is #eant a planned, p(rposive, relatively co#ple*, probably collaborative, str(ct(red se@(ence of pra*es. ,he i#portant thin to notice is people who t(rn on li hts or shift ears need know nothin whatever abo(t all this; all they need to know are the practical effects of their actions. $or all they care, the device #i ht have co#e into bein nat(rally. 1t is a re#arkable tr(th, when one co#es to think of it, that an artificial eye, had we constr(cted one o(t of caref(lly replicated tiss(e, wo(ld work e*actly like an or anic eye; so an or anic watch, were one to row accidentally or #irac(lo(sly in so#e i#probable #etal6rich environ#ent, wo(ld work e*actly like an artificial watch 2artificial in the literal sense of bein an artifact; the co#ple*ities of the ordinary6 > 1=3 > lan (a e behavior of this ter# need not distract (s5. ,here co(ld be no technolo y, in other words, if there were no laws of nat(re. B(t this, of co(rse, is a @(ite different clai# fro# the clai# that there co(ld be no technolo y if there were no science. ,he difference that science #akes is a difference of efficiency, both in selectin what technolo ies to try and in decidin how to o abo(t tryin the#. 1f yo( know how the relevant laws of nat(re operate, yo( o strai ht to the desired res(lt and do not need to spend #illions of years tryin this and that. ,he point is, a ain, @(antitative. $or the cons(#er of technolo y, in fact, the relation between a iven pra*is and its o(tco#e #ay be wholly #a ical. People who know nothin abo(t the internal co#b(stion en ine, when startin a(to#obiles on cold #ornin s, see# to #e to be in a position strictly co#parable to that of dancers dancin for rain: so#eti#es the rit(al, which consists of a certain learned se@(ence of p(llin o(t chokes, t(rnin keys, and depressin accelerators, pleases the od, and so#eti#es it doesn9t. /part fro# the co#ple*ity and predictability of o(r environ#ent)the ran e of different options, and the facility with which the ri ht choice leads to the ri ht res(lt or the wron choice to the wron one)we are pretty #(ch in the position of o(r re#otest h(#an ancestors. .e still have to decide what to do. ,he difference that technolo y #akes is to ive (s reater freedo# of choice, and reater responsibility. ,he risk of (ne*pected conse@(ences) ettin cancer fro# s#okin or killin lakes with ind(strial effl(ents)is #ore dra#atic and yet, once e*plained, #ore tractable than si#ilar risks in past ti#es. 8(ch conse@(ences as den(din whole territories thro( h c(ltivation and irri ation si#ply co(ld not have been predicted on the basis of prehistoric knowled e. 1t is, 1 think, p(re irresponsibility to clai# that technolo y has #ade an essential difference in the condition of the h(#an s(b7ect as knower and a ent. &ven the difference it has #ade in the environ#ent is a @(antitative rather than a @(alitative one, and 1 do not believe that the dialectical law of the transition of @(antity into @(ality applies. ,he #oral and political proble#s that res(lt fro# technolo y are not, 1 repeat, proble#s in the philosophy of technolo y. ,he tro(ble is that in clai#in that h(#an bein s have been chan ed by technolo y we enco(ra e the# to think the#selves at its #ercy. 1n fact they are not. ,hey #ay be at the #ercy of other h(#an bein s who #is(se technolo y, b(t the re#edy for that lies o(tside technolo y, and a K(ddite sol(tion is not, in the end, satisfactory. 1n concl(sion 1 wish to t(rn back fro# this set of e*ternal proble#s to the internal, concept(al ones that constit(te, in #y #ind, the essence of the philosophy of technolo y. 1n partic(lar, 1 want to consider the > 1=3 >

transition fro# pra*is to technolo y proper as analo o(s to the transition fro# e#pirical ac@(aintance with the world to theory. / technolo y was said earlier to be a planned, p(rposive, relatively co#ple*, probably collaborative, str(ct(red se@(ence of pra*es. ,he technolo ist knows which pra*is to carry o(t when and (nder what ob7ective conditions, what reso(rces of #aterial and ener y it will re@(ire, and what its o(tco#e within the technolo ical conte*t will be. /ll this has been learned fro# other technolo ists or practitioners. ,he @(estion is, what sort of activity is it0 1t is #y contention that technolo ies in this sense are 7(st as #(ch an evidence of h(#an intellect as scientific theories are, and that o(r tendency to think of the latter as s(perior is 7(st c(lt(ral pre7(dice arisin o(t of the do#inance of the verbal a#on the leis(red classes. 2.e no lon er, as a r(le, have the reli io(s e*c(se 1 earlier attrib(ted to the Ireeks.5 1t see#s to #e clear that technolo y, in this sense, represents a for# of insi ht into the workin s of the world, a for# of practical (nderstandin , that takes as #(ch talent and application as the #ost ri oro(s theoretical calc(lation. ,he #ost dra#atic cases co#e fro# other c(lt(res. 1 will cite only one, that of the ,r(k navi ators of the Pacific. ,hese islanders, workin fro# traditional recipes which consist of a few lines drawn on a piece of bark, are capable of #akin landfalls within a half #ile or so after voya es o(t of si ht of land for h(ndreds of #iles, in variable weather and at all seasons. ,hey learn d(rin a lon trainin how to take in and process sta erin @(antities of infor#ation)not only winds and c(rrents, the feel of the boat and of its ri in , and the appearance of the sky, b(t at any point the se@(ence of these thin s over the previo(s co(rse of the voya e in relation to their val(e at that point.E11F 21t is no ar (#ent a ainst this achieve#ent to say that #i ratory birds, sea t(rtles, and sal#on perfor# feats 7(st as sta erin . 1n the latter cases it is a species6specific activity, not a c(lt(re6specific one. /lso, the birds and t(rtles #ay be #ore intelli ent than we think.5 1n o(r own c(lt(re, it is clear that the whole develop#ent of the plastic and perfor#in arts is an e*a#ple of this kind of thin . ,he point is that what is involved is a for# of representation inside people9s heads of the behavior of thin s in the world, a representation that is not descriptive b(t rather, we #i ht say, operational. 1t is not 7(st a @(estion of #an(al de*terity, since there are well6attested cases)G. G. ,ho#son was one)of people who can see how the thin oes witho(t bein able to do it. ,he story is that ,ho#son9s laboratory assistants ref(sed to let hi# to(ch the apparat(s, beca(se whenever he did so it broke, b(t that they depended on hi# to show the# what to do with it. 1t is a @(estion of #akin o(r way abo(t in a world whose physical and ca(sal properties we know not only or even #ainly by catchin the# in for#(lae, b(t > 1=A > also by the daily practice of a for# of learnin e#bodied in a str(ct(re of behavior that has been acc(#(lated and trans#itted over #any #illennia. /lon lines like these 1 think we #i ht hope event(ally to co#e to so#e philosophical (nderstandin of technolo y. Lne contrast 1 have tried to stress, and one that is essential if the whole s(b7ect is not to fall into conf(sion, is between the relatively (nintelli ent pra*is of b(tton6p(shers and the tr(e technolo y of en ineers. B(tton6p(shers have nothin interestin to do with technolo y, and their (se or ab(se of it, even if it has disastro(s conse@(ences, does not to(ch its essence. / #oral @(estion is thereby posed for en ineers: the @(estion for who# they are workin . ,here are, after all, risks involved in offerin b(ttons to be p(shed. 1t was re#arked earlier that people will not b(tton b(ttons (nless they want the# b(ttoned, b(t they #ay be te#pted to p(sh b(ttons witho(t havin considered very caref(lly what they want, or whether there is anythin they really want. ,he tro(ble is that the res(lts of b(tton p(shin are o(t of proportion to the effort, and this is likely to prod(ce also a disproportionality between decision and p(rpose, whereas in ele#entary pra*es s(ch as b(tton

b(ttonin these thin s are enerally in a kind of nat(ral balance. /lso, people #ay want the wron thin . ,hese are proble#s that technolo y poses, altho( h they are not technolo ical proble#s, and the philosophy of technolo y cannot by itself deal with the# ade@(ately. ,here is an overlappin of the philosophy of technolo y with the theory of val(e, as with the philosophy of p(rposive action in eneral; technolo y, indeed, #i ht be represented as the syste#atic workin o(t of the hypothetical i#perative, p(ttin into the conse@(ent of the hypothetical anythin we can lay o(r hands on)scientific theory if we have it, b(t other for#s of knowled e and co#petence as well. 8o technolo y is not val(e free, b(t there is still a sense in which it is val(e ne(tral. ,he antecedent of the hypothetical re#ains to be filled in as we collectively prefer; nothin in technolo y itself co#pels (s one way or the other. > 1=" >

71 O% t#e Co%ce2t o& a *o/ai% o& Pra5is

1n this paper 1 shall atte#pt 2a 5 to clarify the concept of !ra(is , 2b 5 to show how it can be treated ho#olo o(sly with the concept of theor" , and 2c 5 to define the concept of the domain of a iven pra*is and e*a#ine its relationship to the do#ain of its associated 2or so#e other5 theory. .hile the concept of pra*is has a lon history, be innin with /ristotle9s distinction between doin , #akin , and observin 2!ra(is$ !oiesis , and theoria 5, it has never attained to the ri o(r of other philosophical concepts 2s(ch as theory itself5; its (se in :ar*, while clear eno( h for his p(rposes, does not rest on any e*tended analysis, and the one #a7or treat#ent of the concept o(tside political philosophy 2Hotarbinski9s ra(iolog" 5 is disappointin ly anecdotal. 21n political philosophy the concept is either too speciali<ed to for# the basis of a eneral treat#ent or, as in the case of :ao ,se6t(n , too si#plified to lead to any interestin develop#ent on the analytic level.5 1 be in by distin (ishin two e*ha(stive altho( h not entirely e*cl(sive species of h(#an behavio(r, which 1 will call lin (istic behavio(r or si#ply language and nonlin (istic behavio(r or si#ply beha-iour . Under lan (a e 1 incl(de speakin and writin and other nonspecified #odes of si nifyin , (nder behavio(r #ovin thin s abo(t, constr(ctin thin s, and so on, b(t also eatin , sleepin and the rest. ,he none*cl(sive character of this distinction arises partly fro# the a#bi (ity of the notion of -si nifyin - and partly fro# the fact that so#e for#s of lin (istic behavio(r 2especially what have co#e to be called -perfor#atives-5 are also special cases of behavio(r in the other sense. B(t this lack of precision in the cate ories is not serio(s. 1 shall wish to locate > 1=4 > theory in the cate ory of lan (a e and pra*is in the cate ory of behavio(r, b(t even in these #ore restricted cases there #ay be so#e overlap 2cf. :ar*: -the !ra(is of philosophy is theoretical-5. By and lar e, however, the obvio(s senses of theory as doin a certain kind of thin with words and pra*is as doin a certain kind of thin with nonlin (istic ob7ects will be ade@(ate. ,o deal first with nonlin (istic behavio(r: 1 start with this rather eneral class of episodes in the life of h(#an bein s in order to e#phasi<e that the s(bclass of actions which 1 i##ediately introd(ce is only a s#all province of behavio(r 2characteri<ed in the (s(al way as intentional, oal6directed, and the like5. Pra*is 1 take to constit(te a s(bclass of actions, and to co#e in two varieties which 1 shall call

theor".related and non.theor".related . 1n order for an action to belon to a pra*is it #(st be an ele#ent of a coherent set of actions, ordered in so#e way 2e. ., as havin to be done one before another, or si#(ltaneo(sly, etc.5 and collectively servin so#e end, s(ch that one or another action or se@(ence of actions belon in to the set is perfor#ed accordin to the state of affairs that obtains, the res(lt of the previo(s actions, and so on. ,he special case of #edical practice offers a (sef(l paradi #, and the concept of a !ractitioner as one who knows how and when to perfor# the actions in @(estion also has a fa#iliar (se. B(t the ordinary e*tension of the ter# -practice- is at once too narrow and too wide, since on the one hand it incl(des #any actions that are #erely preparatory to pra*is 2-practisin on a #(sical instr(#ent5, while on the other it does not incl(de a reat #any pra*es properly so called. :ost pra*es are non6theory6related: daily co#ple*es of action s(ch as ettin dressed and eatin , cli#bin stairs, findin one9s way abo(t, playin a#es, perfor#in vario(s kinds of work, and so on. ,his does not #ean that they are not capable of perfectly ri oro(s specification, altho( h in #ost cases of this sort it wo(ld be otiose. /#on those that are theory6related, however, the relation #ay take one or both of two for#s: the pra*is #ay have been deter#ined by the theory 2in which case it can be learned 7(st like any other pra*is by people who are i norant of the theory5 or it #ay be part of the deter#ination of the theory, e. ., constit(te its e*peri#ental basis. 1t is this last case that is of interest for the philosophy of science. %ow theory itself can be represented as bearin to the real# of lan (a e the sa#e relation that pra*is bears to the real# of behavio(r, i.e., the two concepts can be seen as ho#olo o(s to one another, G(st as we distin (ished a s(bclass of behavio(r, na#ely action, of which pra*is in t(rn was a s(bclass 2(nderstandin all three ter#s, of co(rse, as classes of events or episodes5, so we #ay distin (ish a s(bclass of lan (a e, na#ely assertion , of which theory in t(rn will be a s(bclass. > 1=? > / theory #ay or #ay not be related to a pra*is; if it is not we #ay say that it is a p(re theory, if it is we #ay say that it is an e#pirical or an applied one. Beca(se lan (a e al#ost certainly developed in an e#pirical conte*t it will not be s(rprisin to find that p(re theories are often refine#ents of e#pirical ones; th(s p(re #athe#atics rew o(t of practical arith#etic and eo#etry, altho( h once the principles of p(re theoretical constr(ction had been rasped it beca#e possible to develop p(re theories witho(t e#pirical ori ins. 1n the real# of p(re theory we will find it nat(ral to incl(de a reat deal of what is (s(ally called -literat(re-; the defense of this incl(sion does not co#e (nder the scope of the present paper, b(t the point of #entionin it is to acknowled e that theory constr(ction is an i#a inative activity and that it (ses 2(nder certain constraints of ri o(r and coherence, to be s(re5 the sa#e lin (istic #edi(# as does literat(re. ,here is nothin e*ceptional or special abo(t the lin (istic reso(rces of scientists, altho( h their skills #ay have been developed alon so#ewhat different lines. ,he @(estion 1 now want to raise concerns the relation between e#pirical theories and theory6related pra*es. $or this p(rpose it is necessary to clarify the notion of the -do#ain- of a theory or a pra*is. ,he idea of the do#ain of a theory is fa#iliar b(t (nnecessary, that of the do#ain of a pra*is is (nfa#iliar b(t necessary. 8trictly speakin we need not distin (ish the do#ain of one theory fro# that of another, indeed there is a sense in which the do#ain of any theory that aspires to be e#pirically tr(e is the (niverse as a whole)there can be no co#petition between tr(e assertions, and the fact that e#pirical theories refer directly or indirectly to observable facts or events, and contain the na#es of identifiable entities that enter into those facts or events, #eans that the selection of ob7ects fro# the co##on do#ain is, as it were, b(ilt into the theory. %evertheless for practical p(rposes 2(sin -practical- here in its ordinary sense5 we #ay speak of sets of entities)ele#entary particles, hereditary #aterial in cell n(clei, people re@(irin psychiatric treat#ent)as constit(tin the do#ain of particle physics or

enetics or psychopatholo y. ,hese do#ains represent different c(ts into the available #aterial constr(ed as the a re ate of ob7ects of theoretical interest. ,he theoretical aspects of the ob7ect, however, bear to the totality of its aspects a proportional relation that varies accordin to the case: virt(ally everythin that can be said abo(t f(nda#ental particles is of theoretical interest to particle physics, b(t so#e properties of the hereditary #aterial in cell n(clei are of interest to other branches of biolo y or che#istry in addition to enetics, and very #any thin s that #i ht be said abo(t psychopathic individ(als fall entirely o(tside the scope of psychopatholo y. > 1== > 1t is clear that the atte#pt to #ake the notion of the do#ain of a theory precise raises a n(#ber of diffic(lties, only hinted at in the ill(strative cases considered above, at any rate if a specification is so( ht in ter#s of ob7ects reco ni<ed independently of the theories that refer to the#. ,here is in other words nothin in nat(re that co#pels (s to divide it (p as we do between different sciences; to speak of ani#ate and inani#ate ob7ects, of che#ical or biolo ical properties, of the physical sciences and the social sciences, is already to have i#posed a set of theoretical distinctions. /nd altho( h these distinctions have co#e to be b(ilt in to o(r view of the world we have to reali<e that there were not first electrons and then physics, b(t first physics and then electrons. ,his does not #ean, however, as it is so#eti#es tho( ht to do, the abandon#ent of the distinction between the observable and the theoretical, since if the notion of theory is not to be debased beyond all (sef(lness there #(st be allowed a level of ordinary na#in )of people, do s, trees, stars, and the like)not yet colo(red by theory. ,heoretical considerations enter only when thin s be in to be classified accordin to criteria other than those of obvio(s and i##ediate percept(al si#ilarity, and when this happens the reference back of the theory to the world at once effects a se #entation into do#ains; indeed, one #i ht pla(sibly re ard theoretical activity, even of the #ost advanced kind, as a co#plicated sortin proced(re desi ned to et everythin into the ri ht theoretical do#ain. 1n the case of pra*is the sit(ation is @(ite different. $or the ob7ect acted (pon is not na#ed, classified, or redefined by the action; it #ay be #oved or altered, b(t this is so#ethin that really happens to it in -real ti#e,- not so#ethin that, like theory, can be carried on in the absence of the ob7ect or at a distance fro# it. Pra*is is not referential , as theory is)it is rather, one #i ht say, !artici!ator" . ,ho( ht e*peri#ents belon to theory, not to pra*is. 1n the specification of a do#ain of pra*is, then, we cannot resort to theoretical criteria e*cept at the price of red(cin the pra*is to a #ere appenda e of the theory, which while satisfactory for the theoretician never reflects the tr(e state of affairs even in theory6related pra*es of the second kind disc(ssed above. $or it is the pra*is that takes precedence: if so#ethin odd happens in an e*peri#ent, for e*a#ple, it endan ers the theory b(t not the pra*is, for the si#ple reason that the pra*is #akes no clai#, so that a chan e in it does not co(nt as a ref(tation. ,he theory is obli ed to take acco(nt of ano#alies in the pra*is, b(t not vice versa. ,he do#ain of a pra*is can and #(st be specified in ter#s of ordinary #acroscopic ob7ects that can be arran ed, connected (p, #anip(lated, stored, and the like. ,he contents of the do#ain will be those ob7ects or kinds of ob7ect on which or by #eans of which the actions proper to > 1=9 > the pra*is in @(estion are perfor#ed, and the basis of the reco nition of an ob7ect as belon in to the do#ain will be the -obvio(s and i##ediate percept(al si#ilarity- referred to above. ,his does not #ean that s(ch reco nition does not have to be learned 2by initiation into the pra*is5 or that so#e of it #ay not be achieved by -labelin .- Kabelin is an i#portant and ne lected s(b7ect in itself, which the

li#itations of this paper do not per#it #e to develop; 1 will only re#ark that if so#e co#ponent of a pri#itive phar#acopeia, re@(irin a certain preparation, co#es as a white powder labeled with an e*otic na#e and is known to indi eno(s #edical pra*is as a c(re for warts, this need involve no theory whatever. Be innin with flints and do#estic ani#als, the h(#an race has en a ed since prehistoric ti#es in a contin(o(s interaction with ob7ects and #aterials, (sin cr(de tools to #ake #ore precise ones, perfectin and trans#ittin increasin ly speciali<ed skills. 8cientific pra*is is to be considered as a recent refine#ent of this lon 6established activity. .hile so#e theory6related observations and e*peri#ents #ay still be #ade on do#ains of ob7ects (naffected by technolo ical develop#ents 2ecolo ical and etholo ical st(dies, for e*a#ple5 scientific pra*is has co#e #ore and #ore to involve the #anip(lation of relatively sophisticated instr(#ents, so that the do#ain of the theory6related pra*is of e*peri#ental particle physics tends to incl(de vac((# p(#ps, hi h6ener y enerators, fl(orescent s(rfaces, co(nters, and the like)it certainly does not incl(de ele#entary particles. ,his diver ence of the do#ains of a theory and its related pra*is raises a n(#ber of interestin @(estions. $irst of all, it is clear that the historical develop#ent of pra*is, even in cases that we think of as theory6related, has been relatively independent of theory. 1t has often happened, in fact, that the sti#(l(s for a certain line of e*peri#ental en@(iry has co#e less fro# a crisis in the associated theory than fro# the availability of an i#proved apparat(s or a new techni@(e. ,he history of science as the history of its instr(#ents is lent added i#portance by the reflection that, as s( ested above, the pra*is is never wron )it #ay at #ost be inappropriate for a gi-en theoretical !ur!ose , and even if this is the case it #ay well be appropriate for another)whereas the develop#ent of theory is a history of abandoned errors. Lne reason for this asy##etry is, of co(rse, that 2as we s(ppose5 the world does not chan e even tho( h o(r theories abo(t it do; the o(tco#e of an e*peri#ent #ay be s(rprisin b(t it cannot be #istaken. 2.e #ay (nderstand it #istakenly.5 8econdly, however, if we ass(#e that o(r theories are in so#e sense beco#in #ore ade@(ate to the world, the fact that a iven theory is not the theory of the do#ain of its related pra*is, b(t the theory of a #ore re#ote do#ain to which the do#ain of the pra*is affords it an > 19! > entry, as it were, #ay be an indication of the theoretical prof(ndity of the science in @(estion. 1t is strikin that a s#all advance in an e#pirical theory, e. ., a ain, enetics or particle physics, #ay now involve the co##on effort of very #any different pra*es. /nd this consilience of pra*es #ay be as i#portant as the consilience of hypotheses in the confir#ation of theories. B(t f(rther en@(iry is clearly needed into the #ode or fra#ework of o(r knowled e of the world that is constit(ted by pra*is, partic(larly in the specification of do#ains of elementar" pra*is. ,he concept of pra*is has been conf(sed by its too ready application to co#ple* do#ains 2s(ch as political action5 witho(t the preli#inary analysis that s(ch en@(iry #i ht f(rnish. > 191 >

91 I%di'id-al Pra5is i% Real Ti/e

,he philosophy of pra*is, altho( h it has seen a reat deal of activity in the last cent(ry, and especially since the e#phasis that was laid (pon it by :ar*, re#ains serio(sly defective as co#pared with what #i ht be called the philosophy of theory)that is to say, the philosophical analysis and criticis# of

theoretical syste#s. .hereas in the latter case we can follow a #ore or less contin(o(s ascent fro# the e#pirical point of contact of theories with the world in perception to the #ost abstract lo ical considerations, in the for#er a reat ap separates the philosophy of basic or ele#entary actions 2raisin one9s ar#, for e*a#ple5 fro# the philosophy of historically si nificant political activity with which the concept of pra*is has chiefly been associated. 1n this paper 1 wish to e*a#ine so#e of the reasons for this philosophical (nderdevelop#ent, point o(t so#e of its dan ers, and reco##end so#e lines of work that #i ht be followed to help correct it. Part of the diffic(lty lies in the theoretical character of philosophical pra*is itself, which :ar* pointed o(t in the notes to his doctoral dissertation.E1F /s a self6reflective discipline philosophy offers an e*a#ple of theoretical activity to its own e*a#ination; it has no s(ch readily available #odel of pra*is constr(ed as distinct fro# theory. :ar* indeed considered that the res(lt of philosophical intervention in the practical life of the world wo(ld be an abandon#ent of philosophy itself: -,he conse@(ence, hence, is that the world9s beco#in philosophical is at the sa#e ti#e philosophy9s beco#in worldly, that its reali<ation is at the sa#e ti#e its loss.-E3F 1 have ar (ed elsewhereE3F that we need not accept this concl(sion, which has the force of deprivin politics of any > 193 > contrib(tion fro# an (npre7(diced philosophy, b(t it #(st be ad#itted that, on the other side of the @(estion, philosophical in@(iry #ay well be affected by the physical, social, or political conte*t the description of co#ple* practical action necessarily invokes. 1s there any way of dealin with pra*is in eneral theoretically, apart fro# the ways in which the vario(s sciences 2physical, social or political5 do so0 .hat is the characteristic philosophical task with respect to pra*is0 Lne fre@(ent strate y is to constr(e pra*is as p(rposive action, so that its philosophical treat#ent beco#es the for#(lation of ends and the criticis# of the res(lts of action in ter#s of its s(ccess or fail(re in reachin these ends)both standard propositional activities. 2,he bi#odal distrib(tion all(ded to above #ay derive fro# o(r tendency to ne lect the analysis of p(rposive activities that fall between those ai#ed at #odest private oals on the one hand, and those ai#ed at lobal p(blic oals on the other)between personal self6reali<ation and (niversal peace or 7(stice. 1nter#ediate cases have by and lar e see#ed banal, and few philosophers)with the notable e*ception of Dewey)have been inclined to take acco(nt of the#.5 /nother strate y is to constr(e pra*is as the followin of theoretical instr(ctions; this has the effect)especially in the case of the advanced and ra#ified co#ple* of pra*es known as technolo y)of pre7(dicin the iss(e by readin a propositional str(ct(re into it a !riori . ,he for#er of these two strate ies has, it is tr(e, ety#olo ical sanction, since !rasso is -to pass thro( h,- and hence -in co##on (sa e, to achieve, brin abo(t, effect, acco#plish.-EAF B(t if we retreat fro# these derivative #eanin s we #ay ask, what is it that passes thro( h, and thro( h what does it pass0 1t is worth notin an indirect connection with the notion of the e#pirical, the root -p6rlinkin !rasso thro( h !erao to !eiro and !eira , altho( h the dependence probably oes in the opposite sense: for a passin 6thro( h to be a trial or a test, to constit(te e*perience, it #(st first be passed thro( h and then for#(lated as an e*perience. ,he challen e is to catch the pra*is before it has th(s been rendered propositional or theoretical. /nd the @(estion arises whether there is anythin that can properly be called pra*is independently of so#e propositional anticipation or recollection. 1f there were s(ch a thin it co(ld not of co(rse be artic(lated propositionally witho(t at the sa#e ti#e bein co#pro#ised as nonpropositional. ,he role of disco(rse in dealin with it co(ld only be e*ternal, a pointin to or a settin of so#ethin that co(ld be shown b(t not e*pressed. +ere we re7oin a fa#iliar

philosophical proble#atic whose two #o#ents are on the one hand ineffability and on the other ostension. .hen we be in to speak abo(t so#ethin the thin referred to re#ains (nspoken: lan (a e is the e*pression of tho( hts, not of thin s. > 193 > ,hin s as s(ch are, strictly speakin , ine*pressible, altho( h they #ay be described, located, even analy<ed in lan (a e. /nd pra*is is irrevocably on the side of thin s rather than of words. 1n the case of pra*is, however, we are not sh(t o(t as we are fro# thin s by a relation of #(t(al e*teriority, beca(se the thin chiefly involved in it is one that we inhabit, na#ely o(r own body. &ach of (s has a private relation of interiority to his or her own body. ,here co(ld not be a private lan (a e, beca(se lan (a e is essentially social; by contrast there can in ele#entary cases be only a private pra*is, beca(se pra*is is essentially individ(al. 1 cannot walk another person9s walkin any #ore than 1 can die another person9s death)at best 1 can do so#e thin s for so#eone else, b(t it is 1 who do the#. .ith lan (a e and tho( ht the #atter is different)there is a sense in which propositions, i.e., (nits of lin (istic str(ct(re, are en(inely trans#issible, in which we can think the same tho( ht or (tter the sa#e sentence, and this is #(ch stron er than the sense in which we can perfor# the sa#e action. 1n cases where the action for#s part of a social pra*is 2e. ., a a#e5 so that it is (nintelli ible e*cept in its - ra##atical- conte*t, the difference see#s #ini#al)if 1 serve at tennis 1 a# perfor#in the sa#e action as #y partner and as tho(sands of other players; the cr(cial point, tho( h, is that the action is not shared, it is only replicated. .atchin another person perfor# an action is not like hearin her (tter a sentence, since in the latter case 1 #ay be en a ed as f(lly as she is in the propositional content of the sentence, whereas in the for#er 1 cannot be en a ed at all in the intentional content of the action. ,his assertion #ay see# to be contradicted by the obvio(s possibility of collective pra*is, in si#ple cooperation or in #ore co#ple* for#s of technolo ical collaboration. 1n these cases, however, individ(als play an additive role. 1f #any people 7oin forces, they can lift heavier ob7ects than any one of the# can lift alone, b(t if #any people 7oin in the (tterance of a proposition that does not #ake it any tr(er than if one of the# (ttered it alone. ,o the e*tent that speakin is also a for# of pra*is it #ay be additive in a practical sense 2e. ., if #any evan elists preach the sa#e ospel to different a(diences5, b(t the contrast between the practical on the one hand and the propositional or theoretical on the other holds ood. +ence #y insistence on -individ(al pra*is- in the title. ,he individ(al a ent -passes thro( h- his or her own pra*is, that is, thro( h bodily #otions directed intentionally at practical ends. 2%ote that the intentionality of pra*is is essential)contrast the e*pression -to o thro( h the #otions- as #eanin ina(thentic pra*is.5 %ow 1 wish to #aintain that pra*is constit(tes an i##ediate #ode of o(r cogniti-e relation to the world, indeed the f(nda#ental #ode of > 19A > that relation, and that it precedes the propositional for#(lation of the contents of co nition. Pra*is answers to the properties of #aterial thin s and the re (larities of their behavio(r, and these are represented in it in the sense that, iven the conditions in @(estion, they co(ld be inferred fro# it 2for e*a#ple, if 1 wish to break a stick, the #(sc(lar e*ertion 1 brin to bear on it is a practical #eas(re of its stren th5. .e know a reat deal of the world in this #ode still, in spite of the advances of science and technolo y; children and pri#itives #ay know it chiefly in this #ode. ,he reason why pra*is has re#ained philosophically (nderdeveloped follows fro# its do(ble character

as individ(al and nonpropositional, altho( h these characteristics do not e*cl(de the possibility of its philosophical treat#ent; they tend only to obsc(re it. 1t wo(ld be @(ite feasible to show, not only how ele#entary pra*es co#e to incorporate knowled e of properties and re (larities of fa#iliar thin s and events, b(t also how participation in #ore co#ple* pra*es res(lts in partial for#s of knowled e. 1n the absence of investi ations of this second kind lies a dan er for theoretical (nderstandin of co#ple* social processes. ,he call for -critical6revol(tionary pra*is- that ori inated with :ar* pres(pposed a theoretical (nderstandin of social, political, and econo#ic conditions. +e see#s to co#e close to the view e*pressed above when he says that -the senses have therefore beco#e theoreticians i##ediately in their pra*is,-E"F b(t this re#ark is preceded by the observation that -the eye has beco#e a human eye, 7(st as its ob7ect has beco#e a social, h(#an ob7ect derived fro# and for #an-E4F )in other words, we already have to have a conce!tion of the h(#an before the senses can be, in his ter#s, e#ancipated. ,he dan er, then, is that the practical for# of political co nition achieved in revol(tionary activity #ay see# to s(stain a theoretical interpretation that is in fact pres(pposed by it, if independent philosophical reflection on the co nitive character of pra*es both si#ple and co#ple* is not bro( ht to bear on the proble#. .hat for# #i ht this reflection take0 1t wo(ld itself re@(ire a practical basis, in that it wo(ld have to be preceded by act(al e*periences of pra*is of a s(itable kind to provide paradi #atic instances. 1n the case of ele#entary pra*es this condition is a(to#atically f(lfilled, since o(r knowled e of the world rests in the first instance on o(r ac@(aintance with si#ple properties of #aterial thin s enco(ntered in practical dealin s with it. ,he diffic(lty is that the learnin of lan (a e #akes it possible to proceed at a relatively early a e to the ac@(isition of propositional knowled e, thro( h instr(ction rather than e*perience. .hile this is an essential feat(re of acc(lt(ration and ed(cation, witho(t which it wo(ld be i#possible for individ(als to reach the levels of theo6 > 19" > retical (nderstandin they habit(ally do reach in literate societies 2and indeed witho(t which it wo(ld have been i#possible for knowled e to advance at all5, it has the res(lt that a reat deal of knowled e of co#ple* #atters, even those that p(rport to represent practical aspects of social life, has no correlation to the lived states of affairs which constit(te its ob7ect, b(t only to certain statistical or anecdotal feat(res of the#. Lne of the reasons why the transition to propositional knowled e is advanta eo(s is that, by the processes of instr(ction, co#ple* synchronic propositional str(ct(res can be b(ilt and retained in the #e#ory, and this can be done in s(ch a way that fro# a relatively s#all n(#ber of propositions all the other ele#ents of the str(ct(re #ay be ded(ced. Pra*is, on the other hand, is essentially diachronic, and takes place f(rther#ore in -real ti#e,- rather than in the condensed ti#e of readin or the ti#elessness of the synchronic. Pra*es do not for# a ded(ctive syste#, altho( h there #ay be relations of co#ple#entarity or co#patibility a#on the#, dependin on their intentional conte*t. ,he (tility of havin passed thro( h the# lies not in the constr(ction of a propositional syste# p(rportin to represent the#, which as we have seen wo(ld be a contradiction in ter#s, b(t rather in the @(alifications 2or dis@(alifications5 they #ay brin to bear on propositional syste#s theoretically elaborated on other ro(nds. 1t follows fro# what has been said that there #ay be roo# for so#ethin like an e*peri#ental #ethod in philosophy, especially the philosophy of the social sciences, which wo(ld have the task both of li#itin and correctin syste#s of theoretical assertion on the one hand, and of freein the# fro# (ndetected practical pres(ppositions on the other. ,his wo(ld involve a en(ine division of labo(r, in that, while theoretical syste#s can in principle be #astered and shared by everyone, pra*is can be passed thro( h only individ(ally and in real ti#e, so that nobody co(ld

enco#pass #ore than a fraction of its varieties. 8o#e way wo(ld therefore have to be fo(nd of #akin its findin s c(#(lative, witho(t the pretense that its contents had been shared. 1n this ad#ittedly sketchy proposal lies a challen e to the philosophy of the ne*t decades. > 194 >

:1 Towards a P#iloso2#( o& Tec#%olo$(

/s the philosophy of technolo y develops, it takes its place a#on a n(#ber of disciplines, each known as the -philosophy of ( -)incl(din the philosophy of science, the philosophy of law, the philosophy of art, etc. ,he philosophy of ( , whatever ( #ay be, provides a way of partic(lari<in philosophy in eneral 2altho( h one co(ld think of philosophy in eneral as the philosophy of ( , where ( is everythin there is5. Philosophy in eneral has a n(#ber of standard s(bdivisions, s(ch as lo ic, episte#olo y, and ethics, and @(estions derivin fro# each of these s(bdivisions are likely to be posed abo(t the ( in @(estion. 8o we #i ht ask, what are the principles of artic(lation of disco(rse abo(t ( , or in the field of ( 0 .hat criteria are there for the acceptance of assertions0 .hat val(es overn the activities in the do#ain and the analysis of these activities0 /nd what are the #oral i#ports of s(ch activities0 B(t in so#e fields there co#es to be a stress on one of these s(bdivisions of philosophy rather than on another: for e*a#ple, the philosophy of science has been al#ost e*cl(sively the lo ic and episte#olo y of science. Co(rses in the ethics of science are not ta( ht as part of the philosophy of science as it has traditionally been conceived, altho( h we have recently beco#e hi hly aware of the ethical i#plications of science. 8i#ilarly, the philosophy of art has, by and lar e, dealt with val(es of one sort or another, b(t not #(ch with lo ic or episte#olo y. ,h(s when there is a new instantiation of the e*pression -the philosophy of ( -)when, for e*a#ple, the philosophy of technolo y be ins to take shape, and to be reco ni<ed by depart#ents of philosophy as a > 19? > rep(table part of the field)we have to be on o(r (ard a ainst the a#bi (ities that #ay be enerated by the tendency to stress (ne@(ally the different parts of philosophy. ,he philosophy of technolo y #i ht be one of two @(ite different thin s: it #i ht deal with val(e6laden @(estions abo(t ind(strial alienation, (rban s@(alor, poll(tion, one6di#ensional h(#anity, #oral decline, and other s(pposed (ndesirable conse@(ences of technolo y; or it #i ht deal with analytic @(estions abo(t people and #achines and the relations between the#, al orith#ic co#p(tability, the relation of collective #eans to individ(al ends, and the dialectics of theory and practice. / present dan er is too narrow an ass(#ption of the direction or for# that the philosophy of technolo y o( ht to take. 1t is evident that the philosophy of technolo y, in the #inds of #any people, consists of @(estions abo(t val(es which are challen ed, #odified, or denied by the advance of science and technolo y. ,his #ay obsc(re both sets of iss(es)those that concern val(es and those that concern technolo y. %o do(bt so#e @(estions of val(e, which have arisen in conte#porary society, are responsible for drawin technolo y to pop(lar attention, b(t this attention is often, as it t(rns o(t, acco#panied by so#e i norance abo(t technolo y and its sister discipline, science, as well as abo(t the

relations between the#. /lso, foc(sin on the s(pposed ori ins in technolo y of the crisis in val(es #ay lead to a ne lect of develop#ents in social and political philosophy which #i ht be capable of dealin with the val(e iss(es directly, independently of the @(estion of what it was that precipitated the crisis)which #ay after all have been not technolo y b(t so#ethin else that technolo y #ade possible.

Fo-r ,is-%dersta%di%$s
Before disc(ssin what direction a philosophy of technolo y sho(ld seek to follow, it is i#portant to deal with a set of #is(nderstandin s called here the ind(strial, hand#aiden, #oral, and 7( erna(t views of technolo y. ,he first of these identifies technolo y with ind(stry, and with what has happened since the ind(strial revol(tion; the second holds that technolo y is to be (nderstood as the application of science to practical proble#s; the third, already all(ded to, contends that the principal philosophical @(estions abo(t technolo y are @(estions of val(e; and the fo(rth sees technolo y as an i#personal and a(tono#o(s force into whose cl(tches the world has fallen. > 19= >

Tec#%olo$( a%d I%d-striali@atio%

1f one chooses to (nderstand by -technolo y- e*ploitative and lar e6scale ind(striali<ation on the capitalist #odel witho(t re ard to h(#anity, nat(re, or f(t(re enerations, then of co(rse the pressin @(estions wo(ld be val(e @(estions and concern is reasonable. B(t this see#s to #e a rather (ninterestin (se of the ter#, and the concept 1 have 7(st sketched is #ore perspic(o(sly defined by calling it e*ploitative and lar e6scale ind(striali<ation on the capitalist #odel witho(t re ard for h(#anity, nat(re, or f(t(re enerations. Lne is bo(nd, 1 s(ppose, to have so#e sy#pathy for people into whose awareness technolo y has co#e by that ro(te. / case in point is the editor of a recent book called The Sciences$ the 4umanities$ and the Technological Threat ,E1F for who#, iven the (se of the definite article in the last part of his title, technolo y is obvio(sly a rather fearso#e thin . 21n fact what the book see#s to fear is less technolo y itself than lapses in the conventional #oral order which reached its hei ht in Mictorian &n land.5 / #ore strai htforward and less rhetorical interpretation of the ter# wo(ld rely #ore heavily on its lin (istic ori ins: the logos of the techne , or the logos in the techne , these ter#s havin their (s(al #eanin s in Ireek)-word- or -reason- and -art- or -skill.- 1n the Iliad$ techne is (sed to #ean -shipb(ildin -; in the 3d"sse" , it is (sed to #ean -#etalworkin .- 1n fact, the ter# belon s to a cl(ster of ter#s, the interrelations a#on which are worth attention: theoria$ !ra(is$ !oiesis , on the one hand, techne and e!isteme on the other; a set of activities and a pair of ac@(ire#ents. ,he ter# theoria is of special interest, derivin as it does fro# the verb theorein , -to observe,- which denoted the activity of the theoros , the official observer sent to the a#es or to the cons(ltation of oracles; this last all(sion yields the pri#ary #eanin , since theoros is derived fro# theos , -Iod,- and ora , -care.- 1t is not wholly inappropriate, iven the val(e we correctly attach to theoretical knowled e, that o(r na#e for it sho(ld evoke, however indirectly, a concern for the divine. ,his re#ark has no tinct(re of reli ion)it all(des rather to an i##ediate relation between v(lnerable h(#ans and the physical world, by t(rns bea(tif(l and aweso#e, that is still preserved in the spirit of #odern science. Theoria is often contrasted to !ra(is , rather as spectators of a sport are contrasted with participants in it. ra(is is a doin of so#ethin , the carryin o(t of so#e practical strate y. oiesis , on the other

hand, > 199 > is a #akin . ,here is a close relation between !oiesis and techne , since !oiesis also was ori inally (sed to #ean the #akin of ships 2and perf(#es5. Kater on, of co(rse, it ca#e to #ean #akin thin s with words, i.e., the activity we now call poetic. :ore si nificant for (s, however, is the opposition between e!isteme and techne. '!isteme , translated into its Katin e@(ivalent scientia , ives (s o(r word science; techne , standin for the kind of knowled e involved in art or skill, is so#ethin people have in their hands rather than, as in the case of e!isteme , in their heads. 8o#eti#es these two ter#s are the#selves related; for e*a#ple, in +erodot(s the e*pression e!istesthai ten techne occ(rs, #eanin -to know one9s craft,- that is, to know it not cas(ally b(t in the special way that e!isteme represents. /ll these interconnections see# to #e provocative; one sho(ld not place #ore wei ht than is 7(stified on ety#olo y, b(t lan (a e is a rich so(rce of s( estion in the clarification of ideas. ,he f(ll6fled ed ter# technologeo occ(rs in /ristotle, where it #eans brin in so#ethin (nder the r(les of art, syste#ati<in those r(les; here we have not 7(st the skill, nor even the special or precise knowled e of the skill, b(t the possibility of artic(latin and for#(latin what is done when the skill is e#ployed. 1t is worth #aintainin this set of classical connections and connotations in the conte#porary (se of the word -technolo y,- if it is not too late to resc(e it.

Tec#%olo$( as 0a%d/aide%
,he second #is(nderstandin with which we #(st deal is the identification of technolo y entirely with the application of science to practical proble#s. ,echnolo y and science, of co(rse, are closely related. B(t it is possible to think of an independent history of technolo y, one which fre@(ently antici!ates scientific res(lts. .e know that thin s work witho(t knowin how they work. ,he notions of -knowin that- and -knowin how- correspond nicely to the ter#s e!isteme and techne , respectively, altho( h there is a crossin 6over of sense: to say that one knows so#ethin works witho(t knowin how is e@(ivalent to an assertion that one knows how to (se a certain device or infor#ation witho(t havin the -knowled e that,- which corresponds to the principles of its operation. ,his has happened in #any cases, a co ent e*a#ple bein that of electricity. .hile hypotheses e*isted 2e. ., Lh#9s law5, the theoretical (nderstandin of electricity was achieved only after its technolo y had reached the co##ercial sta e. 1n fact, the ordinary lan (a e of electricity)ter#s like -c(rrent- and -condenser-)indicate a belief abo(t > 3!! > its nat(re 2that it was a fl(id5 that was discredited only after electricity had beco#e a fa#iliar feat(re of practical life. .e are, of co(rse, able to prod(ce res(lts in the world by #anip(latin thin s witho(t any theoretical (nderstandin at all, and #any of the fr(its of h(#an in en(ity have co#e abo(t 7(st this way. ,his is fre@(ently tr(e even of scientific research: $araday, reali<in that wires carryin electric c(rrent #oved in #a netic fields, spent a reat deal of ti#e lookin for the conditions (nder which #ovin a wire in a #a netic field wo(ld prod(ce a c(rrent; he did this by trial and error, and witho(t any cl(e as to the theoretical relationships between electricity and #a netis#. 1t was a @(estion rather of feelin so#ethin in the world, or seein into it directly, than of (nderstandin .

,he concept of -knowin - is to be taken serio(sly even in the conte*t of -knowin how,- and not only in the conte*t of -knowin that,- since knowin how really co(nts as knowled e of the world thro( h a device or a #(sc(lar #ove#ent; it is a #ode of ac@(aintance leadin to #astery even if it does not incl(de analytic (nderstandin . ,here is a passa e in +(#e which #i ht be (sed to reinforce this point if read in a sli htly (northodo* way. +(#e says, in the co(rse of his criticis# of the principle of ca(sality, -:y practice, yo( say, ref(tes #y do(bts. B(t yo( #istake the p(rport of #y @(estion. /s an a ent 1 a# @(ite satisfied in the point, b(t as a philosopher who has so#e share of c(riosity, 1 will not say scepticis#, 1 want to learn the fo(ndation of this inference.-E3FAs an agent I am /uite satisfied in the !oint : +(#e has no practical do(bt abo(t the reliability of ca(sal relations; he is not really afraid that the s(n will not rise to#orrow, b(t he (nderstands that, if we #ake clai#s to knowled e for#(lated in the #ode of- knowin that,- we r(n (p a ainst ins(perable obstacles. 1t see#s to #e worth lookin at the #atter afresh, fro# the a ent9s point of view, and askin whether there #i ht not be a wisdo# of the a ent, independent of the philosophical proble#s that confront the traditional episte#olo ist. Hnowin how need not follow fro# or depend on knowin that)or, to p(t it in the ter#s of the present disc(ssion, technolo y need not follow fro# or depend on science. 1f it is tr(e that #(ch #odern technolo y wo(ld not have co#e into bein witho(t #odern science, it is e@(ally tr(e that #ost #odern science wo(ld not have co#e into bein witho(t #odern technolo y, and there has been so#e atte#pt 2partic(larly in the 8oviet Union5 to approach the history of science, for a chan e, in ter#s of the history of its instr(#ents rather than in ter#s of the history of its theories.

Tec#%olo$( as a ,oral Iss-e

%ow let (s t(rn to the third #is(nderstandin , na#ely, that the philosophical proble#s of technolo y are essentially @(estions of val(e. > 3!1 > ,here is, to be s(re, a crisis of val(e, b(t to attrib(te this to technolo y is to conceal the ethical iss(es, in a narrower sense, that #ay be involved. ,he stren th of o(r val(es is #ediated by the #a nit(de of the strains to which they are s(b7ect, and it is probably a del(sion to think that accepted val(es are co##only stron er than re@(ired to #eet stresses (s(ally enco(ntered. ,he technolo ical sit(ation #ay be disastro(s for people whose val(es are not e*ceptionally stron : p(t devices into their hands that enable the#, by pressin b(ttons, to eli#inate their ene#ies, and they will be #ore likely act(ally to do that than if it had re@(ired elaborate actions. 1t is likely that o(r technolo y will p(t (s in a sit(ation where o(r val(es are strained, b(t the fact that the val(es break down sho(ld not si nify that (ilt attaches to technolo y; the fact that o(r val(es ca#e into bein at a ti#e when s(ch strains were not present #eans that they now need stren thenin , not that technolo y is vicio(s. 1t is tr(e that technolo y has #ade it possible for people to be foolish and evil in ways not previo(sly possible; still, it does not see# reasonable that all this sho(ld be laid to technolo y9s char e. ,echnolo y has not always had the ne ative connotations, even in the do#ain of val(es, that it has recently ac@(ired. 1n the early days, when #achines were #ade of brass and were attended by enth(siasts who kept the# polished, there were #any people who fo(nd i##ense aesthetic satisfaction in the str(ct(re and power of technolo ical devices. ,here has been a recent contrib(tion to this tradition on the part of a conte#porary writer, Cobert Pirsi , in his book <en and the Art of 1otorc"cle 1aintenance ,E3F in which he shows in a convincin and often #ovin way how the technical precision of #achines is a thin of bea(ty and also of reat h(#an potentiality.

,his #ay see# to be an ar (#ent for the val(e6ne(trality of technolo y, and to so#e e*tent, this is so. 8(ch a position #ay be viewed as naWve on the ro(nds that technolo y is part of a co#ple* social str(ct(re, that we cannot escape involve#ent with it, and that every action has #oral and political i#plications. B(t the whole point of philosophy as an analytic device is to neutrali=e that kind of consideration in order to be able to reinsert the conce!ts concerned$ in a clearer form$ into a more com!le( argument later on . Philosophy does not take a position in @(estions of val(e; if it did, it wo(ld beco#e a for# of #orali<in or of the arbitration of taste. 8i#ilarly, it does not take a position on what is tr(e of the world; if it did, it wo(ld beco#e a for# of science. 1nstead, what philosophy tries to do is to clarify the definitions of the ter#s in @(estion and the conditions of their application, the #eanin s of the relevant propositions and the conditions of their acceptance. 1t is tr(e that philosophy #ay establish its criteria in s(ch a way that, of the vario(s alternatives offered to (s, one and only one is selected while > 3!3 > the others are re7ected, b(t this does not #ean that philosophy has itself taken a position)it has si#ply enabled (s to take a position #ore intelli ently than otherwise. ,he position chosen #i ht then be said to have a philosophical warrant, b(t it wo(ld not, for all that, have beco#e a part of philosophy.

Tec#%olo$( as A-$$er%a-t
1n order to deal with the 7( erna(t view, it is necessary first to ar (e that, to so#e e*tent at least, technolo y, like science, is a distrib(tive pheno#enon. ,here wo(ld be no science if it were not for the heads of the scientists who know it; technolo y is si#ilar in that it re@(ires an ar#y of h(#ans to s(stain it. ,he sit(ations of technolo y and science differ in that while the head of a dead scientist ceases to be (sef(l, the #achine of a dead technolo ist #ay contin(e to f(nction; technolo y is therefore less directly red(cible to the activities of the involved people. $(rther, a technolo ist #ay feel a certain loyalty to the technolo ical syste# he or she has helped create or helps to r(n. 1t is te#ptin , therefore, to re ard the develop#ent of technolo y as a(tono#o(s, and to ass(#e that if so#ethin is possible it will in fact be reali<ed and e*ploited, to feel that as individ(als we are powerless in the face of the technolo ical syste#. B(t the 7( erna(t view (nderesti#ates the tenacio(s role of the individ(al and the ti#e scale of develop#ent. ,here is a lon r(n ahead, and voices like 8ch(#acher9s are raised to insist that the tendency to bi ness and (ncontrolled a(to#atis# needs to be reversed.EAF ,he 88, decision in the Con ress #ay have been a t(rnin 6point back towards a #ore rational syste# of control. ,he only way to reverse the trend towards (nthinkin and deleterio(s develop#ents is by a #assive ca#pai n of ed(cation, b(t it is very i#portant not to inhibit this by co(nsels of desperation, by a readiness to believe that the whole thin is already o(t of hand and that technolo y represents an (ncon@(erable force for evil in the #odern world. ,here is no serio(s reason for acceptin any of these propositions.

A New *irectio%. Words a%d T#i%$s

+ow sho(ld we re ard the philosophy of technolo y, and what direction #i ht it reasonably take0 ,he #ost pro#isin approach wo(ld appear to be to work o(t the opposition between e!isteme and techne 2which, when e!isteme is translated into Katin and techne is #ade artic6 > 3!3 >

(late, transfor#s into the opposition between science and technolo y5 in a #(ch #ore radical way than has yet been done)to follow it down to the opposition between two ways h(#an bein s have of dealin with the world, one in ter#s of speech and of words, the other in ter#s of actions and of thin s. Lne thinks a ain of +(#e, satisfied as an a ent, dissatisfied as a philosopher. ,here is another classical so(rce in 8pino<a, who, in his essay 3n the Im!ro-ement of the ,nderstanding , proposed, in a re#arkable tho( h cas(al way, the opposition 1 now wish to e*ploit. 28pino<a is the #ost technolo ical of #odern philosophers, with his lens6 rindin , dependent as it was on the technolo y of lass #an(fact(re and castin , and of eo#etrical #eas(re#ent, and abrasives and polishes.5 +e ar (ed that so#ebody #i ht clai# the need for a #ethod of discoverin the tr(th, and the need for a #ethod to discover this #ethod, and so on into an infinite re ress. +e said, ,he #atter stands on the sa#e footin as the #akin of #aterial tools, which #i ht be ar (ed abo(t in a si#ilar way. $or, in order to work iron, a ha##er is needed, and the ha##er cannot be forthco#in (nless it has been #ade; b(t, in order to #ake it, there was need of another ha##er and other tools, and so on to infinity. .e #i ht th(s vainly endeavor to prove that #en have no power of workin iron. B(t as #en at first #ade (se of the instr(#ents s(pplied by nat(re to acco#plish very easy pieces of work#anship, laborio(sly and i#perfectly, and then, when these were finished, wro( ht other thin s #ore diffic(lt with less labor and reater perfection; and so rad(ally #o(nted fro# the si#plest operations to the #akin of tools, and fro# the #akin of tools to the #akin of #ore co#ple* tools, and fresh feats of work#anship, till they arrived at #akin , with s#all e*pendit(re of labor, the vast n(#ber of co#plicated #echanis#s which they now possess. 8o, in like #anner, the intellect, by its native stren th, #akes for itself intellect(al instr(#ents, whereby it ac@(ires stren th for perfor#in other intellect(al operations, and fro# these operations ets a ain fresh instr(#ents, or the power of p(shin its investi ation f(rther, and th(s rad(ally proceeds till it reaches the s(##it of wisdo#.E"F ,he point of citin this passa e has nothin to do with reachin the s(##it of wisdo#: it is to draw attention to the @(ite nat(ral way in which 8pino<a s( ests that there has been an a(tono#o(s develop#ent of the technolo ical, a #ode of dealin with the co#ple*ity of the world, thro( h the develop#ent of tools and ever #ore co#ple* devices, havin nothin to do with o(r theoretical (nderstandin . ,his wo(ld be a way of beco#in ade@(ate to o(r environ#ent or, even #ore i#portantly, beco#in ade@(ate to o(rselves in that environ#ent, reckonin with #atters of life and death in a way @(ite different fro# the one #ade possible by intellect(al instr(#ents. > 3!A > Ln the other side of this practical relationship to the world, philosophy has so#e e*traordinary aps, which the philosophy of technolo y #i ht have the a#bition to fill. ,here is a reat ap between basic action theory on the one hand 2what happens when 1 raise #y ar#, whether in so doin 1 do one thin or #any, etc.5 and @(estions of political pra*is on the other 2how political action is best or ani<ed, how it leads to revol(tion, etc.5. ,he for#er does not rise to any reat level of co#ple*ity; the latter be ins at a level so co#ple* as to defy l(cid analysis. .e need to pay attention to the inter#ediate ran e, to apparently banal for#s of everyday behavior s(ch as b(ttonin b(ttons, writin , and #anip(latin scientific apparat(s, which are fo(nd everywhere b(t have been the ob7ect of very little philosophical scr(tiny. ,hese activities on the side of -knowin how- are s(rely 7(st as si nificant for h(#an society as activities of lan (a e in a si#ilar ran e, to which philosophers have paid a reat deal of attention. ,he parallel between these two sides has so#e philosophical history of its own. 1n 1=9? &spinas p(blished a book called +es origines de la technologie , in which he #atched a hierarchy of concepts

on the practical side to another on the theoretical side: 8cience Hnowled e Perception 8ensation /rt or techni@(e C(sto# +abit Cefle*

+e also anticipated certain present concerns in speakin of -the pessi#istic aspect of this philosophy: the powerlessness of #an.- ,his, however, was co(ntered by its -opti#istic aspect: the /rts, ifts of the ods.-E4F Ln the practical6technolo ical side we be in with a philosophy of pra*is, which will beco#e a philosophy of technolo y only when a certain co#ple*ity has been reached. .hat has been #issin in recent atte#pts to define a philosophy of technolo y is 7(st this basis in pra*is, and the develop#ent of the inter#ediate re ion which separates the si#ple fro# the co#ple*. ,he analo (e of sensation #ay be 7(st as r(di#entary as it is)#(sc(lar effort, ele#entary #otions, and the like)b(t the analo (e of perception 2which, after all, involves discri#ination between relatively co#plicated aspects of the world5 is to be fo(nd in #(ch #ore pointed and refined pra*es which #ay pres(ppose a considerable de ree of learnin and which represent a sophisticated #ode of knowin a hi hly or ani<ed world. 1n other words, we need a serio(s and developed pra*iolo y as a propaede(tic to the philosophy of technolo y, so#ethin #ore ade@(ate than the rather anecdotal work of Hotarbinski.E?F Pra*is stands to technolo y as ele#ents do to syste#s, > 3!" > technolo y bein a conscio(sly artic(lated se@(ence or b(ndle of pra*es desi ned to reach a conscio(sly apprehended end on a relatively lar e scale. ,his distinction between pra*is and technolo y see#s to be a (sef(l and necessary one, as contrasted with the tendency, for e*a#ple, on the part of &ll(l, to l(#p everythin to ether (nder the ter# -techni@(e.1f we now associate the theoria.e!isteme side of the opposition with words, and the !ra(is.techne side with thin s, the obvio(s s( estion presents itself that there #i ht be a philosophy of thin s; the analysis of the artic(lation of thin s in the world see#s 7(st as worth p(rs(in as the analysis of the artic(lation of words. ,here are so#e hints of this too in the literat(re: KPvi68tra(ss talks in The Sa-age 1ind of a -science of the concrete,- which he attrib(tes to pri#itive peoples, #eanin by this a knowled e of the #aterial reso(rces of their world which is directly e*pressed in their relation to thin s and only secondarily in their lan (a e.E=F ,he science of the concrete is a science of nat(ral thin s) plants, ani#als, and the like)b(t we have a si#ilar relation to artifacts, with which, indeed, o(r lives are s(rro(nded. ,he artifacts that pop(late o(r lives e*press the h(#an #astery of the world as #(ch as, if not #ore so than, propositions do. .e #i ht even be te#pted to say that, if we had ade@(ate artifacts, we co(ld do witho(t the propositions. &lsewhere 1 have even s( ested that the propositional content of science,

na#ely, scientific theory, #ay be historically ano#alo(s, and that its chief f(nction #ay be to #ake itself (nnecessary by incorporatin itself into devices.E9F 1t is perfectly tr(e that if we have the appropriate devices)fro# chan e6#akin #achines and a(to#atic ca#eras to co#p(teri<ed #ass6 specto raphs)we can et res(lts @(ickly and (nthinkin ly that a #ore theory6dependent pra*is wo(ld have had to labor over for a lon ti#e; and it is a soberin tho( ht that if the device had been prod(ced #a ically 2or nat(rally, which a#o(nts to the sa#e thin 5 it wo(ld have worked e*actly as it does when prod(ced to theoretical specifications. 1n a way this line of tho( ht, too, is part of a lon tradition: the &ncyclopedists of the ei hteenth cent(ry attached reat i#portance to the plates which acco#panied articles abo(t technical or ind(strial proced(res, s(ch as lass #akin , weavin , and the like. ,he plates were often divided into an (pper and lower portion, the (pper a realistic representation of the process in @(estion, the lower a set of en ravin s of the vario(s parts of the #achinery, broken o(t and separated like the ra##atical ele#ents of a proposition. 8(ch ill(strations provided independent access to the knowled e the vario(s articles were #eant to co##(nicate, and enabled the reader to see into the str(ct(re of the world, and to rasp directly the spatial and te#poral and ca(sal rela6 > 3!4 > tions involved in a nonpropositional, nonverbal way. / #ore recent contrib(tion to this eneral do#ain is Ba(drillard9s book +e S"st>me des objets , which in a ro( hly str(ct(ralist6:ar*ist way analy<es the syste# of representation that is constit(ted by ob7ects in the daily world)the f(rnit(re and orna#entation of ho(ses, the apparat(s of co##erce and transportation and ind(stry.E1!F ,hin s as they enter into the world)as they are prod(ced, cons(#ed, arran ed)constit(te an intelli ible syste# which has so#e affinities to the lin (istic syste# b(t is not in fact a syste# of lan (a e. /s we develop this parallel between words and thin s, it is to be re#e#bered that the thin s are no lon er #erely the referents of the words, b(t entities in their own ri ht, for#in their own syste#s of artic(lation and e*pressin the fr(its of h(#an knowled e ac@(ired practically. Lf co(rse, to #aintain a ri oro(s separation of the two sides wo(ld be @(ite artificial)the pro ress of either side 2towards science or towards technolo y5 wo(ld have been i#possible witho(t the other. B(t in a certain respect activities traditionally s(pposed to lie on the side of words and of scientific theory are bein taken over by thin s and technolo ical practice. &arlier in this paper an association was noted between prod(ction and prediction; the latter at least has (s(ally been taken to be a theoretical activity, b(t it is now #ore and #ore fre@(ently the case that instead of workin o(t theoretically so#e con7ect(ral state of affairs, the task is entr(sted to co#p(ter si#(lation. ,his is a way of prod(cin new knowled e as the end prod(ct of a process involvin thin s rather than words, witho(t any co nitive #onitorin of the inter#ediate steps. 1t #ay be ar (ed that co#p(ters in fact do #ake (se of lan (a es, and it cannot be denied that their parts are arran ed accordin to the lo ic of a -lan (a e.- B(t what p(ts the si#(lation process on the technolo ical rather than the scientific side is the fact that there is no theoros , no spectator intelli ence to attend and (ide the process; and there is also a sense, as 1 have ar (ed elsewhere, in which the lo ic of o(r lan (a e is a necessary reflection of a prior lo ic of thin s.E11F

Val-es I%de2e%de%t o& Tec#%olo$(

1 ret(rn to the concept of val(e, to e#phasi<e val(es held independently that technolo y #i ht or #i ht not serve. ,he notion of independence is i#portant, and controversial, as a brief reference to so#e recent ar (#ents will show. +eide er sees in technolo y the spirit of the #odern a e and links it with #odern #etaphysics:E13F for hi# this is

> 3!? > not a co#pli#ent, since he thinks that #etaphysics since Plato has been (tilitarian and that indeed Plato represents the wron t(rn in the history of philosophy. 1f technolo y is an instr(#entality, so on this acco(nt is philosophy 2and, +eide er wo(ld say, 7(st as reat a threat to o(r val(es5. 1 wo(ld prefer to say not that technolo y e*presses o(r collective p(rpose b(t that, (nlike philosophy, it is a #eans for the practical reali<ation of this p(rpose. :arc(se, on the other hand, re ards technolo y as part of ideolo y, and hence believes it to have a repressive force in the conte#porary world: 1n this (niverse, technolo y provides the reat rationali<ation of the (nfreedo# of #an and de#onstrates the -technical- i#possibility of bein a(tono#o(s, of deter#inin one9s own life. $or this (nfreedo# appears neither as irrational nor as political b(t rather as s(b#ission to the technical apparat(s which enlar es the co#forts of life and increases the prod(ctivity of labor. ,echnolo ical rationality th(s protects rather than cancels the le iti#acy of do#ination and the instr(#entalist hori<on of reason opens on a rationally totalitarian society.E13F ,he real proble# here see#s #(ch #ore one of technocracy than of technolo y; only if social and political and econo#ic str(ct(res are allowed to create an irreversible dependence on technolo y for the very s(rvival of the individ(al or if thro( h ed(cation and propa anda individ(als are conditioned to see the character of any acceptable s(rvival in technolo y6dependent ter#s, is the trap :arc(se describes effective. ,echnocracy is not so #(ch a proble# for the philosophy of technolo y as for political philosophy in its #ore fa#iliar sense. ,he challen e is to incorporate the technolo ical into the pattern of o(r social and political or ani<ation witho(t allowin it to deter#ine the essential feat(res of that pattern. B(t even to speak of allowin it to do this, or not allowin it, is to fall into one of the errors 1 initially deplored, that of re ardin technolo y as an i#personal force which has to be confronted as so#ethin alien. ,echnolo y is in fact a h(#an prod(ct; so is political or ani<ation. .e need to #aster each concept(ally before we can safely deal with their interaction. 1f a reat #any (ntho( htf(l people, who have not s(fficiently #editated (pon their own political or ani<ation or the ends they wish it to serve, are offered technolo ical sol(tions, they are likely to accept the#, wherever they are available, beca(se they represent the easiest te#poral sol(tion. 1f, likewise, they have not #editated (pon the technolo y, it will not be s(rprisin if disaster and recri#inations follow. 1f, of co(rse, we wanted to clai# that we were, individ(ally or collectively, si#ply not (p to copin with the advanta es of > 3!= > technolo y, we #i ht wish to adopt a K(ddite view, b(t this see#s a cowardly attit(de. .hat we #(st do, rather, is to work on the artic(lation of the social and political val(es we wish to reali<e, so as to be able to adopt technolo ical sol(tions intelli ently witho(t ivin (p other val(es we wish to preserve. ,o repeat a point #ade earlier: 1f technolo y r(ns away with society, this is a conde#nation of society and not of technolo y. ,here is a kind of f(tility in the attack on technolo y, rather like kickin a car after one has backed it into a la#ppost. /n old proverb, s(itably enerali<ed, is applicable in the present conte*t: -/ bad work#an always bla#es his tools.- 1t is tr(e that in this enerali<ed case the work#an is collective, and that we very often have a feelin of indi-idual helplessness in the face of technolo y)it appears to be ettin away fro# (s, if not fro# society as a whole. B(t the sa#e thin

is tr(e of lan (a e; we do not have individ(al control of the #eans of e*pression. .e #i ht say that we are at the #ercy of lan (a e; and yet we can (se the available lan (a e to e*press what we want to say,7(st as we can (se the technolo y there is to do what we want to do. 1f lar er6scale (ses take deleterio(s t(rns, as they occasionally do)in ind(stry on the side of thin s or in literat(re on the side of words)re#edies in action beco#e, as one #i ht e*pect, political. +aber#as contrasted instit(tional fra#eworks characteri<ed by sy#bolic interaction, which he takes to be the #ode (nder which we are to be e#ancipated fro# inherited str(ct(res, with a(tono#o(s syste#s of p(rposive rational action, s(ch as ar#ies, co##ercial and ind(strial fir#s, (niversities, and the like. Under the for#er we can confront one another openly and take acco(nt of si#ilarities and differences of ends or concerns, and this #ode has to be #ade do#inant over the latter if we are not to be a prey to i#personal econo#ic str(ct(res rooted in class ine@(alities.E1AF / ain, however, it is not necessary to follow hi# in identifyin technolo y as one of these autonomous str(ct(res, -a(tono#o(s- si nifyin here self6interestedly concerned and disdainin a #ore eneral law. 1t is #(ch #ore likely that we will find the deleterio(s principles in the econo#ics or politics than in the technolo y. ,he de#i(r e of the #odern world is after all the collectivity of h(#an bein s)individ(al h(#an bein s, not so#e abstract representative :an)a distrib(tive collectivity of people like (s 2for if the event transpires it will be one of (s, not so#e abstract force, who presses the fatef(l b(tton5. %ot that it is i#possible for the 7( erna(t to co#e into bein ; indeed, it #ay already be rindin its way towards the end of the world, in which case nothin any of (s says can #ake any difference. B(t this is not a necessary conse@(ence of technolo y if we co#e to ter#s with it in f(ll (nderstandin . 1t wo(ld take a consid6 > 3!9 > erable de ree of concerted #alice, of which, it is tr(e, the reat powers show the#selves capable, to enco#pass the technolo ical destr(ction of civili<ation. ,echnolo y offers, for the first ti#e in history, the !ossibilit" of an al#ost co#plete co##and over the nat(ral world. Lne is re#inded of the passa e in +e el9s henomenolog" of 1ind in which he disc(sses the relations between the :aster and the 8lave: in the end it is the slave who co#es to do#inate, beca(se he is the one who deals with the world practically and not theoretically; he serves the #aster with his hands, b(t in so doin con@(ers the world by work, and th(s achieves his own e#ancipation not only fro# the #aster b(t also fro# #any of the li#itations of the world itself.E1"F :ar*, followin +e el, was one of the first to perceive the relations between the social str(ct(res we (nconscio(sly perpet(ate and the econo#ic and technolo ical forces which transfor# those str(ct(res, and he has been called by /*elos the -philosopher of technolo y.-E14F 8ince technolo y offers this co##and of the world, it is (p to (s to for#(late with d(e care the #oral and social i#peratives that are to be satisfied in achievin it. B(t technolo y sho(ld not be identified with this task; its philosophical proble#s are its own. > 31! >

;1 Scie%ti&ic T#eor( as a% 0istorical A%o/al(

Up to a point -science- and -scientific theory- can be taken as ro( hly synony#o(s, and -scientific discovery- as the discovery of theoretical tr(ths. ,hese are selected fro# a#on #any propositions that #i ht enerally speakin be called -theoretical,- incl(din spec(lative or even fictional ones. ,he

propositions that science re7ects, while they #ay not have the virt(e of tr(th, have other virt(es, perhaps, which will lead to their selection for other p(rposes)the enlar e#ent of the i#a ination, the enco(ra e#ent of kindness, and so on. %ow the ordinary lin (istic practice of h(#an bein s will pres(#ably always incl(de the prod(ction of propositions of this sort, b(t it is reasonable to ask whether it will always incl(de the prod(ction of tr(ths of scientific theory. / reat deal of everyday disco(rse incorporates propositions that wo(ld once have been considered -scientific- b(t now e*press co##onplaces rather than discoveries, and that will no do(bt contin(e to be tr(e. B(t what will the f(t(re develop#ent of scientific theory as s(ch, the special province of a li#ited co##(nity of scientists, be like0 8cience, in its practical aspect)in which it has been defined by Iilles6Iaston Iran er as -the constr(ction of effecti-e #odels of pheno#ena- 2e#phasis added5)contrib(tes not only or even #ainly to o(r (nderstandin of the world b(t also, and in the lon r(n #ore si nificantly, to o(r control of it. ,he ori ins of science lie in vario(s for#s of practical knowled e 2a ric(lt(re, the do#estication of ani#als, pottery, #etall(r y, navi ation, land s(rveyin , etc.5 ac@(ired in prehistoric ti#es as sol(tions to proble#s of necessity)not that the necessity need have been perceived as s(ch by their first practitioners, > 311 > rather that we can see the# as havin been necessary to the perpet(ation of the race and the e#er ence of civili<ation. .hile #ore p(rely theoretical interests soon developed 2e. ., for reli io(s and philosophical p(rposes5, this practical side has never been absent in any period of scientific advance. 8cientific theory, in other words, has been one of the #eans by which h(#an responses to the environ#ent have been rendered #ore ade@(ate to the challen es it poses)threats to s(rvival, or obstacles to pro ress towards desired oals. 1 shall describe this process of winnin f(nctional control over the environ#ent on the part of a livin 2in this case h(#an5 or anis# as the ade/uation of the or anis# to the environ#ent. 1 (se this ter# rather than, say, ada!tation beca(se the latter #i ht describe an ad7(st#ent in which there were no oals e*cept s(rvival itself and in which the or anis#, while well adapted to nor#al conditions, co(ld not cope individ(ally or collectively with e*traordinary chan es. /daptation occ(rs at all levels, and can be seen wherever species have stabili<ed the#selves, whether they are vir(ses or people. /de@(ation on the other hand has overtones which s( est that a species which had #erely adapted #i ht be #issin all kinds of opport(nities presented by feat(res of its environ#ent to which it was not e@(ipped to respond, #i ht as it were not be doin 7(stice to its environ#ent. ,his possibility of -hi her- for#s of interaction is what allows evol(tion to proceed even when perfectly adapted species are already established. 2.hether the h(#an or anis# is yet ade@(ate to its environ#ent in these senses re#ains to be seen. /ll sorts of thin s #ay be oin on aro(nd (s that we will event(ally be able to e*ploit b(t of which we have as yet no inklin .5 1f we e*a#ine the proble# of relative ade@(ation for or anis#s in eneral)what it is that #akes one or anis# #ore ade@(ate to its environ#ent than another)we see that it rests on adaptation and that it is possible to distin (ish a n(#ber of levels. 1 shall disc(ss these in ter#s of types of responses that the or anis# #ay #ake to chan es in its environ#ent. 2,he notion of -response- can easily be e*tended at the appropriate point to any action taken for any end)the sti#(l(s need not be positive, i.e., a challen e fro# the environ#ent, b(t #ay be ne ative, i.e., a deficiency in it with respect to so#e desire.5 /t the #ost r(di#entary level s(rvival re@(ires a set of innate res!onses which are f(nctions of the str(ct(re of the or anis# and do not involve #e#ory. ,hese incl(de the vario(s refle*es as well as ho#eostatic controls, e. ., of body te#perat(re. 1n or anis#s with a #e#ory, learned res!onses #ay co#e into play; the or anis#9s reaction to new chan es is a f(nction of its str(ct(re pl(s its previo(s

e*perience of si#ilar chan es. :ost ani#als do not rise above this sta e. 1n hi her ani#als, when, > 313 > in addition to individ(al #e#ory, interaction between individ(als is possible, a third cate ory of what 1 shall call taught res!onses is added; the or anis# is dependent for its s(rvival on a social relationship, with a parent or a herd, which lasts thro( h infancy and thanks to which it ac@(ires responses)by i#itation, trainin , etc.)which it wo(ld have been incapable of ac@(irin alone #erely thro( h e*perience of the environ#ent. ,he i#p(lse to behave socially and to ed(cate the yo(n #ay itself be innate in developed species, so this new level does not re@(ire any de ree of awareness of the conditionin process on the part of the or anis#. B(t it does #ake possible a for# of c(lt(ral evol(tion, since for the first ti#e the trans#ission of the response in @(estion or of the conditions for ac@(irin it is not enetic b(t is e*ternali<ed in the ro(p. /s lon as so#e #e#bers who have the skill in @(estion s(rvive, and can instr(ct or be i#itated, the behavior will be passed on fro# one eneration to the ne*t, even tho( h if the contin(ity were broken its revival wo(ld be proble#atic. 28ince s(ch a response wo(ld have been invented at so#e earlier sta e it co(ld always, in principle, be invented a ain, b(t the conditions (nder which its invention occ(rred #i ht not be reprod(ced; if accidental, their reprod(ction wo(ld be very (nlikely.5 Kearned and ta( ht responses #ay be either direct or mediated )that is to say either addressed i##ediately to the sti#(l(s condition, or desi ned to set in #otion a ca(sal se@(ence that will cope with it. ,he latter, a ain, need not be conscio(s)the or anis# #ay not know why it does what it does, even tho( h this #ay be for the sake of so#e @(ite re#ote effect)and the direct and (nconscio(sly #ediated types of learned and ta( ht responses, once the learnin and teachin have been achieved, beco#e indistin (ishable fro# innate responses in that they follow i##ediately (pon what tri ers the# 2cf. the concepts of second nat(re, habit for#ation, etc.5. ,here is however a kind of #ediated response in which alternatives are wei hed and possibilities pro7ected before the final choice of a co(rse of action, and this can only, if the ter#s involved have their (s(al #eanin s, be a conscio(s process. .hat intervenes in this new case between the proble# and its sol(tion, or the desire and its satisfaction, is so#ethin of the nat(re of deliberation or inference, and to this intervenin process 1 shall ive the eneric na#e -calc(lation.*alculated res!onses , then, are those which are deferred while calc(lation proceeds: the or anis#9s reaction now is a f(nction of its str(ct(re, e*perience, and ed(cation, pl(s whatever al orith#ic reso(rces #ay be at its disposal. 21 (se -al orith#- here in its wider sense as -the art of calc(latin with any syste# of notation.-5 ,he e#ploy#ent of these reso(rces will be conscio(s, b(t it still #ay not be intelli ent, > 313 > in the sense that the or anis# #ay not know why the calc(lation is effective)it #ay be a #ethod that has been learned (nco#prehendin ly. 21n this case a calc(lated response wo(ld be 7(st a rather co#plicated kind of ta( ht response.5 %ow, for every #ediated response the @(estion can be raised as to how we know that the action will prod(ce its desired effect. 1n the case of ta( ht responses we 7(st know it, by e*perience. B(t for calc(lated responses)the #ost obvio(s cases of which are precisely the h(#an (se of #athe#atics and science)so#ebody, even if not the person who act(ally carries o(t the calc(lation, will ordinarily be in a position to e(!lain why the action it leads to prod(ces the effects it does, by appealin to a

theory that entails the#; it is no lon er a @(estion of e*pectin res(lts, b(t of predictin conse@(ences. ,he calc(lation e*e#plifies so#e part of the theory, and the theory as a whole provides an effective #odel of the pheno#ena in the conte*t of which the response is appropriate. 8cientific theory, then, #(st be co(nted a#on the al orith#ic reso(rces referred to above; the characteristic #ark of a scientific a e is its (se of calc(lated responses rather than #erely innate or learned or ta( ht ones, and the #ost developed for# of calc(lated response involves raspin the ele#ents of the sit(ation to be dealt with (nder the ter#s of a theory, and by vario(s techni@(es of #eas(re#ent, co#p(tation, the devisin of hypotheses and the testin of their conse@(ences, etc., arrivin at the practical specifications of relevant action. ,he history of science is the history of the ori in and develop#ent of s(ch al orith#ic reso(rces and their associated concepts, vocab(lary, and techni@(es. 1 said above that a calc(lated response #i ht be ta( ht b(t not (nderstood, i.e., that we #i ht profit fro# a theory witho(t ever co#in to know it. 1 wish now to raise the related @(estion, whether it #i ht ever happen that we ca#e to know a theory and then for ot it, retainin however the responses that it #ade possible. 1t see#s clear that this does happen: we work o(t a #ethod or a strate y on theoretical ro(nds, b(t thereafter it beco#es habit(al: its theoretical 7(stification #i ht at so#e later ti#e re@(ire considerable effort, in the li#it involvin the relearnin of the theory. &*a#ples of this kind of thin #i ht be fo(nd in #edical dia nosis or therapy, in en ineerin practice, etc. 1 #ake no co##ent on the lapse of professional standards involved in for ettin the theoretical 7(stification; #y point is only to indicate the possibility, initially on the onto enetic rather than the phylo enetic level, of the e#er ence and s(bse@(ent disappearance of a theory, which however #i ht leave behind a trace in the for# of chan ed behavior. Lne #i ht say, to p(t it in the #ost eneral ter#s, that the or anis# had been obli ed to reach (p into conscio(sness to learn a certain > 31A > ade@(acy to its environ#ent, b(t that once this had been learned it co(ld afford to lapse into (nconscio(sness a ain. ,his association of the theoretical with the conscio(s is f(lly warranted by the root #eanin of the ter# -theory- as s( estin spectatorship. B(t it has been s( ested, by 8chrTdin er, that there #ay also be an essential link between conscio(sness and novelty, as in the e#er ence of chan ed #odes of behavior: /ny s(ccession of events in which we take part with sensations, perceptions and possibly with actions rad(ally drops o(t of the do#ain of conscio(sness when the sa#e strin of events repeats itself in the sa#e way very often. B(t it is i##ediately shot (p into the conscio(s re ion, if at s(ch a repetition either the occasion or the environ#ental conditions #et with on its p(rs(it differ fro# what they were on all the previo(s incidences. . . . ,he rad(al fadin fro# conscio(sness is of o(tstandin i#portance to the entire str(ct(re of o(r #ental life, which is wholly based on the process of ac@(irin practice by repetition. . . . %ow this whole state of affairs, so well known fro# the ontogen" or o(r #ental life, see#s to #e to shed li ht on the !h"logen" of (nconscio(s nervo(s processes, as in the heart beat, the peristalsis of the bowels, etc. $aced with nearly constant or re (larly chan in sit(ations, they are very well and reliably practised and have, therefore, lon a o dropped fro# the sphere of conscio(sness. +ere too we find inter#ediate rades, for e*a#ple, breathin , that (s(ally oes on inadvertently, b(t #ay on acco(nt of differentials in the sit(ation, say in s#oky air or in an attack of asth#a, beco#e #odified and conscio(s. . . . .hat #aterial events are associated with, or acco#panied by, conscio(sness, what not0 ,he answer that 1 s( est is as follows: what in the precedin we

have said and shown to be a property of nervo(s processes is a property of or anic processes in eneral, na#ely, to be associated with conscio(sness inas#(ch as they are new. . . . 1 wo(ld s(##ari<e #y eneral hypothesis th(s: conscio(sness is associated with the learning of the livin s(bstance: its knowing how is (nconscio(s.E1F 1f this is pla(sible)if it is the standard pattern of evol(tion to incorporate the conscio(sly learned into the (nconscio(sly perfor#ed)then one #i ht e*pect to find theory, the @(intessential for# of conscio(s (nderstandin , active #ainly at the frontier of science and technolo y. ,he @(estion now beco#es in what for# the theory leaves its traces behind it when, with respect to so#e do#ain, theoretical activity slows down or ceases. ,he practical effect of scientific develop#ent is as #(ch a chan e in the environ#ent itself as a chan e in o(r ability to (nderstand it or cope with it 2indeed h(#an evol(tion, in the sense in which the ter# is (sed in the precedin para raph, #ay have co#e to a halt precisely beca(se > 31" > of this power of adaptin the environ#ent to the species, th(s eli#inatin the necessity for the species to adapt to the environ#ent5. / reat deal of theory is already incorporated in the world, as it were hidden there so that people are @(ite (naware of it. ,he writer who (ses a pen does not need to know the principles of capillary action, the reader who t(rns on a li ht does not need to know the principles of the eneration and distrib(tion of electricity, and the case is even #ore ac(te in o(r habit(al (se of electronic devices, aircraft, and the like. /nd it is not only in s(ch everyday (tilitarian conte*ts that this e*ternali<ation and ob7ectification of theory has occ(rred; it is now @(ite co##on for che#ical analysis to be carried o(t by pro ra##ed devices, and it is clear that the navi ation of spacecraft wo(ld be i#possible if it were left to the astrona(ts, even s(pposin the# to have the #ost advanced scientific knowled e and observational skills, beca(se of the very co#ple*ity of the necessary observations and calc(lations. %ow it is, a ain, co##onplace to say that co#p(tin #achines enable (s to effect in a few #in(tes tasks that wo(ld take the (naided scientist cent(ries, i.e. which wo(ld be strictly i#possible witho(t the#; it is less co##on to ask what this si nifies for the f(t(re history of science. 1t see#s clear to #e that it #arks the end of a period, the period d(rin which the scientist9s conscio(s involve#ent in the theoretical process was indispensable. ,here are now whole areas of scientific research, incl(din #any p(rely theoretical ones 2s(ch as @(ant(# #echanics5 in which res(lts si#ply co(ld not be obtained at all if every step of the calc(lation had to be conscio(sly worked o(t by the researcher. 1n a sense, of co(rse, this sit(ation is new only in de ree, not in kind; scientists have always e*ternali<ed the inter#ediate steps, (sin pencil and paper as a pri#itive co#p(tin device and as a short6ter# #e#ory, tables of lo arith#s and constants as so#ewhat #ore sophisticated and lon 6ter# versions of the sa#e thin s. B(t in these cases the dyna#ics of the process was still provided by the brain, the se@(ence of steps had to be followed conscio(sly. %ow it is not at all (n(s(al to entr(st whole se@(ences to the co#p(ter. .e co#fort o(rselves with the tho( ht that the principles and pro ra#s involved in these co#p(tations are of o(r own devisin . 1t is worth reflectin , however, that the device wo(ld work, if b(ilt that way, whether we (nderstood the principle or not, and that, in spite of o(r protests that we are not satisfied (ntil we (nderstand, people have always been @(ite content to (se devices that yield the ri ht res(lt in i norance of their operatin principles. 1f everybody for ot the theory of electricity, enerators wo(ld still prod(ce c(rrent and li hts wo(ld respond to switches; the sa#e wo(ld be tr(e e-en if the theor" had alwa"s been mistaken . 1n fact electricity was co##ercially prospero(s

> 314 > lon before the discovery of the electron; the pri#itive notion of electric fl(id that deter#ined the ordinary lan (a e of the trade 2c(rrent, acc(#(lator, condenser, and the rest5 has lon since been abandoned, b(t it was that notion that presided over the transition fro# the idea to the e*ternali<ed reality. 8i#ilar points co(ld be #ade for any n(#ber of other theories. / response that invokes an ob7ectified and e*ternali<ed theory, e#bodied in whatever device, 1 call an automated res!onse . 1t is one of the #ost strikin feat(res of the present a e that whole classes of response, which at the hi h6water #ark of scientific theory 2i.e., in the first half of this cent(ry5 were calc(lated, are now beco#in a(to#ated. 1 have #entioned one or two e*a#ples; let #e add another strikin altho( h banal one. 1t was necessary in the early days of photo raphy for a#ate(rs to learn so#e ele#ents of theory)fil# speeds, f6n(#bers, focal planes, and the like. ,his is less and less the case: coded cartrid es, li ht6sensitive cells, and sonar take care of everythin , and all that is left is to release the sh(tter. 1 now p(t forward the spec(lative hypothesis that the !rinci!al utilitarian task of scientific theor" is to render itself unnecessar" b" ensuring the transition from the calculated to the automated . Lnce this is acco#plished, so that the condition in the environ#ent that once necessitated the theory is ro(tinely dealt with by so#e device or set of devices, the theory #ay conveniently be for otten. %ot, it #ay be said, by the people char ed with the #aintenance or i#prove#ent of the devices. B(t there a ain the theory is embodied in the device and its descendants 2cf. the (se of the concept of - enerations- in connection with co#p(ters5 so that for so#ebody also to know it is in a sense red(ndant. ,he notion of devices that #aintain or even develop their own capacities is no lon er #erely con7ect(ral. .e have not, in fact, for otten #any theories, apart fro# those that were s(perseded by better ones, and as lon as ade@(ate infor#ation6retrieval syste#s e*ist, no theory need be for otten beyond recall)so#ebody can always look it (p, relearn it, and enter into its point of view, provided that its lo ical and #athe#atical co#ple*ity is not too reat to be rasped with the brain capacity and in the ti#e available. B(t serio(s @(estions of a p(rely (tilitarian kind be in to arise when the n(#ber and co#ple*ity of theoretical propositions row rapidly with respect to the n(#ber and brain capacity of available scientists. ,hat the rowth of theory and the rowth in n(#bers of workin scientists sho(ld o hand in hand is entirely (nderstandable when we re#e#ber that, strictly speakin , there cannot be a theory (nless there is a head to entertain it. B(t if the n(#ber of scientists is li#ited they #ay have to choose which theories to entertain, and clearly those which > 31? > can be replaced by a(to#ated devices need not be dwelt (pon by h(#an bein s. +(#an bein s, in fact, think for the #ost part only rel(ctantly. ,heir evol(tion did not involve the# in tho( ht at all (ntil the co#ple*ity of the environ#ent #ade s(rvival i#possible in the absence of the kind of enerali<ed ability that tho( ht represents, (ntil it co#pelled sol(tion at the individ(al level of proble#s that had (p to that ti#e been solved at the species level. .e do not have to think in order to breathe, re (late body te#perat(re, circ(late blood, hear, see, or #ove o(r li#bs, or even 2parado*ical as it #ay so(nd5 in order to think. ,he devices that do these thin s for (s)l(n s, heart, ears, eyes, brain, #(sc(lat(re, and the rest)wo(ld if constr(cted artificially be considered to e#body prodi io(s a#o(nts of theory; indeed, the cr(de i#itations of the# we are be innin to #ana e are hailed as scientific tri(#phs. 'et they worked perfectly before any theory had been tho( ht of, and it is si#ply a #is(se of lan (a e to clai# that they do e#body theories; they work beca(se of the properties of their

parts, not beca(se of o(r (nderstandin of those properties. %ow as far as its operation is concerned it is a #atter of co#plete indifference whether a device happens to be rown or constr(cted, developed in the e#bryo or inserted into 2or hooked (p with5 the #at(re ad(lt. 1#a ine a race of bein s witho(t a sense of balance, who sent o(t #issions on heavily co#p(teri<ed bicycles rather as we send the# o(t in spacecraft. 1#a ine f(rther that so#e of their scientists, specialists in a do#ain known as the theory of balance, were to develop a device called a -se#icirc(lar canal,- a pair of which, fitted into the head of an ad(lt, #ade it possible to dispense with the co#p(ter when ridin a bicycle. 1t had been the f(nction of the co#p(ter to accept fro# special sensors #eas(re#ents of the bicycle9s deviation fro# the perpendic(lar, and to co#p(te the restorin forces necessary to #aintain its dyna#ic e@(ilibri(#, which were then applied by appropriate #echanis#s; now, however, anybody e@(ipped with se#icirc(lar canals co(ld 7(st hop on and ride off. 1#a ine finally that a reliable #ethod of reprod(cin and insertin se#icirc(lar canals were developed that co(ld be applied by people who had no ac@(aintance with the theory of balance. .hat, in practical ter#s, wo(ld be the disadvanta e of for ettin the theory0 ,he analo y sho(ld be plain eno( h. $or h(#an bein s to know theories, to be conscio(sly aware of their beliefs abo(t the physical world, is of co(rse an indispensable brid e between the lon history of biolo ical evol(tion, with its co#plicated devices, and what #ay be an e@(ally lon history of the evol(tion of h(#an6#achine syste#s, not to speak of syste#s for#ed of #achines alone. B(t the history of s(ch > 31= > conscio(s knowled e occ(pies a co#paratively short period of a few tho(sand years, towards the end of which we now find o(rselves. ,his is what 1 #ean by callin scientific theory an historical ano#aly; in the lon history of the ade@(ation of the species to its environ#ent the possession of theoretical knowled e in any for# (sable by individ(als #ay t(rn o(t to have been e*ceptional. 1t #ay be ar (ed that we will always need to keep theory in reserve in case the #achines break down, since the conse@(ences of o(r co#in to depend on the# in the absence of s(ch a theoretical safety6net, to speak #etaphorically, #i ht in the case of catastrophe be very costly. Ln this point there are two thin s to be said. $irst, we have already in practical ter#s beco#e irre-ersibl" dependent on technolo y; if a catastrophe occ(rred the costly conse@(ences wo(ld already have taken place by the ti#e the theoreticians had desi ned the new #achines. 8econdly, even if we co(ld for a ti#e s(stain this reserve of theory it is not clear, for reasons already s( ested, that it co(ld be kept (p in the lon r(n witho(t serio(sly ha#perin technolo ical pro ress. 1t is after all only abo(t a cent(ry since the death of Babba e, and half a cent(ry since the first f(nctional co#p(ter; the chief applications of co#p(ter technolo y to theoretical proble#s 2as opposed to co#p(tations that were not theoretically proble#atic b(t 7(st tedio(s5 belon to the last few decades. ,he decision as to what to re#e#ber and what to for et #ay be p(t off, b(t not for lon . Up to now it has been all ri ht for scientists to for et %ewton beca(se they know :a*well, or to for et :a*well beca(se they know &instein. ,his absorption of earlier theories by later ones in the case of science has often been re#arked (pon, in contrast to the case of philosophy, or of the h(#anities in eneral, in which earlier theories contin(e to be read alon side later ones; it has been e*plained in ter#s of the f(nction of science, which is to discover the tr(th abo(t nat(re 2so that it can be controlled5 rather than to concern itself with for#s of (nderstandin . .hat 1 have been s( estin is that when &instein is for otten it #ay not be beca(se we know a better theory, b(t beca(se so#e h(#an6#achine syste# can do a better 7ob of control. /nd this possibility is one that has to be faced s@(arely.

B(t of co(rse scientific theory is also a for# of (nderstandin . Up to now the develop#ent of (nderstandin has r(n ro( hly parallel to the pro ress of control, b(t there are several reasons why this #ay cease to be tr(e. /s we have seen, the necessities of control for which a(to#ated devices have been constr(cted already o(tstrip o(r private capacities, operationally if not in principle, and there are devices whose principles of operation are (nderstood by a few people only, perhaps so#e not f(lly (nderstood by anybody. .hat is #ore i#portant, how6 > 319 > ever, is that as yet very few people have entered into the scientific (nderstandin we already have 2which #ay already be ade@(ate for #ost h(#an p(rposes, tho( h as s( ested above new ones #ay co#e alon 5, and s(ch (nderstandin is s(rely a h(#an ood. 1n this latter sense 1 do not think of science as ever s(perseded, b(t in order to have its effect it will have to take its place where as theor" it has really always belon ed, na#ely, a#on the h(#anities. > 331 >

PART V1 SCIENTIFIC )NOWLE*+E1ITS SCOPE AN* LI,ITS

> 333 >

Pre&ace to Part V. Scie%ti&ic )%owled$e1Its Sco2e a%d Li/its

1n this part 1 revert to the knowin s(b7ect and the nat(re of his or her knowled e, be innin in chapter 1= with so#e well6known episte#olo ical challen es 2s(ch as the Iettier co(ntere*a#ples to knowled e as 7(stified tr(e belief5. ,he oal here is to arrive at a rob(st definition of 2scientific5 knowled e as a characteristic of the knower . 1t t(rns o(t, if 1 #ay so p(t it, to be an ability rather than a co##odity. ,he definition of knowled e iven in this chapter is already to be fo(nd in The hiloso!h" of Science: A S"stematic Account , b(t here it is #odified and stren thened. ,he other chapters in this part look at so#e enerally ass(#ed characteristics of scientific knowled e and @(estion their ade@(acy. Chapter 19 e*a#ines the ass(#ption, (nderlyin a reat deal of tho( ht abo(t the -e*act- sciences, that science has privile ed knowled e of @(antitative properties of thin s. ,he relation between the @(antitative and the @(alitative is however one of the least well (nderstood in the do#ain and 1 ive what is perhaps a new view of it. Chapter 3!, as re#arked in the preface to part 111, is #ore spec(lative. Celativity theory has lon been (nderstood to i#ply that known characters of ob7ects)partic(larly @(antitative onesB)chan e at relativistic distances and speeds, b(t a ain what that really #eans has not always been clearly tho( ht thro( h. 1n partic(lar what does it #ean to #ake an ad7(st#ent here in the properties of an ob7ect

there 0 Lbservers there wo(ld not have the sense of #ovin at a very reat speed relative to (s, any #ore than we here now have the sense of #ovin at very reat speed relative to the#. 8o what does -relative #otion- a#o(nt > 33A > to, in relation to o(r local (nderstandin of #otion0 ,he iss(e here is one that rec(rs in the last chapter of this part, and is taken (p briefly in an article that co(ld not be incl(ded in this book beca(se it is an entry in an encyclopedia, the 'nc"clo!edia of h"sics : -L(r perceptions and naive tho( hts,- 1 say there, -are adapted to the scale of o(r bodies, o(r days, and o(r lives; relativistic and @(ant(# pheno#ena have no direct bearin on the#, and bein e@(ipped to envisa e s(ch pheno#ena wo(ld have been of no evol(tionary advanta e.- ,he ter# -pheno#ena- is (sed in a loose sense here)strictly speakin , relativity and @(ant(# theory offer (s nothin pheno#enolo ical. 1n chapter 31 1 take (p the proble# of the self6enclosed character of scientific knowled e, another variant on the the#e of hypothetical realis#, and ive reasons why circ(larity in knowled e is not necessarily vicio(s. ,he final chapter is of a different order fro# the others)it is devoted to the work of a $rench philosopher of science and of literat(re, who saw as clearly as anyone has what is involved in the restriction of the i#a inable to the local and #acroscopic. -1#a inable- is (sed in a stron sense, in keepin with the #eanin of the cl(ster of ter#s in $rench b(ilt on this root; we tend to (se -i#a ination- to incl(de the havin of bold ideas of any kind 2for e*a#ple, one of the for#(lations in Science and the Theor" of #alue was -science is i#a ination controlled by e*peri#ent-5, b(t, like the ter# -idea- itself, it has lost in &n lish its close association with the vis(al i#a e. Bachelard stresses thro( ho(t his work on the philosophy of science that it is reason, rather than i#a ination in the stron sense, that ives access to the theoretical str(ct(res of science, b(t in doin so he #akes roo# for a different f(nction of the i#a ination, na#ely, a poetic f(nction, whose correlative stat(s to the activities of science is not stressed by writers in &n lish beca(se it falls for #ost of (s alto ether o(tside the do#ain of in@(iry. +e is one of those very rare practitioners of the h(#an sciences whose contrib(tions to the (nderstandin of the h(#anities on the one hand and of the hard sciences on the other are in a workin e@(ilibri(#, and he deserves to be better known to the profession than he is. > 33" >

<1 Is T#ere BScie%ti&icC )%owled$eD W#o )%owsD

,he title of this paper is co#ple*)it packs in several layers of s( estion by the (se of typo raphical devices. ,he first s( estion is that if -scientific- is an optional ad7ective for knowled e then if there is any knowled e)which is the @(estion at iss(e)then so#e of it needn9t be scientific. Lr, to p(t it the other way ro(nd, 1 a# askin the @(estion abo(t ordinary as well as scientific knowled e. ,he second s( estion, however, is that if the ad7ective -scientific- is an optional part of the @(estion at iss(e, then the two kinds of knowled e, scientific and nonscientific, stand or fall to ether: if there is knowled e then there can be scientific knowled e; if there can9t be scientific knowled e there can9t be any knowled e. 1n other words, to be scientific is a per#anent possibility of knowled e, if there is any. ,he third s( estion, takin -who knows0- in its collo@(ial sense, is that there is so#e do(bt as to whether there is knowled e or not, and that this do(bt isn9t partic(larly easy to dispel, so that one #i ht be

inclined to throw (p one9s hands over the @(estion. B(t the fo(rth s( estion, takin -who knows0- in a plain and strai htforward sense, is that the answer to the @(estion whether there is knowled e has so#ethin to do with the partic(lar individ(als who have it. &piste#olo y is the central discipline of philosophy, and every philosopher has to co#e to ter#s with it. ,he stakes are hi h. Cecently the very idea of knowled e as a reflection of the way the world act(ally is has co#e (nder attack fro# neopra #atists like Cichard Corty, who wish to disco(ra e (s fro# thinkin that we are ettin closer to the tr(th thro( h the efforts of scientific in@(iry, to enco(ra e (s in a kind > 334 > of beni n floatin in the strea# of c(lt(re, fro# which we cannot escape. /ct(ally, this pro ra# is rather appealin , especially in the later sta es of a decayin civili<ation, which o(rs #ay well be; at least it does nobody any direct har#, which can hardly be said for bo#bs and ind(strial effl(ents. B(t it ives (p too easily, and in #y view for inade@(ate reasons, an old hope that knowled e cannot only be reliably ac@(ired b(t also p(t to safe (se for the benefit of people who really need better control of their world. Lne of the thin s that has #ade the old standard of confir#ed scientific knowled e v(lnerable to the criticis#s of the neopra #atists has been its conceit, its ass(#ption 2or the ass(#ption of the people who tho( ht they had it5 that it wo(ld con@(er everythin , prod(ce the answer to all proble#s, be total or absol(te. 1t was no do(bt the risk of this Iod6like pretension that the ancient Gews had in #ind when they told the story of the ,ree of Hnowled e. B(t the fact that h(#an knowled e is li#ited hardly see#s a ood reason for tryin to discredit it alto ether. .hat we need is a en(inely #odest b(t at the sa#e ti#e st(rdy conception of knowled e that will avoid the e*tre#es of #e alo#ania and despondency b(t serve (s ade@(ately in the #iddle re ion between nothin and infinity, between birth and death)it is after all our knowled e that is in @(estion, not so#e abstract entity or s(bstance independent of (s. 8(ppose we start with this idea of what is in /uestion , and ask, what sort of thin have people tho( ht they were talkin abo(t when they (sed the word -knowled e- or its ancestors0 +ere 1 want to take the ancestors serio(sly. 1t is not always helpf(l to ask where a word of o(rs ca#e fro#, since that #ay have very little to do with what it #eans now, b(t there are so#e thin s abo(t the derivation of the word -knowled e- that help to et it in perspective at least. $irst of all the -kn6- at the be innin : this p(ts the word in a whole fa#ily derivin fro# a Ireek root, - no6-; 1 think of the# as the 6n 2or c6n or k6 n5 words. Lne possibly (ne*pected #e#ber of this ro(p is -noble-; the 6n shows (p in its ne ative, -i noble,- the two words #eanin in effect who9s known, and who9s beneath notice. /nother is -kin ,the kin bein in ancient ti#es wise as well as stron ; another is -c(nnin ,- a kind of low knowled e, b(t still part of the fa#ily. Ireek gnosis #eans a kind of knowled e of the sort that we #i ht call ac@(aintance, and indeed -ac@(aintance- is part of the fa#ily too 2call it a @6n word5, havin co#e via Katin cognitio , so#ewhat distorted by a passa e thro( h old $rench. 2.e have this Katin root in a less distorted for# in -co nition.-5 +owever there was another Ireek word for knowled e, e!isteme , which translated into Katin as scientia , #eanin in both cases not knowled e by 2cas(al5 ac@(aintance b(t caref(l > 33? > or serio(s knowled e. 1t is te#ptin to try to see a connection here between Ireek e!isteme and Katin

scientia on the one hand, and Ireek temno and Katin scindo respectively on the other, both the latter #eanin -to c(t,- th(s to divide into cate ories, to distin (ish)distin (ishin a#on the thin s with which we are ac@(ainted bein an i#portant step on the way to #ore ade@(ate knowled e. 1n this way the -sci6- of -science- and the -sci6- of -scissors- wo(ld be related and a point easily #ade abo(t the sharpness and e*actit(de of scientific knowled e. B(t this connection is (ncertain. 1n any case Katin scio , -to know- in the sense of scientia , rad(ally ave way to another verb, sa!io , ori inally #eanin -to taste- and th(s event(ally in its own way -to distin (ish.- Ce#nants of that root are scarce in &n lish, tho( h 4omo sa!iens is fa#iliar eno( h. /t all events we have a do(ble history here, whose two parts are however related to one another: beco#in ac@(ainted with thin s in the world on the one hand, and findin o(t abo(t the# #ore caref(lly and e*actly on the other. -,o know- and -knowled e- in &n lish carry both b(rdens, helped o(t in the latter case by the intensifier -scientific,- scientific knowled e bein an especially knowled eable kind of knowled e. B(t it is worth lookin once a ain at the word -knowled e- itself, since it has a co#ponent that does not derive fro# Katin or Ireek. ,he s(ffi* -6led e- see#s to co#e fro# Lld &n lish -6lac,- which s(rvives in only one other #odern &n lish word. ,he s(ffi* denoted a kind of action or proceedin , and it often had playf(l connotations, as in a#es. ,he basic idea see#s to be of a state or condition into which one enters which enables 2or entitles5 one to en a e in a certain sort of activity or practice, so#eti#es serio(s, so#eti#es not. ,he other s(rvival is in -wedlock.%ow a ain 1 do not wish to b(rden yo( with s(rpl(s ety#olo ical ba a e, b(t 1 have a feelin that the Lld &n lish were on to so#ethin when they assi#ilated knowled e to a class of activities incl(din at the ti#e dancin , fi htin , robbin , pled in 2the ori inal #eanin of -wedlock-5, etc. Hnowin is an activity, it involves skill and can be done well or badly, it can be celebratory or destr(ctive, it can co##it to conse@(ences. 2,here is a line in &liot9s -:(rder in the Cathedral- in which Becket says, -/fter s(ch knowled e, what for iveness0-5 1 #ention all this so that it will be vivid as we pl(n e into so#e of the rey #atter of philosophy. .hat have philosophers in fact said abo(t knowled e0 ,here is a whole history here and 1 will not enter into it b(t be in fairly recently. 8o#e ti#e a o it was a standard #ove in analytic philosophy 2that is, philosophy that en a es in the analysis of concepts, which all philoso6 > 33= > phy o( ht to do at least so#e of the ti#e5 to offer as an analytic e@(ivalent of the concept of knowled e the concept of -7(stified tr(e belief.- Co( hly speakin the ar (#ent was that belief is an attit(de we have to propositions when we think they are tr(e, and if we think we know so#ethin we #(st at least think it is tr(e; we #ay of co(rse be do(btf(l, reali<in that #any of the thin s we think tr(e #ay not be, b(t at all events we aren9t oin to offer as a candidate for knowled e so#ethin we think isn't tr(e. 1f so#ethin we think tr(e t(rns o(t act(ally to be tr(e then we9ll #ove it (p fro# the stat(s of #ere belief to the stat(s of the special kind of belief we call knowled e, and we won9t do this otherwise. B(t how can we be s(re that it act(ally is tr(e0 .e have to have so#e basis for this concl(sion, be able to offer a 7(stification. +ence knowled e as 7(stified tr(e belief. 1n 1943, in a very brief article in Anal"sis ,E1F &d#(nd Iettier blew this view o(t of the water with a co(ple of tellin co(ntere*a#ples. 1 #i ht believe so#ethin , it #i ht be tr(e, and 1 #i ht be 7(stified in believin it was tr(e, b(t it #i ht t(rn o(t that 1 didn9t know it after all. Iettier9s cases hin ed on contin encies and a#bi (ities b(t they were tellin nonetheless. ,he kind of strate y he (ses can be ill(strated as follows: 8(ppose 1 clai# to know that #y car is parked opposite #y ho(se. 1 believe this

to be the case, it is the case, and 1 have a 7(stification for believin it to be the case, na#ely, that 1 parked it there this #ornin . +owever, (nknown to #e #y wife (sed the car to r(n an errand at l(nchti#e, and she ret(rned the car to a sli htly different spot, still opposite the ho(se. 8o the three conditions are still #et; yet nobody wo(ld clai# that 1 know the ori inal proposition. 8ince 1943 a ood #any people have had a crack at this proble#. 1n 19=A Cichard Hirkha# p(blished an article in 1indE3F in which he clai#ed that no -analysis of knowled e can be fo(nd which is 2a 5 enero(s eno( h to incl(de as ite#s of knowled e all, or #ost, of those beliefs we co##only re ard as knowled e, and 2b 5 ri oro(s eno( h to e*cl(de fro# the class of knowled e any beliefs held in real or h"!othetical cases which we wo(ld a ree on reflection are sit(ations where the episte#ic a ent does not know the belief in @(estion.- 1f Hirkha# is ri ht)and 1 think he is)then either we need a new analysis of knowled e or we9ll have to concl(de we don9t have any. Hirkha# takes the latter position, b(t he says it sho(ldn9t bother (s as lon as -we re#e#ber that a belief or proposition does not beco#e less val(able #erely beca(se we can no lon er apply the 9h(rrah9 word 9knowled e9 to it. Lnly the discovery that it had less 7(stification than we tho( ht it had can ca(se it to lose episte#ic val(e.%ow so#ethin very odd is oin on here, so#ethin @(ite characteristic of so#e recent #oves in philosophy, which can throw li ht > 339 > on the co#fortably skeptical neopra #atist pheno#enon to which 1 referred earlier. ,he proble# is that nothin can be absolutel" nailed down, so fir#ly that it can9t be b(d ed by anyone)or rather that's not the proble#, since 1 don9t see how we co(ld possibly e*pect, knowin what we know 2and 1 (se the words deliberately5, that anythin ever co(ld; the proble# is that because thin s can9t be nailed down absol(tely, people tend to throw (p their hands and ass(#e that nothin is even appro*i#ately in place. ,his is so#eti#es called a crisis in the fo(ndations, and the position to which pra #atis# opposes itself called fo(ndationalis# 21 drop the -neo6- here beca(se it is cl(#sy and beca(se the old pra #atis# #ade the sa#e clai# for the sa#e reasons5. $or #yself 19# not too #(ch concerned abo(t fo(ndations; since Copernic(s we9ve had to et (sed to the idea of bein freely s(spended in physical space, and 1 think there is a lesson for the intellect(al do#ain in that. Pra #atis# in fact see#s to #e to be an essentially fo(ndationalist #ove; the sit(ation is like that of theis# and atheis#)as 8artre once said of an atheist friend, he was -a Iod6obsessed crank who saw +is absence everywhere, and co(ld not open his #o(th witho(t (tterin +is na#e, in short a entle#an who had reli io(s convictions.-E3F Pra #atists keep sayin that we sho(ld ive (p the old silly ways of talkin abo(t the differences between knowled e and con7ect(re, between facts and interpretations, between rationality and irrationality, and so on, th(s e#phasi<in the very concepts they re7ect. B(t if we can still #ake sense of the# there see#s no reason why we sho(ld follow this advice. Lne #i ht t(rn the tables and say that historically fo(ndationalis# was an essentially pra #atist #ove: there was a proble# abo(t certainty, and tryin to #ake knowled e fi*ed and absol(te see#ed like a ood sol(tion to it, especially when the #eans were at hand 2thanks to the belief in Iod5 to do so convincin ly. 8pino<a has as 1 recall an ar (#ent to this effect in his essay on the i#prove#ent of the (nderstandin . /t all events we are dealin with so#ethin we all think we have so#e of, with respect to which however o(r confidence has been shaken beca(se of devio(s and c(nnin co(ntere*a#ples devised by tricky philosophers. 1 see# to be #akin li ht of their work; in fact 1 respect it hi hly, b(t want to et it in the kind of perspective that the lively and even playf(l attit(de to knowled e we enco(ntered in Lld &n lish wo(ld facilitate. ,he kinds of ob7ection to the possibility of knowled e that 1 have already

o(tlined are s(pple#ented by ob7ections to eneral tr(ths in science beca(se of the skepticis# abo(t ind(ction that we owe ori inally to +(#e; this has led caref(l philosophers of science as so(ndly e#piricist as +e#pel, for e*a#ple, to ad#it that there are no scientific e*planations, only e*planation sketches 2beca(se in a strict > 33! > e*planation the e*planans wo(ld have to be tr(e and contain a eneral law, so#ethin that can never be known to be tr(e5. 1 think +(#e was ri ht abo(t ind(ction: we don9t, in the end, know wh" the thin s that o to ether in %at(re (lti#ately do so. 2$or co#ple* thin s we so#eti#es know it in ter#s of the properties of their parts; in the end, at so#e level, we can only accept the fact that the parts behave as they do, we cannot e*plain it f(rther.5 B(t that doesn9t #ean that we have to ive (p the word -knowled e- as correctly characteri<in so#ethin we have and can do. Ket #e dwell for a while on the philosophical sit(ation in which we find o(rselves. $or so#e perverse reason it keeps re#indin #e of an (nfort(nate 8cottish lady #y fa#ily knew when 1 was a s#all boy. +er na#e was :rs. Catterall. Lne of :rs. Catterall9s #isfort(nes was to discover in a local store, and to b(y, so#ethin that was labeled -(nbreakable china.- ,his was a #isfort(ne, in fact, only relatively to a second #isfort(ne: that of bein #arried to :r. Catterall. :rs. Catterall bro( ht ho#e her p(rchase and said e*citedly to :r. Catterall, -Ga#esB Lnly thinkB Unbreakable chinaB- -Unbr6r6reakableB- said :r. Catterall, sei<in so#e of the china and dashin it with all his force a ainst the tiled floor of the kitchen, where it (nthinkably broke. ,he point of this story, of co(rse, is that, while -(nbreakable china- is as a(dacio(s a desi nation as -certain knowled e,- :rs. Catterall wasn9t alto ether silly for b(yin it, only for tellin :r. Catterall what it clai#ed to be. .hat -(nbreakable china- #eant was that it wo(ldn9t break (nder nor#al or even ri oro(s conditions of (se, conditions (nder which ordinary cheap china #i ht break, not that it co(ldn9t be broken by a lar e and irate 8cots#an if he p(t his #ind to it. Lf co(rse there9s so#e hyperbole in the -(nbreakable- and if we #ade china we9d be disinclined to call o(rs that, 7(st as we #i ht be disinclined to call o(r knowled e -certain.- B(t in the places and (nder the conditions in which we have to (se it)b(ildin #achines, c(rin diseases, etc.)o(r knowled e see#s to f(nction pretty well and we don9t want to be told we don9t have it. /nd we #i ht feel, as I. &. :oore ca#e to feel, that the principles on which the radical criticis# of knowled e rests are in fact the#selves far less certain than the principles on which the knowled e itself rests. +ow can we characteri<e a kind of knowled e that #i ht withstand radical criticis# and 7(stify o(r reliance on it (nder nor#al conditions of (se0 Lne #ove is to concede everythin the radical critics want and then o patiently back to where we left off. Descartes was the #odern initiator of the radical #ove, which took the for# for hi# of do(btin everythin e*cept the fact that he do(bted. .e #i ht be asleep, he said, we #i ht be #ad, Iod #i ht be deceivin (s. .e #i ht be brains > 331 > in vats, so#e #ore recent thinkers have s( ested. .ell, s(ppose we rant that possibility: in o(r sleepy or cra<y or deceived or wired state we can still ask the @(estion whether there is a difference between what we know and what we do not know, and ask how we know the difference. /nd, (ntil we wake (p or et c(red or (ndeceived or (npl( ed, philosophy can proceed as before. /nother possible #ove is to re7ect any clai# for o(r knowled e that takes it f(rther than what is before o(r eyes, (nless we have caref(lly ar (ed ro(nds for e*trapolation. ,his was the ori inal strate y of

what ca#e to be called positivis#: ref(se to assert anythin yo( don9t positively know to be the case. 1t is very hard to do this, since the #ost ele#entary 7(d #ents abo(t states of affairs take (s beyond the i##ediate, and call for reso(rces of lo ic and lan (a e we certainly didn9t learn fro# observation. 8till we can profit fro# the idea behind the strate y. 8(ppose we resolved not to e*tend o(r clai#s to knowled e, in the first instance, beyond the kinds of thin and event we are directly ac@(ainted with, beyond the places and ti#es of o(r fa#iliar life, and then b(ilt very ca(tio(sly o(t fro# the initial clai#s towards wider ones, holdin o(rselves ready to #odify the# at any ti#e in the li ht of new evidence0 ,hat wo(ld see# #odest and safe eno( h. .hat wo(ld be wron with it0 1n so#e people9s eyes, 1 s(ppose, its very #odesty wo(ld be what is wron with it. .e want knowled e of the whole (niverse, and are te#pted to clai# it on the sli##est of evidence. 8cience see#s to do this syste#atically. %ewton adopted as -r(les of reasonin in philosophy- 2by which he #eant what we call science5 that -to the sa#e nat(ral effects we #(st, as far as possible, assi n the sa#e ca(ses,- and that -the @(alities of bodies . . . which are to be fo(nd to belon to all bodies within the reach of o(r e*peri#ents, are to be estee#ed the (niversal @(alities of all bodies whatsoever.- /nd these have been essential ass(#ptions for the develop#ent of science. B(t in fact, in spite of their sounding i#perialistic, they the#selves e#body 7(st the kind of #odesty we are lookin for: -as far as possible,says %ewton, -within the reach of o(r e*peri#ents-EAF )if it isn9t possible, when o(r e*peri#ents reach f(rther, we9ll be happy to chan e o(r #inds. 2%ewton has taken a lot of criticis# fro# antiscientists beca(se his view of science is taken to have locked (s into randiose and inh(#an clai#s; s(ch clai#s have been #ade by others on the basis of what he worked o(t b(t they need not be i#p(ted to hi#.5 1t did indeed look for a lon ti#e as if scientific knowled e wo(ld prove to be (nli#ited. ,he t(rn away fro# this hope has been partly d(e to a #is(nderstandin . 1t was tho( ht that the knowledge we alread" had wo(ld e*tend to the li#its of the (niverse; when it beca#e > 333 > clear)thanks to &instein and Planck and +eisenber and others)that it didn9t, this was taken to be a blow to science. B(t act(ally the discovery that it didn9t was itself a scientific discovery. ,he eneral point to be #ade here)and to be learned fro# the positivist pro ra#)is that we can9t 7(#p to the li#its and work back, we have to start fro# the #iddle and work o(t. B(t that was what science, properly (nderstood, always did. ,he paradi # case of scientific knowled e 21 (se the ter# -paradi #in its old sense, not in H(hn9s sense5 is for #e so#ethin that lies at the very be innin of the develop#ent of #odern science: it is Ialileo9s de#onstration of the relations between distance and ti#e for bodies #ovin in a ravitational field 2not that he called it that5. +e says he will find an e@(ation that act(ally describes what happens, and he does. ,he e@(ation #atches the behavior of the #ovin body; the behavior of the #ovin body #atches the e@(ation. .hat happens in Ialileo9s laboratory in Pad(a; the e@(ation he writes down he writes down there. ,he lesson 1 want to draw fro# this case is this: that in the first instance all knowled e is local . 1t involves a #atchin of a description and a state of affairs. ,he relation between the two is open to radical challen e)there #i ht be so#ethin wron with o(r eyes, we #i ht not be able to co(nt strai ht, we #i ht be brains in vats. Lr a ain we #i ht not)the clai# that any of these thin s is the case is at least as i#pla(sible as the clai# that all is nor#al. 8o we p(t that challen e co(rteo(sly aside and et on with o(r work. $ro# what is established locally we e*trapolate at o(r own risk, and provisionally. +ow badly do we need to do so0 .ell, that depends on the application we wish to #ake of the knowled e in @(estion. Perhaps we wo(ld like to apply it lobally)b(t what is the #otivation here0 This is where we have to learn restraint. ,here is a parallel sit(ation with #eanin , which ets

people into all sorts of psycholo ical diffic(lties. 1 learn #eanin locally, in episodes of effort or en7oy#ent or h(#an contact; forthwith 1 a# te#pted to re@(ire that the (niverse as a whole sho(ld have the kind of #eanin 1 have learned locally, that #y life sho(ld have it, that life in eneral sho(ld, or history, or h(#an strivin . .hen 1 discover that they don9t, 1 #ay co#e to think that the local episodes didn9t have #eanin either. B(t this wo(ld be a sad #istake)it is a sad #istake, #ade sadder by the fact that so #any people #ake it. / concept 1 have fo(nd (sef(l in dealin with these @(estions is the concept of what 1 call the -flat re ion.- ,he floor of #y roo# is flat; localities enerally are, or their declivities can be #eas(red in relation to a flat s(rface. 1 learn the eo#etry of thin s, the earth6#eas(re#ent, in the flat re ion. /s 1 now know)thanks to other people #ainly, 1 have to ad#it, and this is a point to which we will have to ret(rn)what > 333 > 1 learn here won9t work if 1 try to e*trapolate it for #ore than a few #iles; 19ll have to correct for the c(rvat(re of the earth. B(t that9s only if 1 want to talk abo(t so#e distant place while stayin physically here. 1f 1 act(ally o off aro(nd the earth in search of its c(rvat(re, 1 discover a c(rio(s thin : wherever 1 stop, it9s flat a ain. Lf co(rse if 1 can et off into space and look back at the earth 19ll see it as c(rved, b(t for the p(rposes of #y #etaphor that9s cheatin , altho( h we co(ld e*tend the #etaphor to acco##odate it)space is c(rved too, and fo(r6di#ensional, b(t however far 1 o lookin for that c(rvat(re, #y spacecraft will re#ain -flat- in three di#ensions. ,he #etaphor of the flat re ion applies to other do#ains as well. ,he flat re ion is where we are, locally, in the #iddle of thin s; if we p(sh to the ed es, to #icroscopic or cos#ic di#ensions, speeds near that of li ht, etc., the thin s we9ve learned locally won9t apply. .hy sho(ld we ever have tho( ht they wo(ld0 Up to a point, when we9d had no e*perience at all of anythin nonlocal, the e*pectation was (nderstandable, b(t that was a lon ti#e a o and by now there9s no e*c(se for it. 'et people keep e*clai#in over the fact that at the @(ant(# level thin s don9t look and behave like #acroscopic ob7ects. /re they waves0 /re they particles0 .hy can9t we #eas(re their position and #o#ent(# at the sa#e ti#e0 B(t waves and particles, positions and #o#enta, are thin s we learned abo(t in the flat re ion; off at the li#its we can by now e(!ect thin s to be different. &ven in lo ic and #athe#atics so#ethin like this occ(rs; locally, with ordinary proofs and other inferences, thin s work perfectly well, b(t when we p(sh to li#its of consistency or co#pleteness we r(n into self6referential or self6 descriptive proble#s. ,he concl(sions that are drawn fro# these alto ether e*pectable fail(res of flat6re ion concepts to work after we9ve p(shed in@(iry over the ed e re#ind (s a ain of pra #atist pessi#is# abo(t knowled e. Beca(se of +eisenber people wanted to throw o(t physical ca(sality, beca(se of ITdel they wanted to throw o(t lo ic. 1t is tr(e that the advocates of these drastic revisions enerally had an a*e to rind, abo(t freedo# or the inade@(acy of lan (a e, altho( h it also (s(ally t(rned o(t that they co(ld have ot the res(lts they wanted witho(t reco(rse to sp(rio(s technicalities. B(t they h(n tre#endo(s wei ht on what see# to #e fairly banal concl(sions, to the effect that #iddle6si<e people like (s, who beco#e ac@(ainted with the world in a #iddle6si<ed conte*t, don9t learn in the co(rse of co#in to ter#s with their #iddle6si<ed world all the refine#ents they are oin to need when they set off towards the very lar e, the very s#all, the very distant, the very co#plicated, and so on. Ket #e ret(rn to a point 1 #ade 7(st now, abo(t the earth9s bein flat

> 33A > wherever on its s(rface 1 happen to be. ,he eneral observation to be #ade here is that 1 regularl" take m" flat region with me . ,hat is beca(se 1 can9t #yself o very fast or beco#e very s#all or very bi ; it9s always the other fellow who is #ovin or distant, never #yself. 1 speak of relativistic #otion here, tho( h we could with a bit of perversity s(stain the view for local #otion)in the #ornin the University rolls in #y direction, at ni ht #y ho(se does. 8o#e #edieval thinkers, notably %icholas of C(sa, had e*actly the sa#e idea, which is the essential point of relativity theory, cent(ries before &instein. .e are fi*ed in relation to the world, always here, always now; where we are is always in the #iddle of the perceived (niverse for (s, however far fro# ho#e we #ay be. .hat does all this have to do with knowled e0 1 said earlier that in the first instance all knowled e was local. ,he point of the flat re ion analo y is to insist that the fail(re of a for# of knowled e to carry (ndistorted to the ed e of the (niverse is no ar (#ent a ainst its ade@(acy in the local conte*t. ,he fact that definitions of #ental illness, for e*a#ple, break down in borderline cases, doesn9t #ean that we9re in any do(bt as to the insanity of the patient in fo(r6point restraints. 8o we9ve laid down two lines of defense for o(r st(rdy local concept of knowled e)one a ainst radical, brain6in6the6vat type criticis#s, and another a ainst inade@(acy6in6li#it6cases type criticis#s. .e can now o back once #ore to s@(are one, this ti#e with so#e hope of bein able to et to the strai htaway witho(t bein tripped (p, and ask once a ain the old @(estion: what is knowled e, ass(#in it to be possible0 L(r Lld &n lish friends wanted to #ake knowled e an enablin or entitlin , an ability to en a e in so#e practice. Ket9s say, takin a hint fro# the 7(stified6tr(e6belief school, that the ability in @(estion is telling the truth . +avin knowled e #eans that 1 can tell the tr(th 2if 1 want to; nothin prevents #e fro# lyin , or fro# 7(st keepin #y #o(th sh(t5. 8o knowled e is an ability, in the first instance an ability to assert true !ro!ositions . B(t -tellin the tr(th- has a do(ble #eanin , not 7(st tellin people tr(e thin s b(t also tellin what is tr(e fro# what is false. ,his is the -7(stification- cla(se of 7(stified tr(e belief, and it will event(ally shift the disc(ssion to the concept of tr(th. :eanwhile, however, the Iettier ob7ections really are, as 1 said earlier, tellin in their own way; how sho(ld we deal with the#0 Hnowled e is an ability to assert tr(e propositions and defend their clai# to tr(th. -Defend- here #eans, a#on other tr(e thin s, a ainst the Iettiers of this world)that is, we have to be able to co#e back a ain and a ain to the defense when challen ed, (ntil we drop if necessary, b(ild in safe (ards a ainst accidental f(lfill#ent of the episte#ic conditions, and so on. /lso we #ay have to specify the kinds of knowl6 > 33" > ed e clai# we are prepared to defend in this way 2e*cl(din perhaps as not worth the tro(ble anecdotal assertions abo(t (nspecified #e#bers of ro(ps who have coins or tickets in their pockets, b(t incl(din certainly clai#s abo(t the re (lar behavior of si nificant classes of ob7ect in the flat re ion5. .hat this #eans in effect is that we #(st be prepared to 7(stify o(r 7(stification, (p to as #any levels as #ay be re@(ired; if the 7(stification breaks down at level n we will have to accept as a conse@(ence that the knowled e all the way down to level <ero is wiped o(t, b(t, at least for s#all n , we won9t let that happen (ntil we9ve tried level n Z 1. ,he series of levels of 7(stification constit(te a s"stem of the ade@(acy of the #ind to thin s, to (se an old for#(la, and the proposition whose tr(e assertion entitles (s to clai# knowled e of what it asserts has to belon to the syste# if the clai# is to be valid. ,his view ives incidentally an answer to so#e relativists who clai# that we are c(lt(rally biased in what we accept as scientific #ethod; a favorite co(ntere*a#ple to o(r so6called -.estern- concept of knowled e is a #ethod, (sed a#on the /<ande for deter#inin the tr(th in ve*ed cases, known as the

chicken oracle. ,he /<ande know a poison that is #ar inally fatal to chickens; to cons(lt the oracle a standard a#o(nt of this poison is ad#inistered to a chicken; if it kills the chicken the answer is yes or no as the case #ay be 21 for et which5, if the chicken s(rvives the answer oes the other way. /nd why, ask so#e self6critical .estern social scientists, sho(ldn9t the /<ande believe their oracle 7(st as we believe o(r scientific oracles0 ,he answer is that yo( can9t reliably ask the oracle to prono(nce on its own reliability 2that9s not the sort of @(estion yo( can p(t to it, since it is (sed #ainly to ferret o(t witches5, whereas scientific #ethod belon s to a co#ple* of ar (#ent and inference in which it is possible to raise the @(estion of its reliability, and of the reliability of o(r esti#ate of its reliability, and so on (p for as #any levels as yo( like 2not too #any, enerally, since the hi her6order @(estions have been debated by philosophers of science for whole classes of cases5. Does this whole edifice lie open to radical skepticis#0 Lf co(rse it does. By now, does this dist(rb (s0 1t does not. ,he (sef(lness of radical skepticis# lies in the fact that it forces (s to stare it down. ,he disa ree#ent between (s is not, as far as that oes, as deep as it looks. 1t a#o(nts 2to o back to the lan (a e of the article by Hirkha# cited above5 to a difference of 7(d #ent as to when it is necessary, if ever, to say -h(rrahB- 8keptics have a view of a philosophically perfect kind of knowled e; they think we can9t have it, tho( h if we did it wo(ld be worth sayin -h(rrahB- abo(t it; #eanwhile nothin else will do, everythin falls short, so we sho(ld stop clai#in to have an" knowled e. 1 a ree that we can9t have that kind of knowled e, b(t 1 think > 334 > that only a thoro( h oin Utopian wo(ld ever even drea# of havin it; #eanwhile it see#s to #e @(ite reasonable to clai# as knowled e, (ntil f(rther notice, whatever, havin earned its place in the syste# of 7(stification, enables (s to play o(r part in the tr(th6tellin a#e. Lf co(rse we9ll have to be sensitive to different possible #oves in the a#e, to 7(d e pr(dently how far o(t we #ay vent(re on e*c(rsions away fro# the flat re ion; in ho#e territory, however, we are entitled to a certain confidence. $ro# here there are several directions in which we can o. Cecall that ordinary knowled e and scientific knowled e were said at the be innin to stand and fall to ether; the kind of care science co#pels (s to brin to the for#(lation of o(r knowled e can be e*ercised with respect to any s(b7ect6 #atter whatever, tho( h there are #any cases in which it wo(ld hardly be worth the tro(ble. Lne thin worth noticin , tho( h, is that the nat(ral sciences on the one hand and the social sciences on the other res(lt fro# special care e*ercised on two different kinds of everyday knowled e: one of states of the world that are independent of o(r interest in the# and one of states of the world that are to so#e de ree created by o(r interest in the#. ,o this distinction correspond two different conceptions of tr(th. ,r(ths in one cate ory are accepted as s(ch beca(se they are forced (pon (s by observation: they obey ,arski9s se#antic criterion. ,r(ths in the other are forced (pon (s beca(se they are re@(ired in order to preserve the fabric of intelli ibility in disco(rse)they can9t not be tr(e on pain of the incoherence of o(r whole sche#e. ,hat this desk is hard or this roo# ill(#inated belon to the first cate ory; that it is :onday or that Gohn is a friend of #ine 2or even that he is Gohn5 belon to the latter. ,he person known as -Gohn- is not Gohn in the way that the desk is hard. ,he desk is called -hard- by a lin (istic convention, and hence by so#ethin o(r interest created, that is tr(e, b(t it is independently what we call -hard- 2and what the $rench call -d(r,- etc.5, whereas Gohn isn9t independently anythin called -Gohn- in the sa#e way; there is no property of Gohnness he co(ld have or fail to have and still re#ain hi#self 2tho( h after ac@(aintance with a social ob7ect we #ay be in to attrib(te properties of this kind, sayin , for e*a#ple, -Gohn isn9t hi#self today,- and so on5. +owever, if we do(bt that he is after all properly called -Gohn 8#ith,- we pose a radical challen e to the stability of the social str(ct(re, 7(st as if we do(bt that this day is properly called -:onday, Gan(ary 13,- we challen e the

whole worldwide syste# of na#es and dates. ,here is nothin abo(t this day, as 1 look aro(nd in it, to label it :onday, Gan(ary 13. ,he fact that 19# be innin a co(rse of lect(res toni ht is confir#ation that it is, since the first lect(re is anno(nced for this date, b(t the ali n#ent of earth and s(n > 33? > that #akes this day rather than ni ht, winter rather than s(##er, is s(pre#ely indifferent to #y lect(rin sched(le. .e have to do thin s to #ake days into what they are for (s, b(t we don9t have to do anythin to #ake the table hard, once it is 2that so#ebody #ade it #eans that its e*istence as a table is a social fact; its hardness however isn9t a social fact b(t a nat(ral one5. ,his distinction is (sef(l when it co#es 2as it often does5 to char es of the c(lt(ral relativis# of knowled e. 1t is in fact the fail(re to keep clearly in #ind the distinction between the nat(ral and the social sciences)a distinction that for several perverse reasons nearly everyone has been at pains to s(ppress)that has led to a lot of the conf(sion abo(t the possibility of knowled e. 1f we talk abo(t the tr(ths of society or history or any branch of what 8artre so (sef(lly called the -practicoinert,- then of course these chan e fro# c(lt(re to c(lt(re, fro# eneration to eneration, altho( h even in those cases there are so#e strikin contin(ities in the #ainstrea# fro# its be innin s in Ireece and G(dea (ntil o(r own day. B(t if we talk abo(t the tr(ths of science or nat(re then however different c(lt(ral formulations #ay be they prove in the end to conver e, to be intertranslatable. ,his cas(al assertion on #y part oes a ainst a whole recent tradition that casts do(bt on the conver ence of scientific discovery, on the ro(nds that there have been revol(tions, that &instein has displaced %ewton, etc. +owever, let #e repeat that 1 still have #y feet fir#ly planted in the flat re ion )indeed 19# confident 19ll never leave it)and the kinds of tr(th 19# talkin abo(t are not #e alo#aniac clai#s abo(t how the whole (niverse is b(t are the st(ff of the st(rdy local knowled e on which 1 rely when 1 o to the dentist or (se #y word processor. ,his is not a re ression to so#e sort of naWve realis#)indeed, it is consistent with a @(ite radical theory of perception)b(t it does involve the clai# that it9s pointless to ref(se the title of knowled e of tr(th to what has always co(nted as s(ch in o(r lon adaptation as c(rio(s and disc(rsive or anis#s to the local conditions in which we evolved. ,his view i#plies no re7ection of or even disrespect to scientists whose b(siness it is to p(sh in@(iry far fro# the flat re ion, towards bi ban s or @(arks, b(t it does)to repeat what has already been said) insist that diffic(lties enco(ntered only there need cast no do(bt on the reliability of local knowled e. ,his is the obvio(s point at which to deal with an ob7ection that has no do(bt occ(rred to #any readers. :y radical opposition of the nat(ral to the social sciences, in ter#s of their ob7ects as 2to p(t it s(ccinctly5 #ind6independent as opposed to #ind6dependent, #ay see# to collapse beca(se physicists have been sayin for a lon ti#e that at the @(ant(# level observation partially deter#ines what is observed, etc. > 33= > B(t a ain this is a proble# of a re ion of e*tre#e c(rvat(re, in which all that is available to (s in the way of clai#s to knowled e involves co#ple* theoretical reconstr(ctions 2(ndertaken, 1 #ay re#ind yo(, by #acroscopic scientists in #acroscopic offices and laboratories5. ,he parado*es that have led so#e physicists to posit one for# or another of an -anthropic principle,- accordin to which a condition for the develop#ent of the physical world was the event(al appearance of h(#an bein s capable of observin it, see# to #e e*tre#e cases of the disproportionality 1 have already referred to, han in lobal conse@(ences on s#all discrepancies. ,he discrepancies #ean, to be s(re, that o(r

present knowled e isn9t yet, and #ay never be, absol(tely and co#pletely and (niversally valid. B(t we ave that (p a while a o in favor of knowled e as relatively and partially and locally valid. ,his is not, however, to be interpreted in a #ini#al sense)on the contrary, these deficiencies are acknowled ed only o(t of a principled concession to #odesty. ,hey are #ar inal, not central. ,here is roo# here for a version of the old le al #a*i#, -hard cases #ake bad law-)li#it cases cannot be allowed to overt(rn principles established centrally. Lf co(rse this does not #ean that no other central principles are conceivable)that wo(ld be to play into the hands of critics like $eyerabend who want to #ake all received views into for#s of fascist oppression. B(t (ntil s(ch concept(al replace#ent act(ally occ(rs 1 want to concl(de that the flat re ion re#ains &(clidean, %ewtonian, ca(sal, etc. and that we know this as well as we know anythin . .e know it, 1 repeat once #ore, of the flat region , and it is o(r knowin it there that #akes depart(res fro# flat6re ion principles intelli ible, when we #ove in@(iry in the direction of the li#its. Classical physics #akes #odern physics possible. B(t this is ettin repetitive and that s( ests that it is ti#e to o on to a concl(sion. :ost scientific in@(iry in the history of the race has been cond(cted in the flat re ion. 1n fact the analo y with the s(rface of the earth is ine*act in its proportions, since we don9t really have to o very far before plane &(clidean eo#etry beco#es a bad basis for eo raphic s(rveys, whereas we have to o very far indeed before relativistic or @(ant(# considerations i#pose the#selves #ore than #ar inally. -1 norin second6 and hi her6order ter#s- is a standard and perfectly safe r(bric for #ost act(al co#p(tations. %othin in biolo y, and in practice hardly anythin even in che#istry or physics, re@(ires (s to resort to anythin other than nor#al science 2here H(hn9s ter# is (nob7ectionable, as lon as we reali<e that #ost scientists live practically as if the revol(tion had never occ(rred5. &othing a scientist can !ersonall" do oes beyond the li#its of nor#al science, only what instr(#ents so#eti#es do 2and (s(ally the #ost e*pensive instr(#ents)there is an e*6 > 339 > ponential relation between distance fro# the flat re ion and the cost of research5. &ven space travel, so far, has been entirely within the flat re ion; no navi ational co#p(tations for any spacecraft to date have re@(ired the insertion of relativistic ter#s. /lso we all live in the flat re ion, and it is o(r knowled e we are talkin abo(t. ,his brin s #e back to the last ele#ent of #y title. 1 want to clai# that there is no s(ch thin as knowled e in eneral, only so#eone9s knowled e, and that each knower)1 will take #yself as the paradi # case)has not only two kinds of knowled e of the world, b(t knowled e of two kinds of world. 1 distin (ish between m" world, which will die with #e, and the world, which 1 s(ppose to have been there before 1 was born and which 1 e*pect to re#ain after #y death. 1 learn #y world and carry it with #e; it is #y locality; it is, in #y #etaphorical sense of the ter#, flat, altho( h 1 co(ld probably distort it to so#e de ree, if 1 wanted to, by in estin #ind6alterin che#icals. ,hanks to the fact that there are other people in #y world 2the sense in which they are -in- it needs to be el(cidated by the theory of perception to which 1 referred 7(st now, b(t that will have to be on another occasion5 and thanks to the evol(tionary acc(#(lation of the knowled e they pass on to #e 2each bearin so#e part of it, or directin #e to ele#ents of the practico6inert on the basis of which 1 can reconstr(ct it5, 1 co#e to learn a ood deal abo(t the linea#ents of the world, at least locally, where it too is flat. ,hat the world is locally flat has in fact to be a tr(is#, beca(se -flat- for #e 7(st #eans confor#in , a ain thanks to evol(tionary adaptation, to local conditions. .hether 1 ever want to p(sh #y knowled e off in search of the c(rvat(re of the #ind6independent world depends on #y inclination; #ost people don9t. B(t 1 won9t be able to do that (nless 1 have co#e e(actl" to ter#s with the str(ct(re

of m" world, which is to a first appro*i#ation the local str(ct(re of the world. 2.hat we know of the world can only be str(ct(ral)there is no reason to think it shares the vividness of the #aterial contents of o(r worlds.5 /nd that #eans #akin so#e of #y knowled e scientific, that is, e*ercisin care in its for#(lation and attendin to its e#pirical ade@(acy and its lo ical consistency. %obody can do that for #e, altho( h 1 can profit readily eno( h fro# what they have done for the#selves, especially if 1 a# l(cky eno( h to have access to the# and it)which is e*actly what (niversities e*ist to #ake possible. 8o the @(estion -1s there scientific knowled e0- really has to be posed differently; it sho(ld be -1s any of the knowled e I have scientific0-)that is, have 1 cared eno( h abo(t e*actit(de and consistency to be willin to do the work necessary to #ake it so0 $or if there is to be scientific knowled e, if it is to s(rvive and have the > 3A! > (sef(l effects it is capable of prod(cin , individ(als will have to contin(e to choose to do that work, to attend caref(lly to what they know, to or ani<e and perfect it. .e o( ht not to disco(ra e the# fro# doin so by belittlin the possibility of knowled e. 1ndeed we o( ht)b(t with this 1 wo(ld need to start another lect(re)to et the# to pay s(ch caref(l attention to knowled e in do#ains not enerally tho( ht scientific: reli ion, politics. /t all events we sho(ld e*ercise s(ch care o(rselves, #akin o(r work in these do#ains at least co##ens(rate, in the level of serio(sness and responsibility we brin to bear on it, with the work of the nat(ral sciences. $or scientific knowled e, if it is not the answer to everythin 2and it isn9t5, does at least set a standard. > 3A1 >

!1 T#e Law o& ?-a%tit( a%d ?-alit(= or W#at N-/8ers Ca% a%d Ca%'t *escri8e
Ori$i%s
Before there was writin , any c(lt(re carried by lan (a e had to be trans#itted orally. People #e#ori<ed poe#s that incorporated the knowled e that was to be passed on to f(t(re enerations. / poe# is so#ethin made ?!oiein is -to #ake-5, so#ethin #ade with words and re#e#bered, not 7(st words (ttered for an occasion and for otten. %ow, we are acc(sto#ed to think, thin s have chan ed: there are te*ts and chronicles, and the art of #e#ori<ation has one al#ost entirely o(t of (se. .e don9t need it for the stora e or trans#ission of knowled e, and the old chore of learnin poe#s by heart in school has been al#ost entirely dispensed with. $eats of #e#ory, o(tside so#e technical conte*ts 2in the theater or in #edicine, for e*a#ple5 have beco#e c(riosities, (sef(l to intellect(als who are (ne*pectedly i#prisoned and need so#ethin to keep the# sane, b(t otherwise #erely freakish or decorative. 1t is worth notin , tho( h, that in fact there are still at least two poe#s that everyone who has the #ost r(di#entary ed(cation learns and re#e#bers. Kearnin the# indeed is a condition for participation in the literacy that #akes the old feats of #e#ory (nnecessary. Lne of the# is the alphabet, and the other is the series of na#es for the inte ers.E1F ,hey don9t look like poe#s, b(t on reflection they obvio(sly are poe#s: words that belon to ether, to be re#e#bered and recited in a iven b(t not int(itively

obvio(s order. ,he order is i#portant, and #(st be learned e*actly; later on it will seem int(itively obvio(s, b(t > 3A3 > that will be only beca(se it was thoro( hly learned before the concept of the obvio(s 2or not5 had been ac@(ired. ,he ele#ents of these poe#s have iconic representations, in o(r case respectively Co#an and /rabic) a si nificant detail, this, and relevant to the separation of the @(antitative fro# other predicates in o(r sche#e of concepts. ,he Ireeks and Co#ans (sed letters for n(#erals; in Ireek they were accented, b(t in both cases it was clearly eno( h (nderstood that the co#binatorial r(les were different as between literal and n(#erical (ses, whether ordinal or cardinal. .e however learn different poe#s and not #erely different r(les, so that they see# fro# the be innin to belon to different do#ains, #i*in the ele#ents of which creates awkwardness, tho( h it is easier for (s in the ordinal than the cardinal case. .e #ay identify, and if desirable order, para raphs, b(ses, telephones, postal codes, re istered a(to#obiles, etc., alphabetically or n(#erically or by a co#bination or alternation of the two, and be co#fortable with this, b(t the alphan(#eric notations so#eti#es (sed in co#p(ter pro ra##in 2s(ch as the he*adeci#al, which inserts / thro( h $ between the (s(al 9 and 1!, 1/ thro( h 1$ between the (s(al 19 and 3!, 9/ thro( h $$ between 99 and 1!!, and so on5 still see# int(itively stran e to #ost people. Lf co(rse it is not only alphan(#eric notations that perple*)so do p(rely n(#eric ones to bases less than ten. ,hat is beca(se the n(#ber poe# is a poe# to base ten; the se@(ence 1, 1!, 11, 1!!, 1!1, 11!, 111, 1!!! in the binary syste# wo(ld have to be read -one, two, three, fo(r, five, si*, seven, ei ht,- not -one, ten, eleven, one h(ndred,- etc., in order to refer correctly in ordinary lan (a e to the n(#bers in @(estion, and this strains the intelli ibility of the written characters. 8o#ethin of the sa#e sort happens with Co#an n(#erals)#ost of (s have to #ake a #ore or less conscio(s translation of :DCJKM11 into 14A? as we read it off, #(ch as we do with fa#iliar words in an (nfa#iliar script, Cyrillic for e*a#ple 2try readin -CCCP- as -888C-5. 8o far these considerations are p(rely disc(rsive)they do not bear on the properties these two syste#s of representation #ay serve to artic(late, b(t only on the e*istence of the syste#s the#selves, and the orderin and le ibility of their ele#ents, the letters and n(#erals. B(t it is evidently not 7(st a c(riosity that these syste#s sho(ld e*ist, and it is worth reflectin on what bro( ht the# into bein . Ketters were the iss(e of a lon evol(tion of #odes of representin what co(ld be conveyed in speech, pictorially and then picto raphically and then hiero lyphically. 2%o do(bt at the sa#e ti#e speech itself developed to e*press distinctions that had shown (p raphically.5 /t so#e point the connection between the syste# of representation and the content of what was said ave way to a connection between the syste# of repre6 > 3A3 > sentation and the sound of what was said. ,his reinforced a separation between disco(rse and the world that had be (n far earlier with the abandon#ent of any necessary connection between so(nd and sense, a #ove fro# #otivated so(nd ele#ents to #erely differential ones. .ith the n(#erals the story was so#ewhat different. ,hey see# to have been invented 2if ety#olo y is to be tr(sted at all5 in connection with a special social activity, the ac@(isition and distrib(tion of oods 2Katin numerus is connected with Ireek nemo , to deal o(t, dispense, thence to hold, possess, etc.; one

of the derivatives of this verb is nomos , #eanin a#on other thin s a law that assi ns lots and places to people and thin s, fro# which in t(rn philosophers of science have derived -no#olo ical,- th(s indirectly reinforcin the connection between #athe#atics and the laws of nat(re5. ,his activity necessarily involved on the one hand atherin and co(ntin , on the other dividin , apportionin and so on, and one can i#a ine the closeness of the attention paid to the si<es and @(antities of thin s in these processes. ,he concepts of #ore and less are attached to powerf(lly affective #odes of relatin to the world, involvin property and 7(stice, sec(rity and self6estee#. 1t has been noticed by ed(cators a#on others that people with apparently (ndeveloped #athe#atical talents #ay be @(antitatively knowled eable or even sophisticated when their interests in fair shares or s(#s of #oney are en a ed.

Two )i%ds o& Predicate

,here is an interestin difference in the (ses of these two syste#s, hinted at above in the re#ark abo(t ordinality and cardinality. &ither syste# can be e*ploited for the p(rposes of ordering , on the basis of the conventional str(ct(re of its poe#: we know that H co#es before K 7(st as we know that 11 co#es before 13. B(t the develop#ent of the alphabetic syste# oes in the direction of arbitrary associations of letters and se@(ences of letters with so(nds, and thence of the arbitrary association of so(nds with concept(al contents, that is in the direction of lan (a e and its -do(ble artic(lation.- ,he develop#ent of the n(#eric syste#, on the other hand, oes in the direction of syste#atic co#binations of n(#bers and thence of their syste#atic interrelations a#on the#selves; insofar as they are associated with concept(al content this re#ains e*ternal. .ords #ean by referrin to thin s in the world; n(#bers do not)they #ean only the#selves, tho( h they can be attached to and #odify the referents of associated lin (istic ele#ents. 1f 1 say -ten rey elephants,- the ter#s - rey- and -elephant- refer to each of the entities in @(estion or to their properties, b(t the > 3AA > ter# -ten- doesn9t refer to any of the# or even to all of the# as the entities the" are ; it refers only to the cardinality of the collection to which they happen to belon . 1f 1 had said -ten rey owls,- it wo(ld #ake sense to ask, of - rey,- whether it was the sa#e rey as in the case of the elephants or a different rey; b(t it wo(ldn9t #ake sense to ask if it was the sa#e ten, or a different one. 1s -ten- an ad7ectival property of -ten rey elephants- in the sa#e sense that - rey- is0 ,hat, in a n(tshell, is the proble# of the @(alitative and the @(antitative. 1t certainly looks as if there is a radical difference here: they co(ldn9t be elephants if they weren9t rey b(t they co(ld certainly be elephants if they weren9t ten. .ell, they co(ldn9t be ten elephants, b(t that so(nds ta(tolo ical. .ait a #in(te, tho( h)why not say si#ilarly that the only thin r(led o(t by their not bein gre" is their bein rey elephants 2they #i ht still be pink elephants50 &ven so we are te#pted to feel that the reyness 2or pinkness as the case #ay be5 inheres in the elephants in a way that the @(ality of bein ten does not; oin fro# ten to eleven is a contin ent and e*ternal #ove, re@(irin nothin #ore e*otic than the arrival of another elephant, whereas oin fro# rey to pink see#s like an essential and internal #ove, re@(irin a eneral #eta#orphosis on the part of all ten elephants. -,he @(ality of bein ten-)this e*pression so(nded nat(ral eno( h when 1 (sed it a few lines back. 1t wasn9t a @(ality of the elephants e*actly, b(t rather of the collection they happened to constit(te, which however #i ht @(ite as well have been constit(ted by pen (ins, neb(lae, or abstract entities. Call it a set: st(dents of ele#entary abstract set theory have to et acc(sto#ed to the irrelevance of the obvio(s properties of the #e#bers of sets as individ(als, to dealin with sets whose only #e#bers are, say, X%apoleon, and the s@(are root of #in(s oneY, or Xthe e#pty set, and the Kincoln :e#orialY, and to

reco ni<in that the cardinality of these sets, which we call two , is the sa#e 2and the sa#e as the cardinality of the set that contains both of them )and of the set that contains Xthe e#pty set, and the set that contains both of the#Y5. ,he @(ality of cardinality is so#ethin that only sets have: what it per#its is an (na#bi (o(s classification of sets accordin as they have #ore or fewer #e#bers than, or the sa#e n(#ber of #e#bers as, other sets. Perhaps 1 sho(ld have said, the /ualities of cardinality, since two is different fro# three and both are different fro# 1!1! . /t the lower end of the scale of cardinals 2it doesn9t have an (pper end5 these @(alities are !erce!tible and have co##on na#es: pair or co(ple, triad or threeso#e, etc. Lther na#es for n(#bers 2do<en, score5 are enerally s(rvivals fro# alternative poe#s rather than directly descriptive predi6 > 3A" > cates: applyin the# correctly nor#ally re@(ires co(ntin o(t. 1n special 2patholo ical05 cases the perception of cardinality can apparently o #(ch hi her: the ne(rolo ist Lliver 8acks reco(nts 2an e*pression that in itself reflects the overlappin of the @(alitative and the @(antitative in ordinary lan (a e5 an episode in the lives of a pair of idiot sa-ant twins in which so#eone drops a bo* of #atches and they both say at once, -111B- .hen asked how they co(ld co(nt so @(ickly, they say they didn9t co(nt, they saw . ,hey see#ed s(rprised at #y s(rprise)as if I were so#ehow blind: and Gohn9s est(re conveyed an e*traordinary sense of i##ediate, felt reality. 1s it possible, 1 said to #yself, that they can so#ehow -see- the properties, not in a concept(al, abstract way, b(t as /ualities , felt, sens(o(s, in so#e i##ediate, concrete way0E3F ,he choice of words here reinforces the s( estion that the rest of (s too think of small n(#erical attrib(tes as @(alitative, and that they beco#e properly @(antitative only when the n(#bers are too lar e to be attrib(ted witho(t co(ntin . 1f we now revert fro# speakin of sets as s(ch to speakin of their #e#bers, we say that there is a /uantit" of the#)b(t they don9t thereby ac@(ire any new /ualities . ,hin s et co#plicated, tho( h, when this habit of switchin attention back and forth fro# sets to #e#bers of sets follows the develop#ent of the n(#ber syste# fro# the inte ers or nat(ral n(#bers, in connection with which the idea of cardinality was first defined, to rational, real, or even co#ple* n(#bers. By introd(cin the concept of unit , which #akes so#e standard e#bodi#ent of a @(ality s(ch as len th or wei ht 2the standard #eter, the standard kilo ra#5 the sole #e#ber of a set of cardinality one , and specifyin a r(le of #atchin 2layin end to end, pilin (p in the scale of a balance5 that will enerate sets of hi her cardinality whose #e#bers will be (nits 2fractions of (nits bein rele ated to fractional scales, where the new (nits are fractions of the old: a tenth, a h(ndredth, etc.5, cardinality co#es to be attached by co(rtesy to other ob7ects e#bodyin the @(ality in different de rees. 1nstead of -lon er- and -shorterwe now have -11 #eters- and -1!.3 #eters,- which define whole classes of lon ers and shorters a#on indefinitely #any s(ch possible classes. L(r interest in -11 #eters- as a definin property of so#e ob7ect was initially, no do(bt, a desire to know what it was lon er or shorter than, or the sa#e si<e as, b(t -11- ca#e to attach to it as a predicate alon with -bl(e,- -soft,- - l(tino(s,- and whatever other @(alities o(r post(lated 116#eter ob7ect #ay be s(pposed to have. /nd before we knew it, o(r lan (a e was stocked with ratios, avera es, > 3A4 >

an les, te#perat(res, coefficients, dates, ti#es, indices, prices, and other n(#erically6e*pressed predicates as fa#iliar and (sef(l, in o(r co##erce with thin s in the world, as any other @(alities by which they #i ht be distin (ished fro# one another. ,he specifications of de ree a#on ob7ects sharin a iven @(ality, which @(antitative predicates #ake possible, have been available in so#e technical conte*ts for a lon ti#e, b(t their eneral invasion of daily lan (a e is relatively recent. ,hat the te#perat(re sho(ld be -in the si*ties- has of co(rse been a possible deter#ination only since the invention of the $ahrenheit scale and the eneral availability of ther#o#eters, i.e. since the early ei hteenth cent(ry. B(t a te#perat(re -in the si*ties- has nothin to do with the n(#ber 4! or the cardinality it represents, it has to do with sprin and li ht coats, while -in the twenties- #eans bitter cold and -in the nineties- intolerable heat. %ote that the e*pressions -in her twenties,- and -in his nineties,- coe*ist with these (na#bi (o(sly, as indeed do -in the twenties,- -in the si*ties,- and so on, as applied to the years in a iven cent(ry, b(t that these in their t(rn #ean yo(n and bea(tif(l or old and wi<ened, flappers and flower children, rather than anythin @(antitative. 1t is interestin to find that altho( h these latter e*pressions have been available for #(ch lon er than is the case with the weather, birthdays and calendars havin been #arked by cardinals for cent(ries, they were not in fact (sed (ntil abo(t the sa#e ti#e; whether it be te#perat(res, a es, or years, the first occ(rrences of the e*pressions -twenties,- -thirties,- etc., (p to -nineties,- are all iven by the L*ford &n lish Dictionary as fallin between 1=4" and 1==". 1t was at abo(t this ti#e, in 1=?= to be e*act, that $rederick &n els, in 4err 'ugen 2uhring's 0e-olution in Science 2co##only known as the -/nti6D(hrin -5, ave pop(lar for# to the principle, introd(ced by +e el and (tili<ed by :ar*, of the passa e of @(antity into @(ality. +e el speaks of -nodal lines- in nat(re, alon which incre#ental @(antitative chan es are acco#panied, at the nodes, by @(alitative shifts. 8(ch a shift is -a s(dden rev(lsion of @(antity into @(ality,- and +e el offers as an e*a#ple -the @(alitatively different states of a re ation water e*hibits (nder increase or di#in(tion of te#perat(re.-E3F &n els too cites this as -one of the best6known e*a#ples)that of the chan e of the state of water, which (nder nor#al at#ospheric press(re chan es at !]C fro# the li@(id into the solid state, and at 1!!]C fro# the li@(id into the aseo(s state, so that at both these t(rnin 6points the #erely @(antitative chan e of te#perat(re brin s abo(t a @(alitative chan e in the condition of the water.-EAF ,his -brin s abo(t,- however, is hi hly #isleadin . 1t ives the i#pression that te#perat(re is a property of water that is ca(sally re6 > 3A? > lated to its state: chan e the 2@(antitative5 te#perat(re, and the 2@(alitative5 state will chan e. ,he fact is that at the boilin and free<in points the te#perat(re can't be chan ed until the state has chan ed. .hat happens is this 21 will take the case of boilin , which applies mutatis mutandis to free<in also5: steadily s(pplyin eno( h heat ener y to water will raise its te#perat(re to 1!!]C; at this point s(pplyin f(rther ener y will not chan e the te#perat(re b(t will dissociate the #olec(les fro# one another so that they beco#e stea# at 1!!]C; when all the water has been chan ed to stea# then, ass(#in a closed syste#, the s(pply of still f(rther ener y will raise the te#perat(re of the stea# above 1!!]C. B(t if the process be ins at roo# te#perat(re it will take abo(t seven ti#es as lon to chan e all the water into stea# as it took to raise the water to the boilin point. 8o there are two thin s wron with the +e el6&n els acco(nt: first, it isn9t chan in the te#perat(re that chan es the state, and second, the chan e is not s(dden. /s 1 have pointed o(t elsewhere,E"F when water boils beca(se it is heated fro# the botto#, the chan e of a s#all a#o(nt of it into stea# #akes dra#atic b(bbles, and this is not a bad analo y for re!ressed chan e, which was one of the pop(lar

senses in which the dialectical principle of @(antity and @(ality ca#e to be (nderstood: history will acc(#(late e*ploitation and repression incre#entally, (ntil crisis and revol(tion s(ddenly ens(e. /nd this #ay indeed happen)only the @(antity/@(ality distinction has nothin to do with it. .ater fro<e and boiled lon before te#perat(res were tho( ht of, and when we talk abo(t -the boilin point- and attach a n(#ber to it 2note by the way that it is i#possible to measure the boilin point at standard at#ospheric press(re in de rees Celsi(s, since 1!!]C is defined as the boilin point of water at standard at#ospheric press(re5, the n(#ber by itself does not refer to anythin that is tr(e of the water, b(t 2as before5 only to the cardinality of a collection of (nits. ,his point can be driven ho#e in vario(s ways, Lne of the re#arkable and (sef(l feat(res of the e*act sciences is that @(antities can be #eas(red and the #eas(re#ents pl( ed into co#p(tations. ,he @(alities whose de rees are attended to in the process of #eas(re#ent 2or predicted by the o(tco#e of the co#p(tation5 are so#eti#es tho( ht to enter into the co#p(tations. ,h(s in the #ost ele#entary case of a freely fallin body initially at rest we have the e@(ation:

which #eans -the distance fallen is e@(al to half the acceleration of ravity #(ltiplied by the s@(are of the ti#e elapsed.- B(t a #o#ent9s tho( ht will show that this can9t possibly be what is #eant: ti#es can9t be s@(ared; only n(#bers can. %othin can be #(ltiplied by an acceler6 > 3A= > ation. ,he e*pression is only a shorthand way of sayin that #eas(re#ents of the distance, the acceleration, and the ti#e, (sin co#patible (nits, will yield n(#bers that stand in the re@(ired arith#etical relation. 1n the al ebraic e*pression iven above s isn9t a distance at all, it9s a variable that can take n(#erical val(es, and so for the other ele#ents. ,he coincidence of &n els9s pop(lari<ation of dialectical doctrine on the one hand, and the e#er ence of n(#erical e*pressions as descriptive in ordinary lan (a e on the other, s( ests that the latter paved the way for the eneral conf(sion represented by the for#er. .e can (se n(#bers to describe thin s, b(t (nless the thin described is a set or collection with a iven cardinality, they won9t be f(nctionin as n(#bers, 7(st as predicates to be defined in the ordinary way and eli#inable by s(bstit(tion. ,heir (se will he a #etaphorical (se. 'et in the last h(ndred years or so people have tho( ht of the#selves as ettin hold of a special n(#erical or even #athe#atical feat(re of thin s when they (se n(#bers in this way, a @(antitative feat(re at any rate. /nd when the n(#bers chan e conco#itantly with so#e notable @(alitative chan e we have all the appearances of a passa e fro# @(antity to @(ality.

Nota8le a%d A-st Noticea8le *i&&ere%ces

,he idea of conco#itant chan e 2-conco#itant variation,- to (se :ill9s phrase5 is basic to the scientific enterprise: we want to know, if we #ake so#e chan e in the world, what else will also chan e, so that we can achieve or avoid it. Chan es can be lar e or s#all, dra#atic or #ar inal. Iro(p si<es chan e by the addition or s(btraction of #e#bers, other properties by a( #entation or di#in(tion, intensification or dil(tion, etc., or by o(tri ht #eta#orphosis, one property bein replaced by another. C(#(lative #ar inal chan es, each of which is hardly noticed, #ay event(ally res(lt in states so altered that they re@(ire alto ether different descriptions. B(t this pheno#enon is conte*t6dependent and works on both sides of the @(alitative6@(antitative bo(ndary. 1f a lar e s(rface, a wall for e*a#ple, has always been red, b(t s(ddenly overni ht is painted yellow, the chan e is startlin ly obvio(s, b(t if its red color is #odified very slowly, thro( h an i#perceptible shift in the direction of oran e and pro ressively

thro( h li hter and li hter shades, (ntil finally the last trace of red has vanished and the wall is p(re yellow, the fact that it has chan ed at all #ay dawn only slowly, and then only on an observant witness with a ood #e#ory 2i#a ine the chan e stretched o(t over cent(ries, so that in any one > 3A9 > witness9s life it was 7(st an oran e wall5. Psycholo ists speak of -7nd9s- or -7(st noticeable differencesas a #eas(re of the refine#ent of perception 2si#ilar to -resolvin power- in optics5, a threshold below which chan es cannot be perceived, so that several s(bli#inal #oves #ay be possible before anythin is noticed)and indeed if they are #ade at s(itable intervals nothin #ay ever be noticed. 8o#ethin very si#ilar happens on the @(antitative side if the sets in @(estion are s(fficiently lar e. 1f one person is in a roo# and another enters, the chan e is obvio(s eno( h, and si#ilarly if a third 7oins a co(ple, b(t if forty people are watchin a parade, let (s say, the arrival of the forty6first #ay o entirely (nre#arked. 8till if people keep co#in , one by one, sooner or later we have a h( e crowd, a de#onstration, a tri(#ph)and when e*actly did this happen0 ,here is an ancient parado* called ,he +eap: a rain of wheat is set down, then another rain, and so on; event(ally there is a heap, b(t which rain was it that t(rned a scatterin of rain into a heap0 ,his parado* was pres(#ably intended to re#ain parado*ical)no e#pirical research was done, as far as 1 know, to find o(t when i#partial observers wo(ld start to (se the ter# -heap- witho(t pro#ptin . 2:y (ess is that fo(r rains, in a ti ht tetrahedral array, wo(ld @(alify as a very s#all heap, whereas if the proced(re were to scatter rando#ly over a iven area, say a s@(are yard, there wo(ld be a ran e of #any tho(sands of rains over which the stat(s of the acc(#(lation as a heap co(ld be disp(ted.5 ,he point the parado* #akes is that cate oreal bo(ndaries, for e*a#ple, between -scatterin - and -heap,- are f(<<y, b(t that s(rely co#es as no s(rprise and hardly #akes a very convincin fo(ndation for philosophical doctrine, whether #etaphysical or revol(tionary. ,he dialectical law of the passa e of @(antity into @(ality, like its co#panions, the law of the interpenetration of opposites and the law of the ne ation of the ne ation, is th(s seen to be an entertainin b(t nonessential red herrin . ,here are cases in which c(#(lative i#perceptible chan es in ( lead to the e#er ence of " , and there are cases in which they 7(st lead to #ore ( )and either ( or " can be indifferently @(alitative or @(antitative predicates; everythin depends on the partic(lar case, and can only be learned by lookin . /ddin ato# after ato# to a l(#p of (rani(# 33" event(ally prod(ces an ato#ic e*plosion and an assort#ent of vapori<ed fission prod(cts; addin ato# after ato# to a l(#p of old 7(st prod(ces a bi er l(#p of old. .ater when refri erated chan es into ice; iron when refri erated ets colder b(t doesn9t chan e into another for#. %o eneral law can be established that wo(ld be of any reliable predictive val(e; as in any e#pirical sit(ation, the correlations cannot be enerali<ed in advance b(t #(st be learned for each case or class of cases. ,hat solids will event(ally #elt on heatin , > 3"! > and li@(ids vapori<e, can be e*pected within li#its, b(t even there other for#s of dissociation #ay take place, and nothin whatever is ained by clai#in these pheno#ena as e*a#ples of the dialectic in nat(re. ,he contin ency of the relation between @(antitative and @(alitative chan e, its dependence on the state of the syste#, can be ill(strated by the followin tho( ht6e*peri#ent, in which / is a pedestrian walkin slowly towards the ed e of a cliff C:

C(#(lative @(antitative displace#ents of / in the direction of the arrow will lead to a dra#atic @(alitative chan e in his sit(ation at point C 2call it the -fallin point-5, b(t nobody wo(ld serio(sly think of attrib(tin this to the @(antitative chan e as s(ch, only to its takin place near the ed e of the cliff. ,hese considerations do not abolish the differences between @(alitative and @(antitative b(t they do s( est fresh ways of thinkin abo(t the#. 1n partic(lar it is not clear that they need be accepted as dividin the field when it co#es to deter#inations of the state of the world in vario(s respects. Both derive fro# #e#bers of a fa#ily of Katin adverbs be innin with -@(6,- all of which have interro ative (ses, whose for# was pres(#ably deter#ined by the verb /uaero , to seek, ask, in@(ire. 8o /ualis 0 fro# which -@(alitative- derives, #eans in effect, -1 ask: what sort0- while /uantus 0 si#ilarly #eans, -1 ask: how #(ch0- .e #ay think of this -@(6- prefi* as a kind of @(estion #ark, and translate /ualis and /uantus respectively as -205sort- and -205de ree.- +owever there are lots of other possible @(estions, and Katin provides for the#: 205#anner will ive /uam or /uomodo ; 205ti#e, /uando ; 205elapsed ti#e, /uamdiu ; 205reason, /uia or /uare ; 205distance, /uoad@ 205place, /uo ; 205n(#ber, /uot ; 205fre@(ency, /uoties ; 205n(#ber in series, /uotus , and so on. .hy sho(ld there not therefore be @(a#itative, @(anditative, @(aritative, @(otative and @(otitative in@(iries, as well as @(alitative and @(antitative0 /nd yet these last two are the only s(rvivors to have #ade it into o(r ordinary lan (a e, and this #eans, if we are to take /(stin serio(sly, that only one difference or opposition o(t of this whole crew was i#portant eno( h to be preserved. ,he @(estion is, what opposition was it0 1 shall s( est that it was not the sort of opposition that divides the > 3"1 > world into a part that is @(alitative and a part that is @(antitative, or that allows the transition of one sort of predicate into the other accordin to any law, no #atter how dialectical. ,he world is as it is and its states are a#enable to description on condition of o(r havin a s(itable lan (a e at o(r disposal; every ele#ent of every state invites the @(estion of what sort of thin it is, what sort of thin is oin on. Ket this be the eneral @(estion, the descendant of /ualis 0 to which the answer #ay be in diverse #odes: spatial, te#poral, ca(sal, n(#erical and so on. 1f the last a#on these rather than the others sin les itself o(t for special attention, why #i ht this be0

Se2aratio% o& t#e ,at#e/atical A22arat-s

1t sho(ld be noticed at once that so#ethin is slippin here)if numerical properties had been the iss(e s(rely /uot rather than /uantus sho(ld have been the root of o(r own e*pression. ,his slippa e indicates, 1 think, where o(r own conf(sion lies. ,he @(estions -what sort0- and -how #(ch0- are both re@(ired if the entity or event (nder investi ation is to be esti#ated correctly in relation to other thin s; both are differential @(estions, and the answers to the# provide the coordinates that locate the ob7ect in an array of types and #a nit(des: the first distin (ishes it fro# other ob7ects of different sorts, the second co#pares it with other ob7ects of the sa#e sort. ,he latter p(rpose, however, can be served in diverse ways)within a iven cate ory there can be #ore than one di#ension of variety. 8o a series of possible orders #ay be envisa ed, in which the #e#bers of the cate ory #i ht be arran ed, and for each order an ordinal si n #ay be assi ned to each #e#ber. $or this p(rpose we are not (nlikely to call (pon one of the poe#s with which we be an. /nd the discovery that if we choose the n(#ber poe# we #ay also be able to #ake (se of cardinality, and even perfor# co#p(tations that will acc(rately predict

so#e feat(res of the orderin in @(estion, will co#e as a s(rprise and a revelation. 1t is 7(st this for#al and co#p(tational aspect of the #atter that brin s in the @(antitative as it has enerally co#e to be (nderstood. Lne of the earliest discoveries alon these lines was #ade by the Pytha oreans, who correlated the ratios of len ths of stretched strin s with #(sical intervals. ,hey tho( ht this discovery sacred, and indeed it is hard to i#a ine the awe and astonish#ent it #(st have prod(ced. 1 s(spect 2indeed 1 re#e#ber5 that so#ethin like it can happen in childhood when ele#entary #athe#atical tr(ths s(ddenly dawn, b(t that is an e*pected step, an entry into a known do#ain, not as for the# > 3"3 > the openin (p of so#ethin novel and incredible. Pytha orean doctrine concl(ded that the world was at botto# numerical , which involved a cate ory #istake b(t nevertheless set the tone for a lon tradition. ,he be innin of #odern science was #arked by Ialileo9s resolve to #ake the -definition of accelerated #otion Ei.e., its #athe#atical e*pressionF e*hibit the essential feat(res of observed accelerated #otions,-E4F a scr(p(lo(s for#(lation that see#s (nnecessary to (s, beca(se obvio(s, b(t that re@(ired new clarity on his part. ,he co#parable clai# in his case was that -the book of nat(re is written in the lan (a e of #athe#atics,- which does not involve a cate ory #istake b(t does ass(#e a parallel between an intelli ible do#ain 2the book and its #athe#atics5 and a sensible one 2nat(re5; here also Ialileo was scr(p(lo(s and clear, tho( h his re#ark has fre@(ently been interpreted as #eanin that -nat(re is #athe#atical,- which brin s back the #istake. ,hese episodes represent steps in a process of reali<ation that reached its f(ll for#(lation with the ,(rin #achine: the reali<ation that all relations between e*actly specifiable properties of all the thin s in the world can be #odeled to as close an appro*i#ation as desired in lo ico6#athe#atical lan (a e. ,his develop#ent is reco(nted with reat perspic(ity in +(sserl9s The *risis of 'uro!ean Sciences and Transcendental henomenolog" , in which he speaks of -Ialileo9s #athe#ati<ation of nat(re,- and in a brilliant i#a e describes a tendency to -#eas(re the life6world)the world constantly iven to (s as act(al in o(r concrete world6life)for a well6fittin . . . arb of sy#bols of the sy#bolic #athe#atical theories.-E?F ,he s(ccess of this pro ra# of #eas(re#ent however leads to -the s(rreptitio(s s(bstit(tion of the #athe#atically s(bstr(cted world of idealities for the only real world, the one that is act(ally iven thro( h perception, that is ever e*perienced and e*perienceable)o(r everyday life6 world.-E=F ,he properties of thin s in the life6world are what we wo(ld nor#ally and enerally call -@(alities,and the only @(alities that per#it of direct #athe#atical e*pression are precisely the properties of sets or collections already disc(ssed; all the others have to be translated into sets or collections, thro( h the specification of (nits and co#binatorial proced(res. ,his process has been called -s(bstr(ction- by Pa(l Ka<arsfeld, independently, 1 take it, of +(sserl9s (se of the ter# 2cf. the @(otation above5; it -consists essentially in discoverin or constr(ctin a s#all n(#ber of di#ensions, or variables, that (nderlie a set of @(alitative types.-E9F ,he act(al carryin o(t of the process will involve distinctions between ranked and scalar variables, discontin(o(s and contin(o(s scales, ratio and interval scales, etc.;E1!F fittin the life6world with its #athe#atical arb is a b(sy and de#andin ind(stry. > 3"3 > Lnly sets or collections, properly speakin , can be said to have @(antitative properties, and these in the end will all t(rn o(t to be n(#erical)+(sserl speaks of the -arith#eti<ation of eo#etry,- of the

transfor#ation of eo#etrical int(itions into -p(re n(#erical confi (rations.-E11F 2,his clai# is no do(bt oversi#plified)there #ay be topolo ical feat(res, s(ch as incl(sion or intersection, that have nonn(#erical e*pressions, tho( h these wo(ld not nor#ally be called @(antitative.5 .hat are tho( ht of as @(antitative properties of other entities, s(ch as len th, te#perat(re, density, etc., are so #any @(alitative properties with respect to which however an entity #ay chan e its state over ti#e, or otherwise si#ilar entities #ay differ fro# one another. 8(ch differences are the#selves @(alitative, tho( h they #ay be iven n(#erical e*pression. 1t is i#portant to reali<e that, for e*a#ple, the difference in hei ht between so#eone five feet tall and so#eone si* feet tall is not a n(#erical difference, even tho( h the difference between five and si* is a n(#erical difference. /t every iven instant every entity is in the state it is in, with the @(alities it has. ,hese #ay incl(de vectors of chan e or beco#in . .hether s(ch vectors essentially involve @(antities)that is, whether beco#in involves at every infinitesi#al #o#ent a chan e in the si<e of a collection)is a @(estion as old as ^eno, which however need not be answered in order to characteri<e a #o#entary state. Lf co(rse collections #ay chan e their cardinality with ti#e, and we can over s(itably lar e ti#e intervals make other chan es into chan es in the cardinality of collections by choosin to represent the# n(#erically. 1n co(ntin and #eas(rin we have two ways of eneratin n(#erical predicates o(t of deter#inate @(alitative sit(ations. ,he n(#bers so enerated can be inserted into #ore or less co#plicated #athe#atical e*pressions and #ade the ob7ects of co#p(tation; the n(#erical o(tco#e of the co#p(tation #ay then by a reverse process be applied to a new @(alitative feat(re of the ori inal sit(ation, or to the sa#e feat(re of a transfor#ed sit(ation. ,he r(les accordin to which all this is done 2the eneration of the n(#bers, the co#p(tations, and the application of the res(lts5 have to be learned e#pirically, as Ialileo reali<ed; in this way a n(#ber of #athe#atical relations and for#(lae are selected fro# the potentially infinite store of s(ch thin s and iven physical #eanin by co(rtesy. B(t the #athe#atical work is entirely carried o(t within #athe#atics; #eas(re#ent shifts attention fro# @(ality to @(antity, crossin the bo(ndary between the sensible and the sy#bolic. ,his shift corresponds to what Braithwaite, in his Scientific '(!lanation , called the -separation of the #athe#atical apparat(s.-E13F > 3"A >

?-alitati'e a%d ?-a%titati'e Re'isited

O(alitative and @(antitative do not divide (p a territory; they both cover it, overlappin al#ost totally. B(t one is basic and the other optional. &verythin in o(r world is @(alitative; b(t virt(ally everythin is capable) iven s(itable in en(ity on o(r part)of eneratin @(antitative deter#inations. .hether we want to e*pend o(r in en(ity in this way is (p to (s. ,he United 8tates B(rea( of the Cens(s, whose #ain b(siness #i ht see# to be @(antitative, has nevertheless an interest in @(estions of -the @(ality of life,- and has devoted a ood deal of attention to efforts that have been #ade to translate e*pressions of satisfaction or dissatisfaction into n(#erical #eas(res. ,he standard trick is to develop an ordinal rankin and then assi n cardinal val(es to the positions within it for the p(rpose of drawin raphs, perfor#in statistical co#p(tations, etc. ,he 81.B scale, for e*a#ple 2the initials stand for 8ocial 1ndicators of .ell6Bein 5, assi ns the inte ers i thro( h ? to -terrible,- -(nhappy,- -#ostly dissatisfied,- -#i*ed,- -#ostly satisfied,- -#ostly pleased,- and -deli hted.-E13F Lne possible (se of the res(lts of in@(iries on s(ch bases 2or i#proved ones)the Cens(s people see# realistically aware of the shortco#in s in the state of their art5 #i ht be to prod(ce correlations between these #eas(res and @(antities that per#it of ob7ective assess#ent, s(ch as inco#e, ener y cons(#ption, c(bic feet of livin space, n(#ber and horsepower of a(to#obiles, etc. ,hese #i ht

throw li ht on so#e aspects of o(r co##on syste#s of val(e. B(t it is worth notin that the startin 6 point here is not an e*peri#ental proced(re b(t an appeal to the 7(d #ent of an individ(al. ,he individ(al does not need the @(antitative apparat(s, only in the first instance an awareness that better or worse conditions are possible, and a s(b7ective conviction of distress or e(phoria as the case #ay be. ,his is what 1 #ean by sayin that the @(antitative is optional: o(r lives wo(ld be in so#e i#portant respects 7(st what they are if we did not know the date or the ti#e or the te#perat(re, or perhaps even o(r a es or bank balances or 1O9s or cholesterol co(nts. 1n so#e si nificant respects they #i ht be better. 1 do not #ean this as a re ressive criticis# of #eas(re#ent or co#p(tation, witho(t which we wo(ld be at the #ercy of old forces fro# which they have helped to deliver (s, b(t rather as a co##ent on the (se of the #etaphorical lan (a e of n(#ber. ,he $rench (sed to #ake f(n of to(rists who insistently wanted to know the pop(lation of this city, the hei ht of that b(ildin , by callin the# hommes chiffres , -n(#ber people.- 1t is worth askin what (se is to be #ade of n(#erical infor#ation. 8o#eti#es n(#bers are reas6 > 3"" > s(rin or threatenin , as when they #ean that 1 can e*pect to live a lon ti#e, or that 1 r(n s(ch and s(ch a risk of havin a certain sort of accident. 8o#eti#es they ive #e a sense of solidarity with a co##(nity, so#eti#es a sense of inferiority or s(periority. 8o#eti#es there is an effect of scale, as when the n(#bers of people killed at +iroshi#a or in the +oloca(st bo le the i#a ination) en(ine cases, perhaps, of a !s"chological transfor#ation of @(antity into @(ality 2and with nothin #etaphorical abo(t the n(#bers either5. B(t in every case, even these, 1 or other individ(als #(st prosper or s(ffer sin ly. ,he @(ality of pain or terror or despair involved in a @(ite private in7(ry or death or betrayal #ay #atch anythin any individ(al can feel or have felt in a #ass event. ,he val(e of en(inely collective #eas(res)a re ates, avera es, and the like)re#ains (n@(estioned, b(t the @(estion as to role of n(#erical deter#inations in the descriptive vocab(lary re#ains open. Part of #y ar (#ent has been that when these co#e abo(t as a res(lt of #eas(re#ents they are to be (nderstood not as @(antities b(t as dis (ised @(alities. ,heir (se as s(ch has drawbacks as well as advanta es. ,here is a short story of +e#in way9s, -/ Day9s .ait,- that #ay serve as a closin ill(stration. /n /#erican child who has lived in $rance falls ill, and overhears the doctor tellin his father that he has a te#perat(re of 1!3], (pon which he withdraws into hi#self, stares at the foot of the bed, and won9t let people near hi#. Lnly at the end of the day does it dawn on his father that he takes this 1!3 to be in de rees Celsi(s, a scale on which he has been led to believe a te#perat(re of AA] to be s(rely fatal, and that he has been @(ietly preparin for death. ,he story ends on a happy ira shaky note. B(t in a world where pl(n es in the stock #arket inde* have been known to provoke pl(n es fro# hi h windows there #ay be roo# for the renewed c(ltivation of @(ality (n#ediated by @(antity, leavin the @(antities to do their (ndeniably (sef(l work in their proper do#ain. > 3"4 >

6>1 O% 3ei%$ i% t#e Sa/e Place at t#e Sa/e Ti/e

-%obody has ever noticed a place e*cept at a ti#e,- says :inkowski, -or a ti#e e*cept at a place.-E1F Lne #i ht add, -and nobody has ever noticed a place e*cept here , or a ti#e e*cept now .- .ith this addition, what was #eant as an innocent ar (#ent for the interdependence of space and ti#e beco#es

a serio(s obstacle to all cos#olo ies in the traditional sense. ,his paper is an atte#pt to draw o(t so#e of the philosophical conse@(ences of the fact that the observer #(st always be located here and now. 1t is a co##entary on so#e aspects of the theory of relativity which see# still, after half a cent(ry, to be #is(nderstood. ,he @(otation fro# :inkowski is taken fro# his paper on space and ti#e in which he introd(ces the !ostulate of the absolute world : -the s(bstance at any world6point #ay always, with the appropriate deter#ination of space and ti#e, be looked (pon as at rest.- +is decision to (se the ter# -absol(te- to describe the fo(r6di#ensional world of space6ti#e see#s c(rio(s, since the theory which led to this view of the world was a theory which pro#ised freedo# fro# absol(tes and their replace#ent by relativistic deter#inations, b(t it ill(strates 7(st that a#bivalence in the theory of relativity with which this paper will be concerned. ,he loss of absol(te rest and #otion in absol(te space and ti#e was a serio(s shock to physics, co#parable to the loss 2in #ore recent develop#ents5 of certain aspects of conservation and sy##etry; in both cases the i##ediate reaction was to look for so#e way of restorin , in a sli htly #odified for#, what had beco#e psycholo ically indispensable. 1n the relativistic case the new version appeared to be even better than the old; the effect of :inkowski9s world6post(late is, > 3"? > as Cassirer points o(t, that -the world of physics chan es fro# a !rocess in a three6di#ensional world into a being in this fo(r6di#ensional world.-E3F ,he world6post(late has its first and #ost obvio(s application at the place and ti#e where the observer happens to be, b(t it was of co(rse ass(#ed that it #i ht be applied e@(ally well anywhere else in the (niverse. ,he observer #ay be considered at rest, b(t then for p(rposes of ar (#ent any other point #ay 7(st as well be considered at rest. 1n fact, however, considerin other points as at rest is only a a#e)for serio(s scientific p(rposes the observer must be considered at rest. ,here is no s(ch thin as a #ovin observer. ,his concl(sion was foreseen by as early a thinker as %icholas of C(sa. -/s it will always see# to the observer,- he says, -whether he be on the earth, or on the s(n or on another star, that he is the /uasi 6#otionless center and that all the other thin s are in #otion, he will certainly deter#ine the poles of this #otion in relation to hi#self. ,h(s the fabric of the world will /uasi have its center everywhere and its circ(#ference nowhere.-E3F ,he last sentence is as s(ccinct a state#ent of the theory of relativity as co(ld easily be fo(nd. $or C(sa the @(iescence of the observer poses no proble#, b(t that is beca(se he too believes in an absol(te, na#ely, Iod, in who# all opposites are reconciled)#otion and rest, center and circ(#ference, #a*i#(# and #ini#(#. /pparent contradictions are tolerable when there is a divine (arantee of their (lti#ate resol(tion. B(t s(ch #ystical reso(rces are no lon er available to (s, and the denial of the possibility of a #ovin observer)the clai# that s(ch a bein is a contradiction in ter#s)is intended here as so#ethin #ore than an e*e#plary parado*. ,he assertion appears parado*ical, in fact, only beca(se we are all conditioned to %ewtonian #odes of tho( ht. 1n a ho#o eneo(s three6di#ensional (niverse all vanta e points will be e@(ivalent, and #otion fro# one to another is possible witho(t any distortion of pheno#ena. ,o p(t the sa#e thin in another way, observers are interchan eable. /nd in the %ewtonian syste# Iod is over all, the enerali<ed observer whose o#nipresence is a (arantee of the (niversality of the laws of #otion. &very %ewtonian observer co(ld take Iod9s point of view 2i.e., any point of view re#oved fro# his or her own5 and fro# it re ard the world, observer incl(ded, sub s!ecie aeternitatis . ,he reference to 8pino<a is deliberate; %ewtonian #echanics was a physical co(nterpart of 8pino<a9s ethics, and each rested on the possibility of seein the world in Iod. Unfort(nately a belief in this possibility has persisted; altho( h conte#porary scientists wo(ld hardly describe it in @(ite that way, #any of the#

feel that the task of science is to ive an acco(nt of the world which shall be independent of any partic(lar perspective, B(t this is @(ite i#possible. > 3"= > ,he reason why the theory of relativity was widely tho( ht to provide another absol(te acco(nt was that it did in fact offer a for#(lation of the laws of nat(re invariant between observers, whatever their state of #otion with respect to one another. 21t is to be re#e#bered that it is always the other observer who is #ovin .5 Kaws of nat(re had always been tho( ht of as r(les obeyed by the (niverse as a whole, and an invariant for#(lation of the# was taken to be a new and #ore co#pendio(s way of sayin what the (niverse, as a whole, was like. B(t with the new theory ca#e a new insi ht into the nat(re of scientific law. / law 2and this is by now so fa#iliar that it see#s hardly worth repeatin 5 is si#ply a enerali<ed relationship between observations, each #ade at a partic(lar ti#e and at a partic(lar place; and the invariance of a for#(lation of s(ch a law #eans si#ply that it can be applied to sets of observations taken in different ti#es and places with e@(al s(ccess. B(t these observations can never be #i*ed, and if we wish to insert data fro# an observation at A _ into calc(lations based on observations #ade at A , they will first have to be transfor#ed accordin to so#e set of transfor#ation e@(ations appropriate to the shift fro# A _ to A . ,here is no law which is capable of application to the (niverse as a whole. 8(ch a law, if it e*isted, wo(ld in any case be far too powerf(l for any practical p(rposes. ,he f(nction of laws is to provide e*planations, and there is only one world which calls for e*planation, na#ely, #y own world. 1t wo(ld be pres(#pt(o(s to s(ppose that that constit(tes #ore than an insi nificant fra #ent of the world as a whole. 1n #y world 1 a# always at rest. Lther bodies #ove abo(t, and 1 et infor#ation abo(t their #ove#ents fro# observations #ade, as always, here and now; the lar er their velocity with respect to #e, the odder the transfor#ations they (nder o)increases in wei ht, the speedin (p of ti#e, the contraction of len ths, etc. 1 sho(ld find s(ch chan es e*tre#ely inconvenient, and it is fort(nate that 1 a# not called (pon to e*perience the#. 1t is not that 1 do not #ove fast eno( h, b(t that 1 do not #ove at all 2for the relativistic effects of s#all velocities are only @(antitatively different fro# those of lar e velocities, and are e@(ally inad#issible5. 1 #ay et reports fro# other observers who are in #otion relative to #e, b(t 1 do not accept the# (ntil they have been transfor#ed accordin to the e@(ations #entioned above. Lddly eno( h, these reports never #ake any reference to the inconvenient conse@(ences of #otion fro# which 1 con rat(late #yself on bein preserved; these appear only if 1 #ake observations fro# #y own point of view on the physical syste# of the other observer re arded now not as an observer, b(t as an ob7ect of observation. Lccasionally, it is tr(e, other observers attrib(te to me ano#alo(s states of #otion, etc., b(t > 3"9 > these attrib(tions are contradicted by #y e*perience and are soon corrected by applyin the appropriate transfor#ation e@(ation. ,hese considerations brin (p in a novel for# the whole @(estion of the relationship of theory to observation. 1n theory, theoretical observers #ay be in #otion; one well6known cos#olo ical theory refers in fact to f(nda#ental observers #ovin o(twards fro# a point of #(t(al ori in in s(ch a way that none of the# is at rest. 8(ch theories are, however, p(rely hypothetical, and they have nothin to do with the real world e*cept insofar as their conse@(ences are pro7ected (pon the real world. ,o @(ote :inkowski a ain, -only the fo(r di#ensional world in space and ti#e is iven by pheno#ena, b(t . . . the pro7ection in space and in ti#e #ay still be (ndertaken with a certain de ree of freedo#.-EAF ,o say

that the fo(r di#ensional world is gi-en by pheno#ena is, however, to (se the ter# - iven- in a special sense, since a co#ple* process of reasonin separates the concl(sion that the world is fo(r di#ensional fro# the observational evidence for it. /ccordin to #ore fa#iliar (sa e, what is iven by pheno#ena is what has to be e*plained, and this is done by takin a pro7ection of a theory which is precisely not iven by pheno#ena, b(t which is freely constr(cted by the scientific i#a ination. $or an observer at 2($ "$ =$ t 5 a theory is confir#ed if its pro7ection at 2($ "$ =$ t 5 a rees with observations #ade there, i.e. if it satisfies the bo(ndary conditions at 2($ "$ =.$ t 5. 1t is the possibility of different pro7ections of the sa#e theory, accordin to the different space6ti#e sit(ations of different observers, which :inkowski asserts in the passa e @(oted. B(t the real world can never be the world of theory; only parts of the real world #ay coincide #ore or less e*actly with parts of the world of theory when the latter are s(b#itted to bo(ndary conditions. /nd this i#position of bo(ndary conditions has to be done afresh every ti#e an observer #akes an observation. Cetrospectively, the fit of theory to the real world is re#arkably ood, on acco(nt of the fact that 2at least in principle5 those ele#ents of theory which do not fit are discarded. B(t every f(t(re application of theory, even of a theory which has proved itself witho(t e*ception in the past, has to be validated at the ti#e when it is #ade. 8(ch validated bits and pieces of theory re#ain, nevertheless, the best way of raspin the real world as it presents itself to #e in bits and pieces; for #y e*perience, while it validates theory co nitively, validates reality e*istentially. -,he world can not e*ist,- says 8artre, witho(t a (nivocal orientation in relation to #e. 1dealis# has ri htly insisted on the fact that relation #akes the world. B(t since idealis# took > 34! > its position on the ro(nd of %ewtonian science, it conceived this relation as a relation of reciprocity. ,h(s it attained only abstract concepts of p(re e*teriority, of action and reaction, etc., and d(e to this very fact it #issed the world and s(cceeded only in #akin e*plicit the li#itin concept of absol(te ob7ectivity. ,his concept in short a#o(nted to that of a -desert world - or of -a world witho(t #en-; that is too a contradiction, since it is thro( h h(#an reality that there is a world. ,h(s the concept of ob7ectivity, which ai#ed at replacin the in6itself of do #atic tr(th by a p(re relation of reciprocal a ree#ent between representations, is self6destr(ctive if p(shed to the li#it.E"F ,his wo(ld still be tr(e philosophically even if o(r world were really %ewtonian, b(t in that case a self6 consistent theory of !h"sical ob7ectivity wo(ld be possible, and a (sef(l reinforce#ent of the philosophical point lackin . ,he appeal to 8artre is a ain deliberate. 1t is not, 1 think, too fancif(l to say that, 7(st as 8pino<a was said to be a #oral co(nterpart of %ewton, 8artre is a #oral co(nterpart of &instein. Both 8pino<a and %ewton devised absol(te ded(ctive syste#s; 8artre, like &instein, reco ni<es the necessity of red(cin all @(estions to the level of the individ(al observer. ,he data of science, no less than those of ethics, re@(ire pheno#enolo ical analysis, since h(#an bein s in their capacity as knowers depend on their bodies for entry into the physical world 7(st as basically as, in their capacity as a ents, they depend on the# for entry into the #oral world. /s a #atter of fact, #ost int(itive ob7ections to the thesis of the i##ovable observer rest on pheno#enolo ical ro(nds; what #akes it i#pla(sible is not the theoretical possibility of #otion b(t o(r fre@(ent conscio(sness of it. B(t this -#otion of the observeralways takes place with respect to a #ore or less confined fra#ework, an environ#ent which is itself taken to be at rest and which is always of #odest and h(#an di#ensions. ,his is part of o(r

psycholo ical orientation to the world which we inhabit, and only oes to show that we need to feel anchored and located in a settin which is, by co#parison with o(rselves, stable and end(rin . ,he chan e of attit(de characteristic of the shift fro# %ewtonian to relativistic science reflects a chan e in the answer to the @(estion whether the co#fortin characteristics of this fa#iliar and local world can be e*trapolated beyond it. ,he belief that they can t(rns o(t historically to be tanta#o(nt to a belief in Iod. 1n the li ht of conte#porary science the concl(sion see#s inescapable that h(#an bein s, conde#ned to carry their own perspective on the world always with the#)to be each 2not allB5 in the sa#e place at the sa#e ti#e)are denied the vicario(s view of a do#esticated (niverse once provided by Iod. ,he tro(ble is that the scientists always > 341 > la behind the philosophers in their (nderstandin of the relation of h(#an bein s to Iod. .hile %ewton cl(n to his conception of the -Kord over all, who on acco(nt on his do#inion is wont to be called Kord Iod !antokrator , or Universal C(ler,-E4F 8pino<a had already arrived at his 2eus si-e natura ; and when 8artre had co#e to reco ni<e that a (niversal conscio(sness of (niversal bein was a contradiction in ter#s, &instein still held e*plicitly a 8pino<istic view of -a s(perior #ind that reveals itself in the world of e*perience.-E?F 1t wo(ld of co(rse be foolish to take this disparity of o(tlook too serio(sly, especially since so#e philosophers as well as scientists share &instein9s pantheistic conviction of the intelli ibility of the world in an ob7ective sense, i.e., independently of the perspective fro# which we view it. B(t if scientific theory is only the #eans of renderin intelli ible the world as it appears to #e fro# #y irred(cibly sin (lar point of view 2and any stron er clai# see#s to entail @(ite (n7(stifiable ass(#ptions5 then nothin is ained by p(ttin into theory the possibility of #y own #otion e*cept a sp(rio(s and sli htly #e alo#aniac feelin of all6incl(sive (nderstandin . %othin is lost by it either as lon as the #otion is slow co#pared with the velocity of li ht; the ordinary lan (a e of local #ove#ent does not have to be iven (p. ,he fore oin ar (#ent is addressed to the relativistic case. ,he i##obility of the observer can be carried thro( h for local #otion too, b(t for relativistic #otion it must be. > 343 >

6 1 O% a Circ-larit( i% O-r )%owled$e o& t#e P#(sicall( Real

1n this essay 1 wish to raise a co#paratively innocent6lookin proble# and e*plore the conse@(ences of takin it serio(sly. ,he proble#, briefly stated, is this: is there an essential circ(larity in o(r knowled e of the physical world0 1f so, does it #atter0 ,hat is, does it have a syste#atically self6defeatin effect on o(r atte#pts to (nderstand that world0 1t will be seen as we proceed that a si#ilar @(estion can be raised for all clai#s to knowled e, b(t for the ti#e bein 1 restrict #y attention to the episte#olo y of science. By way of an approach to the proble#, consider an e*a#ple that e#bodies it. 8(ppose we take so#e book abo(t the physical world, for e*a#ple, +enry :ar ena(9s The &ature of h"sical 0ealit" . E1F 1t is an ob7ect in the physical world and has all the properties of s(ch an ob7ect)location, cohesion, relative i#penetrability, #ass, #otion, and the rest. /lso, it consists of an in enio(s and co#pact orderin of plane s(rfaces, abo(t 1.? ` 1!" c#3 of the#, that allows the display of an arran e#ent of so#e 9." ` 1!" #arks, of ro( hly ?" basic types, by #eans of a techni@(e of i#pre natin the s(rface

at the appropriate points with a preparation that chan es its reflective power. ,hese #arks constit(te a code that can be decoded by certain other physical ob7ects, na#ely, h(#an bein s, which share the sa#e basic properties)location, cohesion, and the rest)b(t have in addition special facilities for receivin and analy<in vis(al si nals and processin and storin infor#ation. ,he book that 1 hold in #y hand is a #e#ber of a class of books 2called The &ature of h"sical 0ealit" 5 which is in t(rn a #e#ber of a class of s(ch classes of books 2called 7(st books5. 1t is a characteristic of the #e#bers of the class of > 343 > books called The &ature of h"sical 0ealit" that they are virt(ally indistin (ishable fro# one another, e*cept for accidental #arks of individ(ation)stains, the yellowin of pa es, tears, #ar inal notations, dedications. By contrast, it is a characteristic of the #e#bers of the class of h(#an bein s that they are essentially distin (ished fro# one another, i.e., that each is a (ni@(e individ(al. ,his contrast #ay not be as f(nda#ental as it appears, however, dependin as it does lar ely on differences in the #ode of prod(ction in the two cases: if books were still copied o(t by hand they wo(ld have #(ch reater individ(ality; if h(#ans (nderwent so#e standardi<in or screenin process that strai htened o(t differences in enetics or ed(cation they wo(ld have #(ch less. / #ore f(nda#ental difference between books and people than their de ree of individ(ation 2and one that lar ely e*plains that difference5 is the fact that books, once prod(ced, are inert and do not chan e, either in the#selves or with respect to one another, e*cept by the operation of adventitio(s forces, whereas h(#an bein s not only start o(t with #arked enetic differences b(t also contin(e thro( ho(t their lives to chan e in the#selves and with respect to one another as well as bein acted on by adventitio(s forces. /lso, they are far #ore sensitive to the adventitio(s forces, bein affected by chan es in their environ#ent and by inco#in sti#(li to which books re#ain co#pletely indifferent. 1t is 7(st beca(se the se@(ences of internal chan es and especially of adventitio(s forces are never the sa#e for two individ(als 2altho( h they #ay be closely si#ilar in the case of identical twins5, and beca(se the chan es are for the #ost part irreversible and the effects of the forces c(#(lative, that pro ressive physical individ(ation of h(#an bein s oes on contin(o(sly. 1 p(rs(e perhaps to the point of abs(rdity this insistence on the co##on physical stat(s of books and h(#an bein s beca(se the interaction between the# to which 1 now wish to draw attention is p(rely physical in nat(re, consistin as it does of the scannin of the pa es of the book, (nder s(itable conditions of ill(#ination, by the eyes of the h(#an bein , and the trans#ission of the coded se@(ence of arrays of li ht and dark s(rface areas to the brain, where it is processed by #eans of rapid chains of electro#a netic and che#ical events in and between so#e of the !." ` 1!1! ne(rons nor#ally fo(nd there. 1t is the confi (ration of the links and potential barriers between these ne(rons that deter#ines the individ(ality of the !erson whose brain they constit(te, as apart fro# the individ(ality of that person9s body 2which is #ore like the individ(ality of a book5. ,he person is a #ental str(ct(re. ,his str(ct(re is #ade pro ressively definite by what we call the person9s -e*perience,- which can be tho( ht of as a lon synta #atic se@(ence of sensory inp(ts, so#e of the# co#in into the brain fro# the rest of the body #ore or less > 34A > directly 2as in proprioception, or in lookin at one9s own hands, hearin one9s own voice, to(chin one9s face, etc.5, b(t the reater proportion co#in fro# e*ternal ob7ects in the for# of li ht, so(nd, convection or radiation of heat, press(re, and the like. 1n the case of h(#ans who have rown (p in a social conte*t, an e*tre#ely i#portant, indeed the do#inant, part of this synta #a consists of spoken or written or printed words , that is, arrays of #arks or se@(ences of so(nds that occ(r in repeatin

patterns and set off, sin ly or in co#bination, essentially si#ilar ne(ral reactions on each occ(rrence. Dependin on the state of the #ental str(ct(re at the ti#e, the other types of inp(t that arrive si#(ltaneo(sly, and so forth, these reactions #ay in t(rn tri er others, and the c(#(lative infl(ence of these inp(ts and reactions deter#ines event(ally the str(ct(re of the actions that the person carries o(t. Ket #e refer once a ain to the present case: #y own verbal inp(t synta #a has incl(ded two readin s of :ar ena(9s The &ature of h"sical 0ealit" , one al#ost twenty years a o, the other @(ite recent. Partly as a res(lt of these e*periences, and partly (nder the sti#(l(s of other inp(ts)readin philosophy and talkin abo(t it, feelin ratit(de in respect of certain events in #y life and wishin to cooperate in a partic(lar enterprise, receivin letters and telephone #essa es fro# editors, etc.)it ca#e abo(t at a @(ite definite ti#e and in a @(ite definite location that the physical body with which 1 a# associated sat down, took (p a physical pen, and be an to #ake #arks on a plane s(rface by r(nnin an inked ball over it that left a trace, detectable beca(se of the differential reflectin powers of the s(rface and the ink. -1n this essay,- 1 wrote, -1 wish to raise a co#paratively innocent6lookin proble# and e*plore the conse@(ences of takin it serio(sly.1 have now constr(cted a circle in this essay, and it is easy to see how it #irrors a circle in the processes of o(r knowled e. $or all knowled e that can be reco ni<ed and defended as s(ch event(ally finds its way into written 2or at any rate spoken5 for#, and the physical character of the #ode of its e*pression will locate it in the world alon side the thin s of which it constit(tes knowled e. The &ature of h"sical 0ealit" is not, it is tr(e, a physics book, so that the all(sion to -thin s in the world,- of o(r knowled e of which it constit(tes the e*pression, #ay be needlessly conf(sin . 1 wo(ld be prepared in another conte*t to defend the view that there is only one world, na#ely, #y own, and that everythin that 1 can know finds its place there)and to ar (e f(rther that this does not involve solipsis#)b(t for the ti#e bein wish to concentrate on the case of physical knowled e: books abo(t the physical properties of physical ob7ects are the#selves physical ob7ects, and #ay indeed be co#posed of so#e of the physical ob7ects)f(nda#ental particles, ato#s, #olec(les, etc.)abo(t which they speak. ,his > 34" > is clearly self6referential, b(t its essential circ(larity #ay not be so evident. ,hat, however, is beca(se we have to incl(de o(rselves in order to co#plete the circle. .e believe that o(r eyes and brains, as well as the ink and paper, are #ade of physically real particles, b(t clearly we wo(ld not be able to know abo(t physically real particles if it were not for the (se of o(r eyes and brains, of the ink and paper. %ow it is a #istake to think of all circ(larity as bein parado*ical or even (ndesirable. 1n fact, there is a lon tradition in philosophy which s( ests that circ(larity in ar (#ent is inevitable. /n early hint of it is iven in the 'uth"!hro , where every atte#pt at clarity see#s to res(lt in brin in the ar (#ent back to its startin point;E3F at the other end of the historical scale .itt enstein, in the preface to the hiloso!hical In-estigations , speaks of travelin -over a wide field of tho( ht crisscross in every direction. . . . ,he sa#e or al#ost the sa#e points are always bein approached afresh fro# different directions.-E3F ,he fact is that the world in which philosophy operates is a closed world; e-er" atte#pt on the part of sentient bein s to (nderstand the world in which they find the#selves is bo(nd to be circ(lar if it is carried far eno( h. ,his inevitability arises o(t of the fact that, whatever the startin point of the in@(iry which is to lead to (nderstandin , sooner or later the startin point itself will beco#e an ob7ect of the in@(iry. Circ(larity can, it is tr(e, always be refused by resort to a !riori ass(#ptions; the tro(ble with these, however, is that the res(ltin linear ar (#ent #ay not intersect with another linear ar (#ent constr(cted by so#ebody else on different ass(#ptions. 1f #y ass(#ptions contradict yo(rs, o(r conversation is ended before it is be (n. 2,here are people who are

not tro(bled by this kind of standoff, b(t this 1 s(spect is either beca(se they are too la<y to be interested in alternatives or beca(se they are too do #atic to entertain the#.5 ,he @(estion is, what is the character of this world which is th(s closed in (pon itself0 1s there roo# for physical reality in it0 1n the first instance it is a world #arked by disco(rse, b(t since there are parts of it that have not been ade@(ately artic(lated disco(rse cannot be the whole story. ,he best way of characteri<in it #ay be to say that it is a thought world)not a world of thoughts , b(t a world every ele#ent of which is tho( ht by so#ebody: in #y case, by #e, in yo(rs, by yo(. ,he ar (#ents for clos(re have still not been better p(t than by Berkeley in the Three 2ialogues between 4"las and hilonous .EAF /ll sensation, as well as all conception, all lan (a e, and so on, belon on the side of #ind, as is clearly evidenced by the fact that in the absence of all #ental activity no trace of the world re#ains. ,his is not to say that no world re#ains; it is only to re#ark on the thoro( h assi#ilation of whatever world #ay independently e*ist into #ental for# for p(r6 > 344 > poses of h(#an cons(#ption. 1n the tho( ht world there is clearly no roo# for #aterial, if by #aterial we #ean so#ethin that is not tho( ht. B(t there is no need to identify the physical with the #aterial; !h"sis #eans, after all, nothin #ore than the nat(re of thin s nat(rally enerated. /nd yet 1 think that #ost people who (se the word #ean by the -physical- so#ethin that is at any rate independent of their #inds, and the independence of the #aterial is no #ore proble#atic than, in Berkeley, the independence of the #ind of Iod. &ven for +e el we are only the /bsol(te knowin itself, and its knowin itself does not in any way entail our knowin it. ,he proble# of physical reality re#ains as ac(te as ever for the individ(al in his or her private circle, and the philosophical circle can be described in idealist or in #aterialist ter#s indifferently. 1 started this essay with a book as an ob7ect in the world, b(t 1 co(ld have e@(ally well have started it with the concept of the book)the point is that in both cases the e*ercise was an e*ercise in tho( ht, a concl(sion not to be escaped beca(se it happened to be an e*ercise in disc(rsive tho( ht and even in written for#. ,he choice of the #edi(#, then)ideas or #atter)leaves the @(estion of reality (nto(ched. ,he proble# of the real, as 1 (nderstand it 2and this is not, as we shall see, e*actly the way that :ar ena( hi#self (nderstands it5, is the proble# of clarifyin the stat(s of what there is, insofar as this is independent of #y e*perience. :y e*perience itself is of co(rse also real, b(t this is not proble#atic, nor has it been since Descartes)that is, since the establish#ent of the distinction between the act(ality of e*perience and its si nificance. ,o say that the proble#atic part of the real is the part of it that is independent of #y e*perience does not #ean that none of it co(ld be in #y e*perience, only that it wo(ld be as it is whether it were in #y e*perience or not. B(t by far the lar er part of it)everythin that happened before 1 was born, everythin that will happen after 1 die, everythin that now happens elsewhere, or behind #y back, or beneath the s(rface of thin s)is and re#ains o(tside #y e*perience. Ceality is infinitely richer, ontolo ically speakin , than #y world 2even tho( h #y world can contain a conce!tion of the whole of reality5. 1 wish now to deal with two kinds of atte#pts that have been #ade to solve the proble# of the relationship between the content of #y e*perience on the one hand and reality on the other. Lne strate y has been to try to constr(ct the ele#ents of reality o(t of the ele#ents of e*perience, or at any rate o(t of classes of ele#ents, typical e*a#ples of which are fo(nd in e*perience. ,he #ost ele ant e*positions of this strate y are to be fo(nd in C(ssell and Carnap. C(ssell poses the proble# as -the constr(ction of physical ob7ects o(t of sense6data,- and he arrives at the notion of thin s as classes of

their aspects. .e have seen > 34? > the table fro# a few points of view, (nder a few conditions of li htin , etc.)i#a ine how it wo(ld look fro# all possible points of view (nder all possible conditions, and we have an a re ate that will e*ha(st witho(t re#ainder all possibilities of percept(al knowled e of the table.E"F Carnap9s pro ra# is #ore a#bitio(s: fro# the perceptions of a sin le observer he constr(cts, in ascendin order, a(topsycholo ical, physical, heteropsycholo ical, and c(lt(ral ob7ects.E4F 2+e (ses for the p(rpose a fictional character /, the first half of whose life is spent in e*periencin the world witho(t analysis, the second half in analy<in the data th(s athered, witho(t f(rther e*perience.5 / third atte#pt alon so#ewhat si#ilar lines)altho( h all three have radical differences fro# one another)is that of .hitehead, who by his #ethod of e*tensive abstraction so( ht to isolate real space6ti#e points as the ter#ini of conver in series of e*perienced space6ti#e re ions.E?F ,he second strate y is that of :ar ena( hi#self. +e approaches the @(estion fro# a dia#etrically opposite point: ass(#in , in effect, that if the real shows (p in o(r e*perience at all it will bear the #arks of its independence 2its coherence, its connectedness, and so on5, he li#its the ascription of reality to those parts of e*perience that have been s(ccessf(lly syste#ati<ed by #eans of scientific constr(cts. -,o (s,- he says in The &ature of h"sical 0ealit" , -reality is not the ca(se b(t a specifiable part of e*perience.-E=F %ow both these strate ies)C(ssell9s and Carnap9s on the one hand, :ar ena(9s on the other)see# to #e (nsatisfactory, in the for#er case beca(se of ontolo ical e*trava ance, in the latter case beca(se of ontolo ical poverty. Ln the one hand, C(ssell thinks nothin of introd(cin infinite sets into the real, and he does so with an abandon that wo(ld have #ade Lckha# sh(dder. :ar ena(, on the other hand, e*cl(des fro# the real (ndeniable facts of e*perience, if these have not been -nor#ally standardi<ed into scientific knowled e.- -/s yet,- he says, -they have not been (nited into an or ani<ed pattern co#parable with the str(ct(re of physical reality, and it wo(ld be pardonable for the scientist to s( est that the na#e realit" be at present denied to the#.-E9F 1f we s(bscribe to the Cartesian principle referred to above, this p(ts hi# in the odd position of sayin that reality is only a part of a part of itself. Lf co(rse, the #otivation for introd(cin a li#ited and specific #eanin for the e*pression -physical reality- is @(ite clear in :ar ena(9s work, and if we view it as an episte#olo ical rather than as an ontolo ical li#itation his strate y beco#es perfectly acceptable. /nd yet fro# the ontolo ical point of view it does see# overca(tio(s. :y own inclination is to try a co#pletely different approach, by askin whether there co(ld be anythin with respect to which we co(ld know that it lay o(tside o(r e*perience as well as bein independent of > 34= > it. 1f it were 7(st a @(estion of o(r confrontin the physical world as individ(als, there wo(ld be no possible way in which we co(ld know that anythin lay o(tside o(r individ(al e*perience, and anyone who wished st(bbornly to #aintain that view thro( ho(t the followin ar (#ent co(ld perfectly well do so. ,here is, however, a class of events of which we can co#e to have knowled e that wo(ld strike all b(t the confir#ed solipsist as satisfyin #y criteria: 1 #ean the contents of other people9s e*perience. .e co#e to know these by bein told abo(t the#, and we have to ad#it that, for the #ost part at any rate, o(r e*istence #akes no difference to the# and their i##ediacy is o(t of o(r reach. Lther people report to (s what happened in the past, and what happened elsewhere, and what happened when we were not lookin , and so we e*tend the basis of o(r knowled e of the real. 1 cannot here o

into the details of the process accordin to which scientific knowled e is enerated o(t of this collective reso(rce; s(ffice it to say that the res(lt is not a #onolithic body of scientific theory or even of knowled e of the everyday world, b(t a series of free6standin concept(al sche#es each associated with a sin le knower, yet overlappin in s(ch a way that ro(ps of people can in vario(s ti#es and places be taken to e#body s(ch theories and s(ch knowled e. &very concept(al sche#e is closed (pon itself 7(st in the way in which e*perience was earlier said to be )in fact, every s(ch sche#e is precisely the conse@(ence of a certain e*perience)and so is the a re ate of concept(al sche#es, incoherent as this is bo(nd to be even if li#ited to the do#ain of a partic(lar science. 'et, when the sche#e of an individ(al knower has been critically retho( ht, when o(t of int(itive syste#s scientific constr(cts have been for#ed, when so#e part of the sche#e has been converted into a s"stem , the overlappin with other people9s sche#es proves to be #ore precise than before, so that a#on the practitioners of a iven science it beco#es reasonable to speak of an isomor!hism between individ(al concept(al syste#s. /nd it is this that leads (s back, in the end, to the idea of an e*ternal and independent physical reality. -1t is forced (pon (s by the constant pattern of the iso#orphic syste#s. B(t this in itself does not necessitate the post(lation of an e*ternal: perhaps the iso#orphic syste#s 7(st han to ether that way. /ll of the#, however, e*cept the post(lated nat(ral reality, are in #ind; they constit(te a (niverse of tho( ht. ,he reason why it see#s to #e sensible to post(late a (niverse of bein also is that in principle the (niverse of tho( ht co(ld be entirely capricio(s, and it is not. ,he si#plest e*planation of this constancy of for# between the iso#orphic syste#s is the e*istence of another syste# iso#orphic with all of the#)rather s(ch that they are all i#perfect iso#orphs of it)(nderlyin the# and proceedin independently of the#.-E1!F ,he standard ob7ection to this for#(lation is that it #akes physical > 349 > reality hypothetical, and that this hypothetical stat(s then e*tends to every ele#ent of it, even those we take to be reflected in o(r e*perience. ,his leads to the parado*ical conse@(ence that the real co#ponents of o(r e*perience are #ade (p of hypothetical parts. B(t this is 7(st a set of conf(sions. ,he real ele#ents of o(r e*perience are not made u! of anythin , (nless of parts really e*perienced at the sa#e ti#e 2there is nothin parado*ical abo(t an e*perienced person9s havin e*perienced ar#s and le s5. .hat is hypothetical is the ob7ect as a whole (nder its real, as opposed to its e*perienced, #odality, and there is nothin odd abo(t a hypothetical ob7ect9s havin hypothetical parts. .hat science enables (s to see is that there are #ore hypothetical ob7ects than e*perienced ones: electrons lie in the hypothetical real world, and not in the real world of e*perience)b(t the for#(lation of that sentence is #eant to (nderline the proposition that we are not talkin abo(t two worlds, only abo(t one, #ost of which, however, re#ains o(tside o(r e*periential ran e. ,he (pshot of this analysis is that the cycle of o(r knowled e, fro# perceptions to hypotheses and back to perceptions, while it is itself inscribed in the real, does not enclose the reality it clai#s to know. Ceality lies o(tside the circle, rather in the way that tracks lie o(tside the train. 21#a ine a train r(nnin on a sin le circ(lar track, and passen ers able only to look hori<ontally o(t of the side windows)they co(ld tell by the repetition of the landscape that they were on a closed track even if they co(ld never act(ally see it.5 ,he idealist te#ptation is to identify reality with the circle, b(t this see#s (nnecessarily li#itin as an ontolo ical principle, besides bein i##odestly self6centered. /ss(#in a reality infinitely vaster than o(r knowled e of it, we can still #ake at least one assertion abo(t it with co#plete ass(rance, albeit a ne ative assertion: na#ely, that the real has not been s(ch as to re@(ire other e*periences than those we have in fact had. 1n closin 1 offer two for#(lations of a so#ewhat #ore positive kind, each of which s(#s (p the res(lt of the ar (#ent, and the choice between which

can be left to philosophical te#pera#ent. ,he first is skeptical, and yet conditionally affir#ative: we do not know the real at all$ but what we assert about it would be knowledge if there were an" wa" of getting out of the circle . ,he second, which 1 prefer, has obvio(s affinities to :ar ena(9s position, b(t avoids so#e (nfort(nately relativistic aspects of that position: the real is the objecti-e correlate of those as!ects of conce!tual structure that most !eo!le ha-e in common or in such form that it is translatable into a common structure . ,his ass(#es that the develop#ent of science is on the ri ht track, not necessarily that it has arrived. ,he possibility re#ains, of co(rse, that we #i ht all be #istaken to ether. 1 concl(de, then, that there is an essential circ(larity in o(r knowl6 > 3?! > ed e of the physical world)that every line of de#onstration sooner or later t(rns back (pon itself. B(t 1 concl(de also that this is not a self6defeatin circ(larity, and that two thin s abo(t it even ive ro(nds for philosophical satisfaction. Lne is that, as always happens in philosophy, the state of the knowers , if not of their knowled e, chan es as they o aro(nd the circle, so that they (nderstand each proposition anew in the li ht of the propositions that have intervened since their for#er (nderstandin of it. ,he other is that if the relative se@(ence of the propositions re#ains (nchan ed)if they are always there, as it were, when the ar (#ent co#es ro(nd to the#)that in itself #ay be evidence of an (nderlyin stability in the real, of which, after all, the propositions and the ar (#ent and for that #atter we o(rselves are an inte ral part. > 3?1 >

661 Tr-t# a%d Prese%ce. Poetic I/a$i%atio% a%d ,at#e/atical P#(sics i% +asto% 3ac#elard
1n the stacks of the 8terlin Kibrary at 'ale University, thirty years a o, 1 happened as a rad(ate st(dent in philosophy to be readin Iaston Bachelard9s +'acti-it7 rationaliste de la !h"si/ue contem!oraine while #y closest friend at the ti#e, a rad(ate st(dent in $rench, was readin his +'eau et les rA-es . ,his coincidence was ratifyin , altho( h it did not see# re#arkable; neither of (s fo(nd the other9s interest alien. 1 refer to it not fro# ro#antic nostal ia b(t beca(se it now occ(rs to #e that this personal con7(nction of science and the h(#anities antedated by five years C. P. 8now9s The Two *ultures and the Scientific 0e-olution ,E1F an essay which s( ested that it o( ht to have see#ed re#arkable, since accordin to 8now a reat (lf was, if not fi*ed, at least bein b(sily d( , between the do#ains to which these works belon ed. Lf co(rse 8now believed rather co#placently that he hi#self e#bodied a rare and diffic(lt co#bination of the two, b(t he see#s not to have reali<ed how thoro( hly his proble# had been anticipated, or how satisfactorily it had been solved, by a professor at the 8orbonne who had be (n his career as a provincial $rench post#an. /s far as that oes #y own do(ble interest, in science and in poetry, antedated by #any years #y enco(nter with Bachelard. Bachelard so#ewhere acknowled es a debt to his father in the #atter of b(ildin fires; 1 owe a debt to #ine both for his habit of recitin :ilton and for his c(riosity abo(t the sciences, especially astrono#y. +e possessed so#e of the works of those reat pop(lar writers, both

distin (ished scientists, 8ir Ga#es Geans and 8ir /rth(r &ddin ton, and 1 read the# while 1 was still in school; in the latter9s The &ature of the h"sical /ll translations fro# Bachelard 2e*cept those specifically cited in &n lish translation5 are #y own. > 3?3 > World is a passa e that Bachelard #ay have known and wo(ld certainly have liked. -Lne day,- says &ddin ton, -1 happened to be occ(pied with the s(b7ect of 9Ieneration of .aves by .ind.9 1 took down the standard treatise on hydrodyna#ics, and (nder that headin 1 read,- 2and there follows a para raph of #athe#atical sy#bols5: /nd so on for two pa es. /t the end it is #ade clear that a wind of less than half a #ile an ho(r will leave the s(rface (nr(ffled. /t a #ile an ho(r the s(rface is covered with #in(te corr( ations d(e to capillary waves which decay i##ediately the dist(rbin ca(se ceases. /t two #iles an ho(r the ravity waves appear. /s the a(thor #odestly concl(des: -L(r theoretical investi ations ive considerable insi ht into the incipient sta es of wave6 for#ation.Ln another occasion the sa#e s(b7ect of -Ieneration of .aves by .ind- was in #y #ind; b(t this ti#e another book was #ore appropriate, and 1 read: ,here are waters blown by chan in winds to la( hter and lit by the rich skies, all day. and after $rost, with a est(re, stays the waves that dance /nd wanderin loveliness. +e leaves a white Unbroken lory, a athered radiance, / width, a shinin peace, (nder the ni ht. ,he #a ic words brin back the scene. / ain we feel %at(re drawin close to (s, (nitin with (s, till we are filled with the ladness of the waves dancin in the s(nshine, with the awe of the #oonli ht on the fro<en lake. ,hese were not #o#ents when we fell below o(rselves. .e do not look back on the# and say: -1t was dis racef(l for a #an with si* sober senses and a scientific (nderstandin to let hi#self be del(ded in that way. 1 will take Ka#b9s 4"drod"namics with #e ne*t ti#e.- 1t is ood that there sho(ld be s(ch #o#ents for (s. Kife wo(ld be st(nted and narrow if we co(ld feel no si nificance in the world aro(nd (s beyond that which can be wei hed and #eas(red with the tools of the physicist or described by the #etrical sy#bols of the #athe#atician.E3F &ddin ton s( ests here that the b(siness of life will draw one9s attention now to the scientific side of thin s, now to the poetic; there is no tho( ht that the two f(nctions will be e*ercised by different people, or belon in the life of the sa#e person to separate periods, say, yo(th and #at(rity. Critics are fond of choppin reat thinkers into two, the early and the late, and this is nearly always #isleadin , as the #ost obvio(s e*a#ples show 2:ar*, .itt enstein, and 8artre co#e i##ediately to #ind5. 8o#e people have tried to do this with Bachelard, as if he turned fro# science to poetry, b(t even the se@(ence of p(blished works is #ore co#plicated than that. 1f it is necessary to identify periods there > 3?3 > are at least fo(r, the first two overlappin : 215 an initial preocc(pation with scientific tho( ht, fro#

'ssai sur la connaissance a!!roch7e 2193=5 to +a !hiloso!hie du non 219A!5; 235 the workin thro( h of the ele#ents and the correspondin for#s of the i#a ination, fro# +a !s"chanal"se du feu 2193=5 to +a terre et les rA-eries du re!os 219A=5; 235 a reconsideration of the tho( ht processes of science in the li ht of a new rationalist episte#olo y, which incl(des +e rationalisme a!!li/u7 219A95, +'acti-it7 rationaliste de la !h"si/ue contem!oraine 219"15, and +e mat7rialisme rationnel 219"35, three works that Coch 8#ith has called a -trilo y,- a view s(pported by Bachelard hi#self 2-7e consid\re @(e EcesF trois livres . . . ont (ne (nitP de v(e-;E3F and 2A5 the new poetics of the three last works, Ka poPti@(e de l9espace ?BCDEF$ +a !o7ti/ue de la rA-erie , and +a flamme d'une chandelle 2both 19415. 8o at the be innin of this paper 1 state #y confidence in two kinds of (nity: that of Bachelard9s career, and that of the possible e#bodi#ent of both science and poetry in a sin le individ(al that that career e*e#plified. 1n the stacks of the 8terlin Kibrary, however, the rest of the Bachelardian corp(s was still in #y f(t(re. 1 was readin +'acti-it7 rationaliste for a @(ite specific reason, na#ely, to advance an in@(iry into the ontolo ical stat(s of f(nda#ental entities in physics. &lectrons, protons, and the rest are never observed directly, so they re#ain theoretical constr(cts; what we observe are the conse@(ences of interactions in which we s(ppose the# to have participated)b(bble cha#ber tracks, clicks fro# Iei er co(nters) and these conse@(ences are always #acroscopic and #ore or less fa#iliar. ,his is still a topical proble#, tho( h not in the for# of bewilder#ent abo(t waves and particles that &ddin ton dra#ati<ed with his -wavicle,- which was a wave, as 1 re#e#ber, on :ondays, .ednesdays, and $ridays, and a particle on ,(esdays, ,h(rsdays, and 8at(rdays. %ow, with the benefit of hindsi ht, 1 wo(ld rather be inclined to say: why did we ever s(ppose that the habit(al i#a es e*perience e@(ips (s with in the local -flat re ion- of #acroscopic observation wo(ld be ade@(ate to re#ote reaches of physical reality)the #icroscopic, the cos#olo ical, the relativistic0 Iettin physical theory ri ht #eans bein ready to leave the co#forts of the flat re ion, to depart fro# the si#ple i#a e. %ow two thin s abo(t Bachelard see# to #e partic(larly #e#orable and i#portant: on the one hand the tenacity of his rootedness in what 1 a# callin the -flat re ion,- the fa#iliar, the everyday, the down6to6earth, b(t on the other hand the a(dacity of his spec(lative depart(res fro# this solid base, his persistence in followin his ar (#ents where they led, whether into the loo# of psychoanalytic depths or the verti o of relativistic speed and distance. ,he polarity of his work between > 3?A > science and poetry is, as 1 have already noted, notorio(s; 1 find no less re#arkable the polarity between the post#an and the philosopher. Ln the whole it see#s to #e that it wo(ld be a ood thin for #ore philosophers to have been post#en. ,he #etier #ay not be accidental: apart fro# the letter6scales Bachelard refers to as havin iven hi# his idea of wei ht, there is a her#etic side to the post#an9s activity)he is the point of contact with the world beyond, he brin s sealed #essa es fro# distant ori ins, there is no knowin what #arvels or portents they #ay not contain; at the sa#e ti#e nothin can s(rprise hi#, he is the very i#a e of persistence and reliability, of local inti#acy and ho#ely order. /nd when the post#an hi#self leaves for the o(tside world)for Di7on, for Paris)he takes with hi# this i#pert(rbable sense of the fa#iliar, and his concern contin(es to be with the fir# #ateriality of the world, now fro# the scientific point of view. 1t is, however, the point of view of a new science, a -no(vel esprit scientifi@(e,- one of whose effects is rad(ally to (nder#ine that #ateriality. ,he old science, be innin with Ialileo, say, #ade its ob7ect the #athe#atical representation of obser-able relations; %ewton added the #odern concept of force, b(t that had its own fa#iliar representation in #(sc(lar effort. :icroscopes and telescopes, etc., #erely e*tended the flat re ion; they did not lead o(tside it. 1t was towards the end of the nineteenth cent(ry

that the e*istence of entities hitherto (ns(spected, with entirely new properties, be an to force itself on scientific attention. ,he electron was discovered when Bachelard was eleven, and he was a yo(n #an d(rin the heady days at the be innin of the cent(ry when relativity and @(ant(# theory were (nder oin their dra#atic develop#ent fro# #ar inal con7ect(res to f(nda#ental disciplines of physics. ,he initial reaction to the openin of these new do#ains was so#eti#es overdone, and Bachelard did not escape the te#ptation to which so #any of his conte#poraries s(cc(#bed of #akin a #ystery o(t of the absence of an i#a inable s(bstantiality at the @(ant(# level. 1n +e nou-el es!rit scientifi/ue he says, 1nstead of attachin properties and forces directly to the electron we shall attach @(ant(# n(#bers to it, and on the basis of the distrib(tion of these n(#bers we shall ded(ce the distrib(tion of the places of the electrons in the ato# and the #olec(le. ,he s(dden dissol(tion of realis# sho(ld be clearly (nderstood. 4ere number becomes an attribute$ a !redicate of substance . . . . ,h(s che#istry, which was for a lon ti#e the -s(bstantialistscience !ar e(cellence , finds the knowled e of its own #atter pro ressively dissolvin . 1f we 7(d e the ob7ect accordin to the proofs of its ob7ectivity, we #(st say that the ob7ect is #athe#ati<in itself and that it #anifests a sin (lar conver ence of e*peri#ental and #athe#ati6 > 3?" > cal proof. ,he #etaphysical (lf between #ind and the e*ternal world, so (nbrid eable for a #etaphysics of i##ediate int(ition, see#s less wide for a disc(rsive #etaphysics that atte#pts to follow scientific pro ress. .e can even conceive of a veritable displace#ent of the real, a p(r in of realis#, a #etaphysical s(bli#ation of #atter. Ceality first transfor#s itself into a #athe#atical realis#, and then #athe#atical realis# co#es to dissolve itself in a sort of realis# of @(ant(# probabilities. ,he philosopher who follows the discipline of the @(anta)the schola /uantorum )allows hi#self to think the whole of the real in its #athe#atical or ani<ation, or better, he acc(sto#s hi#self to #eas(re the real #etaphysically in ter#s of the possible, in a direction strictly the inverse of realist tho( ht. Ket (s then e*press this do(ble s(pre#acy of n(#bers over thin s and of the probable over n(#bers by a pole#ical for#(la: che#ical s(bstance is only the shadow of a n(#ber 2l'ombre d'un nombre 5.EAF ,his is terribly conf(sed. 1t is si#ply #isleadin to s( est that there are n(#bers in the ob7ective world and that they so#ehow replace a #ateriality that has dissolved away. 1f the world ever was #aterial, it has not ceased to be so 7(st beca(se we can9t !icture its #ateriality. Before, we co(ld have a pictorial representation as well as a #athe#atical one; now we can #ana e only the #athe#atics, b(t it is no #ore constituti-e of the world than in the for#er case. ,he episte#olo ical basis of science is still in ordinary #acroscopic ob7ects; o(r i##ediate world is still &(clidean and %ewtonian; b(t we have learned that the ro( h6and6ready world6pict(re of the flat re ion, with its colo(rs and so(nds, its solids and spaces, is inade@(ate for the representation of basic physical tr(ths. .hat ets in the way of a rela*ed and (nco#plicated acceptance of this li#itation see#s to be a need on o(r part to have an i#a e of #atter. 1t is diffic(lt to attrib(te reality, #ateriality, or s(bstance to the world there physically is witho(t attrib(tin to it the i#a inative contents that have hitherto acco#panied these ideas. ,here is no way of ettin rid of these i#a inative contents b(t their e*istence poses a proble# for scientific (nderstandin . ,he fact that +a formation de l'es!rit

scientifi/ue and +a !s"chanal"se du feu were p(blished in the sa#e year is not accidental: in the for#er Bachelard is concerned not only with the proper for#ation of the scientific #ind b(t also with the fact that it is de for#ed by its habit(al e*pectations, while in the latter he looks at a partic(lar case, the habit(al association of s(bstantiality and fire. -1n this book when we talk of o(r personal e*periences we are de#onstratin h(#an errors,- he says in the 1ntrod(ction to +a !s"chanal"se du feu , and he contin(es. > 3?4 > L(r work is offered, then, as an e*a#ple of that special psychoanalysis that we believe wo(ld for# a (sef(l basis for all ob7ective st(dies. 1t is an ill(stration of the eneral theses p(t forward in o(r recent book, +a formation de l'es!rit scientifi/ue . ,he peda o y of scientific instr(ction wo(ld be i#proved if we co(ld de#onstrate clearly how the fascination e*erted by the ob7ect distorts inductions . 1t wo(ld not be diffic(lt to write abo(t water, air, earth, salt, wine and blood in the sa#e way that we have dealt with fire in this brief o(tline. . . . 1f we s(cceeded in inspirin any i#itators, we sho(ld (r e the# to st(dy, fro# the sa#e point of view as a psychoanalysis of ob7ective knowled e, the notions of totality, of syste#, of ele#ent, evol(tion and develop#ent. . . . 1n all these e*a#ples one wo(ld find beneath the theories, #ore or less readily accepted by scientists and philosophers, convictions that are often in en(o(s. ,hese (n@(estioned convictions are so #any e*traneo(s flashes that bedevil the proper ill(#ination that the #ind #(st b(ild (p in any pro7ect of disc(rsive reason. &veryone sho(ld seek to destroy within hi#self these blindly accepted convictions. &veryone #(st learn to escape fro# the ri idity of the #ental habits for#ed by contact with fa#iliar e*periences. &veryone #(st destroy even #ore caref(lly than his phobias, his -philias,- his co#placent acceptance of first int(itions.E"F 1t is clear fro# this passa e, a#on other thin s, that Bachelard9s pro7ect at this ti#e was a f(ll6fled ed deconstr(ctionis# a-ant la lettre . ,here are now two directions in which the Bachelardian work #(st obvio(sly o)towards the dissol(tion of the scientific i#a e, and towards the e*ploration of what this t(rn (ncovers, na#ely the richness of the #aterial i#a e in its own ri ht, and not 7(st as an obstacle to scientific (nderstandin . .hat led to the other works on the ele#ents was 7(st the reali<ation, which dawned after 2b(t no do(bt as a res(lt of5 the writin of +a !s"chanal"se du feu , that the do#ain of the i#a ination has its own constr(ctive #ateriality 2-@(and 79ai Pcrit le $e( 7e ne #e rendais pas co#pte d( rale de l9i#a ination #atPrielle-5.E4F ,he for#er direction is taken in +a !hiloso!hie du non , and leads fro# the i#a e to the concept, not now as a #athe#ati<ed abstraction b(t as a post(lated ob7ect #ore real than anythin #erely i#a inable. G(st as in s(rrealis# 2in which Bachelard at this ti#e was deeply interested, to s(ch a de ree that Breton called hi# -the philosopher of s(rrealis#-5, the do#ain of the everyday is transcended, by an appeal to the (nconscio(s, towards the poetically #arvelo(s, so in Bachelard9s -s(rrationalis#- the fa#iliar i#a e is transcended, by an appeal to critical reason, towards the physically f(nda#ental. 1n one way or another, what is c(t away fro# the i#a e has to be fo(nd in the rectified concept. .e co(ld therefore say that the ato# is e*actly the sum of the criticisms to which its first i#a e has been s(b#itted. > 3?? >

Coherent knowled e is a prod(ct not of architectonic reason b(t of pole#ical reason. By its dialectics and its criticis#s, s(rrationalis# in a certain way deter#ines a surobject . ,he s(rob7ect is the res(lt of a critical ob7ectification, of an ob7ectivity that preserves of the ob7ect only what it has critici<ed. /s it appears in conte#porary #icrophysics the ato# is the very paradi # Et"!e F of the s(rob7ect. 1n its relations with i#a es, the s(rob7ect is e*actly the noni#a e. 1nt(itions are very (sef(l: they are ood for destroyin . 1n destroyin its first i#a es, scientific tho( ht discovers its or anic laws. ,he sche#a for the ato# proposed by Bohr a @(arter of a cent(ry a o has in this sense behaved like a ood i#a e: nothin re#ains of it.E?F 21 translate -s(rob7et- as -s(rob7ect- rather than as -s(perob7ect- to #aintain consistency with -s(rrealis#-)and hence -s(rrationalis#-)even tho( h it is a rebarbative ter#. ,he (se of this prefi* in recent tho( ht presents so#e interestin contrasts: -Ueberich- in Ier#an beco#es -s(r#oi- in $rench b(t -s(pere o- in &n lish, which see#s ri ht)b(t if -s(rrPalis#e- had by the sa#e token beco#e -s(perrealis#- 1 cannot help feelin that the (nderstandin of the #ove#ent wo(ld have been very different, perhaps indeed i#proved.5 B(t if for science nothin re#ains of the i#a e, the i#a es that nevertheless re#ain lose nothin of their poetic val(e. 8ince this is the aspect of Bachelard9s tho( ht that has beco#e the #ost fa#iliar, 1 can afford to dispense with a catalo (e of what those i#a es are and concentrate on so#e proble#atic aspects, with the re#ark however that if he had done nothin b(t identify the species of the #aterial i#a ination, that wo(ld have been eno( h to establish hi# as one of the cent(ry9s se#inal fi (res in the do#ain of poetics. 1t is perhaps not witho(t si nificance that this work had its ori ins in a therape(tic sit(ation, the psychoanalysis of fire described in an earlier citation. $ire is the least #aterial of the ele#ents, and its ele#ental stat(s is the #ost obvio(sly (nscientific. 1f we ask what fire is, the scientific response is @(ite strai htforward: it is the hot and therefore visible aseo(s prod(ct of an e*other#ic che#ical reaction, (s(ally one of o*idation; and this is as far as it co(ld possibly be fro# the poetic response, in which it is war#th, passion, do#esticity, life. ,he two poles do not interfere. .hat this #eans is that it is relatively easy to perfor# the re@(ired psychoanalysis; we are not really au( !rises with #ateriality 2indeed as re#arked above the #aterial i#a ination is not in play at the ti#e of +a !s"chanal"se du feu 5. +owever as Bachelard works thro( h the ele#ents thin s et stickier, as it were, and by the ti#e of +a terre et les rA-eries de la -olont7 there is a kind of collision of #atter and i#a ination that see#s to co#pro#ise the distinction between science and poetry. -Ceverie that looks for s(bstance (nder > 3?= > ephe#eral aspects,- confronted with the three li hter ele#ents 2fire, water, and air or sky5, was in no way blocked by reality. .e really confronted a proble# of imagination ; it was a #atter precisely of dreaming a profo(nd s(bstance for the fire, so lively and so bri htly colored; it was a #atter of i##obili<in , faced with r(nnin water, the s(bstance of this fl(idity; finally it was necessary, before the co(nsels of li htness iven (s by bree<es and fli ht, to i#a ine in o(rselves the very s(bstance of this li htness, the very s(bstance of aerial liberty. 1n short #aterials no do(bt real, b(t #obile and inconstant, re@(ired to be i#a ined in depth, in an inti#acy of s(bstance and force. B(t with the s(bstance of the earth, #atter brin s with it so #any positive e*periences, the for# is so evident, so strikin , so real, that it is hard to see how to ive body to reveries to(chin the inti#acy of #atter. /s Ba(delaire says, -,he #ore positive and solid #atter is in appearance, the #ore s(btle

and laborio(s is the task of the i#a ination.-E=F ,he resol(tion of this conflict is to be fo(nd in the ad#ission that the s(bstantiality of earth is 7(st as i#a inary as the s(bstantiality of any of the other ele#ents)that is, #aterial and i#a ination belon to ether on the side of poetry, neither has anythin to do with science. ,o the @(estion whether i#a es of density, hardness, #assiveness, s(bstantiality, etc., tell (s anythin at all abo(t how the physical world really is, the br(tal answer is no. ,hey tell (s abo(t our world, with its verti o and its viscosity, b(t not abo(t the world science has to deal with. ,his doctrine is hard to accept beca(se we want science to be abo(t ordinary ob7ects, not -s(rob7ects- inaccessible to (s, or accessible only thro( h the operations of reason, and beca(se as Bachelard says the i#pression of contact with the real #aterial of thin s is so stron . B(t science is (nder the r(le of reason and it does co#pel (s to concl(de that the physical world is beyond the reach of the #aterial i#a ination; and Bachelard believes that this concl(sion has to be accepted accordin to what he calls the co ito of #(t(al obli ation, Ewhich,F in its si#plest for#, sho(ld be e*pressed as follows: 1 think yo( are oin to think what 1 have 7(st been thinkin , if 1 infor# yo( of the episode of reason which has 7(st obli ed #e to think beyond what 1 previo(sly tho( ht.E9F .hat we have to -think beyond- is, once a ain, the i#a e. 1t is not 7(st i#a es of #ateriality that are s(spect; in conte#porary physics nothing is iven to the i#a ination, not even so#ethin -hidden-) what there is see#s less discovered than invented. 1n the works of the trilo y -s(rrationalis#- ives way to -applied rationalis#,- a > 3?9 > #ore #odest way of handlin the sa#e proble#, and the ato#s of an earlier citation fro# +a !hiloso!hie du non have been enerali<ed into particles, b(t the #essa e, tho( h e*pressed differently, is by now fa#iliar: Particles are sit(ated at the bo(ndary between invention and discovery, 7(st where we think applied rationalis# is active. ,hey are precisely -ob7ects- of applied rationalis#. .hen we st(died #atter in an atte#pt to res(#e it in its fo(r ele#ents, in its fo(r kinds of ato#, pheno#enolo y offered sed(ctive i#a es: fire has a spark, water a drop, earth has a rain, air can be felt in the #ove#ent of d(st. +ere, nothin . %o nat(ral -corp(sc(larisation.%othin , absol(tely nothin in co##on knowled e that co(ld set (s on the track of the isolation of a particle. /nd all the i#a es are deceptive Eet toutes les images sont trom!euses F.E1!F By now the point see#s s(fficiently established. 'et there is so#ethin (nsatisfactory abo(t it even fro# the scientific point of view. 1t is as if, in lookin for the tr(th abo(t the world, which is now to be e*pressed in for#al rather than #aterially i#a istic ter#s, we had so#ehow for otten that it was there . ,he parts of the world)its particles)are yielded only by the application of reason and only when 1 a# attendin to the# with a certain concentration of tho( ht and fro# a partic(lar point of view. B(t all the while the rest of the world is there, as it were, peripherally; 1 can9t, precisely, be attendin to it , and yet its bein there is a condition of #y havin anythin to attend to in the first place. 1n a re#arkable paper delivered to a philosophical con ress in Kyon in 1939 Bachelard speaks of -the idea of the Universe EwhichF presents itself as the antithesis of the idea of the ob7ect,- and introd(ces the lapidary for#(la: -,he Universe is the infinite of #y inattention.- ,he tr(th abo(t ob7ects has to be co#ple#ented by the presence of the world, i##ediately and lobally; o(r sense of this presence is a #atter of int(ition rather than of knowled e, it co#es not fro# the acc(#(lation of facts b(t fro# a

kind of pheno#enolo ical totali<ation. &*perience of the Universe, if we ad#it that this concept has a sense, prepares no #(ltiplication of tho( ht; as far as 1 a# concerned the idea of the Universe i##ediately and definitively dialecti<es #y ob7ective tho( ht. 1t breaks #y tho( ht. ,he I think the world ends for #e with the concl(sion: therefore I am not . 1n other words, the I think the world p(ts #e outside the world . :editate on the other hand on the a*io# of the philosopher of the (niverse: everythin is in everythin . Kisten to hi# sin , like a poet, his 'infGhlung a#on the for#s and the li ht, the breaths and the perf(#es. Kook at hi# in his parado*ical attit(de: it is in openin his ar#s that he e#braces the worldB B(t)stran e concl(sion)this Universe that totali<es all @(al6 > 3=! > ities keeps none of the# as a specific @(ality. Lr at least if it does keep one, one soon sees that it is only as the valori<ation of a reverie.E11F ,his is where the i#a e co#es back into its own. ,he @(ality of the Universe is in effect the @(ality of the #o#ent of #y apprehension of it, not now with scientific concentration b(t with poetic openness; it is the prod(ct of the nonspecific awareness that Bachelard calls reverie, wakin b(t not active, alert b(t not intentional. ,he i#a e, specifically the literary i#a e, offers (s this kind of relation to the world, or rather offers (s a new content for it. Kiterat(re is si nificant, and its si nificance derives in part fro# its lendin new si nificance to the world. 1n Bachelard this process oes thro( h three sta es, in which the i#a e is first directly si nifyin , then #etaphorical, and finally a creator of its own -(nreality.- ,he first is fo(nd in +'air et les songes : +ow can we for et the si nifyin action of the poetic i#a e0 ,he si n here is not a re#inder, a #e#ory, the indelible #ark of a distant past. ,o deserve the title of literar" image it has to have the #erit of ori inality. / literary i#a e is a sense in the state of bein born; the word)the old word)co#es to receive fro# it a new si nification. B(t this is not yet eno( h: the literar" image #(st enrich itself with a new oneirism . ,o si nify so#ethin other, and to #ake for other drea#s, s(ch is the do(ble f(nction of the literary i#a e.E13F -,o #ake for other drea#s-: it is not that we needed the i#a e to have drea#s in the first place, to live the reverie that yields the Universe in the #ode of presence rather than 2scientific5 tr(th, b(t it offers (s a renewal of that presence (nder a different si n. +owever, the relation between si ns that this ori inality of the literary i#a e enerates is nothin other than #etaphor, and so#e years later, in this passa e fro# +a terre et les rA-eries du re!os , Bachelard s( ests that poetry ives access thro( h its #etaphoric shifts to so#ethin like a tr(e drea#, a tr(th of its own: 1n all its ob7ects, %at(re drea#s. $ro# this point, if we faithf(lly follow the alche#ical #editation of a chosen s(bstance, a s(bstance always gathered in %at(re, we arrive at this con-iction of the image which is poetically sal(tary, which proves to (s that poetry is not a a#e, b(t rather a force of nat(re. 1t el(cidates the drea# of thin s. ,h(s we (nderstand that it is the true meta!hor , the do(bly tr(e #etaphor: tr(e in its e*perience and tr(e in its oneiric thr(st.E13F ,he i#a ination here, however, is still, as Bacon #i ht have said, -h(n with wei hts,- held down in this as in the other earth book

> 3=1 > 2cited above5 by the evident reality of the #aterial, convinced by its e*perience rather than freely advent(rin . 1t is only in the period of the last poetics that the i#a ination is iven a power of its own, liberated not only fro# the b(rden of e*perience b(t fro# #etaphor itself. ,h(s, in +a !o7ti/ue de l'es!ace , Bachelard says, /cade#ic psycholo y hardly deals with the s(b7ect of the poetic i#a e, which is often #istaken for si#ple #etaphor. Ienerally, in fact, the word image , in the works of psycholo ists, is s(rro(nded with conf(sion: we see i#a es, we reprod(ce i#a es, we retain i#a es in o(r #e#ory. ,he i#a e is everythin e*cept a direct prod(ct of the i#a ination. . . . 1 propose, on the contrary, to consider the i#a ination as a #a7or power of h(#an nat(re. ,o be s(re, there is nothin to be ained by sayin that the i#a ination is the fac(lty of prod(cin i#a es. B(t this ta(tolo y has at least the virt(e of p(ttin an end to co#parisons of i#a es with #e#ories. By the swiftness of its actions, the i#a ination separates (s fro# the past as well as fro# reality; it faces the f(t(re. ,o the function of realit" , wise in e*perience of the past, sho(ld be added a function of unrealit" , which is e@(ally positive, as 1 tried to show in certain of #y earlier works.E1AF 8(ch a -f(nction of (nreality- is clearly inco#patible with scientific tr(th, whose concern #(st in the end be with the real even if on the way to its for#(lations it passes thro( h the !hiloso!hie du non . B(t it is not inco#patible with presence, especially if we constr(e the !rae of !raesens as tem!orall" before; the f(t(re is a*io#atically (nreal, b(t it is the task of the i#a ination to face it, not in the #ode of knowled e and the deter#ination of parts b(t in the #ode of creativity and transcendence towards the whole. 8o Bachelard @(otes with approval these words of Gean Kesc(re: -Hnowin #(st be acco#panied by an e@(al capacity to for et knowin . %on6knowin is not a for# of i norance b(t a diffic(lt transcendence of knowled e. ,his is the price that #(st be paid for an oe(vre to be, at all ti#es, a sort of p(re be innin , which #akes its creation an e*ercise in freedo#.-E1"F ,he poetic presence to the world that is always a p(re be innin transcends scientific knowled e b(t does not thereby belittle or ann(l it. 1 revert now to the d(ality fro# which 1 be an, between science and poetry, in the li ht of Bachelard9s itinerary. .e left the tr(th abo(t the real, so#e pa es back, in the care of a strictly unimaginable b(t #athe#atically co#pellin -applied rationalis#,- in order to p(rs(e the power of the i#a e towards an i##ediate presence to bein . ,his presence is characteri<ed in +a !o7ti/ue de l'es!ace as a possession of the s(b7ect by the i#a e, as a reverberation that constit(tes a -veritable > 3=3 > awakenin of poetic creation . . . in the so(l of the reader.-E14F ,hese two e*tre#es)on the one hand #athe#atics with no i#a e at all, on the other an i#a e that fills the whole space of s(b7ectivity) see# to stand in co#plete opposition to one another, to have nothin in co##on. $or Bachelard, however 2as for &ddin ton5, they are clearly not opposites b(t co#ple#entaries. 1t #ay be helpf(l in closin to consider their co#ple#entarity thro( h the #ediation of lan (a e. Kan (a e is a co##on reso(rce of science and of poetry, b(t the roles it respectively plays in the# ill(strate at once their separation and their contin(ity. Kan (a e)the lan (a e of lo ic and of #athe#atics)is the only #edi(# we have for representin the tr(th abo(t ob7ective physical reality,

inaccessible as it is to the i#a ination. Ln the other hand lan (a e is incapable of re!resenting the i##ediacy of presence, which is yielded only by the i#a ination, altho( h in poetry it can as it were prepare the i#a ination for presence. Kan (a e, in +eide er9s ter#s, is -the ho(se of Bein ,- by which we are to (nderstand that if we make 2!oiein 5 a place for bein , by #eans of poetry, Bein #ay co#e to dwell in it. Presence to Bein however is not lin (istic, it is not the sa#e as presence to poetry )the latter is #erely propaede(tic to it. Bachelard see#s to have had an independent (nderstandin of this in his doctrine of the reverberation of the poetic i#a e, the i#a e that -has to(ched the depths before it stirs the s(rface.-E1?F ,hese two f(nctions)the disc(rsive ro(nd of science that is constit(ted by lan (a e and the (nspoken intentionality of poetry that is prepared by it)are both e#inently h(#an f(nctions. ,he s(b7ect does not vacillate between the# b(t occ(pies their intersection, an intersection that is not a point b(t a !lace , the place where o(r life, with all its scientific co#ple*ity and poetic intensity, takes place. .hat Bachelard re#inds (s, in his person no less than in his writin s, is that the co#ple*ity and the intensity are depart(res fro#, and e@(ally rooted in, the fa#iliar #ateriality of the si#ple i#a e; that, iven a willin ness to do the necessary work, whether rational or i#a inative, scientific tr(th and poetic presence are both accessible, to post#en as to philosophers. > 3=3 >

PART VI1 SCIENCE AN* SU3AECTIVITY

> 3=" >

Pre&ace to Part VI. Scie%ce a%d S-8Eecti'it(

1n this final part the e#phasis is on the s(b7ect in his or her s(b7ectivity. ,his is obvio(sly what (nites two aspects of the work of Bachelard; as a practitioner of the h(#an sciences it is he hi#self who holds the# in e@(ilibri(#, as s(b7ect and a ent. Chapter 33 links this part to the previo(s one thro( h its association with Bachelard, who as re#arked in chapter 33 was so#eti#es called the -philosopher of s(rrealis#-; it deals with a well6known #ove#ent of ideas in $rance whose connections were #ainly literary, tho( h the reso(rces of the s(b7ect on which its partic(lar for# of awareness depended)the freedo# of the i#a ination, the ref(sal of a !riori li#its, the spirit of advent(re)see# to #e to be 7(st those re@(ired for creativity and (nderstandin in the h(#an sciences, incl(din the philosophy of science itself. Lne detail here: the #inor s(rrealist poet Cha(sson was invented by #e, as was his book and the press that p(blished it. 1 think that at the ti#e this was a est(re in the direction of the s(rrealist a#e; there now see#s less point in it, b(t the invented @(otation re#ains apposite, and there wo(ld be even less point in rewritin it all than in leavin the artifice in place. ,he s(b7ect is e#bodied: co(ld this happen in any cases other than those of h(#an bein s or the hi her ani#als0 1n chapter 3A 1 try o(t the hypothesis of an ascent fro# pri#itive sensitivity to f(ll s(b7ectivity, sketched in the previo(s chapter, in connection with an in@(iry into that by now hoary iss(e of the possibility that #achines #i ht think. B(t 1 ive a fresh t(rn, it see#s to #e 2which #eans

-1 think,- a point developed in the chapter5, to the notion of thinkin . 1n another paper as yet (np(blished, destined for another encyclopedic work, this ti#e > 3=4 > a $rench dictionary of poetics, 1 try a si#ilar tack with the creation and 7(d #ent of works of art, with si#ilar res(lts: nothin that we know abo(t tho( ht, or s(b7ectivity, or art, r(les o(t the event(al perfor#ance by #achines of appropriate, and as far as we can tell a(thentic, f(nctions in these do#ains. Chapters 3" and 34 represent the f(llest develop#ent of the ar (#ent i#plied by the s(btitle 2and, in the case of the epony#o(s chapter 34, the #ain title5 of the book: the dependence of science on, or its e#bodi#ent in, individ(al knowin s(b7ects. ,he stat(s of s(b7ectivity has been a #a7or philosophical proble# since Hant and Hierke aard, b(t it was the introd(ction of the concept of intentionality by Brentano, and its e*tension by +(sserl, that #ade it possible to (nderstand the world6#akin power of the s(b7ect. ,he iss(e is #(ch #is(nderstood: the world the s(b7ect #akes)or the world that is #ade for it by its powers of intentionality)is not the hypothesi<ed real world, the physical (niverse, b(t the life6world, the one that is born with the individ(al and dies when he or she dies. ,his is belied for #ost people)and for #any otherwise caref(l philosophers)by the vividness of the apparently stable feat(res of the life6world, the ob7ectivity of which see#s to be confir#ed by the a ree#ent of others, so that we think of o(rselves as inhabitin a percept(al world in co##on. +owever, other people are only enco(ntered in one9s own life6world; they, and all the apparently stable feat(res of that world, have been constit(ted as ob7ective by the adaptive strate y that (ses intentionality to #ediate the real world 2as environ#ent5 to itself 2as or anis#5 in s(ch a way as to ens(re the s(rvival of the species. 8cience itself can be tho( ht of as part of that strate y. Do 1 #ean here a conscio(s evol(tionary strate y0 Do 1 #ean -(ses intentionality- in a p(rposive sense0 Lf co(rse not, as so#e of the fore oin chapters will have #ade clear. B(t that is the way in which it is te#ptin to think, to a first appro*i#ation, as we try to #ake sense of the life6world, helped by feat(res of it 2s(ch as lan (a e and other c(lt(ral ob7ects5 that we borrow or inherit fro# other people. %ot even s(ch ob7ects (arantee a co##on world, beca(se the #ediation of the real world to itself, 7(st referred to, need never) iven the co#ple*ity of the syste#s involved)take the sa#e for# twice, at least not in a pop(lation as inconsiderable, relatively speakin , as the h(#an pop(lation to date 2only a tiny fraction of which partakes in any c(lt(ral sharin above the local and pri#itive5. ,he life6world is o(r only ro(te of access to the real world)which can figure in it 2to belabor a point, perhaps)b(t it is a delicate and cr(cial point5 onl" as h"!othetical . 1t is th(s a parado*ical fact that while on the one hand #y world occ(pies only a s#all corner of the > 3=? > (niverse, the (niverse on the other hand occ(pies only a s#all corner of #y world. 1 a# a #in(sc(le fra #ent of the hypothesi<ed real world)b(t the hypothesis of the reality of that world is only occasionally the foc(s of #y attention, which tends to be pree#pted by #ore #(ndane ob7ects. ,he way in which 1 co#e to have that world is the #ain topic of chapter 3", and so#e of the ways in which this kind of con7ect(re has been ad(#brated, especially in connection with the theory of perception, is the #ain topic of chapter 34. 1t will be seen that in the hypothetical real world 1 s(bscribe to an (nco#pro#isin ly ca(sal theory of perception, b(t that in the life6world 1 find affinities with theories that appear to take a dia#etrically opposite view.

,he life6world contains #ore than its percept(al contents)#(ch #ore, tho( h the percept(al will do#inate if iven the chance 2which is one of the reasons why television is s(ch a #i*ed blessin 5. Ceflective and affective life in it)as contrasted with #ore strai htforwardly active or reactive life) involves ob7ects of an entirely different order: persons 2as distinct fro# their e#bodi#ents5, artworks 2with a si#ilar proviso5, theories, theore#s, narratives, persona es, ideas, ideals, ideolo ies, societies, co##(nities, nations, c(lt(res. Does the fact that we do not re@(ire a realist hypothesis for these ob7ects)that indeed we cannot propose one witho(t #etaphysical e*trava ance)#ean that they cannot be treated by the #ethods of science0 ,he final chapter of the book is devoted to the thesis that knowin s(b7ects can s(stain, with appropriate theoretical ri or, sciences not only of the nat(ral world b(t also of the h(#an world)sciences that will co#ple#ent b(t need not i#itate one another. 21f the social sciences had not felt a need to i#itate the nat(ral sciences they wo(ld have #ade #(ch reater pro ress.5 .hether knowled e is scientific)to hark back to the concl(sion of chapter 1=)is a @(estion less of what is known than of how the knowin s(b7ect ac@(ires and (ses its knowled e, whether naively or reflectively, whether cas(ally or syste#atically, whether as opinion or as 7(d #ent, whether as borrowed or as earned. /t a ti#e when knowled e of nat(re has so far o(tstripped knowled e of the h(#an)as is evidenced by the enor#o(s discrepancies that are #anifest everywhere between technical power and social (nderstandin )there is a reater need for serio(s work in the h(#an sciences than ever before. /nd yet those sciences, as stable for#s of knowled e, are in their infancy, as can be seen fro# the s@(abbles and recri#inations of co#petin schools, a#on which the old6 established analytic and the (pstart deconstr(ctionist are a#on the #ost notorio(s 2even tho( h their na#es, s(itably (npacked, #ean the sa#e thin 5. 1 wo(ld now be inclined to o even f(rther than 1 do in the last > 3== > chapter as it was ori inally written, to point o(t that in the do#ain of the h(#an sciences the te#ptation to fall back on a realist hypothesis has traditionally taken a theolo ical for#, and that the 2relatively5 stable world6views that have res(lted, while co#fortin to their believers, spell event(al) perhaps i##inent)disaster for h(#anity beca(se they are inco#patible with one another b(t cannot hope to resolve their differences, as the nat(ral sciences nat(rally do, on the basis of a co##on (nderlyin ontolo y. ,he conver ence of the nat(ral sciences over the brief span of historic ti#e is an overwhel#in fact, in spite of c(rrent pra #atist and relativist opinion to the contrary. 1t rests on a persistence of the real: this is the reat back ro(nd hypothesis, the ref(sal of which #akes an" collaborative activity, even that of relativists, (nintelli ible. ,he conver ence of the h(#an sciences, beca(se of the very different nat(re of their ob7ects, has to be constr(cted. ,his is an i#perative that #i ht well set the intellect(al and political a enda for the ne*t #illenni(#. > 3=9 >

6"1 Scie%ce= S-rrealis/= a%d t#e Stat-s o& t#e S-8Eect

:y ai# in this essay is to e*plore so#e concept(al relations between s(rrealis# on the one hand and philosophy and science on the other. 1 shall not however be talkin abo(t partic(lar scientific theories, or abo(t the s(rrealists9 reactions to the#, b(t rather appealin 2briefly and indirectly5 to a possible

scientific pro ra#. ,he co##on thread in this e*ploration will be the philosophical proble# of the s(b7ect, which 1 shall treat first in the conte*t of e*istentialis# and pheno#enolo y 2in Hierke aard, 8artre, and +(sserl5 and then fro# the point of view of a kind of evol(tionary onto eny. 1n (ndertakin this e*ploration 1 do not #ean to red(ce s(rrealis# to the level of a theoretical view a#on others; if one talks abo(t it at all one #(st at least acknowled e and respect the passionate difference of its fo(nder, who after all once said, -$or #e everythin is s(b7ect, nothin is ob7ect.- 1 do however take it in its earliest for#, as a #ove#ent of liberation thro( h the power of the i#a ination, leavin aside the diffic(lties in which it beca#e entan led when it #oved fro# the level of individ(al or ro(p e#bodi#ent to that of p(blic and political involve#ent. ,he proble# of the s(b7ect is one of two chief li#it6proble#s of philosophy. By a li#it6proble# 1 #ean one that cannot be enco#passed within philosophy b(t forces it to acknowled e its li#its; if there is a sol(tion to the proble# it will not be a philosophical sol(tion, and by parity of ar (#ent if only a philosophical sol(tion is acceptable then the proble# re#ains insol(ble. ,he proble# of the s(b7ect has this character beca(se no proble# can be posed e*cept by a s(b7ect, and the s(b7ect cannot attain the e*teriority with respect to itself that wo(ld be necessary to enco#pass the proble#. ,ranslations fro# works cited in $rench are #y own. > 39! > ,he other chief li#it6proble# of philosophy is the proble# of the world as a whole. 1t is correlative to the proble# of the s(b7ect and is proble#atic for a si#ilar reason: no proble# can be posed (nless there is a world, and the s(b7ect as in the world cannot attain the e*teriority with respect to the world that wo(ld be necessary to enco#pass it as a proble#. 1n both cases the last est(re of philosophy can only be a pointin : it can as it were <ero in on the place where s(b7ectivity is likely to be fo(nd, draw its circ(#ference, and point inwards; or it can reach thro( h pheno#ena in the direction of transcendence, draw 2b(t only appro*i#ately and partially)the bo(ndary is both indeter#inate and infinite5 their periphery, and point o(twards. ,he first of these pointin s is the enco(nter with e*istence, the second the enco(nter with bein . Between the# stretches the do#ain of ob7ects, thin s, res , the reality of ordinary #acroscopic everyday life, tro(bled neither by the absol(teness of bein nor by the an (ish of e*istence. ,he real world is a world in which people can live co#fortably eno( h as lon as they are not thr(st (p a ainst what Gaspers already called )ren=situationen , -li#it sit(ations,- like love and pain and death. ,hese are not witho(t philosophical tractability, b(t ele#ents of the# red(ce to o(r two #ain proble#s: love is the i#possible enco(nter with another e#bodied s(b7ectivity, pain the enco(nter of s(b7ectivity with i#placable ob7ectivity, e@(ally e#bodied, death the end of s(b7ectivity beca(se the end of its e#bodi#ent. ,hat s(b7ectivity sho(ld be e#bodied is the first observation on the way to locatin it in the world. B(t whose s(b7ectivity is in @(estion0 1t can only, for #e, be #ine. 1f 1 say -the s(b7ect- as if it were a cate ory of tho( ht, of #etaphysics or ontolo y or episte#olo y, 1 hypostati<e it as an ob7ect of #y own tho( ht and so precisely sacrifice its stat(s as s(b7ect. Lb7ectively we consider only the #atter at iss(e, s(b7ectively we have re ard to the s(b7ect and his s(b7ectivity; and behold, precisely this s(b7ectivity is the #atter at iss(e. ,his #(st constantly be borne in #ind, na#ely, that the s(b7ective proble# is not so#ethin abo(t an ob7ective iss(e, b(t is the s(b7ectivity itself.E1F Hierke aard re#ained in s(b7ective despair over this proble#, (nable to #ake what he considered the necessary leap to so#ethin posited as ob7ective, whether Iod or Ce ina or 7(st everyday life, an

o(tin to the Deer Park for e*a#ple. $or that, faith was re@(ired. %ot that the ordinary realistic bo(r eois was sh(t o(t fro# these thin s, ch(rch or #arria e or o(tin s to the Deer Park)b(t witho(t faith, they wo(ld not be enterin into the# as s(b7ective individ(als. .ith faith, on the other hand, they wo(ld be indistin (ishable fro# the ordinary bo(r6 > 391 > eois, at least as far as e*ternal indicators were concerned. B(t Hierke aard hi#self, (nable to rise to faith, was at the sa#e ti#e (nwillin to reno(nce his s(b7ectivity. 8ince Hierke aard, (p thro( h the s(rrealists and the second 2or 8artrean5 wave of e*istentialis#, the s(b7ect has been a constant preocc(pation in .estern tho( ht, if so#eti#es a thorn in its flesh, to s(ch an e*tent that even 8artre, and after hi# so#e of the str(ct(ralists, have tried in different ways to s(ppress it, by depersonali<in it or rele atin it to -absence.- 8artre had a horror of the -inner life- and went to a reat deal of tro(ble, in The Transcendence of the 'go , to e*tirpate the s(b7ect fro# philosophy. 1 will not follow his whole ar (#ent b(t 1 cite fro# the concl(sion of the book, ,he s(b7ect6ob7ect d(ality, which is p(rely lo ical, Esho(ldF definitively disappear fro# philosophical preocc(pations. ,he .orld has not created the #e; the #e has not created the .orld. ,hese are two ob7ects for absol(te, i#personal conscio(sness, and it is by virt(e of this conscio(sness that they are connected. ,his absol(te conscio(sness, when it is p(rified of the 1, no lon er has anythin of the s(b7ect. 1t is no lon er a collection of representations. 1t is @(ite si#ply a first condition and an absol(te so(rce of e*istence. /nd the relation of interdependence established by this absol(te conscio(sness between the #e and the .orld is s(fficient for the #e to appear as -endan ered- before the .orld, for the #e 2indirectly and thro( h the inter#ediary of states5 to draw the whole of its content fro# the .orld.E3F B(t this -absol(te conscio(sness- constit(tes a far #ore diffic(lt proble# than the s(b7ect itself. 8artre9s answer to the @(estion of the ori in of the s(b7ect is to have it e#er e fro# a sort of prepersonal field of conscio(sness. +e adopts this sol(tion in order to avoid the char e of escapis# that he levels a ainst +(sserl9s doctrine of the transcendental e o, insistin that the e o #(st not take ref( e fro# the world b(t be o(t in it, a#on thin s. Unfort(nately this was 7(st the point on which he #ost ravely #is(nderstood +(sserl. +(sserl inverted the s(b7ect6ob7ect relation 2or the s(b7ect6world relation5, so thoro( hly that the transcendental e o, rather than bein in retreat fro# the world, alto ether contains it. -,he & o hi#self, who bears within hi# the world an accepted sense and who, in t(rn, is necessarily pres(pposed by this sense, is le iti#ately called transcendental.-E3F ,his clearly allows the world of thin s, of reality, to contin(e in e*istence witho(t #e)only it is not #y world, not the world that has sense for #e. +(sserl does not fall into +e el9s #e alo#aniac identification of s(b7ectivity with the /bsol(te; when the latter says, as he does in the Preface to the henomenolog" of 1ind , that -everythin > 393 > depends on raspin and e*pressin the (lti#ate tr(th not as 8(bstance b(t as 8(b7ect as well,-EAF he does not #ean the individ(al s(b7ect 2the one 1 know beca(se 1 a# it5 b(t a .orld6s(b7ect, th(s personali<in and as it were s(b7ectifyin the d(alis# of 8pino<a. +e el, as Hierke aard often re#arks, has for otten, in ivin absol(te reality to the 8yste#, that he is an individ(al s(b7ect. ,he syste#atic 1dea is the identity of s(b7ect and ob7ect, the (nity of tho( ht and bein . &*istence, on the other hand, is their separation. 1t does not by any #eans follow that

e*istence is tho( htless; b(t it has bro( ht abo(t, and brin s abo(t, a separation between s(b7ect and ob7ect, tho( ht and bein . 1n the ob7ective sense, tho( ht is (nderstood as bein p(re tho( ht; this corresponds in an e@(ally abstract6ob7ective sense to its ob7ect, which ob7ect is therefore the tho( ht itself, and the tr(th beco#es the correspondence of tho( ht with itself. ,his ob7ective tho( ht has no relation to the e*istin s(b7ect; and while we are always confronted with the diffic(lt @(estion of how the e*istin s(b7ect slips into this ob7ectivity, where s(b7ectivity is #erely p(re abstract s(b7ectivity 2which a ain is an ob7ective deter#ination, not si nifyin any e*istin h(#an bein 5, it is certain that the e*istin s(b7ectivity tends #ore and #ore to evaporate. /nd finally, if it is possible for a h(#an bein to beco#e anythin of the sort, and the whole thin is not so#ethin of which at #ost he beco#es aware thro( h the i#a ination, he beco#es the p(re abstract conscio(s participation in and knowled e of this p(re relationship between tho( ht and bein , this p(re identity, aye, this ta(tolo y, beca(se this bein which is ascribed to the thinker does not si nify that he is, b(t only that he is en a ed in thinkin . ,he e*istin s(b7ect, on the other hand, is en a ed in e*istin , which is indeed the case with every h(#an bein .E"F ,he proble# is to ive a sense to this -e*istin - which will do 7(stice to the fact that the s(b7ect is a thinkin s(b7ect, witho(t absorbin it into tho( ht taken as ade@(ation to 2or identity with5 bein . ,he co(ples s(b7ect/ob7ect, tho( ht/bein , are tho( ht by a s(b7ect, in this case here and now by #e, by yo(. /nd this necessitates the invasion of the perfect and eternal (nity of the syste# by a new di#ensionality that 1 have elsewhere called -ortho onality-E4F and which 1 (nderstand as the inc(rsion of ti#e into str(ct(re. 8artre, who 2as he hi#self later ad#itted5 was only te#porarily and perversely anti6+(sserlian, introd(ces s(ch a te#poral di#ension in an e*ceptionally brief and l(cid te*t, -1ntentionality: a $(nda#ental 1dea of +(sserl9s Pheno#enolo y-: 1#a ine for a #o#ent a connected series of b(rsts which tear (s o(t of o(rselves, which do not even allow to an -o(rselves- the leis(re of > 393 > co#posin o(rselves behind the#, b(t which instead throw (s beyond the# into the dry d(st of the world, on to the plain earth, a#idst thin s. 1#a ine (s th(s re7ected and abandoned by o(r own nat(re in an indifferent, hostile and restive world)yo( will then rasp the profo(nd #eanin of the discovery which +(sserl e*presses in his fa#o(s phrase -/ll conscio(sness is conscio(sness of so#ethin .- . . . Bein , says +eide er, is bein 6in6 the6world. Lne #(st (nderstand this -bein 6in- as #ove#ent. ,o be is to fly o(t into the world, to sprin fro# the nothin ness of the world and of conscio(sness in order s(ddenly to b(rst o(t as conscio(sness6in6the6world. .hen conscio(sness tries to reco(p itself, to coincide with itself once and for all, closeted off all war# and co<y, it destroys itself. ,his necessity for conscio(sness to e*ist as conscio(sness of so#ethin other than itself +(sserl calls -intentionality.-E?F ,he diffic(lty here is that, as Hierke aard feared 2b(t in a different way5, the e*istin s(b7ect evaporates, this ti#e as it were away fro# itself in the direction of the intentional ob7ect. -/ll conscio(sness is conscio(sness of so#ethin - re@(ires perhaps to be co#ple#ented by the sy##etrical clai#, -/ll conscio(sness is so#ebody9s conscio(sness,- #eanin by -so#ebody- a f(lly e#bodied e*istin individ(al, not an i#personal absol(te sprin in o(t of nothin ness. 8artre9s idea of

prepersonal conscio(sness see#s to #e #erely #ystifyin . 1t is tr(e that very reat diffic(lties attend the @(estion of how personal or individ(al conscio(sness e#er es 21 prefer -individ(al- to -personalbeca(se it is precisely not a @(estion of the -persona,- the way the individ(al appears to others, b(t of biolo ical individ(ality5, b(t it is not helpf(l to invent a co##on so(rce of s(b7ectivity in -absol(te conscio(sness.- .hose is it0 1t is tr(e also that when 1 beco#e conscio(s of the world, b(t ad#ittedly #(ch later, it is not at first as an individ(al b(t as a conscio(sness. B(t it is 1 7(st the sa#e; if 1 do not yet know who 1 a#, it is not that 1 a# conf(sin #yself with so#eone else. 1t see#s to #e in fact that the ref(sal of the idea of the s(b7ect, on the part of s(b7ects, whether by 8artre or by the str(ct(ralists, is 2like the ref(sal by Derrida of the idea of the book, in the introd(ction to a book5 a red herrin , (nless indeed it sho(ld be a kind of s(rrealist a#e 2-ceci n9est pas (ne pipe-5. 1n any other spirit the (tterance of the words -1 a# not a s(b7ect- wo(ld re@(ire elaborate preparation, like the (tterance of the words -1 a# dead- in Poe9s story abo(t :. .alde#ar. $or the #o#ent at least we are still o(rselves s(b7ects. &ven if everythin 1 have said so far is provisionally acceptable there still re#ains the @(estion of the nat(re and provenance of the s(b7ects we are 2or strictly speakin , as before, the @(estion for each of (s of -the s(b7ect 1 a#-5. 1 take this @(estion (p now fro# an entirely different point of view. ,o reflect on s(b7ectivity is necessarily to en a e in > 39A > a(toreflection, to lend oneself to refle*ivity. 1n the rhetoric of O(intilian there was a fi (re called subiectio , which was defined as - ivin the answer to one9s own @(estion.- 1n f(ll s(b7ectivity 1 ive #yself as the answer to #y own @(estion. B(t what kind of bein #(st 1 be in order to be able to do that0 Perhaps so#e li ht co(ld be thrown on this by a enetic approach, so#ethin like Condillac9s device of the stat(e b(t witho(t the prior ass(#ption of interior or ani<ation. .e #i ht think in fact of several sta es in which the interior6e*terior relation takes pro ressively different for#s. 1n the case of a #erely #aterial ob7ect there is no interior6e*terior relation in the re@(ired sense. 1n the case of a very pri#itive b(t #erely reactive or anis# there is s(ch a relation b(t of the si#plest kind)its interior state is re@(ired to #atch, in an ob7ective sense, the e*terior, and if this #atch fails it will #ove, essentially at rando#, (ntil it finds a new and #ore closely #atchin e*terior sit(ation. 1n the case of an or anis# whose nervo(s syste# per#its what we #i ht call sensation there co#es to be an interior representation of the e*terior sit(ation, and it is the #atchin of the interior state with this representation, rather than with the e*terior sit(ation directly, that deter#ines its #otion. / yet #ore co#ple* or anis# which has a representation not only of the e*terior sit(ation b(t also of its own interior state #i ht be said to have reached the sta e of conscio(sness; its #otion is now deter#ined by the #atchin of the two representations. 1ts conscio(sness lies in the awareness of si#ilarity and difference between these representations; b(t one #i ht say that it is not aware of this awareness. $inally we arrive at what 8artre called the prerefle*ive cogito ; in this last sta e s(b7ectivity enters, a kind of conscio(s #onitorin of conscio(sness that consists not in the #atchin of the two representations b(t rather in the #atchin of the interior state with a representation of itself. ,his is of co(rse sketchy and #erely pro ra##atic, b(t 1 think so#ethin like it #(st hold in principle. 1f we now ask the @(estion, -.hat is the conscio(s or anis#9s world like0- we et all sorts of interestin answers fro# biolo ists: speciali<ed creat(res have speciali<ed worlds 2in the case of fro s, for e*a#ple, only what #oves co(nts5. Ln reflection it beco#es clear that #y world cannot be #ore co#plicated than the internal str(ct(re by #eans of which 1 represent it; the aspects of the e*terior

world that are not reflected or #atched 2i.e., anticipated5 by this str(ct(re do not and cannot e*ist for #e. .hat hides this tr(th fro# (s is that we have, of all the ani#als, the #ost eneral6p(rpose str(ct(re, and the #ost co#plicated, so that it takes a serio(s effort of the i#a ination to co#prehend it: ten #illion cells in the retina, ten billion in the brain, all #(ltiply connected, and so on. > 39" > %ow witho(t p(rs(in this idea into its f(rthest physiolo ical ra#ifications we can take one #ore pla(sible step and say that o(r interior world #ay be)and in fact #(st be)far #ore co#plicated than the e*ternal world in which we live. 1n order to #atch a iven e*ternal sit(ation 1 #(st have at #y disposal a repertoire of interior representations that enco#passes and s(rpasses)by far)the s(# of the ele#ents of the iven sit(ation. 1t is a bit like readin 2and indeed is a kind of readin 5: if 1 a# to be able to read a te*t 1 #(st know all the words it contains)and all the others in #y lan (a e as well. ,his concept of the -prepared reader- is very far6reachin and 1 will not p(rs(e it f(rther for the #o#ent. B(t 1 will point o(t that it easily e*plains, in its enerali<ed for#, the e*periences of dr( addicts who think they have co#e (pon a new world; what they have co#e (pon is a state, artificially displaced fro# the nor#al state, that wo(ld have corresponded to the world if the world had been different. 1f we are able to -read- the world in which we do in fact live, we #(st have the #aterials for readin #any others, nearer to it or #ore re#ote 2(p to a point5)we #(st, that is to say, have the #aterials for the constr(ction of the internal representations that are constit(tive of states of conscio(sness other than the -nor#al- state, and these #aterials #ay be constr(ctively e#ployed, as we know they are, (nder special circ(#stances)sleep, illness, into*ication, etc. 1n fact, the co#ple*ity of the apparat(s at o(r disposal is s(ch that -reality- pales in co#parison with it. %ot that in the first instance it takes precedence over reality; indeed, as 8artre s( ests, a lot of what we are co#es fro# the e*ternal world. ,he str(ct(re of the apparat(s is deter#ined, however, not only by the physiolo y of the nervo(s syste# and by e*perience in the (s(al sense of the word, b(t also and #ost strikin ly by readin , and especially by the readin of te*ts. $(rther#ore, this is c(#(lative: reality is as it now is only now, b(t there re#ains in #e so#ethin of what 1 read yesterday, last year, in childhood. 8(b7ectivity, 1 will say, is what ani#ates this co#ple* str(ct(re, what scans it. ,he str(ct(re is idiosyncratic in each one of (s, partly beca(se of enetic differences, b(t #ainly beca(se of radical differences of e*perience and readin . /nd it is indefinitely e*tensible. 1f 1 pick (p a book 1 have not previo(sly read 1 borrow its str(ct(re, 1 lose #yself in it, or as we so#eti#es say, 1 a# -b(ried- in it. ,his is what /ndrP Breton clearly saw when he said, in Surrealism and ainting , %othin prevents #e, in this #o#ent, fro# arrestin #y a<e on so#e ill(stration in a book)and loB what was all abo(t #e no lon er e*ists. 1n the place of what s(rro(nded #e there is now so#ethin else beca(se, > 394 > for e*a#ple, 1 participate witho(t diffic(lties in an alto ether different cere#ony.E=F ,he reality, then, of -what is all abo(t #e- is for the #ost part #(ch less interestin than the reality of what 1 read)or find in #yself, in #y (nconscio(s, #y drea#s, in hypna o ic i#a es or phrases. /s a s(b7ect 1 have a whole do#ain to scan, if only 1 can find the keys to it. 1 also have deep reso(rces of action, even violent action, which can be tapped in a(to#atic writin or other e*ercises, s(ch as shootin at rando# in the street. B(t where then a# 10 1t is not that 1 inhabit #y body, 1 am it insofar as 1 a# a conscio(s s(b7ect. B(t 1 a# it differently accordin to circ(#stances. Lften 1 ani#ate only its

physical str(ct(re, or the borrowed str(ct(re of the i##ediate environ#ent as it is delivered to #e in perception. B(t 1 also ani#ate other str(ct(res, borrowed or created, those of books or of the i#a ination itself. Ket #e cite Breton a ain, fro# the %irst 1anifesto : $or today 1 think of a castle half of which is not necessarily in r(ins; this castle belon s to #e, 1 see it in a r(ral sit(ation not far fro# Paris. . . . 1 will be convicted of poetic (ntr(th: everyone will o abo(t sayin that 1 live in the r(e $ontaine, and he won9t swallow that. arbleuH B(t this castle of which 1 do hi# the honors, is he s(re that it is an i#a e0 1f this palace e*isted, for all thatB :y (ests are there to answer for it; their fancy is the l(#ino(s ro(te that leads there. 1t is in tr(th at o(r fantasy that we live, when we are there .E9F %ow we are always so#ewhere and we are always there #orally, as it were, on the basis of what we are physically, even tho( h this tr(th is for the #ost part hidden and #ay well re#ain so. ,here is eno( h oin on in (s for (s to have no e*c(se for boredo#. /#on other thin s there are second6order activities like philosophy and criticis#)incl(din the @(estion of the s(b7ect. 1f the s(b7ect, as 1 have s( ested, scans or traverses the labyrinthine str(ct(re of the #e, this #eans that it end(res thro( h ti#e and traces o(t, so to speak, a line thro( h this str(ct(re, thro( h this network of available s(b7ective states. ,o the idiosyncrasy of the s(b7ect we can then add its linearity, th(s invokin the doctrine of the si n)(ns(rprisin ly, perhaps, since we re#e#ber fro# +(sserl that the e o, the s(b7ect, contains its world precisely as a -(nity of sense.- ,he concept of #atchin to which 1 referred earlier has since 8a(ss(re been a special #ark of the si n, and that the life of the s(b7ect sho(ld be a life of si nificance is alto ether appropriate. 21 find the notion of a -life of si nificance- far #ore acceptable than that l(re of bad theolo y and #etaphysics, the -si nificance of life.-5 /s the #inor s(rrealist poet Denis Cha(sson points o(t in his > 39? > essay +es lumi>res coincidentes , -1f the s(rrealist life has a sin le power, it is to be able to #ake of the hi hest si nificance whatever is presented to it, in whatever disorder, by the chance of the everyday.-E1!F Lne f(rther step: we can add also to the idiosyncrasy and linearity of the s(b7ect what the latter, in its 8a(ss(rean conte*t, inevitably s( ests, na#ely, the arbitrariness of the s(b7ect. ,hat these s(b7ectivities sho(ld be associated with these bodies, in this place and at this #o#ent, has no reason and no e*planation. ,hey are not only o(r #eans of access to this reality, they are this reality; they contain their world, as +(sserl said they did. B(t that leads to the final @(estion: what is the relation between the reality the s(b7ect contains and the -e*ternal- reality with which we be an0 /s we have already said, the pro7ection of a reality fro# the side of the s(b7ect, o(t of its reso(rces of conscio(s and (nconscio(s str(ct(re, #ay see# in the end far preferable to the (s(al entrap#ent in the ordinary. /nd yet it is perhaps (nrealistic to try to (se that as an escape ro(te fro# reality. ,o @(ote Surrealism and ainting once #ore, &verythin 1 love Esays BretonF, everythin 1 think and feel, inclines #e to a partic(lar philosophy of i##anence accordin to which s(rreality wo(ld be contained in reality itself, and wo(ld be neither s(perior nor e*terior to it. /nd vice versa, for the container wo(ld also be the contained.E11F ,he @(estion is co#plicated, however, for reality see#s to e*ercise an obsc(rin f(nction. 1n his essay on the first Dali e*hibition, in oint du jour , Breton s( ests that what is th(s obsc(red is of para#o(nt i#portance and that it can be recovered by s(rrealistic strate ies: 1t re#ains to s(ppress, in an (n@(estionable fashion, both what oppresses (s in the #oral

order and what -physically,- as they say, prevents (s fro# seein clearly. 1f only, for e*a#ple, we co(ld et rid of these fa#o(s treesB and of the ho(ses, and the volcanoes, and the e#pires. . . . ,he secret of s(rrealis# resides in the fact that we are convinced that so#ethin is hidden behind the#. %ow we have only to e*a#ine the possible #odes of the s(ppression of trees to perceive that only one a#on these #odes is left to (s, that in the end everythin depends on o(r power of -oluntar" hallucination .E13F ,he lan (a e of this passa e has a c(rio(s echo which takes (s back to Hierke aard. $or what was traditionally reco##ended as a #eans of ettin rid of volcanoes, or at any rate of #ovin #o(ntains, was precisely faith, the oal for which Hierke aard strove so contin(ally and, accordin to his own acco(nt, so (ns(ccessf(lly. 1f we had faith, then the real and the s(rreal wo(ld indeed be interpenetratin , 7(st as > 39= > Breton9s earlier citation re@(ires. Consider the Hni ht of $aith in %ear and Trembling : %o heavenly lance or any other token of the inco##ens(rable betrays hi#; if one did not know hi#, it wo(ld be i#possible to distin (ish hi# fro# the rest of the con re ation. . . . ,owards evenin he walks ho#e, his ait is as indefati able as that of the post#an. Ln his way he reflects that his wife has s(rely a special little war# dish prepared for hi#, e. . a calf9s head roasted, arnished with ve etables. . . . /s it happens, he hasn9t fo(r pence to his na#e, and yet he f(lly and fir#ly believes that his wife has that dainty dish for hi#. . . . +is wife hasn9t it)stran ely eno( h, it is @(ite the sa#e to hi#. Ln the way he #eets another #an. ,hey talk to ether for a #o#ent. 1n the twinklin of an eye he erects a new b(ildin , he has at his disposition all the powers necessary for it.E13F +ere is faith at work all ri ht)and yet is it in the world0 /re the container and the contained sy##etrical0 +as so#ethin not appeared behind the -physical- obstr(ction of reality0 Hierke aard re#ained a#bi (o(s abo(t this; he co(ld not #ana e to be this h(#ble Dane, the Hni ht of $aith who takes an o(tin to the sea shore or the Deer Park)did he really think it desirable0 Precisely the sa#e a#bi (ity, strikin ly eno( h, is to be fo(nd in Breton. Consider the followin passa e, in which %ad7a speaks: -/ a#e: 8ay so#ethin . 8h(t yo(r eyes and say so#ethin . /nythin , a n(#ber, a na#e. Kike this 2she closes her eyes5: ,wo, two what0 ,wo wo#en. .hat are they like0 ,hey9re in black. .here are they0 1n a park. . . . /nd then, what are they doin 0 Co#e on, it9s so easy, why don9t yo( want to play0 .ell, #e, that9s how 1 talk to #yself when 19# alone, 1 tell #yself all sorts of stories. /nd not only pointless stories Ede -aines histoires F: it9s even alto ether like that 1 live.-E1AF /nd Breton adds a footnote: -Doesn9t one to(ch here the e*tre#e of s(rrealist aspiration, its stron est li#it6idea0B(t he doesn9t want to play)or he can9t. Kike Hierke aard, who la#ented his own inability to clai# Ce ina, Breton in several places reproaches hi#self for not bein (p to the s(rrealist challen e, for not speakin to s(ch6and6s(ch a wo#an, for not allowin hi#self to drive blindfold with another wo#an who happened to be %ad7a. Lr rather in this latter case it is 7(st an observation: -%o need to add that 1 did not accede to this desire.-E1"F Perhaps in the end)and the parallels are far fro# e*ha(sted in this brief paper)the s(b7ect in s(rrealis# as in pheno#enolo y cannot let itself o wholly in the one direction or the other, to a solipsistic retreat or to a total s(rreality. Perhaps p(re s(rrealis#, like p(re faith, is an (nreali<able li#it6idea. B(t as in the case of the s(b7ect itself, that li#it6proble#, the fail(re

to reach 2let alone to transcend5 the li#it does not, as it t(rns o(t, invalidate the enterprise. > 399 >

671 S-8Eecti'it( i% t#e ,ac#i%e

I1 T#i%ki%$ a%d S-8Eecti'it(
1n this paper 1 shall propose what 1 take to be a ti#ely shift of attention fro# the @(estion of whether a #achine can think to the @(estion of who, if anyone, a thinkin #achine is. B(t there is life in the old @(estion yet, and one way of lookin at it provides a brid e to the new @(estion. ,his is the strate y of treatin -to think- as deponent verb, and it opens (p the whole iss(e of thinkin as behavior vers(s thinkin as e*perience. Deponent verbs, which in Katin ra##ar were passive verbs with an active sense, were so called beca(se their ori inal passive sense had been -p(t aside,- de!osed as it were, in favor of the new active one. 8o they involved a history, the history of a transition fro# so#ethin that ha!!ened to people to so#ethin they did . 1f this can be traced within a livin lan (a e it #(st have been very recent 2tho( h the whole history of lan (a e, indeed the whole of history, is recent in evol(tionary ter#s5. 1n the case of thinkin s(ch a transition does see# to have taken place)indeed, it is still inco#plete, the passive sense bein preserved in #any loc(tions in c(rrent (se: -it see#s to #e,- -it occ(rs to #e.- .e have dropped the archaic passive for# -#ethinks,- b(t it re#ains in the lan (a e as an archaic for#; it was c(rrent only yesterday, as it were. /nd we can et a sense of what the transition #eans by tryin it o(t on another for#: take -it see#s to #e- and transfor# it into -I see# it to #e.- ,hat is what -1 think- in fact a#o(nts to)fro# havin tho( ht contents occ(r whether we want the# to or not, we #ove to a position of control, we choose what to > 3!! > think, we -#ake (p o(r #inds- 2consider the transition fro# the old for# 91 have a #ind to . . . ,- or its c(rrent descendant -19ve half a #ind to . . . ,- to -19ve #ade (p #y #ind to . . . -5. ,hinkin has an a(thentic ety#olo ical connection with see#in or appearin ; what 1 do when 1 think is to brin so#ethin -before- #e, in a sense yet to be specified)the e*pression that co#es to #ind 2the passive position a ainB5 is -before the #ind9s eye,- whose (sef(lness as a #etaphor is however li#ited beca(se of the tendency of the vis(al to pree#pt the field of attention. 1 will ret(rn to this point. ,he #ain thin to notice here is that the shift fro# passive to active takes (s fro# the ob7ect position to the s(b7ect position. /nd this is so#ethin that happens rad(ally, onto enetically as well as phylo enetically, and that re@(ires o(r participation. Bein able to do it is what it #eans to be a s(b7ect in the active sense, to be an a ent in the process of thinkin rather than a patient. B(t doin it does not #ean the end of thinkin in the other sense. ,he two possible ways of constr(in -thinkin ,- then, are as a process that oes on, that happens to (s, and as an activity (ndertaken, that we en a e in. Lnly the latter involves s(b7ectivity essentially. B(t 7(st what do we (nderstand by this -s(b7ectivity-0 /nd, since (nderstandin and e*planation are

correlative in the philosophy of science, is there an e*planation of s(b7ectivity0 ,o deal with these @(estions in order: by -s(b7ectivity- in this paper 1 #ean the condition of bein a s(b7ect, or bein in the s(b7ect position, in relation to ob7ects known or acted (pon)bein sit(ated, that is, at one pole of a vector of attention or intention, the pole characteri<ed by noetic conscio(sness as opposed to the noe#atic contents of conscio(sness. 1 do not #ean -s(b7ectivity- to be contrasted with -ob7ectivitywhere the latter is (sed, as it so#eti#es is, to #ean a co##endable detach#ent fro# affective infl(ences on 7(d #ent. 1f 1 a# to preserve a scr(p(lo(s ob7ectivity 1 cannot allow -s(b7ective- factors to infl(ence #y concl(sion, so it looks as if 1 have to keep so#ethin called -s(b7ectivity- at bay. B(t 1 have to be a subject , hence to have s(b7ectivity in the sense in which 1 (se the ter# here, if I a# to preserve or concl(de anythin , or know that anythin has been preserved or concl(ded. /nother way of p(ttin this is to say that ob7ective knowled e !resu!!oses s(b7ectivity beca(se any knowled e does, knowled e bein 7(st s(ch an intentional relation. Can s(b7ectivity in this sense be e*plained0 ,here are two #ain ways of oin abo(t the b(siness of e*planation, which 1 will call workin out 2fro# an int(ited center5 and workin u! 2fro# a post(lated base5; their paradi # cases are respectively pheno#enolo ical and hypothetico6ded(ctive e*planations. 1deally these processes #eet in the f(ll e*6 > 3!1 > planation of a iven ob7ect, process, or event. ,his shows not only how the entity in @(estion fits into a ca(sal network b(t also how we have access to it in e*perience. B(t a syste#atic diffic(lty arises in any atte#pt at an e*planation of s(b7ectivity: we must start with it in workin o(t, b(t we can't get to it by workin (p. ,his is, a ain, for the obvio(s reason that even workin (p pres(pposes it: s(b7ectivity is intentional, and beca(se both the e*planand(# and the e*planans are intentional ob7ects it is re@(ired if they are to be evoked. ,his is a cr(cial point. 1 (se -intentional- here in Brentano and +(sserl9s sense, not in Dennett9s sense, E1F which, altho( h it catches ad#irably how syste#s with Brentano6+(sserl intentionality #i ht beha-e 2or how their behavior #i ht be e*plained5, it doesn9t s(cceed in showin )and to do Dennett 7(stice doesn9t try to show)that a syste# the e*planation of whose behavior re@(ires the -intentional stance- needs to have intentionality in the Brentano6+(sserl sense. Dennett doesn9t think this #atters, b(t 1 think it #akes a tre#endo(s difference. 1ntentionality is 7(st the feat(re of s(b7ectivity that directs its awareness towards ob7ects 2or is aware of its direction towards ob7ects5. -1ntentions,- in the sense of -p(rposes,- are a fa#iliar case of this, tho( h they acco(nt for no #ore than a s#all fraction of intentional activity; attention, to which 1 shall ret(rn below, is a special case in which the ob7ect is presented 2nor#ally in perception5, so that its constit(tion as what it is re@(ires no active contrib(tion fro# the s(b7ect. Lf co(rse the only s(b7ectivity pres(pposed in this way is #y own. 1ts intentionalities, however, are what #ake #y world and #y pro7ect and #ake the# #eanin f(l. Lr perhaps havin a #eanin f(l pro7ect in a #eanin f(l world is 7(st what it is to be a s(b7ect. O(intilian9s definition of the rhetorical for# subiectio , as -the s( estin of an answer to one9s own @(estion,- s( ests a possible definition of s(b7ectivity: to be a s(b7ect is to be in a position to s( est oneself as the answer to one9s own @(estion. Lne of the thin s 1 think is #yself. B(t 1 think #yself differently fro# the way 1 think ob7ects, and that is one of the diffic(lties in the way of a eneral e*planation of s(b7ectivity. $re(d to the contrary notwithstandin , the s(b7ect can9t be #ade an ob7ect; 1 can9t ive #y own s(b7ectivity as the answer to anyone else's @(estion, nor can anyone else ive theirs as the answer to #ine. B(t if we can9t prod(ce s(b7ectivity as an e*planand(# on the basis of an e*planans we can perhaps at least locate it, and indicate the kinds of str(ct(re and e*perience that are conco#itant with its occ(rrence.

.e have no evidence at the #o#ent of any cases of s(b7ectivity other than o(r own, and 2con7ect(rally5 that of so#e of the hi her #a##als. /ll of the# are associated with the advanced develop#ent of central nervo(s syste#s. B(t central nervo(s syste#s can beco#e e*6 > 3!3 > tre#ely co#ple* witho(t the e#er ence of s(b7ectivity. .hat we find we want to say is that there cannot be s(b7ectivity witho(t the f(ll activity of thinkin , and that brin s (s back to the old @(estion. ,he distinction between tho( ht as process and tho( ht as activity closely parallels the distinction between tho( ht as behavior and tho( ht as e*perience: any syste# can behave, whether conscio(s 2or s(b7ective)b(t the ter#s are not synony#o(s5 or not, b(t only a conscio(s s(b7ect can have e*perience. 2,he -e*6- of e*perience,- tho( h in its ori in a plain -e*6- like any other, shares with the -e*6- of -e*istence- the sense of a standin 6o(t fro# so#ethin : e*6perience is a co#in 6o(t fro# a oin 6thro( h, b(t there has to be so#e contin(ity, so#e s(bstrate, for it to be c(#(lative.5

II1 T#i%ki%$ as 3e#a'ior

-,hinkin as behavior- is itself a#bi (o(s. 1t has two senses, one relatively strai htforward, the other at once #ore trivial and #ore profo(nd. ,he strai htforward sense constr(es the behavior associated with thinkin as a behavioral o(tp(t that is taken to res(lt fro# tho( ht. 1t helps in circ(#scribin the place of tho( ht in the process if there has been an inp(t which has tri ered it by offerin so#ethin to think abo(t. 8o the paradi # case is the answer to a @(estion, and the classical for# of @(estionin is ,(rin 9s i#itation a#e.E3F / #achine that plays the a#e proficiently, so that its -opponent- thinks it is a h(#an bein , has to be ad#itted to have been thinkin , or at any rate doin so#ethin that, if a h(#an bein did it, wo(ld co(nt as thinkin . ,(rin ar (ed that there co(ld be no reason to deny tho( ht to the #achine if it satisfied the test by which we attrib(te tho( ht to h(#an bein s. 1s the i#itation a#e s(ch a test0 ,here is clearly so#ethin it tests: it is by his or her answers to #y @(estions 2or responses to #y conversational #oves )o(tri ht interro ation is not the nor# of social interco(rse5 that 1 7(d e whether #y interloc(tor is awake, &n lish6speakin , intelli ent, knowled eable, witty, tho( htf(l 2which is only one #ode of thinkin 5, ifted at lan (a es or #athe#atics, a co#patriot, a fellow6enth(siast, a professional collea (e, etc. :ostly of co(rse 1 ass(#e these thin s and a# disappointed when he or she t(rns o(t to be inartic(late, slow6witted, or fra(d(lent. ,he i#itation a#e in fact see#s to be less a test of thinkin than of the #e#bership of one9s interloc(tor in one or #ore of a n(#ber of lin (istic co##(nities, all the #e#bers of all of which are assumed to be capable of tho( ht. B(t on reflection it does not see# obvio(s that > 3!3 > if a #achine passes the test of ad#ission to s(ch a co##(nity, it necessarily follows that this ass(#ption operates in its favor too. .hat does the ass(#ption rest on0 +ow do people learn the lan (a e of tho( ht)not the -lan (a e of tho( ht- in $odor9s sense b(t the ordinary lan (a e by which they refer to tho( ht0 ,hey precisely can't learn it by behavioral c(es e*cept in the trivial sense: f(rrowin brows, ban in foreheads, etc. B(t the #ore profo(nd i#plications of this sense)the behavioral conco#itants of

tho( ht, rather than its behavioral conse@(ences)are connected with the reali<ation that so#eti#es it is 7(st the absence of behavioral c(es that indicates thinkin . / child who dist(rbs an i##obile and silent parent is reb(ked for it)-Can9t yo( see 19# thinkin 0-)#ay learn to be silent and i##obile too at tricky 7(nct(res and #ay thereby learn to attend to so#ethin in itself that wo(ld not otherwise have been attended to. /n anecdotal e*a#ple of the point at iss(e here was recently provided by a strikin scene in a play called -.hose Kife 1s 1t /nyway0- 1ts #ain character was a hospital patient paraly<ed fro# the neck down. /t a cli#actic point in the play a 7(d e, who had to decide whether to rant the patient9s wish to be allowed to die and who was in perple*ity abo(t this decision, walked downsta e and stood #otionless for what was in dra#atic ter#s a very lon ti#e, his hand to his chin, obvio(sly deep in tho( ht. 1t was (nderstood that in this #o#ent he was actively e*ercisin his hi hest h(#an capacities, his hi h 7(dicial f(nction; and yet in so doin he was as it were sy#bolically paraly<ed. +e wasn9t doin anythin that the patient co(ldn9t do, and the spectator was led for a #o#ent to reflect that if the hi hest #ode of f(nctionin as a h(#an is co#patible with i##obility, then the patient9s i##obility was no bar to his f(nctionin at the hi hest h(#an level. ,hat wasn9t how the play ca#e o(t, b(t it serves #y p(rpose by sharpenin the @(estion of what is oin on while we are thinkin , what attention to the process of tho( ht reveals, and whether attendin to it has anythin essential to do with the process. 1t #i ht t(rn o(t to be the case that we are thinkin bein s who happen to be able to observe so#e of o(r thinkin processes conscio(sly even tho( h there is no need for (s to do so, like passen ers on a ship who are allowed to o (p on the brid e and watch the captain and hear his co##ands, tho( h the ship wo(ld sail on 7(st the sa#e if they stayed below. /nd it #i ht t(rn o(t that #achines can9t do this, in which case they wo(ld be thinkin all ri ht b(t there still #i ht not be anyone there. Ln the other hand it #i ht t(rn o(t that o(r role on the brid e is as captain, for#in an essential link in the ca(sal chain of co##and. /nd if there were so#e > 3!A > #ane(vers that co(ldn9t be done witho(t the captain9s intervention, and the #achine #ana ed those too, then we wo(ld have to ask what in it corresponded to the captain. Before anyone raises the obvio(s ob7ection to this #etaphor 1 had better do so #yself. 1t so(nds like a ho#(nc(l(s theory, and even Descartes saw that that wo(ld not do. +e (ses #(ch the sa#e i#a e: -1 a# not only residin in #y body, as a pilot in his ship, b(t . . . 1 a# inti#ately connected with it, and . . . so#ethin like a sin le whole is prod(ced.-E3F 8o it is not a @(estion of a !art of #e observin another part, b(t of #y e*ercisin a refle*ive or self6referential ca!acit" that #ay or #ay not be essential to the process of tho( ht. ,his -essential- re#ains proble#atic tho( h)it #i ht t(rn o(t that the captain hi#self served a #erely decorative f(nction, and that the ship wo(ld sail s#oothly on even if he stayed below.

III1 Atte%tio% a%d I%te%tto%alit(

Certainly there are f(nctions of what we all reco ni<e as tho( ht that we can9t attend to even if we try. 1f so#eone asks #e for the prod(ct of si* and seven and 1 say -forty6two,- there is 7(st no way in which 1 can catch any tho( ht6content between the @(estion and its answer. 1 can of co(rse co#plicate thin s so as to provide one)si* sevens is the sa#e as three fo(rteens, which is three tens pl(s three fo(rs, two6and6a6half of which will already #ake another ten, and so on. B(t that is only like cli#bin the steps at Ko(rdes on one9s knees so as to draw attention to the process.

,he concept of attention keeps croppin (p and itself needs to be attended to. 1t #akes a pair with intention and the contrast between the# is instr(ctive. ,his has so#ethin in co##on with the contrast between discovery and invention, in that we attend to what is already there b(t intend precisely what is not yet or is no lon er there, or what never was or never co(ld be there 2 olden #o(ntains, ro(nd s@(ares5. 1t is the difference between findin so#ethin and creatin it. 8(b7ectivity, in the pheno#enolo ical sense, is as we have seen intentional by definition: every conscio(sness is a conscio(sness of so#ethin , and intentionality points alon the a*is fro# neoesis to noe#a. ,his pointin however is an acti-it" of the knowin s(b7ect, which s(stains the ob7ect of tho( ht; it s( ests that the s(b7ect is also agent . ,he standard cases of intentional ob7ects, 7(st referred to, don9t we s(ppose present the#selves; they need to be thought of . 2,heir clai# to ontolo ical stat(s consists wholly in the fact that they are ob7ects of tho( ht.5 .hat if s(b7ectivity were #erely attentional 0 Conscio(sness wo(ld > 3!" > still have a content all ri ht, b(t the @(estion of a ency wo(ldn9t arise; we wo(ld have to ass(#e that tho( ht proceeded a(to#atically and that the vario(s contents of conscio(sness associated with it, incl(din the feelin s of deliberation, a ency, etc., were 7(st iven, as we are nor#ally convinced so#e of the# really are 2for e*a#ple, hypna o ic i#a es and phrases5. ,his is in effect the position fa#iliarly known as epipheno#enalis#. 1f it is correct then there can9t be any way of knowin whether there co(ld be s(b7ectivity in the #achine, b(t on the other hand it won9t #atter #(ch. &pipheno#enalis# is abo(t as (ninterestin , philosophically speakin , as strict deter#inis#, since if either of the# is correct, there9s nothin we can do abo(t it; in fact there9s nothin we can do period)it all 7(st happens. 1t #ay be philosophy, it #ay be se*, it #ay be pain, it #ay be #adness)we9re 7(st alon for the #ovie. Perhaps so#eone wrote the script for the #ovie, perhaps not, it #akes no difference, we9re strapped into o(r seats, no cli#bin o(t of this cave. /nd these views #i ht in fact be correct 21 know of no ar (#ent that can block that possibility in either case5, b(t if so #y con7ect(re that they are or aren9t correct has no wei ht whatever: it9s 7(st so#ethin that ot con7ect(red in #y #ovie, 1 can take no credit for it, I 9# not in it. Possibly the #achine is watchin its #ovie. 1f it is, as 1 shall s( est in a #in(te, it #ay or #ay not be en7oyin itself, and that #i ht have i#plications for (s as #achine6b(ilders)b(t not in an epipheno#enalist world; there there aren9t any i#plications of anythin for (s, 7(st #ovie6i#plications at best, as (nreal as screen kisses or cha#pa ne. 8till once one thinks of it one has to ad#it that a lot of h(#an e*perience is #erely attentional. 8o the capacity for conscio(s attention #i ht be an evol(tionary dead6end, a freak of which we happen to be the co#placent 2or on reflection the astonished5 beneficiaries. B(t it see#s 7(st as likely that it conferred so#e evol(tionary advanta e, that attention #ade intention possible. ,he attention6intention loop constit(tes, one #i ht say, a conscio(s version of the sensori#otor loop, and #ay indeed be inserted in it, altho( h this is not necessary either to the s(ccess of so#e sensori#otor processes or to the #eanin f(lness of so#e intentional responses to attention.

IV1 Se%satio% a%d Co%scio-s%ess

,his way of p(ttin it provides a cl(e as to the e#er ence of s(b7ectivity o(t of #ere conscio(sness. $irst we have peripheral refle* arcs, then sensori#otor coordination thro( h the central nervo(s syste#: so

> 3!4 > far no conscio(sness. ,hen the co#ple*ity of sensori#otor activity, its #(ltidi#ensionality, its necessary swiftness, #ake it desirable to ive the relevant inp(ts analo for# as what we call the -senses,- and to re!resent the state of the a#bient world by #appin its feat(res into a vis(al space into which the position of the body and of its parts can also be #apped. 2:ore acc(rately, the independent develop#ent of s(ch an analo representation #akes reater co#ple*ity, speed, etc. of sensori#otor processes possible for the or anis#s that have it.5 Mis(al awareness, let (s s(ppose, is 7(st this #appin . 1t has its attentional and its intentional aspects: the inp(t is so#ethin that as we say -catches- o(r attention, the o(tp(t is the directed reach, first of si ht 2we look rather than 7(st noticin 5 and then of the appropriate #(sc(lar co#ple*. ,he s(# of sensory awarenesses and their derivatives will constit(te the content of conscio(sness. An" sensori#otor loop, it #i ht be ar (ed, involves representation or #appin of so#e kind: at the very least the vis(al 2or a(ditory or olfactory or tactile5 space fro# which the inp(t arrives will #ap on to the #otor space to which the o(tp(t is directed. +owever we need our syste# of representation to reco ni<e the #appin 2and the spaces between which it holds5 as s(ch)otherwise it9s 7(st a bit of ca(sal #achinery. 1n #ore co#ple* cases, when the loop doesn9t p(t its si nals strai ht thro( h b(t en a es so#e #ore co#ple* ne(ral str(ct(re, possibly involvin ti#e delays that #ake strate ic co#p(tations possible, we #ay find what look to (s like internal representations that #ap into both spaces, sensory and #otor. B(t do they #ake the inp(t and o(tp(t spaces -look like- the sa#e space to the or anis# in @(estion0 1s co#p(tation here also deliberation of a sort0 %o si#ple answer, it see#s to #e, can be iven to these @(estions. 1n o(r case it is so, which s( ests that so#ethin si#ilar probably holds for other or anis#s of co#parable co#ple*ity. Lnce the analo representation is in place 2let (s call it the -sensori(#-5, the or anis# can do all sorts of interestin thin s with it, especially if a ood #e#ory is also available. B(t the develop#ent, fro# the i##ediate and vivid sensori(# 2lar ely pree#pted by percept(al contents, which when available tend to overwhel# co#petitors for attention)this e*plains why the library in which 1 a# writin is @(iet, and decorated in #(ted colors5, of the intentional do#ain re@(ired for thinkin and s(b7ectivity, #(st have been lon and slow. Lnce it had learned to attend to the contents of perception 2selectively no do(bt)at first to #ove#ent and chan e, for e*a#ple, rather than to constant feat(res5, the or anis# co(ld be in to attend to sensory contents re#e#bered or abstracted fro# #e#ory. Kater on)and here is the transition to a ency)it co(ld intend the# also 2i#a ine, pro7ect, etc.5. /t > 3!? > this sta e there need be no act(al sensori#otor involve#ent at all: hence the i##obility of the thinker. ,his activity is by definition conscio(s, and there can be little do(bt that #any ani#als share it with (s 2drea#in do s, for e*a#ple5. ,he @(estion is, how #(ch of the activity of tho( ht necessarily oes on there , rather than oin on elsewhere and bein reported there, or not, as the case #ay be0 1 a# s( estin that so#e for#s of co#ple* sensori#otor coordination #ay have re@(ired the insertion of an attentional6intentional se #ent, that this #ay have been what #ade the# possible. Lr perhaps it is what #ade learning the# possible. 1n this connection 8chrTdin er9s con7ect(res as to the evol(tionary role of conscio(sness are relevant. 8chrTdin er tho( ht that conscio(sness had a phylo enetic f(nction: -1 wo(ld s(##ari<e #y eneral hypothesis th(s: conscio(sness is associated with the learning of the livin s(bstance: its knowing how is (nconscio(s.-EAF B(t once we know how there see#s to be nothin to prevent o(r pro ra##in co#ple* coordinations into the #achine witho(t re@(irin it ever to be conscio(s; we co(ld gi-e it the appropriate transfor# between vis(al space and

sensory space instead of #akin it establish the transfor# for itself, as see#s to be the case with (s 2altho( h even with (s a lot of that see#s to happen a(to#atically)binoc(lar vision, for e*a#ple) only learned refine#ents re@(irin conscio(s #onitorin 5.

V1 T#e Asce%t to S-8Eecti'it(

1t is te#ptin to try to establish a develop#ental se@(ence, an ascent fro# the inertia of #atter to the refle*ive conscio(sness of the s(b7ect. 1 offer here one possible acco(nt of s(ch an ascent, in ter#s of states 285, re!resentations 2C5, and an operator 2U5 which 1 shall call the -#atchin - operator. :atchin , as 1 have e*plained elsewhere,E"F is not a si#ple correspondence b(t has an active sense) a#on thin s that #atch are e@(al n(#bers and identical colors, b(t also left and ri ht loves, keys and locks, #(sical phrases and their repetitions or transpositions, bits of 7i saw p(<<les and the spaces they fit into, and so on. /bove all, in lan (a e the si nifier #atches the si nified 2indeed 1 consider #atchin to be the f(nda#ental pheno#enon of si nification5. ,he sta es of the ascent are represented as 2a5 thro( h 2f5 in fi (re 1. ,he states are states of so#e individ(al entity, which at sta e 2c5 and above is an or anis#. /t sta e 2a5 the entity is not differentiated fro# its environ#ent, so that there is no sense to a contrast between internal and e*ternal states. /t sta e 2b5 there is differentiation b(t no #etabolis#, so that nothin abo(t the environ#ent #atters to or affects the > 3!= >

$i (re 1 entity. :etabolis# is the #ini#(# condition for the entity9s f(nctionin as an or anis#. /t sta e 2c5 and above, then, the e*ternal state 8e is the state of the i##ediate environ#ent as it affects the organism , i norin irrelevant conditions even tho( h these #i ht see#, fro# so#e other point of view, the #ost salient feat(res of that environ#ent. 8ta e 2c5 itself represents a sit(ation in which the or anis# reacts to so#ethin in its environ#ent, salinity or te#perat(re, for e*a#ple, so that it #oves in s(ch a way as to brin its internal state 8i into e@(ilibri(# with the e*ternal state and then stops #ovin (ntil either 8i or 8e chan es with ti#e, in which case #ove#ent reco##ences. ,he #atchin takes place across the bo(ndary between the or anis# and the environ#ent. B(t at sta e 2d5 1 post(late a ca(sal process that for#s within the or anis# a representation of the relevant state of the environ#ent. ,here is obvio(sly no need for the representation to resemble anythin in the environ#ent, as lon as chan es in the environ#ent prod(ce correspondin chan es in the representation. %ow the #atchin beco#es internal to the or anis#, and a #is#atch, which leads as before to #otion (ntil it is corrected, is no lon er a transaction between or anis# and environ#ent. 1 s(ppose that at this sta e the or anis# is sensiti-e , and that the #is#atch, constit(tin as it now does a state a#on others of the or anis# itself, is felt , perhaps in the li#it as pain)indeed al#ost certainly as pain, since pres(#ably the avoidance of ross #is#atches is of evol(tionary si nificance. 1t has to be ad#itted that here 2as at every point in the ascent5 #y

> 3!9 > assertions are wholly con7ect(ral, b(t of co(rse 7(st s(ch con7ect(res, which if tr(e wo(ld acco(nt for the conditions they are intended to e*plain, are the st(ff of scientific disco(rse. /t sta e 2e5 1 envisa e a do(ble representation, not only of the state of the environ#ent b(t of the state of the or anis# that re@(ires to be bro( ht into e@(ilibri(# with it: the #onitorin of the #atch between these representations 1 take to si nal the e#er ence of conscio(s awareness, tho( h this is still tied to i##ediate sensory contents. / centrally i#portant special case at this and the s(bse@(ent sta e will be the case in which the internal state represented by C 28i 5 is an ele#ent of memor" ; the availability of lar e n(#bers of #e#ory6states is part of what #akes conscio(sness and s(b7ectivity as co#ple* as they are. $inally at sta e 2f5 the dependence on #o#entary sensory inp(ts is overco#e, and conscio(sness is free to attend to #atchin s of pairs of internal representations. ,his is the condition for s(b7ectivity: conscio(sness can b(ild (p an internal history, can lead a life of its own independently of the e*ternal state of affairs, provided the latter does not obtr(de in the for# of representations on a lower level that de#and attention beca(se of painf(l dise@(ilibria. ,he n(#ber of available internal states can, with ti#e, row very lar e, and the life of the s(b7ect be al#ost wholly internal.

VI1 T#e Place o& t#e S-8Eect

1n speakin of -#onitorin - or -attendin to- #atchin s of representations there is a risk of #is(nderstandin that 1 wo(ld like to try to dispel, tho( h since the correspondin for# of (nderstandin can at best be #etaphorical, this #ay not be easy. :y s(b7ectivity is of co(rse en a ed in the writin of this te*t, as is the reader9s in readin it; as we look at the representations of the hierarchical sta es, for e*a#ple, at 2e5

the vector of o(r intentionalities is ro( hly ortho onal to the plane of the pa e)we attend to the post(lated #atchin of two states b(t o(r own s(b7ectivity is a third ele#ent in the sit(ation. B(t in 2e5 and 2f5 1 do not #ean to s( est that the conscio(sness or the s(b7ectivity of the or anis# is a third ele#ent alon side the two #atched ele#ents; on the contrary, it is their matching . 1n the percept(al case it will look to the or anis# as if there is only one state, and that e*ternal, perception bein of ob7ects in the environ#ent. B(t all the or anis# has s(b7ective access to is a representation of the e*ternal state, and all representations are internal; what is happenin is that the internal representation > 31! > 2not necessarily rese#blin the e*ternal state b(t deter#ined by it and responsive to it5 is bein intended 2or attended to5 by the or anis#, which for the p(rposes of conscio(s action or reaction is as it were linin it (p with, si htin it thro( h, correlatin it with, a representation of an internal state, a #e#ory6state for e*a#ple. /ll these i#a es of co#parison are (nsatisfactory beca(se they invoke two entities bein #anip(lated by a third, whereas the s(b7ect s(bsists in the dyna#ic relation of the two. ,he net res(lt of the #atchin that prod(ces the s(b7ect is the intendin of ob7ects, of a world. 1n an earlier te*t 1 defined the s(b7ect as -what per#its the inte ral, contin(o(s, and possibly repeated apprehension of the ob7ect, in the #o#ent of this apprehension and abstractin fro# p(rely physiolo ical conditions of perception . . . 91nte ral9 does not re@(ire a total inte ration of the ob7ect in itself . . . and 9contin(o(s9 does not re@(ire a very lon ti#e)b(t eno( h. . . . Contin(ity i#plies, one

#i ht say, a repetition fro# one #o#ent to the ne*t; the f(rther possibility of the repetition of a whole episode of apprehension, the reco nition of the sa#e ob7ect after a #ore or less prolon ed absence, i#plies the 9 enidentity9 of the s(b7ect as an individ(al and of its own point of view.-E4F 8o for the s(b7ect in the dia ra# the vector of intentionality lies alon the line, in the plane of the pa e; at sta e 2e5, the first at which talk of intentionality #akes any sense, one can i#a ine its pointin fro# left to ri ht, si htin the e*ternal world thro( h its representation, as it were. 1n that case we #i ht be te#pted to locate the s(b7ect itself as a kind of virt(al ori in of intentionality so#ewhere to the left. B(t this wo(ld be #isleadin at best, and by the ti#e we reach 2f5 the assi n#ent a !riori of s(ch directionality #akes little sense. 1n eneral we #i ht s(ppose that the vector oes fro# si nifier to si nified, b(t in the ra#ified network of representations that e*ists at this level it #ay beco#e proble#atic or #eanin less to perpet(ate that distinction. ,he s(b7ect in other words is coincident with the #atched ele#ents. ,he so#ewhat el(sive nat(re of this relationship was anticipated 2in what #ay see# an (nlikely @(arter5 by Gean6Pa(l 8artre in his doctrine of the -prerefle*ive co ito.-E?F 8artre9s ar (#ent in effect was that if 1 a# conscio(s of so#ethin , 1 a# at the sa#e ti#e conscio(s of bein conscio(s of it. 8o in the #atchin of representations 1 a# aware of the #atchin as well as of what is represented and the for# (nder which it is represented. ,his do(ble awareness is 1 think an essential feat(re of s(b7ectivity. 21t can of co(rse be #ore than do(ble, since the str(ct(re of the prerefle*ive co ito lends itself to rec(rsion, tho( h in practice 1 s(spect that there is a li#it to the n(#ber of ter#s in the series that can be attended to at once, and that two ter#s)the first two)are the > 311 > nor#.5 8ayin this however is of no help in e*plainin how s(b7ectivity is possible. /s 1 s( ested at the be innin , 1 think that s(ch an e*planation is (navailable to (s in principle. ,he fact of s(b7ectivity is, in the strict sense, absol(te: as a proble# it does not ad#it of sol(tion. %ote that in the ascent described above -representation- is in a so#ewhat si#ilar sit(ation to -intentionality- in the early part of the paper: a specification of the relation of representation #i ht be drawn (p, that wo(ld be #et by cases in which s(b7ectivity was present, b(t at the sa#e ti#e the fact that a case #et the specification wo(ld be no (arantee whatever that s(b7ectivity was in fact present. 1ndeed, s(ch specifications have been drawn (p, by Ch(rchland, Pylyshyn, and others, and they t(rn o(t to be nothin #ore than sophisticated versions of #appin , 7(st as Dennett9s intentionality t(rned o(t to be a sophisticated version of e*planation. 1t see#s to #e (nlikely that we will (nderstand re!resent ation in tho( ht (ntil we have (nderstood !resent ation in perception)and then 2perhaps5 in tho( ht too.

VII1 T#e Se%sori-/ as ,o%itor

.hat e*actly is -present to the #ind- in tho( ht0 1 co#e now to an even #ore con7ect(ral part of #y paper, which belon s to the hi her reaches of the ascent, after all the sta es hinted at above. %ote, a ain, that we #i ht o (p an ascent like this one 2e. ., one that #i#icked it behaviorally, with delayed reactions that looked like -allowin ti#e for tho( ht-5 witho(t activatin the sensori(# or havin en(ine cases of s(b7ective presentation or representation. Lne reason for this is that an or anis# 2or a #achine5 can have sensors witho(t havin a sensori(#. ,he old ,(rin proble#, this ti#e a bit closer to reali<ation, co#es (p i#plicitly in Malentino Braitenber 9s enial #ena erie of -vehicles.-E=F +is second si#plest vehicle)with two sensors and two #otors)already e*hibits -fear- or -a ression,-

dependin on whether the sensor6#otor connections are parallel or crossed over. ,his reinforces the view that there is #ore to thinkin than #eets the behavioral eye 2or less: the i##obile parent lost in tho( ht #ay in fact be #erely daydrea#in 5, b(t a ain it9s we who interpret the behavior as fearf(l or a ressive. 1 will be in this f(rther con7ect(ral develop#ent by likenin the sensori(# to the display of a co#p(ter, a very fine6 rained display with so#ethin on the order of 1!? pi*els. ,he display can be (sed to #ap a vis(al field correspondin to perceived feat(res of a world, b(t it can 7(st as well be (sed for te*t. 2Lf co(rse te*t can be and often is fo(nd in the perceived vis(al field, since readin and writin are the do#inant > 313 > sensory and #otor activities of or anis#s above a certain level of acc(lt(ration)note that -sensori#otor- wo(ld be inappropriate here since there is nor#ally a wide separation, and an e*tre#ely co#ple* correlation, if any, between the two activities.5 ,e*t in the sensori(# will consist of so(nd6i#a es 2in 8a(ss(re9s sense5 or vis(al i#a es of letters, etc., and it will coe*ist there with other sensory ele#ents, with co#ple*es of which te*t(al co#ple*es #ay be #atched, in the first instance 7(st as 8a(ss(re says they are in his theory of the lin (istic si n. ,hese #atchin s, achieved by an ability that 1 have called -apposition,-E9F #i ht be stored)the #echanis# of this stora e is for #y p(rposes a #atter of indifference, altho( h any atte#pt to reali<e this sche#e wo(ld have to pay caref(l attention to it)in a #e#ory capable of e*pansion, in s(ch a way that the appearance of one ele#ent in the display #i ht ca(se the other to be retrieved. ,he !rocess of retrieval wo(ld not be conscio(s, since the display itself is the analo (e of conscio(sness; the appropriate response wo(ld 7(st appear in conscio(sness, as 1 s( ested above that -forty6two- does when so#ebody asks for the prod(ct of si* and seven. .e will have to s(ppose a basic repertoire of possible co#p(tational #oves to have been enetically installed in apparat(s of which we are wholly (nconscio(s. 1t is ad#ittedly far fro# clear 7(st how the contents of the display are presented to conscio(sness. 1 #entioned earlier that the (se of the sensori(# for properly sensory presentation)pres(#ably its earliest (se)tends to overwhel# other #ore con cept(al options, to pree#pt the space of representation; its (se for sy#bol or te*t #anip(lation see#s to be secondary and derivative. ,he history of the fa#iliar co#p(ter display, at any rate in its pop(larly accessible #ode, offers an instr(ctive parallel: ori inally everybody 2apart fro# back6roo# boys with cathode ray t(bes5 tho( ht of the display as nor#ally providin vis(al representations, video i#a es in fact, and only later did it beco#e (s(al to (se it as a #onitor for co#p(ter operations. B(t in the case of the -display- in this #odel of #ind it isn9t necessarily the case that its contents are obvio(sly sensory at all; they aren9t necessarily images in the sense in which that ter# has been (sed, e. ., by Hosslyn.E1!F 1t see#s pla(sible that only after the develop#ent of sensory awareness co(ld conscio(s thought have e#er ed, b(t its intentional do#ain, tho( h as it were derived fro# the sensori(#, isn9t properly speakin a sensori(# 2we #i ht perhaps call the sensory6percept(al do#ain the !rimar" sensori(#, the intentional do#ain of tho( ht the secondar" sensori(#, in order to preserve the sense of the s(ffi* as a place where so#ethin is oin on5. ,he reason why this display #odel is so appealin , iven what we > 313 >

now know abo(t co#p(ters, is that in fact even the contents of the pri#ary sensori(# t(rn o(t to be co#p(ted rather than 7(st iven)perception is the o(tco#e of a co#p(tational process, not the #ere trans#ission of data b(t the constr(ction of a world o(t of the#. ,his -co#p(tational #odel- is still bein ar (ed, tho( h it has been obvio(s eno( h for a lon ti#e to anyone fa#iliar with the relevant physics and ne(rophysiolo y. 1t is a delicate proble# to e*plicate, to be s(re. Consider, for e*a#ple, 8chrTdin er9s re#ark at the be innin of the work already @(oted: -,he world is a constr(ct of o(r sensations, perceptions, #e#ories. 1t is convenient to re ard it as e*istin ob7ectively on its own. B(t it certainly does not beco#e #anifest by its #ere e*istence. 1ts beco#in #anifest is conditional on very special oin son in very special parts of this very world, na#ely on certain events that happen in a brain.-E11F +ere -world- needs to be disa#bi (ated: the contents of #y sensori(# are m" world, even tho( h 1 take there to be a world that e*ists ob7ectively on its own that 1 will call the world, whose local feat(res 1 s(ppose help to deter#ine #y world. B(t the events in #y brain are not in the -very worldwhose !erce!tual apprehension they #ake possible. ,he essential point, tho( h)e*pressed s(ccinctly by the &n lish syste#s6theoretical eccentric Lliver .ells as: the brain co#p(tes the world)is that perception is a co#p(tational #echanis# whose o(tp(t to the display is the world we perceive, or in .ells9s words, after a disc(ssion of Iibson: .hat we propose is that the vis(al syste# be considered as a co#p(tin device which co#p(tes fro# overlaps of . . . different scenes the stable, contin(o(s, (nbo(nded confi (ration of the roo#.).hat we -see.- %ote that this can only be done when there is #ove#ent; the head has been t(rned, and optic infor#ation on the retinas has chan ed. .itho(t this #ove#ent there co(ld not be any co#p(tation. 1t is as in #athe#atics)the co#p(tation of an invariant (nder s(ccessive transfor#ations.E13F 1t #ay be worth notin en !assant that Cassirer had this idea of perception as invariance (nder transfor#ation as early as 193=.E13F 1n the enerali<ed or secondary6sensori(# case we #ay say si#ilarly that tho( ht is a co#p(tational #echanis# whose o(tp(t to the display is the world we apprehend, or rasp, or (nderstand, in its str(ct(re and not #erely in its appearances. :(ch of the inp(t here, while carried by perception, will be p(rely te*t(al or relational and th(s transparent to its #ode of e#bodi#ent)which is why the sa#e tho( ht content can be conveyed in different words, or different lan (a es, or different sy#bolic #odes. 1f this #odel is pla(sible, if tho( ht has available to it both display > 31A > and #e#ory, both what Ch(rchlandE1AF has called -topo raphic #aps- or -state spaces- 2a#on which three6di#ensional vis(al space is the #ost easily envisa ed, altho( h the spaces of hi her di#ensionality that he describes for other senses)which of co(rse we won9t a!!rehend as spaces in the sa#e way)#i ht well f(nction si#ilarly5 and a stora e #echanis# that assi ns addresses to ite#s of str(ct(re as they are encoded 2cross6connections between e*periential ite#s in different state spaces, for e*a#ple, b(t also and #ainly connections between s(ch ite#s and te*t(al ones, or between te*t(al ite#s5 then a reat #any p(<<lin facts abo(t brain str(ct(re and #e#ory #i ht fall into place and so#e ne(rolo ical patholo ies be readily e*plained. ,he @(estion abo(t the conscio(sness of tho( ht then transfor#s into the @(estion of how #(ch thinkin oes on in the display and how #(ch is hidden in circ(its that draw on stored infor#ation, whether learned or innate.

VIII1 T#e S-8Eect as A$e%t= T#e ,ac#i%e as S-8Eect

.hat we have to ass(#e 2if we are not to fall back into the epipheno#enalist position5 is that there is an intentional a ency capable, if not of s(##onin #aterial fro# stora e 2altho( h it probably does that too5, at least of attendin selectively to what happens to be in the display, whether it shows (p there on the basis of sensory e*perience or e#er es when sensory e*perience is to so#e de ree s(spended or shorted o(t 2the i##obile thinker a ain5. ,his selective attention will evoke the appropriate connections and th(s b(ild intentional str(ct(res. $(ll s(b7ectivity, 1 ar (e, re@(ires a refle*ive intentional str(ct(re that represents on the one hand the enidentity of the a ent fro# his or her past to the present and fro# the present to at least a pro*i#ate f(t(re, and on the other the coherence of his or her sensory and te*t(al e#bodi#ent 2tho( h there are #ethodolo ical obstacles to the concl(siveness of any s(ch ar (#ent5. 1t also re@(ires 7(st s(ch an a ency of selection or evocation. +ere 1 think we are oin to need a whole new way of lookin at action as -lettin 6happen,- as well as a theory of the d"namics of action, with respect to which 1 find so#e interestin hints in what 1 take to be a new readin of Kacan9s loss on $re(d9s theory of the drive. +owever, that is another story; 1 will re#ark here only that when the co#p(ter is t(rned on it is on and stays on, whether or not one happens to be doin any co#p(tin , and in o(r case when it is off we9re dead. 1 ar (e also that the e#bodi#ent of s(b7ectivity is transparent to its > 31" > str(ct(re, which #eans a#on other thin s that altho( h so far there see# to be no cases of s(b7ectivity otherwise e#bodied than in biolo ically developed -wetware,- nothin we know as yet e*cl(des the possibility that s(b7ectivity #i ht be e#bodied in hardware. ,he specific character of any syste# is pres(#ably to be fo(nd in its str(ct(re, that is, the co#ple* of relations that it e#bodies. 1n principle one #i ht then s(ppose that the str(ct(re is indifferent to its physical e#bodi#ent. ,h(s, for e*a#ple 2at a #ore pri#itive level of co#ple*ity5, the reachin and bearin f(nctions of an artificial 7oint are in the li#it behaviorally indistin (ishable fro# those of its nat(ral co(nterpart, so that the str(ct(re of the patient9s behavior is (naffected when a nat(ral ele#ent is replaced by a s(fficiently sophisticated artificial one. ,his is what 1 #ean when 1 say that the e#bodi#ent is transparent to the str(ct(re. .e are thoro( hly fa#iliar with n(#bers of ancillary or corrective or prosthetic devices that are transparent in this way: a(to#obiles and telephones have beco#e 7(st as transparent to the str(ct(re of p(rposive behavior as pockets or eye lasses. ,he banality of the e*a#ples is si nificant. 1t re#inds (s that intentionality and p(rpose are everyday #atters, not special states we have to work (p to deliberately. 1f a #achine were to develop a refle*ive intentional str(ct(re of the re@(ired kind 2and 1 wo(ld want to specify so#e constraints: the str(ct(re is always do(ble, the syste# of #atchin s is not, as in the case of lan (a e, initially arbitrary, and so on5 there wo(ld be no reason to deny it s(b7ectivity. +owever a n(#ber of diffic(lt iss(es need to be s(r#o(nted before s(ch a point can be reached. $irst, conscio(sness is a necessary precondition of s(b7ectivity, so that the analo (e of the interior display has to be provided for the #achine. ,he #onitor that we can see won9t do, b(t nor will a #onitor that the machine can see)what has to be provided is a way of its seein , not the #onitor, b(t what the #onitor displays. 8o -interior display- here has to #ean -display as seen fro# within.- 1t is not clear that this condition can ever be known to be #et, tho( h we wo(ld have to ad#it that if it were 2that is, if we b(ilt a #achine like (s in all relevant respects5 there wo(ld be no reason to deny the #achine the attrib(te of conscio(sness.

8econd, the interior display has affective co#ponents in h(#an bein s which have been t(ned by #illennia of evol(tionary selection to be ne(tral to perception and co nition within nor#al li#its. 1f we were to #ake a #achine co#ple* eno( h to rise to conscio(sness we wo(ld have no (arantee that its first e*perience wo(ld not be one of intense pain; it o( ht therefore to be a #atter of co(rse to provide the #achine with a #echanis# for vol(ntary anesthesia if not s(icide. ,hird 2a point already #ade elo@(ently by ,(rin in 19"!5, we co(ld not e*pect the #achine to ive evidence of s(b7ectivity any earlier in its onto enetic > 314 > develop#ent than h(#an bein s do)which 1 believe often to be never, b(t in any case hardly ever before the a e of seven or ei ht, and that after intense sociali<ation and acc(lt(ration. /nd when all was said and done we wo(ld still be liable to Cartesian scepticis# abo(t the reality of the #achine9s s(b7ective e*perience, even if it told (s elaborate stories abo(t that e*perience. B(t then we are liable to this scepticis# abo(t one another. /nd in the end we wo(ld have to rant it the sa#e benefit of the do(bt that we rant each other, and ass(#e that at the ori in of its first person (tterances stood an intentionality and an a ency. ,he answer to the @(estion -.ho is it0- is essentially: the intentional a ent who says -1.- B(t is there any reason to e*pect that we will (nderstand the relation between this -1- and its e#bodi#ent any better in the case of the #achine than in o(r own case0 Perhaps we sho(ld say: we will (nderstand both, or neither. ,he proble# is that o(r (nderstandin an"thing involves o(r use of the #echanis# of tho( ht, o(r occu!"ing the s(b7ective standpoint. ,hat is why 1 find so#ethin co#ical abo(t doctrines like those of KPvi68tra(ss and $o(ca(lt which clai# to have dispensed with the s(b7ect 2e*cept, in $o(ca(lt9s case, the s(b7ect in the sinister sense of bein s(b7ected to social and political forces5, and why doctrines like eli#inative #aterialis#, for e*a#ple in Ch(rchland, strike #e as perverse. 1 clai# to be a #aterialist, b(t there isn9t #(ch abo(t #e that 1 want to eli#inate, certainly not #y feelin s and appetites. 1n the case of eli#inative #aterialis# 1 want to ask: what is eli#inated, and fro# where0 1f we can have a representation of tho( ht witho(t any ele#ents of -folk psycholo y,- well and ood)e*cept that thinking that representation, havin it as the content of #y intentional do#ain, brin s in #y s(b7ectivity a ain. Ch(rchland writes: -1 rad(ally beca#e co#fortable in the idea that there really were @(ite eneral ways of representin co nitive activity that #ade no (se of intentional idio#s.-E1"F Lne #i ht ask)what does -co#fortable- #ean here0 Doesn9t it re@(ire eli#ination in its t(rn0)and then point o(t that a representation of co nitive activity which #akes no (se of intentional idioms #akes (se of intentionality 7(st the sa#e: that of the thinker, co#fortable or otherwise, for who# it is a representation. $or what we are doin now, thinkin abo(t #achines and abo(t their thinkin 2and if thinkin #eans co#p(tation, or 7(st prod(cin answers to any @(estions, co#p(tational or not, then #achines have been doin it all alon )that can9t ever have been the proble#5, is all takin place in o(r individ(al sensoria, pri#ary or secondary. ,he @(estion is, co(ld #achines think in that way too0 /nd the answer is, why not0 Perhaps it will t(rn o(t that the str(ct(re of tho( ht isn9t transparent to its > 31? > e#bodi#ent, that there9s so#ethin special and (nreprod(cible 2e*cept by biolo ical #eans5 abo(t wetware, b(t what evidence there co(ld possibly be for s(ch a view is far fro# clear. /nd there is so#ethin narcissistic in the tho( ht that we are the only #achines to have the e*perience of thinkin as distinct fro# its behavioral #anifestations. /t all events 1 think there are likely to be, before too lon

perhaps, so#e #achines that it wo(ld be #orally pr(dent to treat as ends only, and never #erely as #eans. Doin so at least is what it will take to #ake me feel co#fortable. B(t that opens (p a different ar (#ent. > 31= >

691 Ret#i%ki%$ I%te%tio%alit(

1n this essay 1 wish to float a con7ect(re that 1 think #ay have relevance to the debate abo(t intentionality that has been cond(cted over the last co(ple of decades in an arena co##on to several do#ains whose interests have co#e to overlap in a strikin way: pheno#enolo y, se#antics, artificial intelli ence.E1F 1n doin so 1 shall be s( estin that so#e other do#ains have overlappin interests with these and sho(ld be represented in the arena: str(ct(ralis#, psychoanalysis, the philosophy of literat(re)tho( h these see# as yet, and in their pop(lar for#s, philosophically peripheral. Part of #y point is that, s(itably refor#(lated, they have a si nificant contrib(tion to #ake to the debate. Ket #e be in with a s#all point fro# 8toic lin (istics, and a sol(tion it s( ests to a proble# in the philosophy of literat(re. 1 take the e*a#ple fro# 8eneca, via Benson :ates.E3F ,o (nderstand what is oin on on the occasion of a iven (tterance, say, -Cato is walkin ,- three distinct entities need to be invoked. $irst, there is the so(nd of the (tterance itself: -Cato is walkin .- 8econd, there is Cato, who is walkin or not)if he is walkin the (tterance is tr(e; if not it is false. B(t then there is a third thin that is bro( ht into bein by the (tterance as an ob7ect of attention, na#ely, *ato.walking , so#ethin that #i ht now be called propositional content b(t which the early 8toics called the lekton : what is said or #eant or picked o(t by the (tterance. Co( hly speakin , in #ore conte#porary ter#inolo y, these three correspond to the si n, its reference, and its sense. ,o say -sense,- tho( h, opens (p a lar e do#ain of ar (#ent, partic(larly abo(t what > 319 > $re e #eant by Sinn , that 1 wish to avoid. 1 have fo(nd it (sef(l in developin a theory of literat(re si#ply to retain the Ireek ter#, partly beca(se) iven that in literat(re the foc(s is on (tterances written and read, rather than spoken and heard)there is an instr(ctive 2and ety#olo ically 7(stified5 connection between the reader and the sense of what is read, between lector and lekton , b(t partly beca(se this #ove avoids entan le#ent with c(rrent controversies in se#antics and frees (s to attend to the stat(s of the lekton from the reader's !oint of -iew . .hat is it e*actly that is bro( ht into bein by the act of readin 0 %ot the words, for they have been there on the pa e, or in #e#ory, all alon 21 can9t read a word (nless 1 know it, enerically at any rate5; nor the thin referred to, which is there 2or not5 independently of #y readin . ,he reason why this @(estion is especially interestin in connection with literat(re is that whenever there is obvio(sly so#ethin act(al to refer to, as so often in nonliterary conte*ts, considerations of reference tend to conta#inate the lekton, so that its pec(liar diffic(lties do not have to be confronted. 1t is te#ptin to think that no ob7ect of attention is -bro( ht into bein - when 1 read abo(t the President, or the stock #arket)it is 7(st that 1 a# led to attend to those thin s the#selves, indirectly and at a distance to be s(re b(t not in s(ch a way as to re@(ire any ontolo ical #ediation. 1f 19# present when Cato is walkin , if he9s present to #e 2-presence- 7(st #eans -bein 6before,- which is why it9s a

sy##etrical relation5, then 1 tend to think that it9s his walkin , then and there, that is picked o(t for attention by the (tterance -Cato is walkin .- B(t it isn9t, beca(se taken si#ply as itself the 2nonconte*t(al5 (tterance has to pick o(t the sa#e thin whether Cato is there or not. 1t9s tr(e that if we conte*t(ali<e the (tterance with so#e inde*ical particle: -KookB Cato is walkin B- 2he9s been paraly<ed; the evan elist has 7(st said, -Cise (p and walkB-5, the (r e to conflate lekton and referent beco#es overwhel#in . B(t still it o( ht to be resisted, not only beca(se the (tterance #i ht still be false 2-G(st kiddin ,- so#eone says; the evan elist #oves on, crestfallen5 b(t beca(se, 7(st as in the 8a(ss(rean theory of the si n, we need the lekton in order to know that Cato, walkin , is the referent. E3F 1 shall call this tendency of reference to blanket the lekton -the do#inance of the referential..hen 1 read abo(t +a#let or &##a Bovary the #atter is not @(ite so si#ple. ,hey have, it is tr(e, ten(o(s connections to a referential do#ain, historical in the one case, 7o(rnalistic in the other)b(t we know there9s #ore to +a#let than the ori inal Prince of Den#ark, whereas in the strai ht referential case the s(rpl(s 2let9s hope5 is in the other direction: there9s #ore, that is, to the real President than the report of hi# in the news. /nd #ost of the ti#e the characters in fiction > 33! > bear no #ore than an accidental rese#blance to anybody, livin or dead. ,he book 1 happen to be readin , these days, for reasons havin nothin to do with this paper 2the readin of which 19ve s(spended in order to write the paper5, is 1ollo" . 1 open it at rando#. -,he tr(th is, conaesthetically speakin of co(rse,- writes Beckett, -1 felt #ore or less the sa#e as (s(al, that is to say, if 1 #ay ive #yself away, so terror6stricken that 1 was virt(ally bereft of feelin , not to say of conscio(sness, and drowned in a deep and #ercif(l torpor shot with brief abo#inable lea#s, 1 ive yo( #y word.-EAF ,here9s a powerf(l lekton here, b(t assi nin reference in any strai htforward way wo(ld be proble#atic. 1f fictional ob7ects and characters aren9t s(stained 2or overwhel#ed5 by referential attach#ents to so#e ob7ective world, what world, we #ay ask, do they inhabit0 ,he kind of answer that often see#s wanted to a @(estion like this will involve so#e hypothetical or #etaphysical do#ain)of Ausserseienden , of #ental representations, of the i#a ination, etc. /ll this see#s to #e, the en a ed reader, a very heavy way of dealin with the obvio(s, which is that they inhabit m" world)for as lon as 19# readin , or whenever 1 think back on what 1 read. :y world is a fairly co#plicated place, and its ele#ents do not lend the#selves to neat cate ori<ation; it contains, at the #o#ent, both the pad 19# writin on and the tho( hts 1 think as 1 write, the tickin of the clock and the an*iety of the deadline. K(rkin in the back ro(nd are :olloy, :oran, and the rest, ready to take center sta e a ain when 1 et back to #y readin . ,hen they9ll fill #y world; indeed, it #ay see# for a ti#e that 19ve #oved into theirs)1 #ay be wholly absent fro# #y nor#al s(rro(ndin s, -lost- or even -b(ried- in the book, as we so#eti#es s( estively say. B(t in fact 1 won9t have one anywhere, they9ll have co#e to #e: 19ll read, and there they9ll be. ,hat9s what the lekton is in the case of readin . B(t how does readin prod(ce the lekton)or the -#e alekton,- as one is te#pted to call it in the literary case, the whole world of the te*t0 G(st in the way that seein and hearin prod(ce the percept(al world. 1t see#s clear by now that lan (a e f(nctions like a sensory #edi(#, processed in the corte* #(ch as si ht and hearin are.E"F ,he fact that it9s nor#ally conveyed b" si ht and hearin only #eans that the cortical pathways to the lan (a e6processin areas have to pass thro( h the vis(al and a(ditory areas, b(t their destination is elsewhere 2and probably not as sharply locali<ed, since lan (a e in one for# or another (ses a ood proportion of o(r workin brain capacity5. 1n deaf people (sin si n lan (a e these pathways traverse a different part of the vis(al corte*, dealin with body6 si<ed #ove#ents rather than 2or as well as5 the fine s(rface discri#inations re@(ired for readin , and

don9t et in6 > 331 > volved with the a(ditory at all; in blind people they pass thro( h tactile areas as well as a(ditory ones, etc. 8o lan (a e presents a whole world, or a part of one if other sensory activity hasn9t been blocked o(t or s(spended 2as it often is, locally at least, when we are en a ed in lin (istic activity5. 8o#eti#es that world appears with i#a inative vividness, as if it were painted, and that9s one of the oldest techni@(es of literat(re. / classic case is +o#er9s description of /chilles9 shield in the Iliad ; s(ch a vis(ally evocative passa e was known as an ek!hrasis , a -tellin 6o(t.- Kater on ekphrasis ca#e to be an acade#ic e*ercise, describin paintin s in words 2when copies weren9t easily co#e by5, b(t the ter# still see#s appropriate as referrin 7(st to those (ses of lan (a e whose p(rpose is to present a vis(al tho( ht6content. Colerid e, in Kubla Khan , says that if only he co(ld #ana e it with #(sic lo(d and lon 1 wo(ld b(ild that do#e in air, ,hat s(nny do#eB those caves of iceB And all who heard would see them there )a line 1 e#phasi<e beca(se it e*presses so well the ekphrastic (tterance6lekton connection, takin #(sic as #etaphoric for poetry. 2,he @(estion of the lekton for #(sic proper, takin it now to be a kind of lan (a e in its own ri ht, is a ood test case for theories of intentionality.5 +owever, the -seein - that hearers 2or readers5 do need not be like that done with the eye. 8eein is a co##on #etaphor for all kinds of (nderstandin ; tho( ht6contents can be bro( ht before the #ind 2not -before the #ind9s eye-B5 and #etaphorically -seen- in ways other than the vis(al, indeed other than the sensory 2in the narrow sense5 alto ether. Lne still #i ht want, tho( h 2on the principle of lan (a e as a cate ory of e*tended sense5 to think of these tho( ht6contents as located in a -sensori(#-; that will be the space of the world lan (a e presents, and it will be as really #y world as the #ore vivid percept(al sensori(#. ,he relation between #yself as s(b7ect and the contents of this world is of co(rse that of intentionality: a stretchin 6o(t towards, and a holdin 6in, #eanin s derived respectively fro# Katin tendo and teneo , both referrin back to Ireek teino , one of the senses of which is -to hold o(t, present-; in the case of intentionality 1 hold o(t or present so#ethin to #yself. %ot e*actly that 1 choose to do this 2tho( h within li#its 1 can, when the potential f(rnit(re of the sensori(# is rich eno( h5, b(t it9s obvio(sly a capacity 19# nat(rally f(rnished with: not only can 1 direct attention selectively to percept(al > 333 > contents when they are present, b(t 1 can evoke the# when they are absent, and can also attend to, and evoke, tho( ht6contents of a nonpercept(al nat(re, s(ch as those presented by nonekphrastic lan (a e. ,hese tho( ht6contents, (nder certain conditions of definiteness in conception and description, can @(alify as -intentional ob7ects- in the sense of Brentano and +(sserl. ,he lekton is a do#ain of intentional ob7ects. 1 have s( ested elsewhere that the nonpercept(al sensori(# #i ht be called a -secondary- sensori(#, E4F and it and its tho( ht6contents certainly see# secondary, as do those of #e#ory or evocation 2no #atter how skillf(l the ekphrasis5, in co#parison to the pri#ary vividness of the bri ht o(ter world, of color and so(nd, that 1 inhabit when attendin to the i##ediately percept(al. B(t this contrast #ay be

#isleadin . 1n order to clarify that @(estion it is necessary to e*a#ine the relation between the vivid content of perception and the pale content of tho( ht, between the data of the five senses 2especially that of si ht5 and those of the si*th, as we #ay as well deno#inate lan (a e. +a#let and &##a Bovary, 1 said earlier, 7(st inhabit #y world, so#eti#es to the point of e*tin (ishin the bri htness of the pri#ary sensori(#, of whose details 1 beco#e (naware. Lf co(rse 19# helped in achievin this abstraction by protectin #yself a ainst intense sensory inp(ts, which is why 19ll read by #oderate li ht, in a @(iet co#fortable place, decorated for preference in #(ted colors. ,hose are ood conditions for thinkin , too)and, as far as that oes, for sleepin , a fact that #ay prove relevant in the se@(el. 1t is, when one thinks of it, an e*traordinary fact that literat(re, philosophy, #athe#atics, and so on can occ(py the fore ro(nd of o(r attention, and its back ro(nd too 2the phone rin s and 1 have to attend to pri#ary #atters, b(t 1 keep thinkin abo(t this ar (#ent5, that indeed the contents of the secondary sensori(# can dovetail with those of the pri#ary, the lekton can coe*ist co#fortably with the f(rnit(re of the everyday world. Lf co(rse 1 can tell the difference between the# 2not bein able to do so is a patholo y we9ll co#e to in a #in(te5, b(t so 1 can between different environ#ents in either world. 1f 1 have 1adame 5o-ar" in #y hand 19# in 'onville, or Co(en, if 4amlet , in &lsinore; if 1 have the #en( in #y hand 19# in the resta(rant, if the telephone directory, in the office. 1n fact, as 1 s( ested earlier, 1 live in one world, not #any, tho( h its aspect and its f(rnit(re chan e as 1 shift #y body or #y attention. 1 can distin (ish in it, (p to a point, what is percept(al fro# what is intentional 2tho( h there are proble#s here when what 1 perceive is laden with affect5, b(t 19# not inclined to say that so#e of it, for e*a#ple, is -#ental- and so#e -physical,> 333 > tho( h this see#s to be taken by #any writers on intentionality as an (nproble#atic division. .hich is develop#entally prior, perception or intentionality0 ,his #oves the ar (#ent into #ore spec(lative territory. ,he (s(al acco(nt wo(ld, 1 think, #aintain that perception ives (s a store of e*perience and that we learn, as we ac@(ire this store 2thro( h the a ency of #e#ory5, habits of attention, and event(ally intentional capacities, that enable (s to #anip(late, as it were, its contents intelli ently and in absentia 2Chishol#, followin .illia# Ga#es, calls the proble# of nonreferrin intentionality)that is, the intendin of none*istent ob7ects)-the proble# of presence in absence-E?F 5. B(t how does this process et started0 ,he old e#piricist doctrine of #e#ory and i#a ination as decayed or decayin sense doesn9t do 7(stice to the stren th and interest of the intentional do#ain. +ere 1 find #atter for con7ect(re in so#e work on drea#s, on the one hand $re(dian, on the other e#bryolo ical. $re(d, in -Creative .riters and Day6Drea#in ,-E=F likens the i#a inative writer to a -drea#er in broad dayli ht,- and re#arks that daydrea#s are especially the province of children, who create worlds of their own in play, inventin places and play#ates with creative reso(rcef(lness and certit(de. ,hese worlds, as anyone who has observed children knows, are at least as real to the# as the world of ad(lt perception that will event(ally have to be learned. ,hey are, witho(t @(estion, intentional do#ains; so#eti#es they incorporate lekta fro# children9s stories, so#eti#es ele#ents fro# the percept(al world, b(t the activity of intendin the# see#s far #ore persistent than can easily be acco(nted for by the hypothesis that intentional ob7ects are learned after the pattern of percept(al ones. ,he process of instr(ction consists lar ely in ettin the child9s attention awa" fro# this do#ain, co#pellin it over ti#e to yield to the insistence of the percept(al. &vent(ally the -nor#al- ad(lt loses the ability to intend alternative worlds in this stron sense)e(ce!t in dreams . $re(d hi#self s( ests that wakin life is the nor#, overned by the reality principle, and that

drea#in is in effect a for# of psychosis.E9F B(t in recent years it has been shown that (nborn children in utero spend a reat deal of ti#e in C&: sleep, which sleep st(dies in the last few decades have associated (ne@(ivocally with drea#in . / standard @(estion, when people are told of this, is -.hat can they be drea#in about 0- 1t see#s odd to say that fet(ses are psychotic, the idea of psychosis bein defined in relation to a post(lated nor#ality. ,his is the point at which 1 float the con7ect(re 1 pro#ised at the be innin of the paper. 1t is that intentionalit" is one of the basic functions of the > 33A > human ner-ous s"stem$ that it de-elo!s inde!endentl" of and !rior to !erce!tion$ that dreaming is a normal e(ercise of intentionalit" free of the constraints of !erce!tion$ and that dreaming in utero is to be construed as the la"ing.down and rehearsal of the function of intentionalit" . / le##a to this con7ect(re is that once perception co#es on line, as it were, postnatally 2tho( h there are anticipations of this also in utero 5 it tends event(ally to pree#pt the do#ain of attention and to become the nor# for (nreflective introspection. ,his latter tendency #i ht be called, in parallel with the do#inance of the referential introd(ced above, -the do#inance of the percept(al.- B(t (ntil it happens the $re(dian order is reversed: drea#in is the nor# and wakin life the derivative state. 1t is pla(sible to ass(#e that wakin life has to be develop#entally ac@(ired, and so#e patholo ies #ay be e*plainable as fail(res 2or ref(sals5 to #ana e this. 1f the chaos of i#a es and voices, and even of actions, characteristic of drea#in were to carry over into daily activity they wo(ld prod(ce a pla(sible i#itation of so#e for#s of a(tis# or schi<ophrenia or #ania, and it #ay be that that is 7(st what is happenin in those cases. /lfred 8ch(t< characteri<es the hi hest and #ost aware for# of s(b7ective involve#ent in the world as -wide6 awakeness,- citin Ber son9s concept of a series of planes of interest in life, fro# drea#in at the lowest end of the scale to action at the hi hest, and the transition fro# infancy via childhood to ad(lthood #i ht be constr(ed as the rad(al ascension of this scale.E1!F ,he ability to intend a world, like the ability to speak a lan (a e, is, 1 a# clai#in , a co#petence enetically provided. .itho(t it the child wo(ld never co#e to conscio(sness or s(b7ectivity at all. 2,he s(b7ect is what is present to the ob7ects it intends, that are present to it)as 1 re#arked above, presence is a sy##etrical relation. ,he s(b7ect6ob7ect relation is so#ethin that has to be bro( ht into bein , that co#es into bein at so#e sta e of e#bryonic develop#ent; it #i ht be tho( ht of as e#er ent in a #anner analo o(s to that of pair6creation in physics.5 ,he nor#al world that is event(ally lived 2like the standard lan (a e that is event(ally spoken5 is deter#ined by e*perience, in this case percept(al e*perience. ,he innate ra##ar per#its the child to learn &n lish or Gapanese or Hwaki(tl)which one depends on its lin (istic environ#ent; the innate cate oreal str(ct(re per#its it to learn space, ti#e, and ca(sality. 2,his echo of Hant is not accidental.5 ,here is of co(rse a difference between the lan (a e case and the world case, and it is a strikin ly instr(ctive difference. %ot all children have to learn the sa#e lan (a e, b(t there is a sense in which they all have to learn the sa#e world, na#ely, this one with its day and ni ht, > 33" > its war# and cold, its ti#es and distances and bodies)incl(din their own bodies. 21t is of co(rse possible that different bodies #i ht learn the world differently.5 'et as in the case of lan (a e it #(st have been possible to learn a different world, it wo(ld be astonishin fro# an evol(tionary point of view if the #echanis# of world6#akin had been adapted in detail only to this one. / eneral

adaptation #i ht be e*pected, yieldin what we think of, often with satisfaction, as necessary tr(ths, b(t there is a ran e of states #ore or less ade@(ate to this world)and so#e psychoses #i ht be e*plained, a ain, by the fail(re of possible intentional states, for a iven s(b7ect, to coincide with an" of the#. 1 take it that it was the availability of these alternate states that pers(aded so#e early dr( (sers, who #ana ed che#ically to wrench the brain into prod(cin a different world6confi (ration, that they had discovered a new reality. ,hese considerations s( est a reversal of the (s(al way of thinkin abo(t the relations between tho( ht and perception. Cather than sayin that tho( ht is of a different nat(re fro# perception)while ad#ittin as everyone does that so#e for#s of tho( ht, s(ch as #e#ory and i#a ination, have so#ethin in co##on with a dil(ted perception)1 want to say that perception is an invol(ntary b(t very vivid for# of tho( ht, of 7(st that for# of tho( ht we know in its atten(ated for# as i#a ination. 1#a ination isn9t decayed sense; sense is intensified i#a ination, which is forced (pon the s(b7ect once its body is thr(st into the o(ter world, where it is no lon er protected fro# the onsla( ht of li ht and so(nd, of heat and cold, of to(ch and #ove#ent. 1 (se -i#a ination- here to stand for the f(nction of intentionality that prod(ces i#a es; that it is an intentional f(nction was reco ni<ed by 8artre early on, soon after his e*pos(re to pheno#enolo y, and his acco(nt of it in +'imagination and +'imaginaire still see#s to #e worth attention even tho( h it fails to work o(t a clear relationship precisely between perception and i#a ination. 8artre carries)and can9t help carryin )the b(rden of the old belief that #akes i#a ination on so#e level derivative fro# perception: the i#a e is of the ob7ect, tho( h indirectly, while perception is of it directly. 1f however we are to think of the intentional f(nction that prod(ces the i#a e as !ree(isting its activation by perception then it will have to be possible for the s(b7ect to intend i#a es it never perceived. ,his takes (s back to the drea#in babies. 1 have no do(bt that once perception ass(#es its do#inant role, the contents of the i#a ination co#e to consist lar ely of what has been taken in percept(ally: the ele#ents of the i#a ined centa(r are indeed parts of the perceived #an and the perceived horse. B(t that there #ay be i#a ined ele#ents of a basic kind) eo#etrical shapes, or even so#e or anic ones; colors; > 334 > for#s of #ove#ent)that are independent of perception, and perhaps very enerally shared by nascent conscio(snesses the world over, is not an ori inal con7ect(re: it corresponds to, and easily e*plains, so#e feat(res of what G(n ian psycholo ists have called archetypes, tho( h 1 wo(ld wish to keep a caref(l distance fro# the wei ht that is placed on the# in that tradition. ,he s(pposition that, 7(st as in the case of lan (a e, evol(tion #ay have selected for so#e disposition to constr(e e*perience in one way rather than another 2and as in Cho#sky9s ar (#ent abo(t the lin (istic case it #ay be observed that the p(rely ind(ctive learnin of the spatiote#poral world wo(ld be an a#a<in feat for the first few #onths of life5 does not re@(ire the post(lation of anythin as #elodra#atic as a -collective (nconscio(s.- Lf co(rse, -collective- is a#bi (o(s here, and (nob7ectionable if all it #eans is (nconscio(s str(ct(res we happen to have, individ(ally and distrib(tively, in co##on, beca(se they are deter#ined by a co##on enetic inheritance. /#on the G(n ians, however, it (s(ally see#s to #ean a shared reservoir of so#e transindivid(al sort into which we all tap, and for this 1 can see no evidence, nor even a re#otely pla(sible #odel. ,wo @(estions pose the#selves at this point, one as to the nat(re or #echanis# of the intentional activity that be ins in utero and is then lar ely taken over)co##andeered, as it were)by perception, and the other as to the nat(re of the intendin s(b7ect that ori inates at so#e point 2when05 d(rin fetal

develop#ent and is pres(#ably enidentical 2if not si#ply identical5 with the #at(re s(b7ect the individ(al beco#es. 1 will content #yself with a pro ra##atic treat#ent of each in order to leave ti#e at the end to ret(rn to the #etaphilosophical point with which 1 be an. ,he best #odel for the re@(ired #echanis# is 1 think the $re(dian drive, especially as e*po(nded by Kacan. 1n The %our %undamental *once!ts of s"cho.Anal"sis , Kacan points o(t that for $re(d, -the characteristic of the drive is to be a konstante Kraft , a constant force. +e cannot conceive of it as a momentane Stosskraft Ea #o#entary i#p(lseF.-E11F -,he first thin $re(d says abo(t the drive is, if 1 #ay p(t it this way, that it has no day or ni ht, no sprin or a(t(#n, no rise and fall.-E13F Kater on he @(otes $re(d as sayin , -/s far as the ob7ect of the drive is concerned, let it be clear that it is, strictly speakin , of no i#portance. 1t is a #atter of total indifference.-E13F ,he drive is a tendenc".towards of a wholly nonspecific kind; it is a tendency that seeks satisfaction 2even drea#s in utero #ay be wish6 f(lfill#entsB5 b(t that seeks it nonspecifically)and f(rther#ore will never find it. ,his fr(stration need not be rendered in #elodra#atic ter#s; it is not a tra edy)b(t it is eno( h to keep the drive oin , for a whole life in fact. > 33? > $or 1 take it that the intentionality is switched on, as it were, when the e#bryo be ins to drea#, is never switched off e*cept by death 2tho( h it #ay be s(spended in drea#less sleep5. 1n one sense its final satisfaction #ay be death)that wo(ld certainly be an acceptable readin for $re(d, a final acknowled #ent of ,hanatos. B(t while it re#ains on it is at the service of &ros)as a side6effect, one #i ht al#ost say. 1n castin abo(t for a s(itable i#a e here 1 find two candidates, fro# the very early and very late ind(strial revol(tion. ,he late one wo(ld be of the central processin (nit of a co#p(ter; it is what ets switched on at the be innin of the day 2indeed it #ay be left on for the workin life of the syste#5, and it is at the service of whatever f(nctions one #ay want the #achine to perfor#. B(t 1 don9t wish to reinforce a co#p(ter #odel of #ind 2co#p(ters as we know the# can only be part of the story, tho( h 1 don9t do(bt they are a part5, and 1 prefer the earlier i#a e, which wo(ld be of one of those h( e factory stea# en ines of the sort that can still be seen in #(se(#s, which drove a sin le shaft fro# which every #achine in the factory, by #eans of belts, derived its #otive power. &verythin the s(b7ect does is powered by what we #ay think of as the intentional drive, which directs it o(t and towards its ob7ects, which #ay be en a ed with #ore or less force accordin to the nat(re of the involve#ent, sleepy or wide6awake, nor#al or ne(rotic. .hat of the s(b7ect itself0 1 have s( ested that it #ay co#e into bein after the #anner of pair6 creation, the s(dden 2or in this case perhaps rad(al, like a developin i#a e5 e#er ence of a s(b7ect6 ob7ect polarity definin an intentional vector. What th(s co#es into bein at the s(b7ect pole is perhaps the hardest thin to specify in the whole of philosophy. 1t is s(rely already in so#e r(di#entary for# Dasein; it vent(res forth as &*isten<; yet it is a %othin ness at the heart of Bein . 1t is the condition of e*perience and of #eanin . Lne (nderstands how te#ptin #any philosophers have fo(nd it to s(ppose that, the conditions for its f(nctionin havin been prod(ced or anically, the s(b7ect itself arrives fro# so#e other order of bein , spirit(al perhaps, as an adventitio(s s(pple#ent to the or anic )and at the sa#e ti#e how ine*c(sable it is to yield to that te#ptation on the available evidence. 1 have #yself tried so#e for#(lations of the nat(re of s(b7ectivity, and the closest 1 have co#e to anythin even #ini#ally satisfactory is this: -8(b7ectivity is the ani#ation of str(ct(re.-E1AF Unfort(nately this definition is not f(lly intelli ible (nless one has already be ed the @(estion, beca(se -str(ct(re- has to be (nderstood as a set of relations maintained intentionall" in order to

distin (ish s(b7ective fro# #erely or anic states, and intentionality pres(pposes s(b7ectivity. B(t then there is in any case a syste#atic diffic(lty in the definition of s(b7ectiv6 > 33= > ity, re arded not as an inscription in the sy#bolic 2as Kacan wo(ld have it)tho( h for hi# the s(b7ect is a conse@(ence of str(ct(re rather than its ro(nd5 b(t as an originating intentionality at the level of the real: na#ely, that any definition p(ts the definiend(# alon with the definiens in the ob7ect position, and that is the one place where s(b7ectivity cannot be p(t. B(t then it can9t be e*plained either, the sa#e ar (#ent holdin mutatis mutandis for the e*planand(# and e*planans. ,hese li#itations do not #ean that we are left with nothin to say. 1f we can9t ob7ectify the s(b7ect we can distin (ish between its pro*i#ate and re#ote, its focal and #ar inal, ob7ects, and #(ch of pheno#enolo y devotes itself to these distinctions. .e can also as it were <ero in on its place, show where in the world it is likely to #anifest itself. ,his has in all so far known cases proved to be so#ewhere between the sensory inp(t and the #otor o(tp(t of a livin or anis# havin a developed nervo(s syste#. 1t isn9t that we sho(ld o lookin for s(b7ectivity there; rather, we have already fo(nd it: in o(r own case, to which the other known cases all prove analo o(s. Hnowled e of the co#ple*ity of the str(ct(res s(b7ectivity ani#ates in o(r own case can s( est what prec(rsors of s(b7ectivity, s(ch as reactivity, sensitivity, p(rposiveness, #i ht be s(stained by inter#ediate cases of or anic co#ple*ity, and 1 have atte#pted on several occasions to sketch in this way an ascent fro# the inert to the f(lly s(b7ective. 1n the end, tho( h, s(b7ectivity has to be lived. B(t this t(rns o(t to be tanta#o(nt to livin ob7ectivity, beca(se of the pairin relationship already drawn attention to: no s(b7ect witho(t ob7ect, be it #erely intentional 2and that, as 1 have #aintained, is how s(b7ectivity be ins5; no world witho(t e o, no e o witho(t world. ,he world s(b7ectivity lives, the life6world, or in the case of a world borrowed fro# literat(re what 1 have called the #e alekton, is as a known world the total noe#atic correlate of the s(b7ect9s noetic activity. 1s it the real world, tho( h; is it a p(blic world0 ,hese are @(estions that can only be raised and answered within it, and they will be answered in ter#s of whatever theory of the real, or the p(blic, the s(b7ect who raises the# has at its disposal. 1 do not say -at his or her disposal,not beca(se 1 want to evade the iss(e of se*is# b(t beca(se 1 think that ender, alon with every other deter#ination of the s(b7ect, is part of its ob7ect do#ain)b(t if this is the case then, for e*a#ple, #y bein a child or an ad(lt, a pl(#ber or a philosopher, is part of #y ob7ect do#ain and does not characteri<e #y s(b7ectivity essentially. .e are back to the nonspecific drive: the s(b7ect pole is e#pty, at all events of any of the sorts of ob7ectivity it is capable of intendin , its intentionality is pres(ppositionless, and it re#ains what it is constantly and persistently over the ter# of its e#bodi#ent, fro# prenatal e#er6 > 339 > ence to final e*tinction in death, allowin only 2as re#arked earlier5 for periodic s(spension in drea#less sleep. Lf co(rse we could say, as +eraclit(s did of the s(n, that the s(b7ect is new every day, tho( h it is hard to see what wo(ld be ained by this, since while we were at it we co(ld say it was new every #o#ent. .hat we might draw fro# this line of ar (#ent is the concl(sion that s(b7ectivity reliably e#er es, at the appropriate level of wakef(lness, whenever the conditions are ri ht for it, which wo(ld #ake its initiation in utero (ns(rprisin b(t wo(ld also #ean that if 7(st those conditions were ever reali<ed in an artificial device it wo(ld ac@(ire s(b7ectivity too.

.hile 1 a# confident of the correctness of the fore oin acco(nt, it does not, witho(t f(rther ar (#ent at least, settle the iss(es raised above, abo(t realis#, abo(t the p(blic nat(re of percept(al space, and so on, and while 1 think that there are better and worse positions on these @(estions, and that what 1 have been sayin abo(t s(b7ectivity is relevant to the#, 1 cannot p(rs(e the# f(rther here. 1n any case, in disc(ssin the#, the whole contents of the participatin s(b7ects9 ob7ect worlds, ender and all, ac@(ired over their lifeti#es) enerali<ed versions of what 8artre wo(ld call their facticities)wo(ld co#e into play, and the idiosyncratic variety of these e*plain why philosophical ar (#ents flo(rish and are not easily settled. 1t was in fact beca(se of this occl(sion of ar (#ent by pre7(dice, inherited or ac@(ired, that +(sserl introd(ced the e!oche and the techni@(e of bracketin , and there is a sense in which all 1 #ay have done in this essay is to reinvent the transcendental e o. B(t 1 think that the feat(res of drive and in partic(lar of persistence that 1 have attrib(ted to s(b7ectivity take (s at least #ar inally f(rther than the transcendental e o, which 1 take to be #o#entary and positional. +owever, this -#o#entary- raises a proble# abo(t te#porality that #(st be addressed if only lancin ly. ,he persistence of the s(b7ect co(ld 7(st as well be interpreted as its ti#elessness, since the passa e of ti#e is one of the thin s it has to be able to intend. /nd this wo(ld e*plain the sense that #any of (s have of bein -the sa#e personas we were when yo(n er, even as a child. 1 once tried to catch the essence of this ti#elessness aphoristically: -Until the #o#ent of death, everyone is i##ortal.- 1 ad#it to havin fo(nd this a co#fortin tho( ht, however parado*ical. 1n closin let #e indicate a line of philosophical ar (#entation that wo(ld in #y view be settled, in the sense of bein closed off, if the fore oin considerations were to prevail, na#ely, the very atte#pt to deal with s(b7ectivity, or intentionality, fro# an ob7ective point of view, or indeed fro# any point of view other than that of the s(b7ect in @(estion. $ail(re to see the f(tility of this is, 1 think, what vitiates a reat > 33! > deal of the work 1 referred to at the be innin . ,he history of this f(tility oes back to +e el, whose habit of for ettin that he was an e*istin individ(al so #(ch a#(sed Hierke aard. B(t so#ehow Hierke aard9s point still #ana es to be overlooked. Lf co(rse there is a sense in which any disco(rse at all abo(t s(b7ectivity necessarily partakes of the ob7ective, in that the lan (a e itself has this stat(s; it belon s to the ob7ective do#ain)to speak of -the relation between s(b7ect and ob7ect- is already to invoke a lekton in which the s(b7ect plays an apparently ob7ective role, and it wo(ld see# s(spicio(sly ad hoc to r(le that 7(st e*pressions involvin it failed to pick o(t propositional content. ,his diffic(lty however is not ins(r#o(ntable: in self6reference 1 don9t need an independent lekton to know that 1 a# the referent. ,here can9t be a case in which what is referred to 2na#ely the s(b7ect5 is absent, which wo(ld activate the distinction between sense and reference. By co(rtesy 1 can speak of yo(r s(b7ectivity, or of s(b7ectivity in eneral, b(t that doesn9t endow what is th(s spoken of with ob7ective stat(s, in #y world or in anyone9s. 1f so#ethin other than (n@(alified s(b7ectivity is said to be the carrier of intentionality, the relation spoken of #ay be co#ple* and interestin b(t it won9t #ana e to be intentionality in the sense in which 1 have been (sin the ter#. 8o when Chishol# speaks of intentionality as a property of #ental pheno#ena,E1"F or 8earle speaks of it as a property of #ental states,E14F they #ay s(cceed in evokin so#e relationship between different classes of pheno#ena or between #ental states and other feat(res of the world b(t they don9t rasp what 1 #ean by intentionality thereby. 2:ental states don9t intend)s(b7ects intend; as to #ental pheno#ena, the concept p(<<les #e, since 1 wo(ld have tho( ht nothin co(ld appear e*cept to a #ind)b(t that wo(ld take too lon a di ression.5 8i#ilarly, when Dennett looks at syste#s like (s fro# an intentional stance he ets

interestin e*planatory res(lts too b(t co#es no closer than the others to what intentionality is for (s as s(b7ects.E1?F /# 1 bein i#possibly e*i ent here0 1 don9t think so. 1t isn9t that s(b7ects with en(ine intentionality wo(ldn9t e*hibit 7(st the relationships that Chishol# and 8earle and Dennett specify; it9s that they co(ld e*hibit all that and still not have en(ine intentionality. ,his is a proble# as old as Descartes and his robot ani#als, and 1 know no way of dealin with it e*cept in the first person sin (lar. Lf co(rse that only works for #e, b(t 1 can invite yo( to en a e in a parallel activity, and altho( h 19ll never know for s(re whether it worked for yo(, yo( will. :y concl(din #etaphilosophical re#ark, then, is that 1 find it odd that so #any philosophers si#ply decline to work in the first person sin (lar, even when the proble#s they are confronted with clearly re@(ire it. > 331 > Perhaps that is beca(se they #isconstr(e the proble#s. .hen O(ine says, Lne #ay accept the Brentano thesis Eof the irred(cibility of intentional idio#sF either as showin the indispensability of intentional idio#s and the i#portance of an a(tono#o(s science of intention, or as showin the baselessness of intentional idio#s and the e#ptiness of a science of intention,E1=F and opts for the second alternative, 1 think he #isconstr(es the proble# on two co(nts. Lne is that in spite of Brentano9s co(chin of the proble# in their ter#s, it isn9t a #atter of idio#s b(t of insi ht; the other is that the whole @(estion is be ed ahead of ti#e if what is envisa ed is a science of intention. ,here can9t be a science of intention beca(se science pres(pposes intention. /ll 19# askin here is that this fact abo(t intentionality be reco ni<ed. /s 1 said earlier, it leaves #ost of the rest of philosophy intact, b(t p(ts it (nder a #odality that can, 1 think, lead to new and e*citin possibilities, and has indeed been doin so for so#e decades, for a cent(ry perhaps)b(t not yet eno( h. > 333 >

6:1 Yorick's World= or t#e U%i'erse i% a Si%$le Sk-ll

1n what follows 1 shall e*plore a set of ideas for#erly i#portant in the history of philosophy)ideas that see# on the face of it @(ite i#pla(sible, as so #any philosophical ideas do)to see whether in the li ht of recent develop#ents in science they #ay not contain si nificant tr(ths. ,he central idea, briefly p(t, is this: that when we look at the world it is not the case, as physicists are tho( ht to clai#, that li ht strikes the seen ob7ects and is reflected into o(r eyes; on the contrary the seen ob7ects are the#selves the prod(cts, not the ca(ses, of perception; they are in fact ob7ects in a kind of private and e*tre#ely detailed 36D #ovie that is playin inside o(r heads)@(ite literally inside o(r sk(lls. +ence the appeal to 'orick. 1 need 'orick only for e*e#plary p(rposes, beca(se his is the #ost obvio(s sk(ll in the co##only available literat(re. .hile 1 a# at it 1 sho(ld confess that there is another co##on point of reference that echoes in #y title, na#ely ,ho#as &akins9s 1a( Schmitt in a Single Scull$ one of his 8ch(ylkill Civer paintin s and an old favorite of #ine. ,he connection started o(t #erely as a bad p(n, b(t like all ood works of art this one lends itself to interpretation, and 1 will draw at least this #(ch fro# it: that it represents an individ(al entr(stin hi#self to an ele ant bit of #achinery. 2$or reasons that #ay

beco#e clear later on 1 want to block the $re(dian readin that wo(ld have hi# afloat on the (nconscio(s, or anythin of that sort.5 'orick appears in act ", scene 1 of +a#let)it is the ravedi er scene, and that too #ay see# appropriate, since as 1 o on 1 shall be (nearthin philosophical skeletons so#e #i ht think best left in peace. > 333 > +a#let is with +oratio, the 8toic, who lacks philosophical i#a ination)everyone re#e#bers the re#ark in act 1, scene ": -,here are #ore thin s in heaven and earth, +oratio, than are drea#t of in yo(r philosophy.- B(t here +a#let hi#self is in a thoro( hly #aterialistic #ood. 1t is not 7(st that death is a social leveler, b(t that the d(st it red(ces (s to persists, servin perhaps h(#bler f(nctions in the end: +a#let spec(lates that the noble d(st of /le*ander #i ht be fo(nd, in the i#a ination, stoppin a b(n 6hole. /le*ander, like 'orick, was a #aterial ob7ect, his sk(ll was f(ll of real physical st(ff. .hat #ade hi# /le*ander was not the st(ff b(t its arran e#ent as /le*ander. ,he st(ff of which we are #ade is in fact 7(st abo(t as old as the (niverse 2and so#e of it probably for#ed part of /le*ander on its way fro# the Bi Ban to the present day5. ,wo @(estions, then: how does the st(ff we are #ade of have to be arran ed in order for (s to have the life we do in the world we know, to perceive, to act, to feel and so on0 /nd when it ret(rns to d(st, how #(ch of that world perishes with it0 .hat dies with 'orick0 ,his @(estion can be p(t in another way: what re@(ired 'orick for its e*istence when he was alive0 Lr #ore precisely still, what depended for its being on 'orick9s knowing it0 ,o start with, everythin private to hi#)the secrets, as we #i ht say, that -died with hi#-; his own desires, his #e#ories, his conscio(sness, his s(b7ectivity. B(t then also his perspective on the world, his way of seein , his associations)and his associations in another sense, the social entities of which he for#ed a part. 8(ppose he had had a passion for one of the sc(llery #aids)the clown had been his rival for her affection; that is why he po(red the Chenish)s(ppose even that they were secretly #arried. ,hen the co(ple, the #arria e, depended on hi# and ca#e to an end with his death. 8(ppose he had been the last s(rvivin #e#ber of the Danish Gesters9 /ssociation: then the /ssociation died with hi#. 1n fact it wo(ld not be (nreasonable to say that what dies with 'orick is 'orick9s world. ,his ass(#es a eneral distinction between the world as an ob7ective totality, on the one hand, and partic(lar people9s worlds)yo(rs, #ine, 'orick9s)as the total contents of o(r individ(al e*periences, on the other. .hen 1 die m" world will co#e to an end, b(t the world will, 1 take it, s(rvive, or at any rate persist. 1 believe that it was there before 1 was born and that it will o(tlast #e. Certainly the castle of &lsinore was still there after 'orick9s death, and so was the state of Den#ark, rot and all. B(t now let (s raise the stakes a bit. 8(ppose all the Danskers, as 8hakespeare calls the#, had died0 ,he castle wo(ld have s(rvived the# too, b(t how abo(t the state of Den#ark0 ,he direction of this bit of ar (#ent will by now be clear eno( h, so > 33A > 1 will skip several steps and propose a provisional concl(sion: the social world, 1 shall say, is #ind6 dependent. ,here are two levels on which this proposition can be s(stained, one of the# involvin a stron er clai# than the other. 1t is possible to #ake a ro( h division of thin s in the world into ob7ects of the social sciences and ob7ects of the nat(ral sciences by askin of each ob7ect whether or not h(#an intentions were involved in its prod(ction. ,he weak clai# is that social ob7ects are #ind6dependent in

this sense, as havin been bro( ht abo(t thro( h h(#an action, in which we can s(ppose that h(#an intentions were at work 2altho( h it is not necessary to clai# that any partic(lar h(#an intended any partic(lar o(tco#e, s(ch as the ar#s race or inflation, since as &n els once re#arked, -.hat each individ(al wills is obstr(cted by everyone else, and what e#er es is so#ethin that no one willed-5.E1F ,he stron er clai# is that social ob7ects are not only prod(ced b(t also s(stained by h(#an intentions, and are therefore #ind6dependent in the sense that if everyone9s #ind stopped s(stainin the# they wo(ld, as social ob7ects, cease to e*ist. 1t follows fro# this stron er clai# that idealis# is the appropriate philosophy for the social sciences, and it is abo(t philosophical idealis# that 1 now want to speak. ,he idealist everyone knows abo(t is Ieor e Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, who tho( ht that the cate ory of -#aterial s(bstance- in philosophy was 7(st a #istake. Gohn Kocke had recently developed an e#piricist philosophy that said that the @(alities)shape, color, hardness, war#th, and so on)which #ake (p thin s we know 2and they do #ake the# (p, in the sense that havin all the @(alities of an ob7ect to ether can9t be distin (ished by (s fro# havin the ob7ect5 inhere in #aterial s(bstance. .hen asked, however, what s(bstance was, he @(oted the story of the 1ndian who was asked what the earth rested on: it rested, he said, on the back of a reat elephant, which rested on the back of a reat tortoise, which rested on -so#ethin , he knew not what.-E3F 8(bstance, said Kocke, was so#ethin , b(t he knew not what. Berkeley ot a ood la( h o(t of this and bro( ht so#e very sophisticated ar (#ents to bear, one of which 1 want to spend a little ti#e on. Berkeley p(ts the ar (#ent in the #o(th of Philono(s, the #ind6lover, who is tryin to convince +ylas, the #aterialist, that his position is (ntenable. Philono(s keeps pointin o(t that in order for (s to perceive so#ethin it has to be perceptible, and he clai#s that we can9t know that so#ethin is perceptible (nless we act(ally perceive it. 1n order to perceive it we have to be there. 1 a# obli ed beca(se of its notoriety to refer here to the lone tree that has so often fallen in the deserted forest, and to the noise it does or doesn9t #ake. Berkeley wo(ld have tho( ht that a silly @(estion: if the tree is there, of co(rse > 33" > it #akes a noise)b(t it isn9t, (nless so#eone is watchin it or listenin . Berkeley tho( ht, as he believed 2correctly, it see#s to #e5 ood Christians were obli ed to think, that Iod a(to#atically looked after fallin trees as well as fallin sparrows; and if Iod o#nipotently holds @(alities to ether in ob7ects we don9t need to call on #aterial s(bstance for that service. ,wo of the three really ood philosophical li#ericks 1 know)by Conald Hno* and -/non,- respectively)to ether s(# (p this side of Berkeley9s views 2we will et to another side later5: ,here once was a #an who said -Iod :(st find it e*ceedin ly odd .hen he sees that this tree Contin(es to be .hen there9s no one abo(t in the @(ad.-Dear 8ir, 'o(r astonish#ent9s odd; 1 a# always abo(t in the @(ad) /nd that9s why the tree Contin(es to be 8ince observed by, yo(rs faithf(lly, Iod.1 hope 1 #ay be for iven all this fa#iliar st(ff)we are on the way to #ore serio(s #atters.

D(rin the co(rse of the ar (#ent between +ylas and Philono(s, Philono(s #akes an offer and +ylas thinks he has iven the whole a#e away. Philono(s says, in effect, -1f yo( can conceive of a tree e*istin witho(t Ei.e., o(tsideF the #ind, 19ll ive (p.- +ylas says leef(lly, -%othin easier)1 do now conceive a tree e*istin after that #anner.- -+oldB- says Philono(s, -+aven9t yo( for otten yo(r own #ind0- -Lh bother,- says +ylas, -what a silly #istake)1 tho( ht of this tree all by itself b(t of co(rse it was 1 who was thinkin abo(t it the whole ti#e,- and so on.E3F %ow a brief consideration of Philono(s9s for#(lation: -conceive of a tree e*istin witho(t the #ind,- shows that +ylas ives in too easily. Constr(e this as -conceive of a tree e*istin / witho(t the #ind,- and we have to ad#it that one can9t conceive of an"thing , e*istin or not, witho(t a #ind; b(t constr(e it as -conceive of/ a tree e*istin witho(t the #ind,- and it is clear that so#e of the thin s one can conceive of with the #ind can the#selves, as so conceived, @(ite well be -witho(t- any #ind at all. 1f we can conceive of a tree in a #indless world idealis# fails, at least where trees are concerned. /nd 1 think we can conceive of trees, and oceans, and planets, and Bi Ban s, and all the apparat(s of physical e*istence, as e*istin witho(t #inds. .e can, in other words, conceive of a world witho(t (s. B(t co(ld we conceive of a 7oke in a > 334 > #indless world0 or a p(rchase0 or an ar (#ent0 or a friendship0 Lr even a book 2as so#ethin read5 or a #eal 2as so#ethin en7oyed5 or a war 2as so#ethin s(ffered5 or a nation 2as so#ethin overned or defended50 ,he i#plied answer to these @(estions, at least as far as the social world is concerned, is: /ll these thin s depend on o(r knowin the#; if there were no one to know the#, they wo(ldn9t e*ist. %ow 1 #i ht leave the #atter there, b(t the perversity of the profession drives #e on. 1 said 7(st now that we co(ld conceive of a tree in a #indless world, co(ld conceive of a world in which we didn9t e*ist. B(t what wo(ld that tree and that world be like0 1 a# te#pted to say, what wo(ld they look like0 b(t the #istake in that wo(ld be too obvio(s. 1f we replace -conceive- by -perceive- in o(r te*t no tricks of se #entation will help; we can't conceive of anythin 9s bein !ercei-ed in a #indless world, so the tree we conceive there can9t be a perceived tree. B(t all the trees we9ve act(ally been ac@(ainted with have been perceived ones. +ow shall we proceed with the ar (#ent0 .ell, it #i ht help to look at what so#e philosophers have tho( ht abo(t perception, and partic(larly abo(t the paradi # case of perception that we call vision. ,he standard scientific acco(nt of vision is that li ht is reflected fro# s(rfaces, strikes the eye, is refracted and foc(sed, activates the rods and cones of the retina, and prod(ces nervo(s i#p(lses that so#ehow translate into the e*perience of si ht. 1t is i#portant for #y present p(rposes to reali<e that #ost of that acco(nt is very recent. / few h(ndred years a o nobody (nderstood even reflection in any detail at all, and as to rods and cones and nervo(s i#p(lses, they were as yet (ntho( ht of in anythin like their present for#. 8till, people had theories of vision, often @(ite elaborate ones. Iiven the available evidence, so#e of these theories a#o(nted to p(re eni(s, and we have to ad#it that their proponents were at least as intelli ent as the best of (s and a ood deal #ore i#a inative. 1t is often instr(ctive to try to think oneself into the fra#e of #ind of so#e earlier philosopher, and so#eti#es the enli hten#ent that co#es fro# that e*ercise is en(ine. ,he perception6as6#ovie notion in fact oes back at least as far as Plato, so 1 will be in this part of the ar (#ent with so#ethin fa#iliar a ain, his doctrine of the cave 2fi . 35. 1n Plato this is 7(st an i#a e, altho( h he really does believe that the reality of thin s belon s to a world other than the world of appearance in which we live. +e describes this cine#atic space in Book M11 of the 0e!ublic in these ter#s:

BeholdB h(#an bein s livin in an (nder ro(nd den . . . here they have been fro# their childhood, and have their le s and necks chained so that they cannot #ove, and can only see before the#, bein prevented by the > 33? >

$i (re 3 chains fro# t(rnin ro(nd their heads. /bove and behind the# a fire is bla<in at a distance, and between the fire and the prisoners there is a raised way; and yo( will see, if yo( look, a low wall b(ilt alon the way, like the screen which the #arionette players have in front of the#, over which they show the p(ppets. 1 see. /nd do yo( see, 1 said, #en passin alon the wall carryin all sorts of vessels, and stat(es and fi (res of ani#als #ade of wood and stone and vario(s #aterials, which appear over the wall0 . . . /nd of the ob7ects which are bein carried . . . they Ethe prisonersF wo(ld see only the shadows0 . . . /nd if they were able to converse with one another, wo(ld they not s(ppose that they were na#in what was act(ally before the#0 Mery tr(e. /nd s(ppose f(rther that the prison had an echo which ca#e fro# the other side, wo(ld they not be s(re to fancy when one of the passers6by spoke that the voice which they heard ca#e fro# the passin shadow0 %o @(estion, he replied. ,o the#, 1 said, the tr(th wo(ld be literally nothin b(t the shadows of the i#a es.EAF > 33= >

$i (re 3 1f in do(bt abo(t #y description of the cave as a cine#a, look caref(lly for a #o#ent at the relations between the fire, the prisoners, the ori inal ob7ects, and their shadows in fi (re 3, and co#pare the# with the sa#e relations in fi (re 3. %ow all this is e*ternal to the prisoners, and there are #any of the# in the sa#e cave. Ket #e now invoke the third6cent(ry %eoplatonist Plotin(s, who chan es the sit(ation a bit and #akes it into a serio(s theory of perception, not 7(st an alle ory. Plotin(s is abo(t as far fro# a ca(sal theory, in which e*istin thin s ca(se (s to see the#, as it is possible to et; in his view, on the contrary, we help to ca(se them to e*ist. +is world is as it were t(rned inside o(t: we think that what we see is the o(ter s(rface of #aterial thin s; he thinks it is the inner s(rface of a world of li ht. 'o( will et so#e idea of this inversion if yo( think #etaphorically of t(rnin on the li ht in a roo#, as we nor#ally conceive of it and as Plotin(s #i ht. .e think the roo# is already there and that the li ht 7(st bo(nces off the walls. Plotin(s #i ht say that the li ht creates the roo#, blowin it (p, as it were, fro# the la#p as an

infinitely thin balloon that ass(#es e*actly the roo#9s shape, b(l in inwards where the f(rnit(re is, perhaps pokin o(t into the hall if the door is open. ,he diffic(lty with this #etaphor is how we et into the roo#. Plotin(s9s answer is to t(rn (s into the la#p: instead of havin the pro7ector #ake i#a es and the prisoners look at the#, the pro7ector pro7ects thro( h the eyes of the prisoners. $i (re A is an atte#pt to pict(re Plotin(s9s syste#. > 339 >

$i (re A 1n Plotin(s Plato9s 1dea of the Iood has beco#e a sin le self6 eneratin and s(stainin entity, which he calls ,he Lne. ,he Lne is perfect, so f(ll of perfection indeed that it overflows, e#anatin Bein in all directions. 1 cannot do better than cite fro# The 'nneads of Plotin(s a series of brief @(otations that ive the essentials of the theory: 8eekin nothin , possessin nothin , lackin nothin , the Lne is perfect and, in o(r #etaphor, has overflowed, and its e*(berance has prod(ced the new; this prod(ct has t(rned a ain to its be etter and been filled and has beco#e its conte#plator and so an 1ntellect(al6Principle. 8o(l arises as the idea and act of the #otionless 1ntellect(al Principles. . . .E"F &ver ill(#inated, receivin li ht (nfailin , the /ll68o(l i#parts it to the entire series of later Bein which by this li ht is s(stained and fostered and endowed with the f(llest #eas(re of li ht that each can absorb. 1t #ay be co#pared with a central fire war#in every receptive body within ran e. . . .E4F > 3A! > . . . the /ll68o(l EhasF prod(ced a Cos#os, while the partic(lar so(ls si#ply ad#inister so#e one part of it. . . .E?F . . . so far as the (niverse e*tends, there so(l is. . . .E=F . . . the 8o(l9s operation is not si#ilarly #otionless; its i#a e is enerated fro# its #ove#ent. 1t takes f(llness by lookin to its so(rce; b(t it enerates its i#a e by adoptin another, a downward, #ove#ent. ,his i#a e of 8o(l is 8ense and %at(re.E9F :atter, for Plotin(s, is as ood as none*istent. 1n the words of his translator, 8tephen :cHenna: :atter is the last, lowest, and least e#anation of the creative power of the /ll68o(l, or rather it is a little lower than that even: it is, to speak ro( hly, the point at which the creative or enerative power co#es to a halt; it is the Ulti#ate Possible, it is al#ost %on6 Bein ; it wo(ld be %onBein e*cept that /bsol(te %on6Bein is non6e*istent, i#possible in a world e#anatin fro# the bo(nty of Bein : often no do(bt it is called %on6Bein b(t this is not in strict definition b(t as a convenient e*pression of its (tter, all6b(t6infinite re#oteness fro# the /(thentic6&*istence to which, in the lon line of descent, it owes its ori in.E1!F Partic(lar bits of #atter, for instance, are (nder the ad#inistration. whenever attention is bein paid to the#, of the partic(lar so(ls who see the#, who participate in their e#anation fro# the Lne via the

1ntellect(al6Principle and the /ll68o(l; in this partic(lar case, (s. %at(re and everythin in it is, as we have 7(st learned, -the i#a e of the so(l.- ,he words of Plotin(s rendered by this s(##ary for#(la wo(ld be done better 7(stice, 1 think, if instead of readin , -%at(re is the i#a e of the so(l,- we were to read, -%at(re is an appearance belon in to the so(l.- ,he so(l to who# #y appearances belon , or in whose char e they are, is of co(rse #y own)this is an individ(al and not a collective #atter, even if we all draw o(r e#anations in the end fro# the sa#e so(rce. 1n what follows, 1 want to han on as well as 1 can to this Plotinian view. 1t has a kind of cra<y pla(sibility; the atte#pt to see the s(rfaces of thin s as the screens on which o(r own pro7ections ter#inate is @(ite feasible, as it t(rns o(t, and a fine challen e to the intellect(al i#a ination. .hy did Plotin(s need s(ch a bi<arre doctrine0 .hy co(ldn9t he have accepted the notion that li ht is reflected fro# ob7ects, etc.0 B(t do we reali<e, 1 wonder, 7(st how bi<arre that doctrine, in its t(rn, really is0 .hat physics asks (s to believe is that space is f(ll of trillions (pon trillions of photons, shootin this way and that at the > 3A1 > speed of li ht 2which is their speed5, in s(ch prodi io(s n(#bers that wherever 1 p(t the p(pil of #y eye, however di# the ill(#ination #ay be, eno( h of the# are co#in fro# every direction to that very point for #e to see what is there if 1 t(rn #y eye in that direction, all this happenin so fast that statistical fl(ct(ations are flattened o(t and 1 see thin s steadily. 8(ch an acco(nt wo(ld no do(bt have see#ed to Plotin(s to re@(ire a si#ply inconceivable prodi ality of f(ss and bother, and wildly i#pla(sible @(antities of thin s. +e does in fact entertain the idea that it #ay be so#ethin co#in fro# the ob7ect, thro( h the air, that enables (s to see it, b(t he has an answer to that: $or the #ost convincin proof that vision does not depend (pon the trans#ission of i#pressions of any kind #ade (pon the air, we have only to consider that in the darkness of ni ht we can see a fire and the stars and their very shapes. %o one will pretend that these for#s are reprod(ced (pon the darkness and co#e to (s in linked pro ression; if the fire th(s rayed o(t its own for#, there wo(ld be an end to the darkness. 1n the blackest ni ht, when the very stars are hidden and show no lea# of their li ht, we can see the fire of the beacon6stations and of #ariti#e si nal6towers.E11F .e wo(ld say, of co(rse, that even fro# the distant si nal6tower photons are strea#in by the billions, second after second, in every direction of space. 1 wish to (nderline this point)the astonishin ly lar e n(#ber of thin s that the scientific acco(nt re@(ires)beca(se 1 shall need it later on. 1 now 7(#p fifteen cent(ries, back to Berkeley9s ti#e, with first however a @(ick @(otation fro# Keibni< to show that Plotin(s9s view was not 7(st a %eoplatonic aberration. Keibni< was p(<<led by the fact that each of (s lives in his or her own world, and had a lot of diffic(lty in seein how we co(ld #ana e to have a world in co##on; he concl(ded that everyone was as it were sh(t in, b(t that Iod arran ed for each enclosed world to a ree with every other in #irrorin the whole. Iod for Keibni< is, as can be seen in these @(otations 2fro# the 1onadolog" 5, rather in the position of the Lne in Plotin(s. ,h(s Iod alone is the pri#itive (nity or the ori inal si#ple s(bstance; of which all created or derived #onads are the prod(cts, and are enerated, so to speak, by contin(al f(l (rations of the Divinity. . . .E13F %ow this connection, or this adaptation, of all created thin s to each and of each to all, brin s it abo(t that each si#ple s(bstance has relations which e*press all the others, and that, conse@(ently, it is a perpet(al livin #irror of the (niverse.

/nd as the sa#e city looked at fro# different sides appears entirely different, and is as if #(ltiplied perspectively; so also it happens that, as > 3A3 > a res(lt of the infinite #(ltit(de of si#ple s(bstances, there are as it were so #any different (niverses, which are nevertheless only the perspectives of a sin le one, accordin to the different points of view of each #onad.E13F 8till there re#ains so#ethin a bit odd abo(t this. 1 ret(rn to Berkeley, in his &ew Theor" of #ision , to ive the ar (#ent a #ore #odern twist. Berkeley is #(ch preocc(pied, as we can (nderstand an idealist9s bein , with the @(estion of why we think that the perceived world is o(tside (s rather than inside. +e concl(des that it is beca(se of the fact that part of o(r e*perience of that world is what we #i ht call depth of field, a sense of distance or -o(tness,- as he p(ts it. Lnce a ain his own words will convey the ideas best: $ro# what hath been pre#ised it is a #anifest conse@(ence that a #an born blind, bein #ade to see, wo(ld at first have no idea of distance by si ht; the s(n and stars, the re#otest ob7ects as well as the nearer, wo(ld all see# to be in his eye, or rather in his #ind. ,he ob7ects intro#itted by si ht wo(ld see# to hi# 2as in tr(th they are5 no other than a new set of tho( hts or sensations, each whereof is as near to hi# as the perceptions of pain or pleas(re, or the #ost inward passions of his so(l. . . .E1AF Upon the whole, 1 think we #ay fairly concl(de that the proper ob7ects of vision constit(te an (niversal lan (a e of the /(thor of nat(re, whereby we are instr(cted how to re (late o(r actions in order to attain those thin s that are necessary to the preservation and well6 bein of o(r bodies, as also to avoid whatever #ay be h(rtf(l and destr(ctive of the#. 1t is by their infor#ation that we are pri#arily (ided in all the transactions and concerns of life. /nd the #anner wherein they si nify and #ark (nto (s the ob7ects which are at a distance is the sa#e with that of lan (a es and si ns of h(#an appoint#ent, which do not s( est the thin s si nified by any likeness or identity of nat(re, b(t only by an habit(al conne*ion that e*perience has #ade (s to observe between the#.E1"F .ith this last point we are really on the conte#porary scene, since lan (a e is one of the do#inant philosophical preocc(pations of o(r cent(ry. 1t is to be noticed that we don9t share lan (a e, or inhabit the sa#e lin (istic space; lan (a e is so#ethin we each se-erall" have. /nd we each have a whole lan (a e)it isn9t that 1 have so#e and yo( have so#e #ore, b(t insofar as we are able to co##(nicate, #y lan (a e d(plicates yo(rs; 1 carry #ine aro(nd with #e and yo( do the sa#e, so that when we #eet we can speak and be (nderstood. ,he sa#e thin is tr(e with respect to social instit(tions. &ach of (s in acade#ic life has, for e*a#ple, a whole University, and it is o(r carryin it aro(nd with (s that #akes the University)the instit(tion, not the b(ildin s)e*ist. > 3A3 > ,he idea that e#er es fro# Keibni< and Berkeley is that we each have a perceived world; we don9t live in the sa#e one. 1t was pop(lar in the seventeenth cent(ry to speak of the perceived or sense world as a -sensori(#,- a space f(ll of thin s sensed, as an a(ditori(# is a space f(ll of thin s heard. %ewton (sed to say that space as a whole was the sensori(# of Iod. ,he point to which the ar (#ent has so far bro( ht (s is that we can i#a ine, if Berkeley is correct, that each of (s has a private sensori(# and that its contents bear no necessary rese#blance to what there act(ally is in the world, nor to what is in

other sensoria. 1s there any reason to think that he is correct0 .e #i ht balk at the bit abo(t the /(thor of nat(re, and not be willin to follow Berkeley in sayin , as he does, that what there act(ally is in the world is a lot of ideas in the #ind of Iod, b(t is there so#e other way of interpretin the position he takes0 8(ppose that instead of Berkeley9s Iod or Plotin(s9s Lne we post(late si#ply -the world witho(t (s,however it #ay t(rn o(t to be, and s(ppose that instead of e#anations passin thro( h the so(l or #essa es co#in fro# the /(thor of nat(re we post(late the physical effect that world has on (s, however that oes. B(t s(ppose we keep, fro# Plotin(s, the notion that what we then perceive is so#ethin that proceeds fro# (s, and fro# Berkeley the notion that its contents indicate to (s, b(t do not reprod(ce or represent, what there is in the world witho(t (s. 8(ppose, in other words, we hold that so#ethin in (s enerates 2(nder s(itable sti#(lation5 a sensori(# and its contents, correspondin so#eti#es partially at least, and in so#e way yet to be specified, to the world there is b(t not necessarily bein in any obvio(s way like it. 1s this a conceivable view0 .hat #i ht #ake it diffic(lt to accept, or even inconceivable0 Lne of the #ost i#pla(sible thin s abo(t it is that it wo(ld re@(ire so#ethin in (s, rather than so#ethin in the e*ternal world, to provide 2in response, to be s(re, to detailed instr(ctions fro# witho(t5 the visible detail of the percept(al field, and that field is so rich, so n(anced, so finely rained, so char ed on e*a#ination with #in(te and (ne*pected c(riosities, that it see#s silly to think of (s as havin anythin to do with its !roduction . B(t before 7(#pin to concl(sions let (s re#e#ber all those photons, and how inconceivable it wo(ld have see#ed to anyone #ore than a few h(ndred years a o)if indeed it does not still see# inconceivable)that they are really all there, r(shin invisibly abo(t; and let (s also re#e#ber 'orick and his sk(ll. .hen 'orick was alive, what did his sk(ll #aterially contain0 ,he answer we can now ive, altho( h 8hakespeare co(ld not have iven it, is: thirt" billion neurons . / few #onths a o 1 like everyone else wo(ld have said ten billion, b(t recent ne(rolo ical research has > 3AA > iven (s a bon(s.E14F /t all events we be in with thirty billion, tho( h they start dyin before we are born and no new ones are prod(ced, so it is downhill all the way. +owever, at birth their interconnections are pretty pri#itive, and the epi enetic develop#ent of the brain prod(ces networks of (nbelievable co#ple*ity. ,he infor#ation carried in the vis(al field, however #in(tely detailed, can be handled with a tiny fraction of the available co#p(tational reso(rces. /s far as that oes, the inp(t that tri ers the eneration of that field has to be handled by a #ere ten #illion rods and cones. ,he fact that the n(#ber is finite #eans that the field o( ht to be rainy, and it wo(ld be if it were not for the fact that the pro7ectin #echanis# s#ooths that over, a spatial effect not (nlike that of the s#oothin 6 over in ti#e that we a(to#atically perfor# on the flickerin i#a es in ordinary #ovies. .hen we look at an ob7ect, a white pitcher, for e*a#ple)so#ethin that ives (s a feelin of @(iet and si#plicity)there are act(ally all sorts of b(sy transactions oin on: photons r(shin and bo(ncin , cells in the retina firin , i#p(lses tearin alon nerves and e*plodin packets of che#ical trans#itters at synapses)b(t the vis(al field pro7ects for (s so#ethin @(ite different: a stable, contin(o(s, fir# entity. .e #i ht be #editatin on perfection in total tran@(illity, and all that fren<ied activity wo(ld still be ch(rnin inside the sk(ll. ,here see#s to be pretty ood evidence that the brain p(ts to ether the sensori(# we e*perience fro# se@(ences of inp(ts that it stores and processes. .e have the steady sense of bein in a #ore or less peacef(l enclosed space, relatively lar e and envelopin , b(t o(r eyes are dartin here and there all the ti#e, pickin (p bits of infor#ation and feedin the# into the ne(ral #achinery, as st(dies of saccadic eye #ove#ent have shown.

/ f(rther reinforce#ent of the thesis co#es fro# so#e early str(ct(ralist or protostr(ct(ralist work by &rnst Cassirer, who proposed that 7(st as in lin (istics, where we infer ra##atical constants fro# ro(ps of (tterances or even ro(ps of lan (a es, we infer percept(al constants fro# ro(ps of e*periences.E1?F :y final point is fro# an eccentric &n lish cybernetician called Lliver D. .ells, who in his book, 43W *3,+2 Y3, be so nai-eH , borrows fro# Iibson the idea of an inte ration of overlappin contents as part of the #echanis# of eneratin the sensori(#, altho( h he does not (se that ter#. Iibson i#a ines so#eone sittin in a chair and lookin aro(nd a roo#, takin in one part of it and then another and th(s asse#blin a representation of the whole roo#. .ells takes the process to a #ore f(nda#ental level and says si#ply, in effect, ,he brain co#p(tes the world.E1=F .here does all this leave (s with respect to o(r ori inal @(estions0 .hat liberated (s fro# Plotin(s9s theory of vision, we #i ht say, was > 3A" > the develop#ent of a physical acco(nt of the propa ation of li ht, the reali<ation that the b(rnin of the si nal fire, #ost of whose prod(cts are wasted as heat, really does enerate s(fficient ener y to fill the (niverse, locally and te#porarily, with s(fficiently enero(s n(#bers of photons to activate any eye within reach. .hat restores the theory to (s, in revised for#, is the develop#ent of a physical acco(nt of the operation of the brain, the reali<ation that the co#ple*ity of the interrelations of the ne(rons really is reat eno( h to provide each of (s, in his or her private bony screenin roo#, with a co#plete pict(re of the world. 1t is an incidental virt(e of this view that it #akes drea#s, hall(cinations, into*ication, and so on, not to #ention i#a ination and indeed tho( ht itself, perfectly and i##ediately intelli ible as the f(nctionin of the pro7ection #echanis# (nder other than percept(al sti#(li. 1t re#ains to answer the final @(estion)how #(ch of the world there really is can we really know0)and to fit o(r possession of this apparat(s into an acco(nt of o(rselves: who we are, where we co#e fro#, how if enclosed in o(r own sensoria we can #ake contact with one another. Percept(al conscio(sness does not always convince (s of the e*istence of an o(ter world. Consider a roo# in which one of the walls is a #irror: we can9t see the place in space, away fro# the ed es at any rate, where the real roo# #er es into the #irrored one, b(t we still don9t believe there are two roo#s. 1f we have to operate in the #irror world)as dentists so#eti#es do, or people backin (p their cars) that doesn9t pose any serio(s proble# after a bit of practice. &*peri#ents have been done with the total inversion of the vis(al field by the (se of special pris#atic lasses bolted to the head, and after a bit of st(#blin the field ri hts itself 2only to reverse a ain, with #ore st(#blin , when the lasses are taken off5. ,here isn9t ti#e to p(rs(e this point, b(t it lends wei ht to Berkeley9s re#ark that by vision -we are instr(cted how to re (late o(r actions in order to attain those thin s that are necessary to the preservation and well6bein of o(r bodies, as also to avoid whatever #ay be h(rtf(l and destr(ctive of the#.- Perception, in other words, helps (s to locate the icebo* and not to b(#p into the f(rnit(re. 21 #ean of co(rse the real icebo* and the real f(rnit(re, not 7(st their percept(al co(nterparts.5 /s s(ch it clearly has s(rvival val(e, and while we cannot say that the percept(al apparat(s was developed in order to be (sed in this way, we can say that to so#e de ree at least the re#arkable pro ress h(#an bein s have #ade in (nderstandin what happens in the world is d(e to their ability to pro7ect percept(al #odels of it. ,he final @(estion has to do with what knowled e of the -world witho(t (s- the evidence of perception allows (s to clai#. ,his falls into two proble#s a ain: other > 3A4 >

people, and the physical world. .e have reason to think 2on the basis of percept(al evidence5 that other people live in worlds si#ilar to o(r own; nothin is lost, indeed everythin is to be ained (p to a point, by livin practically as if we had a sensori(# in co##on, even tho( h we co(ldn9t, iven the physical and ne(rolo ical facts, possibly do so. 1t #i ht be that if yo(r ne(rolo ical i#p(lses co(ld be fed into #y brain 1 wo(ld e*perience the# as a horror #ovie, or it #i ht be that 1 wo(ld feel at ho#e. 1 think in fact the for#er is #ore likely to be the case, since 1 have spent fifty idiosyncratic years ettin (sed to #y world, and #y strate ies for bein co#fortable in it are very likely, in their details at least, to be very different fro# yo(rs. B(t the latter is a #ore friendly tho( ht. 1 co(ld at all events e*pect to know the lan (a e, as it were, since the chances are that o(r brains were pro ra##ed in ro( hly si#ilar ways, altho( h even that is not by any #eans certain. ,hirty billion ne(rons, loaded since well before birth with nonstop inp(ts fro# all five senses, will have evolved so#e of their own pro ra#s, and it #ay well be that yo( store the instr(ctions for sayin 2or reco ni<in 5 -bl(e- where 1 store the instr(ctions for sayin or reco ni<in -sala#i.- ,his #i ht have interestin tho( h (nco#fortable conse@(ences sho(ld we ever et o(r wires crossed. /s to the physical world, that is a different story. &verythin we have learned abo(t science s( ests that away fro# the nor#al #acroscopic center of thin s we can9t for# a percept(al #odel of it at all. .e have rown (p in what 1 call the -flat re ion-)a #etaphor 1 take fro# the fact that the earth see#s flat where we live and we need to o off into space, or #ake eo raphical inferences of one sort or another, to concl(de that it is ro(nd. 8o in the direction of the very lar e, the very fast, the very distant, the very s#all, we can only have #athe#atical #odels of how it really is. 8cience be an in the fa#iliar world with the #athe#atical for#(lation of percept(al relations, and for a while we co(ld i#a ine that the e*tensions of perception by #eans of instr(#ents)#icroscopes, telescopes) ave (s access to its re#oter parts. B(t we know now that what is really oin on, not -beneath- perception b(t in the world of which perception ives (s only an appro*i#ate and st(rdy #odel, s(itable for o(r #acroscopic p(rposes, consists of events we can't in principle perceive, a#on the# the very events that #ake perception possible. 1t follows fro# this)and 1 will concl(de with perhaps the #ost prepostero(s clai#s of this essay and the ones that will see# philosophically the #ost (nco#fortable)that the #icroevents to which 1 all(de aren9t happenin in the world we vividly know at all. ,here aren9t any photons in the percept(al roo#, and no percept(al event ca(ses another, 7(st as David +(#e reali<ed. 8o where are the photons and > 3A? > the #icroevents in eneral0 .hy, in the real world. /nd what is the stat(s of o(r knowled e of it0 ,his is where we have to hold on to o(r seats, beca(se nothin protects (s fro# the concl(sion that we have no direct knowled e of it whatever, that all we can ever alle e abo(t it is p(rely and #assively hypothetical. Berkeley #i ht be ri ht: Iod #i ht be doin it all by the word of his power, and there be no s(ch thin as #aterial s(bstance. ,here is no reason whatever to think that this is act(ally the case, and anybody who clai#ed it was wo(ldn9t have any better evidence than we do, in fact wo(ld have reat diffic(lty in even tacklin a lot of @(estions that within o(r hypothesis we have ade@(ate answers for. B(t only within the hypothesis. ,here is in fact no worked6o(t alternative, which is why we have co#e to have s(ch confidence in science. B(t +(#e9s skepticis# re#ains (nref(ted. ,here is one respect, however, in which there #ay be a way o(t of o(r i norance, and that is thro( h #athe#atics. 1t see#s likely that certain str(ct(ral relations, s(ch as -between,- - reater than,- etc., #(st have for#al co(nterparts in the real world, and that we #i ht therefore learn to speak its lan (a e )to speak at any rate with its ra##ar, altho( h we wo(ld still have to (se o(r own vocab(lary. ,he s(pple#entary point that needs to be #ade here is that to say the real is hypothetical or #athe#atical

does not #ean, as so#e fancif(l pop(lari<ers of science have s( ested, that it evaporates into for#(lae, is #erely an idea in o(r heads, etc. .e attrib(te hypothetically to the real 7(st the kind of #ateriality it needs in order to s(stain (s, 7(st the relations a#on its real parts whose #athe#atical e*pression we are able to divine. ,he fact that we don9t know it any better doesn9t #ean that it doesn9t e*ist; o(r knowled e or lack of it is a #atter of co#plete indifference to it; it is , and has no need of (s. L(r proper attit(de to it, it see#s to #e, sho(ld be one of ratit(de for s(stainin (s as perceivin and feelin bein s. ,he real we hypothesi<e can have devastatin ly nonhypothetical effects, of which so#e of the #ost notorio(s and #ost tro(blin occ(r in the do#ain of n(clear physics. ,he apparat(s of o(r sensori(# is adapted to flat6re ion pheno#ena, and o(r i#a ination is li#ited to pla(sible e*tensions of those pheno#ena. .e can observe #any che#ical reactions, or their percept(al co(nterparts, and, horrendo(s as warfare is, it co(nted, (ntil 19A", as a co#ponent of the fa#iliar. Lne of the thin s that #akes n(clear e*plosions horrific is that they constit(te s(ch a violation of the scale of possible i#a ined ca(sal relations; they draw on forces we can't e*perience, even by co(rtesy, as it were. ,his fact #ay acco(nt for the a(to#atic horror6#ovie feelin of their percept(al conse@(ences. 1 a# not s(re that any ood antin(clear ar (#ent co(ld be constr(cted on this basis, beca(se it looks as if it wo(ld > 3A= > r(le o(t beni n (ses like radiation therapy, and the like, b(t it #i ht be worth workin on. 1t see#s silly to let the e*istence of these fra ile sensoria)and they are fra ile, re@(irin as they do the coincidence of tho(sands of s#all deter#inations for their perpet(ation)be threatened by defa(lt. Sa-e the Sensorium so(nds like a pretty ood #otto. &ven if 1 inhabit #ine alone, as yo( do yo(rs, we keep showin (p in each other9s, and it is too ood a life to ive (p witho(t a str( le. > 3A9 >

6;1 A Case &or t#e 0-/a% Scie%ces

T#e Nat-ral Scie%ces= t#e Social Scie%ces= a%d t#e 0-/a%ities
1n this final chapter l shall ar (e that research and teachin in so#e areas of the h(#anities and social sciences stand to benefit fro# the reco nition of a coherent do#ain of in@(iry that #i ht properly be called the -h(#an sciences.- 1 say -in so#e areas- beca(se 1 ass(#e that there are and will contin(e to be e#pirical and @(antitative feat(res of the social sciences, and practical and creative feat(res of the h(#anities, that will fall towards the nat(ral sciences on the one hand, and towards private e*perience on the other, in s(ch a way as to resist incl(sion in this do#ain. /t the sa#e ti#e it #ay also be tr(e that, at least fro# the point of view of teachin , the nat(ral sciences the#selves, as h(#an creations, #i ht profit fro# the attit(des and #ethods of the h(#an sciences. ,he c(rrent classification of the disciplines into the three do#ains of the nat(ral sciences 2and #athe#atics5, the social sciences, and the h(#anities 2and fine arts5, has a perfectly so(nd basis not only historically b(t also concept(ally. 1n settin o(t the concept(al basis 1 shall insist on so#e distinctions that #ay appear to have been discredited, notably the #ethodolo ical distinction between

the nat(ral and social sciences and the ontolo ical distinction between fact and val(e. :y own view is that in spite of their havin lost c(rrency these distinctions are still viable and i#portant. ,he difference between the nat(ral and social sciences is best e*6 > 3"! > pressed, 1 think, in the contrast between thin s and processes a#on whose ca(sal antecedents are to be fo(nd h(#an intentions, and those a#on whose ca(sal antecedents h(#an intentions are not to be fo(nd. ,he for#er belon in the do#ain of the social, and the latter in the do#ain of the nat(ral, sciences. :any thin s 2s(ch as tools, b(ildin s, works of art, etc.5 will be fo(nd in both do#ains, accordin as their #eanin s and (ses on the one hand, or their #aterial e#bodi#ents and properties on the other, co#e into @(estion. $or e*a#ple, h(#an intentions deter#ine that a iven paintin sho(ld be taken as representative or abstract, sho(ld chan e hands at a certain price, sho(ld be attrib(ted to a partic(lar epoch, etc., b(t no s(ch intentions deter#ine that it will s(b#it the wire on which it is h(n to s(ch and s(ch a tension, that it will tear if p(lled or c(t with a certain force, or that if it b(rns it will do so at a partic(lar te#perat(re and with iven prod(cts and resid(es of co#b(stion. 1t sho(ld be noted that the ca(sally6deter#inin intentions need not be those of the maker of the ob7ect in @(estion, nor need the event into whose ca(sal antecedents they enter be the prod(ction of any thing , nor need what e#er es be the reali<ation of any !articular intention 2there #ay be (nintentional conse@(ences of intentional actions)b(t they will only be apprehended as s(ch fro# the point of view of so#e intentionality5. ,he distinction between the sciences 2incl(din the social sciences5 and the h(#anities rests on considerations of a different order. ,he ob7ects of the sciences can be observed and described as they are, and the scientific theories that apply to the# will be confir#ed or ref(ted accordin to the content of those observations and descriptions. $ro# the point of view of a social science in@(iry, say, into the distrib(tion of le*e#es in a iven te*t, it #akes little difference whether the te*t is hi h literat(re or +arle@(in ro#ance. B(t fro# the point of view of the h(#anities it is 7(st what distin (ishes these cases, in the #ode of critical 7(d #ent, that selects the one for scholarly attention and not the other. /nd the work of the h(#anities on what is th(s selected consists as #(ch in (nfoldin and valori<in the basis for that 7(d #ent in the partic(lar case as in confir#in and ref(tin any theory. ,his is not, of co(rse, to play down the role of theory in h(#anistic st(dies; it is 7(st to insist that ob7ects in the do#ain of the h(#anities are incl(ded there not only beca(se they are the prod(cts of h(#an intentions b(t also beca(se they are taken to be e#bodi#ents of h(#an val(e. 1 take val(e to reside not in fact(al presence or even str(ct(re b(t in a power on the part of the ob7ect, e*perienced and attrib(ted as s(ch, to evoke and hold interest and concern, even passion, in the reader, viewer, listener, etc. 1 say -on the part of the ob7ect-)that is how we e*perience it, b(t in fact the pheno#enon of val(e owes as > 3"1 > #(ch to the preparation of the cons(#er 2thro( h personal e*perience, acc(lt(ration, scholarly trainin , etc.5 as to the properties of the ob7ect. Mal(es are facts, or are e#bodied in facts, to which i#peratives are attached.E1F 1n contrast to the sciences, whose facts once established can be left in peace and whose e*peri#ents 2e*cept in the #ode of recheckin or the f(lfill#ent of predictions5 need not be repeated, the -facts- of the h(#anities keep always a f(t(re6referential aspect)they are to be (nderstood, en7oyed, and preserved, and it is to

deepenin o(r f(t(re (nderstandin , enrichin o(r f(t(re en7oy#ent, and 7(stifyin the f(t(re preservation of their ob7ects that the #ain ener ies of the h(#anities are directed.

Scie%ces a%d *isci2li%es

,here is another possible contrast here that is worth drawin and will be of (se in the se@(el. 8ciences, as their na#e s( ests, ai# at for#s of knowled e, syste#ati<ed and #ade coherent in theories. ,o the e*tent that the h(#anities do this they have so#ethin in co##on with the sciences. B(t an ancient opposition sets !ra(is over a ainst theoria , as a #atter of interactin with the world rather than internali<in a representation of it, so#ethin learned by e*a#ple and by doin rather than by instr(ction and by thinkin . ,his s( ests a distinction between the sciences and what #i ht properly be called -disciplines.- ,he difference between a science and a discipline is fairly obvio(s)in a science the (lti#ate ob7ect is knowled e, abo(t the world or abo(t society, and what practice there is follows fro# the knowled e 2or serves it, e. ., in e*peri#entation5, whereas in a discipline the ob7ect is an activity, carried o(t, of co(rse, in a s(itably disciplined way. Kiterary criticis#, co#parative literat(re, and #ost of philosophy co(nt as critical disciplines, whereas the practice of literat(re oes alon with art, #(sic, and the rest into the creati-e disciplines. ,his distinction is obvio(sly not proposed here as a chan e in (sa e, since -discipline- in its ordinary acceptation #eans 7(st what 1 (sed it to #ean at the be innin of the chapter, na#ely, each of the sciences and h(#anities in their instit(tional settin . B(t what it s( ests is a contrast between activity and prod(ct, and a different balance between the# in the different do#ains. 1f the nat(ral sciences have their e*peri#ental or investi ative disciplines the h(#anistic disciplines #ay have their (nifyin and clarifyin sciences. 1t re#ains to be seen what for# these sho(ld take. > 3"3 >

T#e 0-/a% Scie%ces

,he ter# -h(#an sciences,- however, is not intended to be li#ited to the theoretical co#ponents of the traditional h(#anities only; it e*tends to those parts of the social sciences which 2to (se a distinction d(e to Henneth Pike5 attend to the -e#ic- rather than the -etic- feat(res of their ob7ects. Pike borrowed the s(ffi*es fro# the contrast between -phonetic- and -phone#ic- in lin (istics and #ade the# into freestandin ter#s. Phonetics deals with the way an (tterance ob7ectively is, the shape of its so(nds accordin to a standard representation, phone#ics with the way the se #ents of the (tterance contain and convey its #eanin . 8o -the etic viewpoint st(dies behavior as fro# the o(tside of a partic(lar syste#, and as an essential approach to an alien syste#. ,he e#ic viewpoint res(lts fro# st(dyin behavior as fro# inside the syste#.-E3F 1nside the syste# is where the #eanin s are; and #eanin s have an essential co#ponent of val(e. %or is the ter# -h(#an sciences- by any #eans new, tho( h it has not been enerally accepted in &n lish (sa e. ,hat is no do(bt beca(se of the history of the word -science- in &n lish. C(rio(sly eno( h, tho( h, we owe the na#e of the h(#an sciences indirectly to an &n lish ori inal, na#ely, the -#oral sciences- to which Gohn 8t(art :ill devoted book 4 of his S"stem of +ogic ; it was thro( h the translation of that e*pression by Dilthey as )eisteswissenschaften and the renderin of this into $rench as sciences humaines that -h(#an sciences- s( ested itself in &n lish. B(t in order for this to happen, -science- itself had to (nder o a certain #odification of #eanin , and it #ay still be that this #odification is not yet s(fficiently eneral for the new ter#inolo y to be accepted witho(t #is(nderstandin . 2Kendin the na#e to a se#inar #ay perhaps in so#e s#all way help the process

alon .E3F 5 ,he &n lish word -science- ca#e to have its #odern #eanin , as a syste#atic body of ob7ectively confir#ed propositions abo(t a well6defined do#ain of in@(iry, in the ei hteenth cent(ry; the ter# -scientist- did not e#er e for another cent(ry 2it is first reported in 1=A!5, havin been coined by .illia# .hewell on the analo y of -artist.-EAF &arlier (sa e #ade what we wo(ld call a nat(ral scientist a nat(ral philosopher. ,here were also #oral philosophers, who dealt not #erely with ethics b(t also with psycholo y and the forer(nners of what we co(ld now call the social sciences. :ill bro( ht over into the do#ain of science, (nder the na#e -#oral sciences,- the whole of #oral philosophy)e*cept for :orality itself, alon with -Pr(dence or Policy, and /esthetics,- these three for#in -a body of doctrine, which is properly the /rt of Kife, in its three depart#ents . . . the Ci ht, the &*pedient, and the Bea(tif(l or %oble, in h(#an cond(ct and works.-E"F /rt, for > 3"3 > :ill, was nevertheless dependent on the tr(ths of science, and science was everythin or ani<able accordin to the principles of lo ic. 1nsofar as :ill9s #oral sciences were to be scientific at all, they were to be so in the sa#e #ode as the nat(ral sciences. -,he backward state of the :oral 8ciences can only be re#edied by applyin to the# the #ethods of Physical 8cience, d(ly e*tended and enerali<ed.-E4F 1n the &n lish6speakin world this principle re#ained (nchallen ed (ntil @(ite recently, and the standard view in the philosophy of science was that the social sciences were 7(st less e*act nat(ral sciences in which concessions had to be #ade to statistics. ,hat view was reinforced by two twentieth6cent(ry develop#ents 2@(ite in line with their seventeenth6 and ei hteenth6cent(ry antecedents, the #athe#atical physics of %ewton and the #aterialis# of the &nli hten#ent, both of which took root #ore fir#ly in British than in Continental science5: the eras(re of the bo(ndary separatin lo ic and #athe#atics, and the introd(ction of behaviorist psycholo y. All science th(s beca#e @(antitative and -etic.%ot that Continental tho( ht was innocent in this re ard)on the contrary: one of the thinkers who had the #ost infl(ence on :ill was /( (ste Co#te, while the advent of behavioris# was soon reinforced, first indirectly 2thro( h interpreters like /. G. /yer5 and then in person 2on the part of ref( ees like Carnap5, by the second wave of positivis#, fro# Mienna. B(t a #ore enero(s interpretation of -science,- or at least of its Ier#an and $rench e@(ivalents, was preserved on the continent beca(se of the ori inal way in which Dilthey interpreted :ill. $or to :ill9s essentially e*ternal treat#ent of the #oral sciences, and partic(larly the science of history, Dilthey added an internal co#ponent, which he identified as #erstehen or -(nderstandin ,- in effect an e#ic co#ponent. 2,ho( h 1 find Pike9s ter#inolo y appealin , beca(se co#pact, his innovation is only a reinvention of Dilthey.5 #erstehen adds an indispensable ele#ent of interpretation to the -facts- of history; the validation of a historical clai# abo(t iven events re@(ires that the 7(d #ent of a participant in those events, or of so#eone who is in a position to know what it #(st have been like to be a participant in the#, be cons(lted; b(t that 7(d #ent #(st be #ade, or have been #ade, fro# a point of view, and a ain the #eanin of the events as 7(d ed fro# that point of view will involve val(e essentially and cannot be a #erely fact(al #atter. / view so#ethin like this has infor#ed the )eisteswissenschaften and the sciences humaines ever since. 1n this way so#e contin(ity between personal e*perience and the str(ct(re of the world was (aranteed, since these were #ediated by a do#ain in which the latter co(ld be seen only in the li ht of the for#er. Lne #i ht in fact i#a ine a

> 3"A > contin((# of -sciences,- fro# one e*tre#e at which there is no roo# for a s(b7ective and personal co#ponent at all, to the other at which the last trace of the ob7ective and i#personal has at last vanished: at this point, b(t only at this point, the contin((# shades off fro# science into so#ethin else. 1n the &n lish6speakin world, however, with its -two c(lt(res- 2a pernicio(s over6si#plification on the part of Kord 8now, the /llan Bloo# of his day, who con rat(lated hi#self in p(blic on havin been spared, by his s(perior b(t of co(rse personally #erited ood fort(ne, fro# the co##on lot5, this #ediation was #issin . 1ts absence was perceptible, and this led to a revolt a ainst scientis# that t(rned, #istakenly in #y view, a ainst science. 8o#e sy#pto#s of the atte#pt to pl( or brid e the ap, all well6intentioned no do(bt b(t (nfort(nate in their conse@(ences and i#plications, have been Popper9s theory of ob7ective knowled e, H(hn9s theory of paradi # shifts, and Corty9s theory of c(lt(ral conversation. /nother #ove, partly fro# the sa#e and partly fro# different #otives, was the i#portation into the &n lish6speakin debate of a historicis# derived fro# :ar* rather than Dilthey. B(t Popper9s invention of his .orld 111 to acco##odate what he took to be the ob7ective reality of -proble#s- #erely echoed 2(nconscio(sly no do(bt)he was certainly #ade an ry eno( h by the s( estion5 an earlier tho( ht of Bachelard9s; H(hn9s revol(tions had si#ilarly been anticipated by Can (ilhe#; as to Corty, his #i*t(re of the disciplines into a eneral broth of c(lt(re was the last in a lon series of si#ilar pro ra#s that co(ld be traced fro# +e el9s 'nc"clo!edia thro( h to +er#ann +esse9s )lass 5ead )ame .

0istoricis/ a%d t#e Li%$-istic T-r%

1n eneral it #ay be said that all these atte#pts to b(ild (p the low ro(nd between scientific certainty on the one hand and e*istential certit(de on the other s(ffered fro# an e#barrass#ent and a lack. ,he e#barrass#ent was historicis#: it see#ed enerally to be believed that so#ethin +e el had concocted and :ar* had swallowed, that had s(rvived the dialectical inversion fro# idealis# to #aterialis#, #(st carry the wei ht of pla(sibility if not of tr(th itself. &veryone therefore beca#e politically and historically conscio(s and relativist)and this 7(st as there was co#in to be available the notion of a science that #i ht be en(inely c(#(lative and th(s in itself ahistorical, that #i ht be fed by every c(lt(re and th(s transcend c(lt(ral relativis#. 21t is to be noted that the opposite of -relative- in this conte*t is not -abso6 > 3"" > l(te- b(t -ne(tral- or -indifferent.-5 ,he lack was of an ontolo y that co(ld steer between the 8cylla of i##(table ivenness and the Charybdis of #o#entary ani#ation. ,he paradi # case of the sort of thin for which s(ch an ontolo y was re@(ired was seen @(ite early on, by a few pioneers, to be lan (a e, or, in eneral, syste#s of si ns or of si nificance. ,here had of co(rse been st(dies of lan (a e before, ra##atical or philolo ical or co#parative, b(t the @(estion what si ns in fact were, or lan (a e was, see#s not to have been posed as a serio(s ontolo ical @(estion #(ch before $erdinand de 8a(ss(re 2this at all events was his opinion5. ,o be s(re there had been theories of the si n, in the 8toics and then a ain in Charles 8anders Peirce 2to #ention the earliest and latest and #ost sophisticated entries in a lon historical series5, b(t the 8toic doctrine of the lekton , which #i ht have developed into the re@(ired ontolo y, re#ained e#bryonic, while Peirce, o(t of #odesty or disinterest or both, avoided ontolo ical @(estions when he co(ld. 2/ typical disclai#er occ(rs in -+ow to :ake L(r 1deas Clear-: -as #etaphysics is a s(b7ect #ore c(rio(s than (sef(l, the

knowled e of which, like that of a s(nken reef, serves chiefly to enable (s to keep clear of it, 1 will not tro(ble the reader with any #ore Lntolo y at the #o#ent.-5E?F %evertheless in Peirce there are, as (s(al, brilliant anticipatory hints, and one of the# co#es in a re#arkable passa e at the end of his essay, -8o#e Conse@(ences of $o(r 1ncapacities,- where he says, ,he word or si n which #an (ses is the #an hi#self. . . . ,hat is to say, the #an and the e*ternal si n are identical, in the sa#e sense in which the words homo and man are identical. ,h(s #y lan (a e is the s(# total of #yself: for the #an is the tho( ht. 1t is hard for #an to (nderstand this, beca(se he persists in identifyin hi#self with his will, his power over the ani#al or anis#, with br(te force. %ow the or anis# is only an instr(#ent of tho( ht. B(t the identity of #an consists in the consistenc" of what he does and thinks, and consistency is the intellect(al character of a thin , that is, is its e*pressin so#ethin . $inally, as what anythin really is, is what it #ay finally co#e to be known to be in the ideal state of co#plete infor#ation, so that reality depends on the (lti#ate decision of the co##(nity; so tho( ht is what it is only by virt(e of its addressin a f(t(re tho( ht which is in its val(e as tho( ht identical with it, tho( h #ore developed. 1n this way, the e*istence of tho( ht now depends on what is to be hereafter; so that it has only a potential e*istence, dependent on the f(t(re tho( ht of the co##(nity. ,he individ(al #an, since his separate e*istence is #anifested only by i norance and error, so far as he is anythin apart fro# his fellows, and fro# what he and they to be, is only a ne ation.E=F > 3"4 > ,his citation see#s to #e to head e*actly in the ri ht direction, only to veer off in the end. -,he or anis# is only an instr(#ent of tho( ht,- -reality depends on . . . the f(t(re tho( ht of the co##(nity,- -the individ(al . . . is only a ne ation-: that -only- spoils a pro#isin e#phasis, and the s(bse@(ent stress on the co##(nity as a ainst the individ(al co#po(nds the error. ,he or anis# is indeed the instr(#ent of tho( ht, and individ(als constitute the co##(nity. 'et words or si ns s(rely are h(#an reality, and any science of that reality will s(rely have to be, a#on other thin s, a science of lan (a e. 8a(ss(re, like Peirce, see#s to have been an ori inal 2each of the# reinvented a ter# for the science of si ns on the basis of the Ireek semeion , Peirce choosin -se#iotic- and 8a(ss(re -se#iolo y-5. B(t 8a(ss(re raised the ontolo ical @(estion directly, decidin that there #(st e*ist so#ethin called langue , a syste# of r(les that in his words -resides in the collectivity.- 2+e was ro(ndly deno(nced for this by C. H. L den and 1. /. Cichards, who wrote an infl(ential book called The 1eaning of 1eaning , and 1 do not do(bt that this set back the acceptance of 8a(ss(re9s work in the &n lish6 speakin world.5 1 think this is the wron answer, as wron in 8a(ss(re9s case as it was in Peirce9s)b(t it was the ri ht @(estion, and the s(bse@(ent develop#ent of 8a(ss(rean lin (istics and the str(ct(ralis# that e#er ed fro# it was not in fact ha#pered by the wron ness of the answer 2any #ore than &dison9s develop#ent of electric li ht was ha#pered by the wildly erroneo(s theories of electricity enerally held at the ti#e5.

Str-ct-ralis/
,he #istake is to ive ontolo ical priority to the co##(nity or collectivity, when it is the individ(al

and the individ(al alone who e#bodies langue 2even tho( h its ac@(isition by and (sef(lness to any individ(al depends absol(tely on its also bein and havin been e#bodied, individ(ally, in other individ(als5. /nd yet the str(ct(re of langue , or of any other social syste#, as e#bodied in 2or as 1 wo(ld wish to say -instr(cted into-5 each individ(al, is in fact 7(st what it wo(ld be if it co(ld, !er im!ossible , be e#bodied in the collectivity directly, so that it can be dealt with, (p to a point, as if it were so e#bodied. .hat a str(ct(ralis# of ob7ectified collective properties #isses is everythin that hin es on idiosyncrasy and variation as between individ(als, the always discrete processes of diff(sion and instr(ction, and these thin s can beco#e i#portant. ,o a first appro*i#ation it will do, beca(se it is (sef(l to be able to speak of lan (a es or c(lt(res in eneral. B(t in detail it won9t do, beca(se no two people have e*actly the sa#e lan6 > 3"? > (a e, nor do they share e*actly an" social ob7ect, even in the ele#entary case of the freely6for#ed co(ple 2the clearest ill(stration of the dependence of the collective on individ(als, since it co#es into bein when, b(t only when, each partner says so, and ceases to e*ist)e*cept resid(ally in the intentional do#ains of third parties)as soon as either partner says so5. ,he tr(ly central contrib(tion of str(ct(ralis#, which 8a(ss(re artic(lated a-ant la lettre as well as anyone has done since, is its insistence on the differential and relational character of the ob7ects with which it deals, as opposed to the self6identical and s(bstantial character of the ob7ects of the nat(ral sciences. ,he opposition between the two cases can now be p(t in yet another way: the entities with which the nat(ral sciences deal can be tho( ht of as pree*istin and independent of the relations into which they enter; hi her6level entities 2consistin of lower6level entities in relation5 still preserve this thin 6like independence with respect to each other and the relations into which they in t(rn enter.E9F ,he entities with which the social sciences deal, however, are constit(ted o(t of relations, apprehended by so#e conscio(sness or other, prod(ced by so#e intentionality, pres(#ably h(#an 2since h(#an intentionalities are the only ones we know anythin abo(t5. 8tr(ct(res are sets of relations, and str(ct(ralis# 7(st is the view that the ob7ects of the social 2or as we #ay now say h(#an5 sciences are relational rather than s(bstantial. 1n other words, the nat(ral is there whether or not it is tho( ht abo(t, the social is not there (nless it is tho( ht abo(t. Lr a ain, #ore s(ccinctly yet: the appropriate #etaphysics for the nat(ral sciences is realis#, the appropriate #etaphysics for the social or h(#an sciences is idealis#. ,he flowerin 2and fadin 5 of str(ct(ralis# need not be reco(nted here, b(t a co(ple of its eccentricities do need to be noticed, since they contrib(ted, 1 believe, to a eneral fail(re to perceive that it did in fact offer the h(#an sciences the theoretical fo(ndation they were lackin . Partly beca(se of 8a(ss(re9s location of langue in the collectivity and partly, no do(bt, beca(se of an e*a erated respect for :ar*is#, it ca#e to be enerally tho( ht that the str(ct(res with which str(ct(ralis# dealt were ob7ective in the old nat(ral6scientific way, and even that they were so#ehow not #erely intelli ible b(t intelli ent, capable of independent a ency. ,hat they do have so#e ob7ectivity at the ne(rophysiolo ical level there is little reason to do(bt, b(t such str(ct(res are not available for e*planatory p(rposes within the h(#an sciences)h(#an bein s (se the# 2in so#e sense of -(se,- tho( h certainly not the nor#al p(rposive one5 to think the intentional str(ct(res they do think, b(t they the#selves re#ain ob7ects for a nat(ral science 7(st as any (sef(l device

> 3"= > wo(ld, and are as little capable of a ency or p(rpose as any other co#ple* physical arran e#ent. ,his however was not the ob7ectivity that KPvi68tra(ss and $o(ca(lt had in #ind when they represented lan (a e and #yth and power and se*(ality as c(nnin forces in the world whose (nwittin pawns we are, when they insisted on sayin not -we think the world thro( h #yths- b(t rather -#yths think the#selves thro( h (s,- not -1 write- b(t rather -1 a# written,- and other s(ch dark for#(lae. 1 call this aberration -#isplaced a ency-; its effect is to deny s(b7ective a ency on o(r part or even, with s(bli#e inconsistency 2since its proponents are the#selves the s(b7ects of their own (tterances and intentions5, s(b7ectivity itself. ,he str(ct(ralists talked a lot abo(t the eli#ination of the s(b7ect in favor of an interplay of str(ct(res, th(s #issin the i#portant point that s(b7ectivity is in fact the ani#ation of str(ct(re and the only thin that #akes str(ct(res f(nction as they do. Lf co(rse 1 don9t ani#ate the whole &n lish lan (a e, say, all by #yself; it transcends #e, b(t onl" in the !ersons of other indi-iduals with their own subjecti-it" , not as an -ob7ective- str(ct(re that can dispense with s(ch e#bodi#ent. ,hat there are very #any individ(als involved 2all the &n lish6 speakers thro( ho(t history5 e*plains on the one hand why the &n lish lan (a e seems so historically entrenched, to the point of takin on a kind of ob7ectivity, b(t on the other hand and at the sa#e ti#e why a theory that insists on the individ(al e#bodi#ent of str(ct(re is ade@(ate to carry the ontolo ical wei ht of the social: precisely beca(se the b(rden is so widely shared. ,his last e*a#ple #ay be taken as paradi #atic, b(t it leaves o(t one i#portant consideration, na#ely, the role of what 8artre called the -practico6inert- as a carrier of str(ct(re, or rather as a te#plate or enerator by #eans of which str(ct(re is perpet(ally re6created for s(b7ects. ,his #(st be an ele#ent in any developed h(#an science. 8(ch sciences need to be constr(cted with all the slow care that oes into the constr(ction of any science, and can be, in the confidence that their ob7ects have, in their own way, the sort of per#anence that #akes s(ccessive appro*i#ations and repeated confir#ations possible. Beca(se of the do#inance of relativis# and historicis#, however, there has co#e to be an ass(#ption that #a7or theoretical positions will s(cceed one another with so#e re (larity and fre@(ency, and that there is so#ethin sta nant abo(t a field that does not (nder o the appropriate revol(tion every decade or so. 1n the nat(ral sciences there have been, it is tr(e, revol(tionary theoretical chan es in the last cent(ry; b(t in spite of #etatheoretical clai#s to the contrary, the process of slow conver ence has not really been co#pro#ised. 1ts apparent acceleration has been d(e to the very > 3"9 > lar e n(#bers of workers whose in@(iries have cross6fertili<ed one another and to the si#ilarly accelerated chan es in available technolo y d(e also to e*ponentially rowin n(#bers in that do#ain. ,he world, however, re#ains as it was, s(b#ittin inertly 21 a# te#pted to say patiently, b(t the world is no #ore patient than it is a ent5 to e*peri#ental probes and reactin consistently a ain and a ain to the sa#e actions. 1t is this perpet(al availability of nat(re that #akes the nat(ral sciences as happily c(#(lative as they are, even when c(rrent work is at concept(ally distant frontiers. 1t #i ht see# that everythin #(st be different with the h(#an sciences, that their ob7ects are perpet(ally different rather than si#ilar, that the winds of chan e and fashion #ake any conver ence i#possible. Certainly the breathless s(ccession of post(res, since #odernis# and str(ct(ralis# ca#e on the scene, see#s to be infor#ed by so#e s(ch conviction 2one critic has spoken of -the new #aelstro#- of poststr(ct(ralist #odernity.E1!F 5 B(t if the h(#an sciences can only a ree on the kind of thin they are abo(t)and that is the task 1 have been tryin to advance in this chapter)they #ay

find the#selves able to consolidate in a way that transcends, witho(t betrayin , the individ(als who create and s(stain those ob7ects and infor# the# with history 2rather than bein dra ed alon by it; a pla(sible case co(ld be #ade for the view that only individ(als have histories, or even history, b(t that #(st await another occasion5. Certainly str(ct(ralis# in so#e of its #odes see#s to approach this condition, bein as it is as #(ch at ho#e with classical #ytholo y as with seventeenth6cent(ry dra#a or conte#porary se*(ality; with its 28a(ss(rean5 doctrine of the synchronic it #ay be on its way to the con@(est of ti#e that the nat(ral sciences have nat(rally and (nconscio(sly achieved. +(#ans, it is tr(e, cannot be considered as end(rin as nat(re. B(t if we conservatively esti#ate their end(rance on this earth so far 2which is not to be conf(sed with their history5 at, say, a @(arter of a #illion years, and opti#istically rant the# the e*pectation of an e@(al r(n into the f(t(re, that sho(ld ive the h(#an sciences ti#e to establish the#selves. ,he nat(ral sciences, after all, have in their #at(re for# #ana ed it in a few cent(ries.

A New U%dersta%di%$ o& Scie%ce

/ final word as to what that #at(re for# is. Lne of the #is(nderstandin s of nat(ral science 2to which nat(ral philosophers and their scientist s(ccessors since the ei hteenth cent(ry have the#selves been prone5 is that it is a total syste#, a coherence that reaches over the > 34! > (niverse and everythin in it, a potentially co#plete acco(nt of the state and ca(sal deter#ination of everythin at so#e appropriate level: physical, che#ical, or whatever. 1t is this -#irror of nat(re- view to which so#e recent criticis# has been addressed, and that so#e of the social or h(#an sciences have (nwisely tried to i#itate. B(t of co(rse science is no s(ch thin , tho( h in the heady days of the tri(#phant %ewtonian world6view it was easy to think that that was what it #i ht beco#e. Kaplace is notorio(s for havin for#(lated this c(l#ination of pro ress with his vision of an intelli ence for who# -nothin wo(ld be (ncertain . . . the f(t(re, like the past, wo(ld be directly present to his observation.-E11F .hether Iod or de#on, this intelli ence is no lon er conceivable, and not only beca(se of +eisenber , ITdel, and the rest. 1t is not so #(ch that a %ewtonian paradi # has been displaced by an &insteinian one 2H(hn has #(ch to answer for in his careless adaptation of that word5 )indeed, %ewton hasn't been displaced, e*cept at the re#ote frin es of concept(al possibility)it9s rather that %ewton never covered even his own do#ain in the way Kaplace tho( ht. %ewton co(ld ive a co#plete acco(nt of how two #assive bodies wo(ld interact in an otherwise e#pty (niverse, and the whole s(ccess of %ewtonian science has consisted in pretendin that real events can be represented as a re ates of independent pairwise interactions, as (p to a pra #atically satisfactory li#it they can. B(t %ewton co(ldn9t, and science still can9t, ive a co#plete acco(nt of how three #assive bodies wo(ld interact, e-en in an otherwise e#pty (niverse. 1f science can9t even solve the three6body proble# in #echanics, its #ost ele#entary branch, how can anyone ever have tho( ht that it co(ld #irror the whole of nat(re0 .e can appreciate and learn fro# the nat(ral sciences witho(t #akin that #istake)indeed, learnin fro# the# depends on o(r not #akin that #istake. ,he ass(#ption that total disc(rsive ade@(acy was what science clai#ed 2rather than bein what so#e i##oderate scientists and their ad#irers clai#ed5 has obsc(red the en(ine lesson that science has to teach. / ood paradi # case 2(sin the #etaphor e*actly rather than wildly5 of the scientific treat#ent of an event is to be fo(nd at the be innin of #odern science with Ialileo9s e@(ation for the #otion of a ball on a s#ooth inclined plane. / bit of the world, e*peri#entally deli#ited, is #atched by a bit of

disco(rse, for#ally constr(cted; the #atchin is e*act and reprod(cible. :i ht we find another bit of the world, so#ewhere else, and another disc(rsive #atch0 .e #i ht indeed)#any of the#)and this is how science rew. :i ht these bits 7oin (p, so that the e*peri#ental do#ains co(ld be seen to be connected and the disc(rsive do#ains (nite in a lar er science0 ,his too happened, #ost dra#atically in %ewton9s tr(ly prodi io(s #er er of Hepler9s ce6 > 341 > lestial with Ialileo9s terrestrial #echanics, thro( h his inspired con7ect(re that the #oon #i ht be fallin towards the earth, as indeed it perpet(ally is. .ill this process o on (ntil the whole world, in all its detail, is #atched by a sin le science0 ,o this @(estion ei hteenth6cent(ry science ave an e*cited and pre#at(rely affir#ative answer, b(t on reflection it is obvio(s that the very idea involves a parado*, like the #ap, so#ewhere in Bor es 1 think, that in the end was as bi and as real as the co(ntry itself. &ven if we overlook the s#all #atter of the three6body proble#, it is clear that when the science co#es to #atch what is in the scientist9s head so#e diffic(lty will arise, since after all that is where the science itself is and #(st be. 8cience is not in the scientist9s world b(t abo(t it, and we are the only bein s we know capable of s(stainin the relation -abo(t.+ow far, then, can the coherent do#ain of science e*tend0 .ell, as far as it does e*tend)and, (p to now, no f(rther. ,here is no Platonic science waitin to be reali<ed, only an /ristotelian one achieved and artic(lated as best we have been able to do these thin s, which (nder the circ(#stances is pretty well, tho( h the res(ltin science is and will always re#ain partial. .e can be convinced that the world is one and ca(sally connected 2(p to the creative #o#ent we inhabit5 witho(t thinkin that we #(st strive for one scientific representation of it. ,his tho( ht is in fact an echo of /ristotle: /n infinity of thin s befall . . . one #an, so#e of which it is i#possible to red(ce to (nity; and in like #anner there are #any actions of one #an which cannot be #ade to for# one action. Lne sees, therefore, the #istake of all the poets who have written a 4eracleid , a Theseid , or si#ilar poe#s; they s(ppose that, beca(se +eracles was one #an, the story also of +eracles #(st be one story.E13F ,he lesson here, for the nat(ral sciences, is one of restraint as to what they can pretend, b(t for the h(#an sciences it is one of enco(ra e#ent and liberation. $or, in the sense 1 have been insistin on, they can be as scientific as any discipline in findin disc(rsive #atches for their ob7ects and artic(latin these into as ra#ified a str(ct(re as the traffic will bear. ,he -coherent do#ain of in@(iry- referred to in #y very first para raph will be a li#ited do#ain, b(t by now that oes witho(t sayin . %o do(bt part of its activity will be its own perpet(al deconstr(ction. B(t if responsibly carried o(t, this activity will leave so#e thin s in place, and it is in the c(#(lative artic(lation of what th(s re#ains in place that the h(#an sciences are established. $or a science is possible wherever there is so#e constancy of ob7ect and so#e stability in disco(rse. /s to constancy of ob7ect, Katin verse is still with (s after two tho(6 > 343 > sand years, and Baro@(e #(sic after two h(ndred; 1 see no reason why, alon with C(bist paintin and other #ore recent arrivals, they sho(ld not still be occ(pyin the attention of the h(#an sciences tho(sands of years fro# now. ,he essential difference between this and the nat(ral6scientific case is that these thin s will end(re only if the #eans of readin the# o(t of the practico6inert contin(e to be

instr(cted into eneration after eneration. ,his is a chain that can be broken and probably will be, in the event(al dissol(tion or transcendence of o(r present environ#ent, b(t it #ay well have a r(n so#e orders of #a nit(de lon er than c(lt(ral history so far. 1t #i ht be broken also by despair, bro( ht on by irresponsible and (nstable #etatheory. B(t the #etatheory, 1 think, only seems (nstable. ,he late twentieth cent(ry, in fact, see#s to have so#ethin in co##on with the late ei hteenth)then everyone was bein e*citable abo(t the world9s han in to ether; now people are ettin e*cited abo(t its fallin apart. B(t the real work of the sciences, whether nat(ral or h(#an, oes on at a different level, not (nder so#e fashionable -paradi #- b(t in the confrontation of their ob7ects and the i#a inative str(ct(rin of their disco(rse. ,he ai# in both cases is the sa#e: to (nderstand the world and to artic(late its representations, testin the li#its of possibility. /#on the ob7ects to be (nderstood are the sciences the#selves. 1n the case of the h(#an sciences the constr(ction of s(ch an (nderstandin is a refle*ive activity, a tho( ht which 1 now t(rn self6referentially back as a #eans of clos(re. > 343 >

Notes
PREFACE
1. &d#(nd +(sserl, The *risis of 'uro!ean Sciences and Transcendental henomenolog": An Introduction to henomenological hiloso!h"$ trans. David Carr 2&vanston, 1ll.: %orthwestern University Press5, 13!.

Fro/ P#(sics to t#e 0-/a% Scie%ces1T#e Iti%erar( o& a% Attit-de

1. Peter Caws, review of C. +arrP, The rinci!les of Scientific Thinking$ in S"nthese 3", 1/3, %ov/Dec 19?3, 3"3. 3. 8ir 1saac %ewton, The 1athematical rinci!les of &atural hiloso!h"$ trans. /ndrew :otte, 3 vols. 2Kondon: 8herwood, %eely, and Gones; and Davis and Dickson5, 3:14!6143. 3. Pierre68i#on Kaplace, 'ssai !hiloso!hi/ue sur les !robabilit7s 2Paris: Ia(thier6Millars, 19315, 3. A. 8ee /lfred %orth .hitehead, Science and the 1odern World 2%ew 'ork: %ew /#erican Kibrary E:entor BooksF, 19A= Eori inally p(blished in 193"F5, "4. ". Donald Davidson, -Ln the Mery 1dea of a Concept(al 8che#e,- roceedings and Addresses of the American hiloso!hical Association$ A=, 19?36?A, "63!. 4. Peter Caws, The hiloso!h" of Science: A S"stematic Account 2Princeton: Man %ostrand, 194"5. ?. 8a#(al ,aylor Colerid e, The %riend 1:iv 21=4"5, 11=. =. Peter Caws, Science and the Theor" of #alue 2%ew 'ork: Cando# +o(se, 194?5. 9. /ristotle, &icomachean 'thics 1!9A b 3!634. 1!. 8ee Peter Caws, Sartre 2Kondon: Co(tled e and He an Pa(l Eseries -/r (#ents of the Philosophers-F, 19?95. break 11. &d#(nd +(sserl, The *risis of 'uro!ean Sciences and Transcendental henomenolog": An

Introduction to henomenological hiloso!h"$ trans. David Cart 2&vanston, 1ll.: %orthwestern University Press5, A=6A9, 1!361=9. 13. 8ir Harl Popper, 3bjecti-e Knowledge: An '-olutionar" A!!roach 2L*ford: Clarendon Press, 19?35, 1!4. 13. Iaston Bachelard, +'acti-it7 rationaliste de la !h"si/ue contem!oraine 2Paris: Presses Universitaires de $rance, 19"15, 4.

1 As2ects o& 0e/2el's P#iloso2#( o& Scie%ce

1. Carl I. +e#pel, hiloso!h" of &atural Science 2&n lewood Cliffs, %.G.: Prentice6+all, 19445. 3. Keiden: 8i7thoff, 1934. 3. P. .. Brid #an, The +ogic of 1odern h"sics 2%ew 'ork: ,he :ac#illan Co., 193?5. A. C(dolf Carnap, 2er +ogische Aufbau der Welt 2Berlin68chlachtensee: .eltkreis6Merla , 193=5. ". Harl C. Popper, +ogik der %orschung 2Mienna: 8prin er Merla , 193A5. 4. :orris C. Cohen and &rnest %a el, An Introduction to +ogic and Scientific 1ethod 2%ew 'ork: +arco(rt, Brace and Co., 193A5. ?. 1n the paper -8t(dies in the Ko ic of &*planation- with Pa(l Lppenhei#, first p(blished in hiloso!h" of Science 1" 219A=5: 13"61?", and now reprinted in As!ects of Scientific '(!lanation 2see note 11 below5. =. P. H. $eyerabend, -+ow to Be a Iood &#piricist,- in hiloso!h" of Science$ The 2elaware Seminar , ed. Bernard Ba(#rin, 3 vols. 2%ew 'ork: 1nterscience P(blishers, 19435, 3:9. 9. 8ir 1saac %ewton, 3!ticks: 3r$ a Treatise of the 0eflections$ 0efractions$ Inflections and *olours of +ight , 3d ed. 2Kondon: .illia# and Gohn 1nnys, 1?315, 3"4. 1!. %undamentals of *once!t %ormation in 'm!irical Science , vol, 3, no. ? of International 'nc"clo!edia of ,nified Science 2Chica o: University of Chica o Press, 19"35. 11. As!ects of Scientific '(!lanation and 3ther 'ssa"s in the hiloso!h" of Science 2%ew 'ork: ,he $ree Press, 194"5. 13. 8tephen ,o(l#in, in Scientific American 2$ebr(ary 19445: 1396133. 13. P. H. $eyerabend, -&*planation, Ced(ction, and &#piricis#,- in 1innesota Studies in the hiloso!h" of Science , ed. +. $ei l and I. :a*well 2:inneapolis: University of :innesota Press, 19435, 3:3=. 1A. P. H. $eyerabend, -+ow to Be a Iood &#piricist,- 3?. 1". Peter /chinstein, -,he Proble# of ,heoretical ,er#s,- in American hiloso!hical 9uarterl" 3, no. 3 2G(ly 194"5: 19363!3. 14. ,. 8. H(hn, The Structure of Scientific 0e-olutions 2Chica o: University of Chica o Press, 19435. break

61 Scie%ce a%d S(ste/. O% t#e U%it( a%d *i'ersit( o& Scie%ti&ic T#eor(
1. /. %. .hitehead, Ad-entures of Ideas 2Ca#brid e: Ca#brid e University Press, 19335, 3!3. 3. Ialileo Ialilei, 2ialogues *oncerning Two &ew Sciences , trans. +. Crew and /. De 8alvio 2%ew

'ork: :ac#illan, 191A5, 14!. 3. C(dolf Carnap, -Ko ical $o(ndations of the Unity of 8cience,- in Ltto %e(rath, C(dolf Carnap, and Charles :orris, %oundations of the ,nit" of Science: Toward an International 'nc"clo!edia of ,nified Science , 3 vols. 2Chica o: University of Chica o Press, 19""619?!5, 1:"". A. Pa(l Lppenhei# and +ilary P(tna#, -Unity of 8cience as a .orkin +ypothesis,- in 1innesota Studies in the hiloso!h" of Science , ed. $ei l, 8criven, and :a*well 2:inneapolis: University of :innesota Press, 19"=5, 3: 3. ". Carnap, -Ko ical $o(ndations,- 41. 4. Ieor e Perri o Con er, S"no!tic &aturalism 2:inneapolis: University of :innesota Kibrary, 194!5, vi. ?. $rancis Bacon, &o-um 3rganum , bk. 1, aph. A". =. +erbert 8pencer, The )enesis of Science 2%ew 'ork: +(#boldt P(blishin Co., 1==?5, 1A61". 9. Ltto %e(rath, -Unified 8cience as &ncyclopedic 1nte ration,- in Ltto %e(rath, C(dolf Carnap, and Charles :orris, %oundations of the ,nit" of Science: Toward an International 'nc"clo!edia of ,nified Science , 3 vols. 2Chica o: University of Chica o Press, 19""619?!5, 1:3!. 1!. C. I. Collin wood, S!eculum 1entis 2L*ford: Clarendon Press, 193A5, 191. 11. +erbert 8i#on, -,he /rchitect(re of Co#ple*ity,- )eneral S"stems 1! 2194"5: 49. 13. Henneth Bo(ldin , -Ieneral 8yste#s ,heory),he 8keleton of 8cience,- )eneral S"stems 1 219"45: 11. 13. +erbert 8pencer, The )enesis of Science 2%ew 'ork: +(#boldt P(blishin Co., 1==?5, 3A. 1A. +enri PoincarP, -Celations entre la physi@(e e*peri#entale et la physi@(e #athP#ati@(e,- in Ch.6 &d. I(illa(#e and K. PoincarP, 0a!!orts !r7sent7s au *ongr>s International de h"si/ue r7uni I aris en BCJJ 2Paris: Ia(thiers6Millars, A v., 19!!5, 1:3A.

"1 +osse's O/2#alos T#eor( a%d t#e Ecce%tricit( o& 3elie&

1. &d#(nd Iosse, %ather and Son 2%ew 'ork: Charles 8cribner9s 8ons, 19!?5, 33=. 3. &d#(nd Iosse, The +ife of hili! 4enr" )osse$ %.0.S.$ b" 4is Son 2Kondon: He an Pa(l, ,rench, ,rbbner and Co., 1=9!5, ?3. break 3. &d#(nd Iosse, %ather and Son , 4. A. ,itian Peale, a painter of ani#als, is the only brother he #entions; C(bens and Ce#brandt, who earlier had #ade i#portant contrib(tions to /#erican nat(ral history, were by this ti#e considerably older than Iosse. ,he father of these three 2and of ei ht other children also na#ed after artists5 was Charles .illson Peale, the fa#o(s portrait painter. ". Philip Iosse, +etters from Alabama ?,.S.F *hiefl" 0elating to &atural 4istor" 2Kondon: :or an and Chase, 1="95. Ketter 13 deals with #anners in the so(th, especially with slavery. 4. &d#(nd Iosse, The +ife of hili! 4enr" )osse$ %.0.S. , 1"?. ?. Philip Iosse, The *anadian &aturalist. A Series of *on-ersations on the &atural 4istor" of +ower *anada 2Kondon: Gohn Man Moorst, 1=A!5, 3. =. &d#(nd Iosse, %ather and Son , 113.

9. P. +. Iosse 2assisted by Cichard +ill, &s@., of 8panish6,own5, The 5irds of 6amaica 2Kondon: Gohn Man Moorst, 1=A?5. 1!. Philip Iosse, The 0omance of &atural 4istor" 2Kondon: Ga#es %isbet and Co., 1=4!5, 3?!. 11. &d#(nd Iosse, The +ife of hili! 4enr" )osse$ %.0.S. , 1"3. 13. 1bid., ?!. 13. 1bid., ?3. 11. &d#(nd Iosse, The +ife of hili! 4enr" )osse$ %.0.S. , 1"3. 13. 1bid., ?!. 13. 1bid., ?3. 11. &d#(nd Iosse, The +ife of hili! 4enr" )osse$ %.0.S. , 1"3. 13. 1bid., ?!. 13. 1bid., ?3. 1A. &d#(nd Iosse, %ather and Son , 9?. 1". 1bid., ?1. 14. 1bid., 99. 1?. 1bid., =A. 1A. &d#(nd Iosse, %ather and Son , 9?. 1". 1bid., ?1. 14. 1bid., 99. 1?. 1bid., =A. 1A. &d#(nd Iosse, %ather and Son , 9?. 1". 1bid., ?1. 14. 1bid., 99. 1?. 1bid., =A. 1A. &d#(nd Iosse, %ather and Son , 9?. 1". 1bid., ?1. 14. 1bid., 99. 1?. 1bid., =A. 1=. P. +. Iosse, The 3cean 2Philadelphia: Parry and :ac#illan, 1="45, 1!1. 2,he title pa e bears the inscription, -fro# the last Kondon edition.-5 19. Philip +enry Iosse, A &aturalist's 0ambles on the 2e-onshire *oast 2Kondon: Gohn Man Moorst, 1="35, 3"A63"?. ,his was not, after all, @(ite the discovery Iosse tho( ht it. 6ohnstonella was not a new en(s, b(t a s(b en(s of Tomo!teris , which had been na#ed in 1=3" by &schscholt<. ,he species catharina is still reco ni<ed by so#e workers, altho( h Iosse9s drawin and description are too va (e to provide clear identification, and the na#e helgolandica attached to a later and #ore acc(rate description by Ireeff is #ore (s(al. /s a res(lt, what Iosse hoped wo(ld be called 6ohnstonella catharina is in fact called Tomo!teris helgolandica )a disappointin se@(el to so #a nani#o(s a

est(re. 21 a# indebted for the fore oin infor#ation to :r. $rederick :. Bayer, /ctin C(rator of the Division of :arine 1nvertebrates, 8#ithsonian 1nstit(tion.5 3!. &d#(nd Iosse, The +ife of hili! 4enr" )osse$ %.0.S. , 3?4. 31. &d#(nd Iosse, %ather and Son , 3A4. 33. &d#(nd Iosse, The +ife of hili! 4enr" )osse$ %.0.S. , 34?. 33. Philip +enry Iosse, 3m!halos: An Attem!t to ,ntie the )eological Knot 2Kondon: Gohn Man Moorst, 1="?5, ". 3A. / Ireek word #eanin -navel.- ,he epi raph to 3m!halos is fro# /ristotle9s 4istoria Animalium , book ?.=, and in D9/rcy .entworth ,ho#pson9s translation it reads: -/ll ani#als, or all s(ch as have a navel, row by contin(e the navel.- ,he idea is, clearly, to #ake an analo y between /da# as the #icrocos#, whose navel pointed to a birth which never took place, and the earth as the #acrocos#, whose fossils si#ilarly are si ns of an (nreal past; b(t this co#parison is not taken (p serio(sly in the book, there bein only two cas(al references to the navel at pp. 3=9 and 33A. Lne #i ht therefore look for a deeper si nificance in the title, in keepin with vario(s secondary (ses of the Ireek ter#, s(ch as its application to the stone at Delphi which was s(pposed to represent the center of the earth. B(t Iosse9s epi raphs, like his script(ral @(otations, are often disappointin ly irrelevant, and on the whole it see#s (nlikely that there is any #ore to the title than the obvio(s #eanin referred to above. 3". Philip Iosse, 3m!halos , vii6viii. 34. &d#(nd Iosse, %ather and Son , 114. 3?. Philip Iosse, 3m!halos , 1!361!A. 3=. 1bid., 11!. 39. 1bid., 133. 3!. 1bid., 133. 3?. Philip Iosse, 3m!halos , 1!361!A. 3=. 1bid., 11!. 39. 1bid., 133. 3!. 1bid., 133. 3?. Philip Iosse, 3m!halos , 1!361!A. 3=. 1bid., 11!. 39. 1bid., 133. 3!. 1bid., 133. 3?. Philip Iosse, 3m!halos , 1!361!A. 3=. 1bid., 11!. 39. 1bid., 133. 3!. 1bid., 133. 31. Gohn Donne, 'ssa"s in 2i-init" , ed. &. :. 8i#pson 2L*ford: Clarendon Press, 19"35, 1=.

33. Philip Iosse, 3m!halos , 13A613". 33. 1bid., 134. 3A. 1bid., vi. 3". 1bid., 3?3. 34. 1bid. 3?. 1bid., 349. 33. Philip Iosse, 3m!halos , 13A613". 33. 1bid., 134. 3A. 1bid., vi. 3". 1bid., 3?3. 34. 1bid. 3?. 1bid., 349. 33. Philip Iosse, 3m!halos , 13A613". 33. 1bid., 134. 3A. 1bid., vi. 3". 1bid., 3?3. 34. 1bid. 3?. 1bid., 349. 33. Philip Iosse, 3m!halos , 13A613". 33. 1bid., 134. 3A. 1bid., vi. 3". 1bid., 3?3. 34. 1bid. 3?. 1bid., 349. 33. Philip Iosse, 3m!halos , 13A613". 33. 1bid., 134. 3A. 1bid., vi. 3". 1bid., 3?3. 34. 1bid. 3?. 1bid., 349. 33. Philip Iosse, 3m!halos , 13A613". 33. 1bid., 134. 3A. 1bid., vi. 3". 1bid., 3?3.

34. 1bid. 3?. 1bid., 349. 3=. &d#(nd Iosse, The +ife of hili! 4enr" )osse$ %.0.S. , 3=!. 39. 1bid., 3=!63=1. A!. 1bid., 3=1. 3=. &d#(nd Iosse, The +ife of hili! 4enr" )osse$ %.0.S. , 3=!. 39. 1bid., 3=!63=1. A!. 1bid., 3=1. 3=. &d#(nd Iosse, The +ife of hili! 4enr" )osse$ %.0.S. , 3=!. 39. 1bid., 3=!63=1. A!. 1bid., 3=1. A1. Gohn +enry Cardinal %ew#an, A!ologia !ro #ita Sua: 5eing a 0e!l" to a am!hlet 'ntitled KWhat$ Then$ 2oes 2r. &ewman 1eanLK 2Kondon: Kon #an, Ireen, Kon #an, Coberts, and Ireen, 1=4A5, 13!. A3. &d#(nd Iosse, %ather and Son , 11=. A3. &d#(nd Iosse, The +ife of hili! 4enr" )osse$ %.0.S. , 3=1. AA. Philip +enry Iosse, The 0omance of &atural 4istor"$ Second Series 2Kondon: Ga#es %isbet and Co., 1=415, =9. A". &d#(nd Iosse, The +ife of hili! 4enr" )osse$ %.0.S. , 3A9.

91 T#e Parado5 o& I%d-ctio% a%d t#e I%d-cti'e Wa$er

1. G. :. Heynes, A Treatise on robabilit" 2Kondon: :ac#illan, 19315, 3?3. 3. David +(#e, An In/uir" *oncerning 4uman ,nderstanding 2%ew 'ork: ,he Kiberal /rts Press, 19""5, A=. 3. 1bid., "16"3. A. 1bid., A=. ". 1bid., "3. break 3. David +(#e, An In/uir" *oncerning 4uman ,nderstanding 2%ew 'ork: ,he Kiberal /rts Press, 19""5, A=. 3. 1bid., "16"3. A. 1bid., A=. ". 1bid., "3. break 3. David +(#e, An In/uir" *oncerning 4uman ,nderstanding 2%ew 'ork: ,he Kiberal /rts Press, 19""5, A=. 3. 1bid., "16"3. A. 1bid., A=.

". 1bid., "3. break 3. David +(#e, An In/uir" *oncerning 4uman ,nderstanding 2%ew 'ork: ,he Kiberal /rts Press, 19""5, A=. 3. 1bid., "16"3. A. 1bid., A=. ". 1bid., "3. break 4. C. $. +arrod, %oundations of Inducti-e +ogic 2Kondon: :ac#illan, 19"45, passi#. ?. Donald .illia#s, The )round of Induction 2Ca#brid e, :ass.: +arvard University Press, 19A?5, 31. =. 1bid., chap. 1, passi#. ?. Donald .illia#s, The )round of Induction 2Ca#brid e, :ass.: +arvard University Press, 19A?5, 31. =. 1bid., chap. 1, passi#. 9. Blaise Pascal, ens7es , trans. .. $. ,rotter 2%ew 'ork: Cando# +o(se E:odern KibraryF, 19A15, p. =A, no. 33". 1!. 1bid., no. 33A. 9. Blaise Pascal, ens7es , trans. .. $. ,rotter 2%ew 'ork: Cando# +o(se E:odern KibraryF, 19A15, p. =A, no. 33". 1!. 1bid., no. 33A. 11. .illia#s, The )round of Induction , 43. 13. +ans Ceichenbach, '(!erience and rediction 2Chica o: University of Chica o Press, 193=5, 3"!. 13. G. L. .isdo#, %oundations of Inference in &atural Science 2Kondon: :eth(en, 19"35, 344. 1A. Ceichenbach, '(!erience and rediction , 3A=. 1". .isdo#, %oundations of Inference , chap. 3A. 14. +(#e, 4uman ,nderstanding , sect. A, pt. 3. 1?. C. I. Collin wood, An 'ssa" on 1eta!h"sics 2L*ford: Clarendon Press, 19A!5, passi#. 1=. Ceichenbach, '(!erience and rediction , 343. 19. .isdo#, %oundations of Inference , 339. 3!. Pascal, ens7es , p. ?9, no. 33!. 31. +ans Ceichenbach, -,he Ko ical $o(ndations of the Concept of Probability,- trans. :aria Ceichenbach, in 0eadings in the hiloso!h" of Science , ed. +erbert $ei l and :ay Brodbeck 2%ew 'ork: /ppleton6Cent(ry6Crofts, 19"35, A44. 33. .isdo#, %oundations of Inference , 334. ,his article is dedicated to the #e#ory of %orwood C(ssell +anson, vice6president of ///8 section K in 194161943 and for #any years secretary of the section.

:1 T#e Str-ct-re o& *isco'er(

1. Harl Popper, The +ogic of Scientific 2isco-er" , new ed. 2%ew 'ork: +arper, 194" Eori inal Ier#an

ed., 193AF5, 31. 3. Peter Caws, -,hree Ko ics, or the Possibility of the 1#probable,- hiloso!h" and henomenological 0esearch 3" 2194"5: "33. 2/ppears as chapter = in this work.5 3. Popper, The +ogic of Scientific 2isco-er" , 33. A. /. Hoestler, The Act of *reation 2Kondon: +(tchinson, 194A5, pt. 3. ". Charles Darwin, in The +ife and +etters of *harles 2arwin , ed. $. Darwin, new ed. 2Basic Books: %ew 'ork, 19"9 Eori inal ed., 1===F5, =3. 4. 8ee for e*a#ple I. Polya, atterns of lausible Inference , vol. 3 of 1athematics and lausible 0easoning 2Princeton, %.G.: Princeton University Press, 19"A5. ?. I. $re e, -Be riffschrift,- in %rom %rege to )Mdel , ed. G. Man +ei7enoort 2Ca#brid e, :ass.: +arvard University Press, 19"!5, ". break =. %. C. +anson, atterns of 2isco-er" 2Ca#brid e, &n land: Ca#brid e University Press, 19"=5, ?!. 9. P. B. :edawar, The Art of the Soluble 2Kondon: :eth(en, 194?5. 1!. $. Bacon, The &ew 3rganon , new ed. 2%ew 'ork: Kiberal /rts Press, 194! Eori inal ed., 143!F5. 11. Charles Darwin, The 3rigin of S!ecies , new ed. 2%ew 'ork: :odern Kibrary, n.d. Eori inal ed., 1="9F5. 13. Darwin, in +ife and +etters , 4=. 13. &. Gones, -,he %at(re of Ieni(s,- Scientific 1onthl" =A 219"?5: ?". 1A. Darwin, in +ife and +etters , =3. 1". 8ir 1saac %ewton, letter to Cobert +ooke 214?45. 14. C. H. :erton, -,he Cole of Ieni(s in 8cientific /dvance,- &ew Science 13 219415: 3!4. 1?. P. B. :edawar, The Art of the Soluble 2Kondon: :eth(en, 194?5. 1=. Charles 8. Peirce, #alues in a ,ni-erse of *hance , ed. Philip P. .iener 2Iarden City, %.'.: Do(bleday, 19"=5, 3"". 19. D. &. Berlyne, -C(riosity and &*ploration,- Science 1"3 219445: 3". 3!. Cla(de KPvi68tra(ss, The Sa-age 1ind , new ed. 2Chica o: University of Chica o Press, 1944 Eori inal $rench ed., 1943F5, 9. 31. :. B(n e, The Search for S"stem , vol. 1 of Scientific 0esearch 2%ew 'ork: 8prin er, 194?5, 3A".

;1 I%d-ctio% a%d t#e )i%d%ess o& Nat-re

1. Irover :a*well, -1nd(ction and &#piricis#,- in Induction$ robabilit"$ and *onfirmation , ed. Irover :a*well and Cobert :. /nderson, Gr., :innesota 8t(dies in the Philosophy of 8cience, 4 2:inneapolis: University of :innesota Press, 19?"5, 1!4614". 3. 1bid., 1!?. 3. 1bid., 1!4. 1. Irover :a*well, -1nd(ction and &#piricis#,- in Induction$ robabilit"$ and *onfirmation , ed. Irover :a*well and Cobert :. /nderson, Gr., :innesota 8t(dies in the Philosophy of 8cience, 4 2:inneapolis: University of :innesota Press, 19?"5, 1!4614".

3. 1bid., 1!?. 3. 1bid., 1!4. 1. Irover :a*well, -1nd(ction and &#piricis#,- in Induction$ robabilit"$ and *onfirmation , ed. Irover :a*well and Cobert :. /nderson, Gr., :innesota 8t(dies in the Philosophy of 8cience, 4 2:inneapolis: University of :innesota Press, 19?"5, 1!4614". 3. 1bid., 1!?. 3. 1bid., 1!4. A. Peter Caws, -,he Parado* of 1nd(ction and the 1nd(ctive .a er,- hiloso!h" and henomenological 0esearch 33, no. A 2G(ne 19435: "136"3!. 2/ppears as chapter " of this work.5 ". :a*well, -1nd(ction and &#piricis#,- 13". 4. 1bid., 139613!. ?. 1bid., 13A. =. 1bid., 134. 9. 1bid., 1"!. 1!. 1bid. ". :a*well, -1nd(ction and &#piricis#,- 13". 4. 1bid., 139613!. ?. 1bid., 13A. =. 1bid., 134. 9. 1bid., 1"!. 1!. 1bid. ". :a*well, -1nd(ction and &#piricis#,- 13". 4. 1bid., 139613!. ?. 1bid., 13A. =. 1bid., 134. 9. 1bid., 1"!. 1!. 1bid. ". :a*well, -1nd(ction and &#piricis#,- 13". 4. 1bid., 139613!. ?. 1bid., 13A. =. 1bid., 134. 9. 1bid., 1"!. 1!. 1bid. ". :a*well, -1nd(ction and &#piricis#,- 13". 4. 1bid., 139613!.

?. 1bid., 13A. =. 1bid., 134. 9. 1bid., 1"!. 1!. 1bid. ". :a*well, -1nd(ction and &#piricis#,- 13". 4. 1bid., 139613!. ?. 1bid., 13A. =. 1bid., 134. 9. 1bid., 1"!. 1!. 1bid. 11. Charles 8. Peirce, #alues in a ,ni-erse of *hance , ed. Philip P. .iener 2Iarden City, %.'.: Do(bleday, 19"=5, 3?!63?1. 13. 1bid., 3?363?3. 11. Charles 8. Peirce, #alues in a ,ni-erse of *hance , ed. Philip P. .iener 2Iarden City, %.'.: Do(bleday, 19"=5, 3?!63?1. 13. 1bid., 3?363?3. 13. David +(#e, An In/uir" *oncerning 4uman ,nderstanding 2%ew 'ork: ,he Kiberal /rts Press, 19""5, "3. 1A. 1bid., 4!. 1". 1bid., 4?64=. break 13. David +(#e, An In/uir" *oncerning 4uman ,nderstanding 2%ew 'ork: ,he Kiberal /rts Press, 19""5, "3. 1A. 1bid., 4!. 1". 1bid., 4?64=. break 13. David +(#e, An In/uir" *oncerning 4uman ,nderstanding 2%ew 'ork: ,he Kiberal /rts Press, 19""5, "3. 1A. 1bid., 4!. 1". 1bid., 4?64=. break 14. :a*well, -1nd(ction and &#piricis#,- 113. 1?. 1bid., 1"?. 14. :a*well, -1nd(ction and &#piricis#,- 113. 1?. 1bid., 1"?. 1=. Peter Caws, -:ach9s Principle and the Kaws of Ko ic,- in Induction$ robabilit"$ and *onfirmation , ed. Irover :a*well and Cobert :. /nderson, Gr., :innesota 8t(dies in the Philosophy of 8cience, 4 2:inneapolis: University of :innesota Press, 19?"5, A=?6A9". 2/ppears as chapter 9 of this work.5 19. 1bid., A916A93.

1=. Peter Caws, -:ach9s Principle and the Kaws of Ko ic,- in Induction$ robabilit"$ and *onfirmation , ed. Irover :a*well and Cobert :. /nderson, Gr., :innesota 8t(dies in the Philosophy of 8cience, 4 2:inneapolis: University of :innesota Press, 19?"5, A=?6A9". 2/ppears as chapter 9 of this work.5 19. 1bid., A916A93. 3!. Cf. Peter Caws, -,he 8tr(ct(re of Discovery,- Science 144 2Dec. 13, 19495: 13?"613=!. 2/ppears as chapter 4 of this work.5 31. 1bid. 3!. Cf. Peter Caws, -,he 8tr(ct(re of Discovery,- Science 144 2Dec. 13, 19495: 13?"613=!. 2/ppears as chapter 4 of this work.5 31. 1bid.

<1 T#ree Lo$ics= or t#e Possi8ilit( o& t#e I/2ro8a8le

1. Charles 8anders Peirce, *ollected a!ers of *harles Sanders eirce , ed. Charles +artshorne and Pa(l .eiss 2Ca#brid e, :ass.: +arvard University Press, 19316193"5, 1:3!4. 3. I. +. +ardy, A 1athematician's A!olog" 2Ca#brid e, 19A15. 3. .illia# and :artha Hneale, The 2e-elo!ment of +ogic 2L*ford: Clarendon Press, 19435, ?A3. A. Pierre68i#on Kaplace, 'ssai !hiloso!hi/ue sur les !robabilit7s 2Paris: Ia(thier6Millars, 19315, 3. ". C. I. +e#pel and Pa(l Lppenhei#, -,he Ko ic of &*planation,- in 0eadings in the hiloso!h" of Science , ed. +erbert $ei l and :ay Brodbeck 2%ew 'ork: /ppleton6Cent(ry6Crofts, 19"35. 4. Peirce, *ollected a!ers ?:131. ?. 1bid., 4:=4. =. 1bid., 4:33A. 4. Peirce, *ollected a!ers ?:131. ?. 1bid., 4:=4. =. 1bid., 4:33A. 4. Peirce, *ollected a!ers ?:131. ?. 1bid., 4:=4. =. 1bid., 4:33A. 9. $. +oyle, The &ature of the ,ni-erse 2%ew 'ork: %ew /#erican Kibrary, 19"!5, chap. ?, passi#. 1!. Peirce, *ollected a!ers 1:1A=. 11. :. +eide er, An Introduction to 1eta!h"sics , trans. Calph :anhei# 2%ew +aven: 'ale University Press, 19"95, 1. 13. Peirce, *ollected a!ers 1:1A=. 13. 1bid., 1?A. 13. Peirce, *ollected a!ers 1:1A=. 13. 1bid., 1?A.

1A. Gean6Pa(l 8artre, 5eing and &othingness , trans. +a<el Barnes 2%ew 'ork: Philosophical Kibrary, 19"45, 31ff.

!1 ,ac#'s Pri%ci2le a%d t#e Laws o& Lo$ic

1. Peter Caws, -9 . . . O(ine/1s G(st $ine9- artisan 0e-iew 3A, no. 3 28prin 194?5: 3!3. 3. 8ee in this connection Charles +artshorne, -8o#e &#pty ,ho( h 1#portant ,r(ths,- in American hiloso!hers at Work , ed. 8idney +ook 2%ew 'ork: Criterion Books, 19"95, 33"ff. break

>1 A ?-a%t-/ T#eor( o& Ca-salit(

1. :ichael 8criven, -,he Concept of Ca(se,- Abstracts of *ontributed a!ers 28tanford, Calif.: 1nternational Con ress for Ko ic, :ethodolo y, and Philosophy of 8cience, 194!5. 3. Bertrand C(ssell, 4uman Knowledge$ Its Sco!e and +imits 2Kondon: Ieor e /llen and Unwin, 19A=5, 333. 3. Pierre68i#on Kaplace, 'ssai !hiloso!hi/ue sur les !robabilit7s 2Paris: Ia(thier6Millars, 19315, 3. A. C(ssell, 4uman Knowledge , 33A. ". Kaplace, 'ssai !hiloso!hi/ue , 3. 4. David +(#e, An In/uir" *oncerning 4uman ,nderstanding 2%ew 'ork: ,he Kiberal /rts Press, 19""5, A=. ?. /lfred KandP, -%on6O(antal $o(ndations of O(ant(# ,heory,- hiloso!h" of Science 3A 219"?5: 3!9. =. 1##an(el Hant, *riti/ue of ure 0eason , trans. %. He#p 8#ith 2Kondon: :ac#illan, 19"45, "!. 9. .. Coss /shby, An Introduction to *"bernetics 2%ew 'ork: Gohn .iley, 19"=5, 3=.

61 Scie%ce= Co/2-ters= a%d t#e Co/2le5it( o& Nat-re

1. 1saac %ewton, 1athematical rinci!les of &atural hiloso!h" , trans. /ndrew :otte and $lorian Ca7ori 2Berkeley: University of California Press, 19A?5, 39=. 3. Pierre6Ko(is :orea( de :a(pert(is, -&ssai de Cos#olo ie,- 3eu-res de 1au!ertuis , A vols. 2Kyon: Gean6:arie Br(yset, 1?4=5, 1:A36A3. 3. .. Coss /shby, An Introduction to *"bernetics 2%ew 'ork: Gohn .iley, 19"=5, ". A. 8ee for e*a#ple Harl Popper, The +ogic of Scientific 2isco-er" 2%ew 'ork: Basic Books, 19"95, chap. ?; G. L. .isdo#, %oundations of Inference in &atural Science 2Kondon: :eth(en, 19"35, chap. ?; 8ir +arold Geffreys, Scientific Inference 2Ca#brid e: Ca#brid e University Press, 19"?5, sect. 3.?; %elson Iood#an, -/*io#atic :eas(re#ent of 8i#plicity,- 6ournal of hiloso!h" "3, no. 3A, etc. ". .. Coss /shby, -Ieneral 8yste#s ,heory as a %ew Discipline,- )eneral S"stems$ Yearbook of the Societ" for )eneral S"stems 0esearch 3 2/nn /rbor, :ichi an, 19"=5: ".

"1 Pra5is a%d Tec#%e

1. /ristotle, arts of Animals 4A" a 3!. 3. Plato, )orgias A4" a .

3. ,he fact that, as Carl :itcha# has pointed o(t, /ristotle (ses technologia to #ean - ra##ar-)the techne of the logos )does not invalidate this ar (6 soft #ent, which rests on c(rrent (sa e in &n lish. &ty#olo ical analyses are helpf(l beca(se they show how ter#s are artic(lated and so#eti#es how they have chan ed, not beca(se classical (sa e s(pports o(r own. A. /ristotle, &icomachean 'thics , 1!9= a 3=. ". $reidrich6Harl $orber , 1anuel d'7rotologie classi/ue , trans. /lcide Bonnea( 2Paris: /( Cercle d( Kivre PrPcie(*, 19"95, 1:4. $orber contrasts the treatise 2odecatechnon with the co(rtesan 2Cyrene5 known as 99Dodeca#echanos,- beca(se the for#er talks abo(t the twelve positions while the latter knew how to practice the#)a f(rther reinforce#ent of the distinction between techne and !ra(is and an ill(stration as well of the classic forer(nner of the notion of the #achine. .hether 2as so#e co##entators #aintain)see M. de :a alhaes6Milhena, 'ssor scientifi/ue et techni/ue et obstacles sociau( I la fin de l'anti/uit7 EParis, n.d.F5 this (se of mechanos #eant that the co(rtesans practiced the art of love in a -#echanical- way, or whether, which see#s #ore likely, it reflects a conception of the h(#an body as a kind of livin #achine, $orber does not say. 4. Harl :ar*, *a!ital: A *riti/ue of olitical 'conom" , trans. Ben $owkes 2%ew 'ork: Minta e Books, 19??5, 3A?ff. ?. :ao ,se6t(n , -Ln Practice,- in %our 'ssa"s on hiloso!h" 2Pekin : $orei n Kan (a es Press, 19445, 1A. =. Benedict de 8pino<a, 2e intellectus emendatione , trans. /. Boyle, p(blished with the 'tica 2Kondon: G. :. Dent and 8ons, 191!5, 334. 9. /lfred &spinas, +es origines de la technologie 2Paris: $Pli* /lcan, 1=9?5, 1!. 1!. ,ade(s< Hotarbinski, ra(iolog" , trans. L. .o7tasiewic< 2L*ford: Per a#on Press, 194"5. 11. 8ee ,ho#as Iladwin, -C(lt(re and Ko ical Process,- in '(!lorations in *ultural Anthro!olog" , ed. .ard +. Ioodeno( h 2%ew 'ork: :cIraw6+ill, 194A5, 14?ff.

91 I%di'id-al Pra5is i% Real Ti/e

1. -,he !ractice E ra(is F of philosophy, however, is itself theoretical .- Writings of the Young 1ar( on hiloso!h" and Societ"$ ed. Koyd D. &aston and H(rt +. I(ddat 2%ew 'ork: Do(bleday /nchor Books, 194?5, 41. 3. 1bid., 43. 1. -,he !ractice E ra(is F of philosophy, however, is itself theoretical .- Writings of the Young 1ar( on hiloso!h" and Societ"$ ed. Koyd D. &aston and H(rt +. I(ddat 2%ew 'ork: Do(bleday /nchor Books, 194?5, 41. 3. 1bid., 43. 3. Peter Caws, -Cefor# and Cevol(tion,- in hiloso!h" and olitical Action , ed. Mir inia +eld, Hai %ielsen, and Charles Parsons 2%ew 'ork: L*ford University Press, 19?35. A. Kiddell and 8cott9s )reek.'nglish +e(icon . ". &aston and I(ddat, Writings of the Young 1ar( , p. 3!=. 4. 1bid.

". &aston and I(ddat, Writings of the Young 1ar( , p. 3!=. 4. 1bid.

:1 Towards a P#iloso2#( o& Tec#%olo$(

1. .. C. %iblett, ed., The Sciences$ the 4umanities and the Technological Threat 2%ew 'ork: Gohn .iley and 8ons, 19?"5. break 3. David +(#e, An In/uir" *oncerning 4uman ,nderstanding 2%ew 'ork: ,he Kiberal /rts Press, 19""5, "3. 3. %ew 'ork: .. :orrow, 19?A. A. &. $. 8ch(#acher, Small Is 5eautiful@ 'conomics As If eo!le 1attered 2%ew 'ork: +arper and Cow EColophon BooksF, 19?"5. ". B. de 8pino<a, 'thics , ed. G. I(t#ann, preceded by 3n the Im!ro-ement of the ,nderstanding 2%ew 'ork: +afner P(blishin Co#pany, 19A95, 11. 4. /. &spinas, +es origines de la technologie 2Paris: $Pli* /lcan, 1=9?5, 1!, 14, 3!. ?. ,. Hotarbinski, ra(iolog": An Introduction to the Sciences of 'fficient Action , trans. L. .o7tasiewic< 2L*ford: Per a#on Press, 194"5. =. Cla(de KPvi68tra(ss, The Sa-age 1ind 2Chica o: University of Chica o Press, 19445, chap. 1. 9. Peter Caws, -8cientific ,heory as an +istorical /no#aly,- in roceedings of the NIIIth International *ongress of the 4istor" of Science , sect. 1 2:oscow: &ditions -%a(ka,- 19?A5, 4"ff. 2/ppears as chapter 1? in this work.5 1!. G. Ba(drillard, +e s"st>me des objets 2Paris: Ialli#ard, 194=5. 11. Peter Caws, -:ach9s Principle and the Kaws of Ko ic,- in Induction$ robabilit"$ and *onfirmation , ed. Irover :a*well and Cobert :. /nderson, Gr., :innesota 8t(dies in the Philosophy of 8cience, 4 2:inneapolis: University of :innesota Press, 19?"5, A=?6A9". 2/ppears as chapter 9 of this work.5 13. :. +eide er, -,he O(estion Concernin ,echnolo y,- trans. .. .. Kovitt, in 5asic Writings , ed. D. $. Hrell 2%ew 'ork: +arper and Cow, 19??5, 3==ff. 13. +. :arc(se, 3ne.2imensional 1an 2Boston: Beacon Press, 194A5, 1"=. 1A. G. +aber#as, Toward a 0ational Societ" , trans. G. K. 8hapiro 2Boston: Beacon Press, 19?!5, =1ff. 1". I. .. $. +e el, The henomenolog" of 1ind , trans. G. B. Baillie 2%ew 'ork: +arper and Cow E,orchbooksF, 194?5, 33=. ,he interpretation is d(e to /le*andre Ho7\ve in his Introduction to the 0eading of 4egel: +ectures on the Pheno#enolo y of 8pirit Assembled b" 0a"mond 9ueneau , trans. Ga#es +. %ichols, Gr. 2%ew 'ork: Basic Books, 19495, 363!. 14. H. /*elos, 1ar(: enseur de la techni/ue 2Paris: &ditions de :in(it, 19415.

;1 Scie%ti&ic T#eor( as a% 0istorical A%o/al(

1. &rwin 8chrTdin er, 1ind and 1atter 2Ca#brid e: Ca#brid e University Press, 19"95, A69.

<1 Is T#ere BScie%ti&icC )%owled$eD W#o )%owsD

1. &d#(nd K. Iettier, -1s G(stified ,r(e Belief Hnowled e0- Anal"sis 33, 4 2G(ne 19435: 1316133. break 3. Cichard K. Hirkha#, -Does the Iettier Proble# Cest on a :istake0- 1ind A3 219=A5: "!16"13. 3. Gean6Pa(l 8artre, The Words , trans. Bernard $recht#an 2%ew 'ork: Ieor e Bra<iller, 194A5, 43. A. 8ir 1saac %ewton, The 1athematical rinci!les of &atural hiloso!h" , trans. /ndrew :otte, 3 vols. 2Kondon: 8herwood, %eely, and Gones; and Davis and Dickson5, 3:14!6143.

!1 T#e Law o& ?-a%tit( a%d ?-alit(= or W#at N-/8ers Ca% a%d Ca%'t *escri8e
1. ,here are two other poe#s of the sa#e sort that everyone also learns)the na#es of the #onths, and of the days of the week)b(t these do not open (p co#parably lar e do#ains of con7ect(re and ar (#ent. 3. Lliver 8acks, The 1an Who 1istook 4is Wife for a 4at$ and 3ther *linical Tales 2%ew 'ork: 8(##it Books, 19="5, 19!. 3. I. .. $. +e el, 4egel's +ogic$ 5eing art I of the 'nc"clo!edia of the hiloso!hical Sciences ?OBPQJR translated b" William WallaceF 2L*ford: Clarendon Press, 19?"5, 14!. A. $rederick &n els, 4err 'ugen 2uhring's 0e-olution in Science , trans. &#ile B(rns 2%ew 'ork: 1nternational P(blishers, 19395, 13=. ". Peter Caws, -Cefor# and Cevol(tion,- in hiloso!h" and olitical Action , ed. Mir inia +eld et al. 2%ew 'ork: L*ford University Press, 19?35, ?=. 4. Ialileo Ialilei, 2ialogues *oncerning Two &ew Sciences , trans. +. Crew and /. De 8alvio 2%ew 'ork: :ac#illan, 191A5, 14!. ?. &d#(nd +(sserl, The *risis of 'uro!ean Sciences and Transcendental henomenolog": An Introduction to henomenological hiloso!h" , trans. David Cart 2&vanston: %orthwestern University Press, 19?!5, "1. =. 1bid., A=6A9. ?. &d#(nd +(sserl, The *risis of 'uro!ean Sciences and Transcendental henomenolog": An Introduction to henomenological hiloso!h" , trans. David Cart 2&vanston: %orthwestern University Press, 19?!5, "1. =. 1bid., A=6A9. 9. +anan 8elvin, -Ln $ollowin in 8o#eone9s $ootsteps: ,wo &*a#ples of Ka<arsfeldian :ethodolo y,- in 9ualitati-e and 9uantitati-e Social 0esearch: a!ers in 4onor of aul S. +a=arsfeld , ed. Cobert H. :erton, Ga#es 8. Cole#an, and Peter 8. Cossi 2%ew 'ork: ,he $ree Press, 19?95, 33A. 1!. &dwin &. Ihiselli, Gohn P. Ca#pbell, and 8heldon ^edeck, 1easurement Theor" for the 5eha-ioral Sciences 28an $rancisco: .. +. $ree#an and Co., 19=15, 13ff. 11. +(sserl, *risis of 'uro!ean Sciences , AA. 13. Cichard Bevan Braithwaite, Scientific '(!lanation: A Stud" of the %unction of Theor"$ robabilit" and +aw in Science 2Ca#brid e: Ca#brid e University Press, 19"35, A?6A9. 13. Denis $. Gohnston, ed., 1easurement of Subjecti-e henomena 2.ashin ton, D.C.: U.8. Depart#ent of Co##erce E8pecial De#o raphic /nalysesF, 19=15, 3. break

6>1 O% 3ei%$ i% t#e Sa/e Place at t#e Sa/e Ti/e

1. +. :inkowski, -8pace and ,i#e,- in /lbert &instein et al., The rinci!le of 0elati-it" 2Kondon, 19335, ?4. 3. &rnst Cassirer, 'instein's Theor" of 0elati-it" , trans. .. C. and :. C. 8wabey, bo(nd with Substance and %unction 2Chica o: Lpen Co(rt, 19335, AA9. 3. %icholas of C(sa, 2e 2octa Ignorantia , bk. 3, chap. 13. A. :inkowski, -8pace and ,i#e,- =3. ". Gean6Pa(l 8artre, 5eing and &othingness , trans. +a<el Barnes 2%ew 'ork: Philosophical Kibrary, 19"45, 3!?. 4. 1saac %ewton, Ieneral 8choli(# to the second edition of the rinci!ia . ?. /lbert &instein, -Ln 8cientific ,r(th,- in 'ssa"s in Science 2%ew 'ork: Philosophical Kibrary, 193A5, 11.

6 1 O% a Circ-larit( i% O-r )%owled$e o& t#e P#(sicall( Real

1. +enry :ar ena(, The &ature of h"sical 0ealit" 2%ew 'ork: :cIraw6+ill, 19"!5. 3. Plato, 'uth"!hro , 1"b. 3. K(dwi .itt enstein, hiloso!hical In-estigations , trans. I. &. :. /nsco#be 2L*ford: Basil Blackwell, 19"35, p. i* e . A. Ieor e Berkeley, Three 2ialogues 5etween 4"las and hilonous 2%ew 'ork: ,he Kiberal /rts Press, 19"A Eori inally p(blished in 1?13F5. ". Bertrand C(ssell, -,he Celationship of 8ense6Data to Physics,- in 1"sticism and +ogic 2+ar#ondsworth: Pen (in Books, 19"35, 1A!. 4. C(dolf Carnap, The +ogical Structure of the World , trans. Colf /. Ieor e 2Kondon: Co(tled e and He an Pa(l, 194?5. ?. /. %. .hitehead, The 3rganisation of Thought 2Kondon: .illia#s and %or ate, 191?5, chap. ?. =. +enry :ar ena(, &ature of h"sical 0ealit" , p. 3=9. 9. 1bid. =. +enry :ar ena(, &ature of h"sical 0ealit" , p. 3=9. 9. 1bid. 1!. Peter Caws, -,he $(nctions of Definitions in :odern Physical 8cience- 2Ph.D. diss., 'ale University, 19"45, 33". 2,he sponsor of this dissertation was +enry :ar ena(.5 /ll translations fro# Bachelard 2e*cept those specifically cited in &n lish translation5 are #y own. break

661 Tr-t# a%d Prese%ce. Poetic I/a$i%atio% a%d ,at#e/atical P#(sics i% +asto% 3ac#elard
1. C. P. 8now, The Two *ultures and the Scientific 0e-olution 2Ca#brid e: Ca#brid e University Press, 19"95.

3. 8ir /. 8. &ddin ton, The &ature of the h"sical World 2Kondon: G. :. Dent and 8ons E&very#an9s Kibrary ed.F, 193"5, 3!A63!". 3. Personal co##(nication 2letter fro# Bachelard dated Dece#ber 13, 19"45. A. Iaston Bachelard, +e nou-el es!rit scientifi/ue 2Paris: Presses Universitaires de $rance, 193A5, ?96 =3. ". Iaston Bachelard, The s"choanal"sis of %ire , trans. /lan C. :. Coss 2Boston: Beacon Press, 194A5, "64. 4. Personal co##(nication 2see note 3 above5. ?. Iaston Bachelard, +a !hiloso!hie du non 2Paris: Presses Universitaires de $rance, 19A!5, 139. =. Iaston Bachelard, +a terre et les rA-eries de la -olont7. 'ssai sur l'imagination des forces 2Paris: G. Corti, 19A=5, 3. 9. Iaston Bachelard, +e rationalisme a!!li/u7 2Paris: Presses Universitaires de $rance, 19A95, "=. 1!. Iaston Bachelard, +'acti-it7 rationaliste de la !h"si/ue contem!oraine 2Paris: Presses Universitaires de $rance, 19"15, =?. 11. Iaston Bachelard, -Univers et rPalitP,- Te(tes des communications du IIe *ongr>s des Soci7t7s de hiloso!hie 2Kyon, 19395, 4364". 13. Iaston Bachelard, +'air et les songes. 'ssai sur l'imagination du mou-ement 2Paris: G. Corti, 19A35, 3=3. 13. Iaston Bachelard, +a terre et les rA-eries du re!os. 'ssai sur l'imagination de l'intimit7 2Paris: G. Corti, 19A=5, 333. 1A. Iaston Bachelard, The oetics of S!ace , trans. :aria Golas 2Boston: Beacon Press, 19495. 1". 1bid., **viii6**i*. 14. 1bid., *i*. 1?. 1bid. ,ranslations fro# works cited in $rench are #y own. 1A. Iaston Bachelard, The oetics of S!ace , trans. :aria Golas 2Boston: Beacon Press, 19495. 1". 1bid., **viii6**i*. 14. 1bid., *i*. 1?. 1bid. ,ranslations fro# works cited in $rench are #y own. 1A. Iaston Bachelard, The oetics of S!ace , trans. :aria Golas 2Boston: Beacon Press, 19495. 1". 1bid., **viii6**i*. 14. 1bid., *i*. 1?. 1bid. ,ranslations fro# works cited in $rench are #y own. 1A. Iaston Bachelard, The oetics of S!ace , trans. :aria Golas 2Boston: Beacon Press, 19495. 1". 1bid., **viii6**i*.

14. 1bid., *i*. 1?. 1bid. ,ranslations fro# works cited in $rench are #y own.

6"1 Scie%ce= S-rrealis/= a%d t#e Stat-s o& t#e S-8Eect

1. 8oren Hierke aard, A Kierkegaard Antholog" , ed. Cobert Bretall 2Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19"15, 3!?. 3. Gean6Pa(l 8artre, The Transcendence of the 'go , trans. $orrest .illia#s and Cobert Hirkpatrick 2%ew 'ork: %oonday Press, 19"?5, 1!"61!4. 3. &d#(nd +(sserl, The *artesian 1editations , trans. Dorion Cairns 2,he +a (e: :artin(s %i7hoff, 194!5, 34. A. I. .. $. +e el, The henomenolog" of 1ind , trans. G. B. Baillie 2%ew 'ork: +arper ,orchbooks, 194?5, =!. ". Hierke aard, Antholog" , 3!A63!4. 4. Peter Caws, -Parallels and Lrtho onals,- Semiote(t?eF 1, no. 3 219?A5:"=. ?. Gean6Pa(l 8artre, -1ntentionality: / $(nda#ental 1dea of +(sserl9s Phe6 soft no#enolo y,- trans. Goseph P. $ell, 6ournal of the 5ritish Societ" for henomenolog" 1, no. 3 219?!5: ". =. /ndrP Breton, +e surr7alisme et la !einture 2Paris: %C$/Ialli#ard, 193=/ 194"5, 3. 9. /ndrP Breton, 1anifestes du surr7alisme 2Paris: Gean6Gac@(es Pa(vert, 19435, 3!631. 1!. Denis Cha(sson, +es lumi>res conincidentes 2Paris: Depentecate, 19315, 43. 11. Breton, +e surr7alisme et la !einture , A4. 13. /ndrP Breton, oint du jour 2Paris: %C$/Ialli#ard, 19?! Ecollection -1dPes-F5, 49. 13. Hierke aard, Antholog" , 13!. 1A. /ndrP Breton, &adja , Pdition enti\re#ent rev(e par l9a(te(r 2Paris: %C$/Ialli#ard, 19435, ?3. 1". 1bid., 1?4. 1A. /ndrP Breton, &adja , Pdition enti\re#ent rev(e par l9a(te(r 2Paris: %C$/Ialli#ard, 19435, ?3. 1". 1bid., 1?4.

671 S-8Eecti'it( i% t#e ,ac#i%e

1. Daniel C. Dennett, -1ntentional 8yste#s,- The 6ournal of hiloso!h" 4= 219?15: =?61!4. 3. /lan :. ,(rin , -Co#p(tin :achinery and 1ntelli ence,- 1ind "9 219"!5: A336A4!. 3. CenP Descartes, 1editations on %irst hiloso!h" , trans. Ka(rence G. Kafle(r 21ndianapolis: ,he Bobbs6:errill Co. E,he Kibrary of Kiberal /rtsF, 19"15, ?4. A. &rwin 8chrTdin er, 1ind and 1atter 2Ca#brid e: Ca#brid e University Press, 19"=5, 9. ". Peter Caws, -,he 8(b7ect in 8artre and &lsewhere,- in 2escri!tions , ed. Don 1hde and +( h G. 8ilver#an 2/lbany: 8tate University of %ew 'ork Press, 19="5, 1A4.

4. 1bid., 1A161A3. ". Peter Caws, -,he 8(b7ect in 8artre and &lsewhere,- in 2escri!tions , ed. Don 1hde and +( h G. 8ilver#an 2/lbany: 8tate University of %ew 'ork Press, 19="5, 1A4. 4. 1bid., 1A161A3. ?. Gean6Pa(l 8artre, 5eing and &othingness , trans. +a<el Barnes 2%ew 'ork: ,he Philosophical Kibrary, 19"45, 9ff. =. Malentino Braitenber , #ehicles 2Ca#brid e, :ass.: ,he :1, Press, 19=A5. 9. Peter Caws, -:ach9s Principle and the Kaws of Ko ic,- in Induction$ robabilit"$ and *onfirmation , ed. Irover :a*well and Cobert :. /nderson, Gr., :innesota 8t(dies in the Philosophy of 8cience, 4 2:inneapolis: University of :innesota Press, 19?"5, A=?6A9". 2/ppears as chapter 9 of this work.5 1!. 8tephen :ichael Hosslyn, Image and 1ind 2Ca#brid e, :ass.: +arvard University Press, 19=!5. 11. 8chrTdin er, 1ind and 1atter , 1. 13. Lliver D. .ells, 43W *3,+2 Y3, be so nai-eL 2Beaconsfield, Berkshire: :odern Books, Ktd., 19?!5, 4. 13. &rnst Cassirer, -Ke concept de ro(pe et la thPorie de la perception,- 6ournal de !s"chologie normale et !athologi/ue , JJJM e annPe 2193=5: 34=6A1A. break 1A. Pa(l Ch(rchland, -8o#e Ced(ctive 8trate ies in Co nitive %e(robiolo y,- 1ind 9" 219=45: 3?96 3!9. 1". Pa(l Ch(rchland, -Ln the 8pec(lative %at(re of L(r 8elf6Conception: / Ceply to 8o#e Criticis#s,- *anadian 6ournal of hiloso!h" , s(pple#entary vol. 11 219="5: 143.

691 Ret#i%ki%$ I%te%tio%alit(

1. ,he obvio(s na#es to #ention in this connection are those of Dennett, Dreyf(s, :ar olis, and 8earle, a#on others. ,wo recent collections of note are the Lctober 19=4 iss(e of The 1onist and vol(#e 19A of the S"nthese Kibrary: ers!ecti-es on 1ind$ ed. +erbert Ltto and Ga#es ,(edio 2Dordrecht, %etherlands: Ceidel, 19==5. 3. Benson :ates, Stoic +ogic , 3d ed. 2Berkeley and Kos /n eles: University of California Press, 19415, 11ff. 3. ,he parallel between (tterance/lekton and si nifier/si nified 2and, as we shall see later on, te*t/#e alekton5 is in fact a very instr(ctive one: the 8a(ss(rean si n6relation is a basic for# of intentionality, and its sharp separation between si nificance and reference acco##odates ele antly the vocab(lary of none*istence. A. 8a#(el Beckett, 1ollo" , trans. Patrick Bowles in collaboration with the a(thor 2%ew 'ork: Irove Press, 19""5, ?3. ". 8ee for e*a#ple Goa@(in :. $(ster, The refrontal *orte(: Anatom"$ h"siolog"$ and &euro!s"cholog" of the %rontal +obe , 3d ed. 2%ew 'ork: Caven Press, 19=95, which shows how lan (a e is associated with the percept(al interpretation of other sensory #odalities in the prefrontal corte*, -a cortical re ion of polysensory conver ence- 2p. 19A5. 1n partic(lar, -the prefrontal corte* is en a ed in the tem!oral or ani<ation of behavior- 2ibid.5, -participates in the re!resentation of all the essential ele#ents of a iven behavioral str(ct(re- 2p. 1945, and 99s(ppresses e*traneo(s infl(ences2ibid.5 while these activities are oin on 2e#phasis added5. ,he relevance of these points to the view

of intentionality developed here is obvio(s. 4. Peter Caws, -8(b7ectivity in the :achine,- 6ournal for the Theor" of Social 5eha-ior 1=, no. 3 28epte#ber 19==5: 3!3. 2/ppears as chapter 3A in this work.5 ?. Coderick Chishol#, -Presence in /bsence,- The 1onist 49, no. A 2Lctober 19=45: A9?. =. 8i #(nd $re(d, The Standard 'dition of the *om!lete s"chological Works of Sigmund %reud , 33 vols. 2Kondon: +o arth Press, 194465, 9:1A1ff. 9. 8i #(nd $re(d, An 3utline of s"cho.Anal"sis 2%ew 'ork: .. .. %orton and Co., 19A95, 39. 1!. /lfred 8ch(t<, 3n henomenolog" and Social 0elations 2Chica o: University of Chica o Press, 19?!5, 4=649. 2,his concept was drawn to #y attention by G(dith B(tler.5 11. Gac@(es Kacan, The %our %undamental *once!ts of s"cho.Anal"sis , trans. /lan 8heridan 2%ew 'ork: .. .. %orton and Co., 19?=5, 14A. 13. 1bid., 14". break 13. 1bid., 14=. 11. Gac@(es Kacan, The %our %undamental *once!ts of s"cho.Anal"sis , trans. /lan 8heridan 2%ew 'ork: .. .. %orton and Co., 19?=5, 14A. 13. 1bid., 14". break 13. 1bid., 14=. 11. Gac@(es Kacan, The %our %undamental *once!ts of s"cho.Anal"sis , trans. /lan 8heridan 2%ew 'ork: .. .. %orton and Co., 19?=5, 14A. 13. 1bid., 14". break 13. 1bid., 14=. 1A. Peter Caws, -,he Lntolo y of Criticis#,- Semiote(t?eF 1, no. 3 219?"5: A3ff., and Structuralism: The Art of the Intelligible 2/tlantic +i hlands, %.G.: +(#anities Press 1nternational, 19==5, 3"1. 1". 8ee note ? above. 14. Gohn 8earle, -.hat 1s an 1ntentional 8tate0- in 4usserl$ Intentionalit"$ and *ogniti-e Science , ed. +(bert K. Dreyf(s 2Ca#brid e, :ass.: ,he :1, Press, 19=35. 1?. Daniel C. Dennett, The Intentional Stance 2Ca#brid e, :ass.: ,he :1, Press, 19=?5. 1=. .. M. L. O(ine, Word and 3bject 2Ca#brid e, :ass.: ,he :1, Press, 194!5, 331.

6:1 Yorick's World= or t#e U%i'erse i% a Si%$le Sk-ll

1. Harl :ar* and $rederick &n els, Selected *orres!ondence$ trans. 1. Kasker 2:oscow: Pro ress P(blishers, rev. ed. 194"5, A1=. 3. Gohn Kocke, An 'ssa" *oncerning 4aman ,nderstanding , ed. /le*ander Ca#pbell $raser, 3 vols. 2%ew 'ork: Dover P(blications, 19"95, 1:393. 3. Ieor e Berkeley, hiloso!hical Works$ Including the Works on #ision 2Kondon: G. :. Dent and 8ons; ,otowa, %.G.: Cow#an and Kittlefield, 19?"5, 1"=. A. Plato, The 0e!ublic "1A a 2trans. Ben7a#in Gowett5. ". Plotin(s, The 'nneads , trans. 8tephen :cHenna, 3d ed. 2Kondon: $aber and $aber, 19"45, 3=!.

4. 1bid., 13A. ?. 1bid., 34A. =. 1bid., 34=. 9. 1bid., 3=!. 1!. 1bid., **i*. 11. 1bid., 33!. ". Plotin(s, The 'nneads , trans. 8tephen :cHenna, 3d ed. 2Kondon: $aber and $aber, 19"45, 3=!. 4. 1bid., 13A. ?. 1bid., 34A. =. 1bid., 34=. 9. 1bid., 3=!. 1!. 1bid., **i*. 11. 1bid., 33!. ". Plotin(s, The 'nneads , trans. 8tephen :cHenna, 3d ed. 2Kondon: $aber and $aber, 19"45, 3=!. 4. 1bid., 13A. ?. 1bid., 34A. =. 1bid., 34=. 9. 1bid., 3=!. 1!. 1bid., **i*. 11. 1bid., 33!. ". Plotin(s, The 'nneads , trans. 8tephen :cHenna, 3d ed. 2Kondon: $aber and $aber, 19"45, 3=!. 4. 1bid., 13A. ?. 1bid., 34A. =. 1bid., 34=. 9. 1bid., 3=!. 1!. 1bid., **i*. 11. 1bid., 33!. ". Plotin(s, The 'nneads , trans. 8tephen :cHenna, 3d ed. 2Kondon: $aber and $aber, 19"45, 3=!. 4. 1bid., 13A. ?. 1bid., 34A. =. 1bid., 34=. 9. 1bid., 3=!. 1!. 1bid., **i*. 11. 1bid., 33!.

". Plotin(s, The 'nneads , trans. 8tephen :cHenna, 3d ed. 2Kondon: $aber and $aber, 19"45, 3=!. 4. 1bid., 13A. ?. 1bid., 34A. =. 1bid., 34=. 9. 1bid., 3=!. 1!. 1bid., **i*. 11. 1bid., 33!. ". Plotin(s, The 'nneads , trans. 8tephen :cHenna, 3d ed. 2Kondon: $aber and $aber, 19"45, 3=!. 4. 1bid., 13A. ?. 1bid., 34A. =. 1bid., 34=. 9. 1bid., 3=!. 1!. 1bid., **i*. 11. 1bid., 33!. 13. Iottfried .ilhel# Keibni<, -,he :onadolo y,- in +eibni= Selections , ed. Philip P. .iener 2%ew 'ork: Charles 8cribner9s 8ons, 19"15, "A3. 13. 1bid., "AA. 13. Iottfried .ilhel# Keibni<, -,he :onadolo y,- in +eibni= Selections , ed. Philip P. .iener 2%ew 'ork: Charles 8cribner9s 8ons, 19"15, "A3. 13. 1bid., "AA. 1A. Berkeley, hiloso!hical Works , 19. 1". 1bid., "16"3. 1A. Berkeley, hiloso!hical Works , 19. 1". 1bid., "16"3. 14. ,he fi (re of 3! billion was drawn fro# Gean6Pierre Chan e(*, +'4omme neuronal 2Paris: $ayard, 19=35. /t the ti#e of writin 1 had 7(st read this for Pantheon Books and had reco##ended its p(blication in &n lish; it appeared as &euronal 1an: The 5iolog" of 1ind 2%ew 'ork: Pantheon Books, 19="5. 1?. &rnst Cassirer, -,he Concept of Iro(ps and the ,heory of Perception,- trans. /aron I(rwitsch, hiloso!h" and henomenological 0esearch ", 1 219AA5: 163". 1=. Lliver .ells, 43W *3,+2 Y3, be so nai-eH 2Beaconsfield, Berkshire: :odern Books Ki#ited, 19?!5, 4. 28ee chapter 33 at note 13.5 break

6;1 A Case &or t#e 0-/a% Scie%ces

1. 1 have ar (ed this point at len th in #y Science and the Theor" of #alue 2%ew 'ork: Cando# +o(se, 194?5. 3. Henneth K. Pike, +anguage in 0elation to a ,nified Theor" of the Structure of 4uman 5eha-ior 2,he

+a (e: :o(ton c Co., 194?5, 3?. 3. ,his essay was ori inally written as a position paper for the ina( (ration of the University 8e#inar in the +(#an 8ciences at the Ieor e .ashin ton University. A. .illia# .hewell, hiloso!h" of the Inducti-e Sciences$ %ounded u!on Their 4istor" , 3 vols. 2Kondon, 1=A!5, 1:113. 1 a# indebted to Cobert :erton 2personal co##(nication, 19935 for an (np(blished article 2-,he :(ltiple Lri ins and &picene Character of the .ord Scientist : /n &pisode in the 1nterplay of 8cience, Kan (a e and 8ociety-5 in which he points o(t that the coina e act(ally oes back at least to 1=3A. ". Gohn 8t(art :ill, A S"stem of +ogic$ 0atiocinati-e and Inducti-e: 5eing a *onnected #iew of the rinci!les of '-idence and the 1ethods of Scientific In-estigation , new i#pression 2Kondon: Kon #ans, Ireen c Co., 193!5, 43!. 4. 1bid., *v. ". Gohn 8t(art :ill, A S"stem of +ogic$ 0atiocinati-e and Inducti-e: 5eing a *onnected #iew of the rinci!les of '-idence and the 1ethods of Scientific In-estigation , new i#pression 2Kondon: Kon #ans, Ireen c Co., 193!5, 43!. 4. 1bid., *v. ?. Charles 8. Peirce, #alues in a ,ni-erse of *hance , ed. Philip P. .iener 2Iarden City, %.'.: Do(bleday /nchor Books, 19"=5, 13". =. 1bid., ?16?3. ?. Charles 8. Peirce, #alues in a ,ni-erse of *hance , ed. Philip P. .iener 2Iarden City, %.'.: Do(bleday /nchor Books, 19"=5, 13". =. 1bid., ?16?3. 9. 1 a# not here concerned with @(estions of individ(ation that arise at the level of @(ant(# theory; the contrast is intended in a conte*t of #acroscopic observations. 1!. Gohn $ekete, The Structural Allegor": 0econstructi-e 'ncounters With the &ew %rench Thought 2:inneapolis: University of :innesota Press, 19=A5, *i. 11. Pierre68i#on Kaplace, 'ssai !hiloso!hi/ue sur les !robabilit7s 2Paris: Ia(thier6Millars, 19315, 3. 13. /ristotle, oetics 1A"1 a 1?633. break

NOTES ON SOURCES
Chapter 1, -/spects of +e#pel9s Philosophy of 8cience,- was p(blished in 0e-iew of 1eta!h"sics , 3!, A, G(ne 194?, pp. 49!Q?1!. Chapter 3, -8cience and 8yste#: Ln the Unity and Diversity of 8cientific ,heory,- was iven as the presidential address to the ann(al #eetin s of the 8ociety for Ieneral 8yste#s Cesearch, Dece#ber 1944, and was p(blished in )eneral S"stems$ Yearbook of the Societ" for )eneral S"stems 0esearch , 13, 194=, pp. 3Q13. Chapter 3, K3m!halos ,heory and the &ccentricity of Belief,- was p(blished as -&vidence and ,esti#ony: Philip +enry Iosse and the 3m!halos ,heory,- in +arold Lrel and Ieor e G. .orth, eds., Si( Studies in &ineteenth *entur" +iterature and Thought , Kawrence, Hansas, University of Hansas P(blications, 1943, pp. 49Q9!.

Chapter A, -Creationis# and &vol(tion,- was iven as a Misitin Philosopher lect(re at +oward University, .ashin ton, D.C., Dece#ber 1, 19=3. Chapter ", -,he Parado* of 1nd(ction and the 1nd(ctive .a er,- was iven at the first 1nternational Con ress for Ko ic, :ethodolo y, and Philosophy of 8cience, 8tanford, California, /( (st 194!, and was p(blished in hiloso!h" and henomenological 0esearch , 33, A, G(ne 1943, pp. "13Q"3!. Chapter 4, -,he 8tr(ct(re of Discovery,- was iven as the vice6presidential address to 8ection K at the ann(al #eetin s of the /#erican /ssociation for the /dvance#ent of 8cience, %ew 'ork City, Dece#ber 194?, and was p(blished in Science , 144, 13 Dece#ber 1949, pp. 13?"Q13=!. Chapter ?, -1nd(ction and the Hindness of %at(re,- was iven at a #eetin in #e#ory of Irover :a*well, %ew 'ork City, /pril 19=3, and was p(blished in :ary Ko( :a*well and C. .ade 8ava e, eds., Science$ 1ind. and s"cholog" , Kanha#, :aryland, University Press of /#erica, 19=9, pp. ="Q 9=. Chapter =, -,hree Ko ics, or the Possibility of the 1#probable,- was iven > 3=3 > at a philosophy depart#ent collo@(i(#, %ew 'ork University, 1943, and was p(blished in hiloso!h" and henomenological 0esearch , 3", A, G(ne 194", pp. "14Q"34. Chapter 9, -:ach9s Principle and the Kaws of Ko ic,- was iven at a conference on confir#ation theory at the :innesota Center for Philosophy of 8cience, 194=, and was p(blished in I. :a*well and C. :. /nderson Gr., eds., Induetion$ robabilit"$ and *onfirmation 2:innesota 8t(dies in the Philosophy of 8cience, vol. 45, :inneapolis, University of :innesota Press, 19?", pp. A=?QA9". Chapter 1!, -/ O(ant(# ,heory of Ca(sality,- was p(blished in S"nthese , 1", 1943, pp. 31?Q334. Chapter 11, -/ %e ative 1nterpretation of the Ca(sal Principle,- was iven at the 3rd 1nternational Con ress for Ko ic, :ethodolo y and Philosophy of 8cience, /#sterda#, ,he %etherlands, /( (st 34, 194?. Chapter 13, -8cience, Co#p(ters, and the Co#ple*ity of %at(re,- was p(blished in hiloso!h" of Science , 3!, 3, /pril 1943, pp. 1"=Q14A. Chapter 13, - ra(is and Techne ,- was iven at the international 8y#posi(# on the +istory and Philosophy of ,echnolo y, Chica o, :ay 19?3, and was p(blished in Ieor e B( liarello and Dean B. Doner, eds., The 4istor" and hiloso!h" of Technolog" , Urbana, University of 1llinois Press, 19?9, pp. 33?Q33?. Chapter 1A, -Ln the Concept of a Do#ain of Pra*is,- was iven at the JM .orld Con ress of Philosophy, Marna, B(l aria, /( (st 19?3, and was p(blished in roceedings of the N# World *ongress of hiloso!h" , vol. 3, 8ofia, B(l aria, 19?A, pp. 339Q333. Chapter 1", -1ndivid(al Pra*is in Ceal ,i#e,- was iven at the 1J 1ntera#erican Con ress of Philosophy, Caracas, Mene<(ela, /( (st 19??, and was p(blished in +a %ilosofia en Am7rica: Trabajos !resentados en el IN *ongreso Interamericano de %ilosofia , Caracas, 8ociedad Mene<olana de $ilosofda, 19?9, to#o 3, pp. ?9Q=1. Chapter 14, -,owards a Philosophy of ,echnolo y,- was iven at a conference on Mal(es and ,echnolo y at 1owa 8tate University, /#es, 1owa, /pril 19??, and was p(blished in Iowa State 6ournal of 0esearch , "A, 3, %ove#ber 19?9, pp. 339Q3A!. Chapter 1?, -8cientific ,heory as an +istorical /no#aly,- was iven as the ann(al dinner lect(re to the

:etropolitan 8ection of the +istory of 8cience 8ociety, Col(#bia University, %ew 'ork, %.'., /pril 33, 1949, and at the J111 1nternational Con ress for the +istory of 8cience, :oscow, U88C, 19?!, and was p(blished in roceedings of the NIIIth International *ongress of the 4istor" of Science$ :oscow, &ditions %a(ka, 19?A, section 1, pp. 4"ff. Chapter 1=, -1s ,here 8cientific Hnowled e0 .ho Hnows0- was iven at a philosophy collo@(i(# at the University of :aryland, Balti#ore Co(nty, Catonsville, :aryland, %ove#ber ", 19=4. Chapter 19, -,he Kaw of O(antity and O(ality, or .hat %(#bers Can and Can9t Describe,- was p(blished in Gonathan :oreno and Barry Ilassner, eds., The 9ualitati-e.9uantitati-e 2istinction in the Social Sciences , Dordrecht, Hl(wer P(blishin Co., 19=9, pp. 13Q3=. > 3=3 > Chapter 3!, -Ln Bein in the 8a#e Place at the 8a#e ,i#e,- was p(blished in American hiloso!hical 9uarterl" , 3, 1, Gan(ary 194", pp. 43Q44. Chapter 31, -Ln a Circ(larity in L(r Hnowled e of the Physically Ceal,- was p(blished in &rvin Kas<lo and &#ily B. 8ellin, eds., #istas in h"sical 0ealit": %estschrift for 4enr" 1argenau , %ew 'ork, Plen(# Press, 19?4, pp. 133Q133. Chapter 33, -,r(th and Presence: Poetic 1#a ination and :athe#atical Physics in Iaston Bachelard,was iven at the Iaston Bachelard conference at the Dallas 1nstit(te of +(#anities and C(lt(re, Dallas, ,e*as, Dece#ber 19=3, and was p(blished in 5ulletin de la Soci7t7 Am7ricainc de hiloso!hic de +angue %ranSaise , 3, 3, .inter 199!Q91, pp. 13?Q1A1. Chapter 33, -8cience, 8(rrealis#, and the 8tat(s of the 8(b7ect,- was iven at the ann(al conference of the 1nternational /ssociation for Philosophy and Kiterat(re, 8arasota, $lorida, :ay 19=3. Chapter 3A, -8(b7ectivity in the :achine,- was iven at a workshop in artificial intelli ence at the Irad(ate Center, City University of %ew 'ork, :ay 19=4, and was p(blished in 6ournal for the Theor" of Social 5eha-ior , 1=, 3, 8epte#ber 19==, pp. 391Q3!=. Chapter 3", -Ce6thinkin 1ntentionality,- was iven as the presidential address at the ann(al collo@(i(# and ban@(et of the .ashin ton Philosophy Cl(b, .ashin ton, D.C., /pril 1", 19=9. Chapter 34, -'orick9s .orld, or the Universe in a 8in le 8k(ll,- was iven as a $irst .ednesday lect(re, the Ieor e .ashin ton University, .ashin ton, D.C., /pril 19=3. Chapter 3?, -,he Case for the +(#an 8ciences,- was written as a workin paper for the ina( (ration of the University 8e#inar in the +(#an 8ciences at ,he Ieor e .ashin ton University, .ashin ton, D.C., 8epte#ber 19==. > 3=" >

IN*E4
A
/bd(ction. See Cetrod(ction /braha#:

sacrifice of 1saac, ?3 /chinstein, Peter, 39 /ction: as lettin 6happen, 31A /de@(ation, 311 Q31= /lcohol, 3 QA /na*a oras, 31 /nthropic principle, 33= /podictic certainty, 3 /pposition, 119 , 1A3 , 1AA , 313 /@(ari(#: invented by P. +. Iosse, "? /rarat, :o(nt, =! /rchetypes, 334 /r (#ent fro# desi n: co(nterar (#ent, ?= /ristotle, 1=" , 199 , 341 ; chance, 13A ; conte#plation, 1?? ; the #ean, 144 ; &icomachean 'thics , = , 1?? ; pairs of opposites, 149 ; arts of Animals , 1?4 /rt: and #achines, 3=4 /rtificial intelli ence, ? , 1?A , 31= /shby, .. Coss: contin(ity as an artifact, 1"1 61"3; Introduction to *"bernetics , 14= ; treat#ent of co#ple*ity, 1?3 /strono#y, = , 13? /strophysics, 4 /ttention: and intentionality, 3!A 63!?, 333

/(stin, G. K.: ordinary lan (a e, 3"! /*elos, Hostas: on :ar*, 3!9 /yer, /. G., 1A3 ; and positivis#, 3"3 /<ande chicken oracle, 33"

3
Babba e, Charles, 31= Bachelard, Iaston, 33A , 3?1 63=3 passi#, 3=" ; anticipation of Popper, 3"A ; biblio#enon, 11 , 3"A Bacon, $rancis, A3 , 1!3 , 3=! ; &o-um 3rganum 2ind(l ence of the (nderstandin 5, 1!3 Ba(delaire, Charles: and i#a ination, 3?= Ba(drillard, Gean: +e s"st>me des objets , 3!4 Bayesian probabilities, 11A , 1AA Becket, ,ho#as. See &liot, ,. 8. Beckett, 8a#(el: 1ollo" , 33! Behavio(r, 1=" 61=4; lo ic as, 1A3 ; thinkin as, 3!3 Behavio(ris#, 1?1 , 3"3 Bein : and e*istence, 39! Belief, 3 ; belief in and belief that, ?" ; 7(stified tr(e belief, 33= Ber son, +enri, 14! , 33A ; creative int(ition, 99

Berkeley, Ieor e, 49 , 139 , 3A1 63A3, 3A? ; idealis#, 33A 633"; and infinitesi#als, 1"3 ; #ind of Iod, 344 ; &ew Theor" of #ision , 3A3 63A3, 3A" ; Three 2ialogues between 4"las and hilonous , 34" , 33A 633" Berlin, 1saiah, 1A3 Berlyne, Daniel: on e*ploration, 1!9 , 11! Bernstein, Cichard, 1? Bertalanffy, K(dwi von. See von Bertalanffy, K(dwi > 3=4 > Bi Ban , =! Biolo ical sciences, *vi , 9 ; biolo y, 1" , 1?3 Bloo#, /llan, 3"A Body, 193 Boh#, David: and @(ant(# theory, 33 Bohr, %iels: #odel of ato#, 1A9 , 3?? Bor es, Gor e K(is, 341 Bo(ldin , Henneth: on eneral syste#s theory, "! Bo(rdie(, Pierre: on practice, 144 Bovary, &##a, 319 , 333 Brain, 13! , 1?! , 313 , 3AA ; n(#ber of ne(rons, *iii 6*iv, 343 , 39A , 3A3 63AA, 3A4. See also %ervo(s syste# Braitenber , Malentino: #ehicles , 311 Braithwaite, Cichard:

Scientific '(!lanation , 3"3 Brentano, $ran<: intentional idio#s, 331 ; intentionality, 3=4 , 3!1 ; intentional ob7ects, 333 Breton, /ndrP: and Bachelard, 3?4 ; 1anifesto of Surrealism , 394 ; &adja , 39= ; oint du jour , 39? ; s(b7ect vs. ob7ect, 3=9 ; Surrealism and ainting , 39" 6394, 39? Brid #an, P. ..: The +ogic of 1odern h"sics , 1? Browne, ,ho#as, 4= B( liarello, Ieor e, *vi B(n e, :ario: discovery of laws, 111 B(tler, G(dith, 3?=

C
Ca#brid e University, 9 Ca#pbell, Gohn P. See Ihiselli, &dwin &. Can (ilhe#, Ieor es: anticipation of H(hn, 3"A Cardinality, 3A3 63A", 3"3 Carnap, C(dolf, 4 , 3? ; hierarchy of ob7ects, 344 634?; 2er logische Aufbau der Welt , 1= ; pole#ic a ainst #etaphysics, 3" ; and positivis#, 3"3 ; (nity of scientific lan (a e, A1 Carroll, Kewis: /chilles and the tortoise, 99 , 1AA

Cassirer, &rnst: di#ensionality of physical world, 3"? ; perception as invariance (nder transfor#ation, 313 , 3AA Catholicis#, 4A , ?1 Ca(sality, 93 693, 1!3 , 13" 6143 passi#; as #ethodolo ical principle, 133 Celsi(s scale, 3A? , 3"" Chan e(*, Gean6Pierre: &euronal 1an , 3?9 Cha(sson, Denis, 3=" ; +es lumi>res coincidentes , 394 639? Chess: #etaphor for science, 1!= 61!9, 133 Chishol#, Coderick: on intentionality, 333 , 33! Cho#sky, %oa#: lan (a e learnin , 334 Christianity, "9 , 4! , 43 , 4A , 44 ; Christian e*istentialis#, 134 Ch(rchland, Pa(l, 311 ; eli#inative #aterialis#, 314 ; topo raphic #aps, 31A Clifford, .illia# Hin don: on belief, ?4 Cohen, :orris: An Introduction to +ogic and Scientific 1ethod 2with &rnest %a el5, 1= Colerid e, 8a#(el ,aylor, ? ; ekphrasis in Kubla Khan , 331 Collective, 3!= , 3"4 63"? Collin wood, C. I.: f(tility of atte#pts to (nify science, A4 ; on #etaphysics, 9" Co#ple*ity: types of, 1?!

Co#p(ters, 3!4 , 3A3 , 33? ; and Copernican revol(tion, 1?3 61?A; display, 311 6313; episte#olo ical i#portance of, 14" ; and obsolescence of theory, 31" 631?; treat#ent of co#ple*ity, 1?3 Co#te, /( (ste: infl(ence on :ill, 3"3 ; orderin of sciences, AA Concept, A , 1?! Condillac, &tienne Bonnot de: stat(e, 39A Confir#ation, 113 6131 passi#; de ree of, 113 Con er, Ieor e Perri o: synoptic nat(ralis#, A3 Conscio(sness, 1"4 , 31A , 3!3 , 33A ; ascent to, 39A , 3!? 63!9; co#p(ter display as #etaphor for, 313 ; content of, 3!A 63!"; and novelty, 31A , 3!? ; prepersonal, 393 Constr(ct, A , 1?! Copernic(s, %icholas, 1?A , 339 Cos#olo y, 3 , 14 , 13A Costa Cica, University of, == Crab %eb(la, 4 Crackpots, 1!4 Creation, 4" 649; contin(o(s, 14 ; and creationis#, ?A 6=3 passi#; creation science, =1 Creativity, 9= , 99 , 134

> 3=? > Crosse, /ndrew: Acarus crossii , "A C(lt(ral relativis#, 3"A 63"" C(sa, %icholas of, 1"9 ; and relativity theory, 33A , 3"? Cybernetics, 1" , 14= , 1?3

*
Darby, Gohn %elson: Ply#o(th Brethren, 4! ; sin a ainst the +oly Ihost, "A Darwin, Charles, 4A , ?? , ?= , 1!" , 1!4 ; and P. +. Iosse, "? ; on hypotheses, 1!! ; The 3rigin of S!ecies , 1!3 ; readin of :alth(s, 1!A ; resistance to a(thority, 1!3 Dasein, 33? Davidson, Donald: concept(al sche#es, " De#ocrit(s: the la( hin philosopher, *iv ; and philosophy of science, 1? Dennett, Daniel, 311 , 33! ; and intentionality, 3!1 , 3?= Deponent verbs, 399 Derrida, Gac@(es: book not a book, 393 Descartes, CenP, 344 , 33! ; pilot in ship, 3!A ; radical do(bt, 33! Deter#inis#, 1"" , 14! Dewey, Gohn, 193

Diachronic develop#ent: vs. prochronic, 4= Dialectics, 1=3 , 3"A ; laws of, 3A9 ; @(antity and @(ality, 3A? Dilthey, .illia#, 3"A ; )eisteswissenschaften , 3"3 ; #erstehen , 3"3 Disciplines: critical and creative, 3"1 Discovery: lo ic of, 9= 6111 passi#, 133 Donne, Gohn, 4= Drea#s, 3=! , 333 633A, 3A" Dreyf(s, +(bert, 3?= Drive: ca(sal, 134 ; $re(dian, 31A , 334 633?; intentional, 33? D(he#, Pierre, 4

E
&akins, ,ho#as: 1a( Schmitt in a Single Scull , 333 &arth sciences, *vi &ddin ton, /rth(r, 1 , 3 , 3=3 ; The &ature of the h"sical World , 3?1 63?3; wavicles, 3?3 &dison, ,ho#as /lva: develop#ent of electricity in spite of erroneo(s theories, 3"4 &instein, /lbert, 1!4 , 139 , 1?A , 31= , 333 , 33A , 33? , 34! , 341 ; creative leap, 113 ; as eni(s, 1!= 'k!hrasis , 331 &lectricity:

ordinary lan (a e based on erroneo(s theory, 199 , 314 . See also &dison, ,ho#as /lva &liot, ,. 8.: 1urder in the *athedral , 33? &ll(l, Gac@(es: techni@(e, 3!" &ncyclopedia, A3 6A"; 'nc"clo!edia of h"sics , 33A ; &ncyclopedists, 3!" ; +e el9s, 3"A &n els, $rederick, ?" , 3A= , 33A ; Anti.2uhring , 3A4 63A? &n ineerin : responsibility of, 1=A &pi#enides, 1A1 &pipheno#enalis#, 3!" &spinas, /lfred: +es 3rigines de la technologie , 1=! , 3!A &(clidean eo#etry, 91 &vidence, =! 6=1 &vol(tion, ?3 , ?A 6=3 passi#, 11? , 119 613!, 1?9 , 313 , 339 , 314 ; brid e between biolo ical and technolo ical, 31? ; c(lt(ral, 313 , 31A 631"; Ka#arckian, == , 1!? ; #eanin of ter#, ?4 ; ti#e scale of, 131 &*actit(de, 9: sp(rio(s, = &*cl(sive Brethren, 3 , 4A. See also Ply#o(th Brethren &*istence: and bein , 39! &*istentialis#, ? , 3=9 , 39! ; Christian, 134 ;

second wave, 391 &*isten<, 33? &*planation, *iii , 1" , 131 , 313 , 339 633!; +e#pel on, 1= 63A; li#its of, A? ; statistical, 33 ; workin o(t and workin (p, 3!! 63!1 &*ploration: for# of behavior, 1!9

F
$ahrenheit scale, 3A4 , 3"" $aith, 3 , 4= , ?! , ?1 , ?3 $allacy of affir#in the conse@(ent, 14 , 4? , =? $araday, :ichael, 3!! $eedback, 9 $ekete, Gohn: The Structural Allegor" , 3=! $e#inis#: the fe#inist !rise de conscience , *iii $er#at, Pierre de: least action, 14? $eyerabend, Pa(l, 4 , 19 , 31 , 33 ; criti@(e of %a el and +e#pel, 33 633; ob7ection to received views, 33= ; proliferation of theories, 33 $iction, 319 633! $ine arts, 3A9 > 3== > $lat re ion, " , 333 633A, 33= , 339 , 3?3 63?", 3A4 $l(id press(re, 3 $odor, Gerry: lan (a e of tho( ht, 3!3 $orber , $riedrich6Harl, 1anuel d'7rotologie classi/ue , 3?3

$or#alis#: sp(rio(s, = $o(ca(lt, :ichel: criti@(e of s(b7ectivity, 314 , 3"= $o(ndationalis#, 339 $reedo#, free action, *iii , 134 , 14! $re e, Iottlob, 1!3 , 111 , 319 ; r(lefollowin , 1!! $re(d, 8i #(nd, 33A , 333 ; -Creative .riters and Day6Drea#in ,- 333 ; the drive, 31A , 334 633?; &ros and ,hanatos, 33? ; facilitations in ne(ral pathways, 13! ; resistance to a(thority, 1!3 ; s(b7ect as ob7ect, 3!1 ; the (nconscio(s, 333 $(ller, 8teve, *vi $(ster, Goa@(in :.: The refrontal *orte( , 3?=

+
Ialileo, "1 , 3"3 , 34! , 341 ; li ht of nat(re, 114 ; and #athe#atics, 3"3 ; #echanics, A9: scientific #ethod, 34 63?, A= , 333 , 3?A , 34! Ia(ss, Carl $riedrich: least action, 14? Ieneral syste#s theory, 3" 6"3 passi#, 14" , 1?" Ieolo y: conflict with reli ion, 4A 644 Iettier, &d#(nd: on knowled e as 7(stified tr(e belief, 333 , 33= , 33A Ihiselli, &dwin &., Gohn &. Ca#pbell, and 8heldon ^edeck: 1easurement Theor" for the 5eha-ioral Sciences , 3?A Iibson, G. G.: on vis(al perception, 313 , 3AA

Iillispie, Charles: on Iosse9s 3m!halos theory, 44 Iladwin, ,ho#as: -C(lt(re and Ko ical Process,- 3?3 ITdel, H(rt, 111 , 1A3 , 333 , 34! Iood#an, %elson: and si#plicity, 14= Iosse, &d#(nd, "A 6"", 41 , 43 644; %ather and Son , "A , 41 ; on his father, 4! , 41 , 44 , ?3 Iosse, Philip +enry, 14 , "A 6?3 passi#, =3 6=3, =? ; 3m!halos , 4" 6?1 Iran er, Iilles6Iaston: nat(re of science, 31! Irellin , H(rt: parado* of heterolo ical ter#s, =9

0
+aber#as, Gbr en: sy#bolic interaction vs. technolo y, 3!= +abershon, 2issertation on the ro!hetic Scri!tures , 43 +a#ilton, .illia# Cowan: least action, 14? +a#let, *i , *iv , 319 , 333 , 333 6333 +anson, %orwood C(ssell, *vi , 4 ; on discovery, == ; scientific #ethod, 1!! +ardy, I. +.: p(rity of #athe#atics, 13= +arrod, Coy: on ind(ction, 93 +artshorne, Charles: -8o#e &#pty tho( h 1#portant ,r(ths,- 3?! +arvard University, 1"

+e el, I. .. $., 14 , AA , 3A4 63A?, 393 , 33! , 3"A ; /bsol(te, 344 , 391 ; 'nc"clo!edia , 3"A ; e@(ivalence of lo ic and ontolo y, 13" ; #aster6slave dialectic, 3!9 ; orderin of sciences, AA ; henomenolog" of 1ind , 391 6393; s(bstance and s(b7ect, 393 +eide er, :artin, ? , 13" ; bein 6in6theworld, 393 ; and the history of philosophy, 3!? ; lan (a e as the ho(se of bein , 3=3 ; lettin 6, 134 ; on technolo y, 3!4 ; why not %othin 0, 1"9 +eisenber , .erner, 333 , 34! ; li#itations of classical physics, 333 +e#in way, &rnest: -/ Day9s .ait,- 3"" +e#pel, C. I., 1" , 1? 63A passi#, 131 ; As!ects of Scientific '(!lanation , 31 63A; e*planation sketches, 339 ; +e#pel9s parado*, 3" 634; hiloso!h" of &atural Science , 1= 63! +eraclit(s, 1?4 ; the s(n is new every day, 339 ; the weepin philosopher, *iv +erodot(s: techne in, 199 +esse, +er#an: The )lass 5ead )ame , 3"A +iroshi#a, 3"" +istoricis#, 3"A ; e*pectation of revol(tions, 3"=

+istory: belon in to individ(als only, 3"9 ; and #erstehen , 3"3 +oloca(st, 3"" +o#er: ek!hrasis , 331 ; techne in the Iliad and 3d"sse" , 19= +ooker, Goseph: and P. +. Iosse, "? +oyle, $red: contin(o(s creation, 14 , 13" +(#anities, 319 , 3A9 63"!, 3"3 +(#an sciences, *ii , *iii , 9 , 11 , 3=? 63==, 3A9 6343 passi# +(#e, David, 91 , 1!3 , 119 , 13! , 133 , 1A! , 1A? , 1"? , 33! ; a ent vs. philosopher, 9" , 3!! , 3!3 ; on ca(sality,1"" , 3A4 ; > 3=9 > constant con7(nction, 11? ; fallibility of reason, 11= ; on ind(ction, =9 69? passi#; #atters of fact and relations of ideas, 139 ; skepticis#, 339 , 3A? ; wisdo# of nat(re, 11= +(sserl, &d#(nd, *ii , *iv , ? ; conscio(sness, 393 ; The *risis of 'uro!ean Sciences and Transcendental henomenolog" , 1! , 3"3 63"3; e!oche , 339 ; intentionality, 3=4 , 393 , 3!1 ; intentional ob7ects, 333 ; and s(b7ectivity, 3=9 ; transcendental e o, 391 ; world in e o, 394 , 39? +(*ley, ,. +.:

conscio(s awareness, 1?1 ; letter on the death of his son, ?!

I
1#a ination, *iv , 1!= , 33A , 393 , 33! , 33" , 3A" ; li#itations on, 1A! 61A1; and science, 3?4 63=3; in s(rrealis#, 3=9 1ncest prohibition, 1! 1nd(ction, =9 69? passi#, 1!1 , 139 , 1AA ; :ill9s 7(stification of, 114 ; parado* of, 113 1nd(strial Cevol(tion, 1?4 , 33? 1nfor#ation theory, 1" 1nstr(ction, 3"4 1ntentionality, intentional do#ain, *ii 6*iii, " , 1! , 3!1 , 31! , 31= 6331 passi#, 3"? ; ori ins of ter#, 331 1solate, A 1so#orphis#, " , 34 63?, A3 , "! , "1 , 34=

A
Ga#aica: P. +. Iosse on the birds of, "? Ga#es, .illia#, 333 Gaspers, Harl, ? ; li#it sit(ations, 39! Geans, Ga#es, 1 , 3?1 Geffreys, +arold: and si#plicity, 14= Ges(its, ?1 Gohnston, Catharine: 6ohnstonella *atharina , 43 Gohnston, Denis $.: 1easurement of Subjecti-e henomena , 3?A Gones, &rnest, 1!3

G(n ian psycholo y, 334

)
Hansas, University of, *vi , ? Hant, 1##an(el, 3 , 4 , 13= , 134 , 1"1 ; a !riori str(ct(re of world, 13" ; cate orical i#perative, 31? ; space, ti#e, and ca(sality, 33A ; and s(b7ectivity, 3=4 Hek(le, /( (st: drea# of discovery, 9= Hepler, Gohannes, A9 , 1!= , 34! ; laws of planetary #otion, 1"! Heynes, Gohn :aynard, 9! Hierke aard, 8oren, ? , ?3 , 13? , 393 , 33! ; /braha# as hero of faith, ?3 ; e*istin s(b7ect, 393 ; faith, 39? ; %ear and Trembling , 39= ; and s(b7ectivity, 3=4 , 3=9 , 39! 6391 Hin sley, Charles: on Iosse9s om!halos theory, ?! 6?1, ?3 Hirkha#, Cichard: on knowled e as 7(stified tr(e belief, 33= , 33" Hneale, .illia# and :artha: on invol(tional ar (#ents, 139 Hnowin : and for ettin , 3=1 ; knowin how and knowin that, 199 63!! Hnowled e: as 7(stified tr(e belief, 33= ; as local, 333 , 33A , 33? ; #eanin of ter#, 33" 633?, 33A Hoestler, /rth(r:

The Act of *reation , 1!? ; &(reka feelin , 1!! Ho7\ve, /le*andre: Introduction to the 0eading of 4egel , 3?3 Hosslyn, 8tephen: i#a es, 313 Hotarbinski, ,ade(s<: pra*iolo y, 144 , 1=! , 1=" , 3!A Hran<ber , :elvin, *vi H(hn, ,ho#as, 4 , 31 , 33 , 333 , 33= ; paradi # shifts, 3"A , 34!

L
Kabellin , 1=9 Kacan, Gac@(es: The %our %undamental *once!ts of s"cho.Anal"sis , 334 ; on the $re(dian drive, 31A , 334 ; and s(b7ectivity, 33= Ka#arckian evol(tion, == Ka :ettrie, G(lien Lffroy de, 1?1 KandP /lfred: @(ant(# filter e*peri#ent, 1A9 Kan (a e, 193 , 19A , 3!4 , 3!= , 399 , 3A4 ; descriptive, 3? , 39 ; do(ble artic(lation, 3A3 ; and h(#an reality, in Peirce, 3"" 63"4; lin (istic behavior, 1=" 61=4; nat(re of, 3"" ; not shared, 3A3 ; in science and poetry, 3=3 ; as sensory #edi(#, 33! , 331 ; and str(ct(ralis#, 3"4 63"?; as str(ct(rin a ent, 11! ; of theory, 19 ;

of tho( ht, 3!3 ; (nity of, in science, A1 Kaplace, Pierre 8i#on: deter#inis#, 139 , 1A? ; Kaplace9s de#on, 3 , A" , 1A? , 34! Ka<arsfeld, Pa(l: s(bstr(ction, 3"3 Keibni<, I. .., A" , 1"9 , 14= , 3A3 ; 1onadolog" , 3A1 +ekton , 31= 6333, 33= , 33! , 3"" Kesc(re, Gean, 3=1 KPvi68tra(ss, Cla(de: criti@(e of s(b7ectivity, 314 , 3"= ; The Sa-age 1ind , 3!" ; science of the concrete, 11! , 3!" Kife6world, 1! , 11 , 339 , 3"3 , 3"= , 3=4 63=?, 31! , 33! , 33= > 39! > Kiterat(re, 1=? , 3=! , 33= ; as discipline rather than science, 3"1 ; philosophy of, 31= 6331 Kocke,Gohn, 49 , ?! ; ideas and @(alities, 149 61?!; #aterial s(bstance, 33A Kottery parado*, ?9 Kove7oy, /rth(r L.: principle of plenit(de, 1"9 K(ddites, 1=3 , 3!= Kyell, Charles: and P. +. Iosse, "?

,
:ach, &rnst: :ach9s principle, 139 , 1A! , 1A3

:a alhaes6Milhena, M. de: 'ssor scientifi/ue el techni/ue et obstacles sociau( I la fin de l'anti/uit73?3 :a ic: technolo y as, 1=3 :alth(s, ,ho#as, 1!A ; 'ssa" on the rinci!le of o!ulation , ?? :ao ,se6,(n , 1=" ; 3n ractice , 1?= :ap, 341 ; as #etaphor for theory, A? 6A= :arc(se, +erbert: on technolo y, 3!? :ar ena(, +enry, A , " , 344 ; The &ature of h"sical 0ealit" , 343 634A, 34? :ar olis, Goseph: on intentionality, 3?= :artinea(, Ga#es: on reli io(s a(thority, 4A :ar*, Harl, 1=" , 3A4 ; early and late, 3?3 ; historicis#, 3"A ; :ar*is#, ?" , 3"? ; #oney6co##odity relationship, 1?= ; pra*is, 1?? , 191 , 19A ; social str(ct(re. 3!9 :aterialis#, *, 3"3 :ates, Benson: on 8toic lin (istics, 31= :athe#atics, 3 , 11 , 1?? , 3A1 63"" passi#, 3A9 ; absence of i#a ery, 3=3 ; access to real world, 3A4 63A?; bo(ndary with lo ic, 3"3 ; p(rity of, in +ardy, 13= :a(pert(is, Pierre6Ko(is :otea( de: least action, 14?

:a*well, Irover, *vi , == ; on confir#ation, 113 6133 passi# :a*well, Ga#es Clerk, 31= :cHenna, 8tephen: on Plotin(s, 3A! :eanin , 33? , 3A9 , 3"3 ; te#ptation to re@(ire that it be lobal, 333 :edawar, Peter: on discovery, 1!3 ; on eni(s, 1!? :e#ory, 11 , 3!9 :erton, Cobert, 3=! ; on eni(s, 1!= ; on #(ltiple discoveries, 1!4 ; on .hewell9s coina e of -scientist,- 3?9 :essier, Charles, 4 6? :etaphysics: hypothetical, 13" ; for the nat(ral and h(#an sciences, 3"? ; as patholo y, 1"A ; Peirce on, 3"" :ichi an 8tate University, *vi :ill, Gohn 8t(art: conco#itant variation, 3A= ; #oral sciences, 9 , 3"3 63"3; 3n +ibert" , "A ; S"stem of +ogic , 3"3 ; (nifor#ity of %at(re, 114 :ilton, Gohn, 3?1 :inkowski, +er#ann: post(late of absol(te world, 3"4 ; pro7ection in space and ti#e, 3"9 :irror of %at(re, 34! :itcha#, Carl, 3?1 63?3

:oore, I. &.: and certain knowled e, 33! :oral sciences, 9 , 3"3 63"3 :oreno, Gonathan, *v :(nsterber , +( o: need for synthesis, A"

N
%a el, &rnest: $eyerabend on, 33 . See also Cohen, :orris %at(ral sciences, *iii , = ; contrasted with social or h(#an sciences, *ii , 334 633?, 33A , 3A9 63"1, 3"? %at(ral selection, 4? ; str(ct(re of, ?? . See also &vol(tion %eopra #atis#, 33" 6334, 339 %ervo(s syste#, 1!9 , 14" , 39" , 3!1 63!3, 3!" , 33A , 33= %e(rath, Ltto: (nity of science, AA , A" %ew#an, Gohn +enry: A!ologia !ro -ita sua , ?! , ?1 %ewton, 1saac, 1!3 , 31= , 33? , 34! , 34! ; concept of force, 3?A ; fits of easy trans#ission and reflection, 3! ; Iod as lord over all, 341 ; #athe#atical physics, 3"3 ; %ewtonian syste#, 3"? ; %ewtonian world6view, 34! ; r(les of reasonin in philosophy, 3 , 331 ; on si#plicity, 14? ; space as the sensori(# of Iod, 3A3 ; standin on sho(lders of iants, 1!" ; and theory of li ht, 13A ;

(nion of Ialileo and Hepler, A9 %iblett, .. C.: The Sciences$ the 4umanities$ and the Technological Threat , 19= %icholas of C(sa. See C(sa, %icholas of %orthrop, $. 8. C.: nat(ral history sta e of in@(iry, 3! %othin ness, 134 , 1"9 , 33? %(clear war, 3A? 63A=

O
Lbservation: thoro( hness of, "= Lbservational6theoretical dichoto#y, A , 3! , 3= 631, 1== Lckha#, .illia# of, 34? ; principle of econo#y, 14= 6149 L den, C. H., and 1. /. Cichards: The 1eaning of 1eaning , 3"4 > 391 > Lken, Koren<: orderin of sciences, AA Lppenhei#, Pa(l, 1? , 33 , A! , 131 Lpti#(# co#ple*ity principle, 14" , 1?1 Ltto, +erbert, and Ga#es ,(edio: ers!ecti-es on 1ind , 3?=

P
Parado*: Irellin 9s, =9 ; of the +eap, 3A9 ; +e#pel9s, 3" ; of ind(ction, 113 ; lottery, ?9 Pascal, Blaise: e*istence of Iod, 94 ;

wa er, 9A 694 Pa*a#(s, 1?? Peale fa#ily, "" Peirce, Charles 8anders, =? , 119 , 3"" ; on ca(sality, 133 ; $irstness, 8econdness, ,hirdness, 13" 6134; -+ow to :ake L(r 1deas Clear,- 3"" ; on i#a ination, 1!= ; on Hepler, 1!= ; on #oral certainty, 131 ; -/ %e lected /r (#ent,- 114 611?, 133 613A; retrod(ction, 114 , 133 613A; se#iotic, 3"" 63"4; -8o#e Conse@(ences of $o(r 1ncapacities,- 3"" 63"4; -,riado#any,- 13? Penn, Iranville: The 1ineral and 1osaic )eologies , 44 Pheno#enolo y, *iv , " , 1=! , 31= . See also +(sserl, &d#(nd Physicalis#, A! ; in episte#olo y and pra*iolo y, 1=! Physics, *vi , 1" , A! , 1A4 , 33= Pike, Henneth: -e#ic- and -etic,- 3"3 , 3"3 Pirsi , Cobert: <en and the Art of 1otorc"cle 1aintenance , 3!1 Planck, :a*: li#itations of classical physics, 333 Plato, 4 , 1"9 , 3!? ; 'uth"!hro , 34" ; Iod as crafts#an, 1?? ; Platonis#, AA , 1A1 ; 0e!ublic 2the cave5, 334 633?; and technolo y, 1?4 Plotin(s, 33= 63AA Ply#o(th Brethren, 4!.

See also &*cl(sive Brethren Poe, &d ar /llen: -,he $acts in the Case of :. .alde#ar,- 393 Poe#s, 3A1 PoincarP, +enri, 4 , "3 , 1!3 ; #o#ent of discovery, 9= Polya, I.: pla(sible inference, 1!! Popper, Harl, 19 , 1A3 ; falsification, =? ; +ogik der %orschung 2The +ogic of Scientific 2isco-er" 5, 1= , 9= 699; ob7ective knowled e, 3"A ; propensity theory, 14! ; .orld 111, 11 , 3"A Positivis#, 3A 63"; and observation state#ents, 3? ; prediction vs. (nderstandin , 1?" ; pro ra# of, 331 6333; and si#plicity, 14= Possible worlds, 139 61A! Poststr(ct(ralis#, 3"9 Pra #atis#: and fo(ndationalis#, 339 . See also %eopra #atis# Pra*iolo y, 3!A ; need for, 1=! Pra*is, 1?4 619" passi#; and disciplines, 3"1 ; as a for# of knowled e, 193 619A Prefrontal corte*, 3?= Princeton University, 1" Principle of plenit(de, 1"9 Probability, 134 , 13? 613? passi# Prochronic develop#ent, 4= ;

law of prochronis#, 49 Protestantis#, 4A , ?1 Ptole#y, 1?3 P(tna#, +ilary, 4 , A! Pylyshyn, ^enon, 311 Pytha oreans: and #(sical intervals, 3"1 ; n(#erical str(ct(re of world, 3"3

?
O(antitative, 9 , 333 , 3A1 63"" passi# O(ant(# theory, 3 , 3?9 ; of ca(sality, 134 , 1A4 61"3 passi#; Copenha en interpretation, 33 , 13A ; @(ant(# 7(#ps, 13A O(ine, .. M. L., 13= , 139 ; on intentionality, 331 O(intilian: subiectio , 39A , 3!1

R
Ceadin , 39" , 319 6333; prepared reader, 39" Cealis#, 13" ; e*trava ance of, in h(#an sciences, 3=? ; naive, 33? ; str(ct(ral, " Cedi, $rancesco: and spontaneo(s eneration, 13A Ced(ction, 1= , 39 6A1, 1?3 Ceichenbach, +ans: on ind(ction, 9A 694 Celativity, 333 , 3"4 6341 passi#, 3"= Celi ion, 3 , A C&: sleep in utero , 333

Cepresentation, 39A , 3!4 6311, 33! , 3?= Cetrod(ction: Peirce on, 114 Cichards, 1. /. See L den, C. H. Corty, Cichard, 33" ; c(lt(ral conversation, 3"A Cosse, &arl of, 4 C(les and r(le6followin , 1!! 61!1, 1!3 , 119 , 1A! , 1A3 , 1AA C(ssell, Bertrand, 1A3 , 1A? ; aspect theory, 344 634?

S
8acks, Lliver: and idiot savants, 3A" 8antayana, Ieor e, 1?A > 393 > 8artre, Gean6Pa(l, ? , 9 , 341 , 393 , 39" ; on atheis#, 339 ; criti@(e of +(sserl, 391 ; early and late, 3?3 ; facticity, 339 ; on i#a ination, 33" ; -1ntentionality,- 393 6393; %othin ness, 134 ; and the practico6inert, 33? , 3"= ; prerefle*ive cogito , 39A , 31! ; pro7ect, 1 ; and s(b7ectivity, 3=9 ; Transcendence of the 'go , 391 ; world and self as correlative, 3"9 634! 8a(ss(re, $erdinand de, 3"" , 3"? ; se#iolo y, 3"4 ; synchronic, 3"9 ;

theory of the si n, 394 , 313 , 319 8chrTdin er, &rwin: on the brain, 313 ; on conscio(sness and novelty, 31A , 3!? 8ch(#acher, &. $., 3!3 8ch(t<, /lfred, 33A 8cience: #eanin of ter#, 9 , 3"3 ; contin((# of sciences, 3"A ; possibility of, 341 , See also Biolo ical science; %at(ral science; and similar entries 8cientis#, 3"A 8criven, :ichael: ca(se as 7ointly s(fficient condition, 1"? ; criti@(e of +e#pel, 31 , 33 8earle, Gohn: on intentionality, 33! , 3?= 8econd Co#in , 43 8elvin, +anan: -Ln $ollowin in 8o#eone9s $ootsteps,- 3?A 8e##elweis, 1 na<: and p(erperal fever, +e#pel on, 1= 8eneca, 31= 8ensationalis#, 1=! 8ensori(#, 3!4 63!?, 311 , 3A3 , 3A4 , 3A= ; secondary, 313 , 333 8hakespeare, .illia#, *iv , 333 , 3A3 8hin ler, 8. M., 1 , 3 , 3 , 4 8i #a Ji, *vi 8i#on, +erbert: str(ct(re of world, A= 8i#plicity, 14? 61?A passi# 8#ith, Coch: on Bachelard, 3?3 8now, C. P.:

The Two *ultures and the Scientific 0e-olution , 3?1 , 3"A 8ocial sciences, *ii , 9 , 3A9 63"! 8ociety for &#pirical Philosophy, 3A 8ociety for Ieneral 8yste#s Cesearch, 14 , 3" , "3 8ocrates: in )orgias , 1?4 8pecies: as (nit, ?3 8pencer, +erbert: analo ies between sciences, "1 ; criti@(e of serial arran e#ent of sciences, AA 8pino<a, Bar(ch, 1"9 , 144 , 34! , 393 ; 2eus si-e natura , 341 ; and %ewton, 3"? ; 3n the Im!ro-ement of the ,nderstanding , 1?= , 3!3 , 339 8toics: theory of si ns, 31= , 3"" 8tr(ct(ralis#, == , 14" , 3"4 63"9; Cassirer and, 3AA ; definition, 3"? ; and s(ppression of s(b7ect, 391 8tr(ct(re, 1!1 ; ani#ation of, 39" 6394, 33? 633=; archetypal, A3 ; concept(al, " ; of everyday tho( ht, 1A3 61A3; lo ical, 1A3 8t(bbs, G. G., 3 , A 8(b7ect: definitions of, 31! , 33A ; e#er ence of, 33? ; not a cate ory, 39! ; ref(sal of, 393 8(b7ectivity:

definitions of, 39" , 3!! , 3!1 , 33? 633=; e#bodi#ent of, 31A 631"; e#er ence of, 3!" 63!9; and nervo(s syste#, 3!1 63!3; not ob7ective, 33! 8(fficient reason: principle of, 9" 8(rrealis#, 3=" , 3=9 639= passi#; as s(perrealis#, 3?? 8yste#, 3" 6"3 passi#

T
,arski, /lfred: se#antic criterion of tr(th, 334 ,echnocracy, 3!? ,echnolo y, 1?4 61=A passi#, 194 63!9 passi#; irreversible dependence on, 31= ,hales: si#ple acco(nt of the world, 149 ,heolo y, 3 ,heoretician9s dile##a 2+e#pel5, 33 ,heory: f(nction of, 34 63?; ori ins of ter#, 3" , 19= ; relation to pra*is, 1=" 619! ,her#odyna#ics, 1" ,hinkin : in #achines, 399 631? passi#; ori in of ter#, 399 63!!; rel(ctant, 31? ; two senses of ter#, 3!! , 3!3 ,ho#son, G. G.: insi ht witho(t de*terity, 1=3 ,o(l#in, 8tephen:

criti@(e of +e#pel, 33 ,ree of Hnowled e, 334 ,rinity Colle e, +artford, *v ,r(k navi ators, 1=3 ,(edio, Ga#es. See Ltto, +erbert ,(rin , /lan, 311 , 31" ; i#itation a#e, 3!3 63!3; ,(rin #achine, 3"3

U
Una#(no, :i (el de: on parado*, 9? Unifor#ity of nat(re, 114 ; principle of, 9" Unity of science, 39 6"3 passi# Universe: contrasted with world, 1! ; the infinite of inattention, 3?9 U.8. B(rea( of the Cens(s, 3"A Ussher, Ga#es: date of creation, 4A , 44 , =! > 393 >

V
Mal(e, = , 1=! , 1=1 , 1=A , 19? , 3!! 63!1, 3!4 , 3"! 63"1 Man Moorst, Gohn: p(blisher of P. +. Iosse, "4 , ?3 Mi ier, Gean: and @(ant(# theory, 33 von Bertalanffy, K(dwi , 1"

W
.allace, /lfred C(ssel, 4A , ?? , 1!" ; readin of :alth(s, 1!A .artofsky, :ar*, *vi .ells, Lliver: 43W *3,+2 Y3, be so nai-eH , 3AA ; vis(al syste# as co#p(tin device, 313 .hewell, .illia#: coina e of -scientist,- 3"3 , 3=! .hitehead, /lfred %orth, 1 , 3 , 14! ;

e*tensive abstraction, 34? ; on syste#s, 34 Whose +ife Is It An"wa"L , 3!3 .illia# of Lckha#. See Lckha#, .illia# of .illia#s, Donald: on ind(ction, 93 .ilson, :a*, *vi .isdo#, G. L.: on ind(ction, 9A 694; and si#plicity, 14= .itt enstein, K(dwi : early and late, 3?3 ; hiloso!hical In-estigations , 34" .orld: #eanin of ter#, 1! ; correlative to e o, 3"9 634!, 33=

Y
'ale University, " , ? , 1" , 3?1 'orick, *i , *iv , 333 6333, 3A3

F
^edeck, 8heldon. See Ihiselli, &dwin &. ^eno of &lea: infinitesi#als, 3"3
Preferred Citation: Caws, Peter. Yorick's World: Science and the Knowing Subject. Berkeley: University of California Press, c1993 1993. http://ark.cdlib.or /ark:/13!3!/ft!d"n99#!/